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Analysis and Production

Information collected in the previous steps will be analyzed, validated, and fused into intelligence in the analysis process to be included into finished intelligence products. Analysis is defined by the ODNI as “The process by which information is transformed into intelligence; a systematic examination of information to identify significant facts, make judgments, and draw conclusions.” (ODNI, 2013) This transformation occurs when All-Source Analysts use all the Single Source INTs to create a fused intelligence product. 

Single Source INT

We learned about “Single Source INTs” in Module three and they are HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, OSINT, and MASINT. They are referred to as single source because they are derived from a single type of INT. You may hear of a single source SIGINT analyst, who is an expert in signals intelligence collection, or a single source IMINT analyst, who is an expert in imagery intelligence collection. 

All-Source INT

The All-Source Analyst is not an expert in collection of the single sources, but is instead an expert in a region or intelligence function (terrorism, counter-drug, crime, etc.) that is the consumer of the raw single source information from all INTs. Analysts receive incoming information, evaluate it, test it against other information and against their personal knowledge and expertise, produce an assessment of the current status of a particular area under analysis, and then forecast future trends or outcomes. The analyst also develops requirements for the collection of new information. (ODNI, 2013) The All-Source Analyst will learn through experience to validate information using multiple INTs to confirm information collected through a single source INT. For example, if information is collected from a HUMINT source, the All-Source Analyst will look for another HUMINT source to collaborate that information or possibly validate the original HUMINT source through SIGINT sources. 

Validation

Validation is important to also counter an adversary’s attempts to conduct deception; however, the well-organized adversary will release multiple pieces of information through various INTs to mislead All-Source Analysts. A good adversarial deception plan will not only allow deceptive pieces of information to be collected to attempt to fool our intelligence analysts, but will also play into an analyst’s bias. The common biases of an analyst are mirror imaging (thinking the adversary will act the same way Americans do), cry-wolf syndrome (conducting an action multiple times so that when the adversary truly intends to act, our analysts do not take it seriously), and mission-creep/new normal (an adversary slowly changes tactics so that our analysts do not suspect nefarious activities).

It is important for All-Source Analysts to be confident in their assessments, but they should be wary of overconfidence

Many think that the job of an intelligence analyst is to predict the future.  In fact, many early analytical methods were referred to as “predictive intelligence.”  However, no analyst can be 100% certain that they know what an adversary will do and therefore cannot predict the future.  Analysts can “forecast” adversarial actions. This can be explained the same way a meteorologist prepares a “weather forecast” not a “weather prediction.”  To forecast adversarial actions or threats, analysts will use estimative language.  Our ODNI reading explains this language on page 51 and 52. Following the 9/11 attacks intelligence reform also changed the way analysts presented intelligence assessments.  Prior to 9/11 the IC suffered from “circular reporting,” which is nothing short of plagiarism.  Analysts would find another analyst’s products, copy/paste that product into their product, and provide the product to their decision or policy maker.  If an analyst requires two sources that provide the same assessment to validate information and then choose two products, the original analytical piece and the copy/pasted analytical piece, they did not truly have two sources. This led to inflated numbers of adversarial equipment, personnel, strengths, intentions, etc.  Following 9/11, the ODNI created Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. to establish analytical standards.  ICD 203 provided guidance that all analysts must quantify their assessments with a level of confidence. ICD 206 (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. was later published setting a standard of citing sources to put an end to intelligence plagiarism.

All-Source intelligence production varies from organization to organization depending on the agency’s mission and who their customer is. Lower level tactical military or law enforcement products may include products that focus on individuals of interest, groups within the area of operations, analysis of the area’s terrain or other key elements, pattern analysis, event analysis, or other near term / localized Intelligence Requirements a tactical operation can take action on quickly. Higher level products become more strategic in nature and look at larger national or regional issues. These products typically focus on the long-term issues on which a national level diplomatic or large scale military unit will take action. The products can come in the form of presentations, written products, or in-depth studies.  Two of the national level products that are produced by all members of the IC are the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). 

· President’s Daily Brief (PDB): The President of the United States is the highest level consumer of intelligence. The PDB is the highest level intelligence briefing in the IC and is therefore scrutinized heavily before the President receives the brief. The top analysts from all the IC agencies can be selected to become a part of the PDB production and briefing. Topics for the PDB can be submitted to the PDB team for inclusion into the briefing; however, only a few issues make it to the PDB each day.  The National Security Council staff will review the PDB before it is briefed to check issues for accuracy, relevance, and priority. 

· National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): The NIE is the highest level written intelligence product that is typically requested on a nation-state threat, but can also be requested on various issues. The requestors of the NIE are high-level policy makers such as the National Security Council or Congress. Once requested a Terms of Reference (TOR) will be created to propose the necessary input and intelligence needed to create a NIE. Top level analysts from any IC agency that can respond to the TOR are selected to draft the NIE. Once drafted the Director of National Intelligence and the National Intelligence Board will review and approve the NIE for dissemination.

Dissemination

This is the last step and it involves getting the final intelligence product to the requestor that submitted the initial Request For Information (RFI) and those in the IC with the need to know through information sharing.  Once received by the requestor or any other customer, the RFI may not be fully answered, need addional monitoring and analysis, or create additional RFIs.  This will restart the intelligence process, therefore explaining why the process is an intelligence “cycle.”

Evaluation

Simply put, this informal step in the intelligence cycle evaluates the final product’s relevance and if in fact it fully addressed the RFI.  Essentially, the evaluation is “feedback” that occurs between the requestor and producer to address if the requests needs are being met.  Adjustments to the product, established deadlines, format of the final product, validation of sources, or any other need of the requestor should be addressed in the evaluation step soon after the final intelligence product is disseminated.