My General Psychology Week 3

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Psychology James S. Nairne

Purdue University

th edition6

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Psychology, 6th edition James S. Nairne

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Printed in Canada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2

● To Beverly H. Nairne

James S. Nairne is the Reece McGee Distinguished Professor of Psychological Sciences

at Purdue University. Recognized internationally as both a scholar and a teacher, he has

received numerous teaching honors at Purdue, including the Liberal Arts Excellence in

Education Award and the Outstanding Undergraduate Teaching Award. In 2001, he was

named a Fellow of the Purdue Teaching Academy, and in 2004 he was given a permanent

position in Purdue’s Book of Great Teachers. He is also former director of the Honors Pro-

gram for the College of Liberal Arts. Professor Nairne received his Ph.D. in Human Mem-

ory and Cognition from Yale University.

About the Author

1 • An Introduction to Psychology 2 2 • The Tools of Psychological Research 26 3 • Biological Processes 56 4 • Human Development 90 5 • Sensation and Perception 130 6 • Consciousness 170 7 • Learning From Experience 204 8 • Memory 236 9 • Language and Thought 270 1 0 • Intelligence 304 1 1 • Motivation and Emotion 336 1 2 • Personality 372 1 3 • Social Psychology 402 1 4 • Psychological Disorders 442 1 5 • Therapy 474 1 6 • Stress and Health 506

Appendix A–1

Glossary G–1

References R–1

Indexes I–1

● Brief Contents

● Contents

1 • An Introduction to Psychology 2 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Is the Function of Psychology? 3

Defining and Describing Psychology 5 Learning Goals 5 What Psychologists Do 6

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Want to Do Well on the Test? Test Yourself! 9

Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.1 9

Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History 10 Learning Goals 10 Mind and Body: Are They the Same? 10 Nature and Nurture: Where Does

Knowledge Come From? 11 The First Schools: Psychology as Science 12 Freud and the Humanists: The Influence

of the Clinic 15 The First Women in Psychology 16 Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.2 17

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology 18 Learning Goals 18 Cognitive Factors 18 Biological Factors 19 Evolutionary Psychology 20 Cultural Factors 21 Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.3 22

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN The Function of Psychology 23 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 24 Terms to Remember 25 Media Resources 25

2 • The Tools of Psychological Research 26 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN How Do Psychologists Unlock the Secrets of Behavior and Mind? 27

Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research 30 Learning Goals 30 Naturalistic Observation: Focusing on Real Life 31 Case Studies: Focusing on the Individual 32 Surveys: Focusing on the Group 32 Psychological Tests: Assessing

Individual Differences 34 Statistics: Summarizing and Interpreting the Data 35

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

How Should a Teacher Grade? 37

Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.1 38

Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research 38 Learning Goals 38 Correlational Research 39 Correlations and Causality 41 Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.2 42

Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research 42 Learning Goals 42 Independent and Dependent Variables 43 Experimental Control 44 Expectancies and Biases in Experimental Research 46 Generalizing Experimental Conclusions 48 Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.3 48

The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines 49 Learning Goals 49 Informed Consent 49

vii

viii | Contents

Debriefing and Confidentiality 50 The Ethics of Animal Research 50 Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.4 52

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN Unlocking the Secrets of Mind and Behavior 53 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 54 Terms to Remember 55 Media Resources 55

3 • Biological Processes 56 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Are Biological Processes For? 57

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain 58 Learning Goals 58 The Anatomy of Neurons 60 Neural Transmission:

The Electrochemical Message 60 The Communication Network 65 Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.1 65

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor 66 Learning Goals 66 The Central and Peripheral Nervous Systems 66 How We Determine Brain Function 68 Brain Structures and Their Functions 71

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Mirror Neurons: Solving the “Other Mind Problem” 77

The Divided Brain 77 Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.2 79

Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication 80 Learning Goals 80 The Endocrine System 80 Do Men and Woman Have Different Brains? 81 Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.3 82

Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code 83 Learning Goals 83 Natural Selection and Adaptations 83 Genetic Principles 84 Genes and Behavior 85 Recall–Monitor–Recall 3.4 86

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Biological Processes Are For 87 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 87 Terms to Remember 88 Media Resources 89

4 • Human Development 90 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Is Development For? 91

Developing Physically 92 Learning Goals 92 The Stages of Prenatal Development 92 Growth During Infancy 95 From Crawling to Walking 96 From Toddlerhood to Adolescence 97 Becoming an Adult 97 Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.1 99

Developing Intellectually 100 Learning Goals 100 The Tools of Investigation 100 The Growing Perceptual World 102 Piaget and the Development of Thought 104 The Sensorimotor Period: Birth to Two Years 105 The Preoperational Period: Two to Seven Years 105 The Concrete Operational Period: Seven to Eleven

Years 106 The Formal Operational Period: Eleven to

Adulthood 107 Challenges to Piaget’s Theory 108 Core Knowledge 110 Moral Development: Learning Right

From Wrong 111 Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.2 113

Developing Socially and Personally 114 Learning Goals 114 Forming Bonds With Others 114 The Origins of Attachment 114 Types of Attachment 116 Do Early Attachments Matter Later in Life? 117 Day Care: What Are the Long-Term Effects? 118

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Choosing a Day-Care Center 120

Forming a Personal Identity: Erikson’s Crises of Development 120

Gender-Role Development 123 Growing Old 124 Death and Dying 125 Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.3 127

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Development Is For 127 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 128 Terms to Remember 129 Media Resources 129

Contents | ix

5 • Sensation and Perception 130 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN How Do We Build the World of Experience? 131

Vision: The World of Color and Form 133 Learning Goals 133 Translating the Message 133 Identifying the Message Components 138 Producing Stable Interpretations: Visual

Perception 142

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Creating Illusions Of Depth 147

Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.1 151

Hearing: Identifying and Localizing Sounds 152 Learning Goals 152 Translating the Message 152 Identifying the Message Components 154 Producing Stable Interpretations: Auditory

Perception 155 Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.2 156

The Skin and Body Senses: From Touch to Movement 157 Learning Goals 157 Touch 157 Temperature 158 Experiencing Pain 158 The Kinesthetic Sense 159 The Vestibular Sense 160 Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.3 160

The Chemical Senses: Smell and Taste 161 Learning Goals 161 Smell 161 Taste 162 Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.4 163

From the Physical to the Psychological 163 Learning Goals 163 Stimulus Detection 164 Difference Thresholds 165 Sensory Adaptation 166 Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.5 166

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN How We Build the World of Experience 166 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 167 Terms to Remember 169 Media Resources 169

6 • Consciousness 170 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What is Consciousness For? 171

Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning: Attention 173 Learning Goals 173 Experiments on Attention: Dichotic Listening 173 Processing Without Attention: Automaticity 175

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Cell Phones And Driving 176

Disorders of Attention 177 Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.1 179

Sleeping and Dreaming 179 Learning Goals 179 Biological Rhythms 180 The Characteristics of Sleep 180 The Function of Sleep 184 The Function of REM and Dreaming 185 Disorders of Sleep 187 Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.2 189

Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs 190 Learning Goals 190 Drug Actions and Effects 190 Categories of Psychoactive Drugs 191 Psychological Factors 194 Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.3 195

Altering Awareness: Induced States 195 Learning Goals 195 The Phenomenon of Hypnosis 196 Explaining Hypnosis 198 Meditation 199 Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.4 200

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Consciousness Is For 200

cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 201 Terms to Remember 203 Media Resources 203

7 • Learning From Experience 204 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN How Do We Learn From Experience? 205

Learning About Events: Noticing and Ignoring 206

x | Contents

Learning Goal 206 Habituation and Sensitization 206 Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.1 208

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning 209 Learning Goals 209 The Terminology of Classical Conditioning 209 Forming the CS–US Connection 210 Conditioned Responding: Why Does

It Develop? 211 Second-Order Conditioning 212

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Taste Aversions 213

Stimulus Generalization 214 Stimulus Discrimination 215 An Application: Drug Tolerance 215 Extinction: When the CS No Longer Signals

the US 216 Conditioned Inhibition: Signaling the Absence

of the US 217 Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.2 219

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning 219 Learning Goals 219 The Law of Effect 220 The Discriminative Stimulus: Knowing When to

Respond 221 The Nature of Reinforcement 222 Punishment: Lowering the Likelihood of a

Response 223 Schedules of Reinforcement 224 Shaping: Acquiring Complex Behaviors 227 Biological Constraints on Learning 227 Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.3 228

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Superstitious Behavior 229

Learning From Others: Observational Learning 229 Learning Goals 229 Modeling: Learning From Others 230 Practical Considerations 231 Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.4 232

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN Learning From Experience 232 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 233 Terms to Remember 234 Media Resources 235

8 • Memory 236 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Is Memory For? 237

Remembering Over the Short Term 239 Learning Goals 239 Sensory Memory: The Icon and the Echo 239 Short-Term Memory: Prolonging the Present 241 The Working Memory Model 245 Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.1 246

Storing Information for the Long Term 246 Learning Goals 246 What Is Stored in Long-Term Memory? 246 Elaboration: Connecting Material to Existing

Knowledge 247 Mnemonic Devices 250 Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.2 253

Recovering Information From Cues 253 Learning Goals 253 The Importance of Retrieval Cues 253 Reconstructive Remembering 256

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Self-Testing “Appropriately” for Exams 257

Remembering Without Awareness: Implicit Memory 259

Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.3 260

Updating Memory 261 Learning Goals 261 How Quickly Do We Forget? 261 Why Do We Forget? 262 Motivated Forgetting 263 The Neuroscience of Forgetting 265 Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.4 267

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Memory Is For 267 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 268 Terms to Remember 269 Media Resources 269

9 • Language and Thought 270 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Are Cognitive Processes For? 271

Communicating With Others 273 Learning Goals 273

Contents | xi

The Structure of Language 273 Language Comprehension 276 Language Development 277 Language in Nonhuman Species 279 Is Language an Adaptation? 281 Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.1 282

Classifying and Categorizing 282 Learning Goals 282 Defining Category Membership 283 Do People Store Category Prototypes? 284 The Hierarchical Structure of Categories 286 Where Do Categories Come From? 286 Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.2 287

Solving Problems 287 Learning Goals 287 Representing Problem Information 288 Developing Problem-Solving Strategies 290 Reaching the Aha! Moment: Insight 292

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Having Difficulty? Take a Break! 293

Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.3 293

Making Decisions 294 Learning Goals 294 Framing Decision Alternatives 294 Decision-Making Biases 295 Decision-Making Heuristics 296 Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.4 299

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Cognitive Processes Are For 300 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 301 Terms to Remember 302 Media Resources 303

10 • Intelligence 304 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN How Do Psychologists Study Intelligence? 305

Conceptualizing Intelligence 307 Learning Goals 307 Psychometrics: Measuring the Mind 307 Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence 310 Multiple Intelligences: Gardner’s Case Study

Approach 310 Multiple Intelligences: Sternberg’s Triarchic

Theory 312 Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.1 313

Measuring Individual Differences 314 Learning Goals 314 The Components of a Good Test 314 IQ: The Intelligence Quotient 316 Extremes of Intelligence 318 The Validity of Intelligence Testing 319 Individual Differences Related to Intelligence 321

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Can Mozart’s Music Make You Smarter? 323

Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.2 324

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence 324 Learning Goals 324 The Stability of IQ 325 Nature: The Genetic Argument 327 Nurture: The Environmental Argument 329 The Interaction of Nature and Nurture 331 Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.3 333

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN How Psychologists Study Intelligence 333 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 334 Terms to Remember 335 Media Resources 335

11 • Motivation and Emotion 336 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Are Motivation and Emotion For? 337

Activating Behavior 339 Learning Goals 339 Internal Factors: Instincts and Drive 339 External Factors: Incentive Motivation 340 Achievement Motivation 341 Intrinsic Motivation 342 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 343 Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.1 344

Meeting Biological Needs: Hunger and Eating 345 Learning Goals 345 Internal Factors Controlling Hunger 345 External Factors Controlling Hunger 347

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Dietary Variety and Weight Gain 348

Regulating Body Weight 348 Eating Disorders 350 Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.2 352

xii | Contents

Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior 352 Learning Goals 352 The Sexual Response Cycle 353 Internal Factors 354 External Factors 355 Mate Selection 356 Sexual Orientation 357 Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.3 358

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion 359 Learning Goals 359 Are There Basic Emotions? 359 The Emotional Experience: Arousal 362 The Emotional Experience: Subjective

Reactions 362 Theories of Emotion: Body to Mind 365 Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.4 368

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Motivation and Emotion Are For 369 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 370 Terms to Remember 371 Media Resources 371

12 • Personality 372 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Is Personality For? 373

Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality 374 Learning Goals 374 The Factor Analytic Approach 375 Allport’s Trait Theory 377 Personality Tests 378 Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.1 381

Determining How Personality Develops 381 Learning Goals 381 The Psychodynamic Approach of Freud 381 Humanistic Approaches to Personality 386 Social–Cognitive Approaches to Personality 389 Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.2 393

Resolving the Person–Situation Debate 394 Learning Goals 394 The Person–Situation Debate 394

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

The Value of Self-Monitoring 396

Genetic Factors in Personality 396

Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.3 399

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Personality Is For 399 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 400 Terms to Remember 401 Media Resources 401

13 • Social Psychology 402 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Are Social Processes For? 403

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition 404 Learning Goals 404 Person Perception: How Do We Form

Impressions of Others? 404

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Combating Prejudice 409

Attribution Theory: Attributing Causes to Behavior 409

Attitudes and Attitude Change 413 Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.1 417

Behaving in the Presence of Others: Social Influence 418 Learning Goals 418 Social Facilitation and Interference 418 Social Influences on Altruism:

The Bystander Effect 419 The Power of the Group 421 Group Decision Making 424 The Power of Authority: Obedience 426 The Role of Culture 429 Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.2 430

Establishing Relations With Others 431 Learning Goals 431 What Makes a Face Attractive? 431 Determinants of Liking and Loving 433 The Psychology of Romantic Love 436 Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.3 438

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Social Processes Are For 438 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 439 Terms to Remember 440 Media Resources 441

Contents | xiii

14 • Psychological Disorders 442 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Are Psychological Disorders? 443

Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior? 445 Learning Goals 445 Characteristics of Abnormal Behavior 445 The Concept of Insanity 447 The Medical Model: Conceptualizing

Abnormality as a Disease 448 Problems Associated With Labeling 448 Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.1 450

Classifying Psychological Disorders 450 Learning Goals 450 Anxiety Disorders: Fear and Apprehension 452 Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder 454 Somatic Symptom Disorders: Body and Mind 455 Dissociative Disorders: Disruptions

of Identity or Awareness 456 Depressive and Bipolar Disorders 457

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Suicide Prevention 460

Schizophrenia: Faulty Thought Processes 460 Personality Disorders 462 Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.2 463

Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental? 463 Learning Goals 463 Biological Factors: Is It in the Brain or Genes? 464 Cognitive Factors: Is It Maladaptive

Thoughts and Beliefs? 467 Environmental Factors: Is It Learned

Through Experience? 468 Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.3 470

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Psychological Disorders Are 471 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 472 Terms to Remember 473 Media Resources 473

15 • Therapy 474 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Is Psychotherapy For? 475

Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies 477

Learning Goals 477 Drug Therapies 477 Electroconvulsive Therapy 480 Psychosurgery 481 Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.1 482

Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies 483 Learning Goals 483 Psychoanalysis: Resolving Unconscious Conflicts 483 Cognitive Therapies: Changing Maladaptive

Beliefs 485 Humanistic Therapies: Treating the

Human Spirit 488 Group Therapy 491 Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.2 492

Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies 492 Learning Goals 492 Conditioning Techniques 493 Applying Rewards and Punishments 495 Social Skills Training 496 Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.3 497

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy 498 Learning Goals 498 Clinical Evaluation Research 498 Common Factors Across Psychotherapies 500

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Choosing a Therapist 501

Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.4 502

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Psychotherapy Is For 503 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 504 Terms to Remember 505 Media Resources 505

16 • Stress and Health 506 psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN What Is the Connection Between Stress and Health? 507

Experiencing Stress 508 Learning Goals 508 The Stress Response 509 Cognitive Appraisal 511 External Sources of Stress 511 Internal Sources of Stress 515 Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.1 518

Reacting to Prolonged Stress 518

xiv | Contents

Learning Goals 518 Physical Consequences of Stress 518 Psychological Consequences of Stress 520 Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.2 523

Reducing and Coping With Stress 523 Learning Goals 523 Relaxation Techniques 523 Social Support 525

pRAcTIcAl soluTIoNs

Pet Support 526

Reappraising the Situation 527 Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.3 529

Living a Healthy Lifestyle 529 Learning Goals 529 Get Fit: The Value of Aerobic Exercise 529 Don’t Smoke: Tobacco and Health 530 Eat Right: The Value of Proper Nutrition 531

Avoid Risky Behavior: Protect Yourself From Disease 532

Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.4 533

psycHoloGy foR A ReAsoN The Connection Between Stress and Health 534 cHApTeR RevIew Interactive Summary 535 Terms to Remember 536 Media Resources 536

Appendix A–1

Glossary G–1

References R–1

Indexes I–1

Preface To the Student Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mind. It can be a tough subject, but I’m confident that you’ll find it fun and even surprising at the same time. There are scores of research studies and hundreds of isolated facts scattered throughout this book, but my main goal is to help you understand the function of psychology in your life—to tell you what psychology is for! Toward that end, I’ll show you how your behaviors, thoughts, and emotions help you solve important problems every day.

Everything we do is influenced, in part, by our need to adapt to rapidly changing situations. We’re constantly dipping into our psychological “tool kit” to solve specific social, personal, or environmental problems. For example, before you can react, your brain needs to communicate with the environment and with the rest of your body. To communicate internally, your body uses the nervous system, the endocrine system, and to some extent, even the genetic code. We also need to translate the messages from the environment, which come in a variety of forms, into the internal language of the nervous system (which is electrochemical). We solve this problem through our various sensory systems, such as vision and audition. Our survival also depends on our ability to communicate through language and other nonverbal forms of communication.

You’ll soon see that many of our behaviors and thoughts can be viewed as solutions to such problems or demands. But I don’t think you should be expected to understand a topic unless you first know what it’s for! Therefore, each chapter begins with a brief preview section, e.g., Psychology For a Reason, What Is Consciousness For? that asks about the function and purpose of the psychological processes that we’ll be examining. Throughout the chapter I’ll show you how these particular processes help us meet the challenges that we face. Then, at the end of the chapter, a review sec- tion, e.g., Psychology For a Reason, What Consciousness Is For, summarizes the function and purpose of the psychological processes discussed in the chapter.

I invite you to browse through the rest of the preface for a preview of how this book is organized. And I hope you will soon begin applying what you learn to situ- ations in your daily life. The study of psychology may be challenging, but above all else it is relevant to everything we do. Have fun!

To the Instructor One of the first hurdles we face as instructors of introductory psychology is convinc- ing students that psychology is more than just the study of abnormal behavior. Intro- duce yourself as a psychologist, and you’re likely to get a response like “Don’t analyze me!” or “I’d better watch what I say around you!” It takes time for students to realize that psychology is a vast interdisciplinary field that includes all aspects of both nor- mal and abnormal behavior. Even after exposure to its breadth, the topics of psychol- ogy can remain mysterious and forbidding. Take a look at a typical chapter on learn- ing, for example, and its contents seem to bear little resemblance to our everyday understanding of what it means to “learn.” There are extended discussions of drool- ing dogs and key-pecking pigeons, but little about the connection between condition- ing procedures and the learning problems we face on a daily basis.

In Psychology, Sixth Edition, I once again focus extensively on the function and purpose of psychological processes. Instead of leading with the facts and methods

xvi | Preface

specific to a topic, I introduce each topic as a kind of “solution” to a pressing envi- ronmental or conceptual challenge. For example, if you want to understand how we learn about the signaling properties of events (problem), we can look to classical con- ditioning (solution). Notice the shift in emphasis: Instead of topic followed by func- tion, it’s function followed by topic. I believe this kind of “functional approach” offers a number of advantages:

1. The student has a reason to follow the discussion. 2. Because the discussion is about an adaptive or conceptual problem, it naturally

promotes critical thinking. The student sees the connection between the prob- lem and the solution.

3. The adaptive problem-solving theme extends across chapters. 4. The organization provides an effective learning framework.

Each chapter is organized around a set of topics that (a) focus the discussion on the functional relevance of the material, and (b) demonstrate that we think and act for adaptive reasons. When we view behavior as the product of adaptive systems, psychology begins to make more sense. Students learn that behaviors (including the methods of psychologists!) are reactions to particular problems. When we emphasize adaptiveness, we relax our egocentric view of the world and increase our sensitivity to why behavior is so diverse, both within and across species. Our appreciation of individuality and diversity is enhanced by understanding that differences are natural consequences of adaptations to the environment.

Changes For the Sixth Edition Some of the major content changes in the sixth edition are highlighted below. In ad- dition, there are numerous editorial changes throughout these chapters—I’ve con- tinued to make the writing simpler and clearer. I’ve added new references through- out, although I’ve tried to keep the primary and classic references in place where appropriate.

Pedagogical Changes Because I don’t believe students can easily understand a topic unless they first know what it’s for, each chapter in the Sixth Edition begins with a brief preview section, e.g., Psychology For a Reason, What Is Consciousness For? that asks about the function and purpose of the psychological processes discussed in the chapter. A bookend-style feature at the end of the chapter, e.g., Psychology For a Reason, What Consciousness Is For, summarizes the function and purpose of the psychological processes discussed in the chapter. As in previous editions, the Interactive Summary, Terms to Remember, and Media Resources sections complete the end-of-chapter pedagogy.

In addition, I’ve added a new pedagogical feature that is designed to improve student comprehension and retention. Through cutting-edge research on the cog- nitive science of education, it has become clear that practicing retrieval through self-testing is the ideal way for students to study. I discuss the science of retrieval practice and its effects on comprehension and retention in a new Practical Solutions feature in Chapter 1, Want to Do Well on the Test? Test Yourself ! Then, in the Recall– Monitor–Recall at the end of each section of every chapter, students are reminded of the value of self-testing, cautioned to avoid overconfidence, and asked to recall the key points from the section—with the book closed. A short series of questions helps students monitor their learning. It is my hope that students who read my textbook will integrate this recall-monitor-recall system into their study habits throughout their college careers.

Preface | xvii

Content Changes Here are some of the specific content changes:

• New discussion of forensic psychologists (Chapter 1) • New coverage of the infamous “Sybil” case (Chapter 2) • Expanded coverage of glial cell function and the neurotransmitter glutamate

(Chapter 3) • New case studies of brain damage and split-brain patients (Chapter 3) • New Practical Solutions feature, titled Mirror Neurons: Solving the Other-Mind

Problem (Chapter 3) • New section on “core knowledge” development (Chapter 4) • New section on emotion (the “gut”) and moral decision making (Chapter 4) • New section on the relationship between perception and action (Chapter 5) • Reformulation of the sleep stages, per new conventions (Chapter 6) • New coverage of dreams and behavior (Chapter 6) • New coverage of habituation and eating (Chapter 7) • Expanded coverage of the development of drug tolerance (Chapter 7) • New discussion of mirror neurons and observational learning (Chapter 7) • New discussion of the relationship between working memory capacity and

performance of higher order cognitive tasks (Chapter 8) • New discussion of retrieval practice (self-testing) and its role in long-term

retention (Chapter 8) • Reworked sections on grammar and pragmatics in language (Chapter 9) • New section on the origin of categories (Chapter 9) • Expanded coverage of decision-making heuristics (Chapter 9) • Expanded coverage of multiple intelligences (Chapter 10) • Updated coverage of intellectual disabilities (Chapter 10) • Expanded coverage of achievement motivation and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs

(Chapter 11) • Reworked section on the internal factors controlling hunger, with new emphasis

on satiation signals (Chapter 11) • Expanded coverage of eating disorders (Chapter 11) • New coverage of facial expressions and emotion (Chapter 11) • Expanded coverage of the Big Five personality traits (Chapter 12) • Expanded coverage of social neuroscience (Chapter 13) • New coverage of implicit versus explicit prejudice (Chapter 13) • New coverage of ostracism (Chapter 13) • Reworked coverage of the DSM (Chapter 14) • Reworked sections on psychological disorders (Chapter 14) • New coverage of glutamate and schizophrenia (Chapter 14) • New coverage of magnetic seizure therapy (Chapter 15) • Expanded coverage of personality and stress, including Type D personality

characteristics and heart disease (Chapter 16) • Updated coverage of stress and the immune response (Chapter 16) • Reworked coverage of PTSD (Chapter 16)

xviii | Preface

Learning Supplements For Students Psychology, Sixth Edition, is supported by a state-of-the-art teaching and learning package.

Psychology CourseMate Cengage Learning’s Psychology CourseMate brings course concepts to life with interactive learning, study, and exam preparation tools that support the printed textbook. Access an integrated eBook, learning tools including glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more in your Psychology CourseMate. Go to CengageBrain.com to register or purchase access.

Aplia helps you understand psychology as a science through fresh and compelling con- tent, brief engagement activities that illustrate key concepts, and thought-provoking questions.

• Engagement activities pique your interest and motivate you to learn about a con- cept. Short experiments, videos, and surveys provide a range of experiential learn- ing opportunities.

• Questions about real-world situations hone critical thinking skills. • Immediate, detailed explanations for every answer enhance comprehension. • Gradebook Analytics allow instructors to monitor and address performance.

Supplements For Teaching

Instructor’s Resource Manual (978-1-285-19016-7) This easy-to-use manual contains a preface that includes a section mapping the main text to American Psychological Association Goals and Objectives. Each chapter con- tains content organized by major chapter section: chapter outlines, learning goals, lecture elaborations, demonstrations/activities/student projects, student critical thinking journal, making connections, incorporating diversity, focus on research, ex- tending the practical solutions, questions for study and review, answers to the in-text critical thinking questions, film and video suggestions, recommended reading, and “What’s on the Web,” activities.

Test Bank (978-1-285-19017-4) Including more than 300 questions per chapter, this comprehensive Test Bank offers a great variety of items for test creation. Question types include multiple-choice, fill- in-the-blank, essay, and true-false. Each question is marked with the in-text reference, type of question, difficulty level, and correct answer.

Preface | xix

• Approximately 250 multiple-choice questions per chapter • Approximately 40 sentence fill-in-the-blanks • Approximately 20 essay questions per chapter • Approximately 20 true/false questions per chapter

Each chapter contains a grid that indicates which multiple-choice, sentence comple- tion, essay, and true/false questions correspond to each other and the main learning goal (from main text) for the chapter

PowerLecture With ExamView®

(978-1-285-41853-7) This one-stop resource provides you with tools to help you enhance your PowerPoint lectures, create exams, and create interactive PowerPoint lectures. The DVD includes:

• Chapter-by-chapter lecture outline slides with integrated art, a video library, and other integrated media.

• ExamView® computerized testing software. You can quickly create customized tests in print or online. The software contains all Test Bank questions in electronic format. It helps you create and customize tests in minutes. You can easily edit and import your own questions and graphics and edit and maneuver existing questions. ExamView® offers flexible delivery and the ability to test and grade online.

• Full text files of the Instructor’s Resource Manual and print Test Bank.

WebTutor™ Jumpstart your course with customizable, rich, text-specific content within your course management system. Whether you want to Web-enable your class or put an entire course online, WebTutor™ delivers. WebTutor™ offers a wide array of re- sources including access to the eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, virtual psychology labs, and more.

Introductory Psychology, Vol. 1, BBC Motion Gallery Video (978-1-111-35260-8) Introductory Psychology, Vol. 1, drives home the relevance of course topics through short, provocative clips of current and historical events. Perfect for enriching lectures and engaging students in discussion, many of the segments on this volume have been gathered from BBC Motion Gallery. Ask your Cengage Learning representative for a list of contents.

ABC News on DVD: Introductory Psychology Volume 1: 978-0-495-50306-4 Volume 2: 978-0-495-59637-0 Volume 3: 978-0-495-60490-7 ABC Videos feature short, high-interest clips from current news events as well as historic raw footage going back 40 years. Perfect for discussion starters or to enrich your lectures and spark interest in the material in the text, these brief videos pro- vide students with a new lens through which to view the past and present, one that

xx | Preface

will greatly enhance their knowledge and understanding of significant events and open up to them new dimensions in learning. Clips are drawn from such programs as World News Tonight, Good Morning America, This Week, PrimeTime Live, 20/20, and Nightline, as well as numerous ABC News specials and material from the Associated Press Television News and British Movietone News collections.

Wadsworth Psychology: Research in Action Volume 1: 978-0-495-59520-5 Volume 2: 978-0-495-59813-8 Research in Action features the work of research psychologists to give students an opportunity to learn about cutting-edge research—not just who is doing it, but also how it is done, and how and where the results are being used. By taking students into the laboratories of both established and up-and-coming researchers, and by showing research results being applied outside of the laboratory, these videos offer insight into both the research process and the many ways in which real people’s lives are affected by research in the fields of psychology and neuroscience.

Wadsworth Guest Lecture Series (978-0-547-00401-3) The Guest Lecture Series features many talented teachers sharing their teaching tips and best practices on a wide range of topics, including: Rational Emotive Behav- ior Theory, Blogging as an Effective Tool, Demonstrations on Taste, Dramatizing Perspectives in Psychology, How to Teach Writing in Psychology, and more.

Acknowledgments My publisher deserves enormous credit for organizing the team and for helping me carry out my original plan for this book. I’ve had the opportunity to work with a number of very talented individuals during the past decade, especially my editors Jim Brace-Thompson, Stacey Purviance, Marianne Taflinger, Michele Sordi, and now Tim Matray. Each has been a supporter, friend, and source of countless ideas. The current edition has also benefited greatly from the work of two very fine develop- mental editors, Linda Stewart and Mary Falcon.

On the production side, the captain of the sixth edition team is Charlene Carpen- tier, content project manager, who held together the tight production schedule and coordinated the efforts of numerous people.

Of course, I could never have written this book without the help and guidance I received from the reviewers listed below. I hope they can see their mark on the book, because it’s substantial.

Reviewers of the Sixth Edition Pamela Auburn, University of Houston Downtown and Lonestar College; Roy Bau- meister, Florida State University; Jennifer L. Butler, Case Western Reserve Univer- sity; Kristie Campana, Minnesota State University–Mankato; Molly Fasser, Mira Costa College; Shirley-Anne Hensch, University of Wisconsin–Barron County; Dawn McBride, Illinois State University; Nicole Roberts, Arizona State University; Claire N. Rubman, Suffolk County Community College.

I’d like to express continued thanks to reviewers of previous editions, as well.

Preface | xxi

Reviewers of the Fifth Edition Ellen Carpenter, Old Dominion University; Verne C. Cox, University of Texas at Ar- lington; Darlene Earley-Hereford, Southern Union State Community College; Jes- sica Dennis, California State University at Los Angeles; Bert Hayslip, Jr., University of North Texas; Stacy Harkins, University of Texas at Arlington; Kim Kinzig, Purdue University; Christopher E. Overtree, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; and Kathleen Torsney, William Paterson University.

Reviewers of the Fourth Edition Michael Allen, University of Northern Colorado; Deborah Bryant, Rutgers–The State University of New Jersey; Wendy Chambers, University of Georgia; Julia Chester, Purdue University; Gloria Cowan, California State University–San Bernardino; Les- lie Cramblet, Northern Arizona University; David Denton, Austin Peay State Uni- versity; Emily Elliott, Louisiana State University; August Hoffman, California State University–Northridge; Linda Jones, Blinn College; Linda Juang, San Francisco State University; Laura Madson, New Mexico State University; Glenn Meyer, Trinity Uni- versity; Todd Nelson, California State University–Stanislaus; David Perkins, Ball State University; Peter Pfordresher, University of Texas at San Antonio; Robert Smith, Marian College; Michael Strube, Washington University; Noreen Stuckless, York University; Cheryl Terrance, University of North Dakota; Sheree Watson, University of Southern Mississippi.

Reviewers of the Third Edition Cody Brooks, Denison University; Brad Caskey, University of Wisconsin, River Falls; Lynn Coffey, Minneapolis Community College; Donna Dahlgren, Indiana University Southeast; George Diekhoff, Midwestern State University; Diana Finley, Prince George’s Community College; Jill Folk, Kent State University; Nancy Franklin, State University of New York–Stony Brook; Adam Goodie, University of Georgia; Linda Jackson, Michigan State University; Joseph Karafa, Ferris State University; David Kreiner, Central Missouri State University; Daniel Leger, University of Nebraska; David Mitchell, Loyola University of Chicago; Sanford Pederson, University of Indianapolis; Faye Plascak-Craig, Marian Col- lege; Bridget Robinson-Riegler, Augsburg College; Kraig Schell, Angelo State University; Valerie Scott, Indiana University Southeast; Annette Taylor, University of San Diego; Or- ville Weiszhaar, Minneapolis Community College; Jennifer Wenner, Macalester College; and Leonard Williams, Rowan University. Survey Respondents: Tim Curran, Univer- sity of Colorado; Ellen Cotter, Georgia Southwestern State University; Jeffery Scott Mio, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona; Andrew R. Getzfeld, New Jersey City University; Wendy James-Aldridge, University of Texas–Pan American; Sam Gosling, University of Texas–Austin; Jeff Sandoz, The University of Louisiana at Lafayette; Kim MacLin, University of Texas, El Paso; Charles R. Geist, University of Alaska, Fairbanks; Dawn Blasko, Pennsylvania State University–Erie; Shirley-Anne Hensch, University of Wisconsin Center–Marshfield/Wood County; David P. J. Przybyla, Dension University; Anthony Hendrix, Waycross College; Mary Beth Ahlum, Nebraska Wesleyan Univer- sity; David Carscaddon, Gardner-Webb University; Michael Vitevitch, Indiana University; John Harrington, University of Maine at Presque Isle; Romona Franklin, LBW College; Glen Adams, Harding University; John Salamone, University of Connecticut; C. James Goodwin, Wheeling Jesuit University; Bradley J. Caskey, University of Wisconsin–River Falls; Daniel Linwick, University of Wisconsin–River Falls; Everett Bartholf, Missouri Baptist College; Haig Kouyoumdjian, University of Nebraska–Lincoln; Lynn L. Coffey, Minneapolis Community and Technical College; Randy Sprung, Dakota Wesleyan Uni- versity; Patrick Conley, University of Illinois at Chicago; Sheryl Hartman, Miami-Dade Community College; Lisa M. Huff, Washington University; Jim Rafferty, Bemidji State University; Barbara Blatchely, Agnes Scott College; Carolyn Becker, Trinity University; Frank Hager, Allegany College of Maryland; Maria Lynn Kessler, The Citadel; Charles

xxii | Preface

Jeffreys, Seattle Central Community College; Valerie B. Scott, Indiana University South- east; Pat Crowe, NIACC; Edward Rossini, Roosevelt University; Richard S. Cimbalo, Daemen College; Donna Dahlgren, Indiana University Southeast; Thomas Frangicetto, Northampton Community College; Brenda Karns, Austin Peay State University; Buddy Grah, Austin Peay State University; Milton A. Norville, Florida Memorial College; S. F. A. Gates, Ohio University–Lancaster; Neil Sass, Heidelberg College; Christine Panyard, University of Detroit Mercy; Hoda Badr, University of Houston; Jon Springer, Kean Uni- versity; Morton Heller, Eastern Illinois University; Robert B. Castleberry, University of South Carolina–Sumter; Petri Paavilainen, University of Helsinki; Victoria Bedford, Uni- versity of Indianapolis; Marilyn Schroer, Newberry College; Terri Bonebright, DePauw University; Mark Smith, Davidson College; and Bruce J. Diamond, William Paterson University.

Dr. Valerie Scott of Indiana University Southeast generously agreed to solicit diary reviews from the following students. Their responses were helpful and encour- aging: Angela Lashley, Theresa Raymer, Brent Saylor, Mindy Goodale, Scott Hall, D. Jones, Heather Wenning, Rebecca Thompson, Holly Martin, Dan Abel, Edith Groves, Kim Krueger, J. Kittle, and Jennifer Hall.

Reviewers of the Second Edition Glen M. Adams, Harding University; Jeffrey Adams, St. Michael’s College; Mar- lene Adelman, Norwalk Community College; Robert Arkin, Ohio State University; Cheryl Arnold, Marietta College; Nolan Ashman, Dixie College; Elaine Baker, Mar- shall University; Charles Blaich, Wabash College; Dawn Blasko, Pennsylvania State University–Erie; Susan Bovair, College of Charleston; Stephen E. Buggie, University of New Mexico; Brian Burke, University of Arizona; James Butler, James Madison University; James F. Calhoun, University of Georgia; Kenneth Carter, Emory Univer- sity; Jill Cermele, Drew University; Catherine Cowan, Southwest State University; Patricia Crowe, North Iowa Community College; Tim Curran, Case Western Re- serve University; Robert M. Davis, Indiana University–Purdue University, Indianap- olis; Crystal Dehle, Idaho State University; Gina Dow, Denison University; Susann Doyle, Gainesville College; Patrick Drumm, Ohio University; Maryann Dubree, Madison Area Tech College; Peter Dufall, Smith College; Joseph Ferrari, DePaul University; Paul Foos, University of North Carolina–Charlotte; Kathleen Flannery, Saint Anselm College; Susan Frantz, New Mexico State University; William R. Fry, Youngstown State University; Grace Galliano, Kennesaw State University; Stella Gar- cia, University of Texas–San Antonio; Robert Gehring, University of Southern Indi- ana; Judy Gentry, Columbus State Community College; Sandra Goss, University of Il- linois at Urbana–Champaign; Lynn Haller, Morehead State University; Suzy Horton, Mesa Community College; Wendy James-Aldridge, University of Texas–Pan Ameri- can; Cynthia Jenkins, Creighton University; Scott Johnson, John Wood Community College; Robert Kaleta, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee; Deric Kenne, Missis- sippi State University; Stephen Kiefer, Kansas State University; Kris Klassen, North Idaho College; Stan Klein, University of California–Santa Barbara; Richard Leavy, Ohio Wesleyan University; Judith Levine, State University of New York–Farming- dale; Arlene Lundquist, Mount Union College; Molly Lynch, University of Texas– San Antonio; Salvador Macias III, University of South Carolina–Sumter; Douglas W. Matheson, University of the Pacific; Yancy McDougal, University of South Carolina– Spartanburg; Susan H. McFadden, University of Wisconsin; Glenn E. Meyer, Trin- ity University; David B. Mitchell, Loyola University, Chicago; William Nast, Bishop State Community College; Donald Polzella, University of Dayton; Pamela Regan, California State University–Los Angeles; Linda Reinhardt, University of Wiscon- sin–Rock County; Catherine Sanderson, Amherst College; Stephen Saunders, Mar- quette University; Susan Shapiro, Indiana University East; John E. Sparrow, Univer- sity of New Hampshire–Manchester; Jon Springer, Kean University; Tracie Stewart,

Preface | xxiii

Bard College; Bethany Stillion, Clayton College and State University; Thomas Swan, Siena College; Dennis Sweeney, California University–Pennsylvania; Thomas Tim- merman, Austin Peay State University; Peter Urcuioli, Purdue University; Lori R. Van Wallendael, University of North Carolina–Charlotte; David Wasieleski, Valdosta State University; Diane Wentworth, Fairleigh Dickinson University; Lisa Weyandt, Central Washington University; Fred Whitford, Montana State University; and Steve Withrow, Guilford Tech Community College.

Reviewers of the First Edition Karin Ahlm, DePauw University; Mary Ann Baenninger, Trenton State College; Daniel R. Bellack, Trident Technical College; Ira Bernstein, University of Texas at Ar- lington; Kenneth Bordens, Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne; Nancy S. Breland, Trenton State College; James Calhoun, University of Georgia; D. Bruce Carter, Syracuse University; John L. Caruso, University of Massachusetts–Dart- mouth; Regina Conti, Colgate University; Eric Cooley, Western Oregon State Col- lege; Randall Engle, University of South Carolina, Columbia; Roy Fontaine, Penn- sylvania College of Technology; Nelson L. Freedman, Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada; Richard Froman, John Brown University; Grace Galliano, Kennesaw State College; Eugene R. Gilden, Linfield College; Perilou Goddard, Northern Kentucky University; Tim Goldsmith, University of New Mexico; Joel Grace, Mansfield Univer- sity; Charles R. Grah, Austin Peay State University; Terry R. Greene, Franklin & Mar- shall College; George Hampton, University of Houston–Downtown; Linda Heath, Loyola University of Chicago; Phyllis Heath, Central Michigan University; Shirley- Anne Hensch, University of Wisconsin Center–Marshfield/Wood County; Michael Hillard, University of New Mexico; Vivian Jenkins, University of Southern Indiana; James J. Johnson, Illinois State University; Timothy Johnston, University of North Carolina at Greensboro; John Jung, California State University–Long Beach; Salvador Macias III, University of South Carolina at Sumter; Carolyn Mangelsdorf, University of Washington; Edmund Martin, Georgia Tech Michael McCall, Ithaca College; Lau- rence Miller, Western Washington University; Carol Pandey, Pierce College; Blaine F. Peden, University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire; William J. Pizzi, Northeastern Illinois University; Anne D. Simons, University of Oregon; Stephen M. Smith, Texas A & M University; John E. Sparrow, University of New Hampshire–Manchester; Irene Staik, University of Montevallo; Robert Thompson, Shoreline Community College; Diane Tucker, University of Alabama–Birmingham; John Uhlarik, Kansas State University; Lori Van Wallendael, University of North Carolina at Charlotte; Fred Whitford, Mon- tana State University; Carsh Wilturner, Green River Community College; and Debo- rah Winters, New Mexico State University.

We offer special thanks to the following professors and their students for conduct- ing student reviews of the manuscript: F. Samuel Bauer, Christopher Newport Univer- sity; Gabriel P. Frommer, Indiana University; R. Martin Lobdell, Pierce College; Robert M. Stern, Pennsylvania State University; and the students of Dominican College.

Many colleagues and students at Purdue also played very important roles in creat- ing the final product, often suffering through questions about one research area or an- other. Each, along with my patient family, deserves considerable thanks.

Psychology

1 An Introduction to Psychology

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Is the Function of Psychology?

Defining and Describing Psychology Learning Goals What Psychologists Do

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Want to Do Well on the Test? Test Yourself!

Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.1

Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History

Learning Goals Mind and Body: Are They the Same? Nature and Nurture: Where Does

Knowledge Come From?

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON The Function of Psychology

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

The First Schools: Psychology as Science Freud and the Humanists: The Influence

of the Clinic The First Women in Psychology Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.2

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology

Learning Goals Cognitive Factors Biological Factors Evolutionary Psychology Cultural Factors Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.3

Welcome to the study of psychology—the scientific study of behavior and mind. If this is your first psychology course, expect to be surprised by what you find covered in this book. Most people think psychology deals mainly with the study of mental disorders—that is, depression, schizophrenia, or the things you com- monly see on Dr. Phil. It’s true that psychologists often treat psychological problems, but the image of psychology on the afternoon talk shows can be misleading. Did you know that psychologists tend to focus just as much on the study of normal behavior as they do on abnormal behavior?

In fact, most of the material in this book comes from the study of normal people. Psychologists study normal behavior for two main reasons: First, to under- stand the abnormal, it is necessary to understand normal functioning first, in the same way that medical doctors need to understand healthy bodies before they can under- stand sickness and disease. Second, improving our understanding of normal function- ing helps us gain more control over our environments and live more productive lives. As you’ll soon see, modern psychology has something to say about everything from the treatment of irrational fears (such as the fear of spiders) to the development of effective study skills—even to the design of the kitchen stove.

From time to time, you will learn things about yourself that may be difficult to match up with everyday experience. For example, you will discover that your per- sonal memories are not always accurate. Instead, what you remember is sometimes an elaborate reconstruction of the past, one that bears little resemblance to what actually occurred. You will learn that your beliefs—how you think you would act and treat others—can be easily changed in the face of a demanding situation. We will even consider the possibility that free will is an illusion—instead, your thoughts may be influenced by unconscious forces and natural drives that are not under your direct control. As the behavioral neuroscientist David Eagleman put it: “The brain runs its show incognito,” meaning that much of what we see and think is pro- duced by a brain working in secret, below conscious awareness (Eagleman, 2011, p. 12). Sound interesting? Scary? Well, be prepared: What you’ll learn may well change the way you view yourself, the world, and others around you.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Is the Function of Psychology?

“The brain runs its show incognito” (© Cengage Learning 2014)

4 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

About This Book Throughout this book I present the topics of psychology from a “functional” perspective, which means I explain what a psychological process is for before I explain how it works. Our brains are filled with psychological “tools,” control- ling everything from emotion to reason to memory. Each of these tools helps us adapt and solve important problems. I’ll describe these tools in detail and show you how they’re used. We’ll also focus on the specific situations in which they are applied. Each chapter begins with a preview section just like this, called “Psychology for a Reason.” Here I explain how and why each psychological pro- cess is important—both in your everyday life and in your efforts to succeed as a student. To understand any psychological process completely, you first must have some idea of what the process is for.

Here are a few examples: Suppose you’re walking along a mountain trail and hear a sudden rattle. You stop quickly because that sound could signal the presence of a rattlesnake. One important thing you learn about your environ- ment is that certain events, such as rattling sounds, predict or signal other events, such as dangerous snakes. Our brains are designed to learn associa- tions between significant events so we can better adapt to our environment. In Chapter 7, we’ll discuss a procedure called classical conditioning that shows us how this important learning process works. Likewise, in Chapter 13 you’ll learn how we use psychological processes to interpret the behavior of others. If a shadowy figure emerges suddenly from an alleyway, it’s important that you size up the situation quickly and decide on an appropriate response. Is this per- son a threat or just having a little fun? For a broad overview of the types of situa- tions that we’ll be considering in this book, take a look at Table 1.1.

Psychologists use many tools to study mind and behavior.

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● tABLE 1.1 Examples of Functional Problems Considered in the Book

CHAPTER FunCTionAl PRoblEm ExAmPlE SoluTion ToolS

2 Determining the causes of behavior Sally watches a TV program and becomes aggressive.

Experimental research

3 Communicating internally A bicyclist weaves suddenly into the path of your car.

Electrochemical transmission in the nervous system

7 Learning what events signal You hear a rattling tail on a mountain path.

Associations acquired through classical conditioning

8 Remembering over the short term You try to remember a telephone number as you cross the room.

Rehearsal in short-term memory

10 Conceptualizing intelligence Andy is excellent at fixing mechanical devices but is terrible at reading and math.

Psychometric tests designed to measure the mind

13 Interpreting the behavior of others A shadowy figure emerges suddenly from an alleyway.

Knowledge-based social schemas used to predict outcomes

14 Defining abnormality Lucinda hears voices and thinks she’s immortal.

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

15 Treating the mind Ralph is mired in the depths of depression.

Psychoactive drug therapy or “insight” therapy

Defining and Describing Psychology | 5

In Chapter 2, our focus will be on the methods psychologists use to understand behavior and mind. In subsequent chapters, we will see how those methods are used to answer questions, such as: What are the best strategies for understanding the changes we go through from infancy to adulthood (Chapter 4)? What are the best ways to measure intelligence (Chapter 10)? How can abnormal behavior be treated (Chapter 15)? These are practical problems that psychologists face; and, again, the key to understanding the methods psychologists employ is to understand the specific problems that these methods are designed to solve.

About This Chapter This first chapter is designed simply to acquaint you with the scientific study of behavior and mind. Toward that end, our discussion will revolve around three basic questions:

Defining and Describing Psychology What is the proper way to define and describe psychology? We’ll talk about the distinction between behavior and mind and about what psychologists do.

Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History How did current psychological perspectives evolve? Psychology has a short history as a science, but scholars have been interested in psychological questions for centuries. We’ll discuss some of the famous “schools” of psychological thought and how they developed.

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology What trends and directions are shaping modern psychology? We’ll characterize how modern psychologists think and some important recent influences. Increasingly, modern psychologists are con- cerned with cognitive, biological, evolutionary, and cultural factors in under- standing behavior and mind.

Defining and Describing Psychology LEARNING GOALS

● Understand the modern definition of psychology. ● Distinguish among clinical, applied, and research psychologists.

Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mind. The word comes from the Greek psyche, which translates as “soul” or “breath,” and logos, which means the study or investiga- tion of something (as in biology or physiology). The word psychology was not in common use before the 19th century, and the field of psychology didn’t become an independent sci- ence until the middle of the 19th century (Boring, 1950). Prior to that point, “the study of the mind,” as psychology was widely known, was conducted mainly by philosophers and physi- ologists. Neither Sigmund Freud nor Ivan Pavlov was trained in psychology, despite their reputations as famous psychologists. The field as we know it now simply didn’t exist.

psychology The scientific study of behavior and mind.

6 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

Notice that today’s definition of psychology is quite precise—it is not simply the study of the mind; rather, it is the scientific study of behavior and mind. The empha- sis on science, and particularly the scientific method, distinguishes psychology from the closely related field of philosophy. The essential characteristic of the scien- tific method, as you’ll see in Chapter 2, is observation: Scientific knowledge is always based on some kind of direct or indirect observation. Psychologists collect observations, look for regularities, and then generate predictions based on what they’ve observed.

By mind, psychologists mean the contents and processes of subjective experience: sensations, thoughts, and emotions. Behavior and mind are kept separate in the definition because only behavior can be directly measured. Psychologists use the term behavior in a quite general way. The activities of cells within the brain and even internal thoughts and feel- ings can be considered types of “behavior”—as long as they can be observed and measured in a systematic way.

What Psychologists Do The work of all psychologists revolves around the scientific study of behavior and mind, but specialties abound. As summarized in the Concept Review on page 8, we can divide the general job description into three main categories: clinical psy- chologists, applied psychologists, and research psychologists. These categories are some- what artificial—for example, clinical psychologists often work in applied settings and many conduct research—but the categories provide a useful way of defining the profession.

Clinical Psychologists A clinical psychologist diagnoses and treats psychological problems—such as depression, anxiety, phobias, and schizophrenia. Clinical psychologists typically work in clinics or in private practice, delivering human services such as psychotherapy or counseling. To become a clinical psychologist, it is necessary to obtain a postgradu- ate degree such as a Ph.D. (doctor of philosophy) or a Psy.D. (doctor of psychology).

Counseling psychologists also deliver human services, but they usually work on different kinds of problems. Counseling psychologists are more likely to deal with adjustment problems (marriage and family problems), whereas clinical psycholo- gists tend to work with psychological disorders. Counseling psychology also requires a postgradu- ate degree, perhaps a Ph.D. from a graduate pro- gram specializing in counseling psychology or an Ed.D. (doctor of education). Together, clinical and counseling psychologists make up the major- ity of the profession (American Psychological Association, 2002b).

mind The contents and processes of subjective experience: sensations, thoughts, and emotions.

behavior Observable actions such as moving about, talking, gesturing, and so on; behaviors can also refer to the activities of cells and to thoughts and feelings.

clinical psychologists Psychologists who specialize in the diagnosis and treatment of psychological problems.

Psychologists seek to understand how and why people act, think, and feel.

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The term behavior can mean many things to a psychologist—observable actions, thoughts and feelings (as revealed through written reports), and even electrical activity in the brain.

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Defining and Describing Psychology | 7

Many people confuse the terms psycholo- gist and psychiatrist. Psychiatrists also special- ize in the treatment of psychological problems, but psychiatrists are medical doctors. To become a psychiatrist you must graduate from medical school and complete further specialized train- ing in psychiatry. Like clinical psychologists, psychiatrists treat mental disorders, but, unlike most psychologists, they are licensed to prescribe medication.

As you’ll see in Chapter 15, medications are often useful in treating problems of the mind. Currently, there is an ongoing debate among mental health professionals about whether psy- chologists should be allowed to prescribe medi- cation (Fagan et al., 2007; McGrath, 2010). Some states are considering legislation that will extend prescription privileges to licensed clinical psy- chologists; New Mexico and Louisiana, as well as the U.S. territory of Guam, have passed legis- lation giving properly trained psychologists the right to prescribe drugs. At present, though, psy- chologists and medical doctors typically work together. A clinical psychologist is likely to refer a client to a psychiatrist or general practitioner if he or she suspects that a physical problem might be involved.

Applied Psychologists Applied psychologists extend the principles of scientific psy- chology to practical, everyday problems in the real world. Applied psychologists work in many settings. School psychologists work with students in primary and secondary schools to help them perform well academically and socially. Industrial/organizational psychologists are employed in industry to help improve morale, train new recruits, or help managers establish effective lines of communication with their employees. Forensic psychologists apply psychological principles to legal issues, such as the reli- ability of eyewitness testimony or the evaluation of a defendant’s mental compe- tence. Human factors psychologists play a key role in the design and engineering of new products: For example, why do you think telephone numbers are seven digits long, grouped in three, then four (e.g., 555-9378)? How about traffic lights—why red and green? You’ll find answers to these questions later in the book.

Human factors psychologists even work on the design of the kitchen stove. Does your stove look like the one shown in the left panel of ●Figure 1.1? There are four burners, arranged in a rectangle, and four control knobs that line up horizontally along the front (or sometimes the back). To use the stove properly, you need to learn the relationship, or what psychologists call the mapping, between the control knobs and the burners. In this case, you need to learn that the far left knob controls the back burner on the left. Or is it the front burner on the left? If you have a stove like

psychiatrists Medical doctors who specialize in the diagnosis and treatment of psychological problems.

applied psychologists Psychologists who extend the principles of scientific psychology to practical problems in the world.

A clinical psychologist diagnoses and treats psychological problems. Clinical psychologists typically work in clinics or in private practice, delivering human services such as psychotherapy or counseling.

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● FiGuRE 1.1 the Human Factors of Stove Design The stove on the left does not provide a natural mapping between the control knobs and the burners and is therefore difficult to use. The stoves in the middle and on the right provide psychologically correct designs that reduce user errors. (© Cengage Learning)

8 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

this one, which is badly designed from a psychological perspective, you likely have trouble remembering which knob controls which burner. I bet you’ve placed a pot of water on one of the burners, turned a control knob, and found moments later that you’ve turned on the wrong burner…right? The reason is simple: The stove has been designed with an unnatural mapping between its controls and the burners.

Mapping is easier to understand when you look at a psychologically correct design, as shown in the middle panel of Figure 1.1. Notice that the arrangement of the burners naturally aligns with the controls. The left-to-right display of the con- trol knobs matches the left-to-right arrangement of the burners. There is no need to learn the mapping in this case. It’s obvious which knob you would use to turn on the appropriate burner. Alternatively, if you want to keep the rectangular arrangement of the stove top, then simply arrange the control knobs in a rectangular manner that matches the burners, as shown in the far right panel. As these examples illustrate, there are natural and unnatural ways to express the relationship between product control and product function.

We’ll be considering the work of applied psychologists throughout this book. Applied psychologists usually have a postgraduate degree, often a Ph.D., although a master’s in psychology can be sufficient for a successful career in an industrial setting.

Research Psychologists Some psychologists conduct basic research to discover the principles of behavior and mind. They are called research psychologists, and, like applied psychologists, they usually specialize. Behavioral neuroscientists seek to under- stand how biological or genetic factors influence and determine behavior. Personality psychologists are concerned with the internal factors that lead people to act consis- tently across situations and also with how people differ. Cognitive psychologists focus on higher mental processes such as memory, learning, and reasoning. Developmental psychologists study how behavior and internal mental processes change over the course of the life span. Social psychologists are interested in how people think about, influence, and relate to each other. You’ll be reading about the work of research psy- chologists in every chapter of this book. Sometimes research psychologists work on problems of special interest to education—for an example, read the Practical Solutions feature.

research psychologists Psychologists who try to discover the basic principles of behavior and mind.

● CONCEPt REviEw Types of Psychologists TYPE oF PSYCHoloGiST GuiDinG FoCuS PRimARY WoRKPlACE ExAmPlES oF WHAT THEY Do

Clinical psychologists The diagnosis and treatment of psychological problems

Clinics

Private practice

Academic settings

Counsel clients suffering from adjustment prob- lems or more severe psychological problems; evaluate diagnostic techniques and therapy effectiveness

Applied psychologists Extending psychological principles to practical problems in the world

Private industry

Schools

Academic settings

Help performance of students in school; improve employee morale and performance at work; design computers so that humans can use them efficiently

Research psychologists Conduct research to discover the basic principles of behavior and mind

Academic settings

Private industry

Conduct experiments on the best study method for improving memory; assess the impact of day care on children’s attachment to their parents; observe the effects of others on a person’s help- ing behavior

Defining and Describing Psychology | 9

We’ve seen that psychologists work on many different kinds of questions, but you’re prob- ably more interested in what they have to say about doing well in school. Have psycholo- gists discovered the secret to understanding and remembering classroom material, or the subjects covered in your textbook? In fact, psy- chologists have a lot to say about successful learning and retention and what they’ve discov- ered flies in the face of conventional wisdom.

The Myth: Repeated Reading Suppose we conducted a simple experi-

ment. Two groups of students are asked to read and remember a section of material from a college textbook. One group is given four separate opportunities during which they’re allowed to read over the material and try to remember it. The other group is shown the material only once, but is required to recall what they studied on three consecutive tests. Two weeks later everyone is asked to remem- ber the material on a final test. Who does better—the group receiving four opportunities to read and reread the material or the group

taking three tests? If you are like most people, you picked the read and reread group—after all, they’re given four chances to go over the material. But if you did, you would be wrong, very wrong. In fact, the group given the three tests does substantially better. Not only does repeated testing lead to better memory for the original material, it leads to better compre- hension as well (Karpicke & Roedgier, 2008; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011).

The Fact: Repeated Testing The key to effective studying is really

effective testing. You need to practice retrieving the information, not simply read the material over and over again. In fact, repeated reading does very little to enhance either comprehension or later memory. Unfortunately, students rarely engage in repeated self-testing; their preferred tech- nique is repeated studying, in the form of rereading or rewriting material from the book or notes. You will learn about why repeated retrieval is so effective later in Chapter 8, but consider the following example: Suppose you

were trying to learn to play a piece of music on the piano. Which would be better—reading the sheet music over and over again or actu- ally playing the piece on the piano? If the goal is to play the piano, you need to practice play- ing the piano. Likewise, if you want to remem- ber something later on, you need to practice remembering it, not staring at it for hours.

Be Accurate One final warning: Practicing retrieval

through self-testing is a terrific way to study and learn material in a course. But it’s very important that you practice retrieving the right information. If you test yourself and recall the wrong information, you could be in a lot of trouble. That means it’s important to check your work. What you retrieve needs to be accurate or you will “remember” the wrong thing. To make matters worse, many students tend to be overconfident about what they know—they are very poor at monitoring their learning effectively—and this leads to very poor retention and comprehension in the long term (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2011).

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Want to Do Well on the Test? Test Yourself!

Monitor Your Learning The key to effective studying is really effective self-testing. First, test yourself by recalling the key points and terms from the preceding section—with the book closed! Next, monitor your learning by checking the accuracy of your responses. You must check carefully—and don’t be overconfident. Overconfidence can lead to understudying. Finally, close the book and recall the key points and terms again, this time correcting any mistakes you made the first time. Later, before the next class exam, repeat the Recall-Monitor-Recall process. Reading is not enough—you must retrieve!

test Yourself You can also test your knowledge about how best to define and describe psychology by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Psychologists use the term behavior to refer only to observable responses, such as moving about, talking, and gesturing. Internal events, such as thoughts and feelings, fall outside the domain of scientific psychology. True or False?

2. Psychology did not exist as a separate field of science 150 years ago. To explore questions about behavior and mind, it was nec- essary to study philosophy and physiology. True or False?

3. Clinical psychologists are generally interested in diagnosing and treating psychological problems such as depression or schizophre- nia. True or False?

4. Psychiatrists differ from psychologists primarily in their focus of interest. Psychiatrists tend to work on severe and chronic prob- lems, such as schizophrenia, whereas psychologists treat milder problems, such as phobias and anxiety disorders. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.1

10 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History LEARNING GOALS

● Understand what is meant by the mind–body problem. ● Contrast the different viewpoints on the origins of knowledge. ● Trace the development of the first scientific schools of psychology. ● Note the early clinical contributions of Freud and the humanists. ● Highlight the contributions of women to the development of psychology as a field.

The field of psychology has a relatively short past, but it has a long and distinguished intel- lectual history. Thousands of years ago, the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 b.c.) wrote extensively on topics that are central to modern psychology— topics such as memory, sleep, and sensation. It was Aristotle who first argued that the mind is a kind of tabula rasa—a blank tablet—on which experiences are written. The idea that knowledge arises directly from experience, a philosophical position known as empiricism, continues to be an important theme in modern psychological thought.

Modern psychology developed out of the disciplines of philosophy and physiol- ogy. In a sense, psychology has always occupied a kind of middle ground between the two. Aristotle, Plato, and other philosophers helped frame many of the basic ques- tions that occupy the attention of psychologists today: Where does knowledge come from? What are the laws, if any, that govern sensation? What are the necessary condi- tions for learning and remembering? Physiologists, on the other hand, focused their attention on the workings of the human body. Before psychology was formally estab- lished, physiologists collected volumes of data on the mechanics of physical move- ment and the anatomy of sensory systems, which proved essential in the development of a scientific understanding of behavior and mind.

Mind and Body: Are They the Same? What exactly is the relationship between the physical body, as studied by physiologists, and the mind, as studied by philosophers? Are the mind and body separate and dis- tinct, or are they one and the same? In the 17th century, the French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650) argued that the mind and body are separate: The physical body, he claimed, cannot think, nor is it possible to explain thinking by appealing to physical matter. He did allow for the possibility that one could have an important influence on the other. He believed the mind controlled the actions of a mechanical body through the pineal gland, a small structure at the base of the brain (see ●Figure 1.2). He was never clear about the details.

Descartes offered some ingenious descriptions of the human body, and he influ- enced generations of physiologists. His specific ideas about the body turned out to be largely incorrect—the pineal gland, for example, plays a role in producing hor- mones, not muscle movements—but a few of his ideas remain influential today. It was Descartes who first introduced the concept of a reflex. Reflexes are automatic, involuntary reactions of the body to events in the environment (such as pulling your hand away from the hot burner on a stove). As you’ll see in Chapter 3, reflexes play a very important role in our survival. But Descartes did little to advance the scientific study of the mind. To separate the mind from the physical world places psychology outside the boundaries of science. The scientific method is based on observation, and it’s impossible to study something scientifically that cannot be observed in some way.

Today, most psychologists approach the mind–body problem quite differently. They reject the separation of mind and body and assume they’re one and the same. What we call the “mind” today is really nothing more than brain activity; put simply,

empiricism The idea that knowledge comes directly from experience.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mind. Is it really surprising then that its intellectual roots lie in physiology and philosophy?

● FiGuRE 1.2 Descartes and the Reflex René Descartes introduced the concept of the reflex, which he described as an automatic, involuntary reaction of a physical body to an event in the outside world. He thought the mediating structure was the pineal gland, shown here as a tear-shaped area at the back of the head. (© Cengage Learning)

Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History | 11

the mind is what the brain does (Pinker, 1997). As you’ll see, there is an extremely close link between the operation of the brain and behavior. Many psychological disorders come directly from problems in the brain, and many of the symptoms can be treated effectively through biological means (usually medication). Exactly how we infer mental “states” and processes from the study of brain action remains a tricky problem (Barrett, 2009), but it’s a problem that most psychologists believe will ultimately be solved.

Nature and Nurture: Where Does Knowledge Come From? Philosophers and psychologists have always been interested in determining where knowledge comes from. Aristotle adopted an empiricist position: He believed that knowledge comes directly from our day-to-day experiences. Empiricism can be contrasted with a philosophical position called nativism, which holds that certain kinds of knowledge and ideas are inborn, or innate.

The Nativist Argument Nativists believe we arrive in the world knowing certain things. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) proposed that humans are born with a certain mental “structure” that determines how they perceive the world. People, he argued, are born with a natural tendency to see things in terms of cause and effect and to interpret the world in terms of space and time. Of course, it would be silly to claim that all knowledge is present at birth—we certainly learn lots of things—but some kinds of knowledge, the nativists argue, do not depend on experience.

The question of whether humans are born knowing fundamental things about their world is difficult to answer. For one thing, no one is really sure at what point experience begins. We could draw a line at birth and say that any knowledge or abili- ties that exist at that very moment are innate, but, as you’ll see in Chapter 4, the environment exerts tremendous influences on embryos as they develop in the womb. We can never eliminate the influence of experience completely, so we’re always faced with the tricky problem of disentangling which portions of the knowledge we observe are inborn and which are produced by experience.

It is possible to demonstrate that people use certain organizing principles of per- ception that cannot be altered by experience. Take a look at ●Figure 1.3. If I showed you (a) and then (b), do you think you could easily recognize that (a) is in fact embed- ded in (b)? It’s not easy to see, is it? More important, it doesn’t really matter how many times I show you (a). Even if I force you to look at (a) one hundred times, it’s always going to be difficult to find when you look at (b). The reason for this, according to a movement called Gestalt psychology, is that humans are born with a certain fixed way of viewing the world. The visual system naturally organizes the sensory input in (b) in such a way that (a) is hard to see. These organizing principles are innate, and experience cannot change them (Ellis, 1938). I’ll have more to say about organizing principles of perception, and about Gestalt psychology, when we take up the topics of sensation and perception in Chapter 5.

Darwin’s Theory of Evolution By the end of the 19th century, the ideas of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) had taken hold in the debate about the origins of knowledge. Darwin proposed that all living things are the end products of an extended period of evolution, guided by the principles of natural selection. Cats have fur, seals have thick skin, and babies cry because these traits have been passed along—selected for— during the evolutionary history of the species. By natural selection Darwin meant that some individual traits are better than others at promoting survival and enabling an individual to reproduce.

Because animals compete for survival and for opportunities to reproduce, those inherited characteristics that further survival and reproduction will be the traits most

nativism The idea that some knowledge is innate, or present at birth.

Gestalt psychology A movement proposing that certain organizing principles of perception are innate and cannot be altered by experience.

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12 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

likely to persist from generation to generation. If an inborn tendency to cry helps us communicate feelings about hunger effectively, then it’s more likely that we’ll live long enough to pass this tendency on to our offspring. Such tendencies are selected for naturally because they are adaptive—they improve the chances of meeting the needs demanded by the environment (Darwin, 1859, 1871).

Notice that the emphasis is on inherited tendencies. Darwin believed that the principles of natural selection apply to characteristics that pass from parents to their offspring—not only physical traits, but behavioral and psychological ones as well. We now know that the principal vehicle for the transmission of inherited traits is genetic material inside the cells of the body. During development, the activity of the genes, together with other environmental influences, gives rise to the physical structure of the brain and the rest of the body.

By emphasizing the adaptive value of inherited characteristics, including psycho- logical characteristics, Darwin had an enormous influence on psychologists (Buss, 2012; Dennett, 1995). If natural selection plays a role in the evolution of mental abili- ties, then it’s easier to accept the idea that people may inherit certain ways of thinking or of viewing the world (the nativist position). Researchers now commonly argue, for example, that humans may have an inherited predisposition to learn language, much as birds have an inherited predisposition to fly (Pinker, 1994).

Nature via Nurture Today, virtually all psychologists accept that certain psychologi- cal characteristics, such as intelligence, emotion, and personality, are influenced by genetic factors. We’re not born with a blank slate but rather with a brain that is pre- disposed to act and think in particular ways (Gangestad & Simpson, 2007). Yet genes never act alone; they always act in concert with experience. Experience (nurture)

determines how genetic material is expressed, which, in turn, means that physical and psychological traits (nature) will always depend on both. Nature works via nurture and vice versa—one can’t happen without the other (Ridley, 2003).

From an adaptive perspective, it makes sense that both factors are involved. The newborn arrives in the world with a set of basic reflexes that helps the infant to survive. At the same time, it would make no sense to “hardwire” the brain with fixed responses to all environmental events. We live in a constantly chang- ing world, and it is to our advantage that we can shape our responses to best meet the needs of individual situ- ations. One of the unique features of humans is that they do a lot of devel- oping outside the womb, thereby allowing the environment to exert a powerful effect on our neural and psy- chological development.

The First Schools: Psychology as Science The first psychology laboratory was established in 1879 at the University of Leipzig by a German professor named Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920). Wundt was a medical doctor by training, and early in his career he worked with some of the great physiologists

Charles Darwin believed that both physical and psychological characteristics were naturally selected for their adaptive value.

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Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History | 13

of the 19th century. Fittingly, his laboratory was established during the time he spent as a profes- sor of philosophy. (Remember, the intellectual roots of psychology lie at the union of philoso- phy and physiology.) Wundt is traditionally rec- ognized as the founder, or father, of modern psychology, and 1879 is seen as the year that psy- chology finally started as a unique field. Prior to Wundt, it was not possible to major in psychol- ogy because there were no official psychologists or psychology departments (Bolles, 1993).

It is noteworthy that the birth of psychology began with the establishment of an experimen- tal laboratory. Wundt’s background in physio- logical research convinced him that the proper approach to the study of mental events was to conduct experiments. He believed that controlled observations should be collected about the mind in the same way that one might observe twitch- ing frog legs to understand the principles of nerve conduction. Wundt didn’t believe that all men- tal processes could be studied in this way, but he committed himself wholeheartedly to the use of scientific techniques.

Structuralism Wundt (1896) was convinced that the focus of psychology should be on the study of immediate conscious experience, by which he meant the things that people sense and perceive when they reflect inward on their own minds. This view was strongly shared by one of Wundt’s students, Edward Titchener (1867–1927), who proposed that immediate experience could be broken down into elements—primar- ily sensations and feelings. Titchener believed it was the job of the psychologist to (1) identify these elements and then (2) discover how they combine to produce meaning- ful wholes. He later named this approach structuralism. Psychologists should seek the structure of the mind by breaking it down into elementary parts, much as a chem- ist might try to understand a chemical compound (Titchener, 1899).

Unlike a chemical compound, however, it’s not easy to observe the internal work- ings of the human mind. Mental events are subjective, personal, and difficult to record. To solve this problem, the structuralists relied on a technique called systematic intro- spection, which required people to provide rigorous self-reports of their own internal experiences. Introspectionists were trained to describe the elements that they per- ceived in simple visual stimuli, sounds, and tastes. As a result, mountains of data about elementary sensory experiences were collected. Titchener’s laboratory, for example, was one of the first to document that complex tastes could be broken down into com- binations of four elementary tastes: salty, bitter, sour, and sweet (Webb, 1981).

Once psychology was established as a laboratory science by Wundt and his con- temporaries, psychology departments began to spring up rapidly throughout the world. This was particularly true in North America, where dozens of laboratories were established in the last two decades of the 19th century (Hilgard, 1987). Titchener immigrated to the United States and established his own psychological laboratory at Cornell University. By 1890 a number of professional journals had been established, and highly influential textbooks of psychology started to appear (e.g., James, 1890). In 1892 the American Psychological Association (APA) was founded. G. Stanley Hall (1846–1924), an American who had trained under Wundt in Germany, was installed as APA’s first president.

Functionalism Psychologists in North America quickly moved away from the strict structuralist approach advocated by European psychologists. Rather than focusing

structuralism An early school of psychology; structuralists tried to understand the mind by breaking it down into basic parts, much as a chemist might try to understand a chemical compound.

systematic introspection An early technique used to study the mind; systematic introspection required people to look inward and describe their own experiences.

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Certain physical characteristics, including the ability to self-camouflage, are selected for in nature because they are adaptive—they improve the chances of an organism surviving.

Wilhelm Wundt, shown here in about 1912, established the first psychological laboratory in 1879, at the University of Leipzig.

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exclusively on the content of immediate experience, dissecting the mind into parts, North American psychologists began to worry more about the function of immedi- ate experience. What is the purpose of immediate conscious experience? How do thoughts and feelings help us solve adaptive problems related to survival? Because of the emphasis on function rather than content, this school of thought became gener- ally known as functionalism (Angell, 1903; Dewey, 1896; James, 1890).

Functionalists such as William James (1842–1910) and James Rowland Angell (1869–1949) believed the mind couldn’t be understood by looking simply at its parts— that’s like trying to understand a house by analyzing the underlying bricks and mor- tar ( James, 1884). You need to determine the goal of the mental operation first, and then, perhaps, you can discover how the individual parts work together. To under- stand how memory works, a functionalist would argue, you first need to consider its purpose—what specific kinds of problems do our memory systems help us solve (Nairne, 2005)?

Darwin’s ideas about evolution through natural selection were extremely influ- ential in the development of functionalism. To analyze the color markings on a but- terfly’s wings, a Darwinian would argue, you must ask how those markings help the butterfly survive, or at least reproduce. Similarly, when analyzing the operations and processes of mind, a functionalist would argue, you need to understand the adaptive value of those operations. How do they help people solve the problems they face?

Functionalism had a liberalizing effect on the development of psychology in North America. It greatly expanded the acceptable range of topics. It became fashion- able to study how an organism interacts with its environment, which led to an early emphasis on how experience affects behavior (Thorndike, 1898) and to the study of individual differences among people. Later, some functionalists turned their atten- tion to applied issues, such as how people solve practical problems in industry and in educational settings (Taylor, 1911). To a functionalist, almost any aspect of behavior was considered fair game for study, and psychology boomed in North America.

Behaviorism Despite the differences between structuralism and functionalism, both still considered the fundamental problem in psychology to be understand- ing immediate conscious experience. The great functionalist William James is well known for his superb analysis of consciousness, which he compared to a flowing and ever-changing stream (see Chapter 6). Around 1900, the technique of introspection— systematic self-reflection—remained the dominant method of analysis in psychology.

Yet, not all psychologists were convinced that introspection could produce valid scientific results. In fact, throughout the early days of psychology controversies raged over its proper role. By definition, self-observations are personal, so there is no obvi- ous way to tell whether self-reports are accurate or representative of all people. Introspection also limited the range of populations and topics that could be covered. It’s difficult to ask someone with a severe mental disorder, for example, to introspect on his or her condition (Marx & Cronan-Hillix, 1987).

By 1910 psychologists had begun seriously questioning the usefulness of study- ing immediate conscious experience. Increasingly, the focus shifted toward the study of observable behavior. The intellectual leader of this new movement was a young professor at Johns Hopkins University named John B. Watson (1878–1958). Watson was convinced that psychology should discard all references to consciousness. Mental events cannot be publicly observed, he argued, so they fall outside the proper domain of science. The task for the scientific researcher should be simply to discover how changes in the environment lead to changes in behavior. Because its entire emphasis was on behavior, Watson called this new approach behaviorism (Watson, 1913, 1919).

Behaviorism had an enormous impact on psychology, particularly in North America. Remember: The psychology of Wundt and James was the psychology of mind and immediate experience. Yet by the second and third decades of the 20th cen- tury, references to consciousness had largely vanished from the psychological vocab- ulary, as had the technique of systematic introspection. Researchers now concerned

functionalism An early school of psychology; functionalists believed that the proper way to understand mind and behavior is to first analyze their function and purpose.

behaviorism A school of psychology proposing that the only proper subject matter of psychology is observable behavior rather than immediate conscious experience.

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William James, shown here in 1868, was convinced that to understand a mental process its function must be considered: How does it help the individual solve problems in the environment?

John Watson, shown here at age 30, rejected the study of the mind in favor of the study of observable behavior.

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Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History | 15

themselves with measuring behavior, especially in animals, and noting how carefully controlled laboratory experiences could change behavior (Hull, 1943; Skinner, 1938). Influential psychologists such as B. F. Skinner (1904–1990) repeatedly demonstrated the practical value of the behaviorist approach. Skinner discovered the principles of behavior modification—how actions are changed by reinforcement and nonrein- forcement—that are now widely used in mental hospitals, schools, and the workplace (Skinner, 1969). We’ll discuss these principles in Chapter 7.

The behaviorist approach dominated psychology for decades. However, as you’ll see later in this chapter, many psychologists have returned to the study of mental events (but with a healthy insistence on defining those events in observational terms). Behaviorism continues to be influential in modern psychology, but it no longer com- mands the dominant position it once held.

Freud and the Humanists: The Influence of the Clinic As American psychology was slowly drifting toward behaviorism, a medical doctor in Vienna was mounting his own psychological revolution. Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was trained as a neurologist (someone who studies the nervous system). He regularly treated patients whose physical problems, he felt, were actually psychological in origin. His experiences led him to develop an all-encompassing theory of mind that was to have a huge impact on future psychologists and psychiatrists (Freud, 1900, 1910, 1940).

Psychoanalysis Freud called his theory and system of therapy psychoanalysis, because he believed that the mind and its contents—the psyche—must be analyzed extensively before effective treatments can begin. Freud believed that psychologi- cal problems are best solved through insight: The patient, or client, must understand exactly how memories and other mental processes lead to problem behaviors. For this reason, psychoanalysis is often referred to as a form of “insight” therapy.

One of Freud’s unique contributions was his emphasis on unconscious determi- nants of behavior. Freud believed each person houses a hidden reservoir in the mind, filled with memories, urges, and conflicts that guide and control actions. By “uncon- scious” he meant that these conflicts and memories cannot be accessed directly through conscious introspection—you might try, but your mind prevents you from consciously experiencing certain feelings and memories on your own. Not surpris- ingly, Freud largely dismissed the study of immediate conscious experience. He relied instead on the analysis of dreams, which he believed were largely symbolic, and on the occasional slip of the tongue. He spent hours listening to his patients relate their latest dreams or fantasies in the hope of discovering a key that would unlock their unconscious minds. Freud’s complex analyses of the mind and its symbols led to a theory of how the unconscious mind defends itself from those seeking to discover its secrets. We’ll consider this theory, as well as its applications for the treatment of psy- chological disorders, in Chapters 12 and 15.

The Humanistic Response Freud’s influence was substantial, especially among clini- cians seeking to provide effective therapy for psychological disorders. The familiar image of the client lying on a couch talking about his or her childhood, while the therapist silently jots down notes, is a fairly accurate depiction of early psychoanaly- sis. However, not all psychologists were comfortable with this approach. Freudian psychology painted a rather dark view of human nature, a view in which human actions are the product of unconscious urges related to sex and aggression. Moreover, it dismissed people’s own thoughts and feelings about their actions; instead, behavior is primarily motivated by deeply hidden conflicts of which we are unaware.

In the 1950s negative reactions to Freud’s view of therapy and mind led to the development of a new movement, humanistic psychology. Humanistic psychologists

psychoanalysis A term used by Freud to describe his theory of mind and system of therapy.

humanistic psychology A movement in psychology that focuses on people’s unique capacities for choice, responsibility, and growth.

B. F. Skinner, shown here with one of his famous “Skinner boxes,” championed the behaviorist approach and was one of the most influential psychologists of the 20th century.

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such as Carl Rogers (1905–1987) and Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) rejected Freud’s pessimism and focused instead on peoples’ unique capacity for self-awareness, choice, responsibility, and growth. Humanists argued that people are not helpless unknow- ing animals controlled by unconscious forces—they are ultimately in control of their own destinies and can rise above whatever innate sexual or animalistic urges they possess. Humans are built for personal growth, to seek their fullest potential, to become all they are capable of being (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951).

The optimistic message of the humanists played a significant role in theories of personality development, as well as in the treatment of psychological disorders. Carl Rogers, for example, promoted the idea of client-centered therapy, in which the therapist is seen not as an analyst or judge but rather as a supporter and friend. Humanistic psychologists believe that all individuals have a considerable amount of untapped potential that should be nurtured by an empathetic therapist. This idea remains influential among modern psychological approaches to therapy (see Chapters 12 and 15).

The First Women in Psychology Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) was elected president of the American Psychological Association in 1905. It’s worth pausing and drawing special attention to this accomplishment because women have often been overlooked in historical treatments of psychology. Women were subject to significant discrimination in the early days of psychology. Women were denied admittance to Harvard University, and Mary Calkins was allowed to take classes with William James only as a special “guest” graduate student. She passed the final examinations for the Ph.D. but was never officially awarded the degree. Calkins went on to make a number of contribu- tions to the science of psychology, including the development of the paired-associate learning technique (a method for studying memory that is still in use today), and she was a major contributor to philosophy as well.

● CONCEPt REviEw Approaches to the Study of Psychology GEnERAl FoCuS SPECiFiC APPRoACH imPoRTAnT FiGuRE(S) FoCuSES oF APPRoACH

Research Structuralism Wundt, Titchener Determining the structure of immediate conscious experi- ence through the use of systematic introspection, in which one attempts to describe the fundamental elements associ- ated with simple thoughts and sensations.

Functionalism James, Angell Determining the functions of conscious experience through the use of introspection, naturalistic observation, and the measurement of individual differences. Influenced by Darwin, it greatly expanded the range of topics studied in psychology.

Behaviorism Watson, Skinner Establishing laws of observable behavior. The approach rejects the study of immediate conscious experience and mental events. It was the dominant approach to scientific psychology until the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s.

Clinical Psychoanalysis Freud Analyzing personality and treating psychological disorders by focusing on unconscious determinants of behavior. Also contends that childhood experiences play an important role in shaping adult behavior.

Humanistic psychology Rogers, Maslow A reaction against Freud, emphasizing that humans are basically good and have a unique capacity for self- awareness, choice, responsibility, and growth.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Although Freud was not technically a psychologist—he was a medical doctor— would you classify him as a clinical, applied, or research psychologist?

Carl Rogers helped develop the humanistic perspective, which focuses on our unique capacity for self-awareness, personal responsibility, and psychological growth.

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Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History | 17

The first woman to receive a Ph.D. in psychology (in 1894) was Margaret Floy Washburn (1871–1939), who in 1921 became the second female president of the American Psychological Association. Washburn’s early contributions were in the structuralist tradition—she published her dissertation in one of Wundt’s journals— and she became quite well known for her book The Animal Mind (1908) and for her behavioral views on consciousness. Helen Thompson Wooley (1874–1947) helped pio- neer the study of sex differences, abolishing a number of myths about women that were widely accepted at the time. Never one to mince words, Wooley had this to say about the treatment of women in psychology circa 1910: “There is perhaps no field aspiring to be scientific where flagrant personal bias, logic martyred in the cause of supporting a prejudice, unfounded assertions, and even sentimental rot and drivel have run riot to such an extent as here” (Wooley, 1910, p. 340).

Calkins, Washburn, and Wooley are notable examples of female pioneers in psychology, but they were hardly alone. Many others overcame significant hard- ships to become active contributors to the developing science. For example, Christine Ladd-Franklin (1847–1930) was famous for her early work on color vision, and Lillien Martin (1851–1943), who made significant contributions in perception as well, rose to head the psychology department at Stanford University in 1915. Ruth Howard (1900– 1997) was the first African American woman to receive a Ph.D. in psychology, and she is known for her significant contributions in clinical and developmental psychology. Martha Bernal (1931–2001), the first Latina to receive a doctorate in psychology, con- tributed significantly to the study of ethnic issues. Today, women work in all aspects of psychological research, and they continue to be important contributors to psycho- logical thought. As you’ll see in upcoming chapters, there is also a healthy interest in the psychology of women and in the study of gender differences (Kimura, 1999; Else-Quest et al., 2010).

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Mary Whiton Calkins was the first female president of the American Psychological Association.

test Yourself You can also test your knowledge about the development of psychology by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Most modern psychologists believe that the mind and the body are:

a. controlled by different sections of the pineal gland. b. best considered as one and the same. c. separate, but both can be studied with the scientific method. d. best studied by philosophers and physiologists, respectively.

2. Fill in the blanks in the following paragraph. Choose your answers from the following set of terms: behavior, behaviorism, emotions, empiricists, functionalists, introspection, structuralists, thoughts. Functionalists and structuralists used the technique of to understand immediate conscious experience. The believed that it was best to break the mind down into basic parts, much as a chemist would seek to understand a chemical

compound. The were influenced by Darwin’s views on natural selection and focused primarily on the purpose and adaptive value of mental events. , founded by John Watson, steered psychology away from the study of immediate conscious experience to an emphasis on .

3. Freud’s psychoanalysis differs from Rogers’s humanistic approach in which of the following ways?

a. Psychoanalysis is “client centered” rather than “therapist centered.” b. Psychoanalysis is designed to promote self-awareness and

personal growth. c. Psychoanalysis minimizes the influence of early childhood

experiences. d. Psychoanalysis is designed to reveal hidden urges and

memories related to sex and aggression.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.2

18 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology LEARNING GOALS

● Understand what it means to adopt an eclectic approach. ● Understand the factors that started the cognitive revolution. ● Trace recent developments in biology and evolutionary psychology and note how they influence

modern psychology. ● Explain why psychologists think cultural factors help us understand behavior and mind.

Psychology has changed a lot since Wundt established the first psychological lab- oratory in 1879. Psychologists continue to argue about the proper focus for psy- chology (mind or behavior?) and about how to conceive of human nature (e.g., is there free will?). Debates still rage about the proper form that theories should take and about the right kinds of methods to employ (Proctor & Capaldi, 2001). You shouldn’t be too surprised by the presence of controversy, however. Remember, the discipline is still less than a century and a half old; psychology is still getting its theoretical feet wet.

In the 21st century, most psychologists refuse to accept just one school of thought, such as behaviorism or psychoanalysis, and instead adopt a more eclectic approach. The word eclectic means that one selects or adopts information from many different sources rather than relying on one perspective. Eclecticism is common among clinicians working in the field and among research psychologists working in the laboratory.

In the case of the clinical psychologist, the best technique often depends on the preferences of the client and on the particular problem. Some kinds of phobias—for example, irrational fears of heights or spiders—can be treated effectively by focus- ing on the fearful behavior itself and ignoring its ultimate origin. (We don’t need to know why you’re afraid of snakes; we can just try to deal with the fear itself.) Other kinds of problems may require the therapist to determine how factors in childhood contribute to troublesome adult behavior. Modern clinical psychologists tend to pick and choose among perspectives in an effort to find the approach that works best for their clients.

Research psychologists also take an eclectic approach. Depending on the circum- stance, a researcher might try to determine the biological origins of a behavior or seek simply to describe the conditions under which it occurs. Once the conditions are cataloged, the behavior can be modified in a number of positive ways. Researchers recognize that it’s possible to understand behavior and mind from many different perspectives, at many different levels of detail.

At the same time, several trends or perspectives have become influential in recent years. Modern psychologists remain eclectic, but they increasingly find them- selves appealing to cognitive, biological, evolutionary, and cultural factors to explain behavior. Because of the special emphasis these factors currently receive, I highlight them briefly in the following sections.

Cognitive Factors By the 1950s, researchers began to show renewed interest in the fundamental problems of consciousness and mental processes (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Neisser, 1967). This return to the study of internal psychological processes is sometimes called the cognitive revolution. The word cognitive refers to the process of knowing or per- ceiving; as you may remember from our earlier discussion, cognitive psychologists are research psychologists who study processes such as memory, learning, and reasoning.

eclectic approach The idea that it’s useful to select information from several sources rather than to rely entirely on a single perspective or school of thought.

cognitive revolution The shift away from strict behaviorism, begun in the 1950s, characterized by renewed interest in fundamental problems of consciousness and internal mental processes.

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology | 19

Psychologists returned to the study of internal mental phenomena for several reasons. One factor was the development of research techniques that allowed them to infer the characteristics of mental processes directly from observable behavior. Changes in behavior, as measured by reaction times or forgetting rates, can provide detailed information about internal mental processes—as long as the experiments are conducted properly. You’ll learn about some of these specific techniques later in the book.

Another important factor was the development of the computer, which became a model of sorts for the human mind. Computers function through hardware, the fixed features of the machine such as the processor and storage drive, and software, the programs that tell the hardware what to do. Although the human mind cannot be compared directly to a computer, behavior is often influenced by “hardwired” biological (or genetic) factors and by the strategies (the “software”) that we learn from the environment. Cognitive psychologists often explain behavior by appeal- ing to information processing systems—internal structures in the brain that pro- cess information from the environment in ways that help us solve problems (see Chapters 8 and 9).

Everything from perceptions and memories, to decisions about what foods to eat, to our choice of friends is influenced by our prior knowledge and beliefs. How we think determines how we behave. Many psychologists are convinced that to under- stand psychological disorders, such as depression, we need to understand a person’s thought patterns. Depressed individuals tend to think in rigid and inflexible ways, and therapy is often directed specifically at challenging existing thoughts and beliefs. You’ll see many references to “cognitive” analyses as we investigate psychological phenomena.

Biological Factors Modern psychologists have also benefited significantly from recent discoveries in biol- ogy. Over the years, researchers have uncovered fascinating links between structures in the brain and the phenomena of behavior and mind (see ●Figure 1.4). It is now pos- sible to record the activity of brain cells directly, and we know that individual brain

The human mind cannot be compared directly to a computer. Yet, as in artificial intelligence devices, human behavior is often influenced by “hardware” (biological or genetic factors) and “software” (the strategies that we learn from the environment).

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● FiGuRE 1.4 Specificity in the Brain Scientists have discovered that certain functions in the body appear to be controlled by specific areas of the brain. Biological research has an enormous impact on the thinking of psychologists. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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20 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

cells respond to particular kinds of events in the environment. For example, there are cells in the “visual” part of the brain that respond actively only when particular col- ors, or patterns of light and dark, are viewed.

Technology is also enabling psychologists to take “snapshots” of mental life in action. We can now create images of how mental activities change as the mind pro- cesses its environment. These pictures of the brain in action can help researchers understand normal as well as abnormal brain activity. For example, it’s possible to record brain activity during depression, extreme anxiety, or even during auditory and visual hallucinations. This information helps pinpoint where problems in the brain occur and acts as a road map for treatment.

Great strides have also been made in the understanding of brain chemistry—that is, how natural drugs inside the brain control a range of behaviors. It turns out that many psychological problems, such as depression and schizophrenia, can be linked to imbalances among the chemical messengers in the brain. These developments, which we’ll discuss in detail in Chapters 3, 14, and 15, are shaping the way psychologi- cal problems are treated.

Evolutionary Psychology From our earlier discussion about the origins of knowledge, you know that psycholo- gists have been influenced by Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Although it was widely accepted in the 19th century that the principles of natural selection apply to psychological characteristics, few psychologists advanced these ideas after the rise of behaviorism. Instead, psychologists focused their attention on the environment (nurture) and on learning in particular. They essentially ignored evolutionary and inborn contributions (nature) to behavior. John Watson is known for claiming that any human infant might, under the right environmental conditions, be turned into a “doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and yes, even beggar-man and thief, regard- less of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of ancestors” (Watson, 1930, p. 104).

The rise of behaviorism was helped along by persistent attacks on Darwin’s theory. Critics wondered why people and animals often act in ways that don’t seem very adaptive. Across the animal kingdom, it’s easy to find examples of social behavior that seems to occur largely for the benefit of another—often putting the actor in great personal danger. Parents might deny themselves food and water to help their children survive. In the face of a predator, some animals call atten- tion to themselves by emitting warning cries that help save others in their group. How do these behaviors help promote an individual’s “fitness” for survival and reproduction?

It wasn’t until the second half of the 20th century that evolutionary theorists began to address these problems successfully. Some have argued that “altruistic” helping behavior can be handled by the mechanism of natural selection as long as one considers the unit of selection to be the gene rather than the individual (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964). Sometimes actions that appear harmful to the individual can increase the chances that an adaptive gene, one that is shared within a family, will pass from one generation to the next. Moreover, it is now widely recognized that at least some of our actions are designed specifically to secure a mating partner and not necessarily to promote long-term survival (Buss, 2012).

Evolutionary psychology is a recent movement that seeks to identif y exactly how our behaviors and thought processes have been molded by evolution- ary pressures. Evolutionary psychologists believe we’re born with mental soft- ware that guides our think ing and behavior. These natural tendencies, acquired through natural selection in our ancestral past, help us solve adaptive prob- lems such as learning language, f inding a mate, and acting socially in groups.

evolutionary psychology A movement proposing that we’re born with mental processes and “software” that were acquired through natural selection in our ancestral past and help us to solve specific adaptive problems.

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology | 21

For instance, it’s been suggested that we’re born with an ability to detect cheat- ers in social groups—those who violate social contracts or agreements (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). We may also have been born with the natural distaste for incest, or sexual intercourse with relatives, because of its negative genetic consequences (Crawford, 2007). Not surprisingly, many of the claims of the evolutionary psy- chologists are controversial. Critics often argue that satisfactory environmen- tal explanations can be given for behaviors that seem hardwired and universal (Buller, 2005; Gould & Lewontin, 1979).

Cultural Factors Finally, it’s not possible to understand modern psychology without also discussing culture and the role it plays in our thoughts and actions. By culture, psychologists generally mean the shared values, customs, and beliefs of a group or community (Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 2004). Cultural groups can be based on obvious charac- teristics such as ethnicity, race, or socioeconomic class but also on political, religious, or other factors (e.g., those who share the same sexual orientation might be consid- ered a cultural group). Culture is a broad construct, and its influences can be found in virtually all aspects of behavior and mind.

Cultural influences were largely ignored in mainstream psychology for years. In the introductory textbook that I used as a college student, group influences were not discussed except for a mere three paragraphs covering why individuals might dif- fer in intelligence. Psychologists have always recognized that behavior is influenced by the environment, but it was the behavior of individuals in isolation rather than in groups that received the most attention. Researchers spent their time looking for universal principles of behavior that cut across all people in all groups, rather than exploring how the shared values of a community might affect how people think and act. The search for universal principles is still actively pursued today, as noted in our discussion of evolutionary psychology, but cultural influences are now considered to be a vital part of the story of psychology.

culture The shared values, customs, and beliefs of a group or community.

Cultural groups can reflect such obvious characteristics as shared ethnicity, race, or socioeconomic class but may also be based on political, religious, professional, or other factors.

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Early on a few notable psychologists stressed the influence of culture on cogni- tive and social development. Over half a century ago, the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky proposed that children’s thoughts and actions come from their social inter- actions, particularly with parents. Vygotsky didn’t think it was possible to under- stand the mind of a child without carefully considering the child’s social and cultural world. In an important sense, the properties of a child’s mind are actually created by his or her social and cultural interactions. At first these ideas were not very influential in psychology, partly because Vygotsky died young in the 1930s, but they’ve recently been rediscovered by psychologists and are now being actively pursued. (You’ll read a bit more about Vygotsky in Chapter 4.)

Why have cultural factors finally become so important to psychologists? There are a number of reasons, but perhaps the most important is that culture matters, even when studying basic psychological processes. For example, it is recognized that members of Eastern societies (e.g., China and Japan), on average, think more in terms of the “group” than do Westerners (e.g., Americans), who tend to focus more on the individual. Members of these two cultures categorize and remember dif- ferent things about encounters and simple visual scenes. Japanese responders, for example, are more likely to remember and report about the background elements of a visual scene (“there was a pond or lake”); Americans tend to focus on the active elements (“there was a trout swimming to the right”) and ignore the background (Nisbett et al., 2001). We may even have culture-based brains, in the sense that cultural practices can powerfully shape and modify brain pathways (K itayama & Uskul, 2011).

The important lesson learned by psychologists, perhaps reluctantly at f irst, is that a full understanding of behavior cannot be achieved without consider- ing the individual in his or her social and cultural context. Cultural factors play a role in how we think and interact with each other and even in how we see the world.

test Yourself You can also test your knowledge about the focus of modern psychology by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. According to the eclectic approach, in choosing the best technique to use in therapy, you should consider:

a. the specific unconscious urges that are driving behavior. b. the training and biases of the therapist/researcher. c. the preferences of the client and the particular problem

under investigation. d. the availability of relevant monitoring equipment.

2. Fill in the blanks in the following paragraph. Choose your answers from the following set of terms: biology, cognitive, computer, cultural, philosophy.

Over the past several decades, psychologists have returned to the study of internal mental phenomena such as consciousness. This shift away from strict behaviorism has been labeled the

revolution. An important factor that helped fuel this revolution was the development of the , which became a model of sorts for the human mind. Developments in are also playing an important role in shaping modern psychol- ogy and in creating effective treatments for psychological problems.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.3

Psychology For a Reason: The Function of Psychology | 23

At the end of every chapter, you’ll f ind a section like this, which summarizes the main points of the chapter. This is a good point to stop and think about what you’ve read and what it all means. Remember, the psychological processes that we’ll be discussing exist for a reason—they help us solve problems every minute of every day. In this chap- ter my goal was simply to introduce you to the science of psycholog y. I framed our discussion around three main issues.

Defining and Describing Psychology Psycholog y is the scientif ic study of behavior and mind. Notice this def ini- tion makes no specif ic reference to psychological prob- lems or to any k ind of abnormal behavior. Although many psychologists (especially clinical psychologists) do indeed work to promote mental health, applied psychologists and research psychologists work primarily to understand “nor- mal ” people. The goal of the scientif ic study of behav- ior and mind is to discover general principles that can be applied widely to help people adapt more successfully— in the workplace, in school, or at home—and to unravel the great scientif ic mystery of how and why people do the things they do.

Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History Psychology has existed as a separate scientific subject for little more than a century, but people have pondered the mysteries of behavior and mind for thousands of years. Psychology has its primary roots in the areas of philosophy and physiology. Thinkers in these fields addressed several fundamental psychological issues, including the relation- ship between mind and body and the origins of knowledge. Most modern psychologists solve the mind–body prob- lem by assuming that the two are essentially one and the

same—thoughts, ideas, and emotions arise out of the biolog- ical processes of the brain. It is a common belief among psy- chologists that many basic behaviors originate from innate tendencies (nature) as well as from lifetime experiences (nurture).

Once the discipline of psycholog y was established by Wundt in 1879, psychologists struggled with the proper way to characterize and study the mind. Structuralists, such as Wundt and Titchener, believed the world of imme- diate experience could be broken down into elements, much as a chemist seeks to understand a chemical com- pound. The functionalists argued that the proper focus should be on the function and purpose of behavior. The behaviorists rejected the world of immediate experience in favor of the exclusive study of behavior. Added to the mix were the insights of Sigmund Freud, with his emphasis on the unconscious mind, and the arguments of the human- ists, who strongly advocated free will and the power of personal choice.

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology Each of the early psychological perspectives remains influential to a certain extent today, but most modern psychologists adopt an eclectic approach—they pick and choose from the per- spectives. The study of behavior remains of primary impor- tance, but the world of inner experience is also considered fair game for study, as evidenced by the cognitive revolu- tion and by recent developments in the biological sciences. The possibility that some of our thoughts and actions are controlled by innate mental mechanisms, acquired through natural selection, is also being actively pursued by evo- lutionary psychologists. Finally, psychologists increas- ingly point to cultural factors in their attempts to explain behavior and mind.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON The Function of Psychology

3. Evolutionary psychologists believe that we’re born with certain mental mechanisms, acquired through natural selection in our ancestral past, that help us solve specific adaptive problems such as learning language, finding a mate, and acting socially in groups. True or False?

4. Increasingly, psychologists are appealing to cultural factors to help explain human behavior. Which of the following statements about culture and psychology is false?

a. Cultural influences were largely ignored by psychologists for many years.

b. Culture influences social processes but not basic psychological processes such as memory or reasoning.

c. A few notable psychologists, such as Lev Vygotsky, studied cultural influences many decades ago.

d. By “culture,” psychologists mean the shared values, customs, and beliefs of a group or community.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.3 (Continued)

24 | CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Psychology

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Defining and Describing Psychology ● Psychology is the scientific study of (1) and (2) . Scientific knowledge is based on (3) . Psychologists infer how the mind works from directly measuring (4) .

● (5) psychologists diagnose and treat psycho- logical problems. (6) psychologists extend the principles of scientific psychology to practical, everyday problems in the real world. (7) psychologists conduct experiments and collect data to discover the basic principles of behavior and mind.

● Modern psychology developed out of the disciplines of (8) and (9) .

Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History

● (10) believed that the mind is separate from the body, which the mind controls through the pineal gland. Modern psychologists believe that the mind and body are the same, because the (11) is what the brain does.

● (12) holds that we learn everything through experience. (13) holds that certain kinds of knowledge and ideas are innate (inborn). (14) proposed that natural selection guides evolution and that certain tendencies are inherited. Today, virtually all psychologists accept that psychological characteristics are influenced by both (15) and (16) .

● (17) was founded by Wundt, who established an experimental lab to study the elementary components of immediate experience and how they add up to a meaningful whole. (18) was developed by North American psychologists who studied the adaptive purpose (function) of immediate experience. (19) , led by Watson, was based on the

premise that because immediate conscious experience cannot be observed, measurable behavior is the proper subject of psychology.

● Freud was a neurologist and clinician who developed (20) , which used dreams and free association to analyze both the mind and (21) determinants of behavior. Rogers and Maslow rejected Freud’s pessimism and focused instead on positive traits. (22) psychology holds that we control our destinies and can attain our full potential as human beings.

● (23) ,who developed a paired-association technique, was the first female president of the American Psychological Association. (24) was the first woman to receive a doctorate in psychology and is well known for her behavioral views on consciousness. (25) helped pioneer the study of sex differences. (26) and (27) did significant work on color vision and perception. (28) made important contributions to the study of clinical and developmental psychology. (29) contributed significantly to the study of ethnic issues.

Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology ● (30) means that information is selected from many different sources rather than just one. Cognition is the process of knowing that involves learning, (31) , and reasoning and that importantly influences behavior. Biology influences thought and behavior. Certain psychological problems may be caused by imbalances among the (32) messengers in the brain. (33) factors may be the basis for the thoughts and actions that are controlled by innate mental mechanisms. Culture is influenced by the thoughts and actions of group members along with their shared (34) , customs, and beliefs.

Terms to Remember | 25

applied psychologists, 7 behavior, 6 behaviorism, 14 clinical psychologists, 6 cognitive revolution, 18 culture, 21 eclectic approach, 18

empiricism, 10 evolutionary psychology, 20 functionalism, 14 Gestalt psychology, 11 humanistic psychology, 15 mind, 6 nativism, 11

psychiatrists, 7 psychoanalysis, 15 psychology, 5 research psychologists, 8 structuralism, 13 systematic introspection, 13

Terms to Remember

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Do Psychologists Unlock the Secrets of

Mind and Behavior?

Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research Learning Goals Naturalistic Observation: Focusing on Real

Life Case Studies: Focusing on the Individual Surveys: Focusing on the Group Psychological Tests: Assessing Individual

Differences Statistics: Summarizing and Interpreting

the Data

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS How Should a Teacher Grade?

Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.1

The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines

Learning Goals Informed Consent Debriefing and Confidentiality The Ethics of Animal Research Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.4

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON Unlocking the Secrets of Mind and Behavior

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research

Learning Goals Correlational Research Correlations and Causality Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.2

Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research

Learning Goals Independent and Dependent Variables Experimental Control Expectancies and Biases in Experimental

Research Generalizing Experimental Conclusions Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.3

The Tools of Psychological Research

Todd leaned back on his bed, headphones firmly in place, and cranked up the vol-ume on his iPod. He couldn’t hear the hidden message, the one promoting the “Acme Weight Loss Program,” just the steady “thump-thump-thump” of the bass. He noticed nothing at all in particular, but thoughts about losing weight kept entering his mind.…

Are there secret messages lurking about in advertisements or flowing backward on our favorite music tracks? Maybe these messages are everywhere, hidden from the naked eye and ear by greedy advertisers and dark-natured rock stars. Some have assumed that subliminal (“below the threshold”) stimuli are responsible for much of society’s ills, such as sudden buying urges or especially abnormal thoughts (Key, 1973). Do you have an opinion?

Research psychologists have studied subliminal influence. Fortunately, they’ve found little need for concern (Greenwald et al., 1991; Merikle & Skanes, 1992). Subliminal stimuli may have an influence in some circumstances (Karremans et al., 2006), but there’s very little evidence that subliminal messages are used by adver- tisers, and even if they are, their power to influence is weak at best. So if Todd decides to buy Acme, it’s almost certainly not due to a subliminal message play- ing backward on his iPod. It’s an interesting topic for us, however, because this chapter deals with the techniques of psychological research. How do psychologists determine whether an event in the environment, such as a subliminal message, can affect our behavior?

Because psychology is a science, psychologists use the scientific method as their main tool for investigating behavior and mind. To understand the effect of subliminal messages, then, we must first employ the scientific method. Reduced to its barest essentials, the scientific method contains four important steps (see ●Figure 2.1):

1. Observe. The scientific method always begins, appropriately, with observation. In psychology, we choose the behavior of interest and begin recording its characteris- tics as well as the conditions under which the behavior occurs.

2. Detect regularities. Next the researcher looks for regularities in the observations— are there certain consistent features or conditions under which the behaviors com- monly appear?

scientific method A multistep technique that generates empirical knowledge—that is, knowledge derived from systematic observations of the world.

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Do Psychologists Unlock the Secrets of Behavior and Mind?

28 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

3. Generate a hypothesis. The researcher then forms a hypothesis, which is a pre- diction about the characteristics of the behavior under study. Hypotheses are normally expressed in the form of testable if-then statements: If some set of conditions is present and observed, then a certain kind of behavior will occur.

4. Observe. Finally, the predictions of the hypothesis are checked for accuracy— once again through observation. If new data are consistent with the predic- tion of the hypothesis, the hypothesis is supported.

Notice that the scientific method is anchored on both ends by observation: Observation always begins and ends the scientific process. This means that psy- chological terms must be defined in a way that allows for observation. To make certain that terms and concepts meet this criterion, psychologists often use oper- ational definitions, which define concepts specifically in terms of how those concepts can be measured (Levine & Parkinson, 1994; Stevens, 1939). Intelligence might be defined operationally as performance on a psychological test; memory might be defined as the number of words correctly recalled on a retention test. If your goal is to investigate the topic of subliminal influence, you’ll need an opera- tional definition for subliminal influence. Can you think of one? I’ll return to the topic of subliminal messages later in the chapter.

operational definitions Definitions that specify how concepts can be observed and measured.

The rat receives food for jumping through the checkerboard panel on the left.

Over trials, the rat consistently chooses to jump toward the checkerboard panel on the left.

The rat has learned to associate the checkerboard with food, so if the checkerboard is moved to the right, the rat will jump to the right.

The rat jumps to the left, suggesting it has learned that jumping left produces food.

Detect Regularities Generate HypothesisObserve Observe

● FiGuRE 2.1 the Scientific Method: Four Major Steps 1. Observe. The rat jumps toward the checkerboard panel on the left. 2. Detect regularities in behavior. The researcher notes that the rat, over repeated trials, consistently jumps to the checkerboard on the left. 3. Generate a hypothesis: If I move the checkerboard to the right, the rat will jump to the right. 4. Observe to test the hypothesis. Here the hypothesis turns out to be wrong. The rat jumps left again instead of following the checkerboard. (© Cengage Learning)

Now we’ll focus on the methods researchers use to help describe and under- stand behavior and mind. Research techniques are designed to solve specific kinds of problems for the psychologist, such as determining cause and effect or predicting and selecting. To understand a method you must first understand its goals—what kind of information about behavior and mind is the psychologist attempting to collect?

Observing and Describing Behavior Because the scientific process depends on observation, one of the most important steps in any psychological research proj- ect is to choose a behavior and begin recording its characteristics. However, observation in research is more than casual looking or listening—the methods of observation must be systematic. To solve problems associated with observa- tion and description, psychologists have developed a set of procedures known collectively as descriptive research.

Predicting Behavior Once behavioral data have been collected and described, the researcher typically begins to think about the possibility of prediction. Descriptive research yields facts about behavior, but we need a different set of techniques to decide when and how the behavior will reoccur. Prediction is valuable because it allows for more effective control of future environments. To solve the problem of prediction, psychologists often employ correlational research.

Explaining Behavior To understand the cause of a behavior, it’s necessary to con- duct experimental research. The researcher systematically manipulates the envi- ronment to determine its effect on a particular behavior. If conducted properly, an experiment allows the researcher to understand why the behavior occurs or changes over time.

Treating Participants Ethically Is it proper for the psychologist to hide in the shadows, carefully recording someone’s every move in an attempt to advance scientific knowledge? Is it proper to experiment on animals— depriving them of food or water or destroying portions of their brain— simply to learn about the mechanisms controlling behavior? These are not easy questions to answer, but researchers have developed a set of ethical princi- ples to help ensure that all research participants are treated with dignity and respect.

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Psychology for a Reason: How do Psychologists Unlock the Secrets of Behavior and Mind? | 29

30 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research LEARNING GOALS

● Describe the techniques and goals of descriptive research. ● Explain how psychologists conduct naturalistic research. ● Discuss the gains and costs of case studies and surveys. ● Explain how statistics can summarize and help interpret data. ● Describe the major purpose of psychological tests.

Descriptive research consists of the methods that are used to observe and describe behavior. At face value, the act of observation seems simple enough—after all, most people can watch and record the behavior of themselves or others. However, it’s easy to be misled, even when the goal is simply to record behavior passively (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1969; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996).

Let’s suppose you want to observe the behavior of preschoolers in the local day- care center. You arrive with cameras and recording devices to observe the children at play. But you soon notice that the children distract easily—many seem uneasy and hesitant to participate in the activities suggested by the teacher. Several children show outward signs of fear and eventually withdraw, crying, to a corner of the room. You conclude that children in day-care centers adjust badly, and some even show early signs of poor psychological health.

Is this a valid conclusion? Probably not. Whenever you observe the actions of another, the very act of observing can affect the behavior you’re recording. In the case of the day-care center, it’s likely that your unexpected presence (with cameras and the like) made the children feel uncomfortable and led them to act in ways that were not representative of their normal behavior. Psychologists call this a problem of reactivity. Reactivity occurs when behavior is changed by the process

of being observed. It’s called reactivity because the behavior is essentially a reac- tion to the observation process (Orne, 1969; Webb et al., 1981). The children are probably not naturally hesitant and dis- tracted—they were simply startled by your presence.

One consequence of reactivity is the loss of external validity. External valid- ity tells us how well the results of an observation generalize to other situa- tions or are representative of real life (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979). If a child’s behavior is largely a reaction to your presence, it is clearly not representative of real life. More generally, even if these chil- dren are naturally fearful, your one set of observations cannot guarantee that your conclusions are representative of how children at other day-care centers will act. To improve external validity, you must record the behavior of children at another day-care center, or preferably many day-care centers, to see whether similar behaviors emerge.

descriptive research Methods designed to observe and describe behavior.

reactivity When behavior changes as a result of the observation process.

external validity The extent to which results generalize to other situations or are representative of real life.

Psychologists must keep in mind the problem of reactivity: Are the behaviors they’re observing simply a reaction to being observed? If these children behave differently because of the observer’s presence, the observations may not generalize well to other situations.

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Naturalistic Observation: Focusing on Real Life One way to reduce the problem of reactivity and improve external validity is to observe behavior in natural settings. In naturalistic observation, the researcher records only naturally occurring behavior, as opposed to behavior produced in the laboratory. Because the recorded behavior is natural, and the researcher has tried hard not to interfere in any way, the observations are generally considered to be rep- resentative of real life. (Of course, it is also necessary to repeat the observations in different settings to be certain the results generalize.) Also, if the participants are unaware of being observed, their behavior cannot simply be a reaction to the obser- vation process. Naturalistic observation has been used with great success by psychol- ogists as well as by ethologists, biologists who study the behavior of animals in the wild (Goodall, 1990; Lorenz, 1958).

Researchers sometimes use a naturalistic technique called participant observation. Here, the observer attempts to become a part of the activities being studied, to blend into the group. In the 1950s a group of psychologists joined a doomsday cult group by passing themselves off as believers. People in the cult were convinced that the world was going to end, on a particular date, from a natural disaster. Once they were on the inside, the psychologists recorded and studied the reactions of the cultists when the prophesized “day of doom” failed to materialize (Festinger et al., 1956). In another classic project that you’ll read more about in Chapter 14, a group of researchers com- mitted themselves to local mental hospitals—they complained of hearing voices—in an effort to obtain an honest record of patient life inside an institution (Rosenhan, 1973). Participant observation could easily be used in our day-care center example: You could introduce yourself as a new teacher, rather than as a researcher, and hide your cameras or other recording equipment.

In naturalistic observation the researcher records only behavior that occurs naturally (in contrast to behavior produced in the laboratory) and makes an effort not to interfere in any way.

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Another way to reduce reactivity is to measure behavior indirectly, by looking at the results of the behavior rather than the behavior itself. You could learn something about the shopping habits of teenagers at the local mall by analyzing the litter they leave behind. Administrators at museums have determined the popularity of various exhibits by noting how quickly floor tiles in front of each display wear out and need to be replaced (Webb et al., 1981). Neither of these examples requires direct observa- tion; it is the aftereffects of the behavior that provide the insightful clues.

naturalistic observation A descriptive research technique that records naturally occurring behavior as opposed to behavior produced in the laboratory.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you see any ethical problems with the technique of participant observation? After all, isn’t the researcher misleading people by assuming a false identity?

In attempting to understand why people act the way they do, psychologists study both ordinary and unusual behaviors.

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32 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

Naturalistic observation can also be used to verify the results of laboratory exper- iments. To understand why a behavior occurs, researchers usually manipulate the behavior directly through an experiment. Because it is difficult to conduct an experi- ment in natural settings, laboratory studies generate concerns about external validity. Most studies of human memory, for example, have been conducted by having people learn lists of words in the laboratory (Bruce, 1985; Neisser, 1978). Do the principles established from such studies apply to learning and remembering in natural settings? To answer this question, psychologists also record natural instances of remembering and forgetting. There is a new device, called the SenseCam, that takes digital snap- shots of everything in the immediate view of an observer. SenseCam can easily be worn around the neck and it automatically takes a new picture every 30 seconds or so. This means that the SenseCam can provide a digital record of everything the per- son has seen and done over the course of a day. Such a record can then be used by a researcher to verify a person’s memories of the day’s events. SenseCams also have a practical application, helping people with memory difficulties recover important events from the day (Hodges et al., 2011).

Case Studies: Focusing on the Individual In a case study the researcher focuses on a single case, usually one individual. Because lots of information can be collected about the background and behavior of a single person, case studies give researchers an important historical perspective; this, in turn, helps the researcher form hypotheses about the possible causes of a behavior or psychological problem.

It’s easy to find examples of case studies. Just browse around at your local book- store, and you’ll find lots of books written about interesting cases; often the main characters in these books suffer from psychological problems or bizarre neuro- logical disorders. Sybil is a well-known case study of multiple personality disor- der (now known as dissociative identity disorder). The neurologist Oliver Sacks has written a number of delightful books about clinical cases, such as The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (Sacks, 1985) or The Mind’s Eye (Sacks, 2010). One of the most influential psychological theories of the 20th century, the psychoanalytic the- ory of Sigmund Freud, was based primarily on descriptive data gathered from case studies.

Like naturalistic observation, case studies suffer from limitations. By focusing on a single case, one obvious concern is external validity: Are the experiences of the research participant truly representative of others? Sybil’s particular case may not be representative of how psychological disorders normally develop. Another problem is verification: It can be difficult to verify the claims of the studied person. If the observations of the participant are somehow tainted—the person is lying, for example—the entire study must be viewed with suspicion. In fact, recent evidence suggests that many of the original claims about Sybil and her disorder may have been fabrications (Nathan, 2011). Case studies can be excellent vehicles for gen- erating hypotheses but are generally ineffective for determining cause-and-effect relationships.

Surveys: Focusing on the Group Whereas a case study focuses on a single individual, a survey is used to sample behavior broadly, usually by gathering responses from many people. Most surveys use questionnaires. Individuals or groups are asked to answer questions about some

case study A descriptive research technique in which the effort is focused on a single case, usually an individual.

survey A descriptive research technique designed to gather limited amounts of information from many people, usually by administering some kind of questionnaire.

It is possible for researchers to gauge the popularity of an exhibit by noting the wear and tear on the floor in front of the display.

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Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research | 33

personal behavior or psychological characteristic. You’re familiar with the opinion surveys conducted by political campaigns. Surveys can also be used purely for research purposes to gain valuable descrip- tive information about behavior and mind. For example, researchers have used surveys to determine whether there are gender differences in online (Internet) buying behavior (Dittmar et al., 2004), and to see whether television viewing habits in the days immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks affected the likelihood of develop- ing posttraumatic stress disorder (Ahern et al., 2004).

●Figure 2.2 shows the results of a survey conducted by Michael Yapko (1994) in which 869 psychotherapists with differing degrees of academic training responded to questions about the use of hyp- nosis for recovering forgotten or repressed memories. As you may know, hypnosis is sometimes used by therapists as a memory aid to help people recover forgotten instances of trauma. Ninety-seven percent of Yapko’s survey respondents agreed that hypnosis is a worthwhile tool in psychotherapy. Nearly 54% were convinced that hypnosis could be used to recover memories of actual events as far back as birth. More than one in four of the respondents believed that hypnosis could be used to recover accurate memories of past lives. (Huh?) If conducted properly, surveys are useful because they provide researchers with valuable insight into what people believe. In this case, Yapko’s results are alarming because they reveal how widespread misinformed views can be, even among professional psychotherapists (don’t worry, the Yapko data do not represent the majority opinion among psychologists—for reasons that will be described later). As you’ll discover in Chapter 6, memories recov- ered through hypnosis may not be especially accurate. Plus, there is certainly no scientific evidence to support the existence of past lives (remembered or otherwise)! But before survey results can be accepted as truly representative of a group, such as practicing psychotherapists, the researchers must make certain that the participants in the survey have been sampled randomly. (see Lindsay & Poole, 1998).

Sampling From a Population The purpose of a survey is to gather lots of observa- tions to help determine the characteristics of a large group or population. If the pop- ulation of interest is extremely large, such as everyone between ages 18 and 25 in the United States, researchers must decide how to select a representative subset of indi- viduals to measure. A subset of individuals from a target population is referred to as a sample.

When sampling from a population, it’s easy to end up with an unrepresenta- tive, or biased, sample unless the proper precautions are taken. Let’s imagine that a researcher named Rosa wants to know how often college-aged adults practice safe sex. She puts an ad containing a toll-free telephone number in selected college newspapers. Her hope is that students will call the number and answer questions about their sexual practices. However, not every college-aged student in the coun- try will choose to participate. This means that Rosa will end up with only a sub- set, or sample, of the population of interest. Do you think the data collected from her subset will be truly representative of college students? In this case the answer is clearly “No,” because the method of sampling depends on people choosing to participate. Volunteers tend to produce biased samples, because people who volun- teer usually have strong feelings or opinions about the study (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975). Think about it—would you tell a researcher that you regularly fail to practice safe sex?

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● FiGuRE 2.2 Opinions About Hypnosis A survey of psychotherapists shows the percentage of respondents who agreed, disagreed, or gave no response to the following statements: “Hypnosis is a worthwhile psychotherapy tool,” “Hypnosis can be used to recover memories of actual events as far back as birth,” and “Hypnosis can be used to recover accurate memories of past lives.” (Yapko, 1994)

34 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

Representative samples are produced through random sampling, which means that everyone in the target population has an equal likelihood of being selected for the survey. Because everyone has an equal chance of participating, random sampling helps to ensure that all possible biases, viewpoints, and backgrounds will be repre- sented. In principle, for Rosa to achieve a truly unbiased sample she would need to sample randomly from the entire population of college students—everyone in the group must have an equal chance of being selected. Because this is difficult to achieve in practice, Rosa will probably limit herself to sampling randomly from the popula- tion of students going to her particular college.

Now let’s return to Yapko’s (1994) survey, in which 869 practicing psychothera- pists gave their views on the use of hypnosis as an effective memory aid. The results showed that some psychotherapists wrongly believe that hypnosis can be used to recover memories from past lives. Importantly, however, Yapko did not use a random sample of psychotherapists in his study—he simply asked therapists who attended cer- tain conventions and workshops for their opinions. His survey may therefore suffer from a volunteer problem that limits its generalizability. Only psychotherapists with strong opinions about hypnosis may have chosen to participate. To claim his results are truly representative of psychotherapists as a whole, he would need to use random sampling (for a similar study that does use random sampling, see Gore-Felton et al., 2000).

Even if a proper sample of the population has been selected, surveys can suf- fer from additional problems. Because large numbers of people are tested, it is usu- ally not possible to get detailed information about the topic of interest. For example, researchers cannot obtain the in-depth historical information that can be collected in a case study. Surveys also consist mainly of self-reports, and people cannot always be counted on to provide accurate observations. Some people lie or engage in wish- ful thinking; others answer questions in ways they think might please the researcher.

Fortunately, psychologists have developed methods of checking for these types of strategies, but there is no perfect way to assure honest and accurate responses from a participant. The results of a survey can also depend on the particular wording of the questions or even on the order in which the questions are asked. Surveys can be writ- ten in ways that minimize the risk of inconsistent responses—for example, particular questions can be asked several times with slightly different wording—but inaccurate responding remains a concern and is difficult to eliminate.

Psychological Tests: Assessing Individual Differences One of the most widely used descriptive research techniques is the psychological test. Psychological tests come in a variety of forms. They’re designed primarily to mea- sure differences among people. For example, achievement tests measure a person’s cur- rent level of knowledge or competence in a particular subject (such as mathematics or psychology); aptitude tests measure the potential for success in a given profession or area of study. Researchers also use intelligence and personality tests to classify ability, or to characterize a person’s tendencies to act in consistent ways.

Psychological tests have enormous practical value, and they help to advance basic research (Kaplin & Saccuzzo, 2005). Intelligence tests can be used to identify chil- dren who might need extra help in school or who are gifted and can benefit from an enriched curriculum; for adults, intelligence test scores are sometimes used to predict future performance on the job (O’Boyle et al., 2010; Ree & Earles, 1992). Of course, tests also help diagnose psychological problems and verify the effectiveness of treatment.

Psychological tests are also used to answer fundamental questions about behav- ior and mind. For example, do people have a fixed amount of intelligence, present at birth, or do they have multiple kinds of intelligence that rise and fall with experience?

random sampling A procedure guaranteeing that everyone in the population has an equal likelihood of being selected for the sample.

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Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research | 35

Do people have consistent personality traits, such as honesty or pleasantness, or do their behaviors change haphazardly across situations? You’ll hear more about these specific topics when we treat psychological tests in detail in Chapters 10 and 12.

Statistics: Summarizing and Interpreting the Data At the end of any research project, the observations are organized and summarized. Researchers look for patterns in the data so that hypotheses can be formulated and tested. If the observations can be expressed as numbers, you can calculate statistics, or values derived from mathematical manipulations of the data.

Central Tendencies It’s often useful to begin with a measure of central tendency, or the value around which scores tend to cluster. The mean is the arithmetic average of a set of scores. To calculate a mean, you simply add up the numbers for each of the observations and divide the total by the number of observations. Suppose you’re a server at a local restaurant. You work a five-day week, and your tips for the week are $30, $20, $20, $60, and $70. The mean of these scores would be 40 (30 + 20 + 20 + 60 + 70 = 200; 200 / 5 = 40). The mean summarizes the data into a single representative number: On average, you made $40 in tips. Notice, though, you never actually made $40 on any given day. The mean provides only an estimate of central tendency; it does not indicate anything about particular scores.

Other measures of central tendency include the mode, which is the most fre- quently occurring score (in the tip example the mode is $20), and the median, which is the middle point in the set of scores. The mode has the advantage of representing a real score—you did actually receive $20 on some days—and it’s easy to calculate. Calculating the median takes a bit more work. First, order the scores from smallest to largest (20, 20, 30, 60, 70), then look for the middle score. For tips, half the scores fall below 30, and half fall above, so 30 is the median. If the number of scores is even, with no single middle score (e.g., 20, 20, 30, 40, 60, 70), the median is typically calculated by taking the midpoint of the two middle scores (the midpoint between 30 and 40 is 35).

Researchers usually like to compute several measures of central tendency. The mean is an excellent summary of the average score, but it can be misleading. Suppose instead of $70 on your last workday you actually pull in $150! If we replace the old number with the new one, we now have the following set of scores: 20, 20, 30, 60, 150. The mean will shift rather dramatically because of the extreme score, from 40 to 56, but neither the mode nor the median will change at all (see ●Figure 2.3). Because of the way they are calculated, means are very sensitive to extreme scores—the value shifts in the direction of the extreme score. On the other hand, the mode and the median are unaffected. In our example, the median or the mode is probably a better summary of your daily income than the mean.

mean The arithmetic average of a set of scores.

mode The most frequently occurring score in a set of scores.

median The middle point in an ordered set of scores; half of the scores fall at or below the median score, and half fall at or above the median score.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Grade point average is typically calculated using the mean. Suppose the mean was replaced with a grade point mode or a grade point median. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of calculating grade point in these ways?

● CONCEPt REviEw Observational Research Methods SPECIFIC METHOD DESCRIPTION ADVANTAGES (A) AND DISADVANTAGES (D)

Naturalistic observation Record naturally occurring behavior A: Behavior is natural; results are generalizable D: Research lacks control; can’t determine cause

Case studies Gather a great deal of information on a single case

A: Gives historical perspective D: Difficulties in generalization based on one case

Surveys Gather responses from many participants A: Can easily gather large amounts of information D: Sample bias; people misrepresenting themselves

Psychological tests Measure individual differences among people A: Potential practical uses; assess basics of mind D: Difficulties in test construction and validation

36 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

Variability In addition to calculating measures of central tendency, researchers are also interested in variability, or how much the scores in a set differ from one another. The mean indicates the average, but it provides no information about how far apart the individual scores are from each other. Why is this important? Well, think about your last exam score. Let’s assume you received a 79 and the average score was 75. How did you do? Your best guess is probably that you did about average because your score was relatively close to the mean—but perhaps not. If the scores were all bunched toward the middle, your performance might have been spectacular—in fact, a 79 could have been the highest grade in the class. As a result, researchers need to know more than the average of a set of scores; they also need to know something about variability (see ●Figure 2.4).

Several measures of variability are available to researchers. A simple one is the range, which measures the difference between the largest and smallest scores. If the highest score in the class was 90 and the lowest score was 50, the range would be 90 – 50 = 40. A more widely used statistical tool is the standard deviation, which provides an indication of how much individual scores vary from the mean. It’s calculated by (1) finding the difference (or deviation) of each score from the mean; (2) squaring those deviations; (3) finding the average, or mean, of the squared deviations; and (4) cal- culating the square root of that average. Knowing the standard deviation helps you interpret individual scores. If the difference between your test score and the mean is much greater than the “standard” deviation, then we know that your score is rela- tively rare. We’ll return to the concept of standard deviation later in the text, particu- larly in Chapter 10. Psychologists often define psychological characteristics, such as intelligence, by determining how far a score “sits” from the mean in a distribution of scores. (To apply what you have learned about variability, see the Practical Solutions feature.)

variability A measure of how much the scores in a distribution of scores differ from one another.

range The difference between the largest and smallest scores in a distribution.

standard deviation An indication of how much individual scores differ or vary from the mean.

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● FiGuRE 2.3 Comparing the Mean, the Median, and the Mode The top row shows the differences between the mean (arithmetic average), the median (middle point in a set of scores), and the mode (most frequently occurring score) for tips earned per day in a restaurant. The bottom row shows how the mean can be affected by an extreme score, in this case for the day you received $150 in tips. Notice that the extreme score has no effect on the median or mode. (© Cengage Learning)

Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research | 37

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● FiGuRE 2.4 variability Researchers are often interested in variability, the extent to which scores in a set differ from one another. Each of these two distributions has the same average, or mean, but the distribution on the left has more variability. Notice that the difference between the mean and a particular score, such as 83, is the same in the two cases. But scoring 8 points above the mean is highly unusual in the distribution on the right, and more common in the distribution on the left. If you received a score of 83, which class would you rather be in? (© Cengage Learning)

Now let’s apply what you just learned about statistical “variability” to an important topic: GRADING! Every teacher needs a method for discriminating among people. If you work really hard and perform well on tests, you should be rewarded with a higher grade than someone who skips class and never bothers to learn the material, right? Students are often skeptical about grading techniques, what- ever method is employed, but most teachers adopt one of two strategies, absolute grading or relative grading (sometimes called grading “by the curve”). One depends on variability, and the other does not. Let’s consider each in turn.

Absolute grading is simple and easy to understand. Your grade is determined by the number, or percentage, of items that you answer correctly on a test. So, if there are 100 questions on your final exam, you might need to answer 90 or more correctly to receive an A, if you correctly answer between 80 and 90 questions you get a B, and so on. With this method, you immediately know where you stand once you get your test score. Your grade does not depend on how the

rest of the students in the class performed. Variability, or how much the scores in the class differ from one another, is not involved in the calculation.

Relative grading, or grading by the curve, means your grade is determined by your relative performance in the class. If there are 100 students in the class, an A might be given to the top 10 students (or 10%), a B to the next 10, and so on. In this case your absolute score means nothing by itself—you need to know something about how the test scores vary among the students in your class. Variability is critical in determining your grade, as in the example shown in Figure 2.4.

Which is the best technique? Both are easy to justify, but they both have problems. Suppose your teacher doesn’t have a very good “sense” of what the class understands and writes an extremely difficult test—in fact, the best student in the class answers only 50% of the questions correctly. Does this mean that everyone in the class should get an F? That’s what would probably happen if the grades were determined by an absolute

scale. Relative grading takes the teacher’s test out of the equation. It doesn’t matter whether the test is easy or hard. What mat- ters is where your test score “sits” in the distribution of class scores—how well you performed relative to everyone else in the class. So even if you only get half of the test questions correct, you might still get an A. But here’s the trouble with relative grading: Suppose you happen to be in a class of bril- liant students. You might learn the material quite well, perhaps you answer 90% of the test questions correctly, but you could still be at the bottom of the class distribution. Do you deserve to flunk just because you are in a “smart” class?

Lots of factors are involved in picking the best way to grade, such as the size of the class, the experience of the teacher, whether the material is introductory or advanced, and many more. Talk to your teacher about his or her chosen method. Try to determine the role that “variability” is playing in your teacher’s method—it should help you understand why variability is important to the psychologist as well!

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS How Should a Teacher Grade?

38 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

Inferential Statistics Statistics such as the mean and the standard deviation form a part of what is called descriptive statistics—they help researchers describe their data. But it’s also possible to use statistics to draw inferences from data—to help interpret the results. Researchers use inferential statistics to decide (1) whether the behaviors recorded in a sample are representative of some larger population, or (2) whether the differences among observations can be attributed to chance or to some other factor.

Inferential statistics are based on the laws of probability. Researchers always assume that the results of an observation, or group of observations, might be due to chance. For example, suppose you find that the male servers in your restaurant aver- age $38 a day in tips for the week whereas the female servers average $42 (a difference of $4). Is there really a sex difference in tip income? Perhaps the difference is acciden- tal and unrepresentative. Maybe if you had recorded tip income in a different week, you would have found that men produced more income. It is in your interest, then, to determine how representative your data are of true tipping behavior.

Through inferential statistics, researchers try to determine the likelihood, or prob- ability, that results could have occurred by chance. The details of the procedures are beyond the scope of this text, but if the probability is extremely low you can treat your findings as statistically significant. In most psychological studies, the probability that an outcome is due to chance must be lower than 0.05 (5%) for the outcome to be accepted as statistically significant. This means you can treat a female tipping advantage of $4 as significant only if that difference occurs less than 5 times out of 100 by chance alone.

descriptive statistics Mathematical techniques that help researchers describe their data.

inferential statistics Mathematical techniques that help researchers decide whether data are representative of a population or whether differences among observations can be attributed to chance.

test Yourself You can also test your knowledge of descriptive research methods by filling in these blanks with one of the following words or terms: reactivity, external validity, case study, random sampling, survey, mean, median, mode, standard deviation. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The middle point in an ordered set of scores is the .

2. The technique, which focuses on the study of a single instance of a behavior or condition, is open to criticism because its results may lack ; that is, the results may not general- ize or be representative of the population as a whole.

3. When behavior changes as a result of the observation process, the recorded data are said to suffer from a problem of .

4. The descriptive research technique used to gather limited amounts of information from many people is called a .

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.1

Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research LEARNING GOALS

● Define correlation and explain how correlations can be used to predict behavior. ● Explain why correlations cannot normally be used to determine the cause of behavior.

Psychologists are rarely satisfied with just describing behavior. They’re also interested in making predictions about future behavior. Prediction allows you to determine

Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research | 39

how individuals are likely to perform in the future—this is a good thing. Thus the manager of a company can select the best potential employee based on present per- formance; the school administrator can manage a student’s curriculum to maximize future performance.

Correlational Research One way to predict future performance is to determine whether a relationship exists between two measures of behavior, the one recorded and the one expected. Psychologists use a statistical measure called a correlation to help make this deter- mination. A correlation tells you whether two variables, or measures that can take on more than one value (such as a test score), vary together systematically. Correlations are computed by gathering observations on both measures of interest from a single set of individuals and then computing a mathematical index called a correlation coeffi- cient. A correlation coefficient gives the researcher a feel for how well the value of one variable, such as job success, can be predicted if the value of a second variable, such as an achievement test score, is known.

When there is a correlation between two measures of behavior, those behaviors will tend to vary together in some way. For example, there is probably a strong corre- lation between the number of hours worked and the number of tips a server receives. The two measures vary together—the more hours you spend working, the more tips you get. In this particular case, we have a positive correlation, which means the two measures move in the same direction—the more of one, the more of the other. A neg- ative correlation is when the two measures move in opposite directions. For example, there is a negative, or inverse, relationship between the number of hours that Beverly practices on the piano and the number of errors she makes during her recital per- formance. The more she practices, the fewer errors she is likely to make. A relation- ship still exists—we can predict one when we know the other—but the correlation is negative.

Calculating a correlation coefficient requires that you collect observations from a relatively large number of individuals. Moreover—and this is important— data must be recorded initially on both measures. The details of the calculation are beyond the scope of this text, but if calculated properly correlation coefficients always range between +1.00 and –1.00. The absolute value of the coefficient (the range between 0 and 1 without the sign) indicates the strength of the correlation. The closer the value is to 1.00 (either positive or negative), the stronger the relation- ship and the more likely you’ll make an accurate prediction. The sign of the coeffi- cient tells you whether the correlation is positive or negative. Positive correlations fall within the range from 0 to +1.00; negative correlations fall within the range from 0 to –1.00.

Scatter Plots ●Figure 2.5 on the next page shows two examples of how positive and negative correlations can be represented graphically, in the form of a scatter- plot. Each point on a scatterplot represents someone’s scores on the two measures. Figure 2.5a shows a strong positive correlation between the two measures in our study of tips received by servers: hours worked and the amount of tips. Figure 2.5b shows a strong negative correlation between the two measures in our study of piano playing: hours spent practicing and errors made during the recital. Once a correla- tion has been computed, it can then be applied to new individuals who have a score on only one of the measures. So, based on the results of our piano study, you can predict how many errors Natasha will make during her recital by simply knowing how many hours she practiced. The closer the correlation is to 1.00 (positive or nega- tive), the more accurate your prediction is likely to be. This is the logic used by most college admissions committees. They know there is a correlation between SAT and

correlation A statistic that indicates whether two variables vary together in a systematic way; correlation coefficients vary from +1.00 to –1.00.

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college performance, so they try to predict how well people will do in college by look- ing at their SAT scores.

Zero Correlations When a correlation coefficient is not statistically different from zero, the two measures are said to be uncor- related. Technically, this means that know- ing the value of one measure does not allow you to predict the value of the second mea- sure with an accuracy greater than chance. Imagine, for example, trying to predict col- lege grade point average by measuring how many times people wash their hands dur- ing the day. In this case, the correlation is almost certainly zero—you can’t use hand- washing behavior to predict GPA. Note: It’s important not to confuse the concept of a zero correlation with negative correlation. If the correlation between two variables is zero, no statistical relationship is present—a

value on one measure reveals nothing about the other measure. In a negative corre- lation, a clear relationship exists; it’s just that the values move in opposite directions.

Interestingly, the fact that two measures are uncorrelated (they have a zero corre- lation) doesn’t mean that similar values can’t occur on each. Look at the scatterplot in ●Figure 2.6. It shows a zero correlation between hand washing and GPA. Each point shows how many times a particular person washed his or her hands in a day (x-axis) along with his or her GPA (y-axis). If there’s no correlation between the two, as the figure depicts, then we can’t predict GPA simply by knowing hand-washing behavior. Yet notice that some points in the figure (marked in orange) show that a high value on the hand-washing variable can be associated with a high value on the GPA variable. Suppose you only looked at these instances—“Wow, people who wash their hands a lot sure have high GPAs”—you might mistakenly conclude that the key to getting a high GPA is make sure your hands are clean!

Once again, the point to remember is that when two variables are unrelated we can’t predict what will happen. Sometimes a high value on one measure will be associated with a high value on the other measure; sometimes it will be associated with a low value. A mistake people often make is to look only at the cases where the two variables appear to be related. Consider the ability of “psychics” to predict the future. Many people believe in precognition, the ability to predict the future, based on a few anecdotal examples (e.g., “I dreamed my dog was hit by a car, and the next day it happened”). In all likelihood, however, the correlation between predictions and outcomes is zero. We ignore those instances in which our feelings (“I have a feel- ing something bad is going to happen to the dog tomorrow”) don’t come true (“My dog turned out to be fine”); instead, we focus only on those few instances where, by chance, predictions and events occur together.

Behavioral measures rarely correlate perfectly—most correlations are only mod- erate. When researchers make predictions about behavior based on correlations, the accuracy of their predictions is usually limited. The correlation between scores on the SAT and the grade point average of college freshmen is only around +0.50, not 1.0 (Kunkel & Hezlett, 2010). Researchers can use SAT scores to predict college perfor- mance, but the test’s predictive abilities are far from perfect. Likewise, the correlation between height and weight is only about +0.60; on average, taller people do tend to weigh more, but there are obvious exceptions to this general rule. Correlation coeffi- cients give researchers some important predictive ability, but they do not completely capture the variability present in the world.

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● FiGuRE 2.5 Positive and Negative Correlations Each point in the scatterplot shows an individual’s scores on each of the two variables. (a) In a strong positive correlation, the values for both variables move in the same direction; that is, as more hours are worked, more tips are received. (b) In a negative correlation, the values for the two variables move in opposite directions; that is, as more time is spent practicing, fewer errors are made during the recital. (© Cengage Learning)

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● FiGuRE 2.6 Zero Correlation This scatterplot shows a zero correlation between numbers of times hands are washed and grade point average. Overall, it is not possible to predict the value on one of the variables by knowing a value on the other, although high values on each variable (orange) sometimes occur together. (© Cengage Learning)

Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research | 41

Correlations and Causality Determining that a relationship exists between two measures of behavior is impor- tant. It helps people make educated guesses about their environment. It is useful to know that if a person acts in a certain way at time 1, he or she is likely to act in a predictable way at time 2. Suppose that we could demonstrate a meaningful corre- lation between the amount of violence that a child watches on television and how aggressively that child will act later in life. Knowing about such a relationship would probably influence the behavior of parents and might even lead to a social outcry to monitor televised violence (Bushman & Anderson, 2001).

Correlations are useful for helping psychologists describe how behaviors co-occur in our world, but they are of only limited value when it comes to understanding why. The presence of a correlation between two behaviors may help psychologists predict, but correlations do not allow them to determine causality. A correlation between watching violence on television and later aggression does not mean that television violence causes aggression, even if the correlation is perfect.

Third Variables The main reason it’s not possible to determine causality from a cor- relation is the presence of other potentially uncontrolled factors. Two variables can appear to be connected—that is, they might rise or fall together in a regular way—but the connection could be due to a common link with some third variable. Let’s con- sider an example close to home. It’s commonly argued, correctly, that annual income will be higher if a person graduates from college. Put in terms of a correlation, annual income is positively correlated with years of schooling. Does that mean that a good education causes better jobs and higher income? Perhaps, but not necessarily. A third factor could explain the relationship.

Think about the kinds of people who go to college. Do they represent a ran- dom sample of the population as a whole? Of course not. College students tend to be brighter, they tend to come from better secondary schools, and they tend to be people who have worked hard and succeeded in high school. None of these other factors is controlled for in the calculation of a correlation. You can predict with a correlation, but you can’t determine what is responsible for the relationship. College students might end up with higher incomes because they’re smarter, work harder, or because they’re better educated. Any or all of these factors could be contributing to the rela- tionship that the correlation describes.

Now let’s return to the example we considered earlier—the relationship between TV violence and aggression. Can you think of a third variable that might explain the correlation? One possibility is that aggressive kids like to watch violent TV programs. It is not the violence on TV that is causing the aggression; it is the child’s personal- ity that is influencing both program choice and aggression. Still other factors could

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Imagine a scenario in which every time you dreamed about your dog getting hurt, your dog was certain to be okay. Wouldn’t you be truly predicting the future? What kind of correlation would this scenario represent?

● CONCEPt REviEw Correlational Patterns QUESTION TO BE ADDRESSED PATTERN OF CORRELATION INTERPRETATION

How does the number of hours worked relate to the tips received?

Positive The more hours worked, the more tips received; the fewer hours worked, the fewer tips received.

How does performance on the SAT relate to college GPA?

Positive The greater the score on the SAT, the higher the GPA; the lower the score on the SAT, the lower the GPA.

How does the amount of piano practice relate to the number of errors during a recital?

Negative The more practice, the fewer errors are made; the less practice, the more errors are made.

How does the amount of time spent partying relate to college GPA?

Negative The more time spent partying, the lower the GPA; the less time spent partying, the higher the GPA.

How does a person’s shoe size relate to his or her score on an intelligence test?

No correlation Knowing one’s shoe size tells you nothing about his or her IQ test score and vice versa.

42 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

be involved—perhaps children who are allowed to watch violence on television tend to be raised in households where aggression is the norm. Once again, correlations describe relationships, but they typically provide no insight into cause and effect. To determine causality, as you’ll see shortly, researchers cannot simply describe and pre- dict behavior; they must manipulate it.

test Yourself You can also test your understanding of correlations by identifying whether the following statements represent positive, negative, or zero correlations. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The more Larry studies his psychology, the fewer errors he makes on the chapter test: .

2. As Sadaf reduces her rate of exercising, her heart rate begins to slow: .

3. The longer that Yolanda waits for her date to arrive, the higher her blood pressure rises: .

4. Eddie finds no relationship between his dreams about plane crashes and the number of planes that actually crash: .

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.2

Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research LEARNING GOALS

● Explain how and why experiments are conducted. ● Discuss the differences between independent and dependent variables. ● Explain what is meant by experimental control and how it allows for the determination of causality. ● Describe the problems created by expectancies and biases and how these problems are solved. ● Discuss the problems associated with generalizing experimental conclusions.

Now let’s consider techniques that help us understand why behavior occurs. Suppose you wanted to determine whether watching violent programs really does cause later aggression. If Blake becomes aggressive after watching a violent television program, is it really the program that’s responsible for the change? Alternative possibilities need to be eliminated before you can confidently conclude that things are causally related. As you’ve just seen, the mere description of a relationship is not enough— correlation does not imply causation. Establishing causality requires control, one of the most important functions of an experiment.

In experimental research, the investigator actively manipulates the environ- ment to observe its effect on behavior. A psychologist might manipulate the external setting (room temperature, lighting, time of day), a person’s internal state (hunger, mood, motivation to perform), or social factors (presence or absence of an author- ity figure or popular peer group). The particular manipulation is determined by the researcher’s hypothesis. As mentioned earlier, hypotheses in psychology are usually expressed as if-then statements: If some set of conditions is present, then a certain kind of behavior will occur. The purpose of the experiment is to set up the proposed conditions and see what happens.

experimental research A technique in which the investigator actively manipulates the environment to observe its effect on behavior.

Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research | 43

To examine the role of television violence on aggressive behavior, an experimenter would directly manipulate the amount of violence the person watches. Perhaps one group of children would be picked to watch a violent superhero cartoon while a second group watches the playful antics of a lovable purple dinosaur. The experimenter would then carefully measure the effect of the manipulation on the behavior of interest: aggression. This strategy of directly manipulating the viewing habits, rather than simply observing them, is the essential feature of the experimental approach. Notice the difference from correlational research, where the investigator simply records the viewing habits of chil- dren and then measures later aggressive acts. It is only through a direct manipulation by the experimenter, as you’ll see shortly, that control over the environment can be exer- cised and causality determined. ●Figure 2.7 compares experimental research to the other two approaches previously discussed: descriptive and correlational research.

Independent and Dependent Variables The aspect of the environment that is manipulated in an experiment is called the independent variable. Because it is a variable (that is, something that can take on more than one value), any experimental manipulation must consist of at least two different conditions. In our example, the independent variable is the amount of tele- vision violence, and the two conditions are (1) watching a violent program and (2) watching a nonviolent program. The aspect that is manipulated is called an indepen- dent variable because the experimenter produces the change—independently of the participant’s wishes, desires, or behavior.

The behavior that is measured in an experiment is called the dependent variable. In our example, the dependent variable is the amount of aggressive behavior that occurs after watching the programs. The experimenter manipulates the independent variable, the level of TV violence, and observes whether the behavior measured by the dependent variable, aggression, changes. Notice that the experimenter is inter- ested in whether the dependent variable depends on the experimental manipulation (hence the name dependent variable).

independent variable The aspect of the environment that is manipulated in an experiment. It must consist of at least two conditions.

dependent variable The behavior that is measured or observed in an experiment.

● FiGuRE 2.7 Major Research Methods (© Cengage Learning 2014)

Observing and describing behavior

Descriptive Method Correlational Method Experimental Method

Purpose

Research Tactics

Naturalistic observation Case studies Survey research Psychological tests

Predicting and selecting behavior

Statistical correlations based on two or more variables

Determining why behavior occurs: Establishing cause and effect

Experiments manipulating the independent variable to note effects on the dependent variable

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Now let’s return to the topic that opened this chapter: subliminal perception. Can evil advertisers improve product sales by hiding messages such as “BUY ACME” in their advertising material? Remember, a subliminal message is presented below a person’s normal threshold for perception. You won’t be able to see the message con- sciously, but it influences you nonetheless. Let’s begin by forming a hypothesis: If people are exposed to advertising material containing a hidden message then product sales will increase. To test this prediction, let’s give two groups of people an advertise- ment to study. One group receives an ad containing a hidden message and the other group receives the same advertisement without the message. Later, we can check to see how likely the people in each group are to purchase the product.

What is the independent variable in this experiment? To answer this question, look for the aspect of the environment that is being manipulated: The independent variable is the presence or absence of the hidden message (half of the participants receive the message in the ad, and half do not). What is the dependent variable? In this case, the researcher wants to know whether sales of the advertised product will change due to the presence of the subliminal message. The dependent variable is the number of times the people in each group buy the advertised product.

Experimental Control To conclude that changes in the dependent variable are really caused by the inde- pendent variable, you must be certain that the independent variable is the only thing changing systematically in the experiment. This is the main reason at least two condi- tions are needed in an experiment. Researchers compare people who get the change, often called the experimental group, with those who do not, called the control group. In the subliminal perception experiment, the experimental group consisted of the people who received the hidden message, and the control group consisted of those who did not. If product sales subsequently differ between these two groups, and we know that the only difference between them was the presence of the hidden message in the ad, then it’s possible to conclude that hidden messages can indeed cause a change in sales.

Can subliminal messages really influence our behavior? Properly-controlled experiments suggest the answer is No.

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Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research | 45

Confounding Variables Determining cause and effect requires that the experimen- tal and control groups be identical in all respects, except for the critical independent variable manipulation. But how can we ever be certain that this is the case? If some factor other than the independent variable differs across the groups, it will be dif- ficult, if not impossible, to interpret the results. Uncontrolled variables that change with the independent variable are called confounding variables (the word confound means to throw into confusion or dismay). Suppose we use one advertisement in the experimental group and a different advertisement in the control group. This would be a bad idea because any differences in sales could then be attributed to the ad rather than to the presence or absence of the subliminal message. For example, maybe one ad contains men and the other women, or one is simply more colorful than another. Changes in the dependent variable could not be attributed uniquely to the hidden message because there is a confounding variable.

To solve the problem of confounding variables, all of the factors that might vary along with the independent variable need to be controlled. You should give everyone exactly the same advertisement, and you should probably conduct the experimen- tal session at the same time of day for both groups. You should also make certain that people in both groups are given the same amount of time to study the ad and the same length of time to buy the advertised product. Any factor that might affect the likelihood of purchase, other than the independent variable manipulation, should be controlled—that is, held constant—across the different groups. When potential confounding variables are effectively controlled, you can conclude that changes in the independent variable cause changes in the dependent variable. Under these condi- tions the experiment is said to have internal validity.

Knowing what factors to worry about comes, in part, from experience. The more you know about the phenomenon you’re studying, the more likely you are to identify and control confounding variables. Consumer researchers recognize, for example, that it’s essential to give everyone the same advertisement and product in the experi- mental and control conditions; obviously, some ads will be liked more than others regardless of whether they contain hidden messages. But other variables, such as the length of the participants’ hair or their eye color, probably have no effect on buying behavior and require no control.

Random Assignment People differ in many ways: intelligence, personal preferences, their motivation to perform, and so on. Researchers can’t possibly hold all of these fac- tors constant. Just think about the task of finding two groups of people with exactly the same level of intelligence, likes and dislikes, and motivation. It would be impos- sible. So researchers typically use random assignment, which is similar to the ran- dom sampling used for survey research. In random assignment, the experimenter makes certain that each participant has an equal chance of being assigned to any of the groups or conditions in the experiment. At the outset, each person is assigned randomly to a group. For example, the experimenter might choose a number ran- domly and assign the person to one group if the number is even and a different group if the number is odd.

confounding variable An uncontrolled variable that changes along with the independent variable.

internal validity The extent to which an experiment has effectively controlled for confounding variables; internally valid experiments allow for the determination of causality.

random assignment A technique ensuring that each participant in an experiment has an equal chance of being assigned to any of the conditions in the experiment.

● CONCEPt REviEw The Experimental Method RESEARCH QUESTION (VARIABLES IN BOLD)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (EXPERIMENTER MANIPULATES)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE (EXPERIMENTER MEASURES)

Does watching television violence affect aggression?

Experimenter manipulates the amount of exposure to TV violence.

Experimenter measures the amount of aggression displayed.

Does exposure to subliminal messages have an effect on product sales?

Experimenter manipulates whether or not people receive a hidden message.

Experimenter measures product sales.

Does forming images of words to be remem- bered enhance memory for those words?

Experimenter manipulates whether or not people form images of words as the words are presented.

Experimenter measures memory for the words.

46 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

Random assignment does not eliminate differences among people—some par- ticipants will still be more intelligent than others, and some will be more naturally inclined to buy the advertised product. Random assignment simply increases the chances that these differences will be equally represented in each of the groups (see ●Figure 2.8). As a result, the researcher knows that the results of the experiment can- not easily be caused by some special characteristic of the individual participants.

Expectancies and Biases in Experimental Research People are rarely passive participants in research—they have expectations that can influence the results of an experiment. Let’s suppose on the first day of class your teacher randomly selects half of the students, including you, to participate in a spe- cial enrichment program. You receive instruction in a special room, with carefully

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If people are exposed to advertising that contains a hidden message, product sales will increase.

Hypothesis ● FiGuRE 2.8 Random Assignment Volunteers are randomly assigned to two levels of the independent variable. Each participant has an equal likelihood of being assigned to any of the groups or conditions in the experiment. Random assignment increases the chances that unique subject characteristics will be represented equally in each condition. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research | 47

controlled lighting and temperature, to see whether your learning will improve. The rest of the students, forming the control group, are left in the original classroom. The end of the semester arrives and, sure enough, the enrichment group consistently out- performs the control group. What can you conclude from these results?

At first glance, this seems to be a well-designed experiment. It includes both an experimental and a control group, the students were randomly assigned to groups, and let’s assume that all other known potentially confounding variables were care- fully controlled. However, there is still a problem. The participants in the enrichment group expected to perform better, based on their knowledge about the experiment. After all, they were selected to be in an enrichment group. Consequently, these stu- dents may have simply tried harder, or studied more, in an effort to live up to the expectations of the researcher. At the same time, students in the control group knew they were failing to get special instruction; this knowledge might have lowered their motivation to perform, leading to poorer performance. The fact that the groups dif- fered in what they learned is not necessarily due to the enrichment program itself.

Researchers can control for these kinds of expectancy effects in two ways. One way is to disguise the purpose of the experiment when initially describing the study to the participants. This approach raises obvious ethical questions, although it is pos- sible, under some conditions, to omit telling people some critical feature of the study without violating ethical standards.

Second, the investigator can match expectations for both the experimental and control groups. For example, the researchers can lead the people in the control group to believe that they, too, are receiving an experimental treatment. This technique is often used in drug studies. Participants in both groups receive a pill or an injection, but the drug is actually present only in the medication given to the experimental group. The control participants are given a placebo—an inactive, or inert, substance (a “sugar pill”) that looks just like the true drug.

Blind Controls The kind of experimental procedure just described for drug studies is called a single-blind study. That is, the participants are kept “blind” about the particular group in which they’ve been placed (experimental or control). Single-blind studies control for expectancies because people have no idea which group they are in. This helps keep overall expectations the same in both groups. It is even possible to inform the participants that some of them will be given a placebo—the inactive pill or injection—as long as no one knows who is in which group. Notice that the single-blind technique does not eliminate expectancies; it simply reduces the chances that expectancies will contribute more to the experimental group than to the control group (or vice versa).

The people participating in the experiment aren’t the only ones who expect cer- tain things to happen—the experimenter does too (Rosenthal, 1966). Remember, it’s the experimenter who formulated the hypothesis. Experimenters are often convinced that behavior will change in a certain way, and these expectations can also influence the results. Imagine that a researcher has developed a drug designed to cure all forms of influenza. To test the drug, one group of flu patients is given the drug; another group receives a placebo. In a case like this, it’s possible for the experimenter to influ- ence the results in subtle ways. For example, the researcher might give slightly more attention to the people who receive the drug because he or she expects these people to get well. This is not a deliberate bias on the part of the researcher. Nevertheless, these unintentional effects can make it difficult to interpret the results.

The solution to experimenter expectancy effects is to keep the researcher blind about the assignment of people to groups. If those administering the study do not know which individuals are receiving the experimental treatment, they are unlikely to treat members of each group differently. Obviously, someone needs to know the group assignments, but the information can be coded in such a way that the per- son doing the actual observations remains blind about the condition. After the data have been collected, based on the code, the experimenter can determine the

placebo An inactive, or inert, substance that resembles an experimental substance.

single-blind study Experimental participants do not know to which condition they have been assigned (e.g., experimental versus control); it’s used to control for participant expectancies.

48 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

particular manipulation that each person received. When neither the participant nor the observer is aware of who is in the experimental and control conditions, the exper- iment is known as a double-blind study. Double-blind studies, often used in drug research, are effective in reducing bias effects.

Generalizing Experimental Conclusions Properly designed experiments help an investigator determine the causes of behavior. The determination of causality is possible whenever the experimenter has sufficient control over the situation to eliminate confounding factors. But experimental control is occasionally gained at a cost. Sometimes, in the search for appropriate controls, the researcher creates an environment that is sterile or artificial and not representa- tive of situations in which a person normally behaves. The results of the experimen- tal research then cannot easily be generalized to real-world situations; as you learned previously, such results are said to have little external validity.

Consider again the issue of television violence and aggression: Does one really cause the other? A number of experimental studies have explored this question (Anderson et al., 2003; Bushman & Anderson, 2001). Most have been conducted in the laboratory under controlled conditions. People are randomly assigned to groups who watch violent programs or neutral programs, and their behavior is then observed for aggressive tendencies, again under controlled conditions. In one study, preschool chil- dren were exposed to neutral or aggressive cartoons and then were given the oppor- tunity to play with aggressive toys (such as toy guns); more aggressive acts were recorded for the children who watched the violent cartoon (Sanson & Di Muccio, 1993). These results clearly demonstrate that watching violence can increase the likelihood of aggressiveness. But this does not necessarily mean that these children would act similarly in their homes, or that the effects of the brief exposure to violence will be long lasting. In short, the experiment may lack external validity. Concerns about generalizability should not, however, be taken as a devastating critique of the experimental method—results demonstrated in the laboratory often do generalize to real-world environments. Moreover, the true purpose of an experiment is to gain control, not external validity. As you might expect, we’ll return to the issue of exter- nal validity in later chapters.

double-blind study Neither participants nor research observers are aware of who has been assigned to the experimental and control groups; it’s used to control for both participant and experimenter expectancies.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Experiments are sometimes criticized because they are considered artificial. Many psychology experiments use college students in introductory psychology courses as participants. Do you feel there is a problem in generalizing the findings from these studies to the whole population?

test Yourself You can also test your knowledge by answering the following questions about experimental research. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Fill in the blanks with the term independent or dependent. In experimental research, the researcher actively manipulates the environment to observe its effect on behavior. The aspect of the environment that is manipulated is called the

variable; the behavior of interest is measured by the variable. To draw conclusions about cause and effect, the experi- menter must make certain that the variable is the only thing changing systematically in the environment.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.3

The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines | 49

The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines LEARNING GOALS

● Explain the principle of informed consent. ● Discuss the roles of debriefing and confidentiality in research. ● Discuss the ethical issues involved in animal research.

Do you remember the problem of reactivity? Being observed can importantly change the way people behave. Although psychologists have developed techniques for reducing reactivity—designing noninterfering measures, keeping participants blind to their true role in the study, fooling individuals into thinking the observer is really part of the environment—each method raises significant ethical ques- tions. Is it appropriate to deceive people under any circumstances? Is it appropri- ate to withhold treatment, through the use of placebos, in the interest of achieving proper experimental control? To deal with such issues, formal organizations such as the American Psychological Association (APA) develop and publish ethical guide- lines and codes of conduct for their members (American Psychological Association, 2002a; Knapp, 2011).

Psychologists have a responsibility to respect the rights and dignity of all peo- ple. The code of conduct applies to everything that psychologists do, from admin- istering therapy, to working in the field, to giving testimony in the courtroom. Respecting the rights of others means showing concern for their health, safety, and welfare; no diabolical mind-altering treatments are allowed, even “in the name and pursuit of science.” Psychologists are expected to act responsibly in advertising their services, representing themselves in the media, pricing their services, and collecting their fees.

Informed Consent The cornerstone of the ethics code is the principle of informed consent. People must be informed, in easy-to-understand language, of any significant factors that could affect their willingness to participate. Physical and emotional risks should be

informed consent The principle that before consenting to participate in research, people should be fully informed about any significant factors that could affect their willingness to participate.

2. Javier wants to determine whether the presence of Tom Cruise in a movie increases the box office take. He randomly forms two groups of people. One group sees Mission Impossible V, starring Cruise, and the other group sees Barney’s Big Adventure, without Cruise. Sure enough, the Tom Cruise movie is later rated as more enjoyable than the movie starring the purple dinosaur. Javier concludes that Tom Cruise movies are sure winners. What’s wrong with this experiment?

a. The dependent variable—Tom Cruise versus Barney—is confounded with the content of the movie.

b. The independent variable—Tom Cruise versus Barney—is not the only factor changing across the groups.

c. Nothing has been manipulated—it’s really a correlational study.

d. Experiments of this type require independent variables with at least three conditions.

3. Random assignment is an important research tool because it helps the researcher control for potential confounding variables. Which of the following statements about random assignment is true? Random assignment:

a. eliminates individual differences among people. b. ensures that some participants will get the experimental treat-

ment and others will not. c. increases the likelihood that participant differences will be

equally represented in each group. d. controls for bias by ensuring that biased participants will be

placed in the control group.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.3 (Continued)

50 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

explained, as should the general nature of the project and any therapeutic procedures to be used. Participants must then willingly give their written consent to participate in the research. They should understand as well that if for any reason they choose not to participate, they will suffer no negative consequences.

People cannot give truly informed consent unless they understand the details of the project. At the same time, full disclosure can affect the outcome of the study. Suppose you’re interested in how readily bystanders at an accident will come to the aid of a victim. To gain experimental control, you stage a mock accident in the labora- tory, in front of waiting research participants, to see how they react. Conducting the study in the laboratory enables you to investigate the likelihood of intervention under a variety of conditions (such as whether the person is alone or with others in the room when the accident occurs). But people in this situation would need to be misled—you certainly couldn’t fully inform them about the procedure by telling them the accident isn’t real.

The psychological research community recognizes that it’s sometimes necessary to use deception as part of a research procedure (Kimmel, 2011). According to the APA code of ethics, deception is justified only if the scientific, educational, or applied value of the study is clear and if there is no way to answer the research questions adequately without deceiving the participants (American Psychological Association, 2002a). It is also agreed that the deception should not cause physical or emotional harm or affect someone’s willingness to participate in the study. Experimenters have a responsibility to respect the rights and dignity of research participants at all times. Most universities and colleges make certain that participants’ rights are protected by requiring investigators to first submit detailed descriptions of their studies to over- sight review committees. If the committee decides that a study will fail to protect the participant adequately, permission to conduct the study is denied.

Debriefing and Confidentiality Two other key ingredients of the psychologist’s code of ethics are debriefing and confidentiality. Psychologists are expected to debrief people fully at the end of the experimental session, meaning that everyone involved must be informed about the general purpose of the study. Debriefing is intended to clear up any misunderstand- ings about the research and to explain why certain procedures were used. Certainly if deception was a part of the study, the full nature of the deception should be disclosed. Debriefing gives the researcher an opportunity to reduce any anxieties that a person might have about his or her participation. If a participant failed to help the victim of a staged accident, for example, the experimenter could explain that bystander passivity is a characteristic of most people (Darley & Latané, 1968).

Finally, once the participation is completed, a person’s right to privacy contin- ues. All psychologists, including researchers and psychotherapists, are obligated to respect the privacy of the individual by maintaining confidentiality—personal infor- mation obtained in research or in therapy is not to be discussed or reported with- out the permission of the individual (American Psychological Association, 2002a). Confidentiality makes sense for more than just ethical reasons. Research participants, as well as people seeking help for psychological problems, are likely to feel more com- fortable with the process, and to act more naturally, if they are convinced that their right to privacy will be respected.

The Ethics of Animal Research In laboratories all over the world, animals are participating in basic research. They’re pressing metal bars for food, receiving small doses of electrical stimulation in the brain, and being raised in enriched environments designed to improve their ability to

debriefing At the conclusion of an experimental session, informing the participants about the general purpose of the experiment, including any deception that was involved.

confidentiality The principle that personal information obtained from a participant in research or therapy should not be revealed without the individual’s permission.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Can you think of any circumstances in which it might be ethical to conduct research with animals even though the results won’t generalize to humans?

The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines | 51

learn. Although animals are probably used in less than 10% of all current psychological research studies, the famous “labora- tory rat” has been an important source of basic data for decades (Perry & Dess, 2011). As you’ll see in later chapters, many sig- nificant psychological principles were originally discovered through the study of animal behavior.

Why use animals? The reason most often cited is experimental control. It is possible to raise and house ani- mals in relatively ideal environments. Researchers can control diet, experience, and genetic background, thereby eliminating many of the confounding variables that plague human research studies. Researchers can also study life- span development in ways that cannot be accomplished with humans. Studies that would take 70 or 80 years with people take only a few years with rats. Others use animals because they’re thought to contain simple, rather than complex, internal systems. The basic biological machin- ery that underlies learning, for example, has been studied extensively with sea slugs; the number of neural connec- tions in a sea slug is tiny compared with the billions of con- nections residing in a human brain. Research with animals often serves as a vehicle for developing hypotheses that can later be tested, when feasible, with humans (Saucier & Cain, 2006).

But is research with animals ethical? There can be no informed consent in animal research, as animal rights activ- ists point out. Can we justify the invasive procedures some- times used in animal research? Is it okay to destroy a part of a cat’s brain to learn how localized brain structures con- trol behavior? Obviously, the use of animals in research is a highly controversial subject. Millions of dollars are spent every year by animal rights groups; many of these groups oppose any sort of animal research (see Hubbel, 1990). Other critics question the basic value of ani- mal studies, arguing that animals reveal little about human beings and may even mislead researchers into drawing inappropriate con- clusions (see Ulrich, 1991). In one survey of animal rights activists, 85% advocated the complete elimination of all animal research (Plous, 1991).

Most psychologists are convinced that the use of animals in psychological and med- ical research has value. Animal studies have repeatedly led to significant breakthroughs. To cite one instance, animal research has led to significant advances in our understand- ing of depression, as well as to the develop- ment of drugs that lessen the symptoms of this disorder (see Chapters 14 and 15). Similarly, through the study of monkeys’ natural fear of snakes in the wild, psychologists have discov- ered that phobias (such as the fear of heights or of being locked in small places) can be learned by imitating the behavior of others rather than through a traumatic life experience (see Chapter 7).

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52 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

The American Psychological Association enforces strict guidelines with regard to the ethical treatment of nonhuman participants (American Psychological Association, 2002a). Psychologists who conduct research with animals are expected to treat their participants humanely. The animals must be given proper care, and any treatments that cause discomfort, pain, or illness must be avoided unless absolutely necessary. When surgical procedures are performed, the animals must be given the appropriate anesthesia, and proper medical procedures must be fol- lowed to eliminate infection and minimize pain. Failure to stick to these standards can result in censure or termination of membership by the governing body of the association.

The issue of animal research is controversial, in part, because of misinformation. Experiments that inflict pain and suffering on animals are extremely rare and do not fairly characterize the majority of animal studies in psychological or medical research. At the same time, all researchers need to recognize that the nature of the research participant can importantly determine the results (Gluck & Bell, 2003). Findings established from research with animals may, in fact, not always apply to humans—because animals have evolved to solve different problems than humans. Despite these legitimate concerns, animal research continues to be a valuable tool in the search for an understanding of behavior and mind (Perry & Dess, 2011).

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Can you think of any circumstances in which it might be ethical to conduct research with animals even though the results won’t generalize to humans?

test Yourself You can also test what you’ve learned about ethics and research by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Fill in the banks. Psychologists have a responsibility to respect the rights and dignity of all people. To ensure that research participants are treated ethically, psychologists use (a) informed

, which means that everyone is fully informed about the potential risks of the project, (b) , which assures that the participant’s right to privacy will be maintained, and (c) , which is designed to provide more information about the purpose and procedures of the research.

2. Sometimes it is necessary to deceive research participants in some way, such as keeping them blind about group assignments, so that expectations won’t determine the outcome. Most psychologists believe that deception

a. is always justified as long as it furthers scientific knowledge.

b. is never justified unless the research involves clinical treatment.

c. is justified, but only under some circumstances. d. is not necessary if you design the project correctly.

3. The majority of psychologists believe that the use of animals in psychological and biomedical research has enormous value. But some question the ethics of using animals primarily because

a. no real scientific advancements have come from animal research.

b. animals are often treated cruelly. c. animals can give no informed consent. d. animal research is too expensive.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.4

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON Unlocking the Secrets of Mind and Behavior

Psychologists rely on a set of established research methods. Understanding research methodology is important because conclusions are importantly influenced by the methods used. Whether the behavior of children in a day-care center will accurately represent real life depends on the methods of observation that have been employed. In addition, whether an experiment can determine if television violence truly causes aggression depends on the use of proper controls and the appropriate selection of participants. In this chapter we considered various tools and guidelines that psychologists use to uncover the basic principles of behavior and mind.

Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research To observe and describe behavior properly, psychologists use the tech- niques of descriptive research. In naturalistic observation the researcher observes behavior in natural settings rather than in a laboratory environment. Naturalistic observation is a useful technique for generating ideas and for verifying whether conclusions reached in the lab generalize to more realistic settings. In case studies the focus is on a single instance of a behavior. This technique allows the researcher to get lots of background information, but the results may not always generalize to wider populations. In survey, research behavior is sampled broadly, usually by gathering responses from many people in the form of a questionnaire. Surveys typically provide information that is representative of the group being examined, but the amount of informa- tion that can be gathered is limited. Finally, through psycho- logical tests differences among individuals can be measured.

Once the observational data have been collected, they are summarized through the application of statistics. Statistical applications include measures of central tendency—the mean, median, and mode—and measures of variability, or how far apart individual scores are from each other in a set of scores. Researchers use inferential statistics, based on the laws of probability, to test hypotheses. Inferential statistics can help the researcher decide whether a difference between an exper- imental and a control group, for example, is likely to have occurred by chance.

Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research In correlational research the researcher determines whether a relationship

exists between two measures of behavior. For instance, does high school grade point average predict college per- formance? Correlation coefficients, which provide an index of how well one measure predicts another, are statistics that vary between –1.00 and +1.00. Correlations are use- ful because they enable the researcher to predict and select. If employers know there is a correlation between achieve- ment test scores and job performance, they can use some- one’s score on an achievement test to predict that person’s success on the job. Correlations are useful tools for predict- ing and selecting, but they do not allow us to draw conclu- sions about causality.

Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research If you want to know whether an activity, such as watching violence on tele- vision, causes a change in behavior, you must conduct an experiment. In doing so, the researcher manipulates the envi- ronment in a systematic way and then observes the effect of that manipulation on behavior. The aspect of the environ- ment that is manipulated is called the independent variable; the measured behavior is called the dependent variable. To determine that the independent variable is really respon- sible for the changes in behavior, the researcher must have experimental control—the only thing that can change sys- tematically is the manipulation of the independent variable. Researchers conducting experiments encounter a variety of potential pitfalls that need to be controlled, including par- ticipant and experimenter expectancies. Control strategies include the use of random assignment and blind research designs.

The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines It is important to maintain a strict code of ethical conduct throughout the research process. An important safeguard is informed consent, which is designed to guarantee that partic- ipants will be informed of any significant factors that could influence their willingness to participate. Other ethical stan- dards govern debriefing and maintaining confidentiality. All researchers, regardless of the nature of the research, have a professional responsibility to respect the rights and dignity of their participants. This applies not only to human participants but also to animals.

Psychology For a Reason: Unlocking the Secrets of Mind and Behavior | 53

54 | CHAPTER 2 The Tools of Psychological Research

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research ● The goal of psychologists is to study behavior by using the four steps of the scientific method: observe, detect regularities, generate a hypothesis, and observe again to test the (1) .

● (2) research is used primarily to (3) and describe behavior.

● (4) is observed in natural settings with (5) measures.

● (6) studies focus on a single case, usually a single individual. A case study can yield historical information that is useful for generating (7) , but the results may not always generalize to the population as a whole.

● Surveys gather limited (8) from many people. The data are likely to be (9) of the population as a whole but often lack historical perspective.

● Psychological tests are primarily designed to measure (10) differences.

● Data analyses reveal (11) in psychological observations that are used to test (12) . (13) statistics summarize and describe data. (14) statistics help researchers determine whether behaviors are representative of the larger population, or whether differences among observations can be attributed to chance.

Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research ● A (15) helps determine whether there is a relationship between two (16) , or measures of behavior. When there is a correlation between two measures of behavior, it is possible to (17) the value of one variable on the basis of knowledge about the other.

● A correlation between two measures of behavior allows for prediction but does not determine (18) . Causality requires (19) .

Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research ● In (20) research, the investigator actively manipulates the (21) to observe its effect on behavior. The particular manipulation is determined by the researcher’s (22) .

● A(n) (23) variable is the aspect of the environment that is (24) in an experiment. A(n) (25) variable is the behavior that is (26) in an experiment.

● Experimental (27) is achieved by making certain that the only thing changing systematically in an experiment is the (28) variable. The independent variable must include at least (29) conditions. Often there is a (30) , which doesn’t get the experimental treatment, and a(n) (31) group that does get the treatment.

● Expectations and biases, held by both participants and researchers, can influence the results of experi- ments. Expectancy effects on the part of the partici- pant are controlled for with the use of (32) experiments, and (33) experiments control for expectancies on the part of both the participant and the (34) .

● Necessary experimental (35) can limit the relevance of one set of research results to other people and situations.

The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines

● Research participants must be informed of any factors that could affect their willingness to (36) .

● (37) is the process of explaining to research participants why the study is being conducted. (38) protects the participant’s privacy.

● A primary reason for using animals in psychological research is that it allows for greater experimental (39) . The APA enforces strict guidelines for the (40) treatment of laboratory animals. However, some controversy remains over their use in psychological research.

Terms to Remember | 55

case study, 32 confidentiality, 50 confounding variable, 45 correlation, 39 debriefing, 50 dependent variable, 43 descriptive research, 30 descriptive statistics, 38 double-blind study, 48 experimental research, 42

external validity, 30 independent variable, 43 inferential statistics, 38 informed consent, 49 internal validity, 45 mean, 35 median, 35 mode, 35 naturalistic observation, 31 operational definitions, 28

placebo, 47 random assignment, 45 random sampling, 34 range, 36 reactivity, 30 scientific method, 27 single-blind study, 47 standard deviation, 36 survey, 32 variability, 36

Terms to Remember

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

3 Biological Processes

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Biological Processes For?

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain

Learning Goals The Anatomy of Neurons Neural Transmission: The Electrochemical

Message The Communication Network Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.1

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor Learning Goals The Central and Peripheral Nervous

Systems

Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code

Learning Goals Natural Selection and Adaptations Genetic Principles Genes and Behavior Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.4

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Biological Processes Are For

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

How We Determine Brain Function Brain Structures and Their Functions

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Mirror Neurons: Solving the “Other Mind Problem”

The Divided Brain Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.2

Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication

Learning Goals The Endocrine System Do Men and Woman Have Different

Brains? Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.3

L ocated within the confines of a protective layer of bone floats a 3- to 4-pound mass of tissue called the brain. Fueled by simple blood sugar and amino acids, the brain’s billions of cells are engaged in a continuous dance of activity. The rhythms and move- ments of this dance are not well understood, but a “whole” is created that is collectively greater than the sum of the individual parts. From chaotic patterns of cellular activity arise the complexities of human behavior, thought, emotion, and creativity.

Psychologists assume that virtually all of our actions arise from the activities of this brain—not just mundane things like breathing, maintaining a beating heart, and walking, but our intimate thoughts and feelings as well. Every time you think, act, or feel, biological activity in your brain plays a critical, if not primary, role. Disorders of the mind, such as schizophrenia or clinical depression, are products of the brain as well. This chapter introduces you to the field of neuroscience, which studies the con- nection between the brain and behavior.

Our discussion of biological processes revolves around solving four central prob- lems: How do we communicate internally, how do we initiate and control behavior, how do we regulate growth and other internal functions, and how is the genetic code transmitted and adapted? Each of these problems must be solved by the systems in our bodies. Not surprisingly, we’ve evolved a set of sophisticated tools to meet these needs.

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain Our actions are often adaptive because we’re able to monitor the environment continuously and produce quick and appropriate responses. If a dog suddenly runs in front of your car, you quickly hit the brake, saving the animal. These nearly instantaneous world-to-behavior links are pos- sible because of a sophisticated communication network linking the outside world to the brain. Information from the environment is translated into the language of the nervous system and relayed to appropriate processing sites throughout the body.

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor The nervous system may handle the complicated task of receiving and communicating information, but information by itself does not translate into hand movements, quick reactions, or artistic creativity. Somehow the body must assign meaning to the information it receives and coordinate the appropri- ate responses. As you’ll see, there are specific structures in the brain that initiate and coordinate our thoughts, actions, and emotions.

neuroscience An interdisciplinary field of study directed at understanding the brain and its relation to behavior.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Biological Processes For?

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58 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication The sys- tems in the body also have widespread and long-term internal communication needs. To resolve these needs, structures in the body control the release of chemi- cals into the bloodstream that serve important regulatory functions, influencing growth and development, sexual behavior, the desire to eat or drink, and even emotional expression.

Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code Your genetic code determines much of who you are and what you have the potential to become. The genetic code you inherited from your parents and will pass along to your children has been shaped over generations by the forces of natural selection. Molecules carrying the genetic code influence more than eye color, height, or hair color. Intelligence, personality, and even susceptibility to mental disorders can be influenced signifi- cantly by genetic information. We’ll review the basic principles of genetics and discuss how nature and nurture interact to guide and constrain behavior.

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain LEARNING GOALS

●● Describe the structure, type, and function of neurons. ●● Explain how neurons transmit information. ●● Discuss how neurons work together to communicate.

Strike a match and hold it an inch or so away from the tip of your index finger. Now move it a bit closer. Closer. Closer still. Let the flame approach and momentarily touch the flesh of your finger. On second thought, skip this experiment. You already know the outcome. Flame approaches flesh, and you withdraw your finger quickly, automatically, and efficiently. Let’s consider the nervous system mechanisms that produce this kind of reaction, because it represents one of the simplest kinds of world-to-brain communications. The main components of the nervous system are individual cells, called neurons, that receive, transmit, and integrate information. The language used by the neurons to communicate is electrochemical—that is, it’s part electrical and part chemical. There are three major types of neurons:

1. Sensory neurons make the initial contact with the environment and are responsi- ble for carrying the message inward toward the spinal cord and brain. The heat of the flame excites receptor regions in the sensory neurons in your fingertip, which then pass the message along to the spinal cord.

2. Interneurons, the most plentiful type of neuron, make no direct contact with the world, but they convey information from one internal processing site to another. Interneurons in the spinal cord receive the message from the sensory neurons, then pass it on to the motor neurons.

3. Motor neurons carry the messages and commands away from the central ner- vous system to the muscles and glands that produce responses. In the match example in ●Figure 3.1, the motor neurons contact the muscles of the finger, which leads to a quick and efficient finger withdrawal.

neurons The cells in the nervous system that receive and transmit information.

sensory neurons Cells that carry environmental messages toward the spinal cord and brain.

interneurons Cells that transfer information from one neuron to another; interneurons make no direct contact with the outside world.

motor neurons Cells that carry information away from the central nervous system to the muscles and glands that directly produce behavior.

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Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain | 59

The nervous system also contains glial cells, which greatly outnumber neurons (by a factor of about 10 to 1). Glial cells perform a variety of functions in the nervous system, such as removing waste, filling in empty space, and helping neurons to com- municate efficiently. Some glial cells wrap around portions of neurons, acting as a kind of insulation. This insulation, called the myelin sheath, protects the neuron and helps speed up neural transmission. Other glial cells seem to communicate directly with neurons and even control blood flow to active regions of the brain. Some have sug- gested that glial cells might contribute importantly to higher-order thought processes, perhaps even creativity (Koob, 2009)! Unfortunately, glial cells also play an important role in some kinds of brain dysfunction, including brain cancer and Alzheimer disease.

So far the brain hasn’t figured into our discussion of fingers and flames. Actually, the message is passed upward to the brain, through the activity of more interneurons, and you consciously experience the heat of the flame in the brain. But in situations requiring a quick response, as in the case of a flame touching your finger, the nervous system is capable of producing a collection of largely automatic reactions. These reactions, called reflexes, are controlled primarily by spinal cord pathways. A reflex requires no input from the brain. Cut the spinal cord, blocking communication between most of the body and brain, and you wouldn’t feel the pain or react with a facial grimace, but your finger would still twitch. Reflex pathways allow the body to respond quickly to environmental events in a simple and direct way. People don’t think or feel with their spinal cords, but reflex pathways are an important part of our ability to adapt successfully to the world.

glial cells Cells that fill in space between neurons, remove waste, or help neurons to communicate efficiently.

myelin sheath An insulating material that protects the axon and helps to speed up neural transmission.

reflexes Largely automatic body reactions— such as the knee jerk—that are controlled primarily by spinal cord pathways.

Motor neuron

Sensory neuronInterneuron

Motor signal

Sensory signal

Cross-section of spinal cord

Signal to brain

●● FiGuRE 3.1 A Simple Reflex Pathway The information that flame has touched flesh travels through a sensory neuron to the spinal cord, which directs it to an interneuron, which sends it on to a motor neuron. The motor neuron then alerts the finger muscles, which quickly withdraw from the heat. The original information is also passed upward to the brain, which registers pain. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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60 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

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●● FiGuRE 3.2 the Components of a Neuron The dendrites are the primary information receivers, the soma is the cell body, and the axon transmits the cell’s messages. The myelin sheath that surrounds the axon helps speed up neural transmission. Terminal buttons at the end of the axon contain the chemicals that carry messages to the next neuron. (© Cengage Learning)

The Anatomy of Neurons As shown in ●Figure 3.2, neurons have four major structural parts: dendrites, a soma, an axon, and terminal buttons. For a communication system to work properly, it must have a way to receive information, a way to process received messages, and a means for generating an appropriate response. The four components of the neuron play these roles in the communication chain.

The dendrites, which look like tree branches extending out- ward from the main body of the cell, are the primary information receivers. A sensory neuron passes information about a burning flame along to an interneuron by interacting with the interneu- ron’s dendrites. A particular neuron may have thousands of these dendritic branches, enabling the cell to receive input from many different sources. Once received, the message is processed in the soma, the main body of the cell. The soma is also the cell’s meta- bolic center, and it is where genetic material is stored. The axon is the cell’s transmitter. When a neuron transmits a message, it sends an electrical signal called the action potential down its axon toward other neurons. Near its end the axon branches out to make contact with other cells. At the tip of each branch are tiny swellings called terminal buttons. Chemicals released by these buttons pass the message on to the next neuron.

Neurons don’t actually touch. The synapse is a small gap between cells, typically between the terminal buttons of one neuron and the dendrite or cell body of another. The chemicals released by the terminal buttons flow into this gap. The synapse and the chemi- cals released into it are critical factors in the body’s communication network, as you’ll see next.

Neural Transmission: The Electrochemical Message Neurons may differ in size and shape, but the direction of informa- tion flow is predictable and consistent:

Dendrites → Soma → Axon → Terminal buttons

Information arrives at the dendrites from multiple sources— many thousands of contacts might be made—and is passed along to the soma. Here all the received messages sum together; if a sufficient

electrical signal is present, an action potential will be generated. The action potential travels down the axon toward the terminal buttons, where it causes the release of chemicals into the synapse. These chemicals move the message from the end of the axon to the dendrites of the next neuron, starting the process all over again. That’s the general sequence of information flow: Messages travel electrically from one point to another within a neuron, but the message is transmitted chemically between neu- rons. Now let’s consider each of these processes in more detail.

The Resting Potential Neurons possess electrical properties even when they aren’t receiving or transmitting messages. Specifically, a tiny electrical charge, called the resting potential, exists between the inside and the outside of the cell. This rest- ing potential is created by the presence of electrically charged atoms and molecules, called ions, that are distributed unevenly between the inside and the outside of the cell. The main ions in neural transmission are positively charged sodium and potassium

dendrites The fibers that extend outward from a neuron and receive information from other neurons.

soma The cell body of a neuron.

axon The long tail-like part of a neuron that serves as the cell’s transmitter.

terminal buttons The tiny swellings at the end of the axon that contain chemicals important to neural transmission.

synapse The small gap between the terminal buttons of a neuron and the dendrite or cell body of another neuron.

resting potential The tiny electrical charge in place between the inside and the outside of the resting neuron.

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain | 61

ions and negatively charged chloride ions. Normally, ions will distribute themselves evenly in an environment through a process called diffusion. However, the neuron’s cell wall, or membrane, only allows certain ions to pass in and out through special ion “channels.” As shown in ●Figure 3.3, when the neuron is resting, the sodium and chloride ions are concentrated outside of the cell and the potassium ions are largely contained inside. These unequal concentrations are maintained, in part, by a sodium- potassium pump that actively moves the ions into and out of the cell. If you measured the electrical potential of the neuron, you would find that the fluid inside the cell is slightly negative with respect to the outside (between –60 and –70 millivolts). Most of the negative charge comes from large protein molecules inside the cell, which are too big to pass through the ion channels.

Generating an Action Potential For a neuron to generate an action potential— that is, fire its own message—the electrical potential inside the cell must become less negative. This change happens as a result of contact from other neurons. Two types of messages can be passed from one neuron to the next, excitatory messages and inhibitory messages. If the message is excitatory, the cell membrane changes— ion channels open—and sodium ions flow into the cell. This process is called depo- larization and it moves the electrical potential of the cell from negative toward zero. When the message is inhibitory, the opposite happens: The cell membrane either pushes more positive ions out of the cell or allows negative ions to move in. The result is hyperpolarization: The electrical potential of the cell becomes more negative.

Remember, each neuron in the nervous system is in contact with many other neurons. As a result, small changes in potential occur in many input regions of the neuron as messages are received (see ●Figure 3.4). Near the point where the axon leaves the cell body, in a special trigger zone called the axon hillock, all of the excit- atory and inhibitory potentials combine. If enough excitatory messages have been received—that is, if the net electrical potential inside the cell has become sufficiently less negative—the cell will “fire” an action potential.

The firing of an action potential is an all-or-none process. The action potential either fires completely or not at all. Once the firing threshold is reached, the action potential begins and travels completely down the axon toward the terminal buttons. The process is somewhat like firing a gun (or flushing a toilet). Once sufficient pressure

action potential The all-or-none electrical signal that travels down a neuron’s axon.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Glial cells actually make up nearly 90% of cells in the brain. Do you suppose that is where the popular expression “We only use 10% of our brain” comes from?

●● FiGuRE 3.3 the Resting Potential Neurons possess electrical properties even when they are neither receiving nor transmitting messages. The resting potential, a tiny negative electrical charge across the inside and outside of a resting cell, is created by an uneven distribution of ions across the cell membrane. (© Cengage Learning)

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62 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

is delivered to the trigger (handle), a bullet fires and moves down the barrel in a characteristic way (the water flushes). In addition, bullets don’t travel farther or faster if you pull the trigger harder. (Ditto for the toilet—the water doesn’t flush harder if you yank on the handle.) The same is true for an action potential—increasing the intensity of the original message does not increase the intensity of the nerve impulse.

The speed of the message, however, can depend on the axon’s size and shape. In general, the thicker the axon, the faster the message will travel. The speed of an action potential varies among neurons in a range from about 2 to 200 miles per hour (which is still signifi- cantly slower than the speed of electricity through a wire or printed circuit). Another factor that increases the speed of transmission is the myelin sheath. Myelin provides insulation for the axon, similar to the plastic around copper wiring. At regular points there are gaps in the insulation, called nodes of Ranvier, that permit the action potential to jump down the axon rather than traveling from point to point. This method of transmission from node to node is called saltatory conduc- tion; it comes from the Latin saltare, which means “to jump.” The myelin sheath speeds transmission, and it also protects the message from interference from other neural signals. Some diseases, such as multiple sclerosis, damage the myelin sheath, which results in a slow- ing of nerve impulses.

Neurotransmitters: The Chemical Messengers When the action potential reaches the end of the axon, it triggers the release of chemical messengers from small sacs, or vesicles, in the terminal buttons (see ●Figure 3.5). These chemical molecules, called neurotransmitters, spill out into the synapse and interact chemically with the cell membrane of the next neuron (called the postsynaptic membrane). Depending on the particular characteristics of this membrane, the neurotransmitter will transfer either an excitatory or an inhibitory message.

The released neurotransmitter acts as a kind of key in search of the appropri- ate lock. It moves quickly across the synapse—which takes only about 1/10,000 of a second—and activates receptor molecules contained in the postsynaptic membrane. When the message is excitatory, the neurotransmitter causes channels in the cell wall to open, allowing positive sodium ions to flow into the receiving cell. When the mes- sage is inhibitory, negative chloride ions are allowed to enter the cell, and positive potassium ions are allowed to leave. It is important to note, though, that neurotrans- mitters, by themselves, are neither excitatory nor inhibitory. It is really the nature of the receptor molecule that determines whether a particular neurotransmitter will produce an excitatory or inhibitory effect; the same neurotransmitter can produce quite different effects at different sites in the nervous system.

We don’t know how many different types of neurotransmitters exist in our brain, but some important ones have been identified and are well-studied. The most com- mon neurotransmitter in the brain is glutamate. Glutamate is usually an excitatory neurotransmitter and, perhaps not surprisingly, it’s involved in many aspects of brain functioning, including memory. The neurotransmitter acetylcholine acts as the primary transmitter between motor neurons and muscles in the body. When released into the synapse between motor neurons and muscle cells, acetylcholine creates excitatory messages that lead to muscle contraction. Any voluntary motor move- ment, like lifting your arm or walking, involves acetylcholine. The neurotransmitter dopamine usually produces inhibitory effects that help dampen and stabilize com- munications in the brain and elsewhere. Inhibitory effects help to keep the brain on an even keel and allow us to produce smooth voluntary muscle movements, sleep without physically acting out our dreams, and maintain posture. If neurotransmitters had only excitatory effects, there would be an endless chain of communication, pro- ducing a blooming, buzzing ball of confusion in the brain.

neurotransmitters Chemical messengers that relay information from one neuron to the next.

glutamate The most common neurotransmitter in the brain.

acetylcholine A neurotransmitter that plays multiple roles in the central and peripheral nervous systems, including the excitation of muscle contractions.

dopamine A neurotransmitter that has been linked to reward and pleasure systems in the brain; decreased levels have been linked to Parkinson disease, and increased levels have been linked to schizophrenia.

Excitatory messages cause depolarization.

Dendrite

Inhibitory messages cause hyperpolarization.

Electrode

Axon

+++ + +++++++++

++++ +++

– – – –

– – – –– ––

–– – –

●● FiGuRE 3.4 Summing Excitatory and inhibitory Messages Each neuron is in contact with many other neurons. Some contacts initiate excitatory messages, or depolarization, and others initiate inhibitory messages, or hyperpolarization. A neuron generates its own action potential only if the summed messages produce sufficient depolarization (the negative potential moves close enough to zero). (© Cengage Learning)

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain | 63

Dopamine is of particular interest to psychologists because it’s thought to play a role in reward and pleasure systems in the brain but also schizophrenia, a serious psy- chological disorder that disrupts thought processes and produces delusions and hal- lucinations. When patients with schizophrenia take drugs that inhibit the action of dopamine, their hallucinations and delusions are often reduced or even eliminated. It’s been speculated that perhaps an inability to regulate dopamine successfully in the brain may be partly responsible for this debilitating disorder (Grace, 2010). Further support linking dopamine and schizophrenia comes from the study of Parkinson disease, a movement disorder that results from the underproduction of dopamine. Parkinson patients are sometimes given the drug L-dopa, which increases the lev- els of dopamine in the brain, to reduce the tremors and other movement problems caused by the disease. For some patients, however, one of the side effects of L-dopa is a mimicking of the thought disorders characteristic of schizophrenia ( Jaskiw & Popli, 2004).

Neurotransmitters in the brain control our thoughts and actions—that much is clear—but the mechanisms are not well understood. We know, for example, that peo- ple with Alzheimer disease have suffered destruction of cells that play a role in pro- ducing acetylcholine (Casey et al., 2010). Because memory loss is a common problem

Presynaptic neuron

Neural impulse

Myelin sheath

Vesicles containing neurotransmitters

Neurotransmitter molecules diffuse throughout the synapse.

Neurotransmitters bind to receptor, opening the ion channel and allowing sodium ions to flow into the postsynaptic cell.

Neurotransmitter binding site (receptor)

Sodium ion

Synapse

Inside postsynaptic cell

Membrane

Sodium ion channel closed

Sodium ion channel open

Ion channel

Terminal button

Postsynaptic dendrite

Postsynaptic membrane

Synapse

+ +

●● FiGuRE 3.5 Releasing the Chemical Messengers When the action potential reaches the end of the axon, chemical messengers, or neurotransmitters, are released into the synapse, where they interact with the postsynaptic membrane of the next neuron, opening or closing its ion channels. (© Cengage Learning)

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64 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

for Alzheimer patients, a close connection probably exists between acetylcholine and certain kinds of memory functioning (Hasselmo, 2011). Serotonin, another primar- ily inhibitory neurotransmitter, affects sleep, dreaming, and general arousal and may be involved in psychological disorders, such as depression, schizophrenia, and obses- sive–compulsive disorder (Barlow & Durand, 2012). Many medications used to treat depression, such as Prozac (fluoxetine), act by modulating the effectiveness of sero- tonin. Similarly, researchers have suspected for some time that a neurotransmitter called gamma-amino-butyric acid (GABA) plays an important role in the regulation of anxiety. Many medications for anxiety (e.g., tranquilizers such as Valium) regulate GABA in the brain.

Researchers are trying to understand the neural pathways involved in these effects and disorders. However much of our knowledge remains correlational at this point—we know that as the levels of particular neurotransmitters vary in the body, so too do the symptoms of disorders. This is useful information for treatment, but it doesn’t establish a true cause-and-effect link between neurotransmitters and psycho- logical characteristics.

Drugs and the Brain Because the transmission of messages between neurons is chemical, consuming a drug—swallowing, smoking, snorting, and so forth—can significantly affect the communication networks in your brain. Some drugs, called agonists, enhance or mimic the action of neurotransmitters. For example, the nico- tine in cigarette smoke can act like the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. Nicotine has a general stimulatory effect in the body, such as increasing heart rate, because it pro- duces excitatory messages in much the same way as acetylcholine. Cocaine is an ago- nist for dopamine—it allows dopamine to linger longer in the synapse increasing its effectiveness.

Other drugs act as antagonists, which means that they block the action of neu- rotransmitters. The lethal drug curare, which is sometimes used on the tips of hunt- ing arrows and blow darts in South America, is antagonistic to acetylcholine. Curare blocks the receptor systems involved in muscle movements, including those muscles that move the diaphragm during breathing. The result is paralysis and likely death from suffocation.

In the early 1970s, membrane receptor systems were discovered in the brain that react directly to morphine, a painkilling and highly addictive drug derived from the opium plant (Pert & Snyder, 1973). We have receptor systems that are sensitive to morphine because the brain produces its own morphinelike substances called endor- phins. Endorphins serve as natural painkillers in the body. Apparently, the brain has evolved systems for releasing endorphins under conditions of stress or exertion

serotonin A neurotransmitter that has been linked to sleep, dreaming, and general arousal and may also be involved in some psychological disorders such as depression and schizophrenia.

gamma-amino-butyric acid (GABA) A neurotransmitter that may play a role in the regulation of anxiety; it generally produces inhibitory effects.

endorphins Morphinelike chemicals that act as the brain’s natural painkillers.

●● CONCEPt REviEw Neurotransmitters and Their Effects NEUROTRANSMITTER EFFECT* INVOLVED IN …

Glutamate Excitatory Most common neurotransmitter in the brain. Probably involved in a host of mental processes, including memory.

Dopamine Inhibitory Commonly associated with reward and pleasure systems in the brain. Plays a role in both schizo- phrenia and Parkinson disease.

Acetylcholine Excitatory Communication between motor neurons and muscles in the body, leading to muscle contraction. May also play a role in Alzheimer disease.

Serotonin Inhibitory Regulating sleep, dreaming, and general arousal. Also may play a role in some psychological disor- ders, including depression.

GABA Inhibitory The regulation of anxiety; tranquilizing drugs act on GABA to decrease anxiety.

*Note: Neurotransmitters, on their own, can be either excitatory or inhibitory; the nature of its action depends on specific characteristics of the receiving cell’s membrane.

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain | 65

to reduce pain and possibly to provide pleasurable reinforcement (Pert, 2002). We’ll return to the study of drugs, particularly their effects on conscious awareness, in Chapter 6.

The Communication Network To unravel the complex relationship between the brain and mental processes, we must understand how neurons work together. A vast communication network exists within the brain, involving the operation of thousands of neurons. The way in which these cells interact is critically important. Behaviors, thoughts, feelings, ideas—they don’t arise from the activation of single neurons; instead, it is the pattern of activation produced by groups of neurons operating together that produces conscious experi- ence and complex behaviors. As a result, we need to be mindful of the specific ways in which neurons are connected and the means through which those connections can be modified by experience.

Information is partly communicated in the nervous system by the firing rate of a neuron, or the number of action potentials the neuron generates per unit of time. The stronger the incoming message, the more rapidly the receiving neuron tends to fire. These firing rates, however, are subject to some natural limitations. For instance, a refractory period usually follows the generation of an action potential; during this period, additional action potentials cannot be generated. Even with the refractory period, though, neurons are still able to fire off a relatively steady stream of messages in response to environmental input. Many neurons even appear to have spontaneous firing rates, which means that they generate a steady stream of action potentials with little or no apparent input from the environment. A continuously active cell is adaptive because information can be coded by increasing or decreasing a baseline firing rate.

Because the brain contains roughly 100 billion neurons, which is comparable to the number of stars in the Milky Way galaxy, it’s impractical to try to map out individual neural connections. So how can we ever hope to discover how every- thing works together to produce behavior? One solution is to study lower organ- isms, whose circuits of neurons are less complex and more easily mapped. Another option is to try to simulate activities of the mind—such as simple learning and memory processes—by creating artificial networks of neurons on computers.

At this point, no one has come close to achieving anything resembling an artifi- cial brain, but simple computerized networks have been developed that show brain- like properties. For example, computerized neural networks can recognize objects when given incomplete information and can perform reasonably well if artificially damaged. If a subset of input units is turned off, perhaps mimicking damage to the brain, activation of the remaining units can still be sufficient to reproduce the cor- rect output response. This is an adaptive characteristic of both neural circuits in the brain and neural networks. Each is able to sustain damage and still produce correct responses.

refractory period The period of time following an action potential when more action potentials cannot be generated.

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●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.1

66 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor LEARNING GOALS

●● Describe the basic organization of the nervous system. ●● Explain the techniques researchers use to study the brain. ●● Describe the major structures of the brain and their functions. ●● Discuss how the two hemispheres coordinate brain functions.

The nervous system has a lot of tough problems to solve. Besides generating behavior and mental processes such as thinking and feeling, the brain must maintain a beat- ing heart, control breathing, and signal the body that it’s time to eat. If your body is deprived of food or water or if its constant internal temperature gets out of whack, you must be motivated to find food, water, or the appropriate shelter. Even the sim- plest of everyday activities—producing spoken language, walking, perceiving a com- plex visual scene—requires a great deal of coordination among the muscles and sensory organs of the body. To accomplish these different functions, the nervous sys- tem divides its labor.

The Central and Peripheral Nervous Systems The nervous system is divided into two major parts, the central nervous system and the peripheral nervous system. The central nervous system consists of the brain and spinal cord and acts as the central executive of the body. Decisions are made here, and messages are then communicated to the rest of the body via bundles of axons called nerves. The nerves outside the brain and spinal cord form the peripheral nervous system.

It is through the peripheral nervous system that muscles are moved, internal organs are regulated, and sensory input is directed toward the brain. As you can see in ●Figure 3.6, the peripheral nervous system can be divided further into the somatic and autonomic systems. Information travels to the brain and spinal cord through afferent (sensory) nerve pathways; efferent (motor) nerve pathways carry central ner- vous system messages outward to the muscles and glands. The somatic system con- sists of the nerves that transmit sensory information toward the brain, as well as the nerves that connect to the skeletal muscles to initiate movement. Without the

central nervous system The brain and the spinal cord.

peripheral nervous system The network of nerves that links the central nervous system with the rest of the body.

nerves Bundles of axons that make up neural “transmission cables.”

somatic system The collection of nerves that transmits information toward the brain and connects to the skeletal muscles to initiate movement; part of the peripheral nervous system.

1. The main body of the cell, where excitatory and inhibitory mes- sages combine:

2. The long tail-like part of a neuron that serves as the cell’s main transmitter device:

3. The all-or-none electrical signal that travels to the end of the axon, causing the release of chemical messengers:

4. The branchlike fibers that extend outward from a neuron and receive information from other neurons:

5. Acetylcholine, serotonin, GABA, and dopamine are all examples of

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.1 (Continued) test Yourself Now test your knowledge about neurons and how they communicate. Select your answers from the following list of terms: dendrites, soma, axon, terminal buttons, action potential, neurotransmitters, refractory period. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor | 67

somatic system, information about the environment could not reach the brain, nor could we begin a movement of any kind. The autonomic system controls the more automatic needs of the body, such as heart rate, digestion, blood pressure, and the activities of internal glands. These two systems work together to make certain that information about the world is communicated to the brain for interpretation, that movements are carried out, and that the life-sustaining activities of the body are continued.

One critical function of the autonomic system, besides performing the automatic “housekeeping” activities that keep the body alive, is to help us handle and recover from emergency situations. When we’re faced with an emergency, such as a sudden attack, our bodies typically produce a fight-or-flight response. The sympathetic divi- sion of the autonomic system triggers the release of chemicals, creating a state of readiness (e.g., by increasing heart rate, blood pressure, and breathing rate). After the emergency has passed, the parasympathetic division calms the body down by slowing heart rate and lowering blood pressure. Parasympathetic activity also helps increase the body’s supply of stored energy, which may be diminished in response to the emergency situation.

autonomic system The collection of nerves that controls the more automatic needs of the body (such as heart rate, digestion, blood pressure); part of the peripheral nervous system.

Brain Spinal cord

Central nervous system

SomaticAutonomic

Sympathetic (arousing)

Parasympathetic (calming)

Peripheral nervous system

Nervous System

●● FiGuRE 3.6 the Nervous System The central nervous system contains the brain and the spinal cord, and the peripheral nervous system has various subsystems. (Based on Kalat, 1996)

68 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

How We Determine Brain Function Now let’s consider the techniques that researchers use to determine how various parts of the brain actually work. The anatomical features of the nervous system as a whole—the various nerve tracts and so on—can be studied through dissection of the body (after death, of course!). But the dissection of brain tissue, which contains billions of neurons, tells only a limited story. To determine the architecture of the brain, researchers need a broader set of tools. We’ll briefly consider three popular techniques: (1) the study of brain damage, (2) activating the brain, and (3) monitoring the brain in action.

Brain Damage One of the oldest methods for determining brain function is to study people with brain damage. A patient arrives with an injury—such as a blow to the right side of the head—and complains of a particular problem, such as trouble mov- ing the left side of the body. In this way, a link is established between a brain area and its function. As early as the 19th century, it was known that damage to the left side of the brain can create movement problems on the right side of the body as well as very specific speech difficulties. Destruction of Wernicke’s area results in a patient who cannot easily understand spoken language (Wernicke, 1874); damage to Broca’s area produces a patient who can understand but not easily produce spoken language (Broca, 1861). Cases such as these suggest that psychological functions are controlled by specific areas of the brain.

Neuroscientists have made many significant advances by studying brain injury. For example, brain damaged patients have taught us about how knowledge is rep- resented in the brain (Martin, 2007). Damage to one part of the brain can affect a person’s ability to name tools but not fruit; damage to another area might affect the ability to recognize a face. The neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran provides a fasci- nating account of such studies in his book The Tell-Tale Brain (Ramachandran, 2011). We meet Jason who is unable to talk, walk, or recognize people—he follows people with his eyes, but otherwise exists in a zombie-like state. When his father visits, Jason is incapable of interaction—but if his father calls him on the phone from another room Jason suddenly becomes fully conscious and carries on a natural conversation. As Ramachandran notes: “It is as if there are two Jasons trapped inside one body: the one connected to vision, who is alert but not conscious and the one connected to

hearing who is alert and conscious” (Ramachandran, 2011, p. 7). Case studies of brain damage are useful but they do have limita-

tions. For one thing, researchers have no control over when and where the injury occurs. In addition, most instances of brain damage, either from an accident or from a tumor or a stroke, produce widespread damage. So it’s difficult to know exactly which portion of the dam- aged brain is responsible for the behavioral or psychological problem. Researchers have taken advantage of the fact that brain tissue contains no pain receptors to explore the effects of brain damage in lower ani- mals. It’s possible to destroy, or lesion, particular regions of an animal’s brain by administering an electric current, injecting chemicals, or cutting tissue. Even here it is difficult to pinpoint the damage exactly (because everything in the brain is interconnected), but lesion studies in animals have frequently led to significant advances in our under- standing of the brain (Pinel, 1999).

Activating the Brain Another technique used to study brain function is to activate the brain directly by capitalizing on the electrochemical nature of the communica- tion network. Essentially, messages can be created where none would have normally occurred. Chemicals can be injected that excite the neurons in a particular area of the brain. Researchers can also insert small wire electrodes into brain tissue, allowing an area’s cells to be stimulated electrically. The researcher initiates a message externally, then observes behavior.

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To learn whether this man may be suffering from some kind of brain damage, assessment tests are performed at a memory disorders clinic.

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor | 69

Electrical stimulation techniques have been used primarily with animals. It’s pos- sible to implant an electrode in such a way as to allow an animal to move freely about in its environment (see ●Figure 3.7). A small pulse of current can then be delivered to various brain regions whenever the researcher desires. Studies have shown that elec- trical brain stimulation can cause animals to suddenly start eating, drinking, engaging in sexual behavior, or preparing for an attack. Using electrical stimulation, research- ers have discovered what might be “reward” or “pleasure” centers in the brains of rats, leading the animals to engage repeatedly in whatever behavior led to the stimulation (Leon & Gallistel, 1998; Olds, 1958). For example, if rats are taught that pressing a metal bar leads to electrical stimulation of a reward area, they will press the bar thousands of times an hour. (The natural inference, of course, is that the stimulation is pleasurable, although we really have no way to tell what a concept like “pleasure” means to a rat.)

Under some circumstances, it’s possible to stimulate cells in the human brain and note the effects. During certain kinds of brain surgery (such as surgery to reduce the seizures produced by epilepsy), the patient is kept awake while the brain is stimulated from time to time with an electrode. Because there are no pain receptors in the brain, the patient typically receives only a local anesthetic prior to the surgery (along with some drugs for relaxation). Keeping the patient awake is necessary because the sur- geon can stimulate an abnormal area, prior to removal, to make sure that vital capa- bilities such as speech or movement will not be affected. Electrical stimulation under these conditions has caused patients to produce involuntary movement, hear buzzing noises, and in some rare instances even experience what they report to be memories (Penfield & Perot, 1963).

Monitoring the Brain Other techniques monitor the brain directly and are easily used to study brain function. The electroencephalograph (EEG) is a device that sim- ply monitors the gross electrical activity of the brain. Recording electrodes attached to the scalp measure global changes in the electrical potentials of thousands of brain cells in the form of line tracings, or brain waves. The EEG is useful not only as a research tool but also for diagnostic purposes. Brain disorders, including psychologi- cal disorders, can sometimes be detected through abnormalities in brain waves (Alloy & Abramson, 2010).

A three-dimensional picture of the brain, including abnormalities in brain tissue, can be obtained through a computerized tomography scan (or CT scan). CT scan- ners use computers to detect how highly focused beams of X-rays change as they pass through the body. CT scans are most often used by physicians to detect tumors or injuries to the brain, but they can also be used to determine whether there is a physi- cal basis for some chronic behavioral or psychological disorder.

electroencephalograph (EEG) A device used to monitor the gross electrical activity of the brain.

computerized tomography scan (CT scan) The use of highly focused beams of X-rays to construct detailed anatomical maps of the living brain.

Connection to stimulator

Rotating drum

Cumulative response recorder

Connection to recorder

Pen

Electrical stimulator ●● FiGuRE 3.7 Electrical Stimulation When the rat presses a bar, a small pulse of electric current is delivered to its brain. Stimulation of certain brain areas appears to be quite rewarding to the rat because it presses the bar very rapidly. (© Cengage Learning)

Researchers can observe the electrical activity of a person’s brain with the EEG device, which records gross electrical activity in different regions.

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70 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

Other imaging devices are designed to obtain a snapshot of the brain at work. These techniques help the researcher determine how tasks, such as reading a book, affect indi- vidual parts of the brain. In positron emission tomography (PET), the patient ingests a harmless radioactive substance, which is then absorbed into the cells of active brain regions. When the person is performing a task, such as speaking or reading, the work- ing areas of the brain absorb more of the ingested radioactive material. The PET scanner then develops a picture that reveals how the radioactive substance has distributed itself over time. It is assumed that those parts of the brain with the most concentrated traces of radioactive material probably play a significant role in the task being performed.

Another very popular technique is magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). MRI has two main advantages over PET scanning: It doesn’t require the participant to ingest any chemicals, and it’s capable of producing extremely detailed, three-dimensional images of the brain. Functional MRI uses the MRI technolog y to map changes in blood f low or oxy- gen use as the patient thinks or behaves. Functional MRI, like PET scanning, helps researchers determine where spe- cif ic k inds of processing may occur in the brain. So far, this popular new technique has helped to isolate the brain regions associated with visual processing, language, atten- tion, memory, and even social interactions (see Todorov, Fiske, & Prentice, 2011). There is some evidence to suggest that functional MRIs may even help psychologists distin- guish between true and false memories: When we falsely remember something that didn’t occur, the blood f low pat- terns in the brain are somewhat different from those seen when we remember an actual event (Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011). Exactly what these results mean is still a mat- ter of debate, but functional MRI is clearly a very powerful investigative tool.

positron emission tomography (PET) A method for measuring how radioactive substances are absorbed in the brain; it can be used to detect how specific tasks activate different areas of the living brain.

PET scans can demonstrate how a harmless radioactive substance is absorbed into the cells of brain regions active during various tasks.

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Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor | 71

Brain Structures and Their Functions Let’s now turn our attention to the brain itself. Remember, it’s here that mental processes are represented through the simultaneous activities of groups of individual neurons. Particular regions in the brain contribute unique features to an experience, helping to create a psychological whole. Your perception of a cat is not controlled by a single cell, or even by a single group of cells, but rather by different brain areas that detect the color of the fur or recognize a characteristic meow.

I’ll divide our discussion of the brain into sections that correspond to the brain’s three major anatomical regions: the hindbrain, the midbrain, and the forebrain. As we proceed, however, keep in mind that although particular areas in the brain seem to con- trol particular functions, the components of the brain are team players—no single area is likely to work alone. There is almost certainly considerable overlap of function in the brain.

The Hindbrain: Basic Life Support The hindbrain is the most primitive part of the brain, and it sits right where the spinal cord and brain merge (see ●Figure 3.8). Primitive is an appropriate term for two reasons. First, structures in the hindbrain act as the basic life-support system for the body—no creative thoughts or complex emotions originate here. Second, from the standpoint of evolution, the hindbrain is the oldest part of the brain. Similar structures, with similar functions, can be found throughout the ani- mal kingdom. You can think of the hindbrain as a kind of base camp, with higher struc- tures that are situated farther up into the brain controlling increasingly more complex mental processes. Not surprisingly, damage to these lower regions of the brain seriously affects the ability of the organism to survive.

As Figure 3.8 shows, the hindbrain contains several important anatomical sub- structures. The medulla and the pons are associated with the control of heart rate, breathing, blood pressure, and reflexes such as vomiting, sneezing, and coughing. Both areas serve as pathways for neural impulses traveling to and from the spinal cord (the word pons means “bridge”). These areas are particularly sensitive to the lethal effects of drugs such as alcohol, barbiturates, and cocaine. The hindbrain also contains the reticular formation, a network of neurons and nerves linked to the control of general arousal, sleep, and consciousness.

hindbrain A primitive part of the brain that sits at the juncture point where the brain and spinal cord merge. Structures in the hindbrain, including the medulla, pons, and reticular formation, act as the basic life- support system for the body.

●● CONCEPt REviEw Brain Investigation Techniques TECHNIQUE OVERVIEW WHAT CAN IT SHOW?

Assessing brain damage and lesion

Associate areas of brain damage with changes in behavioral function

The areas of the brain that may be responsible for differ- ent functions

Electrical brain stimulation Uses electrical or chemical stimulation to excite brain areas

How activation of certain brain regions affects behavior

EEG (Electroencephalograph) Uses electrodes to record gross electrical activ- ity of the brain

How overall activity in the brain changes during certain activities, such as sleeping, and may allow for detection of disorders

Computerized tomography (CT) scan

Passes X-rays through the body at various angles and orientations

Tumors or injuries to the brain, as well as the structural bases for chronic behavioral or psychological disorders

Positron emission tomography (PET)

A radioactive substance is ingested; active brain areas absorb the substance; PET scanner reveals distribution of the substance

How various tasks (such as reading a book) affect differ- ent parts of the brain

Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)

Monitors systematic activity of atoms in the presence of magnetic fields and radio-wave pulses

A three-dimensional view of the brain, serving as a diagnostic tool for brain abnormalities, such as tumors. Functional MRI allows for observation of brain function

72 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

Finally, at the base of the brain sits a structure that resembles a smaller version of the brain—a kind of “brainlet.” This is the cerebellum (which means “little brain”), a structure involved in the preparation, selection, and coordination of complex motor movements such as hitting a golf ball, playing the piano, or learning how to use and manipulate tools (Lewis, 2006). No one is certain about the exact role the cerebellum plays in movement—for instance, it may be a critical component of how we learn to time motor movements (Teki et al., 2011). Brain-imaging studies have shown that the cerebellum is actually involved in a whole host of tasks, including language, memory, reasoning, and perhaps even the perception of pain (Moulton et al., 2010).

The Midbrain: Neural Relay Stations The midbrain lies deep within the brain atop the hindbrain. Perhaps because of its central position, structures in the midbrain receive input from multiple sources, including the sense organs. The tectum and its compo- nent structures, the superior colliculus and inferior colliculus, serve as important relay stations for visual and auditory information and help coordinate reactions to sensory events in the environment (such as moving the head in response to a sudden sound).

The midbrain also contains a group of neurons, collectively called the substan- tia nigra, that release the neurotransmitter dopamine from their terminal buttons. As you saw earlier in the chapter, dopamine tends to produce inhibitory effects in the body, and it seems to be involved in a number of physical and psychological dis- orders. For example, the rigidity of movement that characterizes Parkinson disease apparently results from decreased levels of dopamine in the brain. Indeed, the death of neurons in the substantia nigra is believed to be the cause of the disorder. Exactly why this portion of the midbrain degenerates is not known, although both genetic and environmental factors are thought to be involved (Przedborski, 2005).

The Forebrain: Higher Mental Functioning Moving up past the midbrain we encoun- ter the forebrain (see ●Figure 3.9). The most recognizable feature of the forebrain is the cerebral cortex, which is the grayish matter full of fissures, folds, and crevices

cerebellum A hindbrain structure at the base of the brain that is involved in the coordination of complex motor skills.

midbrain The middle portion of the brain, containing such structures as the tectum, superior colliculus, and inferior colliculus; midbrain structures serve as neural relay stations and may help coordinate reactions to sensory events.

forebrain The outer portion of the brain, including the cerebral cortex and the structures of the limbic system.

cerebral cortex The outer layer of the brain, considered to be the seat of higher mental processes.

Forebrain

Substantia nigra

Hindbrain Reticular formation Pons Cerebellum Medulla

Midbrain Superior colliculus Inferior colliculus

●● FiGuRE 3.8 the Hindbrain and Midbrain The hindbrain (blue) acts as the basic life- support system for the body, controlling such things as heart rate, blood pressure, and respiration. The midbrain (orange) contains structures that help coordinate and relay information to higher centers. (© Cengage Learning)

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor | 73

that covers the outside of the brain (cortex is Latin for “bark ”). The cortex is quite large in humans, accounting for approximately 80% of the total volume of the human brain (Kolb & Whishaw, 2009). We’ll look at the cerebral cortex in depth in a minute. Beneath the cerebral cortex are the thalamus, the hypothalamus, and the limbic sys- tem. The thalamus is positioned close to the midbrain and is an important gathering point for input from the various senses. Indeed, the thalamus is the main process- ing center for sensory input prior to its being sent to the upper regions of the cor- tex. Besides acting as an efficient relay center, information from the various senses is probably combined in some way here.

The hypothalamus, which lies just below the thalamus, is important in motiva- tion, particularly the regulation of eating, drinking, body temperature, and sexual behavior. In experiments on lower animals, stimulating different regions of the hypo- thalamus kick-starts a variety of behaviors. For example, male and female rats will show characteristic sexual responses when one portion of the hypothalamus is stim- ulated, whereas damage to another region of the hypothalamus can seriously affect regular eating behavior. Neuroimaging studies have shown that the hypothalamus becomes active when monkeys are exposed to sexually arousing odors from recep- tive females (Ferris et al., 2001). The hypothalamus also plays a key role in the release of hormones by the pituitary gland; you’ll read about the actions of hormones shortly when we discuss the endocrine system.

The limbic system is made up of several interrelated brain structures, including the amygdala and the hippocampus. The amygdala is a small, almond-shaped piece of brain (from the Greek word meaning “almond”) that’s linked to a number of moti- vational and emotional behaviors, including fear, aggression, and defensive actions. Destruction of portions of the amygdala in lower animals can produce an extremely passive animal—one that will do nothing in response to provocation. Neuroimaging studies in humans have found that activation in the amygdala increases when peo- ple look at faces showing fear, anger, sadness, or even happiness (Yang et al., 2002); moreover, people with damage to the amygdala sometimes have difficulty recogniz- ing emotions like sadness in facial expressions (Adolphs, 2009).

The hippocampus (Greek for “seahorse,” which it resembles anatomically) is important for the formation of memories, particularly our memory for specific personal events (Hasselmo, 2011). People with severe damage to the hippocampus

thalamus A relay station in the forebrain thought to be an important gathering point for input from the senses.

hypothalamus A forebrain structure thought to play a role in the regulation of various motivational activities, including eating, drinking, and sexual behavior.

limbic system A system of structures thought to be involved in motivational and emotional behaviors (the amygdala) and memory (the hippocampus).

Cerebral cortex

Thalamus

Hypothalamus

Pituitary gland

Amygdala

Hippocampus

●● FiGuRE 3.9 the Forebrain The forebrain includes structures such as the limbic system and the cerebral cortex. Structures in the limbic system are thought to be involved in motivation, emotion, and memory. The cerebral cortex controls higher mental processes. (© Cengage Learning)

74 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

sometimes live in a kind of perpetual present—they are aware of the world around them, and they recognize people and things known to them prior to the damage, but they remember almost nothing new. These patients act as if they are continually awakening from a dream; experiences slip away, and they recall nothing from only moments before. We’ll consider the hippocampus and the role it plays in memory in more detail in Chapter 8.

The Cerebral Cortex With the cerebral cortex, we finally find the seat of higher mental processes. Thoughts, the sense of self, the ability to reason and solve prob- lems—each arises from neurons firing in patterns somewhere in specialized regions of the cerebral cortex. The cortex is divided into two hemispheres, left and right. The left hemisphere controls the sensory and motor functions for the right side of the body, and the right hemisphere controls these functions for the left side of the body. A structure called the corpus callosum, which I’ll discuss later, serves as a communica- tion bridge between the two hemispheres.

Each hemisphere can be further divided into four parts, or lobes: the frontal, temporal, parietal, and occipital lobes (see ●Figure 3.10). These lobes control particular body functions, such as visual processing by the occipital lobe and language process- ing by the frontal and temporal lobes.

The frontal lobes are the largest lobes in the cortex and they act as the brain’s “executive” in charge of planning and coordinating voluntary behavior and deci- sion making. Many higher-order cognitive functions originate here, including prob- lem solving, certain kinds of remembering, and even socialization and personality. Damage to the frontal lobe can lead to withdrawal from the social world, ignoring of friends and relatives, and a refusal to do much of anything (Ramachandran, 2011). A famous case study illustrates the point: In 1848, a railroad foreman named Phineas Gage was packing black powder into a blasting hole when, accidentally, the pow- der discharged, driving a thick iron rod through the left side of his head (entering just below his left eye and exiting the left-top portion of his skull). The result was a 3-inch hole in his skull and a complete shredding of a large portion of the left fron- tal lobe of his brain. Remarkably, Gage recovered, and with the exception of the loss of vision in his left eye and some slight facial paralysis, he was able to move about freely and perform a variety of tasks. But he was “no longer Gage” in the minds of his friends and acquaintances—his personality changed completely. Whereas prior to his injury he was known to all as someone with “a well-balanced mind” and as “a shrewd businessman,” after the meeting of brain and iron rod he became “fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his custom)” (Bigelow, 1850).

The frontal lobes were once the site of a famous surgical operation, the prefron- tal lobotomy, which was performed on people suffering from severe and untreatable psychological disorders. The operation was performed to calm the patient and reduce

frontal lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemisphere of the cerebral cortex, located on the top front of the brain; it contains the motor cortex and may be involved in higher-level thought processes.

Left hemisphere Right hemisphere

Frontal lobe

Motor cortex

Somatosensory cortex

Wernicke’s area

Parietal lobe

Occipital lobe

Broca’s area

Temporal lobe

●● FiGuRE 3.10 the Cerebral Cortex The cerebral cortex is divided into two hemispheres—left and right—each consisting of four lobes. The lobes are specialized to control particular functions, such as visual processing in the occipital lobe and language processing in the frontal and temporal lobes. (© Cengage Learning)

After Phineas Gage suffered a blasting accident that substantially damaged his frontal lobe, he was “no longer Gage,” according to friends and acquaintances.

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Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor | 75

symptoms, which it sometimes did, but the side effects were severe. Patients lost their ability to take initiative or make plans, and they often appeared to lose their social inhibitions (like Gage). For these reasons, the operation fell out of favor as an accept- able treatment for psychological disorders.

The frontal lobes also contain the motor cortex, which controls voluntary muscle movements, as well as areas involved in language production and, possibly, higher- level thought processes. Broca’s area, which is involved in speech production, is located in a portion of the left frontal lobe in most people. The motor cortex sits at the rear of the frontal lobe in both hemispheres; axons from the motor cortex project down to motor neurons in the spinal cord and elsewhere. If neurons in this area of the brain are stimulated electrically, muscle contractions—the twitch of a finger or the jerking of a foot—can occur. Researchers have also discovered an intriguing rela- tion between body parts and regions of the motor cortex. It turns out that there is a mapping, or topographic organization, in which adjacent areas of the body, such as the hand and the wrist, are activated by adjacent neurons in the motor cortex. The motor cortex also contains mirror neurons, which may play an important role in empathy and our ability to take the perspectives of others. For more on mirror neurons, take a look at the accompanying Practical Solutions section.

The parietal lobe contains the somatosensory cortex, through which we experi- ence the sensations of touch, temperature, and pain. The brush of a lover’s kiss on the cheek excites neurons that lie close to those that would be excited by the same kiss to the lips. In addition, as ●Figure 3.11 demonstrates, there is a relationship

parietal lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemisphere of the cerebral cortex, located roughly on the top middle portion of the brain; it contains the somatosensory cortex, which controls the sense of touch.

Swallowing

Vocalization

Pharynx

Teeth

Lips

Upper face

Left hand

Neck Pelvis

Pelvis Trunk

Right hand

Facial expressions

Upper arm

Lower arm

Upper leg

Genitals

Right foot

Frontal lobes

Left Motor Cortex

Left Hemisphere Right Hemisphere

Right Somatosensory Cortex

Motor cortex

Somatosensory cortex

●● FiGuRE 3.11 Cortex Specialization The motor cortex is at the back of the frontal lobe in each cerebral hemisphere. In a systematic body- to-brain relationship, adjacent parts of the body are activated by neurons in adjacent areas of the cortex. The somatosensory cortex, in the parietal lobe of each hemisphere, controls the sense of touch; again, there is a systematic mapping arrangement. Notice that in each type of cortex, the size of the cortical representation is related to the sensitivity of the body part. (© Cengage Learning)

76 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

between sensitivity to touch (or the ability to control a movement) and size of the representation in the cortex. Those areas of the body that show particular sensitiv- ity to touch, or are associated with fine motor control (such as the face, lips, and fingers), have relatively large areas of neural representation in the cortex. It’s not sur- prising, as a consequence, that we display affection by kissing on the lips rather than, say, rubbing our backs together!

The temporal lobes, which lie on either side of the cortex, are involved in pro- cessing auditory information received from the left and right ears. As you’ll see in Chapter 5, there is a close relationship between the activities of particular neurons in the temporal lobe and the perception of certain frequencies of sound. As noted earlier, one region of the temporal lobe, Wernicke’s area, is involved in language comprehen- sion (the ability to understand what someone is saying). A person with damage to Wernicke’s area might be able to repeat a spoken sentence aloud with perfect diction and control yet not understand a word of it; brain-imaging studies also reveal that Wernicke’s area becomes active when people are asked to perform tasks that require meaningful verbal processing (Abdullaev & Posner, 1997). For most people, speech is localized in the temporal lobe of the left hemisphere.

Finally, at the far back of the brain sit the occipital lobes, where most visual processing occurs. It is here that information received from receptor cells in the eyes is analyzed and turned into visual images. The brain paints an image of the exter- nal world through a remarkable division of labor. There appear to be processing sta- tions in the occipital lobe designed to integrate separate signals about color, motion, and form (Sincich & Horton, 2005). Not surprisingly, damage to the occipital lobe produces highly specific visual problems—you might lose the ability to recognize an object moving in a particular direction, a color, or even a face (Gainotti & Marra, 2011). We’ll consider the organization of this part of the brain in more detail in Chapter 5.

temporal lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemisphere of the cerebral cortex, located roughly on the sides of the brain; it’s involved in certain aspects of speech and language perception.

occipital lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemisphere of the cerebral cortex, located at the back of the brain; visual processing is controlled there.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think it’s possible that personality is completely localized in one portion of the brain? If so, how could you explain the fact that someone’s personality can seem to change depending on the situation?

●● CONCEPt REviEw Brain Areas, Structures, and Functions BRAIN AREA GENERAL FUNCTION STRUCTURES AND SPECIFIC FUNCTION

Hindbrain Basic life support medulla and pons: associated with the control of heart rate, breath- ing, and certain reflexes

reticular formation: control of general arousal, sleep, and some move- ment of the head

cerebellum: involved in preparation, selection, and coordination of complex motor movement

Midbrain Houses neural relay stations tectum (components are superior colliculus and inferior colliculus): relay stations for visual and auditory information

substantia nigra: group of neurons that release the neurotransmitter dopamine

Forebrain Higher mental functions thalamus: initial gathering point for sensory input; information com- bined and relayed here

hypothalamus: helps regulate eating, drinking, body temperature, and sexual behavior

hippocampus: important to the formation of memories

amygdala: linked to fear, aggression, and defensive behaviors

cerebral cortex: the seat of higher mental processes, including sense of self and the ability to reason and solve problems

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor | 77

The Divided Brain The division of labor in the brain is particularly striking in the study of the two separate halves, or hemispheres, of the cerebral cortex. Although the brain is designed to operate as a whole, the hemispheres are lateralized, which means that each side is responsible for performing unique and independent functions. As you’ve seen, the right hemisphere of the brain controls the movements of the left side of the body; the left hemisphere governs the right side. This means that stim- ulating a region of the motor cortex in the left cerebral hemisphere would cause a muscle on the right side of the body to twitch. Similarly, if cells in the occipital lobe of the right cerebral hemisphere are damaged, a blind spot develops in the left portion of the visual world. Lateralization undoubtedly serves some adaptive functions. For example, it may allow the brain to divide its labor in ways that pro- duce more efficient processing.

●Figure 3.12 shows how information received through the eyes travels to one side of the brain or the other. If you’re looking straight ahead, an image coming from the left side of your body (the left visual field) falls on the inside half of the left eye and the outside half of the right eye; receptor cells in these locations transmit their images to the back of the right cerebral hemisphere. Both eyes project information directly to each hemisphere, as the figure shows, but information from the left visual field goes to the right hemisphere and vice versa.

Under normal circumstances, if an object approaches you from your left side, the information eventually arrives on both sides of your brain. There are two rea- sons for this. First, if you turn your head or eyes to look at the object—from left to right—its image is likely to fall on both the inside and the outside halves of each eye over time. It might start off on the inside half of the left eye, but as your eyes turn,

One of the unique characteristics of people, compared to most other animal species, is our keen ability to solve the “other mind problem.” We have an unparalleled capacity to get inside the heads of others, to imagine what they’re thinking, how they’re feeling, and what they’re likely to do next. Neuroscientists now believe that they have discovered a key element in the brain that produces this abil- ity: mirror neurons. As you’ve learned in this chapter, neuroimaging studies have revealed that regions in the motor cortex become active when we engage in simple motor move- ments, such as clapping our hands or waving goodbye. However, the startling discovery is that neurons in these same regions become active when we simply observe someone else clapping their hands or waving goodbye. The same systems in the brain that are activated by performing an action are activated when we watch someone else perform the task.

Give it a little thought and this finding makes sense: Watch someone get stuck with a needle and what do you do? You’re likely

to make a face, turn away, or even grab your arm. Watch a good movie and what happens? You jump, cover your eyes, laugh, and even cry in response to a bunch of two-dimen- sional images flashing on a screen. You feel the pain, even though you’re just sitting in a seat. The discovery of mirror neurons sug- gests that …well … you really are experienc- ing the events you’re watching … at least in some sense. Mirror neurons help us solve the “other mind problem” and they may also be the basis for empathy, our ability to identify and relate to the thoughts and feelings of others (Iacoboni, 2009).

Brain imaging studies have shown that when we witness the emotions of others, some of the same emotion systems in our brain get activated. If you watch someone else experience disgust—for example, smell- ing a disgusting odor—your own “disgust systems” in the brain get activated as well (Wicker et al., 2003). A number of stud- ies have found relationships (correlations) between the activation of mirror neuron

systems and behavioral measures of empa- thy and one’s level of competence in social situations (see Gallese et al., 2011; Iacoboni, 2009). Results like these suggest that mir- ror neurons may play fundamental role in a variety of social functions (Glenberg, 2011). Some have even suggested that damage to mirror neuron systems in the brain may be partly responsible for autism, a developmen- tal disorder marked by a reluctance or an inability to interact well with other people (Ramachandran, 2011).

Psychologists and neuroscientists are in agreement: Mirror neurons exist in the human brain and may well contribute to a range of important mental and social human capabili- ties. It’s exciting stuff, because mirror neu- rons sit at the juncture between psychology and neuroscience, but we are a long way from understanding the details of what they do and how they work. A tremendous amount of research effort is currently ongoing, so there are reasons to be hopeful that we’ll see sig- nificant progress in the coming decades.

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Mirror Neurons: Solving the “Other Mind Problem”

78 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

the outside half will soon receive the message. Second, as noted ear- lier, a major communication bridge—the corpus callosum—connects the two brain halves. Information arriving at the right hemisphere, for example, is transported to the left hemisphere via the corpus cal- losum in just a few thousandths of a second (Saron & Davidson, 1989). This transfer process occurs automatically and requires no head or eye turning.

Splitting the Brain Both sides of the brain need to receive infor- mation about objects in the environment. To understand why, imag- ine what visual perception would be like for someone without a corpus callosum—someone with a “split brain.” Suppose an object suddenly appears in the person’s left visual field. There’s no time to move the head or eyes, only enough for a reflexive response. Our patient would be incapable of a coordinated response because the image would be reg- istered only in the right hemisphere, which contains the machinery to control only the left side of the body. The split-brain patient would also be unable to name the menacing object, because the language compre- hension and production centers are located, typically, on the left side of the brain.

Actually, patients like the one just described really do exist; a num- ber of people have split brains. Some were born without a corpus cal- losum; others had their communication gateway cut on purpose by surgeons seeking to reduce the spread of epileptic seizures. The two hemispheres of split-brain patients are not broken or damaged by the operation. Information simply cannot easily pass from one side of the brain to the other. In fact, the behavior of most split-brain patients is essentially normal because most input from the environment still reaches both sides of their brains. These patients can turn their heads and eyes freely as they interact with the environment, allowing infor- mation to fall on receptor regions that transmit to both hemispheres. The abnormal nature of their brains becomes apparent only under manufactured conditions.

For example, in a classic study by Gazzaniga, Bogen, and Sperry (1965), a variety of images (pictures, words, or symbols) were pre-

sented quickly to either the left or right visual fields of split-brain patients. Just like our hypothetical patient, when an image was shown to the right visual field, it was easily named because it could be processed by the language centers of the left hemisphere. For left visual field presentations, the patients remained per- plexed and silent. It was later learned, however, that their silence did not mean that the brain failed to process the image. If the split-brain patients were asked to point to a picture of the object just shown, they could do so, but only with the left hand (Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978). The brain had received the input but could not respond verbally. In another case, Gazzaniga and his colleagues presented a picture to the right hemisphere that triggered a negative mood. The patient denied seeing anything, because the picture wasn’t available to the language centers in the left hemisphere, but she complained of being upset—in fact, she blamed the experi- menters for upsetting her (Gazzaniga, 2008)!

Hemispheric Specialization The two hemispheres of the cerebral cortex are clearly specialized to perform certain kinds of tasks. The right hemisphere, for exam- ple, appears to play a more important role in spatial tasks, such as fitting together the pieces of a puzzle or orienting oneself spatially in an environment. Patients with damage to the right hemisphere characteristically have trouble with spatial tasks, as do split-brain patients who must assemble a puzzle with their right hand. The right

corpus callosum The collection of nerve fibers that connects the two cerebral hemispheres and allows information to pass from one side to the other.

Retina

Language area

Optic chiasm

Corpus callosum

Visual Cortex

Left Visual Field Right Visual Field

PORT AIR

●● FiGuRE 3.12 visual Processing in the two Hemispheres Images originating in the left visual field are projected to the right hemisphere, and information appearing in the right visual field is projected to the left hemisphere. Most language processing occurs in the left hemisphere, so split-brain patients can vocally report only stimuli that are shown in the right visual field. Here the subject can say only “port,” the word available for processing in the left hemisphere. (© Cengage Learning)

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Other than as a treatment for epilepsy, can you think of any situations in which having a split brain might actually be more beneficial than a unified brain?

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor | 79

hemisphere also contributes to some aspects of emotional processing—for example, patients with damage to the right hemisphere have more trouble recognizing vocal emotional expressions.

The left hemisphere—perhaps in part because of the lateralized language cen- ters—contributes more to verbal tasks such as reading and writing. We also use the left hemisphere to solve problems and to create consistent “explanations” of the world. Gazzaniga (2008) calls the left hemisphere the “interpreter” because it smoothes over inconsistencies in our actions and creates coherent stories about our behavior. Show the command “Walk ” to the right hemisphere of a split-brain patient and he is likely to get up and walk. Ask him why he’s walking and he is likely to fab- ricate an answer—for example, “I’m thirsty so I’m going to find a drink.” The lan- guage centers didn’t receive the command, so the left hemisphere makes up a story to “interpret” his behavior.

Still, a great deal of cooperation and collaboration goes on between the hemi- spheres. They interact continuously, and most mental processes, even language to a certain extent, depend on activity in both sides of the brain (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). You think and behave with a whole brain, not a fragmented one. If one side of the brain is damaged, regions in the other hemisphere can sometimes take over the lost functions (Gazzaniga et al., 1996). Specialization in the brain exists because it’s some- times adaptive for the two hemispheres to work independently—much in the same way that it’s beneficial for members of a group to divide components of a difficult task rather than trying to cooperate on every small activity.

test Yourself Now test what you’ve learned about research into brain structures and their functions. Fill in each blank with one of the following terms: EEG, PET scan, hindbrain, midbrain, forebrain, cerebellum, hypothalamus, cortex, frontal lobes, limbic system, corpus callosum. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. A primitive part of the brain that controls basic life support func- tions such as heart rate and respiration:

2. A structure thought to be involved in a variety of motivational activities, including eating, drinking, and sexual behavior:

3. The portion of the cortex believed to be involved in higher-order thought processes (such as planning) as well as the initiation of voluntary motor movements:

4. A structure near the base of the brain that is involved in coordina- tion of complex activities such as walking and playing the piano:

5. A device that is used to monitor the gross electrical activity of the brain:

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.2

80 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication LEARNING GOALS

●● Explain how the endocrine system controls long-term and widespread communication needs. ●● Discuss the role hormones play in sex-specific behaviors.

The human body actually has two communication systems. The first, the nervous system, starts and controls most behaviors—thoughts, voluntary movements, and perceptions of the external world. But the body also has long-term commu- nication needs. The body must initiate and control growth and provide long-term regulation of internal biological systems. Consequently, a second communication system has developed: a network of glands called the endocrine system, which uses the bloodstream, rather than neurons, as its main information courier. Chemicals called hormones are released into the blood by the various endocrine glands and control a variety of internal functions.

The word hormone comes from the Greek hormon, which means “to set into motion.” Hormones play a role in many basic, life-sustaining activities in the body. Hunger, thirst, sexual behavior, and the fight-or-flight response are all regulated in part by an interplay between the nervous system and hormones released by the endo- crine glands. The fact that the body has two communication systems rather than one makes sense from an adaptive standpoint. One system, communication among neurons, governs transmissions that are quick and detailed; the other, the endocrine system, initiates the slower but more widespread and longer-lasting effects. In the fol- lowing section, I’ll consider the endocrine system in more detail and then consider how hormones influence some fundamental differences between men and women.

The Endocrine System The chemical communication system of the endocrine glands differs in some important ways from the rapid-fire electrochemical activities of the nervous sys- tem. Communication in the nervous system tends to be localized, which means that a given neurotransmitter usually affects only cells in a small area. Hormones have widespread effects. Because hormones are carried by the blood, they travel throughout the body and interact with numerous target sites. Also in contrast to neu- rotransmitters, hormones have long-lasting effects. Whereas neural communication operates in the blink of an eye, the endocrine system can produce effects lasting min- utes, hours, or even days. In some animals, for example, it is circulating hormones that prepare them for seasonal migration or hibernation. Thus the endocrine system provides the body with a mechanism for both widespread and long-term communica- tion that cannot be produced by interactions among neurons.

Although the endocrine and nervous systems communicate in different ways, their activities are closely coordinated. Structures in the brain (especially the hypo- thalamus) stimulate or inhibit the release of hormones by the glands; once released, these chemicals then feed back and affect the firing rates of neural impulses. The feed- back loop balances and controls the regulatory activities of the body. The hypothala- mus is of particular importance because it controls the pituitary gland. The pituitary gland, a kind of master gland, controls the secretion of hormones in response to sig- nals from the hypothalamus; these hormones, in turn, regulate the activity of many of the other vital glands in the endocrine system. It is the pituitary gland, for exam- ple, that signals the testes in males to produce testosterone and the ovaries in females to produce estrogen—both of critical importance in sexual behavior and reproduction.

endocrine system A network of glands that uses the bloodstream, rather than neurons, to send chemical messages that regulate growth and other internal functions.

hormones Chemicals released into the blood by the various endocrine glands to help control a variety of internal regulatory functions.

pituitary gland A kind of master gland in the body that controls the release of hormones in response to signals from the hypothalamus.

Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication | 81

The endocrine system also helps us react to stressful situations. Suppose you’re walking home alone and two shadowy figures suddenly emerge from an alleyway and move in your direction. You draw in your breath, your stomach tightens, and your rapidly beating heart seems ready to explode from your chest. These whole- body reactions, critical in preparing you to fight or flee, are created by signals from the brain that lead to increased activity of the endocrine glands. The hypothalamus signals the adrenal glands (located above the kidneys) to begin secreting such hor- mones as norepinephrine and epinephrine into the blood. These hormones, in turn, pro- duce energizing effects on the body, increasing heart rate and directing blood and oxygen flow to energy-demanding cells throughout the body. The body is now pre- pared for action, enhancing the likelihood of survival (see ●Figure 3.13).

Do Men and Woman Have Different Brains? Prior to birth, hormones released by the pituitary gland determine whether a child ends up with male or female sex organs. At puberty, an increase in sex hormones (tes- tosterone and estrogen) leads males to develop facial hair and deep speaking voices and females to develop breasts and to begin menstruation. It is now suspected that hormones released during development affect the basic wiring patterns of men’s and women’s brains as well. Evidence suggests that men and women may think differ- ently as the result of sex-specific activities of the endocrine system.

The ability of women and men to perform certain tasks changes as the levels of sex hormones increase or decrease in the body. Women traditionally perform bet- ter than men on some tests of verbal ability, and their performance improves with high levels of estrogen in their body. Similarly, men show slightly better performance on some spatial tasks (such as imagining that three-dimensional objects are rotat- ing), and their performance seems to be related to their testosterone levels. There is even evidence that females who developed in the womb with a male co-twin perform better on spatial memory tasks than females who developed with a female co-twin, presumably because of prenatal exposure to testosterone (Heil et al., 2011). The evi- dence is correlational, which means we can’t be sure it’s the hormones that are caus- ing the performance changes, but the data suggest there may be sex-based differences

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Initiation of the fight-or-flight response clearly has adaptive value. Can you think of any circumstances in which this response might actually lower the chances of an adaptive response?

Hypothalamus Stimulates adrenal glands.

Adrenal Glands Secrete norepinephrine and epinephrine into bloodstream.

Norepinephrine and Epinephrine Cause energy surge and heart rate increase; blood is shunted away from the stomach and intestine to areas that require it; glucose is made available to the muscles.

●● FiGuRE 3.13 the Fight-or-Flight Response In potentially dangerous situations, the endocrine system releases hormones that produce energizing effects in the body, increasing our chances of survival through fighting back or running away. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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82 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

in some types of mental processing. Testosterone levels typically decline with age, and testosterone replacement therapy in elderly men has been shown to improve cog- nitive ability in some cases (Holland et al., 2011).

It’s also the case that girls who have been exposed to an excess of male hor- mones during the initial stages of prenatal development, either because of a genetic disorder or from chemicals ingested by the mother during pregnancy, tend to be particularly tomboyish during development, preferring to engage in play activ- ities that are more traditionally associated with boys (Hines, 2011). In one study reported by K imura (1992), researchers at UCLA compared the choice of toys by girls who either had or had not been exposed to excess male hormones during early development. The girls who had been exposed tended to prefer the typical mas- culine activities—smashing trucks and cars together, for example—more than the control girls did.

Male and female brains also show anatomical differences, although such differ- ences have often been exaggerated historically (Shields, 1975). Animal studies have confirmed that male and female rat brains are different; moreover, the differences are clearly attributable, in part, to the early influence of hormones. For humans, imag- ing studies have revealed sex-based differences in the thickness of cortical tissue, at least at certain points of development, but whether these anatomical differences account for behavioral differences in performing certain tasks is unclear (Raznahan et al., 2010). Interesting differences have also been found in response to brain damage. For example, damage can sometimes lead to specific deficits in knowledge categories, such as loss in knowledge about plants; women rarely, if ever, show selective deficits in plant knowledge, which may stem from how evolution has selectively shaped the development of male and female brains (Laiacona et al., 2006).

The evidence supporting sex-based differences in brain anatomy and mental func- tioning is provocative and needs to be investigated further. Hormones released by the endocrine system are known to produce permanent changes early in human devel- opment, and it’s certainly possible that actions later in life are influenced by these changes (Hines, 2011). But no direct causal link has yet been established between ana- tomical differences and the variations in intellectual functioning that are sometimes found between men and women.

In addition, the performance differences of women and men on certain labo- ratory tasks aren’t very large and don’t reflect general ability. Many of the studies find that sex-based differences are extremely small (Fine, 2010; Halpern, 2000). To repeat a theme discussed in Chapter 1, it is very difficult to separate the effects of biology (nature) from the ongoing influences of the environment (nurture). Men and women are faced with different environmental demands and cultural expec- tations during their lifetimes. Without question, those demands help determine the actions they take and produce many of the behavioral differences that we see between the sexes.

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.3

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Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code | 83

Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code LEARNING GOALS

●● Review natural selection and adaptation. ●● Describe the basic principles of genetic transmission. ●● Explain how psychologists study genetic influences on behavior.

Brains tend to act in regular and predictable ways. When you read a book, a neu- roimaging “scan” is certain to reveal activity in the occipital lobe of your cortex. If you suffer a stroke in your left cerebral hemisphere, there’s a good chance you’ll find paralysis occurring on the right side of your body. But behavior, the main interest of psychology, remains remarkably difficult to predict. People react differently to exactly the same event—even if they’re siblings raised in the same household. How do we explain this remarkable diversity of behavior, given that everyone carries around a similar 3- to 4-pound mass of brain tissue?

One answer is that no two brains are exactly alike. The patterns of neural activ- ity that determine how we think and act are uniquely determined by our individual experiences and by the genetic material we’ve inherited from our parents. Most of us have no trouble accepting that experience is important, but genetic influences are a little tougher to accept. Sure, hair color, eye color, and blood type may be expressions of fixed genetic influences, but what does genetics have to do with intelligence, per- sonality, or emotionality?

Recognizing that there is an important relationship between heredity and behav- ior has become a key factor in modern psychology. You’ll find references to genetic influences throughout this book—on a whole host of topics. But it’s also important to remember that the genetic code serves two adaptive functions. First, genes provide us with a flexible plan, a recipe of sorts, for our physical and psychological develop- ment. Second, genes provide a means through which we’re able to pass on physical and psychological characteristics to our offspring, thereby helping to maintain quali- ties that have adaptive significance.

Natural Selection and Adaptations Let’s return briefly to the topic of natural selection, first addressed in Chapter 1. Darwin proposed the mechanism of natural selection to explain how species change, or evolve, over time. He recognized that certain traits, physical or psychological, can help an organism’s reproductive “fitness” and that these features, in turn, are likely to be passed

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1. Communication effects tend to be localized, affecting only a small area:

2. Responsible for whole-body reactions, such as the fight-or-flight response:

3. The major determinant of sexual identity:

4. Communicates through the release of epinephrine and norepineph- rine:

5. Operates quickly, with time scales bordering on the blink of an eye:

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.3 (Continued) test Yourself Now test your knowledge about the differences between the endocrine system and the nervous system. For each statement, decide whether the endocrine or nervous system is the most appropriate term to apply. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

84 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

forward from one generation to the next. If a bird is born with a special capacity to store, remember, and relocate seeds, then its chances of living long enough to mate and produce offspring increase. If the bird’s offspring share the same capacity for obtaining food, then over many generations the seed-storing trait is likely to become a stable char- acteristic of the species. It becomes an adaptation, or a feature that has been selected for by nature because it increases the chances of the organism to survive and multiply.

Virtually all scientists accept that natural selection is the main mechanism for producing lasting change within and across species. However, not all features of the body and mind are necessarily adaptations. Consider your ability to read and write. These are highly adaptive psychological abilities, yet neither could have evolved through natural selection. Both developed relatively recently in human history— too short a time period for evolutionary change—and emerged long after the human brain had achieved its current size and form (Gould, 2000). On the other hand, the human eye and the psychological experience of perception are almost certainly spe- cific adaptations that have been molded through generations of evolutionary change (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Dawkins, 1976).

As noted in Chapter 1, evolutionary psychologists are convinced that we’re born with a number of psychological adaptations (Buss, 2012; Kurzban, 2011). How do we identify which features of our mind are adaptations? To qualify as an adaptation, a trait must satisfy several criteria. First, it is necessary to show that the trait can be inherited, or passed along across generations through reproduction. Second, at some point in the past the trait must have been present in some members of the species and not others. Finally, the trait must have been “selected” by nature because it was adaptive—it helped the individual survive or reproduce. For most of the psychologi- cal adaptations of interest to evolutionary psychologists, getting this kind of evidence is difficult, if not impossible (Richardson, 2007). However, the situation is not hope- less. Evolutionary psychologists are constantly gathering evidence that seems to sup- port the existence of psychological adaptations (Confer et al., 2010).

For natural selection to produce an adaptation, there needs to be a mechanism for ensuring that variation, or differences, are present within a species. If all the mem- bers of a species are exactly the same, then there are no special features for nature to select. There also needs to be some way to guarantee that an adaptive feature can pass from one generation to the next. During Darwin’s time, the mechanism for ensuring variability and inheritance was unknown; Darwin made his case by documenting the abundance of variability and inherited characteristics that exist in nature. It was later learned that the mechanism that enables natural selection is the genetic code.

Genetic Principles Let’s briefly review some of the important principles of genetics. How is the genetic code stored, and what are the factors that produce genetic variability? The genetic message resides within chromosomes, which are thin, threadlike strips of DNA. Human cells, with the exception of sperm cells and the unfertilized egg cell, contain a total of 46 chromosomes, arranged in 23 pairs. Half of each chromosome pair is contributed originally by the mother through the egg, and the other half arrives in the father’s sperm. Genes are segments of a chromosome that contain instructions for influenc- ing and creating particular hereditary characteristics. For example, each person has a gene that helps determine height or hair color and another that may determine sus- ceptibility to disorders such as muscular dystrophy or even Alzheimer disease.

Because humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes, they have two genes for most developmental characteristics, or traits. People have two genes, for example, for hair color, blood type, and the possible development of facial dimples. If both genes are designed to produce the same trait (such as nearsightedness), the characteristic will likely develop (you’ll definitely need glasses). But if the two genes differ—for exam- ple, the father passes along the gene for nearsightedness, but the mother’s gene is for

adaptation A trait that has been selected for by nature because it increases the reproductive “fitness” of the organism.

genes Segments of chromosomes that contain instructions for influencing and creating particular hereditary characteristics.

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Adaptations evolved because they increased the chances for survival and/or reproduction at some point in our ancestral past. Does this mean that all adaptations remain adaptive today? Is it possible that we carry around physical and psychological adaptations that are no longer beneficial in modern environments?

Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code | 85

normal distance vision—the trait is determined by the dominant gene; in the case of vision, the “normal” gene will dominate the recessive gene for nearsightedness.

The fact that a dominant gene will mask the effects of a recessive gene means that everybody has genetic material that’s not actually expressed in physical or psy- chological characteristics. A person may see perfectly but still carry around the reces- sive gene for faulty distance vision. This is the reason parents with normal vision can produce a nearsighted child or two brown-haired parents can produce a child with blond hair—it is the particular combination of genes that determines the inherited characteristics.

Another important distinction is between the genotype, which is the actual genetic message, and the phenotype, which is the trait’s observable characteristics. The phenotype, such as good vision or brown hair, is controlled mainly by the geno- type, but it can be strongly influenced by the environment. A person’s height and weight are shaped largely by the genotype, but environmental factors such as diet and physical health contribute significantly to the final phenotype. This is an impor- tant point to remember: Genes provide the materials from which characteristics develop, but the environment shapes the final product. As stressed in Chapter 1, it’s nature via nurture. The environment provides the means through which nature can express itself (Ridley, 2003).

Across individuals, variations in the genetic message arise because there are tril- lions of different ways that the genetic information from each parent can be com- bined at fertilization. Each egg or sperm cell contains a random half of each parent’s 23 chromosome pairs. According to the laws of probability, this means that some 8 million (223) different combinations can reside in either an egg cell or a sperm cell. The particular meeting of egg and sperm is also a matter of chance, which means that the genetic material from both parents can be combined in some 64 trillion ways— and this is from a single set of parents!

Clearly, there are many ways by which a trait, or combination of traits, can emerge and produce a survival “advantage” for one person over another. But variation in the genetic code can also occur by chance in the form of a mutation. A mutation is a spontaneous change in the genetic material that occurs during the gene replication process. Most genetic mutations are harmful to the organism, but occasionally they lead to traits that confer a survival advantage to the organism. Mutations, along with the variations produced by unique combinations of genetic material, are key ingredi- ents for natural selection—together, they introduce novelty, or new traits, into nature.

Genes and Behavior Now let’s return to the link between genetics and psychology—what is the connec- tion between genotypes, phenotypes, and behavior? In some sense, all behavior is influenced by genetic factors because genes help to determine the structure and func- tion of the brain. At the same time, no physical or mental trait will ever be deter- mined entirely by genetic factors—the environment always plays some role. But can we predict the psychological traits of an individual by knowing something about his or her genetic record? Susceptibility to the psychological disorder schizophrenia is a case in point. Natural children of parents who have schizophrenia (where either one or both have the disorder) have a greater chance of developing the disorder them- selves, when compared to the children of normal parents. This is the case even if the children have been adopted at birth and never raised in an abnormal environ- ment. So genes probably influenced the chances that these children would develop the disorder.

One way to study the link between genes and behavior is to investigate family histories in detail. In family studies, researchers look for similarities and differ- ences among biological (blood) relatives to determine the inf luence of heredity. As you’ve just seen, the chances of schizophrenia increase with a family history.

genotype The actual genetic information inherited from one’s parents.

phenotype A person’s observable characteristics, such as red hair. The phenotype is controlled mainly by the genotype, but it can also be influenced by the environment.

mutation A spontaneous change in the genetic material that occurs during the gene replication process.

family studies The similarities and differences among biological (blood) relatives are studied to help discover the role heredity plays in physical or psychological traits.

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86 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

There are many other traits that seem to run in families as well (e.g., intelligence and personality). The trouble with family studies, however, is that members of a family share more than just common genes. They are also exposed to simi- lar environmental experiences, so it’s diff icult to separate the relative roles of nature and nurture in behavior. Family studies can be useful sources of informa- tion—it helps to k now that someone is at a greater than average risk of develop- ing schizophrenia—but they can’t be used to establish true links between genes and behavior.

In twin studies, researchers compare traits between identical twins, who share essentially the same genetic material, and fraternal twins, who were born at the same time but whose genetic overlap is only roughly 50% (fraternal twins can even be of different sexes). In studies of intelligence, identical twins tend to have much more similar intelligence scores than fraternal twins, even when environmental factors are taken into account (Bouchard, 1997). Identical twins make ideal research subjects because researchers can control for genetic factors. Because these twins have virtu- ally the same genetic makeup, emerging from a single fertilized egg, any physical or psychological differences that arise during development must be attributable to envi- ronmental factors. Similarly, if identical twins are raised in different environments but still show similar traits, it’s a strong indication that genetic factors are involved in expression of the trait.

You’ve been given only a brief introduction to “ behavioral genetics” in this sec- tion. But we’ll be returning to the connection between heredity and environment throughout the book. For now, recognize that how you think and act is indeed influenced by the code that is stored in your body’s chromosomes. Through the random processes that occur at fertilization, nature guarantees diversity within the species. Everyone receives a unique genetic message that, in combination with environmental factors, helps determine brain structure as well as human psychol- ogy. From an evolutionary standpoint, diversity is of great importance because it increases the chances that at least some members of a species will have the neces- sary tools to deal successfully with the problems of survival and reproduction.

twin studies Identical twins, who share genetic material, are compared to fraternal twins in an effort to determine the roles heredity and environment play in psychological traits.

test Yourself To check on your understanding of genetics, choose the best answer to each of the following statements. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Reading and writing are examples of adaptations, and therefore result from the mechanism of natural selection: True or False?

2. The actual genetic information inherited from one’s parents: genotype or phenotype?

3. If the two inherited genes for a specific trait differ, which plays a stronger role: dominant or recessive?

4. Psychologists can study genetic effects on a variety of charac- teristics, such as intelligence or susceptibility to schizophrenia, by studying which kind of twins raised in different environments: identical or fraternal?

●● Recall–Monitor–Recall 3.4

We have seen that the human brain, along with the rest of the nervous system, is a biological solution to problems pro- duced by constantly changing environments. Fortunately, out of these biological solutions arise those features that make up the human mind, including intellect, emotion, and artistic creativity. In this chapter we’ve considered four central prob- lems of adaptation.

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain We saw that networks of individual cells, called neurons, estab- lish a marketplace of information called the nervous sys- tem. To communicate internally, the nervous system uses an electrochemical language. Messages travel electrically within a neuron, usually from dendrite to soma to axon to terminal button, and then chemically from one neuron to the next. Combining electrical and chemical components creates a quick, efficient, and extremely versatile communi- cation system. Neurotransmitters regulate the rate at which neurons fire by producing excitatory or inhibitory mes- sages, and the resulting patterns of activation shape how we think and act.

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor We learned that the nervous system divides its labor in order to accomplish the remarkable variety of functions it controls. Through the use of sophisticated techniques, including brain-imaging devices, researchers have begun to map out the regions of the brain that support particular psychological and life-sustaining func- tions. At the base of the brain, in the hindbrain region, struc- tures control such basic processes as respiration, heart rate, and the coordination of muscle movements. Higher up are regions that control motivational processes such as eating, drinking, and sexual behavior. Finally, in the cerebral cortex more complex mental processes—such as thought, sensations,

and language—are represented. Some functions in the brain appear to be lateralized, which means that they’re controlled primarily by one cerebral hemisphere or the other. Through the development of specialized regions of cells, the human brain has become capable of extremely adaptive reactions to its changing environment.

Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication We saw how the body solves its widespread and long-term communication needs by using the endocrine system to release chemicals called hormones into the blood- stream. These chemical messengers serve a variety of regula- tory functions, influencing growth and development, hunger, thirst, and sexual behavior, in addition to helping the body prepare for action. Hormones released early in development and into adulthood may partly explain some of the behavioral differences between men and women.

Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code Finally, adapta- tions are traits that arise through the mechanism of natural selection. Although it’s difficult to establish which psycholog- ical traits are truly adaptations, psychologists acknowledge that our thoughts and behaviors are influenced by genetic factors. The particular combinations of genes that are inher- ited from the parents, along with influences from the envi- ronment, determine individual characteristics. Psychologists often try to disentangle the relative contributions of genes and the environment by conducting twin studies, comparing the behaviors and abilities of identical and fraternal twins who have been raised in similar or dissimilar environments. When identical twins show similar characteristics, even though they have been raised in quite different backgrounds, psychologists assume that the underlying genetic code may be playing an influential role.

Psychology For a Reason: What Biological Processes Are For | 87

●● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Biological Processes Are For

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.) ●● The field of (1) studies the connection between the brain and behavior.

Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain

●● Neurons receive, (2) , and transmit information (3) .

●● A neuron consists of (4) , soma, (5) , and terminal buttons. Sensory neurons carry information through the spinal cord to the brain.

(6) convey information between internal pro- cessing sites. (7) neurons carry messages from the central nervous system to the muscles and glands that produce a (8) response.

●● Within a neuron, messages travel electrically from one point to another. From one neuron to another, messages travel (9) , through neurotransmitters.

●● Groups of neurons operating simultaneously create an (10) pattern that underlies both conscious experiences and complex behaviors.

88 | CHAPTER 3 Biological Processes

Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor ●● We think, feel, and function physically because of a biological division of labor.

●● The central nervous system consists of the brain and (11) , which communicate to the rest of the body through bundles of (12) or nerves. The peripheral nervous system, which includes the (13) and (14) systems, sends sensory information to the brain, moves muscles, and regulates (15) function.

●● Studying brain damage and (16) can reveal brain function. Chemical injection and (17) let scientists stimulate the brain. They can also observe the brain through noninvasive techniques, including monitoring electrical brain activity using an (18) and using X-rays (CT scan) and neuroimaging devices such as (19) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to create three- dimensional pictures or live snapshots of the brain.

●● The (20) provides basic life support, through the medulla, (21) , reticular formation, and cer- ebellum. The (22) relays sensory messages. Higher mental functioning takes place in the (23) using the cerebral cortex, thalamus, hypothalamus, and (24) system.

●● The two hemispheres (halves) of the cerebral cortex are (25) ; that is, each side is responsible for somewhat different functions.

Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication

●● Endocrine glands release (26) into the blood that interact with the nervous system to regulate such basic activities as the fight-or-flight response.

●● The (27) gland releases hormones that determine sexual identity before birth and direct sex- ual maturity at puberty. Activities in the (28) system may account for basic differences in the ways females and males think and behave.

Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code ●● Gene-based physical and psychological traits that increase the chances for (29) , or of finding a mate, can be selected for by nature and become adaptations. (30) , especially psychological ones, can be difficult to identify.

●● Inside the cell are 23 pairs of (31) , threadlike strips of DNA. (32) are segments of chromosomes that contain instructions for creating or influencing a particular hereditary characteristic. Genes can be dominant or (33) .

●● (34) studies identify similarities and differences that may reveal the influence of heredity. In (35) studies, researchers compare the behavioral traits of identical twins, who have the same genetic material, and (36) twins, who have only about half their genes in common. Traits that aren’t accounted for by genetics are attributed to (37) influences.

acetylcholine, 62 action potential, 61 adaptation, 84 autonomic system, 67 axon, 60 central nervous system, 66 cerebellum, 72 cerebral cortex, 72 computerized tomography scan

(CT scan), 69 corpus callosum, 78 dendrites, 60 dopamine, 62

electroencephalograph (EEG), 69

endocrine system, 80 endorphins, 64 family studies, 85 forebrain, 72 frontal lobe, 74 gamma-amino-butyric acid

(GABA), 64 genes, 84 genotype, 85 glial cells, 59 glutamate, 62

hindbrain, 71 hormones, 80 hypothalamus, 73 interneurons, 58 limbic system, 73 magnetic resonance imaging

(MRI), 70 midbrain, 72 motor neurons, 58 mutation, 85 myelin sheath, 59 nerves, 66 neurons, 58

Terms to Remember

Terms to Remember | 89

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

neuroscience, 57 neurotransmitters, 62 occipital lobe, 76 parietal lobe, 75 peripheral nervous system, 66 phenotype, 85 pituitary gland, 80

positron emission tomography (PET), 70

reflexes, 59 refractory period, 65 resting potential, 60 sensory neurons, 58 serotonin, 64

soma, 60 somatic system, 66 synapse, 60 temporal lobe, 76 terminal buttons, 60 thalamus, 73 twin studies, 86

joSon/Digital Vision/Getty Images

4 Human Development

Psychology For a reason: What Is Development For?

Developing Physically Learning Goals The Stages of Prenatal Development Growth During Infancy From Crawling to Walking From Toddlerhood to Adolescence Becoming an Adult Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.1

Developing Intellectually Learning Goals The Tools of Investigation The Growing Perceptual World Piaget and the Development of Thought The Sensorimotor Period: Birth to Two Years

Day Care: What Are the Long-Term Effects?

Practical SolutionS Choosing a Day-Care Center

Forming a Personal Identity: Erikson’s Crises of Development

Gender-Role Development Growing Old Death and Dying Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.3

Psychology For a reason What Development Is For

chaPter review Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

The Preoperational Period: Two to Seven Years The Concrete Operational Period: Seven to

Eleven Years The Formal Operational Period: Eleven to

Adulthood Challenges to Piaget’s Theory Core Knowledge Moral Development: Learning Right From

Wrong Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.2

Developing Socially and Personally Learning Goals Forming Bonds With Others The Origins of Attachment Types of Attachment Do Early Attachments Matter Later in Life?

Psychologists study lots of magical things, none more so than the mind of a child. Thrust into the world, a bundle of reflexes, within days a baby can recognize familiar faces, voices, and smells. Strikingly social, babies persuasively entice us with their coos, gurgles, and waving fists. Within about a year, they have begun to solve the “other mind problem.” They look where we point, understanding our intentions, and point to where they want us to look. By two they feel our pain, showing dis- tress when we’re upset, but still reach for the cookie we said was forbidden. Despite these adultlike qualities, neither babies nor children are thinking or acting like adults. As you’ll soon see, astonishing changes occur in our minds, bodies, and social lives throughout human lifespan development.

The topic of this chapter is human development, the age-related physical, intel- lectual, and social changes that occur throughout life. Why do humans develop? There’s one very straightforward reason: Extending the process of development over time enables us to fine-tune our physical, intellectual, and social abilities to better meet the needs of new and changing environments.

Nature has built a considerable amount of flexibility, or plasticity, into the devel- opmental process. This gives us an exceptional ability to adapt to environmental influences. As you’ll soon see, the environment can change the course of develop- ment in profound ways. Keep the adaptive significance of development in mind as you consider how we effectively solve the problems associated with developing physi- cally, intellectually, and socially.

Developing Physically The environment helps shape the physical process of growth and can determine its ultimate outcome, but most physical changes are surprisingly con- sistent and predictable. We lift our heads before we crawl; we crawl before we can walk. In general, the timing of development is a product of evolutionary history and partly reflects the survival problems that our species has been required to solve.

Developing Intellectually The developmental changes that occur in how people think— what is called cognitive development—are of major importance to psychologists. You’ll discover there are good reasons to believe that infants see and think about the world somewhat differently from adults. Infants are faced with infant problems, and these problems don’t always overlap with those faced by adults. As they develop physically into children, adolescents, and adults, their intellectual capacity changes to meet the unique challenges associated with aging.

development The age-related physical, intellectual, social, and personal changes that occur throughout an individual’s lifetime.

● Psychology For a reason What Is Development For?

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Developing Socially and Personally Humans are social animals. We’re continually interacting with each other, and these relationships help us adapt successfully to our environment. In this section we’ll consider the milestones of social development, beginning with the formation of attachments to parents and caregivers and ending with a discussion of how relationships change in middle and late adulthood.

Developing Physically LEARNING GOALS

●● Describe the physical changes that occur prenatally. ●● Discuss how we grow from infancy through adolescence. ●● Discuss adulthood and the aging body and brain.

To a child, it seems to take forever to grow up. In fact, we do take a relatively long time to reach full physical maturity compared to other species. At birth, a human newborn’s brain has about 25% of its ultimate weight; the chimpanzee newborn’s brain has about 60% (Corballis, 1991; Lenneberg, 1967). We do a lot of developing outside of the womb. Still, the main components of the body—the nervous system, the networks of glands, and so on—develop at an astonishingly rapid rate from the point of conception.

Guided by the genetic code and influenced by hormones released by the endo- crine system, in the early years we change physically at rates that will never again be matched in our lifetimes. To place the growth rate in some perspective, if we contin- ued to develop at the rate we show in the first two years of life, we’d end up over 12 feet tall and weighing several tons! Fortunately, things slow down considerably after the first few years of life; but they never completely stop—we continue to change both physically and mentally until the very moment of death.

The Stages of Prenatal Development Let’s start at the beginning. The human developmental process begins with the union of egg and sperm at conception. Within the fertilized egg, or zygote, the 23 chromo- somes from the father and the 23 chromosomes from the mother pair up to form the genetic recipe. Over the next 266 days or so (approximately 9 months), the single- celled zygote is transformed into an approximately 7-pound newborn composed of literally billions of cells. The period of development that occurs before birth is called prenatal development, and it’s divided into three stages: germinal, embryonic, and fetal (see ●Figure 4.1).

It takes about two weeks after conception for the zygote to migrate down from the mother’s fallopian tubes (where the sperm and egg meet) and implant itself in the wall of the uterus (often called the womb). The period from conception to implanta- tion is called the germinal period. It’s a make-or-break time for the fertilized egg. Most fertilized eggs do not complete the process; well over half fail to achieve suc- cessful implantation, either because of abnormalities or because the implantation site is nutritionally inadequate for proper growth.

Once successful implantation occurs, the embryonic period begins. During the next six weeks, the embryo develops from an unrecognizable mass of cells to

zygote The fertilized human egg, containing 23 chromosomes from the father and 23 chromosomes from the mother.

germinal period The period in prenatal development from conception to implantation of the fertilized egg in the wall of the uterus.

embryonic period The period of prenatal development lasting from implantation to the end of the eighth week.

Developing Physically | 93

a somewhat familiar creature with arms, legs, fingers, toes, and a distinctly beat- ing heart. In the seventh and eighth weeks after fertilization sexual differentiation begins. Depending on whether the father has contributed an X or a Y chromosome (the mother always contributes an X), the embryo starts to develop either male or female sexual characteristics (see ●Figure 4.2). If the developing embryo has inherited a Y chromosome, it begins to secrete the sex hormone testosterone, which leads to the establishment of a male sexual reproductive system. In the absence of testosterone, the natural course of development in humans is to become female. At the ninth week of prenatal development, the fetal period begins and continues until birth. Early in this period, the bones and muscles of what is now called the fetus start to develop. By the end of the third month, the skeletal and muscular systems allow for extensive movement—even somersaults—although the fetus at this point is still only about 3 inches long (Apgar & Beck, 1974). By the end of the sixth month, the fetus has grown to over a foot long, weighs in at about 2 pounds, and may be capable of survival if delivered prematurely. The last three months of prenatal development are marked by extremely rapid growth, both in body size and in the size and complexity of brain tissue. The fetus also develops a layer of fat under the skin during this period, which acts as protective insulation, and the lungs mature in preparation for the baby’s first gasping breath of air.

Environmental Hazards Although the developing child is snugly tucked away within the confines of its mother’s womb, it is by no means completely isolated from the effects of the environment. The mother’s physical health and diet, as well as expo- sure to toxins in the environment, can seriously affect the developing child. Mother and child are linked physically, so if the mother smokes, drinks, uses drugs, or gets sick the effects can transfer to the fetus or embryo. Some psychologists even believe that the mother’s psychological state, such as her level of anxiety or stress during pregnancy, can have an important influence on the psychological health of the child (Charil et al., 2010).

Environmental agents that potentially damage the developing child are called teratogens. As a rule, internal structures are most susceptible to teratogens during their formation. For example, if the mother contracts German measles (rubella) dur- ing the first six weeks of pregnancy, the child is at risk for heart defects because it’s during this period that the structures of the heart are formed. In general, the embry- onic period is the point of greatest vulnerability, although the central nervous system can be affected throughout prenatal development.

fetal period The period of prenatal development lasting from the ninth week until birth.

teratogens Environmental agents—such as disease organisms or drugs—that can potentially damage the developing embryo or fetus.

●● Figure 4.1 Prenatal human Development

4 months5–6 weeks postconception 6 months 8 months

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Interestingly, morning sickness, which usually affects the mother during the first three months of pregnancy, may be a natural defense against the influence of teratogens (Profet, 1992). Pregnant women often show increased sensitivity to foods and odors and even develop aversions to certain tastes, which could help prevent potentially dangerous foods from being eaten. Remember, a food that’s perfectly harmless to the mother might be damaging to the developing child. Morning sickness occurs across the world, in every culture, which suggests that it may be an evolutionary adaptation. Women who experience morning sickness are somewhat less likely to suffer miscarriages than women who do not (Flaxman & Sherman, 2000).

Keep in mind the powerful influence the environment can have on the developing child. If you’re pregnant and drink heavily—five or more drinks a day— you’re at least 30% more likely to give birth to a child suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition marked by physical deformities, a reduction in the size of cer- tain brain structures, and an increased risk of intellectual disabilities (Mattson et al., 2011). Negative long-term effects can also result from drug consumption—including over-the-counter and prescription drugs—as well as from improper nutrition and smoking.

We can’t predict with certainty how an environmental agent will affect develop- ment because timing and genetics matter. Some mothers can abuse themselves terri- bly and still give birth to normal children; others who drink only moderately, perhaps as few as seven drinks a week, may produce a child with significant disabilities

●● Figure 4.2 genetic Determinants of gender If the father contributes an X chromosome, the child will be a girl; a Y chromosome from the father leads to the development of a boy. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Developing Physically | 95

(Mattson et al., 2011). Because the effects of maternal activities are impossible to predict in any particular case, most doctors recommend against playing Russian rou- lette with the developing fetus or embryo; it’s best to stay sober, well fed, and under a doctor’s care throughout pregnancy.

Growth During Infancy Don’t let all this bad news about the environment get you down too much—in the vast majority of cases the environment has a nurturing effect on the develop- ing child. The internal conditions of the mother’s uterus are perfectly “tuned” for physical development. The temperature is right, the fetus floats cushioned in a pro- tective fluid, and regular nourishment is provided through the umbilical cord and placenta. More often than not, the result is a healthy baby who is ready to take on the world.

The average newborn weighs about 7 pounds and is roughly 20 inches in length. Over the next two years, as the child grows from baby to toddler, this weight will quadruple and the child will reach about half of his or her adult height. Along with the rest of the body, the brain continues its dramatic growth spurt during this period. A newborn enters the world with a brain that is only 25% of its final weight, but by the second birthday, the percentage has increased to 75%. Remarkably, this increase in brain size is not due primarily to the formation of new neurons, as most of the cells that make up the cerebral cortex are in place well before birth (Nowakowski, 1987; Rakic, 1991). Instead, the cells grow in size and complexity, and a number of support- ing glial cells are added.

Experience Matters The fact that substantial numbers of neurons are intact at birth does not mean that the brain of the newborn infant is mature—far from it. The brain still needs to build its vast internal communication network, and it requires experience to accomplish this task. During the final stages of prenatal development, and especially during the first year or two after birth, lots of changes occur in the neural circuitry. More branches (dendrites) sprout off from the existing cells, and the number of connections, or synapses, greatly increases. There is even a kind of neu- ral pruning process in which neurons that are not used simply die. This “bloom and prune” process continues throughout childhood, often occurring in spurts, and is particularly active in the frontal “executive” regions of the brain (Hill et al., 2010).

Again, the key principle at work is plastic- ity. The genetic code does not rigidly fix the internal circuitry of the brain. A kind of rough wiring pattern is established during prena- tal development, which is filled in during the important first few years of life. Studies with animals have shown that the quality of early experience may be extremely important dur- ing this period. For example, rats and mice raised in enriched environments (with lots of social contact and external stimulation) show significantly more complex and better func- tioning brain tissue than rats raised in sterile, barren environments (He et al., 2010). Rats also show better recovery of function after brain injury if their recovery time is spent in an enriched environment (Nithianantharajah & Hannan, 2006).

critical thinking

Given that the environment plays such an important role in shaping brain development, what advice would you give new parents to maximize enriched development of their baby’s intellectual capabilities?

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From Crawling to Walking Of course, parents don’t see their baby’s “blooming” neural circuitry—what they notice are the observable things: The baby begins to sit up, crawl, stand alone, and walk. Before a baby can do these things, however, both the brain and the neuron-to- muscle links that radiate throughout the body need to develop adequately.

Generally, the nervous system matures in a “down-and-out” fashion—that is, from the head down and from the center out (Shirley, 1933). Infants can lift their heads before they can roll over because the neuron-to-muscle connections in the upper part of the body mature before those in the lower part of the body. Babies crawl before they walk because they’re able to control their arms efficiently before they’re able to control their legs.

Psychologists don’t like to tie developmental milestones directly to age because not all children develop at the same rate. But most children learn to crawl, then stand alone, then walk at about the same time. ● Figure 4.3 shows the major stages of infant motor development. The sequence of development is generally stable, orderly, and predictable. Also, notice that each stage is associated with an age range, although the range is not large. Roughly 90% of all babies can roll over at 5 months of age, sit with- out support at 8 months, and then walk alone by 15 months. One baby might stand alone consistently at 9 months, whereas another might not accomplish the same feat until nearly 14 months of age; both fall within the normal range of development.

What accounts for the differences among babies? It’s hard to tell for any particu- lar case, but both nature and nurture contribute. Each person has a genetic recipe that determines when he or she will develop physically, although environmental experiences can speed up or slow down the process. Some cultures place great value on early motor development and nurture such skills in children. If a baby is routinely exercised and handled during the early months of life, there is some evidence that he or she will progress through the landmark stages of motor development more quickly (Hopkins, 1991; Zelazo et al., 1972).

But these differences are usually small, and they play little, if any, role in deter- mining final motor development. Hopi babies are traditionally swaddled and bound to cradle boards for much of the first year of life, yet these babies begin walking at roughly the same time as unbound babies (Dennis & Dennis, 1940). More recent stud- ies directly comparing the effects of swaddling on motor development have found lit- tle or no differences between swaddled and unswaddled babies (Manaseki-Holland

Child-rearing practices reflect cultural differences. Hopi babies are traditionally swaddled and bound to cradle boards for much of the first year of life but show no developmental delays in walking.

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1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 153 4●● Figure 4.3 Major stages of Motor Development Although psychologists are reluctant to tie developmental milestones closely to age, most children learn to crawl, stand alone, and walk at about the same age. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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et al., 2010). To learn to walk at a reasonable age, the baby simply needs to be given the opportunity to move around at some point—to “test the waters” and explore things on his or her own (Bertenthal et al., 1994).

From Toddlerhood to Adolescence From the onset of toddlerhood through puberty, the growth rate continues but at a less rapid pace. The average child grows several inches and puts on roughly 6 to 7 pounds annually. These are significant changes, but they’re often hard for parents to detect because they represent only a small fraction of the child’s current size (2 inches added to a 20-inch baby are far easier to spot than 2 inches added to someone who is 40 inches tall). More noticeable are the changes that occur in hand-to-eye coordination as the child matures. Three-year-olds lack the grace and coordination that are so obvious in 6-year-olds. The brain continues to mature, although again at a pace far slower than during prenatal development or during the first two years of life. General process- ing speed—how quickly we think and react to sudden changes in our environment— increases consistently throughout childhood (Kail, 2008; Kail & Salthouse, 1994).

Between the end of childhood and the beginning of young adulthood lies an important physical and psychological transition period called adolescence. Physically, the two most dramatic changes that occur during this time are the adolescent growth spurt and the onset of puberty, or sexual maturity (the word puberty is from the Latin for “to grow hairy”). As with crawling and walking, we can’t pinpoint the timing of puberty, particularly for a specific person, but changes usually start occurring for girls at around age 11 and for boys at about 13. Hormones released by the endocrine system rock us out of childhood by triggering a rapid increase in height and weight accompa- nied by the enlargement and maturation of internal and external sexual organs.

Maturing Sexually Puberty is the developmental period when we mature sexually and acquire the ability to reproduce. For the adolescent girl, high levels of estrogen in the body lead to external changes, such as breast development and broadening hips, and eventually to the beginning of menarche (the first menstrual flow) at around age 12 or 13. For boys, hormones called androgens lead to the appearance of facial hair, a lower voice, and the ability to ejaculate (release semen) at around age 13 or 14. Neither menarche nor the first ejaculation necessarily means that the adolescent is ready to reproduce—ovulation and sperm production may not occur until months later—but psychologically these “firsts” tend to be highly memorable and emotional events (Chang et al., 2010).

The onset of puberty shows, yet again, the importance of both nature and nurture in development. Did you know that the average onset age for menarche has dropped from about 16 in the 1880s to the current 12 to 13? Physically, we’re maturing earlier than in past generations, and it’s not due to systematic changes in the genetic recipe. Instead, better nutrition, better living conditions, and improved medical care are responsible for the trend (Tanner, 1990). Even today, in parts of the world where living conditions are difficult, the average age of menarche is later than in industrial- ized countries such as the United States (Chumlea, 1982). Other factors, such as eth- nicity and even family conflict, seem to matter as well (Romans et al., 2003). The environment does not cause sexual maturation—that’s controlled by the genetic code—but the environment is clearly capable of accelerating or delaying the point when changes start to occur.

Becoming an Adult The adolescent years are marked by dramatic changes in appearance and strength. Motor skills, including hand-to-eye coordination, improve to adult levels during the teenage years. As you know, there are world-class swimmers and tennis players who

puberty The period during which a person reaches sexual maturity and is potentially capable of producing offspring.

Children reach the adolescent growth spurt at varying ages. Boys typically lag behind girls by as much as two years.

A strenuous daily exercise program may delay the onset of puberty.

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are barely into their teens. The brain reaches adult weight by about age 16, although the myelination of the neurons—so critical in early motor development—continues throughout the adolescent years (Paus, 2010). The development of the brain can also be seen in the gradual quickening of reaction times that occurs throughout adoles- cence (Kail, 2008).

Interestingly, researchers using neuroimaging technology (fMRI) have discov- ered that significant changes in both myelination and neural “pruning” occur just before and after puberty. These changes, in turn, are believed to alter the internal communication networks, particularly in the regions of the brain that control higher- level cognitive abilities. These same areas are thought to control aspects of social processing, such as the ability to understand what other people are thinking and the ability to take the perspective of another person. Some researchers have suggested that these brain changes may be responsible for the well-documented and even tur- bulent changes in social functioning that are sometimes associated with adolescence (Blakemore, 2008).

When do we actually cross the threshold to adulthood? That’s a tough question. Becoming an adult is, in some sense, a state of mind. There are differences in how the transition from adolescent to adult is defined across the world. Some cultures have specific rites of passage, and others do not. Some adolescents are willing to accept the responsibilities of adulthood quite early, and others are not. Regardless, by the time we reach our 20s we’re physically mature and at the height of our physical prowess.

The Aging Body It’s barely noticeable at first, but most of us begin slowly and steadily to decline physically, at least with respect to our peak levels of strength and agility, at some point during our 20s. The loss tends to be across the board, which means it applies to virtually all physical functions, from strength, to respiration rate, to the heart’s pumping capacity (Whitbourne, 1985). Individual differences occur in the rate of decline, of course, depending on such factors as exercise, illness, and heredity. (I’m sure you can think of a 40-year-old who is in better physical shape than a 25-year-old.) But wrinkles, age spots, sagging flesh, and loss of muscle tone are all reliable and expected parts of the aging process.

By about age 50, the average woman begins menopause, the period when the menstrual cycle slows down and finally stops. Ovulation also stops, so women lose the ability to conceive children. These events are caused by hormonal changes, in particular by a decline in the level of female hormones in the body. Despite what you might have heard, menopause is not disruptive for all women, either physically or psychologically (Strauss, 2011). The main physical symptoms, such as hot flashes, are not experienced by everyone, and the idea that women typically undergo a sustained period of depression or crankiness is simply a myth (Matthews, 1992). In fact, some women view menopause as a liberating experience, accompanied by an increased sense of sexual freedom (Eden & Wylie, 2009).

The Aging Brain As we age, significant physical changes begin to occur in the brain as well. Some people suffer serious brain degeneration—the loss of brain cells—which leads to senility and, in some cases, to a disabling condition called Alzheimer disease. The good news is that the majority of older people never experience these problems; fewer than 1% of people at age 65 are afflicted with dementia, the technical name for physically based loss in mental functioning. Although that percentage may rise to as much as 20% for individuals over age 80 (Cavanaugh & Blanchard-Fields, 2006), signif- icant losses in mental functioning are still the exception rather than the rule. Everyone loses brain cells with age, and as you’ll see later, declines also occur in certain kinds of memory, sensory ability, and reaction time (see ●Figure 4.4; Salthouse, 1994).

But the physical changes that occur in the aging brain are not all bad. Neurons are lost, and the loss may be permanent, but the remaining neurons sometimes increase in complexity. In a famous autopsy study by Buell and Coleman (1979), dendrites were significantly longer and more complex in samples of normal brain tissue taken from

menopause The period during which a woman’s menstrual cycle slows down and finally stops.

dementia Physically based losses in mental functioning.

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Developing Physically | 99

elderly adults when compared to those of middle-aged adults (see ●Figure 4.5). It appears that the brain may compensate for the losses it experiences by making better use of the structures that remain intact. Some researchers believe that sustained men- tal activity in later years helps promote neural growth, thereby counteracting some of the normal decline in mental skills and even delaying the mental declines associ- ated with Alzheimer disease (Valenzuela & Sachdev, 2009).

Monitor your learning The key to effective studying is really effective self-testing. First, test yourself by recalling the key points and terms from the preceding section—with the book closed! Next, monitor your learning by checking the accuracy of your responses. You must check carefully—and don’t be overconfident. Overconfidence can lead to understudying. Finally, close the book and recall the key points and terms again, this time correcting any mistakes you made the first time. Later, before the next class exam, repeat the Recall-Monitor-Recall process. Reading is not enough—you must retrieve!

test yourself You can also check your knowledge about the physical changes that occur during development by deciding whether the following statements are true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The period in prenatal development lasting from implantation of the fertilized egg to the end of the eighth week is called the germinal period. True or False?

2. The initial development of arms, legs, fingers, and toes occurs during the embryonic period of prenatal development. True or False?

3. The large increases in brain size that occur in the first two years of life are due primarily to increases in the number of neurons in the brain. True or False?

4. The timing of motor development—when a baby begins to crawl, walk, and so on—is affected to a small extent by nature (biology) and to a large extent by nurture (the environment). True or False?

5. Everyone loses brain cells with age, and roughly half of all people over age 70 can expect to develop dementia. True or False?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.1

critical thinking

How might you test the idea that mental activity or exercise helps to counteract the decline in mental skills that occurs with age? Can you make predictions based on choice of profession? Should people who choose intellectually challenging professions show less mental decline with age?

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●● Figure 4.5 aging neurons Notice that the dendrites of adult hippocampal neurons actually increase in length and complexity between 50 and 70, declining only in late old age or with Alzheimer disease. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Developing Intellectually LEARNING GOALS

●● Explain the research tools used to study infant perception and memory. ●● Describe an infant’s perceptual capabilities. ●● Discuss and evaluate Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. ●● Discuss and evaluate Kolhberg’s theory of moral development.

Babies are not born seeing and thinking about the world as adults do. Cognitive pro- cesses—how we think and perceive—develop over time. Like learning to walk, intel- lectual development depends on adequate brain development as well as on the right kinds of experiences. In this section, we’ll consider the answers to three questions about intellectual development: How do we learn to perceive and remember the world? How do thought processes change with age? How do we develop a sense of right and wrong?

The Tools of Investigation What does the world look like to a newborn child? Is it a complex three-dimensional world, full of depth, color, and texture? Or is it a “blooming, buzzing confusion,” as suggested by the early psychologist William James? Think about how difficult it is to answer these questions. Detecting the perceptual capabilities of an infant is not a sim- ple matter. Babies can’t tell us what they see or hear.

Because infants don’t communicate as adults do, the analysis of perceptual devel- opment (or any other intellectual capacity) requires some creative research methods. It’s necessary to devise a way to infer perceptual capabilities from what are essentially immobile, largely uncommunicative infants. Fortunately, babies possess several char- acteristics that make the job a little easier: (1) They show preferences, which means they prefer some stimuli over others; (2) they notice novelty, which means they notice new or different things in their environment; and (3) they can learn to repeat activities that produce some kind of reward. Researchers have developed techniques that capi- talize on each of these tendencies.

The Preference Technique In the preference technique developed by Robert Fantz (1961), an infant is presented with two visual displays at the same time, and the investigator simply records how long the infant looks at each one (see ●Figure 4.6). Suppose one of the displays shows a male face and the other a female face, and the baby looks at the female face for a significantly longer period of time. By “choosing” to look longer at the female face, the infant has shown a preference. By itself, this preference indicates very little. To infer things about what the baby can really see, it’s necessary to present the same two displays several times, switching their positions from trial to trial. If the baby continues to look longer at the female face even though it appears on the left on some trials and on the right on others, we know that the baby

●● Figure 4.6 the Preference technique Babies prefer some visual stimuli over others. In this case, the infant demonstrates a preference for a female face by tracking its location across trials. (The preference can be determined by simply recording how long the baby looks at each face.) (© Cengage Learning)

Developing Intellectually | 101

can discriminate between the two displays. The infant “tells” us that he or she can detect differences by exclusively tracking the female face. Notice that we didn’t need to ask the baby anything—we simply inferred things about his or her visual system by measuring behavior.

Habituation Techniques One preference babies consistently show is for novelty—they like to look at new things. But they tend to ignore events that occur repeatedly with- out consequence. If you show newborns a blue-colored card and track how their eyes move (or how their heart rate changes), you’ll find they spend a lot of time looking at the card when it first appears—it’s something new. But if you present the same card over and over again, their interest wanes, and they’ll begin to look at something else. This decline in responsiveness to repeated events, called habituation, provides an effective tool for understanding the infant’s perceptual world. By acting bored, which is defined operationally by how long they look at the card, babies reveal that they remember the stimulus from its previous presentation and recognize that it hasn’t changed. It’s as if the baby is saying, “Oh, it’s that blue card again.”

Habituation can be used to discover specific information about how babies per- ceive and remember their world (Bauer, 2007; Gopnik et al., 1999). Suppose we wanted to discover whether newborns have the ability to see color. We could show the blue card for a while, then suddenly switch to a green card that matches on all other visual dimensions (such as size and brightness). If the infant shows renewed interest in the card—treating the card as if it were new—then the baby must be able to tell the dif- ference between blue and green.

If, on the other hand, the baby continues to ignore the new green card, it sug- gests that the baby may lack color vision at this stage in development (although there can be other interpretations). We can also study memory by changing the time that elapses between presentations of the card. If the baby continues to act bored by the blue card even though we insert long pauses between presentations, we know that he or she is remembering the card over those particular time intervals.

Using Rewards It’s also possible to understand what a baby sees, knows, and remem- bers by rewarding a simple motor movement, such as kicking a leg or sucking on an artificial nipple, in the presence of particular kinds of events (Siqueland & DeLucia, 1969). In research by Carolyn Rovee-Collier (1993), 2- and 3-month-old infants were taught that kicking their legs could produce movement of a mobile hanging overhead. A moving mobile is quite rewarding to babies at this age, and they’ll double or triple their rate of leg kicking in a matter of minutes if it leads to movement. We can then study cognitive abilities—such as memory—by taking the mobile away, waiting for some period of time, and then replacing the mobile. If the baby begins leg kicking again at rates similar to those produced at the end of training, the baby has remembered what he or she has learned. We can also change the characteristics of the mobile after train- ing and learn things about a baby’s perceptual abilities. For example, if we train an infant with a blue mobile and then switch to a green one, any differences in leg kicking should help to tell us whether the baby can discriminate between green and blue.

Research Designs In addition to the “tools” of investigation just described, research- ers who study development typically use two kinds of research design, longitudinal and cross-sectional. In a longitudinal design, you test the same person repeatedly over time, at various points in childhood or even through adulthood. If you wanted to study perceptual development, for instance, you would track the perceptual capabili- ties of baby Howard at various points in Howard’s life. In a cross-sectional design, you assess the abilities of different people of different ages at the same time. So, rather than just testing Howard when he turns 2, 5, and 10, you would test a group of 2-year- olds, a group of 5-year-olds, and a group of 10-year-old children simultaneously. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each research strategy as shown in the Concept Review on page 102.

habituation The decline in responsiveness to a stimulus that is repeatedly presented.

longitudinal design A research design in which the same people are studied or tested repeatedly over time.

cross-sectional design A research design in which people of different ages are compared at the same time.

Researcher Carolyn Rovee-Collier showed that infants can learn to kick their legs to get an overhead mobile moving.

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The Growing Perceptual World Babies greet the world with reasonably well-functioning sensory systems. Although none is operating at peak efficiency, because the biological equipment is still matur- ing, babies still see a world of color and shape (Kellman & Arterberry, 2006). They even arrive with built-in preferences. One-day-old babies, for example, respond more to patterned stimuli than to unpatterned ones. As shown in ●Figure 4.7, they also prefer to look at correctly drawn faces rather than scrambled facial features ( Johnson et al., 1991). It’s likely that learning plays a role in some of these preferences (Turati, 2004), but reasonably sophisticated perceptual processing occurs soon after birth.

Newborns also hear reasonably well, and they seem to recognize their moth- er’s voice within a day or two (DeCasper & Fifer, 1980). Remarkably, newborns can even hear and remember things that happen prior to birth. By the 28th week, fetuses will close their eyes in response to loud noises presented near the mother’s abdomen. Infants will also choose to suck on an artificial nipple that produces a recording of a

●● concePt review Research Designs for Studying Development TYPE of DEsign ovERviEw ADvAnTAgEs (A) AnD DisADvAnTAgEs (D)

Longitudinal The researcher tests the same individual repeat- edly over time.

A: Can examine changes in individuals. D: Cost- intensive; participant loss over time.

Cross-sectional The researcher tests groups of people of different ages at the same time.

A: Faster, more practical than longitudinal. D: Other variables may be confounded with age.

●● Figure 4.7 infant Preferences In this experiment, babies were shown either a blank stimulus, a stimulus with scrambled facial features, or a face. Each stimulus was first positioned over the baby’s head and then moved from side to side. The dependent variable measured the extent to which the baby tracked each stimulus by head turning. As the results show, the babies tracked the face stimulus more than the others. (Graph adapted from Johnson et al., 1991.)

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Developing Intellectually | 103

story that was read aloud to them repeatedly before birth (DeCasper & Spence, 1986). It’s unlikely that the baby is actually remembering the story—but it does indicate that babies are sensitive to particular experiences that happen in the womb ( James, 2010). This is an adaptive ability for the newborn. Babies need nourishment and are depen- dent on others for survival. Those born into the world with a visual system that can detect shapes and forms and an auditory system tuned to the human voice have a bet- ter chance of survival.

In addition to sights and sounds, babies are quite sensitive to touch, smell, pain, and taste. Place a drop of lemon juice in the mouth of a newborn, and you’ll see a dis- tinctive grimace. Place a small amount of sugar in the baby’s mouth, and the baby will smack his or her lips. These distinctive reactions are present at birth and are found even before the infant has had a single taste of food. A baby’s sense of smell is developed well enough that the newborn quickly learns to recognize the odor of its mother’s breast (Porter et al., 1992). As for pain and touch, babies will reject a milk bottle that is too hot, and, as every parent knows, the right kind of pat on the baby’s back is pleasurable enough to soothe the newborn into sleep.

Babies even seem to perceive a three-dimensional world. When placed on a visual cliff, such as the one shown in the photo, 6-month-old babies are reluctant to cross over the apparent drop-off, or cliff, to reach a parent (Gibson & Walk, 1960). Babies as young as 2 months show heart rate changes when they’re placed on the glass portion covering the deep side of the visual cliff (Campos, Langer, & Krowitz, 1970).

Still, these are infant perceptions, and the infant’s world is not the same as that of an adult. Newborn babies cannot see as well as adults. They’re not very good at discriminating fine detail in visual patterns: Compared with the ideal acuity level of 20/20, babies see a blurry world that is more on the order of 20/400, meaning that what newborns see at 20 feet is what adults with ideal vision see at 400 feet. In addi- tion, newborns probably can’t perceive shapes and forms in the same way adults do ( Johnson, 2010), nor can they hear as well as adults. For example, infants seem to have some trouble listening selectively for certain kinds of sounds, and they require sounds to be louder than adults do before those sounds can be detected (Bargones & Werner, 1994).

Infants’ perceptual systems improve markedly during the first few months, partly because of continued physical development but also because experience fine- tunes their sensory abilities ( Johnson, 2010). In the visual cliff experiments men- tioned above, infants with lots of experience crawling are more reluctant to cross over the “cliff ” and show more fear (e.g., an elevated heart rate) when lowered over the cliff’s deep side (Witherington et al., 2005). Research with nonhumans, such as cats or chimpanzees, has shown that if animals are deprived of visual stimulation during the early weeks or months of life, permanent visual impairments can result (Gandelman, 1992). Thus perceptual development relies on experience as well as on physically mature sensory equipment.

This baby is a few months old, but even newborn infants show distinctive reactions to a variety of tastes (lemon, sugar, and salt are shown here).

In the visual cliff apparatus, a plate of glass covers an abrupt drop-off. From the age of approximately 6 months, babies are reluctant to cross the cliff to reach a beckoning parent.

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By the time we leave infancy, our perceptual systems are reasonably intact. Most of the changes that occur during childhood and adolescence affect our ability to use the equipment we have. For example, as children grow older, their attention span improves, and they’re better able to attend selectively to information. Memory improves throughout childhood, partly because kids learn strategies for organizing and maintaining information in memory (Ornstein et al., 2008). Moreover, as you’ll see in Chapters 5 and 8, how we perceive and remember the world depends on what we know about it. We use our general knowledge about people and events to help us interpret ambiguous stimuli and to remember things that happen in our lives. Perception and memory are influenced by the knowledge gained from experience. This is one of the reasons perceptual development is really a lifelong process.

Piaget and the Development of Thought It was a Swiss scholar named Jean Piaget (1896–1980) who first convinced psycholo- gists that children think quite differently from adults. Children are not little adults, Piaget argued, who simply lack knowledge and experience; instead, they view the world in a unique way. Piaget believed that everyone is born with a natural tendency to organize the world meaningfully. We construct mental models of the world— called schemata—and use these worldviews to guide and interpret our experiences. But schemata are not very adultlike early in development—in fact, they tend not to reflect the world accurately—so much of early intellectual development is spent changing and fine-tuning our worldviews. One of Piaget’s primary contributions was to demonstrate that children’s reasoning errors can provide a window into how the schema construction process is proceeding.

Consider the two tilted cups shown in the margin. If young children are asked to draw a line indicating how the liquid level in a tilted cup might look, they tend to draw a line that’s parallel to the top and bottom of the cup, as shown in the cup on the left, rather than parallel to the ground, as shown in the cup on the right. This kind of error is important, Piaget argued, because children can’t have learned such a thing directly from experience (liquid never tilts that way in real life). Instead, the error reflects a fundamental misconception of how the world is structured. Young children have an inaccurate internal view, or model, of the world.

Assimilation and Accommodation As their brains and bodies mature, children use experience to build more sophisticated and correct mental models of the world. Piaget suggested that cognitive development is guided by two adaptive psychological processes, assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is the process through which we fit—or assimilate—new experiences into our existing schemata. For example, suppose a small child who has been raised in a household full of cats mistakenly con- cludes that the neighbor’s new rabbit is simply a kind of kitty. The new experience— the rabbit—has been assimilated into the child’s existing view of the world: Small furry things are cats. The second function, accommodation, is the process through which we change or modify existing schemata to accommodate new experiences. When the child learns that the new “kitty” hops rather than walks and seems reluc- tant to purr, he or she will need to modify and revise the existing concept of small furry things; the child is forced to change the existing schemata to accommodate the new information. Notice that the child plays an active role in constructing schemata by interacting directly with the world (Piaget, 1929).

Piaget believed that children develop an adult worldview by moving systemati- cally through a series of four stages or developmental periods: sensorimotor, preopera- tional, concrete operational, and formal operational. Each of these periods is tied roughly to a particular age range—for example, the preoperational period usually lasts from age 2 to about age 7—but individual differences can occur in how quickly the child

schemata Mental models of the world that we use to guide and interpret our experiences.

assimilation The process through which we fit—or assimilate—new experiences into existing schemata.

accommodation The process through which we change or modify existing schemata to accommodate new experiences.

Jean Piaget

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moves from one stage to the next. Although the timing may vary from child to child, Piaget believed that the order in which individuals progress through the stages is invariant—it remains the same for everyone. Let’s consider these cognitive develop- mental periods in more detail.

The Sensorimotor Period: Birth to Two Years From birth to about age 2, schemata about the world revolve primarily around the infant’s sensory and motor abilities (hence the name sensorimotor period). Babies initially interact with the world through a collection of survival reflexes. For exam- ple, they’ll start sucking when an object is placed in their mouth (called the sucking reflex), and they’ll automatically turn their head in the direction of a touch or brush on the cheek (called the rooting reflex). This behavior is different from an adult’s, but it’s useful for a newborn. These reflexes increase the likelihood that the baby will get fed which, of course, is a significant problem the newborn needs to solve.

As infants develop intellectually over the first year, they use their maturing motor skills to understand how they can interact with the world voluntarily. Babies start to vocalize to gain attention; they learn they can kick their legs to make sounds; they acquire the ability to reach with their arms to touch or grasp objects. In essence, they begin acting like “little scientists,” exploring their world, learning to repeat actions, and testing simple hypotheses about cause and effect (although not in the same con- scious way that we might). The initial stirrings of symbolic thought begin during this period. The infant gradually develops the ability to construct internal mental images or symbols.

Early in the first year babies lack object permanence, which means they fail to recognize that objects exist when they’re no longer in sight. The photos below illustrate how psychologists have measured object permanence. Notice the baby loses interest when the toy is covered, suggesting that the baby is only capable of thinking about objects that are directly in view. Babies at this point are unable to represent objects symbolically—out of sight equals out of mind. But by the end of the first year, Piaget argued, the child has a different reaction to the disappearance of a favored toy; as object permanence develops, the child will begin to search actively for the lost toy.

The Preoperational Period: Two to Seven Years From about ages 2 through 7, the child’s schemata continue to grow in sophistica- tion. Children in the preoperational period no longer have difficulty thinking about absent objects, and they can use one object to stand for another. A 4-year-old can use a stick to represent a soaring airplane or a cardboard box for a stove. The child real- izes these are not the real objects, but he or she can imagine them to be real for the

sensorimotor period Piaget’s first stage of cognitive development, lasting from birth to about 2 years of age; schemata revolve around sensory and motor abilities.

object permanence The ability to recognize that objects still exist when they’re no longer in sight.

preoperational period Piaget’s second stage of cognitive development, lasting from ages 2 to about 7; children begin to think symbolically but often lack the ability to perform mental operations such as conservation.

The rooting reflex is adaptive because it helps the newborn receive needed sustenance.

According to Piaget, babies who haven’t yet mastered the concept of object permanence don’t understand that objects still exist when they’re no longer in view. Notice how this boy loses interest when he can no longer see his favorite toy.

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purposes of play. At the same time, the child still thinks about the world quite dif- ferently than an adult. As you’ll see momentarily, the child lacks the ability to per- form certain basic mental operations—hence Piaget’s use of the term preoperational to describe a child’s mental abilities during this period.

Conservation Children at the preoperational stage often fail to understand the principle of conservation. Conservation means that certain physical properties of an object remain the same despite superficial changes in its appearance (see ●Figure 4.8). If 4- or 5-year-old children are shown two clay balls of exactly the same size and are asked which object contains more clay, most will say that the two balls contain the same amount. But if one of the balls is then rolled into a long sausagelike shape, the children are likely to think that the two quantities are no longer the same, saying that either the sausage or the ball has more clay.

Children at this age are unable to understand that a basic property of an object, in this case its mass, doesn’t change as the object changes shape. Typically, preopera- tional children will fail to conserve a basic quantity even if they directly observe the change in appearance taking place. Suppose we ask 5-year-old Sam to pour a cup of water into each of two identical glasses. Sam performs the task and accepts that the two glasses now contain the same amount. We then instruct him to pour the water from one of the glasses into another glass that is tall and thin. Do the glasses now contain the same amount of water? “No,” Sam explains, “now the tall one has more water.” Sam is not showing any evidence of conservation; he does not yet recognize that how the water looks in the glass has no effect on its volume.

Piaget also discovered that children in the preoperational period tend to see the world, and the objects in it, from primarily one perspective: their own. Children at this stage have a tough time imagining themselves in another person’s position. If you ask a child in the preoperational period to describe what another person will see or think, you’re likely to find the child simply describing what he or she personally sees or thinks. Piaget called this characteristic egocentrism—the tendency to view the world from your own unique perspective only.

The Concrete Operational Period: Seven to Eleven Years Between the ages of 7 and about 11, children enter the concrete operational period and gain the ability to perform mental actions on objects—to verbalize, visualize, and mentally manipulate objects. A child of 8 can consider the consequences of roll- ing a long strip of clay into a ball before the action is actually performed. Children in the concrete operational period have fewer difficulties with conservation problems because they are capable of reversing operations on objects—they can mentally con- sider the effects of both doing and undoing an action.

principle of conservation The ability to recognize that the physical properties of an object remain the same despite superficial changes in the object’s appearance.

egocentrism The tendency to see the world from one’s own unique perspective only; a characteristic of thinking in the preoperational period of development.

concrete operational period Piaget’s third stage of cognitive development, lasting from ages 7 to 11. Children acquire the capacity to perform a number of mental operations but still lack the ability for abstract reasoning.

●● Figure 4.8 examples of conservation Problems Understanding conservation means recognizing that the physical properties of objects remain the same, even though the objects may superficially change in appearance. Preoperational children often fail conservation problems—they fail to detect, for example, that the objects to the right of the arrows still retain the same volume or number. In the bottom panel simply spreading out some candies can cause a child to think there are more candies to be eaten. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Children at the concrete operational stage also show the initial stirrings of logi- cal thought, which means they can now mentally order and compare objects and per- form more sophisticated classifications. These children can do simple math and solve problems that require elementary reasoning. But their mental operations remain con- crete, or tied directly to actual objects in the real world. Children at this age have great difficulty with problems that do not flow directly from everyday experience. Ask an 8-year-old to solve a problem involving four-armed people and barking cats and you’re likely to get a blank look. Basically, if something can’t be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or smelled, it’s going to be tough for these children to think about (although they can imagine non-real-world objects they have encountered, for exam- ple, in cartoons or fairy tales). For Piaget, the ability to think truly abstractly doesn’t develop until the final stage of cognitive development.

The Formal Operational Period: Eleven to Adulthood By the time children reach their teenage years, most will be in the formal operational period, during which they begin to think much more like an adult. Neither teenag- ers nor adults have problems thinking about imaginary or artificial concepts; they can consider hypothetical outcomes or make logical deductions about places they’ve never visited or that might not even exist. Teenagers can develop systematic strate- gies for solving problems—such as using trial and error—that are beyond the capabil- ity of most preteens.

The formal operational period is the stage at which we start to gain mastery over abstract thinking. Ask a concrete operational child about the meaning of edu- cation, and you’ll be likely to hear about teachers and grades. The formal opera- tional adolescent is able to answer the question in a general and abstract way, perhaps describing education as a system organized by parents and the government to foster the acquisition of useful knowledge. Piaget believed that the transition from concrete operational thinking to formal operational thinking probably occurs gradually, over several years, and may not be achieved by everyone (Piaget, 1970). Once this stage is reached, the adolescent is no longer tied to concrete, real-world constructs and can invent and experiment with the possible rather than just with the here and now.

formal operational period Piaget’s last stage of cognitive development; thought processes become adultlike, and people gain mastery over abstract thinking.

critical thinking

Do you think Piaget’s insights about cognitive development have any implications for education? For example, should teachers be giving first- and second-grade children abstract math problems to solve?

●● concePt review Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development sTAgE BAsiC CHARACTERisTiCs ACComPlisHmEnTs limiTATions

Sensorimotor period (birth–2 years)

Schemata about the world revolve primarily around sensory and motor abilities.

Child develops object perma- nence; learns how to control the body; learns how to vocalize, and learns first words.

Schemata are limited primarily to simple sensory and motor func- tion; problems in thinking about absent objects (early).

Preoperational period (2–7 years) Schemata grow in sophistication. Children can think about absent objects, and can use one object to stand for another.

Children readily symbolize objects, and imaginary play is common; great strides in lan- guage development.

Children are prelogical; they fail to understand conservation; children show egocentricity in thinking.

Concrete operational period (7–11 years)

Children gain the capacity for true mental operations, i.e., verbalizing, visualizing, mental manipulation.

Child understands reversibility and other simple logical opera- tions such as categorizing and ordering.

Mental operations remain con- crete, tied to actual objects in the real world; difficulty with problems that do not flow from everyday experience.

Formal operational period (11 years–adulthood)

Mastery is gained over abstract thinking.

Adolescents can think and answer questions in general and abstract ways.

No limitations; development of reasoning is complete; however, not all reach this stage.

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Challenges to Piaget’s Theory Jean Piaget revolutionized our understanding of how children think. He successfully convinced the psychological community that children have unique internal sche- mata, and he provided convincing demonstrations that those schemata, once formed, tend to change over time. However, not all of Piaget’s ideas are widely accepted today. Specifics parts of his theory have been challenged, primarily his assumptions about what children really know and when they know it (Gopnik, 2009).

It turns out that children and young infants are considerably more sophisticated in their models of the world than Piaget believed. For example, Piaget was convinced that object permanence doesn’t develop until late in the child’s first year. Although it’s true that children will not search for a hidden toy in the first few months of life, more sensitive tests have revealed that even 1- to 4-month-old infants are capable of recognizing that vanished objects still exist (Baillargeon, 2004).

In research by child psychologist T. G. R. Bower (1982), very young infants watched as a screen was moved in front of a toy, blocking it from view (see ●Figure 4.9). Moments later, when the screen was removed, the infants acted surprised if the toy was absent (it could be secretly removed by the experimenter). If objects no lon- ger exist when removed from view, then infants shouldn’t be surprised by a sudden absence. Other researchers have demonstrated that young infants can show symbolic thought—they understand, for instance, that objects move along continuous paths and do not jump around—and they gain this understanding at points in development far earlier than Piaget imagined (e.g., Spelke & Kinzler, 2007).

Piaget has also been criticized for sticking to the notion of distinct stages, or peri- ods of development. Piaget recognized that not all children develop at the same rate, but he remained convinced that a child’s thought processes undergo sharp transitions from one stage to the next. Most developmental psychologists now believe that cog- nitive development is better viewed as a process of continual change and adaptation (Newcombe, 2011; Siegler, 1996). According to the stage view, once a child undergoes

Condition 1 Screen moved aside, toy is there

Time Amount of surprise

Condition 2 Screen moved aside, toy is not there

Time Amount of surprise

●● Figure 4.9 reevaluating object Permanence In this experiment, a screen was moved in front of a toy, blocking it from the infant’s view. Moments later, when the screen was removed, the baby’s level of surprise (defined as a change in heart rate) was measured. In one condition the toy appeared behind the screen; in a second condition it had vanished. Babies showed more surprise when the toy was absent, suggesting that object permanence may develop earlier than Piaget suspected. (Bower, 1982)

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a stage transition—say, from the preoperational to the concrete operational—he or she should be able to perform a variety of new tasks relatively quickly. But this is not usually the case.

The Role of Culture Piaget was also rather fuzzy about the mechanisms that produce cognitive change. He recognized that infants, toddlers, and school-age children think in fundamentally different ways, but he never clearly explained the psychological pro- cesses that produce those changes. He also largely ignored the importance of social context in explaining how children differ in cognitive ability. Cross-cultural research has shown that children across the world develop cognitively in similar ways, but sig- nificant cultural differences can occur in the rate of development (Matsumoto, 1994). For example, children raised in nomadic societies, which move frequently from place to place, seem to acquire spatial skills (the ability to orient themselves in their envi- ronment) earlier than children raised in single, fixed locales. Schooling may also be a factor: Ample cross-cultural evidence indicates that people who never attend school may have a difficult time reaching the formal operational stage of thinking, at least as measured through traditional Piagetian tasks (Cole, 1992).

The importance of social and cultural influences was promoted by a Russian psy- chologist, Lev Vygotsky, around the same time that Piaget was developing his theo- retical ideas. Vygotsky died in 1934, after only a decade of work in psychology, but his ideas remain very influential (Daniels, Cole, & Wertsch, 2007). Vygotsky argued that cognitive abilities emerge directly out of our social interactions with others. He pro- posed, for example, that inner speech, which we use to think and plan activities, is a natural extension of the outer speech that we use to communicate. He was convinced that intellectual development is tied to social interaction—it grows out of each per- son’s attempts to master social situations. Development can’t be understood by con- sidering the individual alone—you must always consider the individual in his or her social context (Vygotsky, 1978).

For example, imagine asking a 3-year-old child to describe how meals are prepared in the household. It’s unlikely that you’ll get much of a response—beyond, perhaps, a shrugging of the shoulders or shake of the head. Yet, if we engage the child in some form of social interaction—we provide clues or ask leading questions (e.g., Where is food stored? Where is it cooked?)—we’re likely to find that the child actually has quite a bit of knowledge about how food is prepared. Every child has what Vygotsky called

Children in nomadic societies, who move from one place to another often, may be able to orient themselves in an environment faster and more efficiently than children raised in fixed locales.©

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a “zone of proximal development,” which is the difference between what the child can accomplish on his or her own and what he or she can do in the context of a social inter- action (such as interacting with Mom or Dad). It is our social interactions, Vygotsky argued, that energize development and help to shape how we think.

Core Knowledge Psychologists who study intellectual development have also discovered that children acquire specialized knowledge very early in life. Not surprisingly, these areas of “core knowledge” tend to be about things relevant to survival or to understanding how people and the world work. For example, infants quickly learn the difference between animate (or living) and inanimate (or nonliving) objects (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Young children understand that animals move around on their own and inanimate objects do not. Children also understand that biological properties—such as getting hungry or tired—apply only to living things. Infants recognize as well that living things, unlike nonliving objects, act to achieve certain goals (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Animals and people are goal-directed, but pieces of wood are not.

Like adults, small children are also convinced that animals and people have a kind of “essence” or true nature that is fixed at birth. When asked, preschool chil- dren believe that if a kangeroo is adopted and raised by goats, it will still grow up to be good at hopping rather than climbing (goats climb well)—they also continue to believe that the kangeroo will grow up to have a pouch. Moreover, if you tell a child that a raccoon has been modified by a scientist to look like a skunk (even with a smelly pouch), he or she is still likely to claim that the animal is a raccoon even though it no longer looks like one. These findings indicate that young children believe that mem- bers of categories have core natural qualities that cannot easily be changed by experi- ence (Gelman, 2009).

Children also quickly acquire knowledge about other people and their behavior. I discussed the “other mind problem” in Chapter 3—our ability to imagine what oth- ers are thinking and feeling—and children begin to show these abilities quite early in development. Most 3-year-olds commonly use verbs such as think, believe, or remember, suggesting that they have an early understanding of mental states. By age 4, children seem to understand that other people act on the basis of their internal “beliefs” about

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the world, even if those beliefs are actually incorrect (Wellman, 2011). Understanding that people sometimes act on the basis of false beliefs is pretty sophisticated for a 4-year-old, but it shows how important the “other mind problem” is to our ability to adapt successfully in our world.

Moral Development: Learning Right From Wrong Developing intellectually means more than learning to think logically and form cor- rect internal models of the world. As children mature intellectually, they also develop character. They acquire a sense of morality, which provides them with a way to dis- tinguish between appropriate and inappropriate actions. Piaget had strong opinions on this topic, arguing that the sense of morality is closely tied to one’s stage of cog- nitive development. For example, from Piaget’s perspective, children in the concrete operational stage shouldn’t show sophisticated moral reasoning skills because moral- ity is basically an abstract concept—something that cannot be handled until the for- mal operational stage of development. Partly for this reason, most of the work on moral development has been conducted with adolescents and adults.

Kohlberg’s Stage Theory One very influential theory of moral development is the stage theory proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg was strongly influenced by Piaget, and like Piaget, he believed that people move through stages of moral devel- opment (Kohlberg, 1963, 1986). He would give people a moral dilemma, ask them to solve it, and use their reasoning to help identify their state of moral development. Let’s consider an example, based on Kohlberg (1969):

A woman is stricken with a rare and deadly form of cancer. There is a drug that can save her, a form of radium recently discovered by a druggist in town. But the druggist is charging $2,000 for the medicine, 10 times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, tries desper- ately to raise the money but can raise only half of the needed amount. He pleads with the druggist to sell him the drug at a reduced cost, or at least to allow him to pay for the drug over time, but the druggist refuses. “No,” the druggist says, “I discovered the drug, and I’m going to make money from it.” Frantic to save his wife, Heinz considers breaking into the druggist’s office to steal the drug.

What do you think? Should the husband steal the drug? Why or why not? Kohlberg was mainly interested in the reasoning behind the answers that people give. He believed that people can be classified into stages of moral development based on how they answer such moral problems. Kohlberg’s theory proposes as many as six stages of moral development, but I’ll focus on his three main levels only: preconven- tional, conventional, and postconventional.

At the lowest level of moral development—the preconventional level—decisions about right and wrong are based primarily on external consequences. Young children will typically interpret the morality of a behavior in terms of its immediate individual consequences—that is, whether the act will lead directly to a reward or to a punish- ment: “Heinz shouldn’t steal the drug because he might get caught and punished” or “Heinz should steal the drug because people will get mad at him if his wife dies.”

At the conventional level of moral reasoning, people justify their actions based on internalized rules. Now an action is right or wrong because it maintains or disrupts the social order. Someone at this level might argue that “Heinz shouldn’t steal the drug because stealing is against the law” or that “Heinz should steal the drug because hus- bands have an obligation to protect their wives.” Notice here that the moral reasoning has moved away from immediate individual consequences to societal consequences. Moral behavior is that which conforms to the rules and conventions of society.

morality The ability to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate actions.

preconventional level In Kohlberg’s theory, the lowest level of moral development, in which decisions about right and wrong are made primarily in terms of external consequences.

conventional level In Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, the stage in which actions are judged to be right or wrong based on whether they maintain or disrupt the social order.

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At the final level of moral development, the postconventional level, morality is based on abstract principles that may conflict with accepted standards. Rather than seeking to please an authority figure or satisfy others, the person adopts a moral stan- dard based on some universal ethical principle. “An individual human life is more important than society’s dictum against stealing,” someone at this level might argue. In this case, moral actions are driven by general and abstract personal codes of ethics that may not agree with normal rules of society.

Evaluating Kohlberg’s Theory Developmental psychologists continue to believe that we progress through periods of moral development, from an early focus on imme- diate individual consequences toward a final principled code of ethics. A number of observational studies have confirmed Kohlberg’s views. For example, people do seem to move through the various types of moral reasoning in the sequence sug- gested by Kohlberg, at least children move from a preconventional to a conventional level in most cultures (Gibbs et al., 2007). Furthermore, the link that both Piaget and Kohlberg made between moral reasoning and level of cognitive development has clear merit. But Kolhberg’s critics argue that he ties the concept of morality too closely to an abstract code of justice—that is, to the idea that moral acts are those that ensure fairness to the individual.

For example, suppose your sense of morality is not based on fairness but rather on concern for the welfare of others. You might believe that the appropriate action is always one that doesn’t hurt anyone—or one that takes into account the happiness of the affected individual. Under these conditions, as analyzed by Kohlberg, your behav- ior will appear to be driven more by an individual situation than by a consistent code of justice. Psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982) has argued that women in our culture often adopt such a view (a moral code based on caring), whereas men tend to make moral decisions on the basis of an abstract sense of justice. According to Kohlberg’s theory, however, this means that women will tend to be classified at a lower level of moral development than men. Gilligan sees this as an unfair and unjustified gender bias.

The Role of Culture Gilligan may have overstated the case for sex differences in moral reasoning. Men and women often think in much the same way about the moral dilemmas studied by Kohlberg (Walker, 1989). At the same time, Western cultures tend to place more value on individualism and stress individual goals more than other cultures, where the emphasis may be on collective goals. These kinds of cultural val- ues certainly affect moral development. For example, Chinese children are taught it’s okay to lie politely when it helps the group, but North American children tend to believe a “polite lie” is fine when it helps the individual (Fu et al., 2007). Moreover, the importance a culture places on teaching moral values can affect the speed with which moral development proceeds (Gibbs et al., 2007). The bottom line: Morality seems to develop in a consistent manner across the world—that is, people tend to interpret

postconventional level Kohlberg’s highest level of moral development, in which moral actions are judged on the basis of a personal code of ethics that is general and abstract and that may not agree with societal norms.

●● concePt review Kohlberg’s Stage Theory of Moral Development sTAgE BAsis foR moRAl juDgmEnT PossiBlE REsPonsE To “wAs HEinz RigHT To ConsiDER sTEAling?”

Preconventional External consequences Yes: “He can’t be happy without his wife.”

No: “If he gets caught, he’ll be put in jail.”

Conventional Social order Yes: “Spouses are responsible for protecting one another.”

No: “Stealing is against the law.”

Postconventional Abstract ethical principles Yes: “Individual lives are more important than society’s law against stealing.”

No: “Laws are necessary in a civilized society; they need to be followed by all to prevent chaos.”

critical thinking

Based on what you’ve learned about moral development, what advice would you give parents who are trying to teach their children about right and wrong?

Developing Intellectually | 113

morality first in terms of external consequences and only later in terms of abstract principles—but, not surprisingly, culture can exert its influence in powerful ways.

The Role of Gut Reactions Kohlberg based his theory of moral development on the study of moral reasoning. He was interested in how children thought about his moral dilemmas, how they consciously “explained” their decisions about right and wrong. But increasingly psychologists are convinced that morality comes first from gut reac- tions—our unconscious feelings and emotions about the situation at hand. When we witness a child being slapped, we experience a flash emotional reaction—anger, sym- pathy, even rage. It is these quick emotional reactions that influence our immediate judgments about right and wrong. Higher-level moral reasoning comes later, when we attempt to justify our feelings (Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

Considerable evidence now suggests that our sense of morality lies partly in such gut feelings. For example, people are often morally dumbfounded, which means they intuitively know something is wrong, but can’t explain it in words. Imagine the following scenario: A brother and sister want to have sex. They’re both consent- ing adults, and they wear protection so pregnancy isn’t an issue. Is it okay for them to have sex? Most people say absolutely not—it’s wrong—but they have a hard time explaining the basis for their judgment. Other evidence comes from neuroscience: People with damage to parts of the brain associated with emotional processing eval- uate moral dilemmas differently from normal controls. For example, in one study patients with this type of brain damage were more likely to consider attempted mur- der as morally permissible; they lacked the gut-based emotional reaction that is nor- mally involved in judging harmful intent (Young et al., 2010).

test yourself You can also check your knowledge of intellectual development by answering these questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Pick the appropriate research technique from among the follow- ing terms: cross-sectional, habituation, longitudinal, preference, and reward.

a. Baby learns to kick her legs because kicking makes the mobile move:

b. Baby grows bored and stops looking at repeated presenta- tions of the same event:

c. Comparisons are made among three groups of children; each group contains children of a different age:

d. The development of memory is studied by testing the same individual repeatedly throughout his or her lifetime:

2. According to Piaget, children develop mental models of the world, called schemata, that change as the child grows. During the preoperational period of development, children often fail to recognize that the physical properties of an object can stay the

same despite superficial changes in its appearance (e.g., rolling a ball of clay into a sausage shape doesn’t change its mass). Piaget referred to this ability as

a. conservation. b. object permanence. c. accommodation. d. relativistic thinking.

3. Pick the appropriate level of moral development, as described by Kohlberg. Possible answers include conventional, preconventional, and postconventional.

a. Actions are justified on the basis of whether they disrupt the social order:

b. Actions are justified on the basis of abstract moral principles:

c. Actions are justified on the basis of their immediate conse- quences:

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.2

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Developing Socially and Personally LEARNING GOALS

●● Discuss the short- and long-term characteristics of early attachments. ●● Explain Erik Erikson’s stage theory of personal identity development. ●● Describe the factors that affect gender-role development. ●● Discuss the psychological issues associated with death and dying.

People do not develop in isolation. We’re social animals, and the relationships we form with others affect how we act and view ourselves. For infants, relationships with caregivers—usually their parents—guarantee them adequate nourishment and a safe and secure environment. Children work hard to become part of a social group, learning how to get along with peers and to follow the rules and norms of society. Adults, whose social bonds become increasingly intimate, must learn to accept responsibility for the care and support of others. As with most aspects of develop- ment, social and personal growth is shaped partly by biology and partly by what we learn from experience.

Forming Bonds With Others Think again about the problems faced by the newborn: limited motor skills, some- what fuzzy vision, yet a powerful need for food, water, and warmth. To gain the nourishment needed to live, as well as protection from danger, the newborn relies on interactions with others—usually the mother. The newborn forms attachments, strong emotional ties to one or more intimate companions. The need for early attach- ments is so critical that researchers commonly argue that bonding behavior is built directly into our nature (Bowlby, 1969; Meltzoff, 2011).

Both caregiver and infant are preprogrammed from birth to respond to certain signals with attachment behavior. The newborn typically cries, coos, and smiles, and these behaviors lead naturally to attention and support from the caregiver. It’s no accident that adults like to hear babies coo or watch them smile—these preferences may be built directly into the genetic code (Bowlby, 1969). At the same time, the baby arrives into the world with a bias to respond to care and particularly to comfort from the caregiver. Newborns imitate the facial expressions of their caregivers (Meltzoff, 2011), for example, which presumably enhances social interactions.

Notice that both the infant and the caregiver are active participants—the attach- ment is formed because both parties are prepared to respond with bonding to the right kind of events. The bond usually is formed initially between baby and mother because it is the mother who provides most of the early care.

The Origins of Attachment The idea that humans are built to form strong emotional attachments makes sense from an adaptive standpoint—it helps to guarantee survival. But what determines the strength or quality of the attachment? The quality of the bond that forms between infant and caregiver can vary enormously—some infants are securely attached to their caregivers, others are not. Research with animal subjects suggests that one very important factor is the amount of actual contact comfort—the degree of warm physical contact—provided by the caregiver.

Contact Comfort In classic research on early attachment, psychologist Harry Harlow noticed that newborn rhesus monkeys, when separated from their mothers at birth, attached themselves to soft cuddly objects left in their cages, such as baby blankets.

attachments Strong emotional ties formed to one or more intimate companions.

When a mother nurses her newborn child, she provides more than sustenance for survival. Contact comfort helps secure the bond of mutual attachment.

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If one of these blankets was removed for cleaning, the monkeys became extremely upset and would cling to it frantically when the blanket was returned. Intrigued, Harlow began a series of experiments in which he isolated newborn monkeys and raised them in cages with a variety of surrogate, or artificial, “mothers” (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1959). In one condition, baby monkeys were raised with a mother made simply of wire mesh and fitted with an artificial nipple that delivered food; in another condition, the babies were exposed to a nippleless cloth mother made of wire mesh that had been padded with foam rubber and wrapped in soft terrycloth.

Which of the two surrogate mothers did the monkeys prefer? If early attachments are formed primarily to caregivers who provide nourishment—that is, infants love the one who feeds them—we would expect the monkeys to prefer and cling to the wire mother because it provides the food. But in the vast majority of cases the monkeys pre- ferred the cloth mother. If startled in some way, perhaps by the introduction of a for- eign object into the cage, the monkeys ran immediately to the cloth mother, hung on tight, and showed no interest in the wire mother that provided the food. Harlow and his colleagues concluded that contact comfort—the warmth and softness provided by the terrycloth—was the primary motivator of attachment (Harlow et al., 1971).

For obvious reasons, similar experiments have never been conducted with human babies. However, we have every reason to believe that human infants are like rhesus infants in their desire and need for contact comfort. Many studies have looked at how children progress in institutional settings that provide relatively low levels of contact comfort (Hodges & Tizard, 1989; Provence & Lipton, 1962; Spitz, 1945). Children reared in orphanages with poor infant-to-caregiver ratios (e.g., one care- giver for every 10 to 20 infants) often show more developmental problems than chil- dren reared in less deprived environments (Shaffer & Kipp, 2010).

Temperament Given that physical contact is such a necessary part of a secure attach- ment, what determines whether infants will receive the contact they need? One fac- tor may be a baby’s temperament, the general level of his or her emotional reactivity. Difficult or fussy babies tend to get fewer comforting and responsive reactions, and the quality of the attachment between parent and child suffers as a result (Thomas & Chess, 1977). Links also exist between temperament and various cognitive abilities, particularly language development (e.g., Dixon & Smith, 2000).

Psychologists who study temperament find that infants can be categorized into types. As you might guess, some babies are easy; they’re basically happy, read- ily establish daily routines, and tend not to get upset very easily. Other babies are

temperament A child’s general level of emotional reactivity.

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difficult; they have trouble accepting new experiences, establishing routines, and maintaining a pleasant mood. Fortunately, only about 10% of babies fall into this dif- ficult group, and about 40% of sampled babies are readily classified as easy (Thomas & Chess, 1977). The remaining 50% are more difficult to categorize. Some babies are “slow to warm up,” which means they roughly fall between easy and difficult and show a mixture of different temperaments.

Psychologists are convinced that these differences in moodiness, or tempera- ment, can’t be explained completely by the environment. Babies are probably born easy or difficult, although experience certainly plays a role (Rothbart, 2007). If tem- perament is based in biology, then you might expect it to remain stable across the life span. If you’re a moody baby, then you should be a moody adolescent and a moody adult. Research has generally supported this conclusion (Caspi et al., 2005). Infants who seem very shy or inhibited tend to remain so as they age. Identical twins, who share the same genes, also show more similarities in temperament than do fraternal twins or siblings raised in the same home (Saudino, 2009). As you’ll see when you read the discussion of personality in Chapter 12, genetic factors probably influence many aspects of personality, not just temperament.

Types of Attachment Not all attachments are created equal: There are differences in the bonds that chil- dren form with their caregivers. To investigate these differences, psychologists have used a technique called the strange situation test. This test classifies 10- to 24-month- old children into four different attachment groups based on the children’s reactions to stressful situations (Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969; Ainsworth et al., 1978). After arrival in the lab, the parent and child are ushered into a waiting room filled with toys; the child is encouraged to play with the toys. Various levels of infant stress are then intro- duced. A stranger might enter the room, or the parent might be asked to step out for a few moments leaving the child alone. Of main interest are the child’s reactions: Initially, how willing is the child to move away from the parent and play with the toys? How much crying or distress does the child show when the parent leaves the room? How does the child react when the parent comes back into the room—does the child greet and cling to the parent, or does he or she move away?

Most infants—approximately 60 to 70%—react to the strange situation test with what psychologist Mary Ainsworth called a secure attachment. With the parent pres- ent, even if the situation is new and strange, these children play happily and are likely to explore the room looking for interesting toys or magazines to shred. But as the level of stress increases, they become increasingly uneasy and clingy. If the mother leaves the room, the child will probably start to cry but will calm down rapidly when the mother returns.

strange situation test Gradually subjecting a child to a stressful situation and observing his or her behavior toward the parent or caregiver. This test is used to classify children according to type of attachment—secure, resistant, avoidant, or disorganized/disoriented.

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A child’s natural temperament can importantly influence the quality of his or her attachment with a caregiver.

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About 10% of children show a pattern called resistant attachment; these children react to stress in an ambiguous way, which may indicate a lack of trust for the parent. Resistant children will act wary in a strange situation, refusing to leave their moth- er’s side and explore the room, and they do not deal well with the sudden appearance of strangers. They cry if the mother leaves the room, yet they’re unlikely to greet her with affection on her return. Instead, these children act ambivalent: They remain by her side but resist her affections.

A third group of children—about 20 to 25%—show a pattern of avoidant attach- ment. These children show no strong attachment to the mother in any aspect of the strange situation test. They’re not particularly bothered by the appearance of strang- ers in the room, nor do they show much concern when the mother leaves the room or much interest when she returns. Ainsworth discovered that the parents of these chil- dren tend to be unresponsive and impatient when it comes to the child’s needs and may even actively reject the child on a regular basis (Ainsworth, 1979).

The final attachment group—about 5 to 8%—is made up of children who show a pattern of disorganized/disoriented attachment. These children react to the strange situation test with inconsistent responses. Sometimes they mimic securely attached children; sometimes they react with fear or anxiety to the returning mother. These children appear to have no consistent strategy for interacting with their caregivers.

What determines the kind of attachment a child will form? There’s no easy way to tell. The parent–child relationship depends on the particular personality character- istics of the parent, the temperament of the child, even the child-rearing practices of the culture. In Japan, caregivers are less likely to encourage independence and explo- ration because the Japanese culture tends to value group-oriented accomplishments. This, in turn, can affect how attachments develop and are measured. When babies in the United States are raised according to Japanese practices, they are less likely to be labeled as “securely attached” using the criteria listed above, presumably because less of an emphasis has been placed on acting independently (see Rothbaum et al., 2000). Psychologists are convinced that attachment behavior is universal, because forming early attachments is critical to survival, but exactly how the attachment is expressed and how it should be appropriately measured may well depend importantly on cul- tural factors (Rothbaum & Morelli, 2005).

As a final note to parents, the strange situation test is a laboratory procedure and observations are made under carefully controlled conditions. You need to take care when drawing conclusions based on your own personal experiences. You shouldn’t con- clude that your child has an avoidant attachment, for example, just because he or she might not cry when left at day care. The strange situation test is not based on haphazard observations but on a careful examination of specific behaviors in a controlled setting.

Do Early Attachments Matter Later in Life? Given that infants can be easily divided into these attachment groups by around age 1, it’s reasonable to wonder about the long-term consequences. Are the avoid- ant children doomed to a life of insecurity and failed relationships? Children with an early secure attachment do seem to have social and intellectual advantages, at least throughout middle and later childhood. For example, secure attachments in infancy have been associated with higher-quality friendships and romantic relationships in adolescence (Collins et al., 2009). Less secure attachments in infancy, such as disorga- nized attachments, have been linked to behavior problems—aggression and antiso- cial behavior—later in life (Fearon et al., 2010).

However, early patterns of attachment are not perfect predictors of later behav- ior. One problem is stability: Sometimes a child who appears to be insecurely attached at 12 months can act quite differently in the strange situation test a few months later (Lamb et al., 1992). In addition, a child who has a particular kind of attachment to

critical thinking

Do you think the findings of the strange situation test would change if the test were conducted in the child’s home? Why or why not?

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one parent may show quite a different pattern to the other. It’s also important to remember that when psychologists talk about predicting later behavior based on early attachment patterns they are referring mainly to correlational studies. As you learned in Chapter 2, it’s not possible to draw firm conclusions about causality from simple correlational analyses. The fact that later behavior can be predicted from early attach- ment patterns does not mean that early bonding necessarily causes the later behavior patterns—other factors might be responsible. Children who form secure attachments in infancy typically have caregivers who remain warm and responsive throughout childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. So it could be that securely attached infants tend to have successful relationships later in life because they live most of their lives in supportive environments.

Friends and Peers Early attachments are important. But the relationships formed after infancy, especially during later childhood and adolescence, matter as well. Under the right circumstances, people can counteract negative experiences of infancy or childhood (Lamb et al., 1992). The significance of friendship is a case in point. Psychologists now recognize that a child’s social network—the number and quality of his or her friends—can have a meaningful impact on social development and well- being (Berndt, 2004; Hartup & Stevens, 1997).

Children with friends interact more confidently in social situations, they are more cooperative, and they report higher levels of self-esteem (Newcomb & Bagwell, 1995). Children with friends are also less likely to seek help for psychological prob- lems, and they’re more likely to be seen as well adjusted by teachers and adult care- takers. These trends are true for young children and adolescents, and they continue on into adulthood (Berndt & Keefe, 1995). When you read Chapter 16, which deals with stress and health, you’ll find that social support—particularly our network of friends—predicts how well we’re able to cope and deal with stressful situations and how well we’re able to recover from injury or disease. This is just as true for children as it is for adults.

Obviously, the quality (or closeness) of the friendship matters, as does the iden- tity of the friends. If you have very close friends who recommend drug use or a life of crime, the developmental consequences will be less than ideal (Dishion & Tipsord, 2011). We also don’t know what features of friendship matter most. For instance, peo- ple often share similarities with their friends (such as common attitudes and values). Does this mean that friends merely reinforce our values and make us more secure in our attitudes? In-depth research on friendships is ongoing, in part because psychol- ogists recognize the value of friendship across the life span. When asked to rank what is most important in their lives, children, adolescents, and adults often pick “friends” as the answer.

Another very important influence—perhaps even more important than friends— is the child’s peer group. Some psychologists believe that acceptance or rejection by the peer group is a more significant influence on later development than the actual rearing practices of the parent (e.g., Harris, 2009). When you examine language, for instance, children tend to speak like their peers, not like their parents. If a child grows up in a Spanish-speaking home but his or her peers speak English, then that child not only acquires the new language but prefers it. The same is true for behavior—chil- dren tend to adapt their behavior to the local norms, at least when they are outside of the home (Harris, 2009).

Day Care: What Are the Long-Term Effects? What about day care and its long-term impact on development? Most parents of pre- school children face a dilemma: Do I stay at home and provide full-time care for my child, or do I work outside the home and place my child in day care? In contemporary

Friends and peers are important determinants of our personal and social development.

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American society, day care often turns out to be the answer, although it’s not always a choice made voluntarily. For many parents, day care has simply become an eco- nomic necessity.

What are the long-term consequences of day care? Will leaving our children in the hands of nonparental caretakers, often for many hours a day, have positive or neg- ative long-term effects on their social and mental development? Well, the answer is “it depends.” The data are somewhat mixed, and the results (not surprisingly) depend on the quality, quantity, and type of care involved. For example, there is a relation- ship between the quality of day care and later academic performance. Children who experience high-quality care tend to have slightly higher vocabulary scores in school, at least through the fifth grade, and there is some evidence that day-care quality is a predictor of reading skills as well (Belsky et al., 2007; Dearing et al., 2009). At the same time, children who go to day-care centers, as opposed to in-home care, can show more problem behaviors as measured through the sixth grade (Belsky et al., 2007). Psychologists recognize that “day care” has many meanings—the term can refer to anything from occasional babysitting by a neighbor for a few hours a week, to care by nonparental relatives, to extended care by licensed professionals in for-profit day-care centers. It’s tough to draw general conclusions. As with most environmental effects, the role that day care plays in the life of a child will depend on many factors, including the individual characteristics of the child, the parents, the home environ- ment, as well as the quality, type, and quantity of the service provided. There is no firm evidence that regular day care produces widespread negative effects on develop- ment—so don’t worry too much. And, as noted above, it can have significant posi- tive effects. Moreover, importantly, the quality of parenting turns out to be a much stronger and more consistent predictor of development than early child-care experi- ences (Belsky et al., 2007). For some guidelines on choosing a day-care facility, see the Practical Solutions feature.

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Forming a Personal Identity: Erikson’s Crises of Development Another cornerstone of social development is the formation of personal identity—a sense of self, of who you are as an individual and how well you measure up against peers. We recognize that we’re unique people, different from others, quite early in our development. Children as young as 6 months will reach out and touch an image of themselves in a mirror; by 18 to 24 months, if they look into a mirror and notice a smudge mark on their nose, they’ll reach up and touch their own face (Butterworth, 1992; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Infants’ reactions to this “mirror test” depend partly on the culture in which they’re raised (Broesch et al., 2011), but the initial stir- rings of the self-concept are easily seen within the first year or two of life.

We use social interactions—primarily those with parents during childhood and with peers later in life—to help us come to grips with who we are as individuals. One of the most influential theories of how this process of identity formation proceeds is the stage theory of Erik Erikson. Erikson (1963, 1968, 1982) believed that our sense of self is shaped by a series of psychosocial crises that we confront at characteristic stages in development.

Infancy and Childhood For the first few years of life babies are largely at the mercy of others for their survival. According to Erikson, this overwhelming dependency leads to our first true psychosocial crisis, usually in the first year of life: trust versus mistrust. Psychologically and practically, babies face an important problem: Are there people out there in the world who will meet my survival needs? Resolution of this cri- sis leads to the formation of an initial sense of either trust or mistrust, and the infant

personal identity A sense of who one is as an individual and how well one measures up against peers.

If you decide to place your child in day care, it’s important to choose a high-quality center. As noted in our discussion, there are consid- erable differences in the quality of existing day-care facilities. And, importantly, quality does matter: Factors such as the child-to-staff ratio, the size of the child’s care group, and the education of the staff have been shown to correlate with measures of cognitive devel- opment. Several professional organizations provide recommendations for assessing the quality of child care (e.g., Child Care Action Campaign, 1996). I’ve summarized some of the main recommendations here:

1. Check the physical environment. It’s a must to visit the center and make sure the physi- cal structure and play environments are safe. For example, are there fences around the grounds? Is the facility clean? Do you see the staff washing their hands regularly? Hands should be washed before and af- ter diapering, after washing surfaces, and before any kind of food preparation. Is the play equipment well constructed? Look to see if the electrical outlets are covered,

and make certain there are no dangerous or toxic substances within reach of the children. Note: If you’re blocked in any way from fully examining the environment, go someplace else for care.

2. Listen and watch. Spend some time watch- ing the children who are currently enrolled. Do they look happy? Do they interact eas- ily with each other and with the staff? Do the staff members speak to the children in a positive and cheerful tone? Is the setting noisy? High noise levels can signal a lack of control on the part of the staff. If possible, also check with other parents and get their perspectives on the quality of the care.

3. Count group and staff sizes. As a general rule, the younger the child, the smaller should be the size of his or her care group. For infants or toddlers, no more than three or four children should be cared for by a single adult. For 2-year-olds, the size can increase to four to six; for 3-year-olds seven to eight; for 4-year-olds eight or nine; for 5-year-olds eight to ten children. If the child-to-staff ratios exceed these

guidelines, the quality of your child’s care may suffer.

4. Ask about staff training. Although legal re- quirements vary from state to state, it’s a good idea to ask whether the center has been accredited by a professional organiza- tion. You should also inquire about the staff turnover rate. Qualified staff should have some specific training in early childhood education or child development. A number of studies have shown that caregiver back- ground—specifically college training—influ- ences the quality of the care provided. The better educated the staff, the more likely your child will be given activities that are ap- propriate for his or her developmental stage.

In a perfect world, all parents would be able to pick and choose from among the best child- care facilities. Unfortunately, high-quality cen- ters are not always available or are too costly for the average parent or guardian. You can, however, be an active participant in choosing the best possible option. Take your time, use the guidelines listed here, and do your best to maximize a quality environment for your child.

●●Practical solutions Choosing a Day-Care Center

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begins to understand that people differ. Some people can be trusted, and some can’t. It’s through social interactions, learning who to trust and who not to trust, that the newborn ultimately resolves the crisis and learns how to deal more effectively with the environment.

During the “terrible twos,” the child struggles with breaking his or her depen- dence on parents. The crisis at this point is autonomy versus shame or doubt: Am I capa- ble of independent self-control of my actions, or am I generally inadequate? Between the ages of 3 and 6, the crisis turns to initiative versus guilt: Can I plan things on my own, with my own initiative, or should I feel guilty for trying to carry out my own bold plans for action? In late childhood, beginning around age 6 and ending at around age 12, the struggle is for a basic sense of industry versus inferiority: Can I learn and master new skills, can I be industrious and complete required tasks, or do I lack fun- damental competence?

What’s important in determining how these crises are resolved is the quality of the child’s interactions with parents, peers, and other significant role models. If 5-year-old Roberta’s parents repeatedly scold her for taking the initiative to get her own drink of milk, she may develop strong feelings of guilt for trying to become independent. According to Erikson, children with highly critical parents or teach- ers can acquire a self-defeating attitude that carries over later in life. Children who resolve these crises positively learn to trust themselves and their abilities and acquire a strong positive sense of personal identity.

Adolescence and Young Adulthood By the time adolescence rolls around, we’re mature enough intellectually to begin thinking abstractly about our own personal qualities. Adolescents are concerned with testing roles and with finding their true identity: Who am I? What kind of person do I really represent? In a very real sense, the teenager acts as a kind of personality theorist, attempting to integrate various self-perceptions about abilities and limitations into a single unified concept of self. Erikson (1968) coined the term identity crisis to describe this transition period, which he believed can be filled with turmoil.

Observational studies of how adolescents come to grips with the identity crisis reveal individual differences (Offer & Schonert-Reichl, 1992; Peterson, 1988). Not all teenagers become paralyzed with identity angst and anxiety—most, in fact, show no more anxiety during this transition period than at other points in their lives. Young people also vary widely in how they commit to a particular view of themselves (Marcia, 1966). Some adolescents choose an identity by modeling others: “I’m honest, open, and cooperative because that’s the way I was brought up by my parents.” Others develop a personal identity through a soul-searching evaluation of their feelings and abilities. However, some adolescents simply choose not to commit to any particular view of themselves.

Entrance into young adulthood is marked by the crisis of intimacy versus isolation. Resolution of the identity crisis causes us to question the meaning of our relation- ships with others: Am I willing or able to form an intimate, committed relationship with another person? Or will my insecurities and fears about losing independence lead to a lifetime of isolation and loneliness? People who lack an integrated concep- tion of themselves, Erikson argued, cannot commit themselves to a shared identity with someone else. Some have argued that this particular conclusion may be more applicable to men than women (Gilligan, 1982). Historically, women have been forced to deal with intimate commitments—raising a family and running a home—either at the same time as, or before, the process of searching for a stable personal identity. Things are a bit different now, of course, because many women are establishing pro- fessional careers prior to marriage.

Adulthood, Middle Age, and Beyond With the establishment of career and family the focus shifts to concern about children and future generations: Am I contributing suc- cessfully to the community at large? Am I doing enough to assure the survival and

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productivity of future generations? Failure to resolve this crisis (generativity versus stagnation) can induce a sense of meaninglessness in middle life and beyond—a condi- tion Erikson calls stagnation.

For some people, especially men in their 40s, this point in psychosocial develop- ment is marked by soul-searching questions about personal identity reminiscent of those faced in adolescence (Gould, 1978; Levinson et al., 1978). A “midlife crisis” arises as people begin to confront their own mortality—the inevitability of death—and as they come to grips with the fact that they may never achieve their lifelong dreams and goals. Although this can be an emotionally turbulent period for some, most of the evidence suggests that the midlife crisis is a relatively rare phenomenon. It gets a lot of attention in the media, and it’s certainly consuming for those affected, but prob- ably fewer than 5% of people in middle age undergo anything resembling a turbulent midlife crisis (McCrae & Costa, 2003).

The final stage in the process of psychosocial development, which occurs from late adulthood to the point of death, is the crisis of integrity versus despair. It’s at this point in people’s lives, Erikson believed, that they strive to accept themselves and their pasts— both failures and successes. Older people undergo a kind of life review in an effort to resolve conflicts in the past and to find ultimate meaning in their accomplishments. If successful in this objective search for meaning, they acquire wisdom; if unsuccessful, they wallow in despair and bitterness. An important part of the process is the prepara- tion for death and dying, which I’ll discuss in more detail near the end of the chapter.

Evaluating Erikson’s Theory Erikson’s stage theory of psychosocial crises has been quite influential in shaping how psychologists view personal identity development (see Steinberg & Morris, 2001). Erikson recognized that people don’t simply establish a rigid personal identity around the time they reach Piaget’s formal operational stage. Rather, the way people view themselves and their relationships changes regularly throughout their lives. Erikson also understood the important role that social and cultural interactions play in shaping human psychology. Human beings don’t grow up in a psychological vacuum; the way we think and act is critically influenced by our interactions with others.

●● concePt review Erikson’s Stages of Personal Identity Development lifE PERioD sTAgE ConfliCTs REvolvE ARounD …

Infancy and childhood Trust vs. mistrust (first year of life) Developing a sense of trust in others: Will the people around me fulfill my needs?

Autonomy vs. shame or doubt (“terrible twos”) Developing a sense of self-control: Am I in charge of my own actions?

Initiative vs. guilt (ages 3–6) Developing a sense of one’s own drive and initiative: Can I carry out plans? Should I feel guilty for trying to carry out my own plans?

Industry vs. inferiority (ages 6–12) Developing a sense of personal ability and competence: Can I learn and develop new skills?

Adolescence and young adulthood

Identity vs. role confusion (adolescence) Developing a single, unified concept of self, a sense of personal identity: Who am I?

Intimacy vs. isolation (young adulthood) Questioning the meaning of our relationships with others: Can I form a committed relationship with another person, or will my personal insecurities lead to isolation?

Adulthood and older adulthood

Generativity vs. stagnation Concern over whether one has contributed to the success of children and future generations: Have I contributed to the community at large?

Integrity vs. despair Acceptance of one’s life—successes and failures: Am I content, looking back on my life?

critical thinking

How well do Erikson’s ideas describe your own personal identity development? Are you going through any fundamental crisis at the moment, or are you aware of having solved one in the past?

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Nevertheless, Erikson’s theory suffers from the same kinds of problems as any stage theory. Although there may be an orderly sequence of psychosocial crises, overlap occurs across the stages (Whitbourne et al., 1992). Furthermore, like Piaget, Erikson never clearly articulated how a person actually moves from one crisis stage to the next: What are the psychological mechanisms that allow for conflict resolu- tion, and what determines when and how they will operate (Achenbach, 1992)? Finally, Erikson’s theory of identity development, although useful as a general orga- nizing framework, lacks sufficient scientific rigor. His concepts are vague enough to make scientific testing difficult.

Gender-Role Development In our discussion of Erikson’s theory, I touched briefly on the role of gender in estab- lishing personal identity. Women are often forced to struggle with questions about intimacy and relationships before addressing the identity crisis, as the task of estab- lishing a home and rearing children typically falls on their shoulders. But gender is itself a kind of identity; children gain a sense of themselves as male or female quite early in life, and gender identity has a lasting effect on how people behave and on how others behave toward them.

The foundations of gender identity are already in place by the age of 2 or 3. Children at this age recognize that they’re either a boy or a girl, and they start to give stereo- typical responses about gender when asked. For example, when shown a picture of an infant labeled as either a boy or a girl, 3-year-olds are more likely to identify the infant “boy” as the one who is strong, big, or hard and the infant “girl” as the one who is weak, small, and soft (Miller et al., 2009). Even so, children at this age have not devel- oped sufficiently to recognize gender as a general and abstract characteristic of indi- viduals. They might believe, for instance, that a boy can become a girl by changing hairstyle or clothing (Marcus & Overton, 1978). To understand that gender is a stable and unchanging condition requires some ability to conserve—to recognize that the qualities of objects remain the same despite superficial changes in appearance.

By the time children are in elementary school, gender is seen as a permanent condition—“I’m a boy (or a girl) and I always will be.” At this point, children tend to follow well-established gender roles—specific patterns of behavior consistent with society’s conventions. As Martin and Ruble (2004) noted, children at this age become “gender detectives who search for cues about gender—who should and should not engage in a particular activity, who can play with whom, and why girls and boys are different” (p. 67). Can you imag- ine the reaction a 7-year-old boy might receive if he walked into his second-grade class wearing a dress or with his fin- gernails polished a bright shade of pink? Forms of gender prejudice and discrimination can begin as early as pre- school, but children become somewhat more flexible and accepting of gender “violations” as they grow older (Martin & Ruble, 2009).

Nature or Nurture? How do these firm ideas about gender roles develop? Are they due to biological differences between male and female brains, or do they grow out of experience? I discussed this issue in Chapter 3, where we considered the evidence supporting gender-based differences in brain anatomy and functioning. Although hormones released by the endocrine system early in development may account for some gender differences in behavior and thought (Hines, 2011), psychologists also take into account environmental influences on gender-role development.

gender roles Specific patterns of behavior that are consistent with how society dictates males and females should act.

Children are often rewarded for behaving in ways that are gender-role appropriate.

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According to social learning accounts of gender-role development, children learn to act in a masculine or feminine manner because they grow up in environments that reward them for doing so. Parents across the world look for and reward specific kinds of behavior from their male and female children. The socialization process begins the moment the new parents learn the answer to their question, “Is it a boy or a girl?” Parents become preoccupied with dressing Adorable Ginnie in pink bows and Active Glenn in blue. Television and movies continue the process: Children are exposed to hour after hour of people acting in gender-appropriate ways (Collins, 2011). Studies have indicated, for example, that children who watch a lot of television are more likely to prefer toys that are “gender appropriate” than children who watch little television (McGhee & Frueh, 1980).

Growing up in societies with well-defined gender roles helps establish gender schemas (Bem, 1981). A gender schema is an organized set of beliefs and perceptions held about men and women. Gender schemas guide and direct how we view oth- ers, as well as our own behavior. We encountered the concept of schemas (or sche- mata) earlier in the chapter when we talked about Piaget, and I’ll have more to say in later chapters about schemas and the role they play in guiding behavior. For the moment, you can think of schemas as little knowledge packages that people carry around inside their heads. Gender schemas are acquired through learning. They set guidelines for behavior, and they help us decide whether actions are appropriate. As you can probably guess, gender schemas are generally adaptive—they help us inter- pret the behavior of others—but they can lead to inaccurate perceptions of specific individuals and even to discrimination.

Growing Old As Bette Davis once famously said, “Growing old ain’t for sissies.” True enough—the physical declines that accompany the aging process are certain to present new chal- lenges for the developing individual. Yet not all of the changes that greet us in our older years are negative—far from it. In fact, some kinds of intelligence seem to increase with age (see Chapter 10). Marital satisfaction often grows (Carstensen, 1995), and many elderly people remain actively involved in the community and report high levels of contentment. One survey found that people in their 70s report more confidence in their ability to perform tasks than do people in their 50s (Wallhagen et al, 1992)!

At the same time, there are definite hurdles in the pathways of the elderly, many related to health care. The elderly need more physical care, require more doctor vis- its, and can be at an economic disadvantage due to retirement. Although most elderly adults do not live in nursing homes, many are in need of continuing care. Whatever form it takes, it’s likely to be expensive; the costs of nursing homes continue to rise. To make matters worse, the bulk of the costs often must be borne by family mem- bers because Medicare (health care for the elderly funded by the federal government) doesn’t cover custodial, or chronic, care. The scope of the problem is troubling, espe- cially as the “graying of America” continues. In the coming decades, there’s expected to be a huge increase in the number of people over age 85.

Ageism The elderly face another problem as well: ageism, or prejudice based on age. We’ll discuss the basis for prejudice, and particularly the formation of stereotypes, in detail in Chapter 13. For the moment, it is sufficient for you to understand that we all have beliefs about the traits and behaviors of individuals belonging to groups. The elderly comprise such a group, and our attitudes and beliefs toward the elderly can affect their ability to cope with the problems of everyday life.

Stereotypes about the elderly are complex and depend on cultural factors and the age of the individual holding the stereotype, but surveys often reveal beliefs that are inaccurate. Palmore (1990) has listed some of the more common myths, including

ageism Discrimination or prejudice against an individual based on physical age.

critical thinking

Do you think that we as a society should work hard to eliminate specific gender roles? Do you believe that men and women can ever be taught to think and act similarly?

Negative stereotypes about the elderly are very often false. Most elderly people are not sick or disabled but live active and productive lives.

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Developing Socially and Personally | 125

the belief that most elderly people are sick, in mental decline, disabled and therefore unable to work, isolated and lonely, and depressed. In each of these cases, the nega- tive stereotype is misleading or simply not true. Most elderly people are not sick or disabled and, as mentioned earlier, the elderly may often be more contented and less prone to depression than younger people (Lawton et al., 1992; Palmore, 1990). Not surprisingly, negative stereotypes can lead to negative consequences, including the fact that older people are generally evaluated less positively (Kite & Johnson, 1988) and may be subject to job discrimination (Kite, 1996).

Some psychologists believe that prejudice toward the elderly arises partly from our anxiety about death (Martens et al., 2005). Terror management theory proposes that each of us is threatened by the idea of dying, and we defend ourselves against the threat by attempting to suppress thoughts about death and by avoiding things that remind us of our mortality. The elderly serve as symbols of our mortality and also of our impending physical decline, which helps feed the negative stereotypes. If college students are asked open-ended questions about death, they subsequently view them- selves as less similar to the elderly, and they rate the attitudes of the elderly in a more negative light (Martens et al., 2004).

However, as you’ll learn in Chapter 13, stereotypes can be quite adaptive. Like schemas, stereotypes help us organize and make predictions about the world. Not all of the beliefs that accompany stereotypes are negative. For example, peo- ple tend to believe that the elderly are kinder, wiser, more dependable, and have more personal freedom than younger people (Palmore, 1990). Stereotypic beliefs such as these, although not necessarily accurate, can lead to a kind of favorable discrimination that helps to counteract the negative stereotypes mentioned pre- viously. One of the lessons of social psychology is that how we view others is often tied to our expectations; age can be a powerful determinant of what those expectations will be.

Death and Dying As we close our discussion of the developmental process, it’s fitting that we turn our attention to the final stage of life: death and dying. As just noted, research suggests that people are threatened by death and thoughts about death. It’s the process of death that troubles us the most—the unpredictability, the uncertainty, the inability to understand what the end will be like. There are many psychological aspects to death and the dying process, including how people come to grips with their own mortality and how they grieve and accept the loss of others.

Elizabeth Kübler-Ross (1969, 1974) proposed that people progress through five distinct psychological stages as they face death. Based on interviews with hundreds of terminally ill patients, she found that people react to their own impending death via a characteristic sequence:

1. Denial—“There must be some terrible mistake.” 2. Anger—“Why is this happening to me?” 3. Bargaining—“What can I do to stop this terrible thing?” 4. Depression—“Blot out the sun because all is lost.” 5. Acceptance—“I am ready to die.”

As a stage theorist, Kübler-Ross believed that people move through each of these five stages, from denial to acceptance, as a normal part of their emotional acceptance of death.

Kübler-Ross’s views on the dying process have been highly influential, in both psychological and medical circles, and rightly so. She was one of the first to treat the topic of dying thoroughly and systematically. She sensitized legions of physicians to the idea that denial, anger, and depression are normal reactions to dying that should

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be treated with respect rather than dismissed out of hand. Yet, many psychologists question whether people progress through a fixed set of orderly stages in exactly the way Kübler-Ross described. Not all dying people move through distinct emotional stages, and, even if they do, the stages don’t seem to follow any particular set order. Stages might be skipped, be experienced out of order, or alternate, with the person being angry one day and accepting the next. A person’s cognitive capacity is impor- tant to consider as well. People’s mental abilities can diminish with age, especially if dementia or Alzheimer disease is present, and their reactions to the dying process will change as well.

Many psychologists find it more appropriate to talk about dying trajectories. A dying trajectory is the psychological path people travel as they face their impending death. People show different trajectories, and the shape and form of the path depends on the particular illness, one’s age, as well as on the personality of the patient (Bortz, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1968). Trajectories are preferred to stages because stages imply that all people react to impending death in fixed and characteristic ways. But there is no right or wrong way to deal with dying—some people may react with anger and denial, others with calm acceptance. Witnesses to the dying process can best serve the dying by offering support and allowing the individual to follow his or her own unique path.

End-of-Life Decisions We end the chapter with a little controversy: the decision- making processes that surround the end of life. Should people have the right to con- trol how and when they die, especially if they’re faced with a poor quality of life (e.g., constant pain, immobility, or dependency)? Is suicide, assisted suicide, or the termination of medical treatment justified under any circumstance? In some sense, these are legal and ethical questions rather than psychological ones, but questions about controlling the end of life occupy the attention of many people, especially the elderly.

Little research has been conducted on the psychological factors that influence end-of-life decisions. It seems likely that religious convictions, value systems, life satisfaction, and even fear of death play a role in how people feel about end-of-life options. A study by Cicirelli (1997) confirms these expectations. Older adults, ranging in age from 60 to 100, were asked their views of various end-of-life options. Each per- son was given sample decision situations such as the following: Mrs. Lee is an elderly widow who has terminal bone cancer. She has had chemotherapy to try to cure the cancer, but it has not helped her, and the side effects from the chemotherapy itself have been difficult to deal with. She is slowly getting worse, and the pain is unbear- able. Drugs for pain help some, but leave her in a stupor.

The participants were then asked to make judgments about various end-of- life options, such as strive to maintain life, refuse medical treatment or request that it be removed, commit suicide, or allow someone else to the make the deci- sion about terminating life. Cicirelli (1997) found that people were often willing to endorse more than one option, but the majority opinion was to strive to continue life (51% of the participants endorsed this view). Psychosocial factors, such as reli- gious convictions and fear of death, played a significant role in their opinions (see also Cicirelli, 2011).

Death can mean many different things to the elderly (Cicirelli, 2002). For some older adults, death is associated with the beginning of the afterlife; for others it means complete extinction or annihilation. Not surprisingly, how one interprets death influ- ences everyday living, reactions to death, and preparations for death. For those who believe that death provides the opportunity to be reunited with deceased friends and family in an afterlife, stressful end-of-life decisions are often easier to make. The fact that the elderly hold so many different views about the meaning of death suggests that it will be difficult for society to reach consensus about the difficulties that sur- round end-of-life decisions.

The dying trajectory depends on individual personality, the effects of age or illness, and what sort of care is received.

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Psychology For a Reason: What Development Is For | 127

As we grow from infancy through childhood to adulthood, fundamental changes occur in physical, intellectual, and social functioning. Most of these changes serve adaptive func- tions. We’re not biological machines, predestined to develop in fixed and inflexible ways from birth. Instead, we’re born with a genetic recipe that mixes innate potential with the rig- ors and demands of the environment. It’s nature via nurture, and the final product is a better-functioning person, someone who is fine-tuned to his or her world.

In many ways this chapter acts as a concise sum- mary of the topics you’ll encounter throughout the book. Understanding human development requires that we take into account all aspects of the psychology of the individual: how people change physically; learn to perceive, think, and remember; and develop socially.

Developing Physically We begin life as a fertilized egg, or zygote, which contains genetic material packed into chromosomes

received from the mother and father. During the prenatal period, we develop rapidly and are especially susceptible to environmental influences. Infancy and childhood are marked by rapid growth in height and weight and by a further matur- ing of the nervous system. One of the by-products of nerve cell maturation is motor development, the major milestones of which—crawling, standing alone, walking—tend to occur at similar times for most people, in part because the nervous sys- tem develops systematically.

As we move through adolescence and into early adult- hood, our physical systems continue to change. During puberty people mature sexually and experience hormone- driven changes in physical appearance. Once people reach their 20s, their bodies become mature, and most begin a gradual decline in physical ability. Some declines occur in mental ability over time, especially in old age, although sig- nificant losses in mental functioning are the exception, not the rule.

●● Psychology For a reason What Development Is For

test yourself You can also test your knowledge about social and personal development by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The strange situation test is often used to study attachment. Identify the type of attachment that best characterizes the following reactions. Choose from avoidant, resistant, secure, or disorganized/disoriented.

a. When Mom leaves the room, the child begins to cry but calms down rapidly when she returns:

b. When Mom leaves the room, the child couldn’t care less. There is little reaction or interest when she returns:

c. When Mom leaves the room, the child cries; when Mom returns the child remains close by but pushes her away when she tries to show affection:

d. When Mom is in the room, the child refuses to leave her side and does not react well to the sudden appearance of strangers:

2. According to Erik Erikson, adolescents face a psychosocial crisis called identity versus role confusion. Current research suggests that

a. this is a time of rebellion for all adolescents. b. Erikson made a mistake—no such crisis occurs. c. the identity crisis has mostly a genetic basis. d. not all teenagers suffer anxiety during this period.

3. Gender identity doesn’t develop until a child enters elementary school—it’s only at that point that gender roles begin to exert an effect. True or False?

4. The following are statements about the elderly and growing old in society. Which are true and which are false?

a. Most elderly people are sick and disabled. True or False? b. Stereotypes about the elderly are always harmful.

True or False? c. Most elderly people have little, if any, confidence in their

abilities. True or False? d. The elderly, on average, would rather die than suffer the conse-

quences of a painful and terminal disease. True or False?

●● Recall–Monitor–Recall 4.3

128 | CHAPTER 4 Human Development

Developing Intellectually Psychologists use the term cognitive development to refer to changes in intellectual functioning that accompany physical aging. Newborns have remark- ably well-developed tools for investigating the world around them: They can see, hear, smell, feel, and taste, although not at the same level as they will in later childhood. We leave infancy with well-developed perceptual systems and use the experiences of childhood to help fine-tune our sensory equipment.

Much of what we know about thought processes during infancy and childhood comes from the work of Jean Piaget. Piaget’s theory of cognitive development proposes that chil- dren use mental models of the world—called schemata—to guide and interpret ongoing experience. Central to the theory is the idea that as children grow and acquire new experiences their mental models of the world change. Piaget believed that children pass through a series of cognitive stages (sen- sorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational), each characterized by unique ways of thinking. Lawrence Kohlberg also proposed a stage theory, suggesting that individuals pass through levels of moral development; these stages differ in the extent to which moral actions are determined by immediate external consequences or by general abstract principles. Not all psychologists agree that cognitive development progresses through fixed stages, but it’s clear that

qualitative differences in cognitive ability do occur over the course of development.

Developing Socially and Personally Our relationships with oth- ers help us solve problems that arise throughout development. Infants form attachments to gain the nourishment they need for survival. Both infant and caregiver are active participants in the attachment process and are prepared to respond, given the right kinds of environmental events, with mutual bonding. Ainsworth identified several categories of attachment based on the strange situation test. In general, the responsiveness of the parent early in life influences, but does not absolutely deter- mine, the relationships formed by the child later in life.

Another aspect of social development is the formation of personal identity. Erik Erikson argued that personal identity is shaped by a series of psychosocial crises over the life span. During infancy and childhood, we address questions about our basic abilities and independence and learn to trust or mistrust others. During adolescence and adulthood, we deal with the identity crisis and come to grips with our roles as participants in intimate relationships. In later years we struggle with ques- tions of accomplishment, concern for future generations, and meaning. Other important components of social development include learning gender roles, growing old in society, and con- fronting the important stages and decisions of dying.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Developing Physically ●● Life begins with the fertilized egg, or (1) . The (2) period is from conception to (3) of the zygote in the uterine wall. The next six weeks are the (4) period. The (5) period includes development of the skeletal and muscular systems, and lasts from the ninth week of gestation until birth.

●● The average newborn weighs about (6) pounds and is about 20 inches long. A newborn’s brain shows (7)

; that is, changes are constantly occurring in the neural circuitry. The sequence of development from lift- ing the head to walking alone is stable and (8) across cultures. As the infant progresses from crawling to walking, the nervous system develops from the head down and from the center out.

●● Past toddlerhood, general processing speed and coordination improve greatly. (9) is an important physical and (10) transition period that features growth spurts and the onset of (11) .

●● By our 20s we are (12) mature and at the height of our physical prowess. Reaching adulthood, however, is in some sense a mental rather than a physical state. Small

physical declines begin to occur in the 20s. Some people eventually suffer brain degeneration with age, but fewer than 1% of people aged 65 are afflicted with (13) , or physically based loss in mental functioning.

Developing Intellectually ●● In the (14) technique, an infant is pre- sented with two visual displays simultaneously, and the researcher notes how long the baby looks at each one. Researchers also use (15) , the decline in responsiveness to repeated stimulation, to investigate infants’ preferences and abilities. Insight into infants’ abili- ties can also be gained by (16) simple motor movements.

●● Newborns’ (17) systems function reasonably well. They prefer some colors and (18) ; they rec- ognize their mothers’ voices a day or two after birth; they are sensitive to smell, taste, and touch; and they seem to perceive the world in three dimensions.

●● Piaget believed that everyone has a natural tendency to organize the world meaningfully, and that to do so we use (19) , or mental models of the world. Cognitive development is guided by (20) (fitting new experiences into existing schemata), and (21)

Interactive Summary | 129

(modifying existing schemata to accommodate new expe- riences). Piaget proposed four basic stages of cognitive development: (22) , (23) , (24)

, and (25) operational.

●● At the (26) level, decisions about right and wrong are based primarily on external consequences. At the (27) level, children justify their actions on the basis of internalized rules and on whether an action will maintain or disrupt the social order. At the (28)

level, morality is based on abstract principles— such as right and wrong—that may at times conflict with accepted standards. Increasingly psychologists are con- vinced that morality is also influenced by (29) reactions—our unconscious feelings and emotions about the situation at hand.

Developing Socially and Personally ●● Some researchers believe that a newborn is prepro- grammed to respond to environmental signals with (30)

behavior. Early attachments are formed pri- marily on the basis of (31) comfort rather than nourishment. (32) , an individual type of emo- tional reactivity, is also an important factor. Attachment bonds have been investigated with the (33)

situation test, in which the child is observed reacting to a gradually developed stressful situation. Most children show (34) attachment, though some show resistant, (35) , or disorganized/disoriented attachments.

●● Erikson believed that personal identity is shaped by a series of (36) crises. During infancy and childhood these involve trust versus mistrust, (37) versus shame or doubt, initiative versus guilt, and industry versus (38) . During adolescence and young adulthood, we experience identity versus (39) confusion.

●● Gender identity is usually in place by the time a child is 2 or 3. By the time children are in grade school, they tend to act in accordance with (40) . Our sexual perceptions and behaviors are directed by gender (41) .

●● (42) is prejudice based on a person’s age. Believing that the elderly are sick, depressed, or in mental decline are common (43) , although the elderly do face the challenges of physical decline.

●● Elisabeth Kübler-Ross proposed that the terminally ill pass through five (44) as they approach death: denial, anger, (45) , depression, and acceptance. Many psychologists prefer to speak of dying trajectories, the individual paths that are traveled on the way to death.

accommodation, 104 ageism, 124 assimilation, 104 attachments, 114 concrete operational period,

106 conventional level, 111 cross-sectional design, 101 dementia, 98 development, 91 egocentrism, 106

embryonic period, 92 fetal period, 93 formal operational period, 107 gender roles, 123 germinal period, 92 habituation, 101 longitudinal design, 101 menopause, 98 morality, 111 object permanence, 105 personal identity, 120

postconventional level, 112 preconventional level, 111 preoperational period, 105 principle of conservation, 106 puberty, 97 schemata, 104 sensorimotor period, 105 strange situation test, 116 temperament, 115 teratogens, 93 zygote, 92

Terms to Remember

Media Resources

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

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5 Sensation and Perception

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Do We Build the World of Experience?

Vision: The World of Color and Form Learning Goals Translating the Message Identifying the Message Components Producing Stable Interpretations: Visual

Perception

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Creating Illusions Of Depth

Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.1

Hearing: Identifying and Localizing Sounds Learning Goals Translating the Message Identifying the Message Components

Taste Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.4

From the Physical to the Psychological Learning Goals Stimulus Detection Difference Thresholds Sensory Adaptation Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.5

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How We Build the World of Experience

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Producing Stable Interpretations: Auditory Perception

Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.2

The Skin and Body Senses: From Touch to Movement

Learning Goals Touch Temperature Experiencing Pain The Kinesthetic Sense The Vestibular Sense Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.3

The Chemical Senses: Smell and Taste

Learning Goal Smell

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Have you ever stared at the Necker cube? Take a look at ●Figure 5.1 for a minute or so. Notice the lines, the angles, the colors. Each remains fixed on the page— how could it be otherwise?—but the cube itself shifts its shape from moment to moment to moment. For a time, the shaded surface of the image forms the front of the cube; in the blink of an eye, magically, it shifts and forms the rear. First you see it from one perspective, and then from another. How is this possible, given that the pic- ture remains fixed? What does it tell us about the world of inner experience?

We’re constantly bombarded by messages from the environment. Some arrive as light energy, such as the words you see printed on this page; others, like the spoken sounds of language, arrive as regular changes in air pressure over time. Ultimately, these messages are translated into an electrochemical language for delivery deep within the brain. The products of this translation process, and their subsequent inter- pretation, serve as the focus of this chapter. It is through sensation and perception that we construct the world of immediate experience.

To understand the difference between the psychological terms sensation and per- ception, return momentarily to the Necker cube. It’s a geometric figure, a cube, but it can be described in other ways as well. It’s made up of lines, angles, patterns of light and dark, colors, and so on. These elementary features—the building blocks of the meaningful image—are processed by the visual system through reasonably well- understood biological systems, and the products are visual sensations. Psychologists have historically thought of sensations—such as a pattern of light and dark, a bit- ter taste, a change in temperature—as the fundamental, elementary components of an experience. Perception, on the other hand, is the collection of processes used to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of those sensations. The simple components are organized into a recognizable form—here, obviously, you perceive a cube.

In the case of the Necker cube, though, the message delivered to the brain is ambiguous. There’s more than one interpretation of the physical image, so the brain engages in a perceptual dance, shifting from one interpretation to the other and then back again. What you see, therefore, is not necessarily a faithful reflection of what the world presents; instead, you see an interpretation, or perception, of the message deliv- ered by the physical world. As I’ll discuss shortly, sometimes the brain gets it wrong altogether—in those cases, perceptual illusions are produced.

sensations The elementary components, or building blocks, of an experience (such as a pattern of light and dark, a bitter taste, or a change in temperature).

perception The collection of processes used to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of sensations.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Do We Build the World of Experience?

●● FiGuRE 5.1 the Necker Cube

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To understand how it all works, we must consider how the brain solves three fundamental problems that cut across all the sensory systems. Regardless of whether we’re dealing with vision, hearing, touch, smell, or taste, the brain needs to figure out a way to translate the incoming message, identify the key components of the message, and produce a stable interpretation (see ●Figure 5.2). Keep these three problems in mind as you discover why our sensory systems work the way they do.

Translating the Message As you learned in Chapter 3, communication in the ner- vous system is electrochemical. When the world “talks” to the brain, however, the messages arrive in forms that are not electrochemical. For example, you see with light, which arrives in the form of electromagnetic energy; you hear by interpreting sound vibrations or repetitive changes in air pressure. In a sense, it’s like trying to listen to someone who speaks a language you don’t understand. The brain needs an interpreter—a process through which the incoming mes- sage can be changed into an understandable form.

Identifying the Message Components Once the message has been successfully translated—appearing now in the form of neural impulses—the message com- ponents must be extracted or pulled out of the complex sensory pattern. To solve this problem, the newly formed sensory code is delivered to processing stations deep within the brain. Along each pathway, which differs for each of the sensory systems, are specialized regions that perform specific sensory functions.

Producing Stable Interpretations

Identifying the Message Components

Translating the Message

●● FiGuRE 5.2 Adaptive Problems of Sensation and Perception To build an internal representation of the outside world, the brain solves three fundamental adaptive problems for each of its sensory systems. (1) It translates messages from the environment into the language of the nervous system; (2) it identifies the elementary components of the messages, such as colors, sounds, simple forms, and patterns of light and dark; and (3) it builds a stable interpretation of those components once they’ve been identified. (© Cengage Learning)

Vision: The World of Color and Form | 133

Producing a Stable Interpretation How do these message components, represented as the activities of many thousands of neurons, combine to produce perceptual experiences? You see objects, not patterns of colored light and dark; you hear melodies, not sequences of irregularly timed sounds. The biological bases of per- ception—the processes that produce the interpretation—are still poorly under- stood, but the brain uses certain principles of organization, along with existing knowledge, to help construct the world of experience.

Vision: The World of Color and Form LEARNING GOALS

●● Explain how light is translated into the electrochemical language of the brain. ●● Discuss how the basic features of the visual message, such as color, are identified by the brain. ●● Explain how a stable interpretation of visual information is created and why the interpretation

process sometimes produces visual illusions.

Let’s begin with vision: our sense of sight. To understand vision, it’s first necessary to understand how the physical message—light—is translated into the electrochemical language of the brain. Next, we’ll trace the brain pathways that are used to identify the basic components of the visual message once it’s been translated (e.g., lines and colors). Finally, we’ll tackle the topic of visual perception: How does the brain create its stable interpretation of the light information it receives?

Translating the Message Light is a form of electromagnetic energy. Visible light is actually a small part of an electromagnetic spectrum that includes other energy forms, such as X-rays, ultravio- let rays, and even radio and television waves (see ●Figure 5.3). Visible light is typically classified by three main physical properties. The first is wavelength, which corre- sponds to the physical distance from one energy cycle to the next. Changes in the wavelength of light are generally experienced as changes in color, or hue. As shown in Figure 5.3, our visual system is sensitive to wavelengths ranging from about 400 to 700 nanometers (billionths of a meter). These wavelengths are experienced as col- ors ranging roughly from violet to red. The second physical property is intensity, or amplitude, which is determined by the amount of light falling on an object. Changes in intensity are generally experienced as increases or decreases in brightness. Finally, the purity of the light, which is determined by the mix of wavelengths present, can influence the saturation, or richness, of perceived colors.

Light comes from a source, such as the sun or a lightbulb, and enters the eye after bouncing off objects in its path. Most of the time light is a mixture of many differ- ent wavelengths. After hitting an object, some of these wavelengths are absorbed— which ones depends on the physical properties of the object—and the remaining wavelengths reflect outward, where they eventually enter the eyes. It is here that the important translation process, called transduction, actually occurs.

Entering the Eye The first step in the translation process is to direct the light toward the light-sensitive receptor cells at the back of each eye. When light bounces off an

light The small part of the electromagnetic spectrum that is processed by the visual system.

hue The dimension of light that produces color; hue is typically determined by the wavelength of light reflecting from an object.

brightness The aspect of the visual experience that changes with light intensity; in general, as the intensity of light increases, so does its perceived brightness.

transduction The process by which external messages are translated into the internal language of the brain.

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object, the reflected wavelengths are scattered about. They need to be brought into focus for a clear image to be processed. The focusing process is accomplished by the cornea, the protective outer layer of the eye, and by the lens, a clear, flexible piece of tissue that sits behind the pupil.

As shown in ●Figure 5.4, light first passes through the cornea and the pupil before traveling through the lens. Your pupil is actually a hole in a ring of colored tissue called the iris. The iris gives the eye its distinctive color (a person with green eyes has green irises), but the color of the iris plays no real role in vision. Relaxing or tightening the muscles around the iris changes the size of the pupil, thereby regulat- ing the amount of light that enters the eye. In dim light, the pupil gets larger, which allows more light to get in; in bright light, the pupil gets smaller, allowing less light to enter.

The lens focuses the light on the sensory receptors, which are at the back of the eye, much as the lens in a camera focuses light on film. But when you focus light in a camera, you change the distance between the lens and the film. Focusing the human eye is accomplished by changing the shape of the lens itself. This process, known as accommodation, is influenced by the distance between the lens and the object being viewed. When an object is far away, the lens is relatively long and thin; as the object moves closer, muscles attached to the lens contract, and the lens becomes thicker and rounder. You lose some of this flexibility with age, which makes the accommoda- tion process much harder. This is one of the reasons people typically require reading glasses or bifocals when they reach middle age. The corrective lenses in the glasses help the accommodation process, which the eyes can no longer successfully perform on their own.

By the way, you may have noticed in Figure 5.4 that the image on the retina is actually inverted, or upside down. This may seem strange, given that we don’t see an

cornea The transparent and protective outer covering of the eye.

lens The flexible piece of tissue that helps focus light toward the back of the eye.

pupil The hole in the center of the eye that allows light to enter.

iris The ring of colored tissue surrounding the pupil.

accommodation In vision, the process through which the lens changes its shape temporarily to help focus light on the retina.

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●● FiGuRE 5.3 Light and the Electromagnetic Spectrum Visible light is actually only a small part of the electromagnetic spectrum, which includes such other energy forms as X-rays and radio and TV waves. Changes in the wavelength of light from about 400 nanometers to 700 nanometers are experienced as changes in color; short wavelengths are seen as violets and blues; medium wavelengths as yellows and greens; and long wavelengths as reds. (© Cengage Learning)

Vision: The World of Color and Form | 135

upside-down world. The inverted image is created by the optical prop- erties of the lens. It tells us, yet again, that our perceptual world is built mainly in our brains. The main function of the eyes is to solve the trans- lation problem and to pass the information to the brain. The brain later corrects the inversion problem, and we see a stable, orderly, and right- side-up world.

Rods and Cones Light completes its journey when it reaches a thin layer of tissue, called the retina, that covers the back of the eye. It is here that the electromagnetic energy gets translated into the inner language of the brain. Embedded in the retina of each eye are about 126 million light-sensitive receptor cells that transduce, or change, the light energy into electrochemical impulses. The translation process is chemically based. Each of the receptor cells contains a photopigment that reacts to light. The light causes a chemical reaction that ultimately leads to a neural impulse. Thus what begins as a pattern of electro- magnetic information ends as a pattern of electrochemical signals: the language of the brain.

There are two types of receptor cells contained in the retina, rods and cones. Of the roughly 126 million receptor cells within each eye, about 120 million are rods and 6 million are cones. Each receptor type is named for its visual appearance—rods are generally long and thin, whereas cones are short, thick, and tapered to a point. Rods are more sensitive to light than cones; they can generate visual signals when very small amounts of light strike their sur- face. This makes rods useful at night and in any situation in which the overall level of illumination is low. Rods also tend to be concentrated along the periphery, or sides, of the retina. This is one reason dim images can sometimes be seen better out of the cor- ners of your eyes. (Did you ever notice this?) Cones are concentrated in the very cen- ter of the retina, bunched in a small central pit called the fovea (which means “central pit”). Unlike rods, cones need relatively high levels of light to operate efficiently. Cones are used for processing fine detail, an ability called visual acuity. Cones also play an extremely important role in the early processing of color, as you’ll see later in the chapter.

Processing in the Retina Once the neural impulse is generated by a rod or a cone, it’s passed along to other cells in the retina, particularly bipolar cells, which feed

retina The thin layer of tissue that covers the back of the eye and contains the light- sensitive receptor cells for vision.

rods Receptor cells in the retina, located mainly around the sides, that transduce light energy into neural messages; these visual receptors are highly sensitive and are active in dim light.

cones Receptor cells in the central portion of the retina that transduce light energy into neural messages; they operate best when light levels are high, and they are primarily responsible for the ability to sense color.

fovea The “central pit” area in the retina where the cone receptors are located.

visual acuity The ability to process fine detail in vision.

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●● FiGuRE 5.4 the Human Eye Light enters the eye through the cornea, pupil, and lens. As the lens changes shape in relation to the distance of the object, the reflected light is focused at the back of the eye where, in the retina, the visual message is translated. (© Cengage Learning)

Each human retina contains two types of photoreceptor cells: rods and cones. As shown in this color-enhanced photo, the rods are rod shaped in appearance and the cones are cone shaped.

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information from the receptors to ganglion cells (see ●Figure 5.5). Even at this early stage in visual processing, cells in the retina are beginning to “interpret” the incom- ing visual message. Each ganglion cell has a receptive field, which means it receives input from a group of receptor cells and responds only when a particular pattern of light shines across the retina.

This concept of a receptive field is very important. The fact that a cell, such as a ganglion cell, receives input from a number of receptor cells means it can pass on more complex information to the brain. Many cells in the retina have center–surround receptive fields, as shown in ●Figure 5.6. In this case, if light falls into the “center” of the cell’s receptive field, it reacts by increasing the number of neural signals it sends to the brain. In contrast, if light falls on the sides of its receptive field, the cell will stop sending signals or decrease its firing rate. By detecting the firing rate, the brain deter- mines how light is spread out across the retina and identifies where light stops and starts. This allows us, among other things, to detect edges.

The visual signals eventually leave the retina, en route to the deeper processing stations of the brain, through a collection of nerve fibers (actually the axons of gan- glion cells) called the optic nerve. The optic nerve consists of roughly 1 million axons that wrap together to form a visual transmission cable. Because of its size, at the point where the optic nerve leaves each retina there is no room for visual receptor cells.

receptive field In vision, the portion of the retina that, when stimulated, causes the activity of higher order neurons to change.

●● CONCEPt REviEw Comparing Rods and Cones CHARACTERisTiC Rods ConEs

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—Light Sensitive at low levels of illumination Not very sensitive at low levels of illumination

—Detail Not sensitive to visual detail High level of sensitivity to detail; high visual acuity

—Color Indistinguishable among different wavelengths

Three types of cone receptors, each maximally sensitive to a different wavelength

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●● FiGuRE 5.5 Rods, Cones, and Receptive Fields Rods and cones send signals to other cells in the retina. Ganglion cells in the fovea, which receive input from cones, tend to have smaller receptive fields than cells located in the sides of the retina, which receive input from rods. This helps to explain why we see fine detail better in the fovea and why we see better out of the sides of our eyes when light levels are low. (© Cengage Learning)

Vision: The World of Color and Form | 137

This creates a biological blind spot because there are no receptor cells in this loca- tion. Interestingly, people normally experience no holes in their visual field; as part of its interpretation process, the visual system fills in the gaps to create a continuous visual scene. You can locate your blind spot by following the exercise described in ●Figure 5.7.

Dark Adaptation Another phenomenon that’s linked to processing in the retina is dark adaptation. When we first enter a darkened room, we can’t see much of any- thing (anyone who has ever gone out for popcorn during a movie knows this phe- nomenon). Gradually, over a span of about 20 to 25 minutes, our eyes adjust. This process is called dark adaptation. It’s caused by a regeneration process in the rods and cones. Remember, visual transduction occurs when light reacts chemically with photopigments in the receptor cells. In bright light, many of these photopigments break down, or become “bleached,” and are no longer useful for generating a neu- ral impulse. When you enter a dark movie theater from a bright environment, your receptor cells simply don’t have enough of the depleted photopigments to detect the low levels of light. The photopigments must be regenerated by the cells, a process that takes time.

The timing of the adaptation process is shown in ●Figure 5.8. The dark adapta- tion curve is produced by measuring the smallest amount of light that can reliably be seen as time passes in the dark. Over 20 to 25 minutes, smaller and smaller amounts of light are needed to achieve accurate detection. Our sensitivity increases over time because the visual receptor cells are recovering from their earlier interactions with bright light. Notice there’s a break, or point of discontinuity, at about the 8-minute

blind spot The point where the optic nerve leaves the back of the eye.

dark adaptation The process through which the eyes adjust to dim light.

a Light in center: increased rate of firing

c Light in both center and surround: cell fires at roughly its baseline rate

b Light in surround: decreased rate of firing

●● FiGuRE 5.6 Center-Surround Receptive Fields Receptive fields in the retina often have a center-surround arrangement. Light falling in the center of the field has an opposite effect from light falling in the surround. (a) Light in the center of the field produces an excitatory response (green). (b) Light falling in the surround produces an inhibitory response (purple). (c) When light falls equally in both regions, there is no net increase in the cell’s activity compared to its no-light baseline activity level. This kind of receptive field helps the brain detect edges. (© Cengage Learning)

●● FiGuRE 5.7 the Blind Spot To experience your blind spot, simply close your left eye and focus with your right eye on the boy’s face. Then hold this book only a few inches from your eyes and slowly move it away until the pie mysteriously disappears. Notice that your brain fills in the spot—complete with the checkerboard pattern. (© Cengage Learning 2014)©

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mark. This occurs because rods and cones adapt at different rates. Early in dark adaptation, cones show the most sensitivity, but they achieve their maximum sensitivity rather quickly. After about 7 or 8 minutes in the dark, the rods begin to take over. This is one of the reasons you can’t see color very well at night; in low illumination lev- els, you’re relying almost entirely on your rods— which don’t do much, if any, color processing.

Identifying the Message Components After leaving the retina, the neural impulses flow along each optic nerve until they reach the optic chiasm (from the Greek word meaning “cross”). From here the information travels to the sepa- rate hemispheres of the brain (see ●Figure 5.9). Information that has been detected on the right half of each retina (from the left visual field) is sent to the right hemisphere, and information falling on the left half of each retina (from the

right visual field) projects to the left hemisphere. The majority of the visual signals move directly toward a major relay station in the thalamus called the lateral genicu- late nucleus; other signals, perhaps 10% of the total, detour into a midbrain structure called the superior colliculus.

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●● FiGuRE 5.8 the Dark Adaptation Curve Your eyes gradually adjust to the dark and become more sensitive; that is, you can detect light at increasingly low levels of intensity. The rods and cones adapt at different rates and reach different final levels of sensitivity. The dark adaptation curve represents the combined adaptation of the two-receptor types. At about the 8-minute mark there is a point of discontinuity; this is where further increases in sensitivity are due to the functioning of the rods. (© Cengage Learning)

Left visual field

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Center Right visual field

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●● FiGuRE 5.9 visual Pathways Input from the left visual field falls on the inside half of the left eye and the outside half of the right eye and projects to the right hemisphere of the brain; input from the right visual field projects to the left hemisphere. Visual processing occurs at several places along the pathway, ending in the visual cortex, where highly specialized processing takes place. (© Cengage Learning)

Vision: The World of Color and Form | 139

The Visual Cortex From the lateral geniculate nucleus, the visual message moves to the back of the brain, primarily to portions of the occipital lobe. Here, in the visual cortex, important components of the message are picked out and identified. Feature detectors have been discovered in the visual cortex of cats and monkeys (Hubel & Weisel, 1962, 1979). Feature detectors are cells that respond best to very specific visual events, such as patterns of light and dark. One type of feature detector, called a simple cell, responds actively only when a small bar of light is shown into the eye. Cells of this type also turn out to be orientation specific, which means the visual bar needs to be presented at a particular angle for the cell to respond. The properties of these cells were discovered by measuring neural impulses in individual cells using implanted recording electrodes. An example of this type of experiment, and the equipment used, is shown in ●Figure 5.10. Remember, there are no pain receptors in the brain, which makes it possible to explore the reactions of brain cells without causing an ani- mal severe discomfort. The recorded cells were found to increase, decrease, or show no changes in their firing rates in response to specific visual stimuli. In Figure 5.10, experimenters are recording the reaction to the presentation of a small bar of light presented at a particular angle. Again, it was discovered that certain feature detectors in the cat’s brain would react to this stimulus, and not to others, and only when the bar was shown at this particular angle.

Feature detectors are not randomly organized in the visual cortex; rather, there is a kind of master plan to the organization in the brain. Cells that respond to stimuli shown at one orientation, say 20 degrees, tend to sit together in the same “columns” of brain tissue. If a recording electrode is moved across neighboring columns, cells show regular shifts in their orientation specificity. So, if cells in a particular column A respond to bars at an angle of 20 degrees, then cells in a physically adjacent column B might respond actively only to bars presented at a 30-degree angle. This suggests that cells in the visual cortex break down the visual message in a systematic and highly organized way.

feature detectors Cells in the visual cortex that respond to very specific visual events, such as bars of light at particular orientations.

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●● FiGuRE 5.10 Feature Detectors in the visual Cortex Hubel and Wiesel discovered feature detectors in the brains of cats and monkeys. Feature detectors increase their firing rates to specific bars of light presented at particular orientations. (© Cengage Learning)

140 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

Obviously, the brain is sensitive to more than just bars or patterns of light and dark. Some cells respond selectively to more complex patterns—for example, corners, edges, bars that move through the visual field, and bars of a certain characteristic length. Researchers have found cells in monkey brains that respond most actively to faces. Moreover, to get the most active response from these cells, the face needed to look realistically like a monkey—if the face was distorted or cartoonish, the cells did not respond as actively (Perrett & Mistlin, 1987). There’s even evidence suggesting that some cells are “tuned” to respond selectively to certain kinds of facial expres- sions (Hasselmo, et al., 1989).

In humans, researchers have studied how the brain analyzes the visual message by testing brain-damaged patients and through the use of neuroimaging techniques. When parts of the human brain are damaged because of stroke or injury, very selec- tive, even bizarre, visual problems can start to appear. For example, in the condi- tion called prosopagnosia, the ability to recognize faces is lost (Behrmann et al., 2009). People with prosopagnosia can fail to recognize acquaintances, family members, and even their own reflection in a mirror!

Additional evidence comes from the f MRI neuroimaging technique. As in monkeys, researchers have found regions in the human cortex that become highly active when people view faces (Calder et al., 2011). Moreover, these regions fail to show the same levels of activation when patients suffering from prosopagnosia are tested (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2002). The f MRI technique is also proving effec- tive for mapping visual pathways in the brain and for detecting whether specific areas of the brain might be involved in the processing of visual images (Wandell & Winawer, 2011).

Studies such as these strongly suggest that the human brain, like the monkey brain, divides its labor. Certain regions of the cortex are specifically designed to pro- cess parts of the visual message. In other words, there is specificity in the organiza- tion and function of the brain. But researchers are still debating the level of specificity. Are there specific areas in the brain that are dedicated to processing faces, language, or even mathematics (Fedorenko et al., 2011)? It’s quite likely that particular cells or regions of the brain perform more than one function (Pessig & Tarr, 2007).

Many areas in the human brain appear to respond selectively to visual motion. The highlighted regions, derived from PET scanning, show areas that react more to a moving visual stimulus than to a stationary one. (P. Dupont, G. A. Orban, B. DeBruyn, A. Verbruggen, and L. Mortelmans. Many areas

in the human brain respond to visual motion.

J. Neurophysiol 72: 1420–1424, 1994, figure 1.

Reprinted by permission of American Physiological

Society and Professor Patrick Dupont, MSc, PhD.)

Vision: The World of Color and Form | 141

Color Vision: Trichromatic Theory We turn our attention now to color, which is processed along virtually the entire visual pathway. In the ret- ina, early color information is detected by comparing the activity lev- els of different types of cone receptors; higher up in the brain, cells are “tuned” to respond only to particular colors.

Earlier you learned that color is determined primarily by the wavelength of light reflected back into the eye. In general, short wave- lengths (around 450 nanometers) produce blues, medium wavelengths (around 530 nanometers) produce greens, and long wavelengths (around 670 nanometers) produce reds. White light, which most peo- ple classify as colorless, is actually a combination of all of the wave- lengths of the visible spectrum. The reason your neighbor’s shirt looks red is because chemical pigments in the fabric of the shirt absorb all but the long wavelengths of light; the long wavelengths are reflected back into the eyes, and you see the shirt as red.

When reflected wavelengths reach the retina, they activate cones in the fovea. The human eye has three types of cone receptors: One type gen- erates neural impulses primarily to short wavelengths (420 nanometers); another type responds most energetically to medium wavelengths (535 nanometers); and a final type responds most to long wavelengths (565 nanometers) of light. The activity levels of each of the cone types are determined by the photopigment contained in the receptor. ●Figure 5.11 shows the sensitivities for each of the cones, as well as for the rods.

The trichromatic theory of color vision proposes that color information is identified by comparing the activations of these three types of cones (trichromatic means “three-color”). An early version of the theory was proposed in the 19th century by Thomas Young and Hermann von Helmholtz—long before modern techniques had veri- fied the existence of the different cone types. Young and Helmholtz noted that most colors can be matched by mixing three basic, or pri- mary, colors. They suggested that the brain must determine color by comparing the activity levels of three primary receptors. When just one receptor type is strongly activated, you see one of the primary col- ors. For example, when a short-wavelength cone is strongly activated, you might see something in the violet to blue region of the spectrum; when a medium cone is active, you would see something resembling green. For long wavelengths, which activate the third type of cone, you see the color red. All other colors, such as pumpkin orange, require the activation of more than one of the receptor types. Most colors corre- spond to a mixture of wavelengths and are sensed by comparing the activations of the three receptors.

The trichromatic theory explains a number of interesting aspects of color vision. For example, it explains certain kinds of color blindness. At times, nature makes a mistake and fills someone’s red cones with green photopigment or the green cones with red photopigment (Boynton, 1979). Under these rare conditions, which affect more males than females, people are left with two rather than three cone receptors. The trichro- matic theory predicts that these dichromats (only two rather than three cone types) should lose their ability to discriminate successfully among certain colors. These people can compare the activity levels of only two cone receptors, so, for example, the colors red, yellow, and orange might be perceived as the same shade of yellow. The particular type of color deficiency depends on the type of lost receptor.

Color Vision: Opponent Processes The trichromatic theory is well supported, but it fails to account completely for color vision. For one thing, the theory has a problem with yellow. Human observers seem convinced that yellow is every bit as “pure” a color as red, green, and blue; even 4-month-old infants prefer dividing the

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●● FiGuRE 5.11 Receptor Sensitivity Curves Blue-sensitive cones are most likely to respond to short wavelengths of light; green-sensitive cones respond best to medium wavelengths; red-sensitive cones respond best to long wavelengths. Notice that rods are not sensitive to long wavelengths of light. (Based on Jones & Childers, 1993)

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color spectrum into four color categories rather than three (Bornstein, Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976). In addition, most people have no problem reporting a yellowish red or a bluish green but almost never report seeing anything resembling a yellowish blue or, for that matter, a greenish red. Why?

It turns out that certain colors are specially linked, such as blue and yellow, and red and green. You can see this for yourself by taking a look at ●Figure 5.12. You’ll find that if you stare at a vivid color like blue for a while and then switch over to a blank white space, you will see an afterimage of its complementary color. Exposure to blue results in an afterimage of yellow; exposure to red produces an afterimage of green. Also, when you mix complementary colored lights, you get white, or at least various shades of gray (Hurvich & Jameson, 1951). The special status of yellow, along with the linking of complementary colors, is quite difficult for the trichromatic theory to explain.

The difficulties with the trichromatic view were recognized in the 19th cen- tury by the German physiologist Ewald Hering, who proposed an alternative view of color vision: opponent-process theory. He suggested that there are receptors in the visual system that respond positively to one color type (such as red) and negatively to another (such as green). Instead of three primary colors, Hering proposed six: blue, which is linked to yellow (therefore solving the problem with yellow); green, which is linked to red; and finally, white, which is linked to black. According to the opponent- process theory, people have difficulty perceiving a yellowish blue because activation of, say, the blue mechanism is accompanied by inhibition, or decreased activation, of the yellow mechanism. A yellowish red does not present a problem in this scheme because yellow and red are not linked in an opponent fashion.

Like Young and Helmholtz, Hering had no solid physiological evidence to sup- port his notion of specially linked opponent-process cells. However, a century later, opponent-process cells were discovered in various parts of the visual pathway (see DeValois & DeValois, 1980). The rate at which these cells generate neural impulses increases to one type of color (for example, red) and decreases to another (green).

This means that the visual system must be pulling color information out of the visual message by relying on multiple processing stations. Color information is pro- cessed first in the retina through the cones (the trichromatic theory); further up in the brain, opponent-process cells fine-tune and further process the message. Finally, at the level of cortex, groups of neurons again appear to be selectively “tuned” to process color (Shapley & Hawken, 2011), although they may be involved in the processing of other information as well (such as shape). Neuroscientists are still working out the details, but both the trichromatic and opponent-process systems play a role in color vision.

Producing Stable Interpretations: Visual Perception Let’s return, for a moment, to the cube in ●Figure 5.1. You’ve seen how light bouncing off the page gets translated into an electrochemical signal. Next, specialized regions of the visual pathway break the message down—the brain pulls lines, edges, colors, even

trichromatic theory A theory of color vision proposing that color information is extracted by comparing the relative activations of three different types of cone receptors.

opponent-process theory A theory of color vision proposing that cells in the visual pathway increase their activation levels to one color and decrease their activation levels to another color—for example, increasing to red and decreasing to green.

●● FiGuRE 5.12 Color Afterimage Stare closely at the middle of this face for about a minute. Then focus on the black dot on the right. What do you see now? The demo works better in a brightly lit environment. (© Cengage Learning)

Additive mixing of lights with different wavelengths creates a variety of perceived colors—even white.

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Vision: The World of Color and Form | 143

angles of orientation from the visual scene. But your fundamental perception is still of a cube—an object with form—not some complex combination of elementary particles.

To understand how the human brain can see “wholes” with visual machinery that seems designed to analyze parts, it helps to remember that perception is only partly determined by what comes in through the eyes. We also rely on what we know to help us construct what we see. Let’s consider a simple example: Take a look at the two images in ●Figure 5.13. If you were raised in North America, you probably have no trouble seeing the image in panel (a): It’s the word SKY, written in white, against a solid black background. Panel (b), on the other hand, might look like a meaning- less collection of black shapes. Actually, panel (b) also shows the word SKY, but it’s written in Chinese calligraphy. People who can read English, but not Chinese, see panel (a) as a meaningful image; if Chinese is your native language and you can’t read English, panel (b) presents the meaningful image (Coren et al., 1987). Prior knowl- edge plays a critical role in helping us interpret and organize what we see.

We also use one part of a visual display to help us interpret other parts. Exactly the same “object” is shown in positions 2 and 4, respectively, of the following two lines:

But you see the letter B or the number 13 depending on which line you read. The surrounding letters and digits act as context leading us to expect a particular “whole” in positions 2 and 4. In some cases, the elements can be arranged to make us see things that aren’t really there. Is there a white triangle embedded in the middle of ●Figure 5.14? It sure looks like there is, but the perception is really an illusion—there is no physical stimulus, no reflected pattern of electromagnetic energy on the retina, that corresponds to the triangular form. Yet you interpret the pattern as a triangle.

So there’s more to perception than what meets the eye. Our perceptual world is built by combining two important mental activities. First, the visual system performs an analysis of the actual sensory message, the pattern of electromagnetic information on the retina. Psychologists refer to this as bottom-up processing—the processing that starts with the actual physical message. Second, we use our knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about the world to interpret and organize what we see, something psychologists call top-down processing. Perception results from these two processes working together. What you see is determined by what’s out there in the world but also by what you expect to be out there (Snowden & Schyns, 2006).

Principles of Organization We’re also born with strong tendencies to organize incom- ing visual information in sensible ways. We considered this process briefly in Chapter 1 when we discussed the work of Gestalt psychologists (Gestalt translates from German as “configuration” or “pattern”). The Gestalt psychologists believed that we’re born with certain organizing principles of perception. For example, we have a natural, auto- matic tendency to divide any visual scene into a figure and a ground—we see the wine glass as separate from the table, the printed word as separate from the page. The rules

bottom-up processing Processing that is controlled by the physical message delivered to the senses.

top-down processing Processing that is controlled by one’s beliefs and expectations about how the world is organized.

SKY a b

●● FiGuRE 5.13 Prior knowledge and Perception Whether you detect meaningful images in (a) and (b) depends on how much prior knowledge you bring to perceptual interpretation. (Sensation and perception, Sixth Edition, Coren, S., Ward, L. M., &

Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons Inc.)

●● FiGuRE 5.14 illusory Contours Can you see the white triangle embedded in this figure? No physical stimulus corresponds to the triangular form. Nonetheless, people interpret the pattern as a triangle. (© Cengage Learning)

144 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

governing the separation of figure and ground are complex (e.g., Brooks & Driver, 2010), but as you can see from ●Figure 5.15, the task is easy or hard depending on whether strong or weak cues are available to guide the interpretation.

The Gestalt psychologists outlined a number of compelling and systematic rules, known generally as the Gestalt principles of organization, that govern how people organize what they see:

1. The law of proximity. If the elements of a display are close to each other—that is, they lie in close spatial proximity—they tend to be grouped together as part of the same object. Here, for example, you see three groups of dots rather than a single collection.

Proximity

2. The law of similarity. Items that share physical properties—that physically resem- ble each other—are placed into the same set. Thus, here you see rows of X’s and rows of O’s rather than mixed-object columns.

Similarity

3. The law of closure. Even if a figure has a gap, or a small amount of its border is missing, people still tend to perceive the object as a whole (e.g., a circle).

Closure

4. The law of good continuation. If lines cross or are interrupted, people tend to still see continuously flowing lines. In the following figure you are likely to see a continuous line that is blocked by the box rather than two separate lines.

Continuation

Gestalt principles of organization The organizing principles of perception proposed by the Gestalt psychologists. These principles include the laws of proximity, similarity, closure, continuation, and common fate.

●● FiGuRE 5.15 Separating Figure from Ground We have a natural tendency to divide any visual scene into a “figure” and “(back)ground.” This task can be difficult, as with the “hidden faces” painting (a); once you’ve detected a face, it becomes a “figure” and stops being part of the background. Solving the problem can also be easy but ambiguous (b): Which do you see—a vase or a pair of profiles?

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5. The law of common fate. If things appear to be moving in the same direction, people tend to group them together. Here the moving dots are classified together as a group, with some fate in common.

Common fate

Object Recognition These natural grouping rules help simplify the problem of object recognition. Psychologist Irving Biederman (1987; Dickinson & Biederman, 2011) has suggested that the Gestalt principles of organization may help the visual system break down complex visual messages into components called geons (short for “geometric icons”). Geons are simple geometrical forms, such as blocks, cylinders, wedges, and cones. From a collection of no more than 36 geons, Biederman argues, more than 150 million possible complex and meaningful objects can be created—far more than people need to capture the richness of their perceptual world. Once the brain is familiar with the geons, it can recognize the basic components of just about any perceptual experience. Just as the 26 letters of the alphabet form the basis for an incredible variety of words, geons form the “alphabet” for visualizing any object.

Biederman’s theory, which he calls recognition by components, helps to explain how people can successfully identify fuzzy or incomplete images. Nature rarely pro- vides all the identifying characteristics of a physical object: Cars are usually partially hidden behind other cars; a hurried glimpse of a child’s face in a crowd might be all the information that reaches the eye. Yet the viewer has no trouble recognizing the car or the child. According to Biederman (1987), only two or three geons can be sufficient for the rapid identification of most objects. To illustrate, Biederman asked people to identify objects such as the ones shown in the left column of ●Figure 5.16. In some cases, the items were presented intact; in other conditions, the images were made more difficult to see by removing bits of information that either maintained (the middle column) or disrupted (the right column) the component geons. Not sur- prisingly, people had no problem recognizing the objects in the middle column but had considerably more trouble when the geons were obscured. In fact, Biederman found that identification of the right-column objects was almost impossible—most people in this condition failed to identify any of the objects correctly.

But not all researchers are convinced that a relatively small set of basic shapes is sufficient to allow us to identify and discriminate among all objects Many objects share basic parts, yet we’re able to quickly and efficiently tell them apart. Moreover, there may be certain kinds of objects, such as faces, that are perceived and remem- bered immediately as wholes, without any breaking down or building up from parts. As you learned earlier, some cells in the brain respond selectively to faces; also, cer- tain kinds of brain damage make recognizing faces, but not other objects, difficult or impossible. We’re capable of recognizing an enormous range of objects in our world without hesitation, so it’s likely that our brains solve the problems of object recogni- tion in a number of different ways (Pessig & Tarr, 2007).

Perceiving Depth Depth perception is another amazing capability of the visual sys- tem. It too results from a combination of bottom-up and top-down processing. People use their knowledge about objects, in combination with bottom-up processing of the actual visual message, to create a three-dimensional world. For example, the brain knows and adjusts for the fact that distant objects produce smaller reflections on the retina. If you see two people whom you know to be roughly the same height, but the retinal images they produce are of different sizes, your brain figures out that one per- son must be standing closer than the other. Experience also makes it clear that closer objects tend to block the images of objects that are farther away.

recognition by components The idea proposed by Biederman that people recognize objects perceptually via smaller components called geons.

●● FiGuRE 5.16 Recognition by Components Biederman proposed that we recognize visual forms in part by extracting simple geometric forms (geons) from the visual message. Degraded versions of the objects on the left are in the other columns. We have no trouble recognizing the objects in the middle column, but most of us cannot identify those in the right column because the geons are degraded in the right column but not in the middle column. (Osherson, Daniel N., Stephen M. Kosslyn, and John Hollerbach, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive

Science, Volume 2: Visual Cognition and Action,

of Technology, by permission of The MIT Press.)

146 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

Another cue for distance, one that artists often use to depict depth in paint- ings, is linear perspective. As shown in the photos above, parallel lines that recede into the distance tend to converge toward a single point. Generally, the farther away two lines are, the closer together those lines will appear to be. The relative shading of objects in a scene can provide important clues as well: If one object casts a shadow on another, you can often tell which of the two is farther away. Objects that are far away also tend to look blurry and slightly bluish. If you look at a realistic painting of a mountain scene, you’ll see that the distant hills lack fine detail and are painted with a tinge of blue.

The depth cues we’ve been considering are called monocular depth cues, which means they require input from only one eye. A person can close one eye and still see a world full of depth based on the use of monocular cues such as those just dis- cussed; you don’t need two eyes to perceive depth. But the brain also uses binocular depth cues; these are cues produced by two eyes, each with a slightly different view of the world. Hold your index finger up about an inch or so in front of your eyes. Now quickly close and open each eye alternately. You should see your finger jumping back and forth as you switch from one open eye to the other. The finger appears to move because each eye has a slightly different angle of view on the world, producing differ- ent images in each retina.

The differences between the locations of the images in the two eyes is called retinal disparity. It’s a useful cue for depth because the amount of disparity changes with distance from a point of fixation. The farther away an object is from the fixation point, the greater will be the differences in the locations of the images in each eye. The brain derives depth information, in part, by calculating the amount of disparity between the image in the left eye and the image in the right eye. The brain can also use the degree that the two eyes turn inward, called convergence, to infer informa- tion about depth. The closer an object is to the face, the more the two eyes must turn inward, or converge, to see the object properly. Not surprisingly, our brain is also able to monitor how these various cues change with motion, such as shifting our head or walking about, to compile an increasingly accurate view of the world in three dimen- sions (Wexler & van Boxtel, 2005).

monocular depth cues Cues for depth that require input from only one eye.

binocular depth cues Cues for depth that depend on comparisons between the two eyes.

retinal disparity A binocular cue for depth that is based on location differences between the images in each eye.

convergence A binocular cue for depth that is based on the extent to which the two eyes move inward, or converge, when looking at an object.

Can you identify the types of cues present in these “flat” pictures that allow us to perceive depth?

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Vision: The World of Color and Form | 147

●● CONCEPt REviEw Depth Cues TyPE of CuE CuE dEsCRiPTion

Monocular Relative size Comparably sized stimuli that produce different-sized retinal images are perceived as varying in distance from the observer.

Overlap Closer objects tend to block the images of objects farther away.

Linear perspective Parallel lines that recede into the distance appear to converge on a single point.

Shading Shadows cast by objects on other objects assist in depth perception.

Haze Distant objects tend to look blurry and slightly bluish.

Binocular Retinal disparity The differences between the locations of the images in the two eyes; the amount of disparity changes with distance from a point of fixation.

Convergence The closer the stimulus, the more the eyes turn inward toward one another.

Have you ever used a stereoscope—perhaps in its modern form, the View-Master? How about a stereogram? The image shown in ●Figure 5.17 may look like a bunch of random color waves, but if you look at it just right, you’ll see an image presented in astonishing depth.

Each of these examples represents an instance in which we can see depth from what is essentially a two-dimensional visual message. In the case of the stereogram, the 3-D image emerges out of a flat, and mean- ingless, two-dimensional picture—no special equipment is needed. How is this possible? Not surprisingly, these visual tricks rely on the same perceptual principle—retinal

disparity—that we discussed in the section on depth perception. We see with two eyes, and each of our eyes sees the world from a slightly different viewpoint. Through a process that is not completely understood, our brain is able to perceive an object in depth by noting, in part, the differences that exist between the left- and right-eye images. As you know from reading the text, this is not the only cue we use to perceive depth (our top-down knowl- edge of the world is also important), but it’s a sufficiently strong cue to trick the brain into seeing depth when it’s not really there.

In the case of a 3-D movie, the film actu- ally contains two slightly offset images. By

wearing special glasses, the two images can be selectively filtered to your left and right eyes. This creates the image disparity that is needed to create depth. (The 3-D effect is achieved in the film production process, not by the glasses, which is why your 3-D glasses won’t work on just any movie.) A stereoscope is based on a similar principle; when you look through the View-Master, you’re actually seeing two different images of the same scene, drawn or photo- graphed from two slightly different perspectives. The View-Master delivers one of the images to each eye, producing the illusion of depth.

A stereogram, such as the one shown in Figure 5.17, is slightly more difficult to see. There is a repeating pattern that is slightly offset. If you focus beyond the image in a cer- tain way, your brain picks up on the dispar- ity, and a 3-D image “mysteriously” appears. Here are some simple steps to view the image: First, make sure you’re sitting in a brightly lit environment. Hold the book up in front of your face, relatively close to your nose, and imag- ine you’re focusing on a distant object beyond the page. This will make the stereogram seem blurry, but that doesn’t matter. (You’re not really looking at anything in particular, and especially not the stereogram; instead, you’re staring blankly forward.) Now start to move the book slowly away from you, trying to keep your eyes focused on the imaginary distant object. Eventually, if you’re lucky, the 3-D image will appear. Don’t get discouraged—it may take a long time for the effect to work.

●●PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Creating Illusions of Depth

●● FiGuRE 5.17 A Single-Picture Random-Dot Stereogram (© Cengage Learning)

148 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

Motion Perception We see a three-dimensional world, full of depth, but we experience a world rich in movement as well. Cars speed by, birds soar and dive, and leaves scatter in the wind. Our ability to perceive motion effortlessly is extremely useful. Movement helps us determine the positions of objects over time; it helps us to identify objects as well. Movement gives us information about shape because we’re able to see the object from more than one viewpoint. It also helps us solve figure–ground problems—once an object begins to move, we can easily separate its image from a still background. Motion plays an important role in our detection of animate objects as well—is that thing hiding in the brush living or nonliving (Gao & Scholl, 2011)?

How do we perceive movement? You might think the brain could solve this prob- lem by simply tracking the movement of images across the retina. This is true to a certain extent, but motion perception is actually more complex. Images are constantly moving across our retinas as we turn our eyes, yet we don’t necessarily see objects as moving. Moreover, sometimes we perceive motion when there is none. Think about the flashing arrows you often see in front of stores or motels—they beckon us in, but they’re actually made up of fixed lights that are blinking on and off at regular intervals. We experience an illusion of motion, called the phi phenomenon, even though noth- ing in the environment is actually moving. We experience a similar illusion of motion every time we watch a movie. Movies are really nothing more than still pictures pre- sented rapidly in succession, but we certainly experience smooth and flowing images.

Neuroscientists believe there are designated pathways in the brain that help us process movement, and a variety of cells that respond specifically to movement have been discovered in the cortex (Battelli et al., 2007). Changes in the retinal image, changes in the motion of the eyes, as well as changes in the relative positions of objects in the environment all contribute to our general perception of movement. For example, our brain infers movement when the retinal image of one object changes over time but the images of other objects in the background do not. As with depth, many cues in the environment help in the interpretation process.

Perceptual Constancies Another remarkable feature of the human visual system is its capacity to recognize that an object remains the same even when the image in the retina changes. As you watch a car pull away, the size of its retinal image becomes smaller and smaller—so small, in fact, that it eventually resembles the image that might be reflected from a toy car held at arm’s distance. But you never think the car has been mysteriously transformed into a toy. Your visual system maintains a stable interpretation of the image despite the changes in its retinal size.

When you perceive an object, or its properties, to remain the same even though the physical message delivered to the eyes is changing, you are showing what’s called a perceptual constancy. In the case of the car, it is size constancy—the perceived size

of the car remains constant even though the actual size of the reflected image is changing with distance. ●Figure 5.18 provides an example of shape constancy. Consider how many changes occur in the reflected image of a door as it slowly moves from closed to open. Yet you still recognize it as a door, not as some bizarre shape that evolves unpre- dictably over time. Size and shape constancies turn out to be related; both result, at least in part, from the visual sys- tem’s use of cues to determine distance.

To see what kind of cues produce constancy, look at ●Figure 5.19. You see the planters as the same size and shape in part because of the pattern of the paving stones covering the path. Each of the planters covers three stones in length and three stones in width. The actual retinal image, however, differs markedly for each of the planters (take a ruler and measure the physical dimensions of each planter). You interpret and see them as the same because

phi phenomenon An illusion of movement that occurs when stationary lights are flashed in succession.

perceptual constancy Perceiving the properties of an object to remain the same even though the physical properties of the sensory message are changing.

●● FiGuRE 5.18 Shape Constancy Notice all the changes in the image of a door as it moves from closed to open. Yet we perceive it as a constant rectangular shape. (© Cengage Learning)

Vision: The World of Color and Form | 149

your experiences in the world have taught you that size and distance are related in systematic ways.

We experience perceptual constancies for a variety of object dimensions. In addi- tion to size and shape constancy, the brightness and color of an object can appear to remain constant even though the intensity and wavelength of the light changes. Once again, these characteristics help us maintain a stable and orderly interpretation of a constantly changing world. Think about how chaotic the world would appear if you saw a new and different object every time the physical properties of its reflected image changed. Instead of seeing the same dancer gliding across the floor, you might be forced to see a string of dancers each engaged in a unique and unusual pose.

Perceptual Illusions The perception of constancy is not gained without a cost. In its effort to maintain a stable image, the visual system can be tricked—perceptual illusions, or inappropriate interpretations of physical reality, can be created. Take a look at the two lines shown below:

The vertical line with the wings turned out appears longer than the line with the wings turned in, even though each line is identical in length. This is called the Müller- Lyer illusion. You’re tricked because your brain uses cues in the environment—in this case the wings are acting as depth cues—to “interpret” the size of the lines. The retinal images of the two lines are the same, but your brain assumes the one with the wings turned out is actually farther away—hence it scales the image to make it look larger.

perceptual illusions Inappropriate interpretations of physical reality. Perceptual illusions often occur as a result of the brain’s using otherwise adaptive organizing principles.

●● FiGuRE 5.19 Constancy Cues We see these three planters as matching in size and shape partly because of depth cues in the environment: Each covers three tiles in length and three in width. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

150 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

●● FiGuRE 5.20 the Müller-Lyer illusion This particular illusion may be influenced by experiences with the interior and exterior corners of buildings. (© Cengage Learning)

●● FiGuRE 5.21 illusion of Depth These two figures, based on the Ponzo illusion, show that depth cues can lead to perceptual errors. In (a) the horizontal lines are actually the same length, and the monsters in (b) are the same size. (Monster illusion from the book MIND SIGHTS by Roger N. Shepard. © 1990 by Roger N. Shepard. Reprinted by

permission of Henry Holt and Company.)

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As ●Figure 5.20 shows, this particular illusion may have a real-life model—the interior and exterior corners of a room or building. Notice that for the outside corner of this building the wings are really perspective cues signaling that the front edge is thrusting forward and the walls are sloping away. For the inside corner, the perspec- tive cues signal the opposite—the inside edge is farther away. Again, the two lines produce the same retinal image, but your visual system assumes that the interior corner is likely to be farther away, and consequently must be larger in size.

The Ponzo illusion, shown in ●Figure 5.21, operates in a similar way. In part (a), you see two lines of exactly the same length as slightly different because the perspec- tive cue—the converging parallel lines—tricks your brain into thinking that the hori- zontal line near the top of the display is farther away. Because it has the same size retinal image as the bottom line (remember, the two are physically the same size) the brain compensates for the distance by making the top line appear larger. The mon- sters in part (b) are really the same size, but the one on the top certainly appears larger!

Vision: The World of Color and Form | 151

Perception and Action It’s easy to think of visual illusions as tricks—we’ve fooled the visual system into an inaccurate representation of the world—but the processes involved are useful and adaptive. Usually depth cues are correct—the object really is farther away—so we are seeing and interpreting objects in the right way. Some psy- chologists believe that what we “see” is always intended to help us act. Our perceptual systems have been designed by nature to help us perform successfully in the world.

For example, did you know that a hill looks steeper if you are wearing a heavy back- pack (Proffitt, 2006)? A heavy backpack also makes objects appear to be farther away. If you’ve been asked to throw a ball toward a target, the distance between you and the target seems to be greater if the ball is heavy. In these cases your visual system is helping you act by providing “clues” about how much energy you’ll need to perform the action. What you see is also influenced by your ability: Golfers who are playing well see the hole as bigger when they putt, at least compared to golfers who are put- ting poorly; softball players who are hitting well report seeing a bigger ball; tennis players who are returning the ball well report perceiving the tennis net as lower (for a review see Witt, 2011). In each case there seems to be a close relationship between perception and action—what you see is determined by what you have to do, or your ability to perform (Wagman & Morgan, 2010).

test Yourself Check your knowledge about vision by answering the following questions. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. To test your understanding of how the visual message is trans- lated into the language of the brain, choose the best answers from among the following terms: accommodation, cones, cornea, fovea, lens, opponent-process, pupil, receptive field, retina, rods, trichromatic.

a. The “central pit” area where the cone receptors tend to be located:

b. Receptors that are responsible for visual acuity, or our ability to see fine detail:

c. The process through which the lens changes its shape tempo- rarily to help focus light:

d. The “film” at the back of the eye that contains the light- sensitive receptor cells:

e. The protective outer layer of the eye:

2. Decide whether each of the following statements about how the brain extracts message components is true or false.

a. Visual messages tend to be analyzed primarily by structures in the superior colliculus, although structures in the lateral geniculate are important too. True or False?

b. It’s currently believed that information about color and move- ment are probably processed in separate pathways in the brain. True or False?

c. The opponent-process theory of color vision makes it easier to understand why most people think there are four, rather than three, primary colors (red, green, blue, yellow). True or False?

d. Some feature detectors in the brain are “tuned” to respond only when certain patterns of light enter the eye at specific angles of orientation. True or False?

3. Test your knowledge about visual perception by filling in the blanks. Choose your answers from the following terms: binocular depth cues, bottom-up processing, convergence, monocular depth cues, perceptual constancy, perceptual illusion, phi phenomenon, retinal disparity, recognition by components, top-down processing.

a. The part of perception that is controlled by our beliefs and expectations about how the world is organized:

b. Perceiving an object, or its properties, to remain the same even though the physical message delivered to the eyes is changing:

c. An illusion of motion: d. The depth cue that is based on calculating the degree to which

the two eyes have turned inward: e. The view that object perception is based on the analysis of

simple building blocks, called geons:

●● Recall–Monitor–Recall 5.1

152 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

Hearing: Identifying and Localizing Sounds

LEARNING GOALS ●● Explain how sound, the physical message, is translated into the electrochemical language

of the brain. ●● Discuss how pitch information is pulled out of the auditory message. ●● Explain how the auditory message is interpreted and how sound is localized.

Imagine a world without sound. There wouldn’t be music, or speech, or laughter. Sounds help us identify and locate objects; through sound, we’re able to produce and comprehend the spoken word. Even our most private sense of self—the world inside our heads—often appears in the form of an inner voice, or an ongoing speech-based monologue (see Chapter 8).

Translating the Message The physical message delivered to the auditory system, sound, is a form of energy, like light, that travels as a wave. However, sound is mechanical energy and requires a medium (such as air or water) to move. Sound begins with a vibrating stimulus, such as the movement of vocal cords or the plucking of a tight string. The vibration pushes air molecules out into space, where they collide with other air molecules, and a trav- eling chain reaction begins. Want to feel a pressure wave? Simply put your hand in front of the pounding diaphragm of a stereo speaker.

The rate of the vibrating stimulus determines the frequency of the sound, defined as the number of times the pressure wave moves from peak to peak per second (mea- sured in units called hertz, where 1 Hz = 1 cycle/second). Psychologically, when the frequency of a sound varies, we hear a change in pitch, which corresponds roughly to how high or low a tone sounds. Middle C on a piano has a frequency of 262 Hz, and the highest note corresponds to about 4000 Hz. People are sensitive to frequen- cies from roughly 20 to 20,000 Hz, but we’re most sensitive to frequencies in the 1000 to 5000 Hz range. Many important sounds fall into this range, including most of the sounds that make up speech.

The other major dimension of sound is intensity, or pressure amplitude. Psychologically, changes in intensity are experienced as changes in loudness. As the intensity level increases, it generally seems louder to the ear. The amplitude of a wave is measured in units called decibels (dB). To give you some perspective, a normal con- versation measures around 60 dB, whereas an incredibly loud rock band can produce sounds over 100 dB. ( Just for your information, prolonged exposure to sounds at around 90 dB can produce permanent hearing loss.)

Entering the Ear Let’s follow a sound as it enters the auditory pathway (see ●Figure 5.22). The first stop, of course, is the ears. The external flap of tissue usually referred to as the “ear” is known technically as the pinna; it helps capture the sound, which then funnels down the auditory canal toward the eardrum, or tympanic membrane.

The tympanic membrane responds to the incoming sound wave by vibrating. The particular vibration pattern, which changes for different sound frequencies, is then transmitted through three small bones in the middle ear: the malleus (or ham- mer), the incus (or anvil), and the stapes (or stirrup). These bones help intensify the vibration pattern and prepare it for passage into the inner ear. Inside the inner ear is a bony, snail-shaped sound processor called the cochlea; here the sound energy is translated into neural impulses.

sound The physical message delivered to the auditory system; a mechanical energy that requires a medium such as air or water in order to move.

pitch The psychological experience that results from the auditory processing of a particular frequency of sound.

pinna The external flap of tissue normally referred to as the “ear”; it helps capture sounds.

tympanic membrane The eardrum, which responds to incoming sound waves by vibrating.

middle ear The portion between the eardrum and the cochlea containing three small bones (the malleus, incus, and stapes) that help to intensify and prepare the sound vibrations for passage into the inner ear.

cochlea The bony, snail-shaped sound processor in the inner ear where sound is translated into nerve impulses.

A stereogram shows how the intensity and frequencies of sounds change over time.

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The third bone in the middle ear, the stapes, is connected to an opening in the cochlea called the oval window. As the stapes vibrates, it causes fluid inside the cochlea to move a flexible membrane, called the basilar membrane, that runs throughout the cochlear shell. Transduction takes place through the activation of tiny auditory recep- tor cells, called hair cells, that lie along the basilar membrane. As the membrane starts to ripple—like a cat moving under a bedsheet—tiny hairs, called cilia, that extend outward from the hair cells are bent (because they knock into something called the tectorial membrane). The bending of these hairs causes the auditory receptor cells to fire, creating a neural impulse that travels up the auditory pathways to the brain (see ●Figure 5.23).

Different sound frequencies trigger different movement patterns along the basi- lar membrane. Higher frequencies of sound cause the membrane to be displaced the most near the oval window; low frequencies produce a traveling wave that reaches

basilar membrane A flexible membrane running through the cochlea that, through its movement, displaces the auditory receptor cells, or hair cells.

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●● FiGuRE 5.22 the Structures of the Human Ear Sound enters the auditory canal and causes the tympanic membrane to vibrate in a pattern that is then transmitted through three small bones in the middle ear to the oval window. The oval window vibrates, causing fluid inside the cochlea to be displaced, which moves the basilar membrane. The semicircular canals contribute to our sense of balance. (© Cengage Learning)

Hair cells

Basilar membrane

Cross-section of cochlear canal

Cochlear neuron

Cilia Tectorial membrane

●● FiGuRE 5.23 the Basilar Membrane This figure shows an open slice of the cochlea. Sound vibrations cause fluid inside the cochlea to displace the basilar membrane that runs throughout the cochlear shell. Different frequencies trigger different patterns along the membrane. Transduction takes place through bending hair cells. The hair cells nearest the point of maximum displacement will be stimulated the most, helping the brain extract information about pitch. (© Cengage Learning)

154 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

its peak deep inside the cochlea. The brain partly determines pitch by recognizing which of the receptor cells are activated by a particular sound pattern. If hair cells near the oval window are responding the most, the incoming sound is perceived as high in pitch. If many cells along the mem- brane are active, and the most active ones are far away from the oval win- dow, the incoming sound is perceived as low in pitch.

Identifying the Message Components The neural impulses generated by the hair cells leave the cochlea in each ear along the auditory nerve. Messages that have been received in the right ear travel mainly along pathways leading to the left hemisphere of the brain; left-ear messages go primarily to the right hemisphere. Just as in the visual system, auditory nerve fibers are “tuned” to transmit a specific kind of message. In the visual system, the ganglion cells transmit information about light and dark. In the auditory system, fibers in the auditory nerve pass on frequency information. Measurements of individual auditory nerve fibers show tuning curves—for example, a fiber might respond best to an input stimulus of around 2000 Hz and less well to others.

Detecting Pitch Complex sounds, such as speech patterns, are built from combina- tions of simple sound frequencies. The auditory system pulls out information about the simple frequencies, which correspond to different pitches, in several ways. Pitch is determined, in part, by the particular place on the basilar membrane that is active. For example, as discussed earlier, activation of hair cells near the oval window leads to the perception of a high-pitched sound. This is called the place theory of pitch perception (Békésy, 1960). We hear a particular pitch because certain hair cells are responding actively. “Place” in this instance refers to the location of the activated hair cell along the basilar membrane.

Place theory helps to explain certain kinds of hearing loss. As people grow older, they have trouble hearing the higher frequencies of sound (such as those in whis- pered speech). Why? Because most sounds activate the hair cells that lie nearest the oval window. Cells in the interior portions of the cochlea respond actively only when low-frequency sounds are present. If receptor cells wear out from years of prolonged activity, then those nearest the oval window should be among the first to do so. Place theory partly explains, as a result, why older people have difficulty hearing high- pitched sounds.

At the same time, place theory does not offer a complete account of pitch per- ception. One problem is that hair cells do not act independently—often many are activated at the same time. As a result, it’s thought that the brain must also rely on the rate at which cells fire their neural impulses. According to frequency theory, pitch is determined partly by the frequency of neural impulses traveling up the audi- tory pathway: The higher the rate of firing, the higher the perceived pitch. Like place theory, frequency theory does a reasonable job of explaining many aspects of pitch perception, but it runs into difficulties with high-frequency sounds. Because of their refractory periods, individual neurons cannot fire fast enough to deliver high- frequency information. To solve this problem, the brain tracks the patterns of firing among large groups of neurons. When groups of cells generate neural impulses rap- idly in succession, they create volleys of impulses that provide additional clues about the pitch of the incoming message (Wever, 1949).

To sum up, the brain uses several kinds of information to extract pitch. The brain uses information about where on the basilar membrane activation is occurring (place theory) as well as the rate at which signals are generated (frequency theory). Neither place nor frequency information, by itself, is sufficient to explain our perception of pitch—both kinds of information are needed.

place theory The idea that the location of auditory receptor cells activated by movement of the basilar membrane underlies the perception of pitch.

frequency theory The idea that pitch perception is determined partly by the frequency of neural impulses traveling up the auditory pathway.

Prolonged exposure to intense noise can create hearing loss.

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Hearing: Identifying and Localizing Sounds | 155

The Auditory Cortex The auditory message eventually reaches the auditory cortex, which is located mainly in the temporal lobes of the brain. Cells in the auditory cor- tex are frequency sensitive, which means they respond best to particular frequencies of sound. There is also a well-developed organization, just like in the visual system. Cells that sit in nearby areas of the auditory cortex react to similar frequencies of sound. Cells that respond to low-frequency sounds are clustered together in one area of the auditory cortex, whereas cells responsive to high-frequency sounds sit in another area (Recanzone, 2011).

Some cells in the auditory cortex respond best to complex combinations of sounds. For example, a cell might respond only to a sequence of tones that moves from one frequency to another, or to a burst of noise (Pickles, 1988). In animals, corti- cal cells have been discovered that respond only to sounds that exist in the animal’s natural vocabulary, such as a particular shriek, cackle, or trill (Wollberg & Newman, 1972). In people, neuroimaging studies have found specific areas of the brain are activated when complex auditory sequences are played; different regions seem to be involved in detecting the identity of a sound (what) and its location in space (where). Much remains to be learned about how complex sounds—such as patterns of speech—are represented in the cortex, but recent advances in imaging technology are opening many new doors for the researcher. For example, recent imaging studies have made it clear that multiple pathways are involved in speech comprehension, just as there are multiple processing pathways in vision (Pallier et al., 2011).

Producing Stable Interpretations: Auditory Perception Say the phrase “kiss the sky,” then repeat it aloud in rapid succession. Now do the same thing with the word “stress” or “life.” You’ll notice that your perception of what you’re saying undergoes some interesting changes. “Kiss the sky” begins to sound like “kiss this guy”; “stress” will probably turn into “dress” and “life” into “fly.” This is a kind of auditory analog to the Necker cube, which was discussed at the beginning of the chapter.

Organizing the Auditory Message As with the ever-changing cube, the brain is often faced with ambiguous auditory messages—it seeks meaning where it can, usually by relying on established organizational rules (Bregman, 1990; Hirsh & Watson, 1996). The brain separates the incoming auditory stream into figure and ground; it groups auditory events that are similar and that occur close together in time. Sound fre- quency can be used as a grouping cue to distinguish among voices. Females generally speak at higher frequencies than males. As a result, it is easier to tell the difference between a male and a female talking than it is to tell the difference between two speakers of the same sex. At the same time, the auditory system shows a remark- able ability to maintain perceptual constancy: We can easily recognize the same mel- ody played by different instruments, even though the physical characteristics of the sounds reaching the ears are very different (Zatorre, 2005).

The fact that the brain organizes the incoming sound message should not come as much of a surprise. Think about how easily you can listen to a band or orchestra, filled with many different instruments, and pick out the trumpet, violin, or piano. Think about how easily you can focus on the voice of a friend, to the exclusion of other voices, when you’re in the middle of a noisy party. Moreover, your ability to identify and organize sounds increases with experience (McDermott et al., 2011). We use our knowledge and expectations, through top-down processing, to help us interpret the incoming auditory sequence. Car mechanics, after years of experience, can identify an engine problem simply by listening to the particular “knocking” that the engine makes; cardiologists can use the sounds of the heartbeat to diagnose the health of a cardiovascular system. In one neuroimaging study, people were asked to

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listen to familiar or unfamiliar songs while being scanned in an f MRI machine. At certain points in the song the music was turned off unexpectedly. During these silent gaps, activity continued in auditory regions of the brain but to a much greater extent if the participants were familiar with the song. Everyone reported still “hearing” the song during the gaps—a kind of auditory imagery—but only if he or she was familiar with the song (Kraemer et al., 2005).

Sound Localization Another useful characteristic of the auditory sense is the ability to determine location. For example, if you’re driving down the street fiddling with your car radio and hear a sudden screech of brakes, you’re able to identify the source of the sound rapidly and efficiently. How do you accomplish this feat? Just as com- parisons between the retinal locations of images in the two eyes provide informa- tion about visual depth, message comparisons between the ears help people localize objects in space.

Let’s assume that the braking car is approaching yours from the left side. Because your left ear is closer to the source of the sound, it will receive the relevant sound vibrations slightly sooner than your right ear. If an object is directly in front of you, the message will arrive at both ears simultaneously. By comparing the arrival times between the left and right ears, the brain is able to localize the sound fairly accurately. What’s amazing is that these arrival time differences are extremely small. For exam- ple, the maximum arrival time difference, which occurs when an object is directly opposite one ear, is less than one-tenth of a second.

Another important cue for sound localization is intensity—more precisely, inten- sity differences between the ears. The sound that arrives first—to either the left or right ear—will be somewhat louder, or more intense, than the sound arriving second. These intensity differences are not large, and they depend partly on the frequency of the arriving sound, but they are useful cues for sound localization. Your brain can cal- culate the differences in arrival times, plus any differences in loudness, and use this information to localize the source.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Can you think of any songs that you like now but didn’t like when you first heard them? One possibility is that your brain has learned to organize the music in a way that makes it more appealing.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about the auditory system by determining whether each of the following statements is true or false. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Sound is a form of mechanical energy that requires a medium, such as air or water, in order to move. True or False?

2. According to the frequency theory of pitch perception, the loca- tion of activity on the basilar membrane is the primary cue for determining pitch. True or False?

3. Sound pressure causes tiny hair cells, located in the pinna, to bend, thereby generating a neural impulse. True or False?

4. The separation of a sensory message into figure and ground occurs for vision but not for hearing. True or False?

5. We use multiple cues to help us localize a sound, including comparisons of arrival times and intensity differences between the two ears. True or False?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.2

The Skin and Body Senses: From Touch to Movement | 157

The Skin and Body Senses: From Touch to Movement LEARNING GOALS

●● Explain how sensory messages delivered to the skin (touch and temperature) are translated and interpreted by the brain.

●● Describe how we perceive and interpret pain. ●● Discuss the operation and function of the body senses: movement and balance.

We now turn to the three skin senses—touch, temperature, and pain—and to the body senses related to movement and balance. The skin and body senses have tre- mendous adaptive value. You need to detect that spider crawling up your leg; if a blowing ember from the fireplace happens to land on your forearm, it is certainly adaptive to respond quickly. It’s also important to detect and control the movement and position of our own bodies. We need to know, for example, whether we’re hang- ing upside down and the current positions of our arms and legs. Human sensory sys- tems have developed not only to detect the presence of objects in the environment but also to provide accurate information about the body itself. As in our earlier dis- cussions, in each case the environmental message must be translated, transmitted to the brain, and interpreted in a meaningful way.

Touch For touch or pressure, the physical message delivered to the skin is mechanical. An object makes contact with the body—perhaps your fingers actively reach out and initiate the contact—and receptor cells embedded in the skin are disturbed. The mechanical pressure on the cell (it is literally deformed) produces a neural impulse, and the message is then transmitted to the spinal cord and up into the brain.

There are several different types of pressure-sensitive receptor cells in the skin. Some respond to constant pressure; others respond best to intermittent pressure, such as tapping on the skin or a stimulus that vibrates at a particular frequency. As with vision and hearing, touch information is transmitted up the neural pathway through distinct channels to processing stations in the brain, where the inputs received from various points on the body are combined. One kind of nerve fiber might carry infor- mation about touch location; other fibers might transmit information about whether the touch has been brief or sustained. Touch is used to determine the properties of objects and surfaces as well as their locations in space (Lederman & Klatzky, 2009).

At the level of the somatosensory cortex, located in the parietal lobe of the brain, a close connection is found among regions of the skin and representation in the cor- tex. As you learned in Chapter 3, the cortex contains multiple “body maps,” where adjacent cortical cells show sensitivity to adjacent areas on the skin. As in the visual cortex, some areas are represented more elaborately than others. For example, a rela- tively large amount of cortical tissue is devoted to the hands and lips, whereas the middle portion of the back, despite its size, receives little representation in the cortex. Maybe that’s the reason we kiss to display intense affection rather than simply pat someone on the back. There’s a lot more cortex devoted to the lips than to the back.

Everyone has the ability to recognize complex objects exclusively through touch. When blindfolded, people show near-perfect identification of common objects (such as toothbrushes and paperclips) after examining them by active touch (Klatzky et al., 1985). Active skin contact with an object produces not only shape information but information about firmness, texture, and weight. As with seeing and hearing, a per- son’s final interpretation of an object depends on what the person feels as well as on

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what he or she expects to feel. For instance, if you expect to be touched by an object on a particular finger, you are more likely to identify the object correctly (Craig, 1985). There are also changes in blood flow in the somatosensory cortex when a per- son simply expects to be touched (Drevets et al., 1995).

Temperature The body records and processes temperature through “thermoreceptors” located in the skin. Cold fibers respond to a cooling of the skin by increasing the production of neural impulses; warm fibers respond when the temperature of the skin increases. But our perception of warm and cold is only indirectly related to the actual temperature of the real-world object. To demonstrate, try plunging one hand into a bowl of cold water and the other hand into a bowl of hot water. Now place both hands into a third bowl containing water sitting at room temperature. The hand that was in the cold water will sense the water as warm; the other hand will experience it as cold. Same water, same temperature, but two different perceptual experiences. It’s the temperature change that determines your perception. When your cold hand touches warmer water, your skin begins to warm; it is the increase in skin temperature that you actually perceive.

At times these perceptual processes can lead to temperature “illusions.” For instance, metal seems cooler than wood even when both are at the same physical temperature. Why? Metal is a better conductor of heat than wood, so it absorbs more warmth from the skin. Consequently, the brain perceives the loss of heat as a cooler physical temperature.

Experiencing Pain Pain is an adaptive reaction that the body generates in response to events that are intense enough to cause tissue damage. It’s not fun, but pain is extremely use- ful. People who are born without the ability to experience pain live troubled lives. Without pain’s signal, they can’t tell when the frying pan is too hot to hold; they don’t

cold fibers Neurons that respond to a cooling of the skin by increasing the production of neural impulses.

warm fibers Neurons that respond vigorously when the temperature of the skin increases.

pain An adaptive response by the body to any stimulus that is intense enough to cause tissue damage.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Can you tell the difference between the touch of a loved one and the touch of a stranger? Do you think you could learn to interpret a touch differently with experience?

Humans use touch to acquire information about shape, firmness, texture, and weight.

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The Skin and Body Senses: From Touch to Movement | 159

know to shift position when too much pressure is being placed on a joint. Pain is the body’s warning system—be careful, something is wrong.

Each of us has pain receptors in our skin, called nociceptors, that can be activated externally (e.g., by heat or severe pressure) or by internal dam- age or inflammation to our tissues and joints. The psychological experience of pain, however, relies on much more than just a physical stimulus. There are well-documented examples of soldiers who report little or no pain after receiving serious injuries in battle; the same is true of many individuals entering an emergency room. In addition, certain non-Western cultures use rituals that should, from a Western perspective, inflict great pain but appar- ently do not (Melzack, 1973).

Gate-Control Theory The interplay between the physical and the psy- chological in pain perception forms the basis for the gate-control theory (Melzack & Wall, 1965, 1982). The basic idea is that the neural impulses gen- erated by pain receptors can be blocked, or gated, in the spinal cord by sig- nals produced in the brain. If you’ve just sliced your finger cutting carrots on the kitchen counter, you would normally feel pain. But if a pan on the stove suddenly starts to smoke, the pain evaporates while you try to prevent your house from burning down. According to gate-control theory, the brain can block the critical pain signals from reaching higher neural centers when it is appropriate to do so.

How is the gating action actually carried out? The mechanisms are unclear, but two types of nerve fibers appear to be responsible for opening and closing the gate. So-called “large” fibers, when stimulated, produce ner- vous system activity that closes the gate; other “small” fibers, when stimu- lated, inhibit those neural processes and effectively open the gate. External activities—such as rubbing or placing ice on a wound—also apparently stimulate the large fibers, which close the gate, preventing further passage of the pain message toward the brain. The details of the neural circuitry remain to be worked out, and it’s worth noting that the neural connections proposed in the origi- nal gate-control theory turned out to be wrong, but the idea of a pain gate that opens and closes remains popular among researchers (Sufta & Price, 2002).

In addition to gating the pain signals, as we discussed in Chapter 3, the brain can also control the experience of pain through the release of chemicals called endor- phins, which produce painkilling effects like those obtained through morphine. The release of endorphins may help explain those instances in which pain should be expe- rienced but is not. For example, swallowing a sugar pill can sometimes reduce pain even though there’s no medical reason it should work (a placebo effect). Such effects, and other analgesic procedures such as acupuncture, might be caused by the brain’s internal production of its own antipain medication.

The Kinesthetic Sense The word kinesthesia literally means “movement”; when used in connection with sensation, the term refers to the ability to sense the position and movement of one’s body parts. For example, as you reach toward a blossoming flower, feedback from your skin, tendons, muscles, and especially joints helps you maintain the correct line toward the target. The kinesthetic sense shares many properties with the sense of touch—a variety of receptors in the muscles that surround the joints react to the physical forces produced by moving the limbs.

The nerve impulses generated by the kinesthetic receptors travel to the somato- sensory cortex, where, it is presumed, increasingly complex cells respond only when body parts (such as the arms) are placed in certain positions (Gardner & Costanzo, 1981). But the psychological experience of movement is most likely influenced by

gate-control theory The idea that neural impulses generated by pain receptors can be blocked, or gated, in the spinal cord by signals produced in the brain.

kinesthesia In perception, the ability to sense the position and movement of one’s body parts.

The popularity of winter swimming among Russians demonstrates how the perception of temperature can be influenced by psychological factors.

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multiple factors, as with other kinds of perception. The visual system, for exam- ple, provides additional feedback about current position, as does the sense of touch (Lederman & Klatzky, 2009).

The Vestibular Sense We have another complex receptor sys- tem, attached to the cochlea of the inner ear, that responds not only to movement but also to acceleration and to changes in upright posture. Each ear contains three small fluid-filled semicircular canals that are lined with hair cells similar to those found in the cochlea. If you quickly turn your head toward some object, these hair cells are displaced, and nerve impulses signaling acceleration are transmitted throughout the brain. Some of the nerve fibers project to the cortex; others direct

messages to the eye muscles, allowing you to adjust your eyes as your head is turning. The vestibular system is also responsible for the sense of balance. If you tilt

your head, or experience a 360-degree loop on a roller coaster, receptor cells located in other inner ear organs, called vestibular sacs, quick ly transmit the appropriate orientation information to the brain. Continual disturbance of the semicircular canals or the vestibular sacs can produce dizziness, nausea, and motion sick ness.

semicircular canals A receptor system attached to the inner ear that responds to movement and acceleration and to changes in upright posture.

vestibular sacs Organs of the inner ear that contain receptors thought to be primarily responsible for balance.

The vestibular sense helps people maintain balance by monitoring the position of the body in space.

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test Yourself Check your knowledge about the skin and body senses by answering the following multiple-choice questions. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Alicia holds her left hand in a bowl of cold water and her right hand in a bowl of hot water. She then transfers both hands to a bowl containing water at room temperature. She finds that her left hand now feels warm and her right hand cool. Why?

a. Cold and hot fibers rebound after continued activity. b. It’s temperature change that determines perception. c. She expects a change; therefore, a change is experienced. d. Opponent-process cells in the cortex are reacting.

2. According to gate-control theory, psychological factors can influence the perception of pain by

a. channeling pain signals to the occipital lobe. b. reducing the supply of endorphins in the body. c. blocking pain signals from reaching higher neural centers. d. blocking pain receptors from relaying messages to the spinal cord.

3. The vestibular sacs contain receptor cells that help us maintain our sense of balance. Where are they located?

a. In the lateral geniculate nucleus b. In the superior colliculus c. In the joints and limbs of the body d. In the inner ear

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.3

The Chemical Senses: Smell and Taste | 161

The Chemical Senses: Smell and Taste LEARNING GOAL

●● Describe how chemical stimuli lead to neural activities that are interpreted as different odors and tastes.

We end our review of the individual sensory systems with the chemical senses, smell and taste. Few messages from the environment carry as much emotional impact as chemically based input. You can appreciate the touch of a loved one, or the visual beauty of a sunset, but consider your reaction to the smell of decaying meat or to the taste of milk left a bit too long in the sun! Smells and tastes are enormously adaptive because they too possess powerful signaling properties: Like other animals, humans learn to avoid off odors and bitter tastes.

The perception of both smell and taste begins with the activity of receptor cells, called chemoreceptors, that react to invisible molecules scattered about in the air or dissolved in liquids. These receptors solve the translation problem and project the newly formed neural impulses toward the brain. Psychologically, the two senses are related: Anyone who has ever had a cold knows that things “ just don’t taste right” with a plugged nose. You can demonstrate this for yourself by holding your nose and trying to taste the difference between an apple and a piece of raw potato. People can identify a taste far more efficiently if they are also allowed a brief sniff (Mozell et al., 1969). Let’s consider each of these chemical senses in more detail.

Smell The technical name for the sense of smell is olfaction, which comes from the Latin olfacere, meaning “to smell.” Airborne molecules enter through the nose or the back of the throat and interact with receptor cells embed- ded in the upper region of the nasal cavity. Like the receptor systems used to hear and detect motion, the olfactory receptor cells contain tiny hairs, or cilia. The airborne molecules are thought to bind with the cilia, causing the generation of a neural impulse. Receptor fibers then move the message forward to the olfactory bulb, located at the bottom front region of the brain. From there the information is sent to several areas in the brain.

Studies have shown that people probably have a thousand or more dif- ferent kinds of olfactory receptor cells (Buck & Axel, 1991). Each receptor cell responds only to certain molecules, but a given “smell” results from a pattern of activation across a number of these different receptors. Most odors are complex psychological experiences. People have no problem rec- ognizing the smell of frying bacon or the aroma of fresh coffee, but a chemi- cal analysis of these events fails to reveal the presence of any single defining molecule. Clearly, the ability to apply the label “frying bacon” to a set of airborne chemicals comes from complex perceptual processes. It’s even pos- sible to produce smell illusions—if you’re led to expect that a particular odor is present, even though it’s not, you’re likely to report detecting its pres- ence (O’Mahony, 1978). Similar to other sensory systems, odor perception is likely signaled by a pattern of activation across the olfactory bulb and by changes in the firing rates of neurons (Shepard, 2006).

The neural pathway for smell is somewhat unusual, compared with other sensory systems, because connections are made with forebrain struc- tures such as the amygdala, hippocampus, and the hypothalamus (Buck, 1996). As you learned in Chapter 3, these areas have been linked with the regulation of feeding, drinking, sexual behavior, and even memory. Part of

chemoreceptors Receptor cells that react to invisible molecules scattered about in the air or dissolved in liquids, leading to the senses of smell and taste.

olfaction The sense of smell.

A taster’s ability to identify the smell, or “bouquet,” of wine depends on the constellation of airborne chemicals produced by the wine and on the experience of the taster.

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the emotional power of olfactory cues might be related to the involvement of this motivational pathway. Certainly in lower animals, whose behavior is often dom- inated by odor cues, brain structures such as the hypothalamus and the amygdala seem likely to play a major role in the animal’s reaction to odors in its environment.

Many animals release chemicals, called pheromones, that cause highly specific reactions when detected by other members of the species (Brennan & Zufall, 2006). Pheromones often induce sexual behavior or characteristic patterns of aggression, but other reactions can be produced. Ants, for example, react to the smell of a dead member of the colony by carrying the decaying corpse outside the nest (Wilson, 1963). So far, much to the disappointment of the perfume industry, little support has been found for human pheromones; at least no scents have been discovered that reli- ably induce sexual interest (Doty, 2010). There is some tantalizing evidence suggest- ing that women prefer the scents of men who show physical traits suggestive of “good genes,” such as facial symmetry; moreover, these preferences are strongest when the women are most fertile (Thornhill et al., 2003).

Taste Smell’s companion sense, taste, is known by the technical term gustation, which comes from the Latin gustare, meaning “to taste.” Unlike odors, which are difficult to classify, there appear to be four basic tastes: sweet, bitter, salty, and sour. There may be a fifth basic taste as well, called umami (which translates from the Japanese as “meaty” or “savory”), but its status as a basic taste remains controversial (Beauchamp, 2009). When psychologists use the term taste, they are referring to the sensations produced by the taste receptors; they are not referring to the overall richness of the psychological experience that accompanies eating. Typically, the term flavor is used to describe the meal experience. Flavor is influenced by taste, smell, and the visual appearance of the food, as well as by expectations about the quality of the meal (Shepard, 2006).

Taste receptors are distributed throughout the mouth but mainly occur across the tongue. If you coat your tongue with a mouthful of milk and glance in a mirror,

gustation The sense of taste.

flavor A psychological term used to describe the gustatory experience. Flavor is influenced by taste, smell, and the visual appearance of food, as well as by expectations about the food’s quality.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Some smells and tastes are truly disgusting and lead to characteristic facial expressions and reactions. Can you think of any adaptive reasons we might have such reactions?

Taste buds, which contain the receptor cells for taste, are embedded within the folds of the large circular papillae.

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From the Physical to the Psychological | 163

you’ll see that your tongue is covered with tiny bumps called papillae. The taste buds, which contain the actual receptor cells, are embedded within the folds of the papil- lae. Different types of taste receptor cells have been discovered; each is sensitive to a particular kind of taste molecule—one might respond to salt and another to sweet. Contact with the relevant molecule leads to the generation of neural responses (action potentials), which are then transmitted to several taste-sensitive regions of the brain.

The brain produces stable interpretations of taste stimuli, but the identification pro- cess is complex. Again, the ultimate experience of flavor depends on many factors. Taste interacts with smell and experience can alter one’s perception. No one is born liking chili peppers. Moreover, prior exposure to one kind of taste often changes the perception of another. Anyone who has ever tried to drink orange juice after brushing his or her teeth understands how tastes interact. To some extent, the interaction process depends on the similarity of successive tastes. A taste of a sour pickle, but not a salty cracker, will reduce the “sourness” of lemon juice. There are even natural substances that can completely change the normal perception of taste. One substance extracted from berries, called “miracle fruit,” turns extremely sour tastes (such as from raw lemons) sweet. Another substance, taken from the leaves of a plant found in India and Africa, temporarily elimi- nates the sweet taste of sugar. Despite these complexities, there are universals: Babies are born liking sweet tastes and disliking things that taste bitter. Bitter taste can signal poten- tial poisons and sweetness can help identify sugars that are biologically necessary. These taste fundamentals clearly helped our ancestors adapt and survive in their environments.

taste buds The receptor cells on the tongue.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about smell and taste by filling in the blanks. Choose the best answer from among the following terms: chemoreceptors, flavor, gustation, hypothalamus, olfaction, olfactory bulb, pheromones, taste, taste buds. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The general term for receptor cells that are activated by invisible molecules scattered about in the air or dissolved in liquids:

2. One of the main brain destinations for odor messages:

3. A psychological term used to describe the entire gustatory experience:

4. The technical name for the sense of smell:

5. The technical name for the sense of taste:

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.4

From the Physical to the Psychological LEARNING GOALS

●● Explain stimulus detection, including techniques designed to measure it. ●● Define difference thresholds and explain Weber’s law. ●● Discuss stimulus adaptation and its adaptive value.

There’s a transition from the physical to the psychological. Messages originate in the physical world, but our conscious experience of those messages is influenced by our

164 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

beliefs about how the world is organized. We interpret the physical message, and this means our conscious experience of the sensory message can be different from the one that is actually delivered by the environment. In the field of psychophysics, research- ers search for ways to describe the transition from the physical to the psychological in the form of mathematical laws. By quantifying the relationship between the physi- cal properties of a stimulus and its subjective experience, psychophysicists hope to develop general laws that apply across all kinds of sensory input. Let’s consider some examples of how such laws are established.

Stimulus Detection Psychophysics is one of the oldest research areas in psychology; it dates back to the work of Wilhelm Wundt, Gustav Fechner, and others in the 19th century. One of the first questions these early researchers asked was this: What is the minimum amount of stimulus energy needed to produce a sensation? Suppose I present you with a very faint pure tone—one that you cannot hear—and gradually make it louder. At some point you will hear the tone. This point is known as the absolute threshold for the stimu- lus; it is the level of intensity that lifts the stimulus over the threshold of conscious awareness. One of the early insights of psychophysicists was that absolute thresholds are really not absolute. It turns out that there is no single point at which detection reli- ably begins. For a given intensity, sometimes people will hear the tone, other times not (the same situation applies to detection in all the sensory modalities, not just auditory). For this reason, absolute thresholds were redefined as the intensity at which people can detect the presence of a stimulus 50% of the time (see ●Figure 5.24).

It might seem strange that detection changes from moment to moment. Part of the reason is that trial-to-trial observations can be “noisy.” It’s virtually impossible for a researcher to control for all the things that can affect performance. For example, a person might have a momentary lapse in attention that causes him or her to miss a presented stimulus. Some random activity in the nervous system might even create brief changes in the sensitivity of the receptor systems. Experimenters try to take these factors into account by presenting many detection opportunities and averaging performance over trials.

Psychologists have also developed statistical techniques to pull the “truth” out of noisy data. Human participants often have built-in biases that influence their responses. For example, people will sometimes report the presence of a stimulus even

though none has actually been presented. Why? Sometimes the observer is simply worried about missing a presented stimulus, so he or she says “Yes, I heard it” on every trial. To control for these tendencies, researchers use a technique called signal detection that mathematically compares hits—in which a stimulus is correctly detected—to false alarms—in which the observer claims a stimulus was presented when it actually was not.

Four types of outcomes can occur in a detection situation. Besides hits and false alarms, you can also fail to detect a stimulus when it was actually presented—called a miss—or correctly recog- nize that a stimulus was, in fact, not presented on that trial—called a correct rejection. Researchers compare outcomes over trials in an attempt to determine true detection ability.

To see why it’s important to compare the different outcomes, imagine Lois is participating in a simple detection experiment and that her strategy is to say, “Yes, a stimulus occurred,” on every trial (even when no stimulus was actually presented). If the researcher pays attention only to hits, it will appear as if Lois has perfect

psychophysics A field of psychology in which researchers search for ways to describe the transition from the physical stimulus to the psychological experience of that stimulus.

signal detection A technique used to determine the ability of someone to detect the presence of a stimulus.

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●● FiGuRE 5.24 Absolute threshold The more intense the stimulus, the greater the likelihood that it will be detected. The absolute threshold is the intensity level at which we can detect the presence of the stimulus 50% of the time. (© Cengage Learning)

detection ability—she always correctly identifies a stimulus when it occurs. But say- ing “Yes” on every trial will also lead to false alarms—she will say “Yes” on trials when no stimulus was actually presented. By comparing hits and false alarms, the researcher is able to determine whether her high number of “hits” is really due to detection ability or whether it’s due to some other bias on her part. If Lois can truly detect the stimulus when it occurs, she should show lots of hits and very few false alarms.

Difference Thresholds Researchers in psychophysics have also been concerned with the measurement of difference thresholds: the smallest detectable difference in the magnitude of two stimuli. Suppose I present you with two tones, each equally loud. I then gradually increase the intensity of one of the tones until you notice it as being louder than the other (called the standard). How much of a change do I need to make for you to detect the difference? As with absolute thresholds, the required amount changes from one moment to the next, but an important general principle emerges.

It turns out that detection of a just noticeable difference (or jnd) depends on how intense the standard was in the first place. If you have your iPod cranked up, small changes in the volume will not be noticed; but if the volume starts out low, the same changes are likely to produce a very noticeable difference. If you’re at a rock concert and your friend Gillian wants to tell you something, she needs to yell; if you’re in a library, a whisper will do. We can state this relationship more formally as follows: The jnd for stimulus magnitude is a constant proportion of the size of the standard stimulus. In other words, the louder the standard stimulus (the iPod), the more vol- ume will be needed before a difference in loudness will be detected. This general rela- tionship, called Weber’s law, doesn’t work just for loudness—it applies across all the sensory systems. If the lights in your house go off, two candles will make the room a lot brighter than one; if the lights are on, adding one or two candles will lead to little, if any, noticeable increase in brightness (see the above photos). Weber’s law demon- strates once again that the relationship between the physical and the psychological is not always direct; increases in the magnitude of a physical stimulus will not always lead to increases in the psychological experience.

difference threshold The smallest detectable difference in the magnitude of two stimuli.

Weber’s law The principle stating that the ability to notice a difference in the magnitude of two stimuli is a constant proportion of the size of the standard stimulus. Psychologically, the more intense a stimulus is to begin with, the more intense it will need to become for one to notice a change.

The addition of a few candles to a brightly lit room has little effect on perceived brightness (a); but when candles are added to a dimly lit room (b), the increase in brightness is quite noticeable.

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166 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

Sensory Adaptation One other feature of all sensory systems is important to remember: Sensory systems are more sensitive to a message when it first arrives than to its continued presence. Through sensory adaptation, the body quickly adapts by reducing sensitivity to a message that remains constant—such as the feel of a shirtsleeve on your forearm, your hand resting on your knee, or the hum of computers in the background. Think about what the world would be like without sensory adaptation. The water in the pool would never warm up; the smell of garlic from last night’s dinner would remain a pervasive force; you would constantly be reminded of the texture of your sock pressing against your foot.

Adaptation is a feature of each of the sensory systems we’ve discussed. Images that remain stable on the retina will vanish; this doesn’t normally occur because the eyes are constantly moving and refreshing the retinal image. If you are presented with a continuous tone, your perception of its loudness decreases over time. If audi- tory adaptation didn’t occur, no one would ever be able to work in a noisy envi- ronment. Human sensory systems are designed to detect changes in the incoming message; sensitivity is reduced to those aspects of the message that remain the same.

sensory adaptation The tendency of sensory systems to reduce sensitivity to a stimulus source that remains constant.

test Yourself Check your understanding of psychophysics by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The intensity level that is required to perceive a stimulus varies across individuals but remains constant for any given individual. True or False?

2. A “false alarm” occurs in signal detection when an observer claims a signal was present when, in fact, it was not. True or False?

3. According to Weber’s law, the detection of a just noticeable difference in magnitude is constant across all intensity levels. True or False?

4. Sensory adaptation is a characteristic of all sensory systems. True or False?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.5

●● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How We Build the World of Experience To navigate successfully in the world, we rely on multiple sen- sory systems. As you’ve seen, the outside world itself is not very user friendly—it bombards the body with energy-based messages, but none arrives in a form appropriate for the lan- guage of the brain. Moreover, the messages that our sensory systems receive are complex and ever changing. To build an

accurate view of the world, our sensory systems need to solve three problems: (1) the external message must be translated into the internal language of the nervous system; (2) the ele- mentary components must be identified and pulled from the message; (3) a stable and lasting interpretation of the message components must be built.

Psychology For a Reason: How We Build the World of Experience | 167

Translating the Message To solve the translation problem, the body relies on specialized receptor cells that generate neural impulses in the presence of particular energy sources. In the visual system, receptor cells—rods and cones—react to light; in the auditory system, sound leads to movement of the basi- lar membrane, which in turn causes tiny hair cells to generate a neural impulse. The body also has specialized receptors that react to pressure on the skin, free-floating chemicals in the air, and the relative position or movement of muscles. Each of these receptor systems acts as a kind of “translator,” changing the messages delivered by the world into the electrochemical language of the brain.

Identifying the Message Components Once translated, systems in the brain work to identify the basic components contained in the sensory message. A variety of neural pathways are spe- cialized to look for particular kinds of sensory information. For example, opponent-process cells in the lateral geniculate are specialized to process color; they signal the presence of one kind of color by increasing the rate at which they gen- erate neural impulses; they signal another kind of color by decreasing their firing rate. Similarly, highly specialized cells in the visual cortex respond only to particular patterns of light and dark. One kind of cell might respond to a bar of light presented at a particular orientation; another cell might respond to a pattern of light that moves in a particular direc- tion across the retina.

In the auditory cortex, the brain detects information about the frequencies of sound in an auditory message. Psychologically, changes in frequency correspond to changes in perceived pitch. The brain extracts frequency infor- mation by noting the particular place on the basilar mem- brane where hair cells are stimulated and by noting the rate

at which neural impulses are generated over time. It’s not unusual for the brain to rely on multiple kinds of processing to extract a particular message component. The perception of color, for instance, relies not only on opponent-process cells but also on the relative activations of three different cone types in the retina.

Producing a Stable Interpretation To build a stable inter- pretation of the sensory message, we use a combination of bottom-up and top-down processing—beliefs and expecta- tions work with the actual sensory input to build perceptions of the external world. In many respects our perceptual abili- ties are truly amazing. The pattern of light reflected from a moving object changes continuously with time, yet we have no trouble recognizing a dancer moving effortlessly across the stage. We also have no trouble identifying the voice of a friend in a crowded room, even though the actual auditory message reaching our ears may be filled with frequency infor- mation from many different voices.

The brain solves these problems of perception, in part, by relying on organizational “rules.” For example, we’re born with built-in tendencies to group message components in par- ticular ways. Figures are separated from ground, items that share physical properties are perceived together, and so on. But we also rely on prior knowledge for help in the interpre- tation process. We use what we know about how cues are related in the environment to arrive at sensible interpreta- tions of ambiguous objects. For instance, if two parallel lines converge in the visual field, the brain assumes that the lines are moving away—like railroad tracks moving off in the dis- tance. Such top-down processing is usually extremely adap- tive—it helps us maintain a stable interpretation—although in some cases perceptual illusions may be produced.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.) Vision: The World of Color and Form

●● Light reflected from an object enters the (1) through the cornea, (2) , and (3) . Light reaches the back of the eye, or (4) , where light-sensitive receptor cells called (5) and (6) translate the message into the language of the brain.

●● After leaving the retina, neural activation flows first to the (7) and then primarily through the lateral geniculate nucleus in the (8) . (9) in the visual cortex respond to particular aspects of a stim- ulus, such as orientation and patterns of light and dark. The trichromatic theory proposes that color information is extracted from (10) different kinds of cones;

(11) - proposes that cells respond positively to one color type and negatively to others. Each theory accounts for certain aspects of color vision.

●● Bottom-up processing starts with a physical message, and (12) - processing applies knowl- edge and expectation. We group incoming visual mes- sages according to Gestalt principles of organization, which include the laws of (13) , similarity, (14) , good continuation, and common fate. Monocular and (15) cues help us perceive (16) . We use top-down processing to help us identify objects and achieve perceptual (17) , although sometimes inappropriate interpretations of physical reality can occur.

168 | CHAPTER 5 Sensation and Perception

Hearing: Identifying and Localizing Sounds ●● Sound varies in (18) and (19) . Sound wave vibrations enter the ear through the pinna and travel to the tympanic membrane, or (20) , and then to the middle ear, inner ear, and cochlea. Vibrating fluid in the (21) displaces the (22) , which activates auditory receptors called hair cells.

●● The (23) uses several types of information to identify pitch. The (24) of pitch perception holds that we hear a particular pitch because (25) at a certain location on the basilar membrane are responding actively. According to frequency theory, pitch is partly determined by the (26) of neural impulses traveling up the auditory pathway. Final processing of the auditory message takes place in the audi- tory cortex. Cells in certain areas of the (27) are sensitive to different sound information.

●● The brain uses existing knowledge and (28) to impose structure on and (29) incoming auditory messages. Sound (30) depends on comparing how the arrival (31) and (32) of a sound differs from one ear to another.

The Skin and Body Senses: From Touch to Movement

●● Touch information is transmitted from different types of (33) - skin cells through distinct neural pathways to the brain, where it is processed by the (34) cortex in the (35) lobe. Cold fibers respond to skin cooling and warm fibers respond to skin warming by (36) neural firing. Temperature perception depends on (37) in temperature.

●● According to (38) - theory, pain receptors generate impulses that are gated, or blocked, in the (39) by brain signals. This can prevent criti- cal pain signals from reaching higher neural centers when appropriate. The (40) also controls our experi- ence of pain by releasing (41) , chemicals that produce pain-relieving effects.

●● (42) is the ability to sense the (43) and movement of the various parts of the body. Kinesthetic receptors generate nerve impulses that travel to the (44) cortex. The (45) sense responds to movement, (46) , and changes in upright pos- ture. (47) canals and vestibular sacs in the ear help us detect the position of the head and influence our sense of balance.

The Chemical Senses: Smell and Taste ●● The sense of smell, or (48) , and taste, or gusta- tion, depends on the activity of (49) that react to molecules in the air or dissolved fluids. Olfaction relies on airborne molecules that enter the nose or back of the throat and interact with chemoreceptors in the (50) cavity to produce a message that travels to the olfactory (51) in the brain. Gustation relies on taste buds that contain chemoreceptors embedded in the tiny bumps on the tongue called papillae. Taste appears to have four categories: sweet, salty, bitter, and sour. Taste messages travel first to the (52) and then to the taste-sensitive regions of the cortex.

From the Physical to the Psychological ●● The (53) of a stimulus is the level of intensity at which we can detect the presence of the stimulus (54) percent of the time. To account for varying responses, researchers developed (55) , a technique that mathematically compares hits to (56) alarms.

●● A (57) is the smallest difference in the (58) of two stimuli that can be (59) . According to Weber’s law, detecting a (60) ( jnd) depends on the intensity or size of the standard stimulus.

●● Sensory (61) is an important function that allows the body to adapt quickly to a (62) by reducing (63) to sensory messages that remain (64) , such as the feel of a sleeve on your arm.

Terms to Remember | 169

absolute threshold, 164 accommodation, 134 basilar membrane, 153 binocular depth cues, 146 blind spot, 137 bottom-up processing, 143 brightness, 133 chemoreceptors, 161 cochlea, 152 cold fibers, 158 cones, 135 convergence, 146 cornea, 134 dark adaptation, 137 difference threshold, 165 feature detectors, 139 flavor, 162 fovea, 135 frequency theory, 154 gate-control theory, 159

Gestalt principles of organization, 144

gustation, 162 hue, 133 iris, 134 kinesthesia, 159 lens, 134 light, 133 middle ear, 152 monocular depth cues, 146 olfaction, 161 opponent-process theory, 142 pain, 158 perception, 131 perceptual constancy, 148 perceptual illusions, 149 phi phenomenon, 148 pinna, 152 pitch, 152 place theory, 154 psychophysics, 164

pupil, 134 receptive field, 136 recognition by

components, 145 retina, 135 retinal disparity, 146 rods, 135 semicircular canals, 160 sensations, 131 sensory adaptation, 166 signal detection, 164 sound, 152 taste buds, 163 top-down processing, 143 transduction, 133 trichromatic theory, 142 tympanic membrane, 152 vestibular sacs, 160 visual acuity, 135 warm fibers, 158 Weber’s law, 165

Terms to Remember

Media Resources

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

170

6 Consciousness

Psychology for a reason What is Consciousness For?

Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning: Attention

Learning Goals Experiments on Attention: Dichotic

Listening Processing Without Attention:

Automaticity

Practical solutions Cell Phones And Driving

Disorders of Attention Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.1

Altering Awareness: Induced States Learning Goals The Phenomenon of Hypnosis Explaining Hypnosis Meditation Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.4

Psychology for a reason What Consciousness Is For

chaPter review Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Sleeping and Dreaming Learning Goals Biological Rhythms The Characteristics of Sleep The Function of Sleep The Function of REM and Dreaming Disorders of Sleep Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.2

Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs Learning Goals Drug Actions and Effects Categories of Psychoactive Drugs Psychological Factors Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.3

171

Stop for a moment and take a look inside your own head. Try to grab hold of con-scious thought and take it for a ride. Forget about its contents—ideas, images, sounds—concentrate only on the movements from thought-to-thought-to-thought- to-thought. Notice the transitions, the ways ideas and feelings spring forth, only to disappear a moment later. Would you call the movements bumpy? Smooth? The American psychologist William James (1890) was convinced that consciousness flows. Consciousness isn’t something that can be chopped up in bits, he argued, “words such as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly . . . a ‘river’ or ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described” (p. 233).

Psychologists define consciousness as the subjective awareness of internal and external events. The key term here, of course, is awareness, but what does it mean to be aware? To be aware is to experience the here and now, to experience the past in the form of memories, but especially to think and reason. Awareness has the addi- tional property of focus: You can choose to attend to that bug walking up the page of your text, or to the voice of your roommate telling you to turn out the light. You can also use conscious thought to develop strategies for behavior; you can think about what you want to say or do, and you can imagine the outcomes of those actions with- out actually performing the behaviors. You can use conscious thought to imagine the content of other minds—to predict the behavior of other people and to understand their motivation (Baumeister et al., 2011).

At the same time, one of the insights of modern neuroscience is that our thoughts and actions are often controlled by processes that operate below levels of conscious awareness. To take an extreme case, you’re not aware of the processes controlling your heartbeat or breathing rate, yet these functions carry on like clockwork. Lots of things require little or no conscious thought: our ability to understand spoken lan- guage, detecting that one object is farther away than another, sensing anger or hap- piness from a fleeting glimpse of a face, orienting to a loud noise, riding a bike on an empty road—the list goes on and on.

Even conscious decision-making, like your decision to pick up a coffee cup, is partly controlled by unconscious processes. If we measure the brain activities used to guide behavior, such as picking up a coffee cup, they’re already gaining steam well before you consciously decide to pick up the cup (Libet, 2004). In some sense, your brain knows what it wants to do before you do! This doesn’t mean that conscious- ness is unimportant, but it’s less involved in guiding immediate behavior than you

consciousness The subjective awareness of internal and external events.

● Psychology for a reason What Is Consciousness For?

172 | CHAPTER 6 Consciousness

might think. Indeed, if you measure what people tend to think about, it’s usually not about what’s happening in the immediate here and now. Instead, we use our conscious thoughts to plan future behaviors, solve demanding problems, and to think about the consequences of our actions. Consciousness enables us to assign meaning to our actions, thereby helping us to understand, predict, and ultimately control our world (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010).

To appreciate the role of consciousness, as well as to understand how psy- chologists study it, we’ll consider four situations in which the processes of con- sciousness importantly apply.

Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning There are limits to the number of things we can think about at the same time or to the number of tasks we can perform. Have you ever tried to solve a difficult thought problem while someone talks nearby? What about driving and sending a text message on your cell phone— having trouble? Obviously, it’s critical to be selective about what we choose to focus on. In this section we’ll discuss how the psychological processes of atten- tion help focus our resources on the important tasks at hand.

Sleeping and Dreaming Sleep clearly serves an adaptive function, and it represents a change in level or state of awareness. But what are the functions of sleep and dreaming? Some researchers believe that we sleep in order to give the brain a chance to rest and restore itself from the day’s activities. Others believe that sleep protects us during periods when our sensory equipment is unlikely to function well (such as at night). Dreaming may help us work out hidden con- flicts or simply help us exercise the neural circuitry of the brain.

Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs You know that psychoactive drugs, such as those contained in alcohol and marijuana, can produce mind-bending altera- tions of consciousness. But did you know that the biological processes that pro- duce these changes are actually natural and important ingredients of an adaptive mind? Make no mistake—consuming psychoactive drugs can have harmful and long-lasting consequences. But it’s important to understand that artificial drugs operate, in part, by tapping natural adaptive systems.

Altering Awareness: Induced States We’ll end the chapter by discussing hypnosis, a procedure that induces a heightened state of suggestibility, and meditation. Both are induced “states” of awareness that have a long history in psycholog- ical research. Does hypnosis tell us anything about awareness and its func- tion? Through hypnosis, it’s possible to break bad habits (such as smoking) and drastically reduce the experience of pain. The techniques of meditation have proven effective in the treatment of stress and psychological disorders. You’ll discover that both hypnosis and meditation can have very useful and adaptive benefits.

Setting priorities for mental functioning

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Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning: Attention | 173

Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning: Attention LeArnIng goALS

● Define attention and discuss its adaptive value. ● Explain how experiments on dichotic listening can be used to study attention. ● Describe automaticity and its effects on awareness. ● Describe such disorders as visual neglect and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

The world is a teeming smorgasbord of sensory information. We don’t experience every sight and sound, of course; we sample selectively from the table based on cur- rent needs. If you’re searching for a friend adrift in a crowded room, you focus on the familiar sound of his voice or the color of her shirt. If you’re trying to deter- mine what’s for dinner tonight, you sniff the air for the odor of cooking pot roast or simmering spaghetti sauce. You notice those things that are important to the task at hand—you sift through, block out, and focus on those messages that solve the particular problem you face.

Psychologists use the term attention to refer to the internal processes that set pri- orities for mental functioning. For adaptive reasons, the brain uses attention to focus selectively on certain parts of the environment while ignoring others. Obviously, the concepts of attention and consciousness are closely linked—you’re consciously aware only of those things that receive some measure of attention. But why is awareness selective? One reason is that the resources of the brain and nervous system are lim- ited. The brain has only so many neurons, and there are limits to how fast and effi- ciently those neurons can communicate. These limitations require us to make choices about which parts of the environment to process (Broadbent, 1958; Chun et al., 2011).

Even if we had unlimited resources, we would still need to make choices. In a mystery novel, certain events are important for solving a murder and others are “red herrings”—irrelevant points that lead the reader in the wrong direction and delay solving the crime. The trick is to be selective about which clues to pursue. A first-rate detective knows not only what to look for but also what information to avoid. The same is true for even the simplest kind of action, such as walking across the room or reaching for a cup. The visual and motor systems must focus on objects in your path, not every single object in the room. If you looked at and thought about everything, you would become paralyzed with indecision. Prioritizing mental functioning is an important part of how we coordinate and control our behavior.

Experiments on Attention: Dichotic Listening Research on attention really began in the 1950s with the development of the dichotic listening technique (Broadbent, 1952; Cherry, 1953). As shown in ●Figure 6.1, in a typical experiment people are asked to listen to spoken messages presented individu- ally to each ear through headphones. To promote selective attention, the task is to shadow, or repeat aloud, one of the two messages while ignoring the other. This kind of listening is called dichotic, meaning “divided into two,” because two messages are involved, delivered separately into each of the two ears.

A dichotic listening experiment requires you to listen to two voices at the same time. Have you ever tried to watch television while someone next to you is talking nonstop? Not an easy task. In fact, in all likelihood you had to either ignore one of the two or switch back and forth from one message to the other. This is essentially what happens in a dichotic listening experiment. Forcing a person to repeat just one of the messages aloud usually results in poor processing of the other message. For example, if people are given a surprise test for the unattended message at the end of

attention The internal processes used to set priorities for mental functioning.

dichotic listening Different auditory messages are presented separately and simultaneously to each ear. The person’s task is to repeat aloud one message while ignoring the other.

critical thinking

Can you think of any circumstances in which your brain attends to things of which you are not aware?

174 | CHAPTER 6 Consciousness

the experiment, they can usually remember very little, if anything, about its content. They might pick up on the fact that one speaker was male and the other female, but they remember virtually nothing else about the unattended message (Cherry, 1953; Moray, 1959).

At the same time, we don’t just shut off the part of the world that isn’t bathed in the spotlight of attention. If we did, we would be in trouble because the world is con- stantly changing—something new, and possibly important, can happen at any time. Instead, the brain monitors many things at the same time, although the monitoring may be minimal and beyond our current awareness. A case in point is the cocktail party effect. Imagine you’re at a large party, filled with noisy conversation, and you’re trying really hard to hear what your companion is saying. In all likelihood you won’t be consciously aware of all the conversations around you. It’s doubtful, for example, that you could repeat what the couple standing next to you is saying. But suppose someone across the room suddenly speaks your name. There’s a reasonable chance

that you’ll turn your head immediately. People in dichotic listening experiments have shown the same effect: They appear to ignore the contents of the unattended message, but if their name appears in it, they notice and remember it later. This is the cocktail party effect, and it suggests that our brains are aware of more than we think.

Another compelling example of how we can monitor multiple messages at the same time comes from an experiment by Treisman (1960), again using the dichotic listening technique. People were presented with compound sentences such as “Against the advice of his broker, the naive investor panicked” in one ear and “Released from his cage, the little lamb bounded into the field” in the other (see ●Figure 6.2). Participants were asked to attend to the message in just one of the ears by repeating it aloud, but in the middle of some of the sentences Treisman switched things around—the second half of each sentence moved to the opposite ear. So in the attended ear the person heard something like “Against the advice of his broker, the little lamb bounded into the field,” whereas in the unattended ear the message became “Released from his cage, the naive inves- tor panicked.” The interesting finding was that about 30% of the

cocktail party effect The ability to focus on one auditory message and ignore others; also refers to the tendency to notice when your name suddenly appears in a message that you’ve been actively ignoring.

“Four-score and seven years ago our fathers ...”

Unattended Channel “When asked the question, ‘what is consciousness?’ we become conscious of consciousness ...”

Attended Channel “Four-score and seven years ago our fathers ...”

● figure 6.1 the Dichotic listening technique In dichotic listening, a person listens to different spoken messages presented simultaneously to each ear and shadows—or repeats aloud—one of the messages while ignoring the other. The task taps the ability to attend selectively. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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The processes of attention let us filter out competing conversations in a noisy environment. But if someone across the room suddenly speaks your name, you’ll probably notice it. This is the “cocktail party effect.”

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Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning: Attention | 175

time people continued to repeat the meaningful sentence (“Against the advice of his broker, the naive investor panicked”) even though the message had switched midway from the attended to the unattended ear. Moreover, many reported being unaware that the message had switched.

These findings suggest that the brain doesn’t simply filter out what goes on in the unattended message. It focuses the spotlight of attention on the task at hand, but it carries on at least some unconscious monitoring of the rest of the environment as well. If something important happens, the brain shifts its attention and allows the new event to enter conscious awareness. In Treisman’s experiment, the brain must have been following the meaning of the messages in both ears, even though the peo- ple who participated were only aware of monitoring one thing. This process is clearly adaptive. People wouldn’t live for long in a world where they processed only those things in the realm of immediate awareness.

Processing Without Attention: Automaticity Remember, a lot of what you do is accomplished without conscious thought. You can drive a car and carry on a conversation at the same time—you don’t need to focus attention on every turn of the wheel or on pressing the brake. These things occur automatically. In the case of driving, or riding a bike, you have developed a skill that demands less and less attention with practice.

Psychologists use the term automaticity to refer to fast and effortless processing that requires little or no focused attention (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). When you practice a task, such as playing Mozart on the piano, overall speed steadily improves. You may even reach a point where performing the task seems automatic—Mozart rolls off your fingertips with such ease that you’re not even consciously aware of fin- ger movement. Automatic processes, once they develop, no longer seem to require conscious control. The mind is free to consider other things while the task itself is per- formed without a hitch. Many of the activities we take for granted—such as reading,

automaticity Fast and effortless processing that requires little or no focused attention.

Unattended Channel “Released from his cage the naive investor panicked.”

Attended Channel “Against the advice of his broker the little lamb bounded into the field.”

“Against the advice of his broker,

the naive investor panicked.”

● figure 6.2 treisman’s “ear-switching” experiment At one point in a dichotic listening experiment by Treisman, unknown to the participant, the to- be-shadowed message was suddenly and without warning switched to the unattended channel. Interestingly, people often continued to repeat the meaningful sentence even though it was now presented in the unattended ear. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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If you practice a task for extended periods, your performance may become automatic. Once acquired, automatic processes no longer require much conscious control.

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You’ve seen how the resources of the brain are limited. We use the processes of atten- tion to help us attend selectively to current priorities because we simply cannot attend to multiple messages at the same time—at least, not very well. There are some excep- tions. Automatic tasks can be performed without the need for sustained attention. Yet tasks that sometimes seem automatic, such as driving, often are not. Certain compo- nents of driving are well practiced and require little conscious thought, yet driving demands vigilance at all times. It’s been estimated that perhaps 50% of all traffic accidents on U.S. highways are influenced by driver inat- tention (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1998). The culprits? We’re conversing with a friend, listening to a cranked-up radio, or talk- ing on a cell phone.

Quite a bit of research has been done recently on cell phone use during driving. Cellular phones have become extremely popu- lar worldwide—there are well over 100 million subscribers in the United States alone—and surveys indicate that as many as 75% of cell phone users talk on the phone at least occasionally while driving; half of all adults report they’ve been in a car when the driver was sending or receiving a text (Madden & Rainie, 2010). Studies have established solid connections between cell phone use and traffic accidents. In fact, talking on a cell phone increases the risk of an accident to

levels similar to those seen when driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit (Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997). The pres- ence of a correlation between phone use and accidents, however, is not sufficient to infer that cell phone use causes accidents. It could be that people who use cell phones while driv- ing are just bad drivers. As you know, correla- tions do not imply causality.

To determine a causal link, we must have experimental control. A number of experi- ments have examined the link between cell phone use and driving. Typically, these stud- ies manipulate cell phone use during simu- lated driving—either in a driving simulator or by requiring people to perform a tracking task on a computer. In a study by Strayer and Johnston (2001), people were asked to use a joystick to move a cursor on a com- puter screen; the task was to keep the cursor aligned as closely as possible to a mov- ing target (meant to correspond roughly to maintaining location on a road). At random points, either a red or a green light flashed on the computer screen. The participants were instructed to react to the red light by press- ing a “brake” button on the joystick. When people were engaged in a cell phone conver- sation while performing the simulated driving task, they missed twice as many red lights. Even when the red light was detected, and the brake applied, people were considerably slower to respond. Moreover, the impairments

were found regardless of whether the cell phone was handheld while “driving” or a hands-free model. Perhaps not surprisingly, similar studies have found that text messag- ing during simulated driving also leads to very significant impairments in driving perfor- mance (Drews et al., 2009).

Cell phone conversations induce a kind of inattention blindness—you literally fail to remember seeing objects in the road because your attention is directed toward the cell phone conversation. Although any kind of in-vehicle conversation can lead to some impairment in driving ability, the effects of cell phone conversations appear to be par- ticularly disruptive (Strayer & Drews, 2007). The implications of these studies are clear: Turn off the cell phone when you drive. In fact, in 2011 the United States National Transportation Safety Board advocated for a full ban on cell phones and portable elec- tronic devices in cars.

● Practical solutions Cell Phones and Driving

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talking, and walking—are essentially automatic processes. (For another viewpoint on driving, see the Practical Solutions feature on the hazards of driving while using a cell phone.)

It’s possible to measure automaticity through a divided attention task (Logan, 1988). In a typical experiment, people are asked to perform two tasks at the same time, such as playing a piece by Mozart on the piano while simultaneously trying to remember a short list of unrelated words. Automaticity is demonstrated when one task, the auto- matic one, fails to interfere with performance on the other task (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Clearly, if you’ve just learned to play the Mozart piece, your mind will need to focus on every note; you’ll have enough trouble just getting through it without error, let alone recalling a list of words. But if you’re an accomplished pianist—if your Mozart performance has become automatic—you can let your fingers do the playing and your mind can concentrate on remembering the word list.

Notice the relationship between automaticity and awareness, because it tells us something important about the function of consciousness. The better you are at per- forming a task—the more automatic the task has become—the less likely you are to attend consciously to the details. In fact, some studies have found that highly trained athletes actually improve their skilled performance when they are slightly distracted

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by other attention-demanding tasks (see Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). This is a very impor- tant characteristic of mental functioning. If we assume that the resources of the brain and nervous system are limited, then automaticity can help free up needed resources for conscious thought. Environmental conditions can change at any moment, so we often need to use conscious awareness as a kind of work space for developing new and creative reactions. We use consciousness for handling the new and demanding while relying on the steady and effortless processes of automaticity to keep moving and acting normally.

Disorders of Attention I’ve stressed the link between attention and consciousness because, in many respects, attention is the gateway to consciousness. Not surprisingly, if the brain systems that control attention are damaged, there can be a corresponding loss in conscious awareness. Brain researchers have used clinical cases of brain damage to examine how attention and consciousness are related. They’re also using neuroimaging tech- niques to discover attention-related areas of the brain (Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009). Let’s briefly consider two attention disorders that may be related to brain dysfunction, visual neglect and the inattention associated with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

Visual neglect Damage to the right parietal lobe of the cerebral cortex can produce an odd and complex disorder of attention called visual neglect. People with visual neglect show a tendency to ignore things that appear toward the left side of the body (remember from earlier chapters that the right side of the brain generally controls the left side of the body). Visual neglect can cause people to read only from the right side of pages and copy only the right side of pictures. They may even dress, shave, or apply makeup only to the right side of the body (Bisiach & Rusconi, 1990). It’s as if an entire side of their visual field has vanished from awareness. It’s also not unusual for the patient to deny that he or she has a problem. Fortunately, the condition sometimes recovers with time, although it’s often associated with other kinds of processing defi- cits in the brain. It can also arise from damage to the left side of the brain, which then creates problems in the right visual field, but it occurs more frequently with right brain damage (Posner, 1993). There are also patients who show auditory neglect; after damage to the right hemisphere, they seem somewhat unresponsive to voices and noises that come from their left side (Clarke & Thiran, 2004).

Is the brain really shutting off all the information it receives from one side of the body? Probably not. In one study, a patient suffering from visual neglect was shown drawings of two houses (see ●Figure 6.3). One house was normal in appear- ance; the other was normal on the right side but had bright red flames and smoke billowing out from a window on its left side. The patient was asked to choose which of the two houses she would prefer to live in. “The houses look the same to me,” she reported, presumably because she was attending only to the right side of each picture. Nevertheless, she consistently chose to live in the house without the flames (Marshall & Halligan, 1988). She showed no conscious awareness of the full image, but her brain was still able to use all the available information to help determine the appropriate response (Bisiach, 1992).

Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder A much more common disorder of atten- tion, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), is associated with general difficulties in concentrating. People with ADHD have trouble paying attention for long periods—they’re easily distracted and can’t finish the tasks they begin. It’s one of the most common psychological problems in school-aged children, although it probably affects only about 3 to 5% of all children. In addition to attention problems,

visual neglect A complex disorder of attention characterized by a tendency to ignore things that appear on one side of the body (usually the left side).

attention deficit /hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) A psychological disorder marked by difficulties in concentrating or in sustaining attention for extended periods; can be associated with hyperactivity.

critical thinking

In what ways are the symptoms of visual neglect similar to the symptoms of the split-brain patients who were discussed in Chapter 3?

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which affect the quality of their schoolwork, ADHD children are often hyperactive and impulsive—they squirm and fidget and blurt out answers to questions before the questions are completely asked. Attention problems are not always associated with hyperactivity, although the diagnosis is known generally as attention deficit/hyper- activity disorder.

Psychologists are actively searching for the brain mechanisms involved in ADHD. Not surprisingly, neuroimaging studies have shown that the regions of the brain thought to be involved in controlling attention, including the frontal and parietal lobes, are selectively involved (Bush, 2011). There’s some evidence that the problem may be associated with irregularities in neurotransmitter action, perhaps dopamine or even mild brain damage, but research is ongoing (Liston et al., 2011). It’s unlikely that any single brain location is responsible because the disorder is complex and expresses itself in a variety of ways. It’s almost certainly the case that experience plays a role in the onset and maintenance of the disorder as well.

What about treatment? The news is promising. It turns out that a majority of children and adults who have attention problems can be helped with either medica- tion, directed training, or some combination of both. Children with attention prob- lems need to learn coping strategies to help them perform well in school and in social settings. A training program typically includes teaching study skills, such as learning to write down important information (rather than relying on memory), and offer- ing rewards for sitting still and not being disruptive in social situations. Medications, such as Ritalin, seem to help concentration, and they often reduce hyperactivity and disruptive behavior. It’s interesting to note that Ritalin, as well as many other drugs used to treat the disorder, actually comes from a class of drugs—called stimulants— that generally increase nervous system activity (you’ll read more about stimulants later in this chapter). In low doses Ritalin improves a person’s ability to concentrate and focus attention selectively (Mattay et al., 1996).

There is some concern among psychologists that attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder may be overdiagnosed; in fact, there has been rapid growth recently in the use of medications to treat both children and adults (Castle et al., 2007). It’s important to be cautious about applying the label “attention disorder” to a child simply because he or she has trouble sitting still in school or paying attention. All children are rest- less from time to time, and certainly most ignore their parents in some situations, but

● figure 6.3 visual neglect Patients suffering from visual neglect might consciously detect no differences between these two houses. But they would probably choose to live in the house without the flames. (© Cengage Learning)

A diagnosis of ADHD does not always involve hyperactivity.

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that doesn’t mean that medication or a directed training program is in order. Many psychologists feel, in particular, that medications such as Ritalin are being overpre- scribed as a kind of quick fix to what may be essentially normal behavior. Children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder are usually identified relatively early in childhood. They have trouble in social settings and don’t make friends easily; their behavior, either because of the hyperactivity or the difficulties in concentrating, is simply too much for their peer group to bear.

test yourself To test your knowledge about how we set priorities for mental functioning, decide whether each of the following statements about attention and its disorders is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The cocktail party effect suggests that we cannot attend to more than one message at a time; we focus our attention on one thing, and the rest of the environment is effectively filtered out. True or False?

2. In dichotic listening tasks, people are presented with two auditory messages, one in each ear, and the task is to repeat one of the messages aloud while essentially ignoring the other. True or False?

3. If a task—such as playing Mozart on the piano—has become automatic, then you can perform a second task—remembering

a list of letters—without interfering with performance on the first task. True or False?

4. When visual neglect is caused by damage to the right side of the brain, people seem not to notice things that appear on the right side of the body. True or False?

5. Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder is primarily learned and easily treated by special skills training. True or False?

● recall-Monitor-recall 6.1

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● Define biological rhythms and discuss how they are controlled. ● Describe the various stages and characteristics of sleep. ● Discuss the function and adaptive significance of sleep. ● Discuss the function of REM sleep and theories of dreaming. ● Describe the various sleep disorders.

To set priorities for mental functioning, we focus our attention selectively. If you’re trying to read a book, you focus on the page and try to block out distracting sounds. If you’re listening to music, you might close your eyes to focus on the rhythms and harmonies. Notice, however, when you redirect your attention in these cases, you’re not really changing anything fundamental about the processes of consciousness; instead, you’re simply altering the content of conscious awareness. In the case of sleep, the change is more fundamental—you’re no longer consciously aware of the external world, yet your mind is still quite active. For this reason, sleep is sometimes referred to as a different “state” of consciousness.

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Biological Rhythms The regular daily transition from waking to sleep is an example of what is known generally as a biological rhythm. Actually, many body functions work in cycles, which is something we share with all other members of the animal kingdom. Sleep and waking vary daily, along with body temperature, hormone secretions, blood pres- sure, and other processes. Activities that rise and fall along a 24-hour cycle are called circadian rhythms (circa means “about,” and dies means “day”). Other biological activities may follow cycles that are either shorter or longer. The female menstrual cycle operates on an approximately 28-day cycle, whereas changes in appetite and the ability to perform certain tasks may change several times throughout the day.

These rhythmic activities are controlled automatically by structures in the brain called biological clocks. These clocks trigger the needed activities at just the right time and schedule the internal functions of the body to make sure everything is per- forming as it should. A particular area of the hypothalamus, called the suprachias- matic nucleus, plays a key role in regulating the clock that controls circadian rhythms. It’s thought that the human brain probably has several clocks, each controlling func- tions such as body temperature or activity level.

Setting our Biological Clocks The environment helps our brains synchronize— or set—our internal clocks. Light is a particularly important controller, or zeitgeber (meaning “time giver”). If you were suddenly forced to spend all your time in the dark or in a continuously lit environment, you would still sleep regularly, but your sleeping and waking cycles would begin to drift (see ●Figure 6.4). Rather than falling asleep at your usual 11 p.m. and waking at 7 a.m., after a while you might find yourself becom- ing sleepy at 2 a.m. and rising at 10 a.m. People use light during the day, as well as the absence of light at night, as a way of setting their internal sleep clock (Lavie, 2001).

The fact that the environment is so important in maintaining internal body rhythms makes considerable adaptive sense. Remember, the environment also shows regular cycles. The sun rises and sets approximately every 24 hours. There are daily changes in air pressure and temperature caused, in part, by the continuous rotation of the Earth about its axis. It’s perfectly reasonable to assume that animals, including humans, have adapted to remain in harmony with these cycles. As the cold of winter approaches, birds fly south for a warmer climate and more abundant food supplies; other animals stay put and prepare for hibernation. These changes in behavior are sensible adaptations to fixed changes in the environment that are not under the animal’s control.

Jet lag is a good example of how the environment can play havoc with our inter- nal clocks. When you travel to a new time zone, especially if you move east (which shortens your day), your usual signals for sleeping and waking become disrupted—it gets light and dark at unusual times for you. The net result is that you have trouble going to sleep, you get up at the “wrong” time, and you generally feel lousy. Your body needs to reset its clocks in line with your new environment, and this process takes time. This is one reason diplomats and business travelers often arrive at their destinations a few days before an important event or meeting; it gives them time to adjust their internal clocks and shrug off the jet lag.

The Characteristics of Sleep As mentioned earlier, the transition from waking to sleep can be described as a change in one’s state or level of consciousness. Rather than “death’s counterfeit” (as Shakespeare called it), sleep does involve awareness, although the focus of that awareness no longer connects directly to events in the world. The sticky problem fac- ing researchers, of course, is that they can’t directly measure the internal experience (because the subject is unresponsive). What researchers can do is eavesdrop on the electrical activity of the brain through EEG recordings and draw conclusions about

circadian rhythms Biological activities that rise and fall in accordance with a 24-hour cycle.

biological clocks Brain structures that schedule rhythmic variations in bodily functions by triggering them at the appropriate times.

The activity levels of many animals are controlled by internal clocks that are “set,” in part, by the environment. Bears are active during the warm summer months and hibernate during the winter.

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Can you think of any workplace environments that might lead to symptoms similar to jet lag?

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how consciousness is changing based on the patterns of brain activity. It is also pos- sible to use neuroimaging techniques, such as PET scanning and f MRI, to take snap- shots of the sleeping brain (Dang-Vu et al., 2010).

As you may recall from Chapter 3, the electroencephalograph, or EEG, is a device that monitors the electrical activity of the brain. Electrodes are attached to the scalp, and changes in the electrical potentials of large numbers of brain cells are recorded in the form of line tracings, or brain waves. It’s possible to record EEG-based brain waves at any time, including when someone is asleep. The EEG was first applied to the sleeping brain in the 1930s, and by the 1950s researchers had discovered some very intriguing and unexpected things about the sleep process. For example, EEG tracings revealed that dur- ing sleep there are regular, or cyclic, changes in brain activity. The EEG also revealed that at certain points the electrical activity of the sleeping brain bears a striking similarity to the brain activity of a person who is wide awake (Aserinsky & Kleitman, 1955).

●Figure 6.5 on the next page presents typical EEG record- ings made during waking and sleep states. The main things to notice are (1) the height, or amplitude, of the brain waves; (2) the frequency, or number of cycles per second (usually described in hertz); and (3) the regularity, or smoothness, of the pattern. Regular high- amplitude waves of low frequency reflect neural synchrony, meaning that large numbers of neurons are working together. In the first row of tracings, measured when a participant was awake, you’ll see no evidence of neural synchrony—the EEG pattern is fast and irregular, and the waves are of low amplitude. Presumably,

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● figure 6.4 Pacing the internal clock Light strongly influences our internal biological clocks. If you were suddenly forced to live without darkness, you would still sleep a normal 8 hours (shown by the length of the bar). But sleep onset times would probably drift. For example, if you usually fall asleep at 11 p.m. and wake at 7 a.m., after a while you might find yourself becoming sleepy at 2 a.m. and rising at 10 a.m. (© Cengage Learning)

In sleep disorder clinics, changes in the gross electrical activity of the brain are monitored throughout the night.

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when we’re awake, the brain is busy dividing its labor; lots of cells are working on specialized individual tasks, so the combined brain activity tends to look irregular. In contrast, when the brain is in a relaxed state, it produces alpha waves, which have a higher amplitude and cycle in a slower, more regular manner.

Stages of Sleep As you settle down for the night and prepare for sleep, the fast and irregular wave patterns of the waking state are soon replaced by slower, more regu- lar alpha waves. You’re not really asleep at this point—just relaxed and perhaps a little drowsy. The first official sign of sleep—what is called stage N1 sleep—is marked by a return to waves that are bit lower in amplitude and slightly more irregular. The dominant wave patterns of stage N1 sleep are called theta waves; as you can see in Figure 6.5, they’re different from the patterns found in the waking state. Even here, however, people often report that they’re not really asleep; instead they might claim that their thoughts are simply drifting.

The next stage of sleep, stage N2 sleep, is marked by another change in the EEG pattern. Specifically, the theta activity that defines stage N1 sleep begins to be inter- rupted occasionally by short bursts of activity called sleep spindles. There are also sudden, sharp, intermittent waveforms called K complexes. You’re definitely asleep at

alpha waves The pattern of brain activity observed in someone who is in a relaxed state.

theta waves The pattern of brain activity observed in stage N1 sleep.

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● figure 6.5 eeg Patterns associated with sleeping and wakefulness As we move from a waking state into sleep, characteristic changes occur in the electrical activity of the brain. Generally, as we become drowsy and move through the different stages of sleep, our brain waves become slower and more regular and show more amplitude. But during REM sleep, when we are presumed to be dreaming, the EEG shows a pattern more closely resembling the waking state. (From Current Concepts: The Sleep Disorders, by P. Hauri, 1982, The Upjohn Company, Kalamazoo, Michigan.

Reprinted by permission of the author.)

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this point, although your brain still shows some sensitivity to events in the external world. Loud noises, for example, tend to be reflected immediately in the EEG pattern by triggering a K complex (Bastien & Campbell, 1992). Your brain reacts, as revealed by the K complex, but you’re not really consciously aware of the environment. For instance, you won’t do a very good job of responding to signals delivered by an exper- imenter (say, by raising your finger or hand).

The final stage of sleep, stage N3, is a progressively deeper state and shows more synchronized slow-wave brain patterns called delta activity; this stage is sometimes called delta or slow-wave sleep. For many years researchers proposed an additional stage (4), based on the amount of delta activity observed in the EEG pattern, but this convention is no longer widely followed (Iber et al., 2007). Notice the wave patterns in Figure 6.5 appear large (high in amplitude) and cycle slower than the patterns of the earlier sleep stages. You’re really asleep now and tough to arouse. If I shake you awake during slow-wave sleep, you won’t be very responsive. You’ll act confused and disoriented, and it’ll take quite some time for you to reach a normal state of conscious awareness.

reM Sleep As you move from stage N1 to stage N3 sleep, you’re progressing from light to deep sleep. Not surprisingly, other internal measures of arousal, such as breathing rate, heart rate, and blood pressure, decline as you pass through each of the stages. But about 70 to 90 minutes into the sleep cycle, something very unex- pected happens—abrupt changes appear in the entire physiological pattern. Heart rate increases rapidly and becomes more irregular; twitching movements might begin in the hands, feet, and face; in males, the penis becomes erect, and in females vaginal lubrication begins; the eyes begin to move rapidly and irregularly, darting back and forth or up and down behind the eyelids. The EEG pattern starts to look very similar to the waking state. But you’re not awake—you’ve entered paradoxical, or REM (rapid eye movement), sleep.

REM sleep is called “paradoxical” for an obvious reason: The electrical activity of the brain during REM sleep resembles the “awake” pattern, yet you remain deeply asleep. Muscle tone is extremely relaxed, and you’re somewhat difficult to arouse. But as the EEG indicates, the brain is extremely active during this period—if jostled awake from REM sleep, you’ll seem instantly alert. Again, this contrasts sharply with the con- fused reaction that people typically have when they’re awakened from the early stages of sleep. Perhaps most interesting, people who awaken from REM sleep are likely to report an emotional and storylike dream. In fact REM-based dreaming is reported well over 80% of the time, even in people who have previously denied that they dream.

There is still debate among sleep researchers about the exact relationship between the REM sleep state and dreaming. People often report dreaming if they’re awakened during REM sleep, but dreaming also seems to occur during the earlier stages of sleep. Have you ever experienced a dream moments after going to sleep? Most people have, but it’s unlikely that your brain was in an official REM sleep state. Systematic studies of dreaming and the sleep stages have revealed conflicting results. Some studies report low levels of dreaming during non-REM stages (Dement, 1978); other studies have found the percentages to be relatively high (over 50%; see Foulkes, 1985). It remains an open question whether dreaming is an exclusive result of REM sleep, which seems unlikely, or whether dreaming is simply highly correlated with REM sleep activity. I’ll have more to say about the REM sleep state momentarily when we consider the function of dreaming.

The Sleep Cycle During an average night, we cycle through the various stages of sleep, including REM sleep, about four or five times. Each sleep cycle takes about 90 minutes: You progress from stage N1 through stage N3, then back toward stage N1, ending in REM. This sequence remains intact throughout much of the night, but the time spent in each stage changes as morning approaches. During the first cycle of sleep, the majority of time is spent in slow-wave sleep, but REM sleep tends to

delta activity The pattern of brain activity observed in stage N3 sleep; it’s characterized by synchronized slow waves. Also called slow- wave sleep.

reM sleep A stage of sleep characterized by rapid eye movements and low-amplitude, irregular EEG patterns resembling those found in the waking brain. REM is typically associated with dreaming.

critical thinking

Can you think of any adaptive reasons sleep occurs in stages? What might be the advantage to starting off in a light sleep and moving to a deeper sleep?

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dominate the later cycles. The amount of time spent in REM sleep, presumably dream- ing, increases, and the interval between successive REM sleep states becomes shorter (Ellman et al., 1991). In fact, by the end of the night you are spending the majority of your time in REM sleep. As you’re aware, many dreams seem to occur toward the end of the sleep period, and these are the dreams you’re most likely to remember.

The Function of Sleep If you sleep eight hours a night and reach the ripe old age of 75, you’ll have spent a quarter century with your eyes closed, your limbs lying useless at your sides, and your outstretched body seemingly open to attack. Doesn’t this seem a bit strange? Think about it. What could be the adaptive value, beyond the exercising of neurons during REM sleep, of redirecting the focus of awareness inward, away from potential threats in the environment?

repairing and restoring Researchers aren’t exactly sure why people sleep. One pos- sibility is that sleep functions to restore or repair the body and brain. Our daily activi- ties produce wear and tear on the body, and some mind–brain down time may be needed to put things back in order. There are definitely periods during sleep, espe- cially slow-wave sleep, when the metabolic activity of the brain is dramatically low- ered. Moreover, if people are deprived of sleep for any extended period of time, their ability to perform complex tasks, especially those requiring sustained attention, dete- riorates (Lim & Dinges, 2010).

Is the brain really working overtime during sleep—repairing disorganized cir- cuits or restoring depleted resources? Some evidence supports this idea. Slow-wave sleep increases after a bout of vigorous exercise, particularly if you exercise late in the day. There is also an increase in the release of growth hormone during slow-wave sleep. Adequate amounts of sleep are also needed to maintain functioning of the immune system. Researchers aren’t completely certain what all these activities mean at the moment (Payne & Walker, 2008), but restorative activities clearly do go on dur- ing sleep. Moreover, there is excellent evidence that sleep helps us consolidate memo- ries, making them less susceptible to later interference (Stickgold & Walker, 2006). Slow-wave sleep seems to promote a neural “pruning and sculpting” process that leads to leaner and more stable memory traces (Payne, 2011). We’ll return to the topic of sleep and memory later in Chapter 8.

Survival Value Another possibility is that sleep is useful because it increases the chances that we’ll survive hostile environments. People rely significantly on their visual systems; as a result, we aren’t very efficient outside at night when light lev- els are low. Our ancestors could have moved about at night looking for food, trying to avoid being eaten or killed by some predator, but it was probably a better idea for them to stay sheltered until dawn. Sleep thus became adaptive—particularly sleeping at night—because it stopped people from venturing forth into a dangerous environ- ment (Kavanau, 2002).

The sleeping patterns of animal species in the wild seem to support this view. If sleep is an adaptive reaction to light–dark cycles and susceptibility to predators, then we would expect animals that rely on senses other than vision to be active primar- ily at night, when vision-based predators would be at a hunting disadvantage. This is indeed the case for mice, rats, and other rodents. Second, large animals that must eat continuously and can’t easily find places to hide should sleep very little. And, indeed, grazing animals such as sheep, goats, horses, and cattle, which are vulnerable to sur- prise attack by predators, sleep only a few hours a day (see ●Figure 6.6). In one study, researchers found that body weight and susceptibility to attack could explain the majority of the sleeping patterns among different species (Allison & Cicchetti, 1976).

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Sleep Deprivation Earlier I mentioned that our ability to perform complex tasks is disrupted if we haven’t received much sleep. Surprised? Well, you’ve probably per- formed an all-nighter at some point, only to find yourself irritable and out of sorts the next day. But how serious is prolonged sleep deprivation? From time to time peo- ple have tried to remain awake for very long periods—approaching two weeks—and the results have been generally quite disruptive: Symptoms include slurred speech, sharp declines in mental ability, and even the development of paranoia and hallucina- tions. Although severely sleep-deprived individuals can appear normal for brief peri- ods, extensive loss of sleep generally hurts virtually all aspects of normal functioning (Coren, 1996).

Even more dramatic are the consequences in animal studies. When rats and dogs are deprived of sleep for extended periods, the results can be fatal. Sleep deprivation disrupts the ability of the animal to regulate internal functions, such as tempera- ture, and leads to considerable loss of weight (despite an increased intake of food). The immune system also starts to fail, along with various organs in the body. After roughly three weeks of no sleep, the survival rate among these animals is virtually zero (Coren, 1996; Rechtschaffen & Bergmann, 1995). Fortunately, people don’t ever reach these levels of sleep deprivation because we simply can’t stay awake. Indirectly, however, sleep loss contributes to thousands of deaths each year, mostly through traf- fic accidents and job-related mishaps.

The Function of REM Sleep and Dreaming It’s easy to see how sleep might have developed as an adaptive response, whether to repair, restore, or protect the organism struggling to survive. But why are there stages of sleep? Why, if people want to protect or rest the body, do they spend a sig- nificant amount of time in an internally active state like REM sleep? REM sleep is strongly correlated with the recall of dreams: Does dreaming serve some unique bio- logical or psychological function? Unfortunately, we don’t really know.

Sleep researchers are still debating whether REM sleep is even necessary for normal functioning. It’s possible to deprive people selectively of REM sleep by care- fully monitoring the EEG and then waking the person whenever characteristic REM

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Students tend to be sleep-deprived—are you? Sleep deprivation generally hurts virtually all aspects of normal functioning.

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patterns appear in the recordings. Unlike the findings for sleep loss in general, losing significant amounts of REM sleep often does not lead to drastic impairment. People may be a bit more irritable (compared to controls who are shaken awake during non- REM sleep periods), and their performance on tasks requiring logical reasoning and problem solving does suffer, but not much (Ellman et al., 1991). Interestingly, some forms of severe depression appear to be helped by REM sleep deprivation, and some effective antidepressant drugs suppress REM sleep as a side effect (Vogel et al., 1990).

On the other hand, intriguing changes do occur in sleep patterns after periods of REM sleep deprivation. Sleep researchers have noticed that on the second or third night of REM sleep deprivation it’s necessary to awaken the person with much greater frequency. When people lose sleep, particularly REM sleep, their bodies attempt to make up for the loss during the next sleep period by increasing the total amount of time spent in the REM stage. The more REM sleep lost, the more the body tries to make it up the next night. This tendency, known as REM rebound, is one reason many researchers remain convinced that REM sleep serves some unspecified but extremely important purpose.

Wish Fulfillment Why do we dream? Historically, psychologists considered dreaming to be extremely significant. Sigmund Freud believed that dreams, once interpreted, could serve as a “royal road to the unconscious.” Freud believed that dreaming was a psychological mechanism for wish fulfillment, a way to satisfy forbidden wishes and desires—especially sexual ones. Dreams often look bizarre, he argued, because the objects within our dreams tend to be symbolic. We hide our true wishes and desires because they’re often too unsettling for direct conscious awareness. So the appearance of a cigar or a gun in a dream (in fact, any elongated object) might repre- sent a penis, whereas a tunnel (or any entryway) could stand for a vagina. To estab- lish the true meaning of the dream, Freud believed it was necessary to distinguish between the dream’s manifest content—the actual symbols of the dream—and its latent content, the hidden desires that are too disturbing to be expressed consciously.

Modern psychologists are reluctant to search for hidden meaning in dreams. Although certain kinds of dream events are common across people and cultures ( people often dream of flying or falling, for example), and most people have the unset- tling experience of recurring dreams, there is no consensus about how to interpret dreams. Whether a cigar represents a penis, or just a cigar, isn’t immediately obvi- ous—even to the most thoughtful or well-trained psychologist. Moreover, just because you repeatedly dream about being chased by a poodle that looks like your brother Ed doesn’t mean the dream is significant psychologically. A troubling dream, for example, might simply cause you to wake up suddenly and think about what has just occurred. As a result, the dream becomes firmly ingrained in memory and likely to occur again.

Activation-Synthesis An alternative view, the activation-synthesis hypothesis of Hobson and McCarley (1977; Hobson et al., 2000) proposes that dreaming is a conse- quence of random activity in the brain. During REM sleep, for reasons that are not particularly clear, cells in the hindbrain tend to spontaneously activate the higher centers of the brain. This activity might arise simply to exercise the brain circuitry (Edelman, 1987), or it could be a consequence of random events in the room (e.g., the cat snoring or a mosquito buzzing around your face). Whatever the reason, the higher brain centers have evolved to interpret lower brain signals in meaningful ways. Thus the brain creates a story in an effort to make some sense out of the signals it receives. But in the activation-synthesis view, there’s little of psychological significance here: Dreams typically represent only random activity in the brain.

The activation-synthesis hypothesis has received a lot of attention because it takes into account how biological activity in the brain changes during sleep. It also provides another explanation for why dream content can be bizarre: Because the sig- nals that produce dreams are random in nature, the brain has a tough time creating a story line that is meaningful and consistent. Consequently, there may be some

reM rebound The tendency to increase time spent in REM sleep after REM deprivation.

manifest content According to Freud, the actual symbols and events experienced in a dream.

latent content According to Freud, the true psychological meaning of dream symbols.

activation-synthesis hypothesis The idea that dreams represent the brain’s attempt to make sense of the random patterns of neural activity generated during sleep.

Are dreams a consequence of wish fulfillment, random electrical activity in the brain, or something else?

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Sleeping and Dreaming | 187

psychological significance to reported dreams after all, but not for the reasons sug- gested by Freud. The biological mechanisms that generate the REM sleep state are not psychologically driven, but the brain’s interpretations of those purely physiologi- cal activities may have psychological meaning. The story your brain creates probably tells us something about how you think when you’re awake (Domhoff, 2003).

The activation-synthesis hypothesis is an intriguing alternative to the traditional Freudian view, but questions remain. For example, as noted earlier, we also dream during non-REM sleep states, but the theory focuses primarily on brain activity that occurs during REM sleep. It is also of interest to note that REM activity is common- place in numerous nonhuman organisms (Durie, 1981). Virtually all mammals expe- rience REM, as do birds and some reptiles, such as turtles. Moreover, human infants spend a remarkable amount of time in REM sleep; even human fetuses show REM patterns in the womb. Perhaps a fetus dreams, but it’s unlikely that the fetus is cre- ating an internal “story” to make sense of random activity. Recent advances in neu- roimaging are providing clues about the specific neurological changes that occur during REM sleep, so answers may be forthcoming (Hobson, 2009).

We’ve discussed two prominent views of dreaming—Freud and activation- synthesis—but there are others. Some psychologists have suggested that dreams help us solve pressing problems in our lives. We may dream to focus our attention on cur- rent problems in order to work toward possible solutions (Cartwright, 1991; Fiss, 1991). Unfortunately, the evidence for the problem-solving view is not very strong, relying pri- marily on anecdotes that seem to support the position (Blagrove, 1996; Domhoff, 1996). Cartwright (1996) found that depressed individuals who dreamed about the source of their negative emotions (e.g., their spouse during a painful separation) were better adjusted a year later, but something other than dreaming may have been responsible for the improvement. Evidence suggests as well that the content of our dreams affects our behavior. People generally think their dreams are meaningful and they allow their dreams to influence their judgments and actions. For example, if a friend protects rather than betrays you in a dream, you are likely to report greater affection for that person; if you dream about a plane crash, you report later that you are less likely to fly (Morewedge & Norton, 2009). But our dreams usually don’t deal with current events, and we often have trouble remembering what we dream, so it’s unlikely that dreaming evolved simply to help us solve pressing problems (Domhoff, 2003).

Another recent view comes from evolutionary psychology: Dreaming may allow us to simulate threats from the environment and mentally practice the skills needed to avoid those threats (Revonsuo, 2000; Valli & Revonsuo, 2009). We do some- times dream about aggressive events and threatening situations and take appropri- ate defense actions (Zadra et al., 2006), but whether dreaming really evolved to help us handle real-world threats remains somewhat speculative. It’s safe to assume that REM sleep and dreaming reflect some important property of the brain, but at the moment the major questions remain unanswered.

Disorders of Sleep We end our treatment of sleep and dreaming with a brief discussion of sleep disor- ders. Mental health professionals divide sleep disorders into two main categories: (1) dyssomnias, which are problems connected with the amount, timing, and qual- ity of sleep; and (2) parasomnias, which are abnormal disturbances that occur during sleep. Let’s consider some prominent examples of each type.

Dyssomnias The most common type of dyssomnia is insomnia, where you have difficulty starting or maintaining sleep. Everyone has trouble getting to sleep from time to time, and everyone has awakened in the middle of the night and been unable to get back to sleep. For the clinical diagnosis of insomnia, these difficul- ties must be chronic—lasting for at least several months. It’s been estimated that

insomnia A chronic condition marked by difficulties in initiating or maintaining sleep, lasting for a period of at least one month.

critical thinking

The activation-synthesis hypothesis proposes that dreams arise from the interpretation of random neural activity. Yet many people dream of flying, falling, or being unprepared for a test. How do you explain the fact that people have similar dreams if dreaming results from random neural activity?

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● concePt review Functions of Sleep and Dreaming WHY Do WE SlEEP?

Theory Description Evaluation

Repair and restoration Sleep restores and/or repairs the body and brain.

Some support, but restorative activities of the body are not limited to sleep. Increases in the release of growth hormone occur during slow-wave sleep; sleep may be necessary for adequate functioning of the immune system.

Survival value Sleep increases chances of survival. Receives some support from observation of sleep patterns in dif- ferent species of animals.

WHY Do WE DREAm?

Theory Description Evaluation

Wish fulfillment (Freud) Dreaming is a psychological mechanism for fulfillment of wishes, often sexual in nature.

Difficult to assess; psychologists are reluctant to assign hidden meaning to dreams.

Activation synthesis Dreaming is a consequence of random activity that occurs in the brain during REM sleep. The brain creates a story to make sense of these random signals.

Theory has led to significant developments in our understanding of the sleeping brain. But dreaming is not limited to REM sleep.

Problem solving Dreaming helps us focus on our current problems to find solutions.

Evidence tends to be anecdotal, but dream content does affect judgments and behavior.

Threat simulation Dreaming evolved to help us practice the skills needed to avoid threats.

Still speculative at this point.

perhaps 30% of the population suffers from some degree of insomnia, although the number of truly severe sufferers is thought to be closer to 15%. There are many causes for the condition, including stress, emotional problems, and alcohol and other drug use, as well as medical conditions. Some kinds of insomnia may even be learned—for example, children who regularly fall asleep in the presence of their parents often have trouble getting back to sleep if they wake up later alone in their room (Adair et al., 1991). Presumably, these children have learned to associate sleep- ing with the presence of a parent and consequently can’t return to sleep without the parent present.

In hypersomnia (or hypersomnolence) the problem is too much sleep. People diagnosed with hypersomnia show excessive sleepiness—they’re often caught cat- napping during the day, and they complain about being tired all the time. Genetic factors might be involved in this condition (Sehgal & Mignot, 2011), although exces- sive sleepiness can also be caused by infectious diseases, such as mononucleosis or chronic fatigue syndrome, and by a sleep disorder called sleep apnea. Sleep apnea is a relatively rare condition in which the sleeper repeatedly stops breathing through- out the night, usually for short periods lasting up to a minute or so. The episodes typically end with the person waking up gasping for breath. Because these episodes occur frequently throughout the night, the affected person feels tired during the day. Significant sleep apnea problems are found in perhaps 5% of the population, although a higher percentage of people may experience occasional episodes (Latta & Van Cauter, 2003).

An even rarer sleep disorder, called narcolepsy, is characterized by sudden extreme sleepiness. Sleep attacks can occur at any time during the day and can last from a few seconds to several minutes. What makes this disorder unusual is that the person seems to directly enter a kind of REM sleep state. The person loses all muscle tone and can even fall to the ground in a sound sleep! Fortunately, not all instances of narcolepsy are this extreme, although it can be a disabling condition. The disorder

hypersomnia (or hypersomnolence) A chronic condition marked by excessive sleepiness.

narcolepsy A rare sleep disorder characterized by sudden extreme sleepiness.

Sleeping and Dreaming | 189

has been linked to the absence of a certain neurotransmitter in the brain ( hypocretin) and it may have a genetic link as well (Sehgal & Mignot, 2011). Again, it’s rare and probably affects only a few people in a thousand.

Parasomnias The second category of sleep disorders, parasomnias, includes such abnormal sleep disturbances as nightmares, night terrors, and sleepwalking. Nightmares are frightening and anxiety-arousing dreams that occur primarily during REM sleep. They inevitably cause the sleeper to awaken; if they recur fre- quently, they can lead to the symptoms of insomnia. What causes nightmares? No one is certain at this point, although frequent nightmares may indicate the presence of a psychological disorder or problems associated with the regulation of emotion (Levin & Nielsen, 2009).

Night terrors, which occur mainly in children, are terrifying experiences in which the sleeper awakens suddenly in an extreme state of panic—the child may sit in bed screaming and will show little responsiveness to others who are present. Fortunately, night terrors are not considered to be indicators of serious psychological or medical problems, and they tend to go away with age.

Finally, sleepwalking occurs when the sleeper rises during sleep and wanders about. Sleepwalking happens mainly in childhood, tends to vanish as the child reaches adolescence, and, again, it’s not thought to result from a serious psychologi- cal or medical problem. There’s some evidence that sleepwalking runs in families, so you may be born with a genetic susceptibility for the condition (Lecendreux et al., 2003). It’s interesting to note that both night terrors and sleepwalking occur during periods of non-REM sleep, which suggests that neither may be related entirely to dreaming.

nightmares Frightening and anxiety-arousing dreams that occur primarily during the REM stage of sleep.

night terrors Terrifying experiences, which occur mainly in children, in which the sleeper awakens suddenly in an extreme state of panic.

sleepwalking The sleeper arises during sleep and wanders about.

test yourself To check your understanding of sleep and dreaming, answer the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Choose the EEG pattern that best fits the following descriptions. Choose from the following: alpha waves, delta activity, K com- plex, sleep spindles, theta waves, REM sleep.

a. The characteristic pattern found in stage N1 sleep b. Often triggered by loud noises during stage N2 sleep

c. Another name for the slow-wave patterns that are found during stage N3 sleep

d. The characteristic pattern of paradoxical sleep

2. Which of the following statements is most consistent with the view that we sleep because it keeps us away from hostile environments during times when we can’t see well?

a. Sleep deprivation leads to a breakdown in normal functioning.

b. Cats sleep more than cows. c. People sleep less as they age. d. Fearful dreams make us wary of venturing outside.

3. Diagnose the following sleep disorders based on the information provided. Choose from the following terms: hypersomnia, insomnia, nightmare, night terror, sleep apnea, sleepwalking.

a. Difficulty initiating and maintaining sleep b. Sleeper awakens suddenly, screaming, but the EEG pattern

indicates a period of non-REM sleep c. Sleeper repeatedly stops breathing during the night, usually for

short periods lasting less than 1 minute d. An anxiety-arousing dream that usually occurs during the REM

stage of sleep

● recall-Monitor-recall 6.2

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Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs LeArnIng goALS

● Compare neurotransmitters with psychoactive drugs. ● Discuss the different categories of psychoactive drugs, with examples of each. ● Discuss the psychological factors that influence the effects of psychoactive drugs.

The rhythmic cycles of sleep reveal how conscious awareness shifts as the electrical activity of the brain changes. We haven’t talked much about the factors that control these brain changes, but the brain’s chemical messengers, the neurotransmitters, are primarily responsible. The brain is a biochemical factory, altering moods and shifting awareness through the actions of its various neurotransmitters. As we’ve discussed previously, the brain sometimes reacts to stress or injury by releasing brain chemicals called endorphins, which reduce pain and serve to elevate mood. Altering awareness can be highly adaptive, because the delay of pain can allow an organism to escape from a life-threatening situation.

If you allow an external agent, such as a drug, to enter your body, it too can radi- cally alter the delicate chemical balance that controls awareness and other mental processes. Obviously, drugs can have tremendously beneficial effects, especially in the treatment of psychological and medical disorders (see Chapter 15). But drugs can have negative effects as well, even though they might seem to change awareness in a highly pleasurable way. Drug abuse, particularly of alcohol and tobacco, is directly or indirectly responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths annually in the United States. In this section, we’ll consider the actions of drugs labeled psychoactive—those that affect behavior and mental processes through changes in conscious awareness.

Drug Actions and Effects Psychologists are primarily interested in psychoactive drugs because they help us understand the neural mechanisms that cause behavior. Psychoactive drugs, like most natural drugs produced by the brain, affect the normal communication chan- nels of neurons. Some drugs, like nicotine, duplicate the action of neurotransmitters

psychoactive drugs Drugs that affect behavior and mental processes through alterations of conscious awareness.

This series of PET scans shows how administration of a drug affects general activity in the brain over time. The first PET scan in the top row shows a normal active brain; the last PET scan in the bottom row shows diminished activity after the drug has taken full effect.

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by attaching themselves to the receptor sites of neurons; this allows the drug to pro- duce the same effect as the brain’s natural chemical messenger. Other drugs depress or block the action of neurotransmitters; some sleeping pills, for instance, decrease norepinephrine or dopamine stimulation. The psychoactive drug fluoxetine (known commercially as Prozac) is effective in treating depression; it acts by slowing the pro- cess through which the neurotransmitter serotonin is broken down and taken back up into the transmitting cell (Kramer, 1993).

Long-term drug use often changes the way the body reacts. With repeated use, one can develop a drug tolerance, which means that increasing amounts of the drug are needed to produce the same physical and behavioral effects. The brain essen- tially changes its chemistry to adapt to the ingested drug, counteracting its effects. Tolerance, in turn, can lead to drug dependency, which is a physical or a psycho- logical need for continued use. At this point, if the person stops taking the drug, withdrawal symptoms are likely. These are physical reactions such as sweating, vomiting, changes in heart rate, or tremors. Drug dependency is the primary cause of substance abuse, although the mechanisms that lead to dependency are still a matter of some debate. At this point, it’s not certain whether dependency develops as a con- sequence of psychological “urgings” produced by biological withdrawal, fundamen- tal changes in the brain’s chemistry, or whether people essentially learn to become dependent on the drug with repeated use. It’s likely that multiple factors are involved (Degenhardt et al., 2010).

Categories of Psychoactive Drugs Psychoactive drugs can be classified into three main categories—depressants, stimu- lants, and hallucinogens—based on their specific mind-altering characteristics. We’ll briefly examine each type and then conclude with a discussion of some psychological factors involved in drug use.

Depressants In general, drugs classified as depressants slow, or depress, the ongo- ing activity of the central nervous system. Ethyl alcohol, which is present in beer, wine, and distilled drinks, is a well-known example of a depressant. Alcohol affects a number of neurotransmitters, including GABA, glutamate, and dopamine. The GABA system is involved in the regulation of anxiety and generally reduces, or inhibits, neural activity. (Drugs that block the action of GABA can reduce alcohol’s effects.) Alcohol stimulates the release of dopamine as well, which is part of the brain’s natural reward system. Animals, by the way, find the effects of alcohol quite reinforcing—they will perform tasks that yield small amounts of alcohol as a reward (Becker et al., 2011).

As alcohol consumption increases, the brain centers that control judgment become sluggish from inhibition. As you’re undoubtedly aware, after a few drinks people can start acting in unusual ways. The normally demure become loud and aggressive; the sexually inhibited become flirtatious and provocative. These behav- ioral changes are produced, in part, because alcohol reduces self-awareness. Drinkers are less likely to monitor their behaviors and actions closely, and they tend to forget about current problems. These carefree moments are stolen at a cost, of course, because the body eventually reacts to the drug in a more negative way. Fatigue, nausea, and depression can result from drinking too much. If too much alcohol is consumed, the results can even be fatal. Alcohol poisoning, which comes from drink- ing large quantities of alcohol in a short period of time, often leads to death. The indirect costs are great as well: As activity in the sympathetic nervous system slows, so too does reaction time, which increases the chances of an accident while driving or in the workplace. Thousands of people die every year as a result of alcohol-related incidents.

drug tolerance An adaptation made by the body to compensate for the continued use of a drug, such that increasing amounts of the drug are needed to produce the same physical and behavioral effects.

drug dependency A condition in which one experiences a physical or a psychological need for continued use of a drug.

withdrawal Physical reactions, such as sweating, vomiting, changes in heart rate, or tremors, that occur when a person stops taking certain drugs after continued use.

depressants A class of drugs that slow or depress the ongoing activity of the central nervous system.

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Barbiturates and tranquilizers are also classified as depressant drugs. Both are widely prescribed for the treatment of anxiety and insomnia. They produce effects in the brain similar to those induced by alcohol (the neurotransmitter GABA is again involved). Like alcohol, at low doses tranquilizing agents tend to produce pleasurable feelings of relaxation. But at higher doses your ability to concentrate easily is lost, memory is impaired, and speech becomes slurred. Barbiturates also commonly lead to tolerance and dependency. With continued use, one’s metabolism changes and tol- erance sets in. Tranquilizers (such as Valium and Xanax) are less habit forming than barbiturates and for this reason are more likely to be prescribed.

Opiates (sometimes called narcotics) also depress nervous system activity, thereby reducing anxiety, elevating mood, and lowering sensitivity to pain. Opium, heroin, and morphine are well-known examples of opiates. Morphine—which is derived from the flowering opium poppy plant—acts on existing membrane receptor sites in the nervous system. Its painkilling effects and pleasurable mood shifts (it’s named after Morpheus, the Greek god of dreams) come from mimicking the brain’s own chemi- cals, specifically endorphins, that are involved in reducing pain. Abuse or long-term use of opiates can produce strong physical and psychological dependence. Stop taking the drug, and the body will rebel with intense and prolonged withdrawal symptoms.

People who are regular users of opiates, such as heroin or morphine, pay a large price for any fleeting pleasures that might immediately follow drug use. Kicking an opiate habit is extremely tough because the withdrawal symptoms—which can include everything from excessive yawning, to nausea, to severe chills—last for days. Users who opt for the common method of administration—intravenous injection— run additional risks from disease, especially HIV. Longitudinal studies of heroin addicts paint a grim picture: Addicts tend to die young (at an average age of about 40) from a variety of causes including suicide, homicide, and overdose (Hser et al., 1993).

Stimulants A stimulant is a drug that increases central nervous system activity, enhancing neural transmission. Examples of stimulants include caffeine, nicotine, amphetamines, and cocaine. These agents generally increase alertness and can affect mood by inducing feelings of pleasure. The morning cup of coffee is an excellent example of how a stimulant in low doses—caffeine—can improve your mood signifi- cantly and even increase concentration and attention. Other side effects of stimulants include dilated pupils, increased heart and respiration rate, and decreased appetite. In large doses, stimulants can produce extreme anxiety and even convulsions and death.

Both amphetamines and cocaine produce their stimulating effects by increasing the effectiveness of the neurotransmitters norepinephrine and dopamine. Dopamine

opiates Drugs that reduce anxiety, lower sensitivity to pain, and elevate mood; opiates often act to depress nervous system activity.

stimulants A class of drugs that increase central nervous system activity, enhancing neural transmission.

Despite the pleasurable properties of alcohol, too much alcohol consumption can have severe negative consequences on your health and well-being.

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The left photo shows the bud of an opium poppy, cut to release the narcotic sap. The middle photo shows psilocybin, a type of mushroom that produces hallucinogenic effects; the right photo shows marijuana.

Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs | 193

seems to be primarily responsible for the positive, reinforcing qualities of these drugs (Dackis & Miller, 2003). In the laboratory, animals work hard to self-administer drugs that increase the activity of dopamine-based synapses. In the case of cocaine, which is derived from the leaves of the coca plant, the drug blocks the reabsorption of both norepinephrine and dopamine. When reabsorption is blocked, the effects of these transmitter substances last longer. Cocaine produces intense feelings of euphoria, although the effects of the drug generally wear off quickly. A half hour or so after the drug enters the body the user crashes, in part because the drug has temporar- ily depleted the user’s internal supply of norepinephrine and dopamine. Regular use of cocaine produces a number of harmful side effects, including intense episodes of paranoia and even hallucinations and delusions (Adeyemo, 2002).

Cocaine and amphetamines are also available in crystallized forms that can be smoked, snorted, or injected. Crack, the crystallized form of cocaine, tends to be purer than street cocaine, and its effects are generally faster acting and more intense. The effects also last for a shorter amount of time, which leads to heightened cravings and a desire for more of the drug—fast. The low that follows crack is also more intense; again, this increases the desire for more of the drug. These factors produce a lethal combination—a substantial increase in the likelihood of overdose and death, even in occasional and first-time users.

Another stimulant that’s shown an alarming increase in popularity recently is a self-labeled designer drug called Ecstasy. The active ingredient in Ecstasy is meth- ylenedioxymethamphetamine, or MDMA. Like other stimulants, it produces feel- ings of well-being, or even euphoria, and increased energy levels. The dangerous side effects of Ecstasy are similar to those produced by the other stimulants. Research with animals has found that it can lead to brain damage (the destruction of serotonin- producing neurons), and it’s been shown to interfere with memory and even sleep in people (Roberts et al., 2009). Ecstasy, which comes in pill or liquid form, has the added disadvantage that it’s street-made; as a result, the user never knows exactly what substances he or she has ingested.

Hallucinogens For the final category of psychoactive drug, hallucinogens (some- times called psychedelics), the term “psychoactive” is particularly apt. Hallucinogens play havoc with the normal internal construction of reality. Perception itself is frac- tured, and the world becomes awash in fantastic colors, sounds, and tactile sensa- tions. Two of the best-known examples of these drugs, mescaline and psilocybin, occur naturally in the environment. Mescaline comes from a certain kind of cactus; psilocybin is a type of mushroom. Both have been used for centuries, primarily in the context of religious rituals and ceremonies. Since the 1960s they have served as poten- tially dangerous recreational drugs for those seeking alternative realities.

Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is a synthetic version of a psychedelic drug. LSD is thought to mimic the action of the neurotransmitter serotonin (Vollenweider & Kometer, 2010); the drug acts on specific serotonin-based receptor sites in the brain, producing stimulation. For reasons that are not particularly clear, variations in sen- sation and perception are produced. A typical LSD experience, which can last for hours, consists of profound changes in perception. Some users report a phenomenon called synesthesia, which is a blending of sensory experiences—colors may actually feel warm or cold, and rough textures may begin to sing. Also for unknown reasons, a user’s experience can turn sharply wrong. Panic or depression can develop, increas- ing the likelihood of accidents and personal harm.

Marijuana, which comes from the naturally occurring Cannabis plant, is another hallucinogenic drug. It is unusual to see profound distortions of perceptual reality with this drug unless large amounts are ingested. Marijuana is usually smoked or swallowed, and its effects last around four hours. Users typically report a melting away of anxiety, a general sense of well-being, and increased awareness of normal sensations. Changes in the perception of time and its passage are sometimes reported, along with increased appetite. The pleasant effects of the drug are usually followed by fatigue and sometimes sleep.

hallucinogens A class of drugs that tends to disrupt normal mental and emotional functioning, including distorting perception and altering reality.

194 | CHAPTER 6 Consciousness

Marijuana does not always produce a pleasant experience. Some users report anxi- ety, extreme fearfulness, and panic. A number of studies have shown that marijuana use impairs concentration, motor coordination, and the ability to track things visually (Bolla et al., 2002); these side effects certainly contribute to the likelihood of traffic acci- dents when driving under the influence. Less is known about the long-term effects of reg- ular use, but there’s evidence that chronic use can impair memory functioning (Battisti et al., 2010). On the positive side, marijuana helps reduce some of the negative symptoms of chemotherapy (e.g., nausea), and in some cases it’s proved helpful in treating eye dis- orders such as glaucoma. But the medical evidence in this area remains controversial.

Psychological Factors Psychoactive drugs often produce individual differences. Two people can take the same drug, in exactly the same quantity, but experience completely different effects. A small amount of LSD consumed by Teo produces a euphoric “religious experience”; the same amount for Jane produces terror and fear. Why? Shouldn’t the effects on neu- rotransmitters in the brain produce similar or at least consistent psychological effects?

Many factors influence the psychological experience: biological, genetic, and environmental. Smoking marijuana for the first time in a car speeding 75 miles per hour seriously limits the anxiety-reducing effects of the drug. Users report that familiarity is also critical—users claim you need to “learn” to smoke marijuana or take LSD before the full effects of the drug can be experienced. In fact, experienced users of marijuana have reported experiencing a “high” after smoking a cigarette they only thought was marijuana; similar effects did not occur for novice users ( Jones, 1971). Both familiarity and environment affect the user’s mental set—his or her expec- tations about the drug’s harmful and beneficial consequences. Individual biological and genetic factors are also important: Some people develop resistance or tolerance to a drug faster than others do. The experience of a drug may even depend on such things as whether the person has eaten or is well rested.

The setting in which the drug is experienced can also hide its effects. In a study by Johnson and colleagues (2000), male college students were asked to judge the acceptability of forced sexual aggression toward a blind date. Everyone saw a video of a couple interacting: For one group, the female in the video acted friendly and

● concePt review Psychoactive Drugs TYPE ExAmPlES GEnERAl EffECTS

Depressants Ethyl alcohol, barbiturates, tranquilizers

Depress nervous system activity. Affect a number of neurotransmitters, including GABA, glutamate, and dopamine. Produce pleasurable feelings of relaxation, but at high doses concentration and memory are impaired.

Opiates Opium, morphine, heroin Depress nervous system activity, resulting in reduced anxiety, mood elevation, and lower sensitivity to pain. May mimic the brain’s own natural pain-killing substances. Can produce strong physical and psychological dependence.

Stimulants Caffeine, nicotine, amphetamines, cocaine, Ecstasy

Generally increase nervous system activity. Amphetamines and cocaine may work by increasing the effectiveness of dopamine and norepinephrine. Stimulants tend to increase alertness, elevate mood, and produce physical changes such as increased heart and respiration rate.

Hallucinogens LSD, mescaline, psilocybin, marijuana

Produce variations in sensation and perception. LSD is believed to mimic the action of serotonin. Some users report synesthesia, a blending of sensory experiences. Marijuana leads to a general sense of well-being and heightened awareness of normal sensations. Negative side effects can include anxiety, fearfulness, and panic.

Altering Awareness: Induced States | 195

cheerful toward the male date (e.g., touching his arm from time to time and sitting close); in a second condition, the woman acted unresponsive and distant. Afterward everyone was asked to judge how acceptable it would be for the male to force himself sexually on the woman.

Overall the men found such behavior to be unacceptable, but their rating depended, in part, on whether they had just consumed a moderate amount of alco- hol. Interestingly, when the woman in the video acted unfriendly and unresponsive, alcohol had essentially no effect—all the men thought sexual aggression toward the woman was unacceptable. However, when the woman in the video acted friendly and responsive, drinking began to matter: Men who had consumed a moderate amount of alcohol were significantly more likely to view sexual aggression as an acceptable response. In this case, alcohol’s effect depended importantly on the behavior of others present in the situation.

test yourself Test your knowledge about psychoactive drugs by picking the type of drug that best fits each of the following statements. Choose from among these terms: depressant, hallucinogen, opiate, stimulant. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Increases central nervous system activity:

2. Reduces pain by mimicking the brain’s own natural pain- reducing chemicals:

3. Tends to produce inhibitory effects by increasing the effectiveness of the neurotransmitter GABA:

4. Distorts perception:

5. The type of active ingredient found in your morning cup of coffee:

● recall-Monitor-recall 6.3

Altering Awareness: Induced States LeArnIng goALS

● Describe the physiological and behavioral effects of hypnosis. ● Discuss whether hypnosis can be used effectively to enhance memory. ● Describe the dissociation and role-playing accounts of hypnosis. ● Describe the physical, behavioral, and psychological effects of meditation.

The setting is Paris, late in the year 1783. Dressed in a silk robe, German-born physi- cian Franz Anton Mesmer is busy restoring his patients’ balance of “universal fluids.” In rhythmic motions, he passes an iron rod over their outstretched bodies, stirring their innate animal magnetism. Some quickly fall into a trancelike state; others become agitated and fitful. All enter an alternative form of consciousness accompa- nied by a loss of voluntary control. On later awakening, many feel better, apparently cured of their various physical and psychological problems.

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Although Mesmer himself eventually fell into disrepute, rejected by the scien- tific community of his time, the phenomenon of “mesmerizing” did not. We recog- nize today, of course, that the artificial state of awareness he induced had nothing to do with magnets or the balancing of universal fluids. Instead, the bizarre behavior of his patients is better explained as an example of hypnosis. Hypnosis can be defined generally as any form of social interaction that produces a heightened state of suggest- ibility in a willing participant. It is of interest to psychologists, like the related topic of meditation, because it’s a technique specifically designed to alter conscious aware- ness. Hypnosis has many useful and adaptive properties (Kerns et al., 2011).

The Phenomenon of Hypnosis Much remains to be learned about hypnosis and its effects. One key question centers on whether it’s truly an altered state of awareness or simply a kind of social playact- ing—more on that later. But we do know a few things about what hypnosis is not. For one thing, people who are hypnotized never really enter into anything resembling a deep sleep. The word hypnosis comes from the Greek hypnos, meaning “to sleep,” but hypnosis bears little physiological relation to sleep. The EEG patterns of a hyp- notized subject, along with other physiological indices, more closely resemble those of someone who is relaxed rather than deeply asleep (Graffen et al., 1995). Moreover, certain reflexes that are commonly absent during sleep, such as the knee jerk, are still present under hypnosis (Pratt et al., 1988). At the same time, recent studies using modern neuroimaging techniques have detected what appear to be unique neural “signatures” associated with hypnosis (Oakley & Halligan, 2009).

Another myth is that only weak-willed people are susceptible to hypnotic induc- tion. We’re all susceptible to a degree, in the sense that we show heightened suggest- ibility under some circumstances. Hypnotic “suggestibility” scales, which measure susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion, indicate that only about 20% of the population is highly hypnotizable (Hilgard, 1965). But it’s not clear exactly what factors account

hypnosis A form of social interaction that produces a heightened state of suggestibility in a willing participant.

In the late 18th century, Anton Mesmer helped promote the belief that physical and psychological problems could be cured by passing magnets over the body. In this engraving, Mesmer and a subject are portrayed at far left. ©

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for these differences. Personality studies have shown that people who are easy to hypnotize are not weak willed or conforming, although they may have more active imaginations than people who resist hypnosis (Nadon et al., 1991).

There are many ways to induce hypnosis. In the most popular technique, the hypnotist acts as an authority figure, suggesting to the client that he or she is growing increasingly more relaxed and sleepy with time: “Your eyes are getting heavier and heavier, you can barely keep your lids open,” and so on. The client is usually asked to fixate on something, perhaps a spot on the wall or a swinging pendulum. The logic here is that eye fixation leads to muscle fatigue, which helps convince clients they are indeed becoming increasingly relaxed; eye fixation also helps the client focus his or her attention. Other approaches to induction rely more on subtle suggestions (Erickson, 1964), but in general no one method is necessarily better than another. In the words of one researcher, “The art of hypnosis relies on not providing the client with grounds for resisting” (Araoz, 1982, p. 106).

Once hypnotized, people become highly suggestible, responding to commands from the hypnotist in ways that seem automatic and involuntary. The hypnotist can use the power of suggestion to achieve beneficial ends, such as helping people kick unwanted habits like smoking or overeating. Anesthetic effects are also possible at certain deep stages of hypnosis. Hypnotized patients report less pain during childbirth (Harmon et al., 1990) and typically suffer less during dental work (Houle et al., 1988). It’s even been possible to perform major surgeries (such as appendectomies) using hypnosis as the primary anesthesia (Kihlstrom, 1985). Research is ongoing to deter- mine the biological basis for these striking analgesic effects. It was once thought, for example, that the release of endorphins by the brain might be responsible, although this possibility now seems less likely (Moret et al., 1991). Imaging studies have been conducted comparing activated areas of the brain before and after painful stimula- tion and differences in the activation patterns have been found between hypnotized and waking states (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009). No firm conclusions can be drawn at this point, but research is continuing.

Memory enhancement Another frequent claim is that hypnosis can dramatically improve memory, a phenomenon called hypnotic hypermnesia. There have been criminal cases in which hypnotized witnesses have suddenly and miraculously recalled minute details of a crime. In one famous kidnapping case from the 1970s, a bus driver along with 26 children were buried 6 feet underground inside a tractor trailer. Later, under hypnosis, the driver was able to reconstruct details of the kidnap- per’s license plate—digit by digit. There is a long-standing belief among some psycho- therapists that hypnosis is an excellent tool for uncovering hidden memories of abuse or other forms of psychological trauma (Pratt et al., 1988; Yapko, 1994). There have even been well-publicized examples of age regression under hypnosis, in which a per- son mentally traveled backward to some earlier place (such as his or her second-grade classroom) and was able to recall numerous details.

Unfortunately, there’s little hard evidence to support these phenom- ena scientif ically. Memory does sometimes improve after a hypnotic session, but this doesn’t allow us to conclude that the hypnotic state was responsible (Spiegel, 1995). One possibility is that hypnotic induction procedures (the relax- ation techniques) simply create effective and supportive environments in which to remember (Geiselman et al., 1985). It’s also diff icult to judge whether mem- ories recovered during hypnosis are, in fact, accurate representations of what actually occurred. You may “remember” a particularly unfortunate experience from the second-grade classroom, but can you be sure that this traumatic episode indeed occurred as you remember it?

As you’ll see in a moment, hypnotized people often adopt roles designed to please the hypnotist. What appear to be memories are sometimes fabrications—sto- ries that the person unintentionally makes up to please the hypnotist. For this rea- son, many states have banned the use of hypnotic testimony in criminal court cases.

hypnotic hypermnesia The supposed enhancement in memory that occurs under hypnosis; there is little if any evidence to support the existence of this effect.

critical thinking

Under what circumstances do you think it might be adaptive for someone to enter a heightened state of suggestibility?

critical thinking

Can you think of any situations in which memories accessed through hypnosis should be admitted in court? Why or why not?

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It’s simply too difficult to tell whether the memory recov- ered after hypnosis is accurate or a product of sugges- tion. Controlled experiments in the laboratory have been unable to find good evidence for true memory enhance- ment—at least, memory enhancement that can be tied directly to the properties of hypnosis. There’s no question that hypnosis can affect cognitive processes, including memory, but hypnosis holds no special key for unlocking the past.

Explaining Hypnosis What exactly is hypnosis? How do we explain the height- ened suggestibility? There are two prominent expla- nations: (1) Hypnosis is a kind of dissociation, or true splitting of conscious awareness; and (2) hypnosis repre- sents a kind of social role playing. Let’s consider each of these ideas in more detail.

Hypnotic Dissociations Some researchers have suggested that hypnosis produces hypnotic dissociations. “Dissociation” means that the individual experiences a kind of splitting of consciousness where multiple forms of awareness exist simultaneously (Hilgard, 1986, 1992). This is kind of a fancy way of saying that you have divided con- sciousness. One stream of consciousness follows the commands of the hypnotist— for example, feeling no pain in response to a painful stimulation. The second kind of awareness, called the “hidden observer,” experiences the pain but reveals nothing to the observer.

Support for these ideas comes from experiments in which people are hypnotized and asked to submerge one arm into a bucket of extremely cold ice water (a com- mon procedure to test for the analgesic effects of hypnosis). “You’ll be aware of no pain,” the participant is told, “but that other part of you, the hidden part that is aware of everything going on, can signal any true pain by pressing this key.” A button is made available that the person is allowed to press, at will, with the nonsubmerged hand. It turns out that people press this key repeatedly—reporting the pain—and the key presses become much more frequent the longer the arm is kept submerged. During hypnosis, as well as afterward, people claim to have no knowledge of what the nonsubmerged hand is doing. There is a hidden part of consciousness, Hilgard argues, that maintains realistic contact with what’s going on; it is the other hypno- tized stream of awareness that feels no pain (also see Spiegel, 1998).

This idea that conscious awareness is divided or split during hypnosis may seem mystical, strange, and worthy of skepticism. But as you know, the brain often divides its labor to arrive at adaptive solutions. You walk and talk at the same time, and you certainly don’t consciously think about picking up each leg and putting it down while making a point in the conversation. The idea that consciousness is regularly dissoci- ated, or divided, is not really an issue to most psychologists; it’s accepted as a given, as a normal part of psychological functioning.

Social role Playing Many psychologists remain skeptical about hypnosis because hyp- notized people often seem to be playing a kind of role. The behavior of a hypnotized person is easily modified by expectations and by small changes in the suggestions of the hypnotist. For example, if people are told before being hypnotized that a rigid right arm is a prominent feature of the hypnotized state, then rigid right arms are likely to be reported after hypnosis even when no such specific suggestion is made during the induction process (Orne, 1959). It often appears as if people are trying desperately to do whatever they can to act in the suggested way (Kihlstrom & McConkey, 1990).

hypnotic dissociation A hypnotically induced splitting of consciousness during which multiple forms of awareness exist.

Although hypnosis is often used for entertainment, it can have considerable clinical value.

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Hypnotic behavior may, in fact, be a kind of social role playing. Everyone has some idea of what hypnotized behavior looks like—when hypnotized, you fall into a trance state and obey the commands of the all-powerful hypnotist. So when people agree to be hypnotized, they implicitly agree to act out this role (Barber et al., 1974; Sarbin & Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1982). You don’t actually lose voluntary control over your behavior; instead, you follow the lead of the hypnotist and obey his or her every com- mand because you think, perhaps unconsciously, that involuntary compliance is an important part of what it means to be hypnotized (Lynn et al., 1990).

Quite a bit of evidence supports this role-playing interpretation of hypnosis. One compelling finding is that many hypnotic phenomena can be reproduced with simu- lated participants—people who are never actually hypnotized but who are told to act as if they’re hypnotized (Spanos, 1986, 1996). Moreover, many of the classic phenom- ena—such as posthypnotic suggestions—turn out to be controlled mainly by expec- tations rather than by the hypnotist. For instance, if people are told to respond to a cue, such as tugging on their ear every time they hear a particular word, they will often do so after hypnosis. However, such posthypnotic suggestions work only if the people believe they’re still participating in the experiment; if the hypnotist leaves the room, or if the participants believe the experiment is over, they stop responding to the cue (see Lynn et al., 1990, for a review).

At the same time, it’s hard to believe that people can simply “role play” the anal- gesic effects of hypnosis during childbirth or surgery. Recent experiments have also found that people can reduce the harmful effects of interference during visual and verbal processing after hypnotic suggestion—somewhat more so than can nonhyp- notized people who are trying hard to perform the task (Iani et al., 2006). It is also possible to simulate neurological disorders during hypnosis, such as visual neglect or even blindness. A hypnotic suggestion for color blindness, for example, even seems to suppress the same areas of the brain that are damaged in patients who truly have lost the ability to sense color (Oakley & Halligan, 2009).

Meditation There are similarities between hypnosis and meditation—both are claimed to produce an altered state of consciousness, and both tend to rely on relaxation. In meditation, of course, it’s the participant alone who seeks to manipulate awareness. Most medita- tion techniques require you to perform some time-honored mental exercise, such as concentrating on repeating a particular string of words or sounds called a mantra.

The variations in awareness achieved through meditation, as with hypnosis, are often described in mystical or spiritual ways. Meditators report that they’re able to obtain an expanded state of awareness, one that is characterized by a pure form of thought unburdened by self-awareness. There are many forms of meditation and numerous induction procedures; most trace their roots back thousands of years to the practices of Eastern religions.

Daily sessions of meditation have been prescribed for many physical and psy- chological problems. As with hypnosis, the induction procedure usually begins with relaxation, but the mind is kept alert through focused concentration on breathing, internal repetition of the mantra, or efforts to clear the mind. The general idea is to step back from the ongoing stream of mental activity and set the mind adrift in the oneness of the universe. Great insights, improved physical health, and release from desire are some of the reported benefits.

Scientifically, it’s clear that meditation can produce significant changes in physio- logical functions. Arousal is lowered, so heart rate, respiration rate, and blood pressure tend to decrease. EEG recordings of brain activity during meditation reveal a relaxed mind—specifically, there is a significant increase in alpha-wave activity (Benson, 1975). Such changes are, of course, to be expected during any kind of relaxed state and do

meditation A technique for self-induced manipulation of awareness, often used for the purpose of relaxation and self-reflection.

Daily meditation can produce significant reductions in anxiety and improve physical and psychological well-being.

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not necessarily signify anything special about a state of consciousness. Indeed, there appear to be no significant differences between the physiological patterns of accom- plished meditators and those of nonmeditators who are simply relaxing (Holmes, 1987; Travis & Wallace, 1999). At this point, researchers have little to say about the subjec- tive aspects of the meditative experience—whether, in fact, the meditator has indeed merged with the oneness of the universe—but most researchers agree that inducing a relaxed state once or twice a day has beneficial effects. One recent neuroimaging study even found that emotion-regulating brain regions were larger in long-term meditators than in control participants who had never meditated (Luders et al., 2009). It’s tough to interpret the results of this study conclusively—it could be that people with better reg- ulating brains simply like to meditate—but meditation can be extremely helpful. Daily meditation sessions have helped people deal effectively with chronic anxiety as well as lower blood pressure and cholesterol levels (Seeman et al., 2003).

test yourself Check what you’ve learned about hypnosis and meditation by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. The EEG patterns of a hypnotized person resemble those of non- REM sleep. True or False?

2. Hypnosis improves memory under some circumstances because it reduces the tendency to fabricate, or make things up, to please the questioner. True or False?

3. Hypnotic dissociations represent a kind of splitting of conscious- ness, in which more than one kind of awareness is present at the same time. True or False?

4. Hilgard’s “hidden observer” experiments provide support for the social role-playing explanation of hypnosis. True or False?

5. Meditation leads primarily to alpha wave rather than theta wave EEG activity. True or False?

● recall-Monitor-recall 6.4

It’s difficult to study consciousness because consciousness is a subjective, personal experience. It’s tough to define con- sciousness objectively, and appealing to the scribblings of an EEG pattern or to a pretty picture from a neuroimaging device may, in the minds of many, fail to capture the com- plexities of the topic adequately. Is consciousness something that can change its state, like water as it freezes, boils, or evaporates? For the moment, psychologists are working with a set of rather loose ideas about the topic, although conscious awareness is agreed to have many adaptive properties. We

considered four adaptive characteristics of consciousness in this chapter.

Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning The processes of attention allow the mind to prioritize its functioning. Faced with limited resources, the brain must be selective about the enormous amount of information it receives. Through atten- tion, we can focus on certain aspects of the environment while ignoring others; through attention, we can adapt our thinking in ways that allow for more efficient and deliberate

● Psychology for a reason What Consciousness Is For

Psychology For a Reason: What Consciousness Is For | 201

problem solving. Attentional processes enable the brain to divide its processing. People don’t always need to be con- sciously aware of the tasks they perform; automatic pro- cesses allow us to perform multiple tasks—such as walking and talking—simultaneously. Certain disorders of attention, including visual neglect and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, provide insights into attention processes. In both of these cases, which may be caused by physical problems in the brain, the person’s ability to adapt to the environment is compromised.

Sleeping and Dreaming Sleep is one part of a daily (circadian) rhythm that includes wakefulness, but sleep itself turns out to be composed of regularly changing cycles of brain activity. Studies using the EEG reveal that we move through several distinct stages during sleep, some of which are characterized by intense mental activity. Sleeping may allow the brain a chance to rest and restore itself from its daily workout, or it may simply be adaptive as a period of time out. Remaining hidden and motionless may have protected our ancestors at night when their sensory equipment was unlikely to func- tion well. Dreaming, which occurs mainly during the REM period of sleep, remains a mystery to psychologists. Some believe that dreaming may reveal conflicts that are normally hidden to conscious awareness, or that dreaming may be one way to work out troubling problems. A third possibility is that dreaming is simply the brain’s attempt to make sense of spon- taneous neural activity. Dreaming may even help us practice, or rehearse, our responses to threatening situations.

Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs Psychoactive drugs alter behavior and awareness by tapping into natural brain systems that have evolved for adaptive reasons. The brain, as a biochemical factory, is capable of reacting to stress

or injury by releasing chemicals that help reduce pain or improve mood. Many of the drugs that are abused regularly in our society activate these natural systems. As a result, the study of psychoactive drugs has enabled researchers to learn more about communication systems in the brain. There are three main categories of psychoactive drugs. Depressants, such as alcohol and barbiturates, lower the ongoing activ- ity of the central nervous system. Stimulants, such as caf- feine, nicotine, and cocaine, stimulate central nervous system activity by increasing the likelihood that neural transmissions will occur. Finally, hallucinogens, such as LSD, play havoc with the user’s normal internal construc- tion of reality. Although the mechanisms involved are not known, it’s believed that LSD mimics the actions of the neurotransmitter serotonin.

Altering Awareness: Induced States Two techniques have been designed specifically to alter conscious awareness, hyp- nosis and meditation. Hypnosis is a form of social interaction that induces a heightened state of suggestibility in people. Hypnotic techniques usually promote relaxation, although once achieved, brain activity under hypnosis more closely resembles the waking rather than the sleeping state. In med- itation, it is the participant alone who manipulates aware- ness, often by mentally repeating a particular word or string of words. The biological mechanisms of both hypnosis and meditation are poorly understood at present, but each has some positive consequences. Pain and discomfort can be sig- nificantly reduced through hypnotic suggestion, and the con- tinued use of meditation has been linked to the reduction of stress and anxiety. Psychologists study hypnosis and medi- tation, in part, because they believe these techniques may provide important insight into how we respond to the sugges- tions of others, particularly authority figures.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning: Attention ● (1) refers to the internal process of setting (2) for mental functioning. The brain uses attention to focus selectively on certain aspects of the environment and not others. Why? In part because there are (3) to how fast and efficiently (4) communicate.

● Different messages are received simultaneously by each ear. In (5) , the participant tries to repeat one message aloud while ignoring the other. Although the brain appears to (6) many things at the same time, some of the monitoring may be minimal or beyond current (7) . One example of this monitoring is the (8)

● (9) refers to mental processing that is (10) and easy, requiring little or no focused

(11) . Once developed, automatic processing does not seem to require (12) control or awareness. Automaticity can be measured in a (13) attention task.

● Visual (14) is caused most often by damage to the right (15) lobe and results in the tendency to ignore everything on the (16) side of the body. Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a psychological con- dition that is characterized by (17) , which is often combined with impulsivity or hyperactivity.

Sleeping and Dreaming ● Structures in the brain called biological (18) trigger biological, or circadian, (19) . Sleeping and (20) , body temperature, (21)

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secretions and other biological processes follow a 24-hour (22) cycle.

● Repeated cycles of brain activity, each about (23) minutes long, occur during sleep. EEG recordings show cyclic changes in brain wave patterns that vary in (24) , frequency, and regularity. The sleep cycle contains (25) stages of sleep and REM (rapid eye movement). Stage N1: Theta waves are dominant. Stage N2: Theta waves are interrupted by K complexes. Stages N3: Delta or (26) -wave sleep waves are dominant. REM sleep occurs 70 to (27) minutes into the sleep cycle, and the EEG pattern is similar to the awake state. During REM sleep, abrupt physiological changes occur, and we dream the most.

● Sleep may help (28) and restore the body and brain. Sleep may also help us respond adaptively to chang- ing environmental conditions (for example, by causing us to remain hidden and motionless at night) and increase our likelihood for (29) . Sleep deprivation results in a decline in both (30) and physical function.

● REM sleep may strengthen certain kinds of (31) . Freud believed that dreams are a form of (32) . The activation-(33) hypothesis holds that dreams are a product of (34) activity in the brain. The problem-solving view suggests that dreaming may be a way for us to find solutions to our problems. Dreaming may help us mentally practice our survival skills by allowing us to simulate (35) from the environment.

● Insomnia, (36) , and (37) are (38) that involve problems with the amount, quality, and timing of sleep. Nightmares, night (39) , and sleepwalking are (40) that involve abnormal sleep disturbances.

Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs ● Drugs influence the action of (41) . Like neurotransmitters, certain drugs alter behavior and (42) processes. A person’s physical response to a drug may change with repeated use. With (43) , increasing amounts of the substance are required to produce

the desired effects. A physical or (44) need for continued drug use indicates (45) . Withdrawal involves measurable physical reactions when drug use stops.

● (46) , which include (47) , barbiturates, and tranquilizers, reduce the activity of the central nervous system. Stimulants, including caffeine, nicotine, amphetamines, and cocaine, (48) central nervous system activity. Opiates (or narcotics), such as opium, heroin, and morphine, depress central nervous system activity and reduce both anxiety and sensitivity to (49) . (50) (or psychedelics), including mescaline, psilocybin, and LSD, drastically alter normal (51) .

● Psychoactive drugs produce different effects in different people due to biological, genetic, and (52) factors. Reactions to psychoactive drugs can be influenced by the environment, (53) with the effects of the substance, physical state, and mental (54) or expectations.

Altering Awareness: Induced States ● Hypnosis produces a heightened state of (55) and physiological indices resemble a (56) state. Hypnosis can produce profound (57) relieving effects and has been used to eliminate unwanted habits.

● A controversial claim is that hypnosis can (58) memory, a phenomenon called hypnotic hypermnesia, but it’s not certain that any kind of hypnotic state is respon- sible. It may be that the (59) techniques create an effective and supportive environment that facilitates remembering.

● Hypnosis may produce hypnotic (60) , where (61) is split into multiple forms of awareness. Some researchers suggest that hypnotic behavior may be a form of (62) role playing, in which the subject responds in a way designed to please the hypnotist.

● Meditation, characterized by self-induced altered (63) , can cause significant physiological changes, promote relaxation, and reduce (64) .

Terms to Remember | 203

activation-synthesis hypothesis, 186 alpha waves, 182 attention, 173 attention deficit/hyperactivity

disorder (ADHD), 177 automaticity, 175 biological clocks, 180 circadian rhythms, 180 cocktail party effect, 174 consciousness, 171 delta activity, 183 depressants, 191

dichotic listening, 173 drug dependency, 191 drug tolerance, 191 hallucinogens, 193 hypersomnia, 188 hypnosis, 196 hypnotic dissociation, 198 hypnotic hypermnesia, 197 insomnia, 187 latent content, 186 manifest content, 186 meditation, 199

narcolepsy, 188 night terrors, 189 nightmares, 189 opiates, 192 psychoactive drugs, 190 REM rebound, 186 REM sleep, 183 sleepwalking, 189 stimulants, 192 theta waves, 182 visual neglect, 177 withdrawal, 191

Terms to remember

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media resources

204

7 Learning From Experience

Psychology For a reason How Do We Learn From Experience?

Learning About Events: Noticing and Ignoring Learning Goal Habituation and Sensitization Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.1

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning

Learning Goals The Terminology of Classical Conditioning Forming the CS–US Connection Conditioned Responding: Why Does It Develop?

Practical solutions Taste Aversions

Second-Order Conditioning Stimulus Generalization Stimulus Discrimination

Biological Constraints on Learning

Practical solutions Superstitious Behavior

Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.3

Learning From Others: Observational Learning

Learning Goals Modeling: Learning From Others Practical Considerations Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.4

Psychology For a reason Learning From Experience

chaPter review Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

An Application: Drug Tolerance Extinction: When the CS No Longer Signals

the US Conditioned Inhibition: Signaling the

Absence of the US Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.2

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning

Learning Goals The Law of Effect The Discriminative Stimulus: Knowing

When to Respond The Nature of Reinforcement Punishment: Lowering the Likelihood of a

Response Schedules of Reinforcement Shaping: Acquiring Complex Behaviors

205

We now turn our attention to learning, one of the most basic of all psycho-logical processes. The ability to adjust our actions in response to past experience—to learn—is fundamental to our lives. What exactly is learning? You might define it as the process of acquiring knowledge. You go to school, you take classes, you learn things about the world. In essence, that’s the same way psycholo- gists think about learning. But, as you know from Chapter 2, psychologists like to define concepts by how those concepts can be measured. “Knowledge” can’t be mea- sured directly; instead, learning is defined by behavior—more precisely, as a change in behavior, or potential behavior, that results from experience. Notice the emphasis is on behavior, which can be directly observed. We make inferences about learning by observing behavior and noting how it changes over time.

Like most definitions, this one needs a little tweaking. Sometimes behavior changes as a result of experience in ways that we wouldn’t classify as learning. For example, your behavior changes as you age. Experience plays a role in development, as you know, but some changes occur purely as a result of physical development. Your behavior also changes when you get injured or sick. Suppose you’re stuck in bed for two days with a high fever; your behavior is going to change—you sleep a lot more than normal—but these changes have nothing to do with learning. The concept of learning is reserved for those cases when behavior changes in a way that reflects the experience—we change our behavior, either as a reaction to the experience or as a result of practice, so we can act more sensibly in the future. Not surprisingly, there are different kinds of learning, each directed at solving unique problems, and we’ll discuss each of these kinds in turn.

Learning About Events: Noticing and Ignoring We need to recognize new events but also learn to ignore events that occur repeatedly without consequence. A baby crying, the screeching sirens of a fire engine—these sounds demand our attention and cause us to react. Humans and animals notice sudden changes in their environment; they notice those things that are new and potentially of interest. But our reactions to these novel events change with repeated experience, and these changes are controlled by some of the most basic and important of all learning processes.

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning When does one event predict that a second event is likely to follow? Many things that happen in our world signal the occurrence of other events. For instance, you know that lightning precedes thunder

learning A relatively permanent change in behavior, or potential behavior, that results from experience.

● Psychology For a reason How Do We Learn From Experience?

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and that a rattling sound can signal the presence of a venomous snake. Often you can’t do anything about the co-occurrence of such events, but if you recog- nize the relationship, you can respond accordingly (you can take cover or move to avoid the snake).

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning All species, sea snails as well as people, need to learn that some behaviors have consequences. The child who flicks the tail of a cat once too often receives an unwelcome surprise. The family dog learns that if he hangs around the dinner table, an occasional scrap of food might come his way. Behaviors are instrumental in pro- ducing rewards and punishments, and it’s clearly adaptive for us to learn when and how to act.

Learning from Others: Observational Learning Often our most important teachers are not our own actions and their consequences but the actions of others. We can learn by example, through observational learning. Obviously, observational learning has considerable adaptive significance: A teenager learns about the con- sequences of drunk driving, one hopes, not from direct experience but from observing others whose fate has already been sealed. A young monkey in the wild learns to be afraid of snakes not from a deadly personal encounter but from observing its mother’s fear.

Learning About Events: Noticing and Ignoring LEARNING GOAL

●● Describe and compare habituation and sensitization.

How do we learn to notice and ignore events that occur and repeat in our world? We’re constantly surrounded by sights, sounds, and sensations—from the traffic outside the window, to the color of the paint on the wall, to the feel of denim jeans against our legs. As you discovered in Chapter 6, we can’t attend to all of these events. The human nervous system has limited resources so we must prioritize our men- tal functioning. And this is not only a human problem: Animals, too, have limited resources. They constantly need to decide whether events in their environment are important or unimportant.

Habituation and Sensitization People and animals are programmed from birth to notice novelty; when something new or different happens, we pay close attention. Suppose you hear a funny tick- ing noise in your car engine when you press the gas pedal. When you first notice the sound, it occupies your attention. You produce an orienting response, which means you orient toward the new sound, maybe by leaning forward and listening. After driving with the problem for a while, however, your behavior changes—the

orienting response An inborn tendency to notice and respond to novel or surprising events.

Learning about consequences

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ticking becomes less bothersome, and you may even stop reacting to it altogether. Your behavior changes with repeated experience, which is the hallmark of learning.

Habituation occurs when you slow or stop responding to an event that has become familiar through repeated presentation; you may remember we talked about this process in Chapter 4. Most birds will startle and become agitated when the shadow of a hawk passes overhead, but their level of alarm will rapidly decline if the object is presented repeatedly and there’s no subsequent attack (Tinbergen, 1951). It makes sense for animals to produce a strong initial orienting response to a sudden change in their environment. If a bird fails to attend quickly to the shape of a preda- tor, it’s not likely to survive. Through habituation, organisms learn to be selective about their reactions. They attend initially to the new and unusual but subsequently ignore events that occur repeatedly without consequence.

Habituation plays a role in eating as well—at least in how long and how much food we choose to consume (Epstein et al., 2009). Evidence suggests that we habituate to the taste of food during the course of a meal; this explains, in part, why we stop eat- ing. When we eat the same food during a meal, the sensory stimulation is reduced by the food’s repeated presentation. Such a process helps explain why we eat more when there are a variety of foods on our plate (Temple et al., 2008). It also helps explain why we can feel stuffed at the end of a meal, but suddenly feel hungry again when the des- sert menu arrives. We have habituated to the main course, not to dessert. Researchers have even suggested that individual differences in our susceptibility to habituation may help explain why some people are obese and others are not (Epstein et al., 2009).

A related phenomenon, called sensitization, occurs when our response to an event increases rather than decreases with repeated exposure. If you’re exposed repeatedly to a loud noise, you’re likely to become sensitized to the noise—your reactions become more intense and prolonged with repeated exposure. (This happens to me when our cat con- stantly yells for food.) Both habituation and sensitization are natural responses to repeated events. They help us respond appropriately to the environment. Whether repetition of a stimulus will lead to habituation or sensitization depends on several factors (Groves & Thompson, 1970). Generally, sensitization is more likely when the repeated stimulus is intense or punishing. If the stimulus is mild or modest in intensity, repeated exposure usu- ally leads to habituation. Habituation and sensitization also depend importantly on the timing of presentations—for example, habituation typically occurs faster when the repeti- tions occur close together in time (Miller & Grace, 2003).

habituation The decline in the tendency to respond to an event that has become familiar through repeated exposure.

sensitization Increased responsiveness, or sensitivity, to an event that has been repeated.

It’s adaptive for all living things to notice sudden changes in the environment. In this case, the unexpected appearance of a red-tailed hawk elicits distinctive orienting reactions from an opossum family.©

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We rely on simple learning processes such as habituation to help conserve our limited resources. The world is full of events to be noticed, far more than we can ever hope to monitor. Orienting responses guarantee that we will notice the new and unusual, but through habituation we learn to ignore those things that are repeated but are of no significant consequence. Therefore, we’re able to solve a very important problem—how to be selective about the events that occur and recur in the world.

Through habituation, people easily learn to ignore distracting noises in their environment. ©

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test yourself Check your knowledge about noticing and ignoring by choosing the best answer for each of the following descriptions. Choose from the following terms: habituation, orienting response, sensitization. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. When Shawn practices his trumpet, he tries repeatedly to hit a high C note. The first time he tries, his roommate says nothing. By the third try, his roommate is banging on the door telling him to be quiet:

2. Alonda turns her head and stares intently when a strange howling sound begins in her backyard:

3. Kesha loves clocks and has six different varieties in her apartment. Strangely, she never notices any ticking noises:

4. Your cat, Comet, used to startle and jump 3 feet in the air whenever you ground your gourmet coffee beans in the morning. Now he never seems to notice:

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.1

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning | 209

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning LEARNING GOALS

●● Describe the basic elements of classical conditioning. ●● Discuss why and how conditioned responding develops. ●● Differentiate among second-order conditioning, stimulus generalization, and stimulus discrimination. ●● Discuss extinction and conditioned inhibition.

Everyone knows that a flash of lightning means a clap of thunder is likely to follow; experience has taught us to associate lightning with thunder. You also know that a sour smell coming from the milk means it probably won’t taste very good. In both these cases, you’ve learned an association between two events—more specifically, you’ve learned that one event predicts the other. This knowledge is clearly useful because it allows you to prepare yourself for future events. You know to cover your ears or to avoid drinking the milk.

The scientific study of simple associations like these began around the turn of the century in the laboratory of a Russian physiologist named Ivan P. Pavlov (1849–1936). Pavlov developed a technique, known as classical conditioning, to investigate how these associations are formed. According to most accounts, Pavlov didn’t start off with a burning desire to study learning. His main interest was in digestion, which included the study of how dogs salivate, or drool, in the presence of food. We salivate when food is placed in our mouth, as do dogs, because saliva contains certain chemicals that help in the initial stages of digestion. However, to his annoyance, Pavlov found that his dogs often began to drool much too soon—merely at the sight of the food dish and long before food was actually placed in their mouths. Pavlov referred to these prema- ture droolings as “psychic” secretions, and he began to study why they occurred, in part to avoid future contamination of his digestion experiments.

The Terminology of Classical Conditioning Pavlov recognized immediately that “psychic” secretions developed as a result of experience. At the same time, he was keenly aware that drooling in response to food is not a learned response. He knew that certain stimuli, which he called unconditioned stimuli (US), automatically lead to responses, which he called uncon- ditioned responses (UR). Food is an unconditioned stimulus that automatically pro- duces salivation as an unconditioned response. Neither dogs nor humans need to be taught to drool when food is placed in their mouths; rather, this response is a reflex similar to the jerking of your leg when the doctor taps you just below the knee. The response produced to an unconditioned stimulus is unconditioned—that is, no learn- ing, or conditioning, is required.

The problem facing Pavlov was that his dogs began to drool at the sight of the food dish or even to the sound of an assistant entering the room. Food dishes and footsteps are not unconditioned stimuli that automatically cause a dog to salivate. Drooling in response to such stimuli is learned; it is conditioned, or acquired as a result of experi- ence. For this reason, Pavlov began referring to the “psychic” secretions as conditioned responses (CR) and to the stimuli that produced them as conditioned stimuli (CS).

Let’s take footsteps as an example. The sound of an approaching feeder leads to drooling because the dog has learned that the sound predicts or signals the appear- ance of the food. Footsteps and food bear a special relation to each other in time: When the footsteps are heard, the food is soon to arrive. To use Pavlov’s terminol- ogy, the footsteps act as a conditioned stimulus that produces salivation, a conditioned response, in anticipation of food. This is not unlike what happens to you when your

classical conditioning A set of procedures used to investigate how organisms learn about the signaling properties of events. Classical conditioning involves learning relations between events—conditioned and unconditioned stimuli—that occur outside of one’s control.

unconditioned stimulus (US) A stimulus that automatically leads to an observable response prior to any training.

unconditioned response (UR) The observable response that is produced automatically, prior to training, on presentation of an unconditioned stimulus.

conditioned response (CR) The acquired response that is produced by the conditioned stimulus in anticipation of the unconditioned stimulus.

conditioned stimulus (CS) The neutral stimulus that is paired with the unconditioned stimulus during classical conditioning.

critical thinking

Can you think of any reason it might be adaptive to begin the digestive processes before food actually gets into the mouth?

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mouth begins to water as you sit down to a delicious-looking meal. Conditioned stim- uli typically lead to conditioned responses after the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus have been paired together in time—the footsteps (the CS) reliably occur just before presentation of the food (the US).

Forming the CS–US Connection What are the necessary conditions for forming an association between a condi- tioned stimulus and an unconditioned stimulus? It helps to remember the following general rule: A conditioned stimulus becomes a signal for the unconditioned stimu- lus when it provides information about the delivery of the unconditioned stimulus (Rescorla, 1988). If a bell (CS) is struck just before the delivery of food (US), and these pairings are continued over time, the dog will begin to salivate (CR) when- ever the bell (CS) is struck (see ●Figure 7.1). A connection is formed because the bell provides information about the delivery of the food—the dog knows that food will be arriving soon after it hears the bell. This rule helps to explain a number of exper- imental findings.

First, for an effective association to form, the conditioned stimulus usually needs to be presented before the unconditioned stimulus. If the two are presented at the same time (simultaneous conditioning), or if the conditioned stimulus is presented after the unconditioned stimulus (backward conditioning), little conditioning will occur. This makes sense: In both cases the conditioned stimulus provides no information about when the unconditioned stimulus will appear, so conditioned responding is unlikely to develop. There are some exceptions to this general rule (Cole & Miller, 1999; Rescorla, 1980), but usually the conditioned stimulus needs to be presented first, before the unconditioned stimulus, for effective conditioning.

Second, the unconditioned stimulus needs to follow the conditioned stimu- lus closely in time. Pavlov found that if there was a long delay between the bell (CS) and the food (US), his dogs usually didn’t form a connection. As the gap between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus increases, one becomes a less efficient signal for the arrival of the other—that is, the conditioned stimulus pro- vides less useful information about the appearance of the unconditioned stimulus. Once again, there are important exceptions to the rule, but they need not concern us

Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov watches one of his experiments on “psychic” secretions in dogs in 1934. Notice the dog’s cheek, which is fitted with a device for measuring salivation. ©

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here (see Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000). (For one exception, take a look at the Practical Solutions feature on page 213.)

Finally, the conditioned stimulus must provide new information about the uncon- ditioned stimulus. If you already know when the unconditioned stimulus will occur, then adding another signal will lead to little, if any, evidence of further conditioning. Suppose you teach some rats that a tone is a reliable signal for an electric shock. Once the rats have begun to freeze when they hear the tone (a typical conditioned response to the expectation of shock), you start turning on a light at the same time as you pres- ent the tone. Both the light and the tone are then followed by the shock. Under these conditions, rats typically don’t act as if the light is also a reliable signal for the shock (e.g., Kamin, 1968). This result is called blocking because the established signal, the tone, appears to prevent, or block, the animal from learning about the light. Blocking occurs because the light provides no new information about the shock—the tone already tells the rat the shock is about to occur—so the animal fails to treat it as a significant signal.

Conditioned Responding: Why Does It Develop? Forming an association between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus—that is, that one signals the appearance of the other—doesn’t really explain conditioned responding. Why should dogs drool to a bell that signals food or rats freeze to a tone that predicts shock? One possibility is that conditioned responses pre- pare the organism for events that are expected to follow; conditioned responses help the organism interact with the US, which is usually some kind of biologically signifi- cant event (Domjan, 2005). Drooling readies the dog to receive food in its mouth, and “freezing” lowers the chances that any predators will see the rat. Because the condi- tioned stimulus tells the animal that a significant event is about to occur, it responds in a way that’s appropriate for the upcoming event.

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●● Figure 7.1 classical conditioning Through classical conditioning, organisms learn about the signaling properties of events. The presentation of an unconditioned stimulus (US) leads to an automatic unconditioned response (UR) prior to training. A neutral stimulus is paired closely in time with a US. Eventually, the animal learns that this conditioned stimulus (CS) predicts the occurrence of the US and begins to show an appropriate conditioned response (CR) on presentation of the CS. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

critical thinking

Why do you think it’s adaptive to learn associations only when the conditioned stimulus provides new information about the unconditioned stimulus? Can you think of any situations in which it might be useful to learn that many stimuli predict the appearance of the unconditioned stimulus?

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It was once commonly believed that the pairing of the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus simply caused the unconditioned response to “shift” to the conditioned stimulus. Pavlov was convinced, for example, that the conditioned stimulus acted as a kind of substitute for the unconditioned stimulus—you respond to the conditioned stimulus as if it were essentially identical to the unconditioned stimu- lus. However, this means that the conditioned response should always be identical, or at least highly similar, to the unconditioned response. Dogs should always drool to a stimulus that predicts the arrival of food; rats should jump to a stimulus that predicts shock because they usually jump when they’re actually shocked. But as you’ve seen, rats will freeze rather than jump to a signal predicting shock.

The form of the conditioned response depends on many factors. In general, the idea that classical conditioning turns the conditioned stimulus into a substitute for the unconditioned stimulus—or that organisms simply learn to respond to the con- ditioned stimulus in the same way that they automatically respond to the uncon- ditioned stimulus—is misleading or wrong. Instead, we learn relationships among events that occur in our world. We learn that some events signal the occurrence of other events and we respond appropriately. This perspective is known as the cognitive view of classical conditioning.

Second-Order Conditioning Pavlov also discovered that a conditioned stimulus could be used to condition a second signal. In second-order conditioning, an established conditioned stimulus, such as a tone that predicts food, is presented immediately after a new event, such as a light; the unconditioned stimulus itself is never actually presented. In such a case, pairing the tone with the light can be sufficient to produce conditioned responding to the light.

An example from Pavlov’s laboratory helps to illustrate the procedure. One of Pavlov’s associates, Dr. Frolov, first taught a dog that the sound of a ticking metro- nome signaled meat powder in the mouth. The dog quickly started to drool in the pres- ence of the ticking. A black square was then presented, followed closely by the ticking. After a number of these black square–metronome pairings, even though the ticking was never followed by food powder on these trials, the dog began to drool in the pres- ence of the black square. The dog drooled in response to the square because it signaled the ticking, which the dog had previously learned signaled the food (see ●Figure 7.2).

The fact that conditioned stimuli can be used to condition other events greatly expands the number of situations in which classical conditioning applies. You don’t need an unconditioned stimulus to be physically present to learn something about its occurrence. For example, consider the logic behind using celebrities to endorse prod- ucts. Advertisers are trying to get you to form a connection between their product and feelings of pleasure or enjoyment. Most people like Beyoncé because she’s linked to something they enjoy—great entertainment. If a product, such as a new perfume, is repeatedly paired with her, you’re likely also to associate it with pleasurable conse- quences—the product becomes a signal for something that leads to enjoyment. This is a kind of second-order conditioning, and it’s been used for decades in the marketplace.

second-order conditioning A procedure in which an established conditioned stimulus is used to condition a second neutral stimulus.

●● concePt review Factors Affecting Classical Conditioning FACToR RElATion To CondiTioning EFFECTivEnEss

Timing relationship between CS and US The CS should usually be presented before the US. The US should usually follow the CS closely in time.

Informativeness of CS The CS should uniquely predict the US. The CS should provide new information about the occurrence of the US (blocking).

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning | 213

On St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, research- ers Lowell Nicolaus and David Nellis encour- aged captured mongooses to eat eggs laced with carbachol, a drug that produces tempo- rary illness. After five days of eating eggs and getting sick, the mongooses reduced their consumption of eggs by about 37% (Nicolaus & Nellis, 1987). In a very different context, in a research program designed to combat the negative effects of chemotherapy, young cancer patients were allowed a taste of some unusually flavored ice cream just before the onset of their normal chemotherapy—a treat- ment that can produce nausea and vomit- ing. Several weeks later, when offered the ice cream, only 21% of the children were willing to taste it again (Bernstein, 1978).

Both of these situations represent natu- ralistic applications of classical condition- ing. Can you identify the critical features of each? First, let’s look for the unconditioned stimulus—the stimulus that unconditionally produces a response prior to training. In both of these cases, the unconditioned stimulus is the illness-producing event, either the drug carbachol or the cancer-fighting chemother- apy. The response that is automatically pro- duced, unfortunately for the participants, is stomach distress. Children don’t need to learn to vomit from chemotherapy; a mongoose

doesn’t need to be taught to be sick after receiving carbachol. These are inevitable con- sequences that require no prior conditioning.

Now what is the conditioned stimulus— the event that provides information about the occurrence of the unconditioned stimulus? In these examples, it’s the taste of the food, either the eggs or the ice cream, that signals the nausea. It’s worth noting that the children were aware that their nausea was produced by the chemotherapy, not the ice cream, yet an association was still formed between the taste of the ice cream and a procedure that led to sickness. A conditioned response, feelings of queasiness to the food, was produced whenever the opportunity to eat was presented. Taste aversions are easy to acquire. They can occur after a single pairing of a novel food and illness.

It is extremely adaptive for people and mongooses to acquire taste aversions to poten- tially dangerous foods—it is in their interest to avoid those events that signal something potentially harmful. In the two studies we’ve just considered, the researchers investi- gated the aversions for a particular reason. Mongooses often eat the eggs of endangered species (such as marine turtles). By baiting the nests of mongoose prey with tainted eggs and establishing a taste aversion, scientists have

been able to reduce the overall rate of egg pre- dation. Similar techniques have also been used to prevent sheep from eating dangerous plants in the pasture (Zahori et al., 1990).

In the case of chemotherapy, Illene Bernstein was interested in developing methods for avoiding taste aversions: Cancer patients who are undergoing chemotherapy also need to eat, so it’s critical to understand the conditions under which aversions are formed. Taste aver- sions can develop as a side effect of chemo- therapy, although modern anti-nausea drugs often help reduce the severity of the stom- ach distress. Patients tend to avoid foods that they’ve eaten just before treatment, potentially leading to weight loss that slows down recov- ery. Researchers have found that associations are particularly likely to form between unusual tastes and nausea. Broberg and Bernstein (1987) found that giving children an unusual flavor of candy just before treatment reduced the likelihood of their forming aversions to their normal diet. These children formed a taste aversion to the candy instead. Another helpful technique is to ask the patient to eat the same, preferably bland, foods before every treatment. Foods that do not have distinctive tastes and that people eat regularly (such as bread) are less likely to become aversive.

●●Practical solutions Taste Aversions

For children undergoing the rigors of chemotherapy, like this boy suffering from leukemia, it’s important to prevent taste aversions from developing as a negative side effect. Broberg and Bernstein (1987) found that giving children candy with an unusual flavor just before treatment reduced the chances of a taste aversion forming. ©

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Stimulus Generalization Pavlov also noticed that conditioned responses tend to generalize to other, related events. If a tone of a particular pitch is established as a signal for food, other similar- sounding tones also produced drooling—even though they have never actually been presented. When a new stimulus produces a response similar to the one produced by the conditioned stimulus, it’s called stimulus generalization.

Stimulus generalization is aptly demonstrated in a famous study by the behav- iorist John Watson and his colleague Rosalie Rayner circa 1920. Watson and Rayner were interested in applying the principles of classical conditioning to a human—in this case to an 11-month-old infant known as Little Albert. They presented Albert with a white rat (the conditioned stimulus), which he initially liked, followed quickly by a very loud noise (the unconditioned stimulus), which he did not like. The loud noise, not surprisingly, produced a strong, automatic fear reaction: Albert cried (the unconditioned response). After several pairings of the rat with the noise, Albert began to pucker his face, whimper, and try to withdraw his body (all conditioned responses) immediately at the sight of the rat. (By the way, psychologists now rightly question the ethics of this experiment.) But Albert didn’t just cry at the sight of the rat. His cry- ing generalized to other stimuli—a rabbit, a fur coat, a package of cotton, a dog, and even a Santa Claus mask. All of these “white furry stimuli” had been presented to Albert before the conditioning session, and none had produced crying. Albert cried at the sight of them now because of his experience with the rat; he generalized his cry- ing response from the white rat to the other stimuli.

stimulus generalization Responding to a new stimulus in a way similar to the response produced by an established conditioned stimulus.

Conditioned stimulus (CS)

Metronome Food Salivation

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●● Figure 7.2 second-order conditioning In second-order conditioning, an established CS is used in place of a US to condition a second signal. In Dr. Frolov’s experiment, a ticking metronome was first paired with food; after repeated pairings, the ticking elicited salivation as a CR. Next, a black square—which did not produce salivation initially— was paired with the ticking (no US was presented). After repeated pairings, the presentation of the black square began to produce salivation. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning | 215

Stimulus generalization occurs when the newly introduced stimulus is similar to the conditioned stimulus (see ●Figure 7.3). If you get sick after eating clams, there’s a good chance you’ll avoid eating oysters; if you’ve had a bad experience in the den- tist’s chair, the sound of the neighbor’s high-speed drill may make you uncomfortable. Generalization makes adaptive sense: Things that look, sound, or feel the same often share signif icant properties.

Stimulus Discrimination Albert did notice the difference between white furry or fluffy things and things that were not white and fluffy. For example, he didn’t cry when a block of wood was shoved into his crib. This is called stimulus discrimination; it occurs when you respond to a new stimulus in a way that’s different from your response to the original conditioned stimulus. Through stimulus discrimination, you reveal that you can distinguish among stimuli, even when those stimuli share properties.

When stimuli do share properties—for example, two tones of a similar pitch— we often need experience to teach us to discriminate. The natural tendency is to gen- eralize, that is, to treat similar things in the same way. Albert could certainly tell the difference among rats, rabbits, and Santa Claus masks; what he needed to learn was which of those white furry things signaled the unfortunate noise. In many cases, the development of stimulus discrimination requires that one directly experience whether or not the unconditioned stimulus will follow a particular event. If event A is followed by the unconditioned stimulus but event B is not, then you learn to discrimi- nate between these two events and respond accordingly.

An Application: Drug Tolerance Classical conditioning teaches us that certain events signal, or predict, the occur- rence of other events. We’ve been talking about bells and Santa Claus masks, but often the “signal” for significant events is the general environment. For example,

stimulus discrimination Responding differently to a new stimulus than how one responds to an established conditioned stimulus.

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●● Figure 7.3 stimulus generalization After conditioned responding to a CS is established, similar events will often also produce conditioned responding through stimulus generalization. For example, if a red light is trained as a CS, then similar colors that were not explicitly trained will also produce responding if tested. Notice that the less similar the test stimulus is to the training CS, the less generalization occurs. (© Cengage Learning)

This still from a 1920 film shows Little Albert reacting with dismay to a white rat that had previously been paired with a very unpleasant noise. On the right is behavioral psychologist John Watson; to the left of Albert is Watson’s colleague, Rosalie Rayner.©

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if you always eat ice cream in your kitchen then your kitchen, and not your living room, becomes a specific signal for something tasty. Context conditioning is particu- larly important—and even deadly—in the case of drug addiction. People usually take drugs in the same environment, like a particular room in their house. Associations then form between the room or context and the drug’s effects. Pulling out the nee- dle or the crack pipe in your “safe room” signals the body that a powerful drug is about to be injected.

Many psychologists believe that drug tolerance develops as a classically condi- tioned response. When intake of the drug is signaled by the environment, the body produces a conditioned response that counteracts the physical effects of the drug— in the same way that a rat freezes when it anticipates a shock. Once signaled that the drug is coming, the body produces internal responses that block or attenuate the drug’s effects. This is drug tolerance—the body needs larger and larger amounts of the drug to overcome the body’s compensatory “conditioned” response. Note: The body has learned to anticipate the drug, and generate the compensating response, only in particular environments. If the user takes the drug in a different environ- ment, the normal signals will be absent and the body will not generate its normal compensatory reaction. This process can lead to overdose.

The people who are most likely to suffer drug overdoses are experienced users. These are people who are used to taking their drugs in a particular environment, one that signals the body that the drug is coming. Studies with drug addicts have found that the majority of overdoses occur when the user takes the drug in a new environment. Without the compensatory responses, signaled by the old envi- ronment, the normal drug dosage produces devastating and even fatal effects on the body (Siegel, 2001). A similar process seems to occur with recreational alco- hol as well. People who drink alcohol in an unusual way, such as in the fruit-fla- vored drink Four Loko, are more prone to hospitalizations for alcohol intoxication (Siegel, 2011).

Extinction: When the CS No Longer Signals the US Remember our general rule: A conditioned stimulus becomes a good signal when it provides information about the occurrence of the unconditioned stimulus. But what happens if the conditioned stimulus stops signaling the appearance of an uncondi- tioned stimulus? In the procedure of extinction,the conditioned stimulus is presented repeatedly, after conditioning, but it is no longer followed by the unconditioned stim- ulus. Under these conditions, the conditioned stimulus loses its signaling properties, and conditioned responding gradually diminishes as a result. So if a dog drools to a bell that predicts food, and we suddenly stop delivering the food after striking the bell, the dog will eventually stop drooling.

It’s sensible for us to change our behavior during extinction because we’re learn- ing something new—the conditioned stimulus no longer predicts the unconditioned stimulus. Yet Pavlov discovered an interesting twist: If you wait a while after extinc- tion and present the conditioned stimulus again, sometimes the conditioned response reappears. Spontaneous recovery is the recovery of an extinguished response when the conditioned stimulus is presented again, after a delay (see the far right panel in ●Figure 7.4). In Pavlov’s case, his dogs stopped drooling if a bell signaling food was repeatedly presented alone, but when the bell was rung again the day after extinc- tion, the conditioned response reappeared (although often not as strongly). No one is certain exactly why spontaneous recovery occurs, but it tells us that behavior, or performance, isn’t always a perfect indicator of what is known or remembered. At the end of extinction, the conditioned stimulus can seem to have lost its signaling properties, but when it is tested after a delay, we see that at least some of the learning remained (Bouton, 2007).

extinction Presenting a conditioned stimulus repeatedly, after conditioning, without the unconditioned stimulus, resulting in a loss in responding.

spontaneous recovery The recovery of an extinguished conditioned response after a period of nonexposure to the conditioned stimulus.

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●● Figure 7.4 training, extinction, and spontaneous recovery During training, Pavlov found that the amount of salivation produced in response to the CS initially increased and then leveled off as a function of the number of CS–US pairings. During extinction, the CS is repeatedly presented without the US, and conditioned responding gradually diminishes. If no testing of the CS occurs for a rest interval following extinction, spontaneous recovery of the CR will often occur if the CS is presented again. (© Cengage Learning)

Conditioned Inhibition: Signaling the Absence of the US During extinction, you learn that a conditioned stimulus no longer predicts the unconditioned stimulus. As a result, you stop responding to a stimulus that once elic- ited a response because you no longer anticipate that the unconditioned stimulus will follow. You’ve not forgotten about the unconditioned stimulus. Instead you’ve learned something new: A conditioned stimulus that used to signal the unconditioned stimu- lus no longer does (Rescorla, 2001).

In conditioned inhibition, you learn that an event signals the absence of the unconditioned stimulus. There are a variety of ways to create an inhibitory stimu- lus, but most involve presenting a new stimulus when the unconditioned stimulus is normally expected but is not delivered (Williams et al. 1992). For example, if dogs are currently drooling to a bell that predicts food, then putting the bell together with a light and then following this compound (bell + light) with no food will establish the light as a conditioned inhibitor for food. The animal learns that when the light is turned on, food does not follow the bell.

What change in behavior is produced by a stimulus that predicts the absence of something? Inhibitory learning can be expressed in various ways, but often you get a reaction that is the opposite of that produced by a normal conditioned stimulus. For example, if a conditioned stimulus signaling food produces an increase in responding, then an inhibitory conditioned stimulus will lead to a decrease in the normal amount of responding. Several experiments have shown that pigeons and dogs will approach a signal predicting food but will withdraw from a stimulus signaling its absence (see ●Figure 7.5; Hearst & Frank lin, 1977; Jenk ins et al., 1978).

It’s important to appreciate the value of an inhibitory signal. It’s just as adaptive to know that a significant event will not occur as it is to know that the event will occur. For example, every kid knows there are bullies on the playground. The sight of troublemaker Randy might usually make Kelley quake with fear—but not if there’s

conditioned inhibition Learning that an event signals the absence of the unconditioned stimulus.

critical thinking

After reading about Little Albert, can you understand why some psychologists believe that certain psychological problems, such as specific fears called phobias, might result from learning experiences?

218 | CHAPTER 7 Learning From Experience

Food hopper

Keylight signaling food

Keylight signaling no food

●● Figure 7.5 conditioned inhibition In conditioned inhibition, the CS provides information about the absence of the US. Pigeons will approach and peck at a keylight CS that signals the appearance of food (upper panel), but they will withdraw from a keylight CS signaling no food (lower panel). Notice that the withdrawal response is an indication that the red light has become a conditioned inhibitor—a CS that predicts the absence of food. (© Cengage Learning)

a teacher around. The teacher signals the absence of a negative event—Randy won’t be causing any trouble while the teacher is present. Inhibitory stimuli often act as “safety signals,” telling people when potentially dangerous events are likely to be absent or when dangerous conditions no longer apply.

●● concePt review Major Phenomena of Classical Conditioning PHEnomEnon dEsCRiPTion PAvlov’s dogs

Second-order conditioning

An established CS is presented immediately after a new event; after several pairings, this new event may come to elicit a response.

After a dog has been conditioned to salivate in response to a CS (tone), the CS is presented immediately after a new signal (e.g., a light). After several pairings, the light may come to elicit a response.

Stimulus generalization

A new stimulus produces a response similar to the one produced by the conditioned stimulus.

After a dog has been conditioned to salivate in response to a CS (e.g., a bright light), the same response may be produced by a similar stimulus (e.g., a dimmer light).

Stimulus discrimination

The response to a new stimulus is different from the response to the original CS.

After a dog has been conditioned to salivate in response to a CS (light), the response does not occur to a different stimulus, such as a ringing bell.

Acquisition Conditioned responding becomes stronger with repeated CS–US pairings.

The more times a dog hears the stimulus (tone) paired with the US (food), the stronger the conditioned response becomes.

Extinction Conditioned responding diminishes when the CS (after conditioning) is presented repeatedly without the US.

After a dog has been conditioned to salivate in response to a CS (tone), the tone is presented repeatedly without the US (food). The dog’s response to the CS lessens.

Spontaneous recovery

Conditioned responding that has disappeared in extinction recovers spontaneously with the passage of time.

After extinction, a dog no longer responds to the CS (tone). After a rest period, the dog will again respond when presented with the CS (tone).

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning | 219

test yourself Check your knowledge about classical conditioning by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Growing up, your little sister Leah had the annoying habit of screaming at the top of her lungs every time she stepped into her bathwater. Her screaming always made you wince and cover your ears. Now, years later, you still wince every time you hear running water. Identify these elements of learning:

a. Unconditioned stimulus: b. Unconditioned response: c. Conditioned stimulus: d. Conditioned response:

2. Every year when you visit the optometrist, you get a puff of air blown into your eye to test for glaucoma. It always makes you blink. Just before the puff is delivered, the doctor typically asks you if you’re “ready.” Now, whenever you hear that word, you feel an urge to blink. Identify these elements of learning:

a. Unconditioned stimulus: b. Unconditioned response: c. Conditioned stimulus: d. Conditioned response:

3. People often wonder whether Little Albert, the participant in the Watson and Rayner experiment, grew up filled with fear and anxiety. Suppose I told you that he suffered no long-term effects from the experiment and, in fact, later grew his own fluffy white beard. Which of the following probably best accounts for his normal development?

a. Conditioned inhibition b. Stimulus generalization c. Spontaneous recovery d. Extinction

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.2

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning LEARNING GOALS

●● Define operant conditioning and discuss the law of effect. ●● Explain what we mean by the discriminative stimulus. ●● Define reinforcement and punishment and distinguish between their positive and negative forms. ●● Discuss and compare the different schedules of reinforcement. ●● Explain how complex behaviors can be acquired through shaping. ●● Discuss how biological factors might limit the responses that can be learned.

Classical conditioning answers an important survival question: How do we learn that certain events signal the presence or the absence of other events? Through classical conditioning, we learn to expect that certain events will or will not occur, at cer- tain times, and we react accordingly. But our actions under these conditions typi- cally don’t have any effect on the presentation of the signal and the unconditioned stimulus. Usually, the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus occur outside our control. You can’t change the fact that thunder will follow lightning; all you can do is prepare for an event (thunder) when a prior event (lightning) tells you it’s coming.

There is another type of learning, studied through a procedure called operant conditioning (or instrumental conditioning), in which we learn that our own actions, rather than conditioned stimuli, lead to outcomes. If you study for hours and hours for

operant conditioning A procedure for studying how organisms learn about the consequences of their own voluntary actions (also called instrumental conditioning).

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an exam and receive an A, you learn that your behavior is instrumental in producing a top-notch grade; by operating on your environment, you have produced a pleasing consequence. Notice how classical conditioning differs from operant conditioning: In the former you learn that events signal outcomes; in the latter you learn that your own behavior produces outcomes (see ●Figure 7.6).

The Law of Effect The study of operant conditioning predates Pavlov’s historic work by several years. In 1895 Harvard graduate student Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1949), working in his mentor William James’s cellar, began a series of experiments on “animal intelligence” using cats from around the neighborhood. He built a puzzle box, which resembled a kind of tiny prison, and carefully recorded the time it took for the cats to escape. Thorndike designed the boxes so that escape was possible only through an unusual response, such as tilting a pole, pulling a string, or pressing a lever (see ●Figure 7.7). On release, the cats received a small amount of food as a reward. Thorndike’s goal was to observe how the cats learned to escape over time. Through trial and error, the cats eventually learned to make the appropriate response, but the learning process was gradual. Thorndike also found that the time it took for an animal to escape on any particular trial depended on the number of prior successful escapes. The more times the animal had successfully escaped in the past, the faster it could get out of the box on a new trial.

The relationship between escape time and the number of prior successful escapes led Thorndike to formulate the law of effect: If a response in a particular situation is followed by a satisfying or pleasant consequence, then the connection between the response and that situation will be strengthened; if a response in a particular situa- tion is followed by an unsatisfying or unpleasant consequence, the connection will be weakened. According to the law of effect, cats (and people) learn to make certain

law of effect If a response in a particular situation is followed by a satisfying consequence, it will be strengthened. If a response in a particular situation is followed by an unsatisfying consequence, it will be weakened.

a Classical conditioning: Food is delivered independently of rat’s behavior

b Operant conditioning: Rat’s behavior causes food to appear

●● Figure 7.6 classical versus operant conditioning In classical conditioning (top row), food is delivered independently of the rat’s behavior. The light CS signals the automatic arrival of the food US. In operant conditioning (bottom row), the rat must press the bar in the presence of the light to get the food. The light serves as a discriminative stimulus, indicating that pressing the bar will now produce the food. (© Cengage Learning)

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning | 221

responses in certain situations; the responses that regularly occur are those that have produced positive consequences in the past. If a response that tends to occur initially (e.g., scratching at the walls of the cage) is not followed by something good (such as freedom from the box), the chances of that same response reoccurring diminish.

The Discriminative Stimulus: Knowing When to Respond It’s important to understand that Thorndike’s law of effect applies only to responses that are rewarded in particular situations. If you’re praised for raising your hand in class and asking an intelligent question, you’re not likely to begin walking down the street repeatedly raising your hand. You know that raising your hand is rewarded only in a particular situation, namely, the classroom lecture. What you really learn is the following: If some stimulus situation is present (the classroom), and you act in a certain way (raising your hand), then some consequence will follow (praise).

B. F. Skinner (1938) referred to the stimulus situation as the discriminative stimulus. He suggested that a discriminative stimulus “sets the occasion” for a response to be rewarded. Being in class—the discriminative stimulus—sets the occa- sion for an inquisitive student to be rewarded. In some ways, the discriminative stimulus shares properties with the conditioned stimulus established in classical con- ditioning. For example, you often find stimulus generalization of a discriminative stim- ulus: If a pigeon is trained to peck a key in the presence of a red light, the bird will later peck the key whenever a light of a similar color is turned on. If you’re rewarded for asking questions in psychology, you might naturally generalize your response to another course, such as economics, and raise your hand there. Conversely, stimu- lus discrimination also occurs, usually after experiencing reward in one situation but not in another. You may learn, for instance, that raising your hand in psychology class leads to positive consequences but a similar behavior in your economics class is frowned on by the professor. In such a case, one setting (psychology) acts as an effec- tive discriminative stimulus for a certain response, but another setting (economics) does not.

discriminative stimulus The stimulus situation that sets the occasion for a response to be followed by reinforcement or punishment.

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●● Figure 7.7 operant conditioning In Thorndike’s famous experiments on animal intelligence, cats learned that some kinds of unusual responses—such as pressing a lever or tilting a pole—allowed them to escape from a puzzle box. The graph shows that the time required to escape gradually diminished over learning trials. Here, the cat is learning that its behavior is instrumental in producing escape. (Based on Weiten, 1995)

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The Nature of Reinforcement The law of effect states that responses will be strengthened if they are followed by a pleasant or satisfying consequence. By “strengthened,” Thorndike meant that a response was more likely to occur again in that particular situation. But what defines a pleasant or satisfying consequence? This is a tricky problem because the concept of a “pleasant” or “satisfying” event is highly personal—what’s pleasant for me might not be pleasant for you. Moreover, something that’s pleasing at one time might not be pleasing at another. Food, for example, is “positive at the beginning of Thanksgiving dinner, indifferent halfway through, and negative at the end of it” (Kimble, 1993).

For these reasons, psychologists use a technical term—reinforcement—to describe consequences that strengthen responding. As you’ll see, it’s popular to dis- tinguish between two major types of reinforcement, positive and negative.

Positive Reinforcement If presenting an event after a response increases the strength of the response, it’s called positive reinforcement. Usually, the presented event is an appetitive reward—something the organism likes, needs, or has an “appetite” for. Food and water are obvious examples, but responses can be reinforcing too (such as sexual activity or painting a picture). Remember, though, it’s not the subjective quali- ties of the consequence that matter—what matters in defining positive reinforcement is whether or not the response that led to the reward is strengthened. As long as the “reward” makes the response more likely to occur again in that situation, the conse- quence qualifies as positive reinforcement.

Negative Reinforcement Sometimes responses can be strengthened by the removal of an event—this is called negative reinforcement. In most cases, negative reinforce- ment occurs when a response enables you to eliminate, avoid, or escape from an unpleasant situation. For instance, you hang up the phone on someone who is criti- cizing you unfairly, shut off the blaring alarm clock in the morning, or walk out of a boring movie. These responses are more likely to occur again in the future, given the appropriate circumstance, because they lead to the removal of something negative— criticism, noise, or boredom. But, as you may have guessed, the event that’s removed doesn’t have to be unpleasant—it simply has to strengthen the response that led to the removal.

Students are often confused by the term negative reinforcement because they think negative reinforcement is a bad thing. Actually, whenever psychologists use the term reinforcement, both positive and negative, they’re referring to outcomes that strengthen responses—they increase the chances that you will respond in a similar way again. Here positive and negative simply refer to whether the response ends with the presentation of something or the removal of something. In both cases the result is rewarding, and we can expect the response that produced the reinforcement to occur again in that situation.

reinforcement Response consequences that increase the likelihood of responding in a similar way again.

positive reinforcement An event that, when presented after a response, increases the likelihood of that response.

negative reinforcement An event that, when removed after a response, increases the likelihood of that response occurring again.

critical thinking

Can you think of a case in which presenting an unpleasant event actually increases the likelihood of the response that produces it?

●● concePt review Positive and Negative Reinforcement ConsEquEnCE dEsCRiPTion ExAmPlE

Positive reinforcement The presentation of an event after a response increases the likelihood of the response occurring again.

Juan’s parents reward him for cleaning his room by giving him $5. This reinforcement increases the likelihood that Juan will clean his room again.

Negative reinforcement The removal of an event after a response increases the likelihood of the response occurring again.

Hannah’s parents nag her continually about cleaning up her room. When she finally cleans her room, her parents stop nagging her. The removal of the nagging increases the probability that Hannah will clean her room again.

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning | 223

Conditioned Reinforcers Sometimes a stimulus can act like a reinforcer even though it seems to have little or no intrinsic value. For example, money serves as a satisfying consequence even though it’s only a well-made piece of paper marked with interest- ing engravings. However, having money predicts something of value—you can buy things—and this is what gives it its reinforcing value. In the same way, if a stimulus or event predicts the absence or removal of something negative, then its presentation is also likely to be reinforcing. Stimuli of this type are called conditioned reinforcers because their reinforcing properties are acquired through learning (they are also sometimes called “secondary” reinforcers to distinguish them from more “primary” reinforcers such as food or water). These stimuli are reinforcing because they signal the presence or absence of other events.

Punishment: Lowering the Likelihood of a Response Now for the dark side: punishment. Remember Thorndike claimed that if a response is followed by an unsatisfying or unpleasant consequence, it will be weakened. The term punishment refers to outcomes that decrease the likelihood of responding. Like reinforcement, punishment comes in two forms, positive and negative.

Positive Punishment Positive punishment occurs when the presentation of an event after a response weakens that response, making the response less likely to occur again. Notice that as with reinforcement, the concept is defined in terms of its effect on behavior—lowering the likelihood of responding—rather than on its subjective qualities. Usually, however, positive punishment occurs when a response leads directly to something aversive. If your Mom yells at you for hassling the cat, this qualifies as positive punishment. Provided the aversive event (the scolding) is intense enough, the response that produced the punishment (hassling the cat) will tend to disappear rapidly or become suppressed. Spanking is another example.

Negative Punishment Negative punishment is when the removal of an event after responding lowers the likelihood of that response occurring again. Instead of yell- ing at you for hassling the cat, your Mom takes away something you like—maybe she grounds you or sends you to your room. Here, she is removing something you like when you engage in an inappropriate behavior—this qualifies as negative punish- ment. Notice the critical difference between positive and negative punishment: In one case, positive punishment, the response is weakened by the presentation of an aver- sive stimulus; in the other case, negative punishment, the response is weakened by the removal of something positive. Both positive and negative punishment are recog- nized as effective training procedures for rapidly suppressing undesirable responses.

What accounts for the rapid suppression of the response that’s punished? It seems likely that people simply learn the connection between their behavior and the particular outcome. You learn about the consequences of your actions—that a particular kind of behavior will lead to a relatively unpleasant consequence. In this sense, we don’t really need two different explanations to account for the behavior changes produced by rein- forcement and punishment; the only major difference is that behavior increases in one situation and declines in the other. In both cases you use your knowledge about behav- ior and its consequences to maximize gain and minimize loss in a particular situation.

Practical Considerations Punishment works—it’s an effective technique for sup- pressing undesirable behavior. However, punishment isn’t always the smartest way to change behavior. Sometimes it can be hard to gauge the appropriate strength of the punishing event. When the punishment is aggressive or violent, such as the force- ful spanking of a child, you run the risk of hurting the child either physically or emo- tionally. At the same time, if a child feels ignored, yelling can actually be reinforcing because of the attention it provides.

conditioned reinforcer A stimulus that has acquired reinforcing properties through prior learning.

punishment Consequences that decrease the likelihood of responding in a similar way again.

positive punishment An event that, when presented after a response, lowers the likelihood of that response occurring again.

negative punishment An event that, when removed after a response, lowers the likelihood of that response occurring again.

critical thinking

When you study for an examination or try to do well in school, are you seeking positive reinforcement or negative reinforcement?

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Moreover, punishment only suppresses a behavior; it doesn’t teach the child how to act appropriately. Spanking your child for lying might reduce the lying, but it won’t teach the child how to deal more effectively with the social situation that led to the lie. To teach the child about more appropriate forms of behavior, you need to reinforce some kind of alternative response. You must teach the child a positive strategy for dealing with situations that can lead to lying. That’s the main advantage of reinforce- ment over punishment: Reinforcement teaches you what you should be doing—how you should act—whereas punishment only teaches you what you shouldn’t be doing.

Schedules of Reinforcement Actions are more likely to be repeated if they’re followed by positive or negative rein- forcement. However, response strength in operant conditioning depends impor- tantly on how often, and when, the reinforcements are actually delivered. People must understand that their behavior uniquely predicts the reward—if you deliver the reward in a haphazard way, or when the behavior in question has not occurred, learn- ing can be slow or nonexistent (Miller & Grace, 2003).

A schedule of reinforcement is a rule used to determine when particular responses will be reinforced (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). If a response is followed rap- idly by reinforcement every time it occurs, the reinforcement schedule is called con- tinuous. If reinforcement is delivered only some of the time after the response has occurred, it’s called a partial reinforcement schedule. There are four major types of partial reinforcement schedules: fixed-ratio, variable-ratio, fixed-interval, and vari- able-interval. Each produces a distinctive pattern of responding (see ●Figure 7.8).

Fixed-Ratio Schedules Ratio schedules of reinforcement require a certain number of responses before reinforcement is delivered. In a fixed-ratio (FR) schedule, the num- ber of required responses is fixed and doesn’t change from one instance to the next.

schedule of reinforcement A rule that is used to determine when particular responses will be reinforced.

partial reinforcement schedule A schedule in which reinforcement is delivered only some of the time after the response has occurred.

fixed-ratio (FR) schedule A schedule in which the number of responses required for reinforcement is fixed and does not change.

●● concePt review Comparing Reinforcement and Punishment REinFoRCEmEnT: ConsEquEnCEs THAT INCREASE THE liKEliHood oF REsPonding

Outcome Description Example

Positive reinforcement Response leads to the presentation of an event that increases the likelihood of that response occurring again.

Five-year-old Ajay helps his mom do the dishes. She takes him to the store and lets him pick out any candy bar he wants. Letting Ajay pick out a candy bar increases the likelihood that he’ll help with the dishes again.

Negative reinforcement Response leads to the removal of an event that increases the likelihood of that response occurring again.

Five-year-old Ajay has been such a good helper all week that his mom tells him that next week he doesn’t have to do any of his scheduled chores. Relieving Ajay of his chores increases the likelihood that he’ll be a good helper.

PunisHmEnT: ConsEquEnCEs THAT DECREASE THE liKEliHood oF REsPonding

Outcome Description Example

Positive punishment Response leads to the presentation of an event that decreases the likelihood of that response occurring again.

Five-year-old Ajay runs nearly into the street; his mother pulls him back from the curb and gives him a brief tongue-lashing. This decreases the likelihood that Ajay will run into the street.

Negative punishment Response leads to the removal of an event that decreases the likelihood of that response occurring again.

Five-year-old Ajay keeps teasing his 3-year-old sister at the din- ner table. His mom sends him to bed without his favorite dessert. Withholding the dessert decreases the likelihood that Ajay will tease his sister at the dinner table.

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning | 225

Suppose you’re paid a dollar for every 100 envelopes you stuff for a local marketing firm. This schedule of reinforcement is called an “FR 100” (fixed-ratio 100) because it requires 100 responses (envelopes stuffed) before the reinforcement is delivered (a dollar). You can stuff the envelopes as quickly as you like, but you must produce 100 responses before you get the reward.

Fixed-ratio schedules typically produce steady, consistent rates of responding because the relationship between the response and the reinforcement is clear and predictable. For this reason, assembly-line work in factories is often reinforced on a fixed-ratio schedule. The only behavioral quirk occurs when the number of required responses is relatively large. For example, if you have to pick 10 bushels of grapes for each monetary reward, you’re likely to pause a bit in your responding immedi- ately after the tenth bushel. This delay in responding after reinforcement is called the postreinforcement pause. Pausing after reinforcement is easy to understand in this situation—after all, you have to do a lot of work before you receive the next reward.

Variable-Ratio Schedules A variable-ratio (VR) schedule also requires that you make a certain number of responses before reinforcement. (This is the defining fea- ture of a ratio schedule.) However, with a variable-ratio schedule the required num- ber can change over time. Reinforcement might be delivered after the first response

variable-ratio (VR) schedule A schedule in which a certain number of responses are required for reinforcement, but the number of required responses typically changes.

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●● Figure 7.8 schedules of reinforcement Schedules of reinforcement are rules used to determine when responses will be reinforced. Ratio schedules tend to produce rapid rates of responding because reinforcement depends on the number of responses. Interval schedules tend to produce lower rates of responding because reinforcement is delivered only for the first response after a specified time interval. In the cumulative response functions plotted here, the total number of responses is plotted over time. (© Cengage Learning)

226 | CHAPTER 7 Learning From Experience

initially, but it might take seven responses to get the reward the next time. It’s called a variable-ratio schedule because the responder doesn’t know how many responses are needed to obtain the reward (that is, the number of responses varies, often in a random fashion).

In a variable-ratio schedule, unlike a fixed-ratio schedule, you can never predict which response will get you the reward. As a result, these schedules typically produce high rates of responding, and the postreinforcement pause, seen in fixed-ratio sched- ules, is usually absent (after all, the next response might get you the reward again). Gambling is an example of a variable-ratio schedule; because of chance factors, a gam- bler wins some bets and loses others, but the gambler never knows what to expect on a given bet. You might win two in a row, but then lose the next 10 times you play.

The unpredictability of reward during a variable-ratio schedule makes it diffi- cult to eliminate a response trained on this schedule when the response is no longer reinforced. Consider the typical compulsive slot machine player: Dollar after dollar goes into the machine; sometimes there’s a payoff, more often there’s not. Even if the machine breaks and further payments are never delivered, many gamblers would continue playing long into the night. On a variable-ratio schedule, it’s hard to see that reinforcements are no longer being delivered because you can never predict when reinforcement will occur.

Fixed-Interval Schedules In interval schedules of reinforcement, the reward is deliv- ered for the first response that occurs following a certain interval of time. In a fixed- interval (FI) schedule, this time period remains constant from one instance to the next. Suppose we reward a pigeon with food when it pecks a lighted response key after 2 minutes have elapsed. In this case we would be using an “FI 2 min” sched- ule. Note that the pigeon must still produce the response to receive the reward. (Otherwise the learning procedure would not be operant conditioning.) Pecking just doesn’t do any good until at least 2 minutes have elapsed.

Fixed-interval schedules typically produce low rates of responding. There is no direct association between how much you respond and the delivery of reinforcement—you’re rewarded only when you respond after the interval has passed—so it doesn’t make sense to respond all the time. Another characteristic of fixed-interval schedules is that responding slows down after reinforcement and grad- ually increases as the end of the interval approaches. If the total number of responses is plotted over time in a cumulative response record, the net effect is a scalloping pat- tern of the type shown in Figure 7.8. Again, this makes adaptive sense—there’s no point in responding immediately after reinforcement; you should only start respond- ing when you think the interval has passed.

Variable-Interval Schedules In a variable-interval (VI) schedule, the critical time interval—the amount of time that needs to pass before a response will produce rein- forcement—changes. For example, reinforcement might be delivered initially for a response occurring after 2 minutes; next, 10 minutes might have to pass before another response is reinforced. Variable-interval schedules are common in everyday life. Suppose you’re trying to reach someone on the telephone, but every time you dial you hear a busy signal. To be rewarded, you know you have to dial the num- ber and that a certain amount of time has to elapse, but you’re not sure exactly how long you need to wait. Fishing is the same way. You know you have to cast your line to catch a fish, but you never know when an interested (hungry) fish will happen to swim by.

Like variable-ratio schedules, variable-interval schedules help eliminate the pause in responding that usually occurs after reinforcement. If you stop delivering reinforcements, the rate at which the response will extinguish will also be slower because it’s never clear when (or if ) another reinforcement will be delivered. For responding to cease, you need to recognize that the relationship between responding and reinforcement has changed—that’s tough to do when the reinforcements aren’t predictable.

fixed-interval (FI) schedule A schedule in which the reinforcement is delivered for the first response that occurs following a fixed interval of time.

variable-interval (VI) schedule A schedule in which the allotted time before a response will yield reinforcement varies from trial to trial.

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning | 227

Shaping: Acquiring Complex Behaviors Reinforcement schedules are fine and good, but how do you train a response that never occurs in the first place? Suppose you want to teach your dog to sit— how do you reward your dog for sitting if the dog never sits on command? Most people simply yell “Sit,” push the dog’s bottom down, and then stuff a food reward in its mouth. Under these conditions, though, you’re not really establish- ing the proper relationship between the dog’s own behavior and the delivery of a reward. You’ve actually set up a kind of classical conditioning procedure—the dog is taught that having his bottom pushed downward is a signal for an inviting unconditioned stimulus (food). This might work, but it doesn’t teach the animal that its own behavior is necessary to produce the outcome.

To solve this problem, Skinner (1938) developed a procedure called shaping, in which reinforcement is delivered for approximations to the desired response. Instead of waiting for the complete response—here, sitting to the command “Sit”—you rein- force some part of the response that is likely to occur without training. For instance, you might reward your dog for simply approaching when you say, “Sit.” As each part of the response is learned, you become stricter about what constitutes a success- ful response. Skinner and others have shown that incredibly complex sequences of behavior can be learned using the successive approximation technique of shaping.

Biological Constraints on Learning Is it really possible to teach any response, in any situation, provided you have enough time and a reinforcer that works? Probably not. Many psychologists believe there are biological constraints, perhaps based on the genetic recipe, that limit the responses that can be taught. Thorndike, in his early studies of cats in puzzle boxes, noticed that it was basically impossible to increase the probability of yawning or of certain reflex- ive scratching responses in cats through the application of reinforcement.

Similar observations were reported later by animal trainers Keller Breland and Marion Breland (1961). The Brelands, who were former students of B. F. Skinner,

shaping A procedure in which reinforcement is delivered for successive approximations of the desired response.

It is possible to produce unusual behaviors in animals through shaping—reinforcements are delivered for successive approximations of a desired behavior. These rabbits are in the early stages of training for an advertisement that featured them popping out of top hats (circa 1952).

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Continuous Every response is followed rapidly by reinforcement.

Every time Suparna cleans her room, her parents give her a dollar.

Leads to fast acquisition of response, but response is easily extinguished when the reward is no longer delivered.

Partial Response is followed by reinforcement only some of the time.

Sometimes Suparna gets a dollar after she cleans her room.

Acquisition is slower, but learned response is difficult to eliminate when the reward is stopped.

Fixed-ratio The number of responses required for reinforcement is fixed.

Suparna gets a dollar every third time she cleans her room.

Suparna cleans her room consistently with a pause in cleaning after each $1; she stops quickly if reward stops.

Variable-ratio The number of responses required for reinforcement varies.

Suparna gets a dollar after cleaning her room a certain number of times, but the exact number varies.

Suparna cleans her room consistently with few pauses; she continues to clean her room even if the reward isn’t delivered for a while.

Fixed-interval Reinforcement is delivered for the first response after a fixed interval of time.

Every Tuesday, Suparna’s parents give her a dollar if her room is clean.

Suparna doesn’t do much cleaning until Tuesday is approaching; she stops quickly if reward stops.

Variable-interval Reinforcement is delivered for the first response after a variable interval of time.

On some random weekday, Suparna gets a dollar if her room is clean.

Suparna cleans her room consistently and doesn’t stop even if the reward isn’t delivered for a while

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encountered some interesting difficulties while attempting to train various species to make fixed responses. In one case, they tried to train a pig to drop a large wooden coin into a piggy bank (for a bank commercial). They followed the shaping procedure, where approximations of the desired sequence are reinforced, but they could not get the pig to complete the response. The animal would pick up the coin and begin to lumber toward the bank but would stop midway and begin “rooting” the coin along the ground. Despite applying punishment and nonreinforcement of the root- ing response, the Brelands could never completely eliminate the unwanted response. They encountered similar problems trying to teach a raccoon to put coins in a bank.

In the cases of the pig and the raccoon, biological tendencies connected with feed- ing and food reinforcement interfered with the learning of certain response sequences. Pigs root in connection with feeding, and raccoons rub and dunk objects related to food (Domjan, 2010). These natural tendencies are adaptive responses for the animals—at least with respect to feeding—but they may limit what the animals can be taught.

In other cases, people and animals may be predisposed to learn relationships between certain stimuli and outcomes. For example, the delay between experienc- ing a distinctive taste (such as clam pizza) and subsequent illness can be quite long (hours), yet we’re still quite likely to form an aversion to the taste (Garcia & Koelling, 1966). We may also be naturally predisposed to learn about and recognize potential predators in our environment, such as snakes. In a classical conditioning procedure, we quickly learn to associate pictures of snakes with aversive events (e.g., shock)— much more quickly, in fact, than we do to nonthreatening events, such as pictures of flowers (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Some psychologists believe that we have special circuitry in the brain, acquired through evolution, that helps us process and learn about stimuli related to survival threats (Öhman & Mineka, 2003).

test yourself Check your knowledge about operant conditioning by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. For each of the following statements, decide which term best applies: negative punishment, positive punishment, negative rein- forcement, positive reinforcement.

a. Stephanie is grounded for arriving home well past her curfew:

b. Greg receives a bonus of $500 for exceeding his sales goal for the year:

c. Nikki gets a ticket, at double the normal rate, for exceeding the posted speed limit in a school zone:

d. Little Mowrer cries all the time when her Mom is home because Mom always comforts her with a kiss and a story:

e. With Dad, Mowrer is a perfect angel because crying can be followed by a stern lecture that lasts for an hour or more:

2. Identify the schedule of reinforcement that is at work in each of the following situations. Choose from the following terms: fixed- interval, fixed-ratio, variable-interval, variable-ratio.

a. Rowena feels intense satisfaction after she calls the psychic hotline but only when a psychic named Darlene reads her future:

b. Prana likes to visit the monster truck rally because they always have good corn dogs:

c. Sinead constantly watches music television because her favor- ite show, Puck Live, comes on from time-to-time at odd hours:

d. Mohamed has just joined a coffee club; he gets a free pound of gourmet coffee after the tenth pound that he buys:

e. Charlie hangs around street corners for hours at a time. Occasionally, a pretty woman walks by and gives him a smile:

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.3

Learning From Others: Observational Learning | 229

Have you ever noticed the odd behavior of a professional baseball player as he approaches the batter’s box? He kicks the dirt (a fixed number of times), adjusts his helmet, hitches up his trousers, grimaces, swings toward the pitcher a few times, and adopts a characteris- tic crouch. Basketball players, as they prepare to make a free throw, endlessly caress the ball with their hands, bounce it a certain number of times, crouch, pause, and release. Such regular patterns are a player’s signature—you can identify who’s in the batter’s box or up at the line by watching these ritualistic prepara- tion patterns.

Let’s analyze these behaviors from the perspective of operant conditioning. According to the law of effect, these odd patterns of behavior must have been rein- forced—they occurred initially, perhaps by chance, and were followed by a reward (a hit or a successful free throw). But the pairing of the behavior with its consequence was really accidental, so psychologists refer to this kind of reinforcement as accidental or adventitious reinforcement. In the player’s mind, however, a cause-and-effect link has been formed, and he acts in a similar fashion again. Once the player starts to perform the behavior on a regular basis, it’s likely that it will continue to be accidentally reinforced, although on a

partial schedule of reinforcement. (Can you identify the particular schedule?) The result is called a superstitious act, and because of the partial schedule (a variable-ratio one), it is difficult to eliminate.

In 1948, B. F. Skinner developed an experimental procedure to mimic and gain control over the development of superstitious acts. He placed hungry pigeons in a chamber and delivered bits of food every 15 seconds, irrespective of what a bird happened to be doing at the time. In his own words:

In six out of eight cases the resulting responses were so clearly defined that two observers could agree perfectly in counting instances. One bird was conditioned to

turn counterclockwise about the cage, making two or three turns between reinforcements. Another repeatedly thrust its head into one of the upper corners of the cage. A third developed a “tossing” response, as if placing its head beneath an invisible bar and lifting it repeatedly. (Skinner, 1948, p. 168)

Remember, from the experimenter’s point of view, no cause-and-effect relation- ship existed between these quirky behav- iors and the delivery of food. Researchers since Skinner have replicated his results, but with some added caveats (Staddon & Simmelhag, 1971). For example, many of the behaviors that Skinner noted are character- istic responses that birds make in prepara- tion for food; therefore, some of the strange behaviors Skinner observed might have been natural pigeon reactions to the expectation of being fed rather than learned responses. Nevertheless, the point Skinner made is important to remember: From the respond- er’s point of view, illusory connections can form between behaviors and outcomes. Once these connections have been made, it’s likely that the behaviors will continue to occur and be accidentally reinforced, thus creating the familiar forms of superstitious acts.

●●Practical solutions Superstitious Behavior

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Learning From Others: Observational Learning LEARNING GOALS

●● Describe observational learning and the conditions that lead to effective modeling. ●● Explain why observational learning is adaptive and discuss its practical effects.

The world would be a very unpleasant place if you could only learn through simple trial and error. You could learn to avoid certain foods through positive punishment, but only after eating them and experiencing an unpleasant consequence. You could learn to avoid illegal drugs, but only if you have a bad experience, such as an arrest or a risky overdose. Clearly, it’s sometimes best not to undergo the actual experiences that lead to learning.

In the wild, rhesus monkeys show an adaptive fear response in the presence of snakes. Because snakes are natural predators of monkeys, it makes sense for mon- keys to avoid them whenever possible. But how do you suppose that fear is origi- nally acquired? According to a strict interpretation of the law of effect, the animal must learn its fear through some kind of direct reinforcement or punishment—that is, through trial and error. This means that a monkey must approach a snake and be bitten (or nearly bitten) before it can learn to fear the snake; unfortunately, this single learning experience is likely to be fatal much of the time. Trial-and-error learning is

230 | CHAPTER 7 Learning From Experience

not always adaptive, especially when you’re learning about something dangerous or potentially harmful.

Fortunately, it’s possible to learn a great deal without trial and error—by sim- ply observing the experiences of others. People and animals can learn from others and this kind of learning, called observational learning, has considerable adaptive value. In the wild, newly weaned rats acquire food habits by eating what the older rats eat (Galef, 1985); red-winged blackbirds will refuse to eat a certain food if they’ve observed another bird getting sick after it has eaten the food (Mason & Reidinger, 1982); chimpanzees in the wild learn how to use stone tools to crack open nuts by observing older chimpanzees eating (Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997). Rhesus monkeys, it turns out, acquire their fear of snakes partly through observational learn- ing rather than through direct experience (Öhman & Mineka, 2003). They watch other monkeys in their environment showing fear in the presence of a snake and thereby acquire the tendency to show fear themselves.

Is observational learning a unique form of learning? You may remember our pre- vious discussion of mirror neurons in the brain. Neuroimaging studies have confirmed that regions in the motor cortex become active when we engage in simple motor movements, such as biting an apple or clapping our hands. But neurons in these same regions also become active when we simply observe someone else performing the same actions (Iacoboni, 2009). The same systems in the brain that are activated by performing an action—waving good-bye—are activated when we watch someone else perform the same task. The presence of these mirror neurons suggests that our brains are naturally built to model, or imitate, the actions of others. Indeed, babies will imitate facial expressions—even sticking out their tongues—shortly after birth. Psychologists increasingly believe that imitation, and therefore observational learn- ing, is a natural and important part of our learning repertoire.

Modeling: Learning From Others We now know a great deal about the conditions that produce effective observational learning in people. One important factor is the presence of a significant role model. As noted, we naturally tend to imitate, or model, the behavior of significant others. You probably learned a lot of things by watching your parents or your teachers— even though you may never have been aware of doing so. Research has shown that

observational learning is particularly effective if the model has positive characteristics, such as attractiveness, honesty, perceived competence, and some kind of social standing. It’s also more likely if you observe the model being rewarded for a particular action or if the model’s behavior is particularly successful.

In one classic study, Bandura and his col- leagues showed nursery-school children a film that portrayed an adult striking, punching, and kicking a large, inflatable, upright “Bobo” doll. Afterward, when placed in a room with Bobo, many of these children imitated the adult and violently attacked the doll (Bandura et al., 1963). In addition, the chances of the children kicking the doll increased if the adult was directly praised in the film for attacking Bobo (“You’re the cham- pion!”). Bandura (1986) has claimed that the responses acquired through observational learn- ing are especially strengthened through vicari- ous reinforcement, which occurs when the model

observational learning Learning by observing the experience of others.

modeling The natural tendency to imitate the behavior of significant others.

critical thinking

Do you think monkeys raised in captivity, such as in a zoo, will also show a strong fear of snakes?

We naturally tend to imitate, or model, the behavior of significant others. Modeling is adaptive because it allows us to learn things without directly experiencing consequences.

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Learning From Others: Observational Learning | 231

is reinforced for an action, or weakened through vicarious punishment, in which the model is punished for an action. A clear parallel therefore exists between the law of effect and observational learning; the difference, of course, is that the behavior of others is being reinforced or punished rather than our own.

Albert Bandura did much of the early pioneering work on observational learning (you’ll find more discussion of his work in Chapter 12). Bandura believes that much of what we learn from an experience depends on our existing beliefs and expectations. You’re unlikely to learn from a model, for example, if you believe you’re incapable of ever performing the model’s behavior. You can watch a great pianist or singer or ath- lete, but you’re not likely to imitate his or her behavior if you feel you’re incapable of performing the task. Our beliefs about our own abilities significantly shape and con- strain what we gain from observational learning.

Practical Considerations Psychologists regularly use the techniques of observational learning to improve or change unwanted behaviors. Many studies have shown that observing desirable behavior can lower unwanted or maladaptive behavior. Children have been able to reduce their fear of dental visits (Craig, 1978) or impend- ing surgery (Melamed & Siegel, 1975) by observing films of other children effectively handling their dental or surgical anx- ieties. Clinical psychologists now use observational learning as a technique to deal with specific fears and as a method for pro- moting cooperative behavior among preschoolers.

At the same time, observational or social learning can have significant negative effects as well. For example, chil- dren witness thousands of reinforced acts of violence just by watching Saturday morning cartoons. Although causal con- nections between TV violence and personal aggression remain somewhat controversial (Block & Crain, 2007), the consensus among psychologists supports a link (Anderson et al., 2003). In addition, it can be difficult for a society to overcome unpro- ductive stereotypes if they’re repeatedly portrayed through the behavior of others. Many gender-related stereotypes, such as submissive or helpless behavior in females, continue to be rep- resented in TV programs and movies. By the age of 6 or 7, chil- dren have already begun to shy away from activities that are identified with members of the opposite sex.

Even if people don’t directly imitate or model a particu- lar violent act, it’s still likely that the observation itself influ- ences the way they think and act. For instance, after playing a violent video game people are less likely to offer aid to people in pain—the game apparently “desensitizes” people to violent acts (Bushman & Anderson, 2009). Moreover, witnessing repeated examples of fictional violence distorts people’s esti- mates of realistic violence—they’re likely to believe, for example, that more people die a violent death than is actually the case. This can lead individuals to show irra- tional fear and to avoid situations that are in all likelihood safe. People who watch a lot of television tend to view the world in a way that mirrors what they see on the screen. They might think, for example, that a large proportion of the popula- tion are professionals (such as doctors or lawyers) and that few people in society are actually old (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). It’s not just the imitation of particular acts we need to worry about: Television and other vehicles of observational learning can literally change or determine our everyday view of the world (Bandura, 1986; Bushman & Anderson, 2001).

Observational learning has powerful consequences that are not always what we intend. Children imitate significant role models, even when the behavior lacks adaptive value.

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Given what you’ve learned about modeling, do you now favor the passage of laws that will control the amount of violence shown on television? Why or why not?

232 | CHAPTER 7 Learning From Experience

test yourself Check your knowledge about observational learning by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Observational learning, like classical conditioning, typically involves learning about events that occur outside of your control. True or False?

2. People are more likely to imitate the behavior of a role model if the model is observed being rewarded for his or her behavior. Bandura refers to this reward process as vicarious reinforcement. True or False?

3. Observational learning is usually a passive process. Our beliefs and expectations about how well we can perform the model’s behavior play little or no role. True or False?

4. Most psychologists believe that television is a powerful vehicle for observational learning. True or False?

5. Clinical psychologists now use observational learning to treat specific fears, such as phobias. True or False?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.4

As we struggle to survive, our capacity to learn—that is, to change our behavior as a result of experience—repre- sents a great strength. Psychologists have long recognized the importance of understanding how behavior changes with experience; historically, research on learning predates research on virtually all other topics, with the exception of basic sensory and perceptual processes. In this chapter we’ve concentrated on relatively simple learning processes. To meet the needs of changing environments, each of us must solve certain types of learning problems, and the principles of behavior you’ve learned about apply generally across ani- mal species.

Learning About Events: Noticing and Ignoring Novel or unusual events lead to an orienting response, which helps ensure that we’ll react quickly to sudden changes in our environment. The sound of screeching automobile brakes leads to an immediate reaction; we don’t have to stop and think about it. At the same time, no one can attend to all the stimuli that surround us, so we learn to ignore events that are of little adaptive significance. Through the process of habituation, characterized by the decline in the tendency to respond to an event that has become familiar, we become selective about responding to events that occur repeatedly in our environment.

●● Psychology For a reason Learning From Experience

Finally, suppose the link between witnessed violence and personal aggres- sion is real, but small. Imagine, for example, that only 1% of people who watch a violent television program become more violent after watching the show. Is this a cause for concern? Remember, many millions of people watch television every day. If 10 million people watch a show, and only 1% are affected, that would still mean that 100,000 people might have an increased tendency for violence. Those are scary numbers when you consider that it only takes one or two people to terror- ize a building or commit murder in a school (e.g., Columbine). Ironically, recent research suggests that when violence is shown in a television program, it may actu- ally hurt the very industries that are sponsoring the show. Evidence collected from Bushman and Phillips (2001) indicates that television violence actually impairs sub- sequent memory for the brand names and product information shown in accompa- nying commercials.

Psychology For a Reason: Learning From Experience | 233

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning We also learn about what events signal—it’s helpful to k now, for example, that a wailing siren means an emergency vehicle is somewhere nearby. Signals, or conditioned stim- uli, are established through classical conditioning. Events that provide information about the occurrence or nonoc- currence of other signif icant events become conditioned stimuli. A conditioned stimulus elicits a conditioned response, which is a response appropriate for anticipat- ing the event that will follow. When we hear the siren, we anticipate the arrival of the ambulance and quick ly move out of the way.

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning We also learn that our actions produce out- comes that are sometimes pleasing and sometimes not. In operant conditioning, the presentation and removal of events after responding can either increase or decrease the likeli- hood of responding in a similar way again. When a response is followed by reinforcement, either positive or negative, the

tendency to respond in the same way again is strengthened. When a response is followed by punishment, either positive or negative, we are less likely to repeat the behavior. The schedule of reinforcement matters too. Schedules affect not only how rapidly we will learn and respond but also the pat- tern of responding; schedules of reinforcement also affect how likely we are to change our behavior if the reinforce- ment stops.

Learning From Others: Observational Learning Through observational or social learning, we imitate and model the actions of others, thereby learning from example rather than from direct personal experience. We study how other people behave and how their behavior is reinforced or punished, and we change our own behavior accord- ingly. Whether or not we will imitate the behavior of oth- ers depends on several factors, including the social standing of the model. Observational learning can have a number of effects, both positive and negative, on the individual and on society.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

●● Learning is defined by a change in (1) that results from (2) .

Learning About Events: Noticing and Ignoring ●● The limited resources of the nervous system keep us from attending to every environmental stimulus. Psychological processes help us (3) our mental functioning.

●● (4) occurs when we stop responding to an event that has become familiar through repeated presentation. Sensitization occurs when responding to an event (5) with repeated exposure to the event.

Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning

●● Stimuli and events in the environment have (6) prop- erties that tell us when one event (7) a second one.

●● An (8) stimulus (US) leads to an automatic or unconditioned (9) (UR). Repeated pairing of an event or stimulus with a US results in that event becoming a (10) stimulus (CS), which can then elicit a conditioned response (CR).

●● For a CS–US connection to form, the CS must provide new (11) about the delivery of the US.

●● Sometimes the CS–US pairing leads to a CR that is (12) from the UR. A CR may be opposite to the UR, but a CR usually prepares the organism for the arrival of the (13) .

●● In (14) order conditioning, an established CS (e.g., a tone that predicts food) immediately follows a (15) event (e.g., a light). The US itself is never presented again, but the pairing of tone and light can now produce conditioned responding to the light alone. Stimulus (16) occurs when a new stimulus produces a response similar to the one produced by the conditioned stimulus. Stimulus (17) occurs when the response to a new stimulus is (18) from the response to the original stimulus.

●● If the CS is presented repeatedly, and is no longer followed by the (19) , it loses its signaling properties and the CR gradually becomes weaker. This is called (20) . Conditioned (21) occurs when we learn that an event signals the (22) of the US.

234 | CHAPTER 7 Learning From Experience

Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning

●● Behaviors produce rewards and punishments, so it’s clearly adaptive to learn when and how to operate, or act, on your environment.

●● (23) conditioning is a procedure for studying how organisms learn about the (24) of their own behavior. Thorndike’s law of (25) holds that if a response is followed by a satisfying or pleasant consequence, the connection between the response and that situation will be (26) ; conversely, if a response leads to an unsatisfying or unpleasant consequence, the connection will be (27) .

●● The law of effect applies when a response is rewarded in one situation and not in another. The situation is the (28) stimulus.

●● (29) reinforcement occurs when the presentation of an event after a response (30) the likelihood of the response occurring again. Negative reinforcement occurs when removing an event after a response (31) the likelihood of the response occurring again. Conditioned, or secondary, (32) are stimuli that acquire reinforcement properties through learning.

●● Positive punishment occurs when the presentation of an event (33) the chances of that response occurring again. (34) punishment occurs when the removal of an event (35) the likelihood of responding.

●● A schedule of (36) is a rule used to determine when responses will be reinforced. In a (37) schedule, every response is followed by reinforcement; in a (38) schedule, reinforcement is delivered only after some responses. Partial schedules include (39) ratio, variable (40) , fixed (41) , and (42) interval.

●● Someone can be trained to behave in a particular way through (43) , which refers to giving rein - forcement for successive (44) of the desired behavior.

●● Many psychologists believe that (45) constraints, perhaps in the genetic code, limit the responses that can be learned; in addition, we are predisposed to learn relationships between certain stimuli and outcomes, such as taste and illness.

Learning From Others: Observational Learning ●● We naturally tend to model the behavior of people who are significant to us. (46) learning is especially likely if the model’s characteristics are (47) , or if we see that the person is (48) for certain behaviors.

●● It’s (49) to model the behavior of others because it reduces the likelihood of coming into contact with something harmful or dangerous. Observing desirable behavior can (50) unwanted or maladaptive behavior. Observational learning can also (51) maladaptive behavior, as when people model the violence they see on TV.

classical conditioning, 209 conditioned inhibition, 218 conditioned reinforcer, 223 conditioned response (CR), 209 conditioned stimulus (CS), 209 discriminative stimulus, 221 extinction, 216 fixed-interval (FI) schedule, 226 fixed-ratio (FR) schedule, 224 habituation, 207 law of effect, 220 learning, 205

modeling, 230 negative punishment, 223 negative reinforcement, 222 observational learning, 230 operant conditioning, 219 orienting response, 206 partial reinforcement

schedule, 224 positive punishment, 223 positive reinforcement, 222 punishment, 223 reinforcement, 222

schedule of reinforcement, 224 second-order conditioning, 213 sensitization, 207 shaping, 227 spontaneous recovery, 216 stimulus discrimination, 215 stimulus generalization, 214 unconditioned response (UR), 209 unconditioned stimulus (US), 209 variable-interval (VI)

schedule, 226 variable-ratio (VR) schedule, 225

Terms to Remember

Media Resources | 235

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

236

8 Memory

Psychology For a reason What Is Memory For?

Remembering Over the Short Term Learning Goals Sensory Memory: The Icon and the Echo Short-Term Memory:

Prolonging the Present The Working Memory Model Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.1

Storing Information for the Long Term Learning Goals What Is Stored in Long-Term Memory? Elaboration: Connecting Material to Existing

Knowledge Mnemonic Devices

Motivated Forgetting The Neuroscience of Forgetting Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.4

Psychology For a reason What Memory Is For

chaPter review Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.2

Recovering Information From Cues Learning Goals The Importance of Retrieval Cues Reconstructive Remembering

Practical solutions Self-Testing “Appropriately” for Exams

Remembering Without Awareness: Implicit Memory

Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.3

Updating Memory Learning Goals How Quickly Do We Forget? Why Do We Forget?

237

What if the flow of time suddenly fractured and you were forced to relive the same 10 minutes, over and over again, in an endless pattern? Maybe you’d be driving your car, or reading a book; it wouldn’t matter—at the end of the interval you’d begin again, back at the same fork in the road, or the same location on the page. Think about how this might affect you. Perhaps you wouldn’t age, but could you possibly endure?

The answer, of course, depends on your capacity to remember and forget. If you’ve seen the movie Groundhog Day, you’ll remember that the main character was caught in a kind of time warp—he was forced to relive the same day over and over. To make matters worse, he was fully aware of his situation. Like the character in the movie, if your memories remained intact from one cycle to the next, if you were aware of the endless repetition, life would quickly become unbearable (even if it was a particularly good day). But if your memories were erased before each new 10- minute interval, you’d lack awareness of your hopeless plight; your life, although existing in an abbreviated form, would continue as usual. It’s through memory—broadly defined as the capacity to preserve and recover information—that concepts such as the past and the present gain meaning in our lives.

Like learning, memory is not something that can be directly observed. It’s an inferred capacity, one that psychologists assume must be operating when people act on information that’s no longer physically present. To understand how memory works, we need to consider how memories are formed, how memories are maintained over time, and how the stored information is recovered and translated into perfor- mance. The processes of encoding determine and control how memories are initially acquired. Storage controls how memories are maintained. Retrieval is the term used to describe how stored memories are recovered and translated into performance. Each of these key psychological processes is illustrated in ●Figure 8.1.

Memory is a highly adaptive feature of our cognitive tool kit. By maintaining and recovering the past, we equip ourselves to better handle the present. We can change our behavior to correct past mistakes, or we can continue to act in ways that led to past success. But as you’ll see in this chapter, memory is far more than simply recov- ering past events. A world without memory would be devoid of thought and reason. You would never learn; you would never produce spoken language or understand the words of others; your sense of personal history would be lost along with much, if not all, of your personal identity. In this chapter we focus on the key adaptive problems that memory helps us solve.

memory The capacity to preserve and recover information.

encoding The processes that determine and control how memories are formed.

storage The processes that determine and control how memories are stored and kept over time.

retrieval The processes that determine and control how memories are recovered and translated into performance.

● Psychology For a reason What Is Memory For?

238 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

Remembering Over the Short Term It’s natural to link memory to the recovery of events that happened hours, days, or weeks ago, but we need to remember over the very short term as well. Consider the interpretation of spoken language. Because speech unfolds one word at a time, it’s necessary to remember the early part of a sentence, after it has receded into the past, before you can hope to understand the meaning of the sentence as a whole. Likewise, when we perform most mental tasks, such as solving math problems, certain bits of information must be retained during the ongoing solution process. Try adding 28 and 35 in your head without remembering to carry the 1 (or subtract 2 if you round the 28 up to 30). Through short-term memories, we’re able to prolong the incoming message, giving us more time to interpret it properly.

Storing Information for the Long Term To remember information for longer peri- ods, it must be learned in a way that promotes lasting storage. Forming a visual image of a to-be-remembered item generally increases its durability in memory. It also helps to think about the meaning of the item, or to relate the item to other material that’s already been stored. As you already know, practicing retrieval through self-testing is another extremely effective way to remember over the long-term. We’ll consider these techniques in some detail, and I’ll provide more tips to help you improve your ability to remember.

Recovering Information From Cues What initiates an act of remembering? What causes you to remember your appointment with the doctor this afternoon, or what you had for breakfast this morning, or a fleeting encounter with a stranger yesterday? Most researchers believe that our memories are triggered by other

● Figure 8.1 Basic Memory Processes When a person is asked to remember a word such as CAT, how the person thinks about it will affect how that word is encoded into memory (panel 1). CAT might be then be stored in long-term memory by activating existing knowledge structures (panel 2). If the person uses the cue ANIMAL to help retrieve the memory of CAT, it might be difficult to pick out the correct response from other animals stored in memory (panel 3). (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Remembering Over the Short Term | 239

events, or cues, encountered in the environment. When we fail to remember, it’s usually because we lack the right retrieval cues. We’ll discuss what makes a “good” retrieval cue, and we’ll examine how existing knowledge is used to help us reconstruct what happened in the past.

Updating Memory It’s upsetting to forget, but forgetting actually has very useful properties. Among other things, it prevents us from acting in ways that are no longer appropriate. It’s the study assignment you need to complete today that’s critical, not the one from yesterday or the week before. It’s your current phone number that you need to remember, not the one from a previous apartment or from the home you lived in as a child. We’ll consider the major determinants of forgetting, both the normal kinds and abnormal forgetting of the type that char- acterizes amnesia.

Remembering Over the Short Term LEARNING GOALS

● Discuss how visual and auditory sensory memories can be measured. ● Describe how information is represented, maintained, and forgotten over the short term.

When information first reaches the senses, we rely on two memory systems to help us prolong the incoming message over the short term. The first, called sensory mem- ory, keeps the message in a relatively pure, unanalyzed form. Sensory memories are like fleeting snapshots of the world. The message is represented in accurate detail—as a kind of picture or echo—but the memory usually lasts less than a second. The sec- ond system, short-term memory, is a limited-capacity “working memory” that we use to hold information after it has been analyzed for periods lasting on the order of a minute or two. Short-term memories are also rapidly forgotten, but they can be main- tained for extended periods through internal repetition. Let’s take a brief look at each of these systems and consider some of their important properties.

Sensory Memory: The Icon and the Echo When you watch a movie you experience a continuous flow of movement across the screen. As you probably know, the film does not actually contain moving images; it is composed of still pictures presented rapidly in sequence, each separated by a period of darkness. We perceive a continuous world, some researchers believe, partly because the nervous system activity left by one picture lingers for a brief period prior to pre- sentation of the next image. This extended nervous system activity creates a sen- sory “memory” that helps to fill the gap, thereby providing a sense of continuous movement.

In vision, the lingering sensory memory trace is called an icon, and the sensory memory system that produces and stores icons is known as iconic memory (Neisser, 1967). It’s relatively easy to demonstrate an icon: Simply twirl a flashlight about in a darkened room and you will see a trailing edge. You can obtain a similar effect on a dark night by writing your name in the air with a sparkler or a match. These trails of light are not really present in the night air; they arise from the rapidly fading images of iconic memory, which act as still photographs of the world. These images allow the

sensory memory An exact replica of an environmental message, which usually lasts for a second or less.

short-term memory A limited-capacity system that we use to hold information after it has been analyzed for periods lasting less than a minute or two.

iconic memory The system that produces and stores visual sensory memories.

critical thinking

Do you consider the lingering afterimage left by the flash of a camera to be a type of memory?

Updating memory

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240 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

visual sensations to be extended in time so that the brain can more efficiently process the physical message it receives (Coltheart & Coltheart, 2010).

In the auditory system, there is a lingering echo, or echoic memory. Pure sounds can be held for brief intervals to help auditory perception. In Chapter 5 you learned how the brain calculates arrival time differences between the ears to help localize sounds. However, to compare arrival times, the first sound must be retained until the second one arrives; echoic memory may help fill the gap. Echoic memory is also widely believed to play a role in language processing, perhaps to help retain exact replicas of sounds during sentence and word processing (Crowder, 1976; Nairne & Neath, 2012).

Measuring Iconic Memory How can an icon be measured? More than 50 years ago a grad- uate student in psychology named George Sperling (1960; also see Averbach & Coriell, 1961) developed a clever procedure for studying the properties of iconic memory. Using an apparatus called a tachistoscope, which presents visual displays for carefully controlled durations, Sperling showed people arrays of 12 letters arranged in rows. For example:

XLWF JBOV KCZR

The person’s task was to look at the display and then report the letters. Sounds simple, but the presentation time was extremely brief—the display was shown for only about 50 milliseconds (1/20 of a second). Across several experiments, Sperling found that people could report only 4 or 5 letters correctly in this task (out of 12). But more important, they claimed to see an image—an icon—of the entire display for a brief period after it was removed from view. All 12 of the letters could be seen, the people claimed, but the image faded before all could be reported.

To provide evidence for this rapidly decaying image, or icon, Sperling tried ask- ing people to report only the letters shown in a particular row—but, critically, he didn’t tell them which row until after the display was turned off. A high, medium, or low tone was presented immediately after the display, which cued participants to recall just the top, middle, or bottom row (see ●Figure 8.2). Sperling called this new condition partial report because only a part of the display needed to be recalled. Performance was great—people almost always reported the row of letters correctly.

echoic memory The system that produces and stores auditory sensory memories.

The trails of light created by a whirling sparkler are caused by visual sensory memories, which act like still photographs of the perceptual scene. ©

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critical thinking

Can you think of a reason it might be adaptive for icons to be lost so quickly?

Remembering Over the Short Term | 241

Remember, people heard the tone after the display had been turned off. There was no way to predict which row would be cued, so the entire display must have been available in memory for participants to perform so well. Performance improved, Sperling reasoned, because people had enough time to read a single cued row, but not the entire display, before the iconic image had completely faded. In further experi- ments he was able to measure how quickly the sensory image was lost by delaying presentation of the tone. He discovered that the fleeting image—the iconic memory— was indeed short-lived; it disappeared in about half a second.

Measuring Echoic Memory Sensory memories are produced by each of the five senses, but little work has been done on systems other than vision and audition. An experi- ment by Efron (1970) demonstrates how it’s possible to measure the lingering echoic trace, or echo. People were presented with a series of very brief tones, each lasting less than about 1/10 of a second; the task was to adjust a light so that it appeared exactly when each tone ended. Efron discovered that people always thought the tone ended later than it actually did; that is, people reported hearing the tone for a brief period after it had been turned off. Efron argued that this “phantom tone” was actually caused by a memory—the lingering echo of echoic memory. As in visual sensory memory, auditory sensory memory is believed to last for only a brief period—prob- ably less than a second—although in some circumstances it may last longer, perhaps for as long as 5 or 10 seconds (Cowan, 1995).

Short-Term Memory: Prolonging the Present The function of sensory memory is to maintain an exact replica of the environmental message, for a very short period, as an aid to perception. Short-term memory is the sys- tem we use to temporarily store, think about, and reason with information. The term working memory is sometimes used because this temporary storage system often acts as a kind of mental workplace, allowing us to store the components of a problem as we work toward a solution (Baddeley, 2012; Nairne, 2002a).

It’s useful to keep recently presented information available over the short term. Consider language: It would be hard to understand spoken language, which occurs

Memory fades with time.

Time (sec)

Recall output

Tone sounds after display terminates, indicates

line to be remembered, and starts recall.

Presentation for 50 msec

0.5

● Figure 8.2 the Partial report technique After presentation of the display, a tone indicates the row of letters to be recalled. As the participant attempts to recall them, the visual iconic memory fades and becomes less and less accurate. When only part of the display is to be recalled, most of the relevant information can be reported before the image is completely lost. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

242 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

sequentially (one word at a time), without remembering the first part of a spoken phrase. It would also be difficult to read any kind of text without keeping themes of the passage, or what was presented in the previous sentence, in mind. Short-term memory helps us produce and interpret spoken language, rehearse the steps in a recipe, reason and problem solve, and even think. In the following sections we consider some of the properties of short-term memories, including how and why they’re forgotten.

The Inner Voice Unlike sensory memories, short-term memories are not exact copies of the environmental message. When we maintain information over the short term, it is usually in the form of an inner “voice.” You can convince yourself by repeat- ing this word—PSYCHOLOGY—silently inside your head. Notice you can repeat the word quickly or slowly, and, if you like, you can even insert internal pauses after each repetition. There’s nothing visual about this repetition process; you have recoded, or translated, the visual message PSYCHOLOGY into another form—an inner voice.

This notion of an inner voice is supported by the errors that occur during short- term recall. When recalling over the short term, people usually make errors that are acoustically based. Mistakes tend to sound like correct items even when the stimu- lus materials have never been presented aloud (Conrad, 1964). For example, suppose you’re given five letters to remember—B X R C L—but you make a mistake and mis- remember the fourth letter. Your error will probably be a letter that sounds like the correct one, something such as T or P. Notice that C and T and P all sound alike, but they look nothing alike. It’s believed that errors tend to be acoustic because people typically recode the original visual input into an inner voice.

Why do we store things over the short term in an inner voice? It’s probably because we’re often called on to interpret and produce spoken language. It makes sense to think in a way that’s compatible with the way we communicate. In fact, there’s some evidence to suggest that deaf or hearing-impaired individuals, particularly those who communicate with American Sign Language, may not rely on an inner voice to the same extent as people with normal hearing; they sometimes encode information in a form that’s compatible with their normal language format (Hall & Bavelier, 2011).

The Inner Eye We usually use our inner voice to store short-term memories, but we can use other formats. For example, sometimes we use visual images. To illustrate, close your eyes and count the number of windows in your house or apartment. Did you perform this task by visualizing the rooms, one by one, and counting the number of windows you “saw”? Now try forming a visual image of a rabbit standing next to a rat. Does the rabbit in your image have whiskers? If I measure your reaction time, it turns out that you’ll answer a question like this more quickly if you imagine the rab- bit standing next to a rat instead of next to an elephant (Kosslyn, 1983). This is exactly the kind of result we’d expect if you were looking at an actual picture—the larger the object is in the picture, the easier it is to “see.”

Experiments have shown that the imagery produced by the “inner eye” may rely on the same brain mechanisms as normal visual perception. Neuroimaging tech- niques reveal that imagery and perception activate many of the same regions in the brain (Cichy et al., 2012). Other studies have found that people have trouble storing a visual image in their head while they’re also performing a visually based track- ing task, such as finding locations on a map (Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980). There are even brain-damaged patients who report corresponding impairments in both imagery and visual perception. For example, some patients whose brain damage has caused them to lose their color vision also have difficulty forming a colorful visual image. There appears to be an important link between the brain systems involved in perception and those involved in mental imagery.

Short-Term Forgetting Everyone knows it can be tough to remember telephone numbers or directions long enough to write them down. It’s possible to prolong short-term memories indefinitely by engaging in rehearsal, which is the process of

rehearsal A strategic process that helps to maintain short-term memories indefinitely through the use of internal repetition.

Short-term memories help us maintain information, such as phone numbers, over relatively brief time intervals.

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Remembering Over the Short Term | 243

internal repetition, assuming that you have the time and resources to continue the rehearsal process. (Think about the word rehearsal as re-hear-sal, as if listening to the inner voice.) Without rehearsal, however, short-term memories are quickly forgotten (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). In an early investigation of short-term forgetting, Lloyd Peterson and Margaret Peterson (1959) asked students to recall short lists of three let- ters (such as CLX) after delays that ranged from 3 to 18 seconds. The task sounds easy—remembering three letters for less than half a minute—but the experiment had an unusual feature: No one was allowed to rehearse the letters during the delay inter- val; instead, the students were asked to count backward by threes aloud until a recall signal appeared. You can try this experiment for yourself: Ask someone to read you three letters, then try immediately counting backward by threes from the number 832. Finally have your friend signal you to recall after about 10 to 20 seconds. Under these conditions, you’ll probably find that you forget the letters relatively quickly (if the first trial seems easy, try a few more with different letters). In the Petersons’ experiment, the students were reduced to guessing after about 10 to 15 seconds of counting backward (see ●Figure 8.3).

Why is information forgotten so rapidly without rehearsal? Some researchers believe that short-term memories are lost spontaneously over time, through a process called decay, unless those memories are kept active through rehearsal (Barrouillet et al., 2012). Decay also explains the rapid forgetting of sensory memories. Other researchers believe that short-term forgetting is caused by interference from new information or because people confuse current memories with past memories (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2009). A third possibility is that both decay and inter- ference operate together to produce information loss. We’ll return to the question of what causes forgetting later in the chapter.

Short-Term Memory Capacity Another characteristic of short-term memory is its lim- ited capacity: We can only remember a small amount of information over the short term. Research has shown that short-term memory span—which is defined as the number of items a person can recall in the exact order of presentation on half of the tested memory trials—is typically about seven, plus or minus two items. In other words, short-term memory span ranges between five and nine items (Miller, 1956). It’s easy to remember a list of four items, but quite difficult to remember a list of eight or nine items (which is one of the reasons telephone numbers are seven digits long).

Most psychologists believe that the capacity of short-term memory is limited, in part, because it takes time to execute the process of rehearsal. To illustrate, imagine you’re asked to remember a relatively long list of letters arranged this way:

CA TFL YBU G

memory span The number of items that can be recalled from short-term memory in their proper presentation order on half of the tested memory trials.

RecallDistraction Interval, Counting Backward

Trial 1 “. . . 391-388” “C-L-X”

“F-V-R”

“Z-W-Q ?”

“L-B- ?”

“K- ? - ?”

“? - ? - ?”

“. . . 476-473-470”

“. . . 582-579-576-573”

“. . . 267-264-261-258-255”

“. . . 941-938-935-932-929-926”

“. . . 747-744-741-739-736-733-730”

CLX

0 3 6 9 12 15 18

Trial 2 FVR

Trial 3 ZQW

Trial 4 LBC

Trial 5 KJX

Trial 6 MDW

Time (sec)

Input

● Figure 8.3 the Peterson Distractor task On each trial, people were asked to recall three letters in correct order, after counting backward aloud for 3 to 18 seconds. The longer the participants counted, the less likely they were to recall the letters correctly. (© Cengage Learning)

244 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

First, try reading this list aloud, from C to G. You’ll find that several seconds elapse from start to finish. Now imagine cycling through the list with your inner voice as you prepare for short-term recall. It turns out that the C to G cycling takes a similar amount of time inside your head (Landauer, 1962).

Remember, however, that items stored in short-term memory are forgotten in a matter of seconds, so the first part of the list tends to be forgotten during execution of the last. By the time you’ve finished with the last letter and returned to the beginning of the list, the early items have already been lost from memory. You can think about this relationship between forgetting and rehearsal as roughly similar to juggling (see ●Figure 8.4). To juggle successfully, you need to win the battle against gravity. You throw the dinner plates up, and gravity pulls them down. To prevent one of the plates from crashing, it’s necessary to catch and toss it back up before gravity runs it into the ground. Similarly, you need to return to the rapidly fading short-term memory trace and reactivate it through rehearsal before the “forces” of forgetting win out. It’s a race between two opposing forces—rehearsal and forgetting.

People differ in their ability to rehearse and maintain short-term memories. These individual differences are related to our ability to allocate attention to a task, such as rehearsal, especially when we have to do more than one thing at a time. Some people are quite good at rehearsing information while performing another task—for example, remembering a coupon code while searching the Internet. It turns out that the ability to keep multiple things available in short-term memory at the same time predicts performance on higher-order cognitive tasks, such as reasoning, or even your score on an intelligence test (Fukada et al., 2010). It is also the case that some clinical conditions, such as attention deficit disorder and schizophrenia, are associated with problems in the ability to use short-term memory effectively (Hill et al., 2010).

Chunking As a general rule, memory span is roughly equal to the amount of mate- rial you can internally rehearse in about two seconds (which usually turns out to be about seven plus or minus two items). To improve your ability to remember over

Gravity pulls balls down.

Rehearsal keeps memory alive.

Decay causes loss of memory.

“C” “A”

“T” “F”

“Y”

“L”

“G”

“B ” “U”

Throwing keeps balls up.

“C AT

”

“FLY”

“BUG”

Chunks are easily rehearsed.

● Figure 8.4 the capacity of short-term Memory The amount of information that can be stored in short-term memory depends on rehearsal, which you can think of as roughly analogous to juggling. You return to each rapidly fading short-term memory trace and reactivate it through rehearsal before it is permanently forgotten. Chunking the material makes it easier to rehearse and therefore remember the information. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

Remembering Over the Short Term | 245

the short term, then, it’s best to figure out a way to rehearse a lot of information in a short amount of time. One effective strategy is chunking, which involves rearrang- ing the incoming information into meaningful or familiar patterns, called chunks. Remember that long list of letters presented earlier (CA TFL YBU G)? Perhaps you saw that the same list could be slightly rearranged:

CAT FLY BUG

Forming the letters into words drastically reduces the time it takes to repeat the list internally (try saying CAT FLY BUG over and over internally). In addition, once you remember a chunk, it’s easy to recall the letters—in most cases, words are great storage devices for remembering sequences of letters. Of course, the trick lies in finding meaningful chunks in what can appear to be a meaningless jumble of information.

The ability to create meaningful chunks often depends on how much you know about the material that needs to be remembered. Expert chess players can re-create most of the positions on a chessboard after only a brief glance—as long as a mean- ingful game is in progress (Chase & Simon, 1973). They recognize familiar attack or defense patterns in the game, which allows them to create easy-to-rehearse chunks of position information. Similar results are found when electronics experts are asked to remember complex circuit board diagrams (Egan & Schwartz, 1979). In both cases, if the materials are arranged in a more or less random fashion (for example, the chess pieces are simply scattered about the board), the skilled retention vanishes, and mem- ory reverts to normal levels.

The Working Memory Model We’ve focused on the characteristics of short-term memories—how they’re stored and forgotten—but we haven’t discussed the “system” that controls memory over the short term. Unfortunately, memory researchers still don’t completely agree about the mechanisms that enable us to remember over the short term. Some psychologists believe that memory over the short term is controlled by the same processes that controls memory over the long term (Melton, 1963; Nairne, 2002a). But most psy- chologists assume we have special equipment for short-term memory because of its importance in language and thought. The most popular account of the short-term memory system is the working memory model developed originally by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and elaborated more recently by Baddeley (2007; 2012).

In the working memory model, several distinct mechanisms are important for short-term retention. First, the temporary storage of acoustic and verbal information is controlled by the phonological loop. The phonological loop is the structure we use to temporarily store verbal information and engage in repetitive rehearsal—it corre- sponds to the inner voice and is believed to play a critical role in language (Baddeley et al., 1998). The short-term retention and processing of visual and spatial information is controlled by a different system—the visuospatial sketchpad. If you try to count the number of windows in your house by moving through it in your mind’s eye, you are probably using the visuospatial sketchpad. Finally, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) propose that a central executive controls and allocates how processing is divided across the loop and the sketchpad. The central executive determines when the loop or sketchpad will be used and coordinates their actions.

One reason the working memory model is popular among memory researchers is that it helps explain the effects of certain types of brain damage. There are patients, for example, who seem to lose very specific verbal skills, such as the ability to learn new words in an unfamiliar language. Other patients retain their language skills but have difficulties with memory for spatial or visual information (Baddeley, 2000, 2007). These results suggest that we have separate systems controlling verbal and visual

chunking A short-term memory strategy that involves rearranging incoming information into meaningful or familiar patterns.

critical thinking

Why do you suppose the telephone company encourages you to group the numbers into chunks—for example, 212-449-5854?

246 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

test yourself Check your knowledge about remembering over the short term by deciding whether each of the following statements best describes sensory memory or short-term memory. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Information is forgotten in less than a second:

2. Information is stored as a virtually exact copy of the external message:

3. Information can be stored indefinitely through the process of rehearsal:

4. The system measured through Sperling’s partial report procedure:

5. Recall errors tend to sound like the correct item even when the item is presented visually:

6. May help us calculate message arrival time differences between the two ears:

7. Span is roughly equal to the amount of material that you can say to yourself in two seconds:

8. Capacity is improved through chunking:

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.1

storage, just as the working memory model proposes. Neuroimaging techniques also show that different areas of the brain are active when we remember spatial and non- spatial information ( Jonides et al., 2008).

Storing Information for the Long Term LEARNING GOALS

● Define episodic, semantic, and procedural memories. ● Explain why it’s important to form an elaborate and distinctive memory record. ● Describe some simple mnemonic techniques.

Long-term memory is the system we use to remember information for extended periods. When you remember the name of your fifth grade teacher or the correct route to class, you’re using your long-term memory. Most psychologists believe that the capacity of long-term memory is effectively unlimited. There are no limits to what we can potentially remember, but not everything we experience gets stored. We also don’t necessarily store information in a way that makes it easy to remember. To achieve effective long-term storage, it’s necessary to encode the experience in a way that makes it easy to retrieve. We’ll consider the kinds of encoding activities that lead to effective long-term storage momentarily, but first let’s briefly consider the general kinds of information that are stored.

What Is Stored in Long-Term Memory? Stop for a moment and think about your first kiss. The recollection (assuming you can remember your first kiss) is probably filled with warmth, intimacy, and per- haps embarrassment. Do you remember the person’s name? The situation? The

long-term memory The system used to maintain information for extended periods of time.

Storing Information for the Long Term | 247

year? Memories that tap some moment from our personal past are called episodic memories—they consist of the events, or episodes, that happened to us personally. Most experimental research on memory investigates episodic memory because peo- ple typically are asked to remember information from an earlier point in the experi- ment. The task is to remember an event, such as a word list, that forms a part of the personal history of the participant.

Some psychologists believe that episodic memory is a uniquely human qual- ity (Tulving, 2002). Other animals show memory, in the sense that they can act on the basis of information that’s no longer present (such as remembering the location of food), but they lack the ability to mentally travel backward in time and “relive” prior experiences. They live only in the present and show no awareness of the past. Interestingly, some forms of brain damage produce a similar effect in humans. Such patients appear normal in most respects—they can read and write normally, solve problems, and even play chess—but they lack the ability to remember any events or circumstances from their personal past (Wheeler & McMillan, 2001).

Now think of a city in Europe that’s famous for its fashion and fine wine. The correct response is Paris, but did you “remember” or “know” the answer? What about the square root of 9, or the capital city of the United States? These are certainly mem- ories, in the sense that you have preserved and recovered information from the past, but “remembering” these answers feels vastly different from remembering your first kiss. When you reveal what you know about the world, but make no reference whatsoever to a particular episode from your past, you’re using semantic memory (semantic refers to “meaning”). It’s through semantic memory that we store facts and remember the rules we need to know to adapt effectively in the world.

Finally, think about how to tie your shoes, drive a car, or ride a bike. The knowledge about how to do things is called procedural memory. Most skills, including athletic abil- ity, rely on procedural memories. Procedural memories differ from episodic and seman- tic memories in a fundamental way: They rarely produce any conscious experience of “remembering.” Most people have a difficult time consciously reporting how to tie their shoes or ride a bike. They can do these things, but it’s extremely difficult to put the knowledge into words. Procedural memories are among the simplest of all memories to recover, but they are among the most difficult for psychologists to study—they seem to be inaccessible to conscious awareness (Tulving, 1983). For a summary of these memory types—episodic, semantic, and procedural—see the concept review table.

Elaboration: Connecting Material to Existing Knowledge Now let’s turn to long-term episodic memory. What’s the best way to remember something over the long term? As a general rule, if you want a lasting memory, relate what you want to remember to what you already know. There’s a vast storehouse of

episodic memory A memory for a particular event, or episode, that happened to you personally, such as remembering what you ate for breakfast this morning or where you went on vacation last year.

semantic memory Knowledge about the world, stored as facts that make little or no reference to one’s personal experiences.

procedural memory Knowledge about how to do things, such as riding a bike or swinging a golf club.

It’s difficult to teach skills associated with procedural memory because such memories tend to be inaccessible.

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● concePt review Varieties of Long-Term Memory TYPE Of MEMORY DEsCRiPTiOn ExAMPlE

Episodic Memories that recall a personal moment from our past

Wanda, the mail carrier, remembers that yesterday 10 inches of snow fell, making her job very difficult.

Semantic Knowledge about the world, with no specific reference to a particular past episode

Wanda knows the cost of mailing a letter first-class; she also knows that it costs more to send something by express mail.

Procedural Knowledge about how to do something

Wanda drives the streets of her mail route effortlessly, without really thinking about it.

248 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

information in the brain, and memory works best when you make use of it. When you actively relate new information to the already-stored contents of long-term memory, the process is called elaboration. Elaboration works for two reasons: First, it helps establish routes to remembering—that is, retrieval “cues” that ease later recovery. Second, elaboration creates a distinctive memory record that stands out and is easy to identify. Elaboration comes in many forms, as the following sections demonstrate.

Think About Meaning One of the easiest ways to promote elaboration is to think about the meaning of the information you want to remember. In an experiment by Craik and Tulving (1975), people were asked questions about single words such as MOUSE. In one condition, the task required everyone to make judgments about the sound of the word (Does the word rhyme with HOUSE?); in another condition, peo- ple were required to think about the meaning of the word (Is a MOUSE a type of ani- mal?). Much better memory was obtained in this second condition. Thinking about meaning, rather than sound, leads to richer and more elaborate connections between events and other things in memory. The deeper and more elaborative the processing, the more likely that memory will improve (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).

Notice Relationships You can also use your existing knowledge to look for relation- ships among the things that need to be remembered. Suppose you’re asked to remem- ber the following list of words:

NOTES

PENCIL

BOOK

NEWSPAPER

MUSIC

COFFEE

If you think about what the words mean and look for properties that they have in common—perhaps things that you would take to a study session or a lecture— you’re engaging in a form of elaboration called relational processing. Relational pro- cessing works because you are embellishing, or adding to, the input. If you’re trying to remember the word PENCIL and you relate the word to an involved sequence of events, there are likely to be lots of cues that will remind you of the correct response at a later time. Thinking about music, newspapers, drinking coffee—any of these can lead to the correct recall of PENCIL.

Notice Differences You should also think about how the material you want to remember is different from other information in long-term memory. If you sim- ply encode PENCIL as a writing tool, you might incorrectly recall things like PEN, CHALK, or even CRAYON at a later time. Instead, specify the particular event in detail—we’re talking about a yellow, number 2 pencil, not a crayon—so the memory record becomes unique. Psychologists use the term distinctiveness to refer to how unique or different a memory record is from other things in memory. Unique mem- ory records are remembered better because they stand out—they’re easier to distin- guish from related, but not appropriate, material in memory.

Elaboration tends to produce distinctive memory records. When you compare to-be-remembered information to other things in memory, noting similarities and differences, you encode how that information both shares properties with other information (relational processing) and is unique or different (distinctive process- ing). This leads to lots of retrieval cues that will help you remember the encoded material. Generally, if you want to remember something particularly well, you should concentrate on encoding both item similarities and differences (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).

elaboration An encoding process that involves the formation of connections between to-be- remembered input and other information in memory.

distinctiveness Refers to how unique or different a memory record is from other things in memory. Distinctive memory records tend to be recalled well.

Storing Information for the Long Term | 249

Form Mental Pictures Another way to produce an elaborate memory record is to form a visual image of the material when it’s first presented. If you’re trying to remember COFFEE, try forming a mental picture of a steaming hot, freshly brewed cup. Forming mental pictures is an effective memory strategy because it naturally leads to elaborate, rich encodings. Mental pictures require you to think about the details of the material, and these details create a distinctive memory record. As you’ll see later, many memory improvement techniques, called mnemonic devices, rely importantly on the use of visual imagery.

Visual imagery leads to excellent memory, but the memories themselves are not photographic (as you might assume)—instead, they’re surprisingly abstract, and important details are often missing or inaccurate. To demonstrate, try forming a visual image of a penny or a quarter. You use coins every day, so this should be a fairly easy task. Now try to reproduce the image on paper—simply draw the presi- dent depicted on the coin, which direction he is facing, and so on. Your performance is likely to be mediocre at best. People are simply unable to reproduce the main fea- tures of a coin very accurately, despite the strong belief that they can see an accurate representation in their head. In fact, it’s even difficult for people to recognize the cor- rect coin when it is presented along with incorrect versions. For a display like the one shown in ●Figure 8.5, fewer than half of the participants pick out the right penny (Nickerson & Adams, 1979). Certainly, if you were looking at a coin, you would be able to trace the features accurately, so the image we form isn’t necessarily an accu- rate representation of physical reality. This in no way detracts from the power of imagery on memory, however. We may not store exact pictures in our head, but the records produced from imagery are among the easiest to retrieve.

Space Your Repetitions Elaborate memory traces can also be achieved through rep- etition: If information is presented more than once, it will tend to be remembered better. The fact that repetition improves memory is not very surprising, but it might surprise you to learn that repetition alone is not what leads to better memory. It’s pos- sible to present an item lots of times without improving memory—what’s necessary is that you use each repetition as an opportunity to encode the material in an elaborate and distinctive manner. If you think about the material in exactly the same way every time it’s presented, your memory won’t improve very much.

visual imagery The processes used to construct an internal visual image.

● Figure 8.5 can you recognize a Penny? We may think we can form an accurate mental image of a penny, but it isn’t easy to pick a true penny from a group of fake ones. Can you find the real penny in this display? (Reprinted from “Long-Term Memory for a Common Object”

by R. S. Nickerson and M. J. Adams in Cognitive

with permission from Elsevier.)

250 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

How the repetitions are spaced is another important factor. Your memory will be better if you distribute the repetitions—that is, if you insert other events (or time) between each occurrence. This is called distributed practice. It means that all-night cram sessions where you read the same chapter over and over again are not very effec- tive study procedures. It’s better to study a little psychology, do something else, and then return to your psychology. Why does distributed practice lead to the best memory? Again, what matters to memory is how you process the material when it’s presented. If you use massed practice—where you simply reread the same material over and over again without a break—you’re likely to think about the material in exactly the same way every time it’s presented. If you insert a break between presentations, when you see the material again there’s a better chance that you’ll notice something new or different. Distributed practice leads to memory records that are more elaborate and distinctive.

Consider Sequence Position If you have to remember a set of items, such as a list of grocery items, you’ll tend to remember the items from the beginning and the end of the sequence best. This pattern is shown in ●Figure 8.6, which plots how well items are recalled as a function of their temporal, or serial, position in a list (this graph is often called a serial position curve). The improved memory for items at the start of the list is called the primacy effect; the end-of-the-list advantage is called the recency effect. Memory researchers believe that primacy and recency effects occur because items at the beginning and end of a sequence are more naturally distinctive in mem- ory and are therefore easier to rehearse and/or to recall (Surprenant & Neath, 2009). Practically, then, if you’re trying to remember a list, put the most important things at the beginning and the end of the list.

Test Yourself Finally, you’ve been getting advice about the importance of practic- ing retrieval throughout this book. When you test yourself, the act of retrieving the information makes that information more memorable. No one is certain exactly why the benefit occurs, but it is one of the strongest ways to produce lasting long-term memory (Karpicke & Blunt, 2011). One popular account is that testing leads to elabo- ration; during retrieval, but not reading, we generate cues that will remind us later of the tested information. Think about it: When you study something, it’s right in front of you—you don’t need to generate reminder “cues.” But when you’re required to produce the information from memory, which you have to do when you test your- self, you’re on the look-out for hints or clues that will remind you of the answer later on. The act of retrieval helps establish effective retrieval routes, which is a form of elaboration (Pyc & Rawson, 2010).

Mnemonic Devices Mnemonic devices (mnemonic means “pertaining to memory”) are special mental tricks that were developed thousands of years ago as memory aids (Yates, 1966). They’re worth discussing because they’re relatively easy to use and have lots of practical applications—in fact, virtually all how-to memory books rely entirely on these techniques. Professional memorizers, including those who compete in national and international memory contests (the memory “Olympics”), all use versions of these techniques (Foer, 2011).

One of the oldest mnemonic devices is the method of loci (loci is Latin for “places”). Like most mnemonic devices, the method of loci relies on visual imagery. You start by choosing a well-known place or location—sometimes called a “memory palace”—that’s easy to access and remember. A good example might be your house, or possibly a route you might take to school. In your mind, you then place the material that you want to remember—suppose it’s a list of errands—at

distributed practice Spacing the repetitions of to-be-remembered information over time.

primacy effect The better memory of items near the beginning of a memorized list.

recency effect The better memory of items near the end of a memorized list.

mnemonic devices Special mental tricks that help people think about material in ways that improve later memory. Most mnemonic devices require the use of visual imagery.

method of loci A mnemonic device in which you choose some pathway, such as moving through the rooms in your house, and then form visual images of the to-be-remembered items sitting in locations along the pathway.

critical thinking

Given what you’ve learned about repetition and memory, do you think it’s a good idea to have children learn arithmetic tables by rote repetition?

1 50

100

P ro

p o rt

io n o

f It e m

s C

o rr

e ct

ly R

e ca

lle d

2 3 4 5 6 7 Serial Position of Items in List

● Figure 8.6 the serial Position curve When we are asked to recall a list of items, our performance often depends on the temporal, or serial, position of the entries in the list. Items at the beginning of the list are remembered relatively well—the primacy effect—and so are items at the end of the list—the recency effect. (© Cengage Learning)

Storing Information for the Long Term | 251

various locations along the path or within the location. It’s important to form a visual image of each memory item and to link the image to a specific location. If you wanted to remember to pay the gas bill, you could form a mental picture of a large check made out to the gas company and place it in the first location on your path (such as the entry hall in your house).

Depending on the size of your pathway, you can store a relatively large amount of material using this method. At the end of encoding you might have 15 different errands stored. Overdue library books could be linked to the living room sofa, clean shirts encased in plastic could be draped across the kitchen coun- ter, or big bags of dog chow could be associated with a dog on the television screen (see ●Figure 8.7).

To recover the material later, all you need to do is walk along the pathway in your mind, “looking” in the different locations for the objects you’ve stored. The method of loci is an effective memory aid because it forces you to use imagery—creating an elaborate and distinctive record—and the stored records are easy to recover because the storage locations are easy to access.

The peg-word method resembles the method of loci in that it requires you to link material to specific memory cues, but the cues are usually words rather than mental pathways. One easy technique is to pick peg words that rhyme with num- bers: For instance, one is a bun, two is a shoe, three is a tree, and so forth. This makes the pegs easy to remember and access. You then form an image linking the to-be- remembered material with each of the pegs. You might picture your overdue library books inside a hamburger bun, a bag of dog chow sitting inside a shoe, or some clean shirts hanging from a tree. To recover the memory records, you simply start count- ing, and the peg word should lead you to the image of the to-be-remembered errand. One is a bun—return books; two is a shoe—buy dog chow; three is a tree—pick up shirts.

An alternative version of the peg-word method, called the linkword system, has been used successfully to assist in learning foreign language vocabulary (Godwin-Jones, 2010). Suppose you wanted to remember the French word for rab- bit (lapin). While studying, think of an English word that sounds like the French word; perhaps the word lap would do for lapin. Next, think about the meaning of the French word and try to form a visual image of the result linked to the English

peg-word method A mnemonic device in which you form visual images connecting to-be-remembered items with retrieval cues, or pegs.

● Figure 8.7 the Method of loci To-be-remembered items are mentally placed in various locations along a familiar path. They should now be remembered easily because visual imagery promotes an elaborate memory trace and because the stored locations are easy to access. (© Cengage Learning)

252 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

rhyme. For example, you could imagine a white furry rabbit sitting in someone’s lap. When the word lapin then appears later on a test, the English rhyme should serve as an effective cue for bringing forth a remembered image of the rabbit (lap acts as a k ind of peg word for rabbit). This method has been shown to pro- duce nearly a doubling of the rate of learning for vocabulary words (Raugh & Atk inson, 1975).

Remembering With a Stone-Age Brain The fact that forming a visual image is an effective way to remember shouldn’t surprise you too much. After all, we rely heav- ily on our visual system to navigate and understand our world, so it makes sense that memory, too, relies to some extent on visual imagery (Paivio, 2007). Most cogni- tive processes, including memory, evolved to help us solve particular problems and bear the “footprints” of ancestral selection pressures. For example, if people are asked to think about material in terms of its potential survival value, they remember that material particularly well (Nairne et al., 2007).

We also tend to form rich records of the circumstances surrounding emotion- ally significant and surprising events (Brown & Kulick, 1977). So-called flashbulb memories have been reported for lots of events—for example, the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan, the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and even the verdict in the O. J. Simpson murder trial. People who experience flashbulb memories are convinced they can remember exactly what they were doing when the event occurred. Playing in school, watching television, talk- ing on the phone—whatever the circumstance, people report vivid details about the events surrounding their first exposure to the news. Do you remember what you were doing when you first heard of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States?

Surprisingly, flashbulb memories are often inaccurate. Neisser and Harsch (1992) asked college students one day after the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded to describe exactly how they first heard the news. The details were recorded, then three years later the same students were asked to recollect their experiences. People were highly confident about their recollections, yet there wasn’t much agreement between the original and the delayed memories. The students thought they were remembering things accurately, but the data proved otherwise. The fact that their memories were poor suggests that the psychological experience of flashbulb memories—that is, the strong conviction that one’s memories are accurate—may be related more to the emotionality of the original experience than to the presence of a rich and elaborative memory record.

One reason flashbulb memories tend to be inaccurate is that we often incorpo- rate later experiences into our original memories. When something shocking hap- pens, we talk about it a lot, see footage of the event on TV, and hear other people analyze how and why it happened. The events of September 11 are a good exam- ple. When President Bush was asked about his memory for the events some months later, he remembered having seen footage of the first plane hitting the tower before he learned about the crash of the second plane. At the time, of course, no footage was available on TV, so his memory of having seen the first plane attack was simply wrong. This led to some conspiracy theories on the Internet—“Bush films his own attack on the World Trade Center”—but a more reasonable explanation is that he simply mistakenly incorporated a later memory (viewing the footage) into his mem- ory for the original event (Greenberg, 2004).

It’s important to remember, though, that just because flashbulb memories are sometimes inaccurate doesn’t mean they aren’t useful and adaptive. We don’t nec- essarily want to remember the past exactly, because the past can never happen again in exactly the same way. Instead, we want to use the past, in combination with the present, to decide on an appropriate action. As you’ll see in the next sec- tion, remembering often involves reconstructing the past rather than remembering it exactly.

flashbulb memories Rich memory records of the circumstances surrounding emotionally significant and surprising events.

You probably have a strong flashbulb memory for the events of September 11—but is the memory accurate?

et er

C . B

ra nd

t/ G

et ty

Im ag

Recovering Information From Cues | 253

test yourself Check your knowledge of how information is stored over the long term by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. For each of the following, try to decide whether the relevant memory is episodic, semantic, or procedural.

a. The capital city of Texas is Austin: b. Breakfast yesterday was ham and eggs: c. My mother’s maiden name is Hudlow: d. Executing a perfect golf swing: e. Tying your shoelaces:

2. Your little brother Eddie needs to learn a long list of vocabulary words for school tomorrow. Which of the following represents the best advice for improving his memory?

a. Say the words aloud as many times as possible. b. Read the words as many times as possible. c. Form a visual image of each word. d. Spend more time studying words at the beginning and end of

the list.

3. For each of the following, decide which term best applies. Choose from the terms: distinctiveness, distributed practice, elaboration, method of loci, and peg-word technique.

a. Visualize each of the items sitting in a location along a pathway:

b. Notice how each of the items is different from other things in memory:

c. Form connections among each of the items to be remembered:

d. Form images linking items to specific cues: e. Engage in relational processing of the to-be-remembered

material:

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.2

Recovering Information From Cues LEARNING GOALS

● Discuss the importance of retrieval cues in remembering. ● Discuss the differences between explicit and implicit memory. ● Explain the role of schemas in reconstructive memory.

Can you still remember the memory list from a few pages back? You know, the one based on things you might take to a morning lecture class? If you remembered the items, such as PENCIL, NOTES, and COFFEE, it’s probably because you were able to use the common theme—things at a lecture—as a cue to help you remember. Psychologists believe that retrieval, the process of recovering previously stored mem- ories, is guided primarily by cues, called retrieval cues, that are either generated inter- nally (thinking of the lecture scene helps you remember PENCIL) or are present in the environment (a string tied around your finger).

The Importance of Retrieval Cues A classic study conducted by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) illustrates the important role that retrieval cues play in remembering. People were given lists to remember containing words from several meaningful categories (types of animals, birds, veg- etables, and so on). Later, people were asked to remember the words either with or

254 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

without the aid of retrieval cues. Half were asked to recall the words without cues, a condition called free recall; the other half were given the category names to help them remember, known as cued recall. People in the cued-recall condition recalled nearly twice as many words, presumably because the category names helped them gain access to the previously stored material.

Although these results are not surprising, they have important implications for how we need to think about remembering. Because people performed poorly in the free-recall condition, it’s tempting to conclude they never learned the material

or simply forgot many of the items from the list. But performance in the cued-recall condition shows that the material wasn’t actually lost—it just couldn’t be accessed. With the right retrieval cues—in this case the cate- gory names—the “lost” material could be remembered with ease. Memory researchers believe that most, if not all, forgetting is caused by a failure to access the right kinds of retrieval cues. Once information is encoded, it is available somewhere in the brain; you simply need appropriate retrieval cues to gain access.

This is the main reason elaboration is an effective strategy for remem- bering. When you connect material to existing knowledge, creating a rich and elaborate memory record, you’re effectively increasing the number of potential retrieval cues. The more retrieval cues, the more likely you’ll be able to access the memory record later on. It’s also the main reason mne- monic techniques such as the peg-word method work so well—they estab- lish readily available retrieval cues as part of the learning process (counting to 10 provides immediate access to the relevant “pegs”).

The Encoding–Retrieval Match Increasing the number of potential retrieval cues helps, but it also helps if the cue matches the memory that was encoded. If you think about the sound of a word during its original presentation, rather than its appearance, then a cue that rhymes with the stored word will be more effective than a visual cue. Similarly, if you think about the mean- ing of a word during study, then an effective cue will get you to think about the encoded word’s meaning during retrieval. Retrieval cues are effective to the extent that they match the way information was originally encoded.

Let’s consider an example. Suppose you’re asked to remember two words: BANK and WAGON. To improve retention, you form a visual

free recall A testing condition in which a person is asked to remember information without explicit retrieval cues.

cued recall A testing condition in which people are given an explicit retrieval cue to help them remember.

Can you name all of your fifth-grade classmates? Probably not, but your memory is sure to improve if you’re given a class photo to use as a retrieval cue. ©

R ic

ha rd

H ut

ch in

gs /P

ho to

E di

In the years to come, this couple may find it easier to remember this blissful reunion at times when they’re happy rather than sad. How does this conclusion reflect the encoding–retrieval match?

P Ph

ot o/

N ew

s- H

er al

d, D

an Y

ou ng

Recovering Information From Cues | 255

image of a WAGON perched on the BANK of a river (see ●Figure 8.8). Later BANK is provided as a retrieval cue. Will it help you remember WAGON? Probably, but only if you interpret the retrieval cue BANK to mean a slope immediately bordering a river. If for some reason you think about BANK as a place to keep money, you probably won’t recover WAGON successfully. A retrieval cue works well only if you interpret it in the proper way. By “proper” psychologists mean that the cue must be interpreted in a way that matches the original encoding. There are some exceptions to this gen- eral rule (Nairne, 2002b), but a good encoding–retrieval match is one of the most important factors to consider when seeking a useful retrieval cue.

The encoding–retrieval match helps to explain why remembering is often state or context dependent. Divers can remember important safety information better if they learn the information while diving rather than on land (Martin & Aggelton, 1993). Presumably, there’s a better match between encoding and retrieval when infor- mation is learned and tested in the same environment. Another example is childhood, or infantile, amnesia: Most of us have a difficult time remembering things that hap- pened to us before the age of 4 or 5. However, it’s likely that we interpreted the world very differently when we were small. Childhood amnesia may result, then, from a poor match between the present and the distant past. We see and interpret events dif- ferently now than we did as children, so we have few effective retrieval cues available for remembering childhood events ( Jack & Hayne, 2010).

Transfer-Appropriate Processing Is there any way to guarantee a good encoding– retrieval match? One way is to pay close attention to the conditions that are likely to be present when you need to remember. You can engage in what psychologists call transfer-appropriate processing, which means you should encode material using the same kind of mental processes that’ll be required during the test. Matching the mental processes used during study and test increases the chances that effective retrieval cues will be available (Lockhart, 2002).

To illustrate, let’s assume you’re asked to remember the word TUG for a later memory test (see ●Figure 8.9). If you form a visual image of a tugboat and you’re then specifically asked about a tugboat on the memory test, you’ll probably perform well. But suppose you’re asked instead to remember whether the word TUG was printed in upper- or lowercase letters. All of the elaboration in the world isn’t going to help

transfer-appropriate processing The idea that the likelihood of correct retrieval is increased if a person uses the same kind of mental processes during testing that he or she used during encoding.

Study

Encoding Input

Retrieval Match

Retrieval Cue: “Bank”

Retrieval Mismatch

Retrieval Cue: “Bank”

● Figure 8.8 the encoding–retrieval Match Memory often depends on how well retrieval cues match the way information was originally studied or encoded. Suppose you’re asked to remember the word pair BANK–WAGON. You form a visual image of a wagon teetering on the edge of a riverbank. When presented later with the retrieval cue BANK, you’re more likely to remember WAGON if you interpret the cue as something bordering a river than as a place to keep money. (© Cengage Learning)

256 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

you unless you’ve specifically encoded the way the letters were shaped (“TUG,” not “tug”). The lesson of transfer-appropriate processing is that you need to consider the nature of the test before you can decide how to study most effectively. For some hints on how to apply the principle of transfer-appropriate processing when you prepare for an exam, see the Practical Solutions feature.

Reconstructive Remembering Retrieval cues guide remembering in much the same way that a physical message guides the processes of perception. What you “see” really depends on both the incom- ing message and the expectations you hold about what’s “out there.” In a similar way, remembering depends on more than just a retrieval cue—your expectations and beliefs color an act of remembering just as they color what you see and hear. Think about what you had for breakfast two weeks ago. Did you skip breakfast or, perhaps, gulp down a quick bowl of cereal? It turns out that what you “remember” in a case like this often corresponds more to habit than to actual fact. If you regularly eat a bowl of cereal in the morning, then eating cereal is what you’re likely to recall, even if you broke the routine on that particular day and had a bagel.

Memory Schemas To understand why memory acts in this way, we must return to that vast storehouse of information in the brain—the repository of episodic, proce- dural, and especially semantic memories. As you know, we store more than facts in long-term memory—we also store relationships among facts. You know, for exam- ple, that houses contain rooms with walls, require insurance protection, and are sus- ceptible to burning down. You know that college students like to sleep late, wear jeans, and listen to loud music. These large clusters of related facts are organized into knowledge structures called schemas. Schemas can be about people, places, or activities—we even have them for routines such as going to a restaurant, visiting the

schema An organized knowledge structure in long-term memory.

● Figure 8.9 transfer-appropriate Processing It’s useful to study material with the same type of mental processes that you’ll be required to use when tested. Suppose you form a visual image of a to-be-remembered word (panel 1). If the test requires you to recognize an image of the word, you should do well (panel 2). But if the test asks how the word sounds (panel 3) or whether the word was presented originally in upper- or lowercase letters (panel 4), you’re likely to perform poorly. You need to study in a way that is appropriate to the test. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

Memory List

TUG

Was this on the memorylist?

Recall the word that rhymes with DUG

Was this word

presented earlier

in capital letters? TUG tug

TU G?

RUG?BUG?

YES

Recovering Information From Cues | 257

You’re now familiar with some techniques for improving memory. You form an elaborate and distinctive memory record during encod- ing, which helps make certain that relevant retrieval cues are available when you need to remember. Practicing retrieval, through repeated self-testing, is one solid way to guar- antee good performance over the long term. It also helps to space your practice—don’t cram all of your studying and self-testing into one marathon session the night before the test. By studying the material at different times, and in different situations, you increase the chances that the information will be linked to lots of different retrieval cues. Perhaps most important, you should pay particular attention to the concept of transfer-appropriate process- ing: Make certain that when you test yourself you do it in a way that matches what you’ll be required to do on the classroom exam.

On a practical level, this means you need to think about the characteristics of an exam before you sit down to study. An essay exam, for example, is a kind of cued-recall test— you’re given a cue in the form of a test ques- tion, and you’re required to recall the most appropriate answer. To study for such a test, it’s best to practice cued recall: Make up questions that are relevant to the material and practice recalling the appropriate answer with only the test question as a cue. For a multi- ple-choice test, which is a kind of recognition test, it’s necessary to discriminate a correct answer from a group of incorrect answers (called distractors). The best way to study for a multiple-choice test is to practice with mul- tiple-choice questions; either make up your own or use questions from a study guide.

Have you ever thought to yourself, “I’ll just read the chapter one more time before I

go to bed, and I’ll ace the exam tomorrow”? Think about your reasoning from the perspec- tive of transfer-appropriate processing—what exactly does the typical exam ask you to do? Exams don’t measure the speed or fluency with which the chapter can be read. Most exams require you to retrieve the material in the presence of cues. So, practicing retrieving the information makes a lot more sense than simply reading it. Learn the material by read- ing the chapter, but prepare for the exam by using processes similar to those required by the test. Practice reproducing the material by answering questions from memory or practice discriminating correct from incorrect answers by responding to a variety of multiple-choice questions.

● Practical solutions Self-Testing “Appropriately” for Exams

local urgent care center, or following daily eating habits. When you remember, you use these organized knowledge packages to help recover the past. So when some- one asks you what you ate for breakfast two weeks ago, you can confidently answer “cereal” because you know cereal is what you usually eat for breakfast. You don’t have to remember the specific episode; you can rely on your general knowledge.

The trouble with schema-based remembering is that it can easily lead to false or inaccurate retention. You might remember something that’s completely wrong—it didn’t really happen—yet still be convinced your memory is accurate. (Remember our earlier discussion of flashbulb memories?) More than 80 years ago an English psychologist named Frederick Bartlett asked undergraduates to read an unfamiliar North American Indian folktale about tribe members who traveled up a river to bat- tle with some warrior “ghosts” (the story’s title was “The War of the Ghosts”). In recalling the story sometime later, the students tended to distort facts, omit details, and fill in information that was not included in the original version. For example, familiar things were substituted for unfamiliar things—the word boat was substituted for canoe; “hunting seals” was replaced with “hunting beavers.” Because these things were not actually in the story, Bartlett assumed his participants must have used their prior knowledge to reconstruct what they remembered—even though they were con- vinced they were remembering the material accurately (Bartlett, 1932).

A similar point was made more recently by Loftus and Palmer (1974). Undergraduates were shown a short film depicting an automobile accident. Later, when questioned about the film, the students were asked to estimate how fast the cars were traveling just prior to the accident. Some students were asked to estimate the speed of the cars just before they smashed into each other; others were asked how fast the cars were going before they contacted each other. Notice the difference between the words—the schema for smashed implies that the cars were traveling at a high rate of speed, whereas contacted suggests that the cars were moving slowly. As shown in ●Figure 8.10, people who heard the word smashed in the question estimated that the cars were traveling about 42 miles per hour; people in the contacted group gave an estimate of about 10 miles per hour slower.

critical thinking

Do you think all remembering is reconstructive? What about sensory memory—isn’t that a pure kind of remembering?

258 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

Once again, these results show that memory is importantly influenced by general knowledge, as well as by expectations. Everyone in the Loftus and Palmer experi- ment saw the same film, but what people remembered depended on how the ques- tions were worded—that is, on whether people were led to believe that the cars were going fast or slow. In addition to giving estimates of speed, some were asked whether any broken glass was present in the accident scene. When smashed was used in the speed question, people were much more likely to remember seeing broken glass, even though there wasn’t any in the original film. By asking the right kinds of ques- tions during testing, it’s possible to make people think they experienced things that did not occur. As Loftus (1979, 1991) has emphasized, these findings suggest that cau- tion must be exercised in interpreting the testimony of any eyewitness—reconstruc- tive factors can always be involved.

Here’s an easy way to demonstrate schema-based remembering for yourself: Read the following list of words aloud to a group of friends:

BED

REST

AWAKE

TIRED

DREAM

WAKE

SNOOZE

BLANKET

DOZE

SLUMBER

SNORE

NAP

YAWN

DROWSY

Now ask your friends to write down all the words they’ve just heard. The chances are very good that someone will remember an item that was not on the list, especially the word SLEEP. In experiments using lists of such related items, people have been found to recall nonpresented items (e.g., sleep) nearly 50% of the time (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The chances of false memory increase even more when recognition memory is tested—that is, when you’re given the word SLEEP and are asked if it was presented on the list (McDermott & Roediger, 1998). What’s behind this effect? Obviously, the word SLEEP is highly related to the words on the list. It seems likely that people recognize the relationships among the words and use this knowledge to help them remember. This is a very effective strategy for remembering, but it can lead to false recollections.

Recall Instructions Schema Response

“How fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?”

“About 42 mph”

“How fast were the cars going when they contacted each other?”

“About 32 mph”

● Figure 8.10 schema-Based remembering Loftus and Palmer (1974) found that students remembered cars traveling faster when retrieval instructions used the word smashed instead of contacted. All people saw the same film, but their different schemas for the words smashed and contacted presumably caused them to reconstruct their memories differently. (© Cengage Learning)

Recovering Information From Cues | 259

Despite the mistakes, schema-based remembering clearly has adaptive value. By relying on preexisting knowledge to “fill in the gaps” or to help interpret fuzzy rec- ollections, you increase the chances that what you remember will be appropriate— after all, the past is usually the best predictor of the future. Schematic knowledge can also be used to “correct” for any minor details you may have missed during the origi- nal exposure. If you already have a pretty good idea of what goes on during a visit to a fast-food restaurant, your mind doesn’t need to expend a great deal of effort attending to details the next time you enter a McDonald’s. You can rely on your prior knowl- edge to capture the gist of the experience, even though, on the down side, you may recollect a few things that didn’t actually happen.

The point made earlier about eyewitness testimony is important, however. Most people, including the members of virtually all juries, don’t understand the recon- structive nature of remembering. They’re convinced that memories are highly accu- rate, especially when someone expresses lots of confidence about the memory. In one recent survey nearly 40% of the public agreed with the following statement: “In my opinion, the testimony of one confident eyewitness should be enough to convict a defendant of a crime.” When expert memory researchers were asked the same ques- tion, none agreed with the statement (Simons & Chabris, 2011). This certainly sug- gests that juries give too much weight to eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness testimony can be accurate, but recognizing the reconstructive nature of memory should make you skeptical about any remembered event, regardless of its importance or the confi- dence of the rememberer.

Remembering Without Awareness: Implicit Memory Up to this point we’ve concentrated on conscious, willful acts of remembering—that is, situations in which you’re consciously intending to remember something (such as what you ate for breakfast or the words from a memory list). But we often remember things without conscious intent or awareness. You speak, walk to work, recognize someone you know—all these things require memory, but you’re usually not explic- itly trying to remember anything.

Psychologists use the term implicit memory to describe this kind of remem- bering. Explicit memory is the name researchers use to describe conscious, will- ful remembering. It turns out that implicit memory—remembering without awareness—follows many of the same rules as explicit memory. For example, both implicit and explicit memory are strongly influenced by retrieval cues. If you look at ●Figure 8.11, you’ll see some examples of word and picture fragments. Your

implicit memory Remembering that occurs in the absence of conscious awareness or willful intent.

explicit memory Conscious, willful remembering.

Picture fragment completion

Word fragment completion

E_ _P_ _ _ _ EL_P_ _NT EL_PHANT ELEPHANT

● Figure 8.11 implicit Memory tests The person’s task in each test is to complete the picture or word fragment so as to identify the object shown on the far right. (© Cengage Learning)

260 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

ability to complete one of these fragments improves if you’ve seen the solution word recently during reading (for example, the word fragment E_E_ _AN_ is easier to solve if the word ELEPHANT has been seen in the prior 24 hours). But importantly, you don’t need to remember seeing the word. Your performance improves even if you don’t consciously remember the word (which makes the remembering implicit). At the same time, performance depends importantly on whether the earlier encoun- ter matches the fragment. If you need to solve a picture fragment, then you’re helped more if the earlier encounter was in the form of a picture—such as seeing a picture of an elephant—rather than a word (McDermott & Roediger, 1994). Once again, the conditions during testing need to match the conditions present during the original exposure.

There are situations in which implicit memory acts somewhat differently from explicit memory. One of the most interesting cases is with amnesia, memory loss that is caused by a physical problem. People who suffer from severe amnesia— e.g., they might show little memory for a sentence spoken moments before—often show little decline in implicit memory. We’ll discuss this topic in more detail later in the chapter. There’s also evidence that older adults have better implicit mem- ory for irrelevant information (things that are not central to the task at hand) than younger adults (Gopie et al., 2011). In addition, encoding strategies that typically improve conscious, willful remembering often have little or no effect on implicit memory (Roediger et al., 1992). If you think about the meaning of the material, which induces elaboration, you’re much more likely to recall it on an explicit test of memory, such as recall or recognition. But the same improvement often isn’t found when memory is tested using an implicit test, such as solving word fragment prob- lems (Graf et al., 1982). Differences such as these have led some researchers to sug- gest that explicit and implicit memories are controlled by different systems in the brain (see Henke, 2010).

test yourself Check your knowledge about how we use cues to help us remember by answering the following questions. fill in the blanks with one of the following terms: cued recall, explicit memory, free recall, implicit memory, schema, transfer-appropriate processing. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. An organized knowledge package that’s stored in long-term memory:

2. Remembering without awareness:

3. Studying for a multiple-choice test by writing your own multiple- choice questions:

4. Remembering material without the aid of any external retrieval cues:

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.3

Updating Memory | 261

Updating Memory LEARNING GOALS

● Discuss the contributions of Ebbinghaus and explain why forgetting is often adaptive. ● Describe the mechanisms that cause forgetting, including decay and retroactive and proactive

interference. ● Discuss motivated forgetting and the case for repression. ● Describe retrograde and anterograde amnesia and explain where memories might be stored in

the brain.

Like other storage devices, the mind is susceptible to clutter. Effective remember- ing often hinges on your ability to successfully discriminate one occurrence from another—you need to remember where you parked your car today not yesterday, or a current phone number (not a previous one). What if you felt the urge to buy two dozen paper cups every time you entered the grocery store because one time last year you needed paper cups for a party? Forgetting, the loss of accessibility to previously stored material, is one of the most important and adaptive properties of your memory system (Bjork, 1989; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008).

If you need further convincing, consider the case of a Russian journalist known as S. who possessed an extraordinary ability to remember. Through a fluke of nature, S. reacted automatically to stimuli in ways that formed unusual and distinctive encod- ings. When he heard a tone pitched at 500 hertz, S. reported seeing “a dense orange color which made him feel as though a needle had been thrust into his spine” (Luria, 1968, p. 24). For a 3,000-hertz tone, S. claimed that it “looks something like a firework tinged with a pink-red hue. The strip of color feels rough and unpleasant, and it has an ugly taste—rather like that of a briny pickle” (p. 24).

S. had a remarkable memory—he could remember grids of numbers perfectly after 15 years—but he suffered a near fatal flaw: He simply couldn’t forget. He had trouble reading books because words or phrases so flooded his mind with previous associations that he had great difficulty concentrating. He would notice, for example, small errors in the text: If a character entered the story wearing a cap and in later pages was described without a cap, S. would become greatly disturbed and disap- pointed in the author. He had trouble holding a job or even a sustained conversation. For S., the failure to forget produced a truly cluttered mind.

How Quickly Do We Forget? For most people, once an item has left the immediate present, it’s forgotten in a regular and systematic way. How quickly an item is forgotten depends on several factors: how the item was initially encoded, whether it was encountered again at some later time, and the kinds of retrieval cues that are present at the point of remem- bering. But in general the course of forgetting looks like the curve shown in ●Figure 8.12. Most of the forgetting occurs early, but you will continue to forget gradually for a long period following the ini- tial exposure (Averell & Heathcote, 2011).

The forgetting curve shown in the figure is taken from some classic work by the German philosopher Hermann Ebbinghaus, who was one of the first researchers to investigate memory and forgetting scientifically (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964). Isolated in his study, he forced himself to learn lists of nonsense syllables (such as ZOK) and then measured how long it took to relearn the same material after various delays (a technique called the savings method). As the graph shows, the longer the delay after original learning, the greater effort Ebbinghaus

forgetting The loss of accessibility to previously stored material.

Forgetting is often bothersome, but it can have considerable adaptive value.

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● Figure 8.12 the ebbinghaus Forgetting curve The German philosopher Hermann Ebbinghaus memorized lists of nonsense syllables and then measured how long it took to relearn the same material after various delays. Fifty percent savings means it took half as long to relearn the list as it did to learn it originally; 0% savings would mean that it took as long to relearn the list as it did to learn the list originally. (© Cengage Learning)

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had to spend relearning the list. The Ebbinghaus forgetting function—a rapid loss followed by a more gradual decline—is typical of forgetting. Similar forgetting func- tions are found for a variety of materials, and even for complex skills such as flying an airplane (Fleishman & Parker, 1962) or performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (McKenna & Glendon, 1985).

Even memories for everyday things, such as the names of high school classmates or material learned in school, are forgotten in regular and systematic ways. In one study, Bahrick (1984) studied memory for a foreign language (Spanish) over intervals that ranged from about 1 to 50 years. In another study, Bahrick and Hall (1991) exam- ined the retention of high school mathematics over 50 years. In both cases there was rapid loss of recently learned material, followed by more gradual loss, but a consider- able amount of knowledge was retained indefinitely. What’s surprising about these studies is that a fair amount of the knowledge remained, even though the participants claimed to have not rehearsed or thought about the material in more than half a cen- tury. (Maybe there’s hope for education yet!)

There’s one more characteristic of long-term forgetting that you’ll probably find interesting. When older adults are asked to recall and date events from their past, not surprisingly they tend to remember things from the more recent past best. However, there’s a “bump” in the forgetting curve for events that happened between late ado- lescence and about age 30 (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997). For some reason we retain events from this period particularly well—or, at least, these are the events that we’re apt to recall in our older years. This is known as the “reminiscence bump,” and psy- chologists aren’t exactly certain why it happens. We experience lots of “firsts” during this period (career, possibly marriage and family), so perhaps we simply repeatedly rehearse what happens during the 20-something period throughout our lives (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003). It’s also possible that we learn from our culture that important things happen during the “bump” period, so we tend to search for memories from that period when we recall our past (Bohn & Berntsen, 2011).

Why Do We Forget? We can agree that it’s adaptive to forget, and we can measure how quickly informa- tion becomes unavailable over time, but what causes forgetting? As we discussed ear- lier, most memory researchers believe that forgetting is cue dependent—you fail to remember a prior event because you don’t have the right retrieval cues. But it’s also possible that memories simply fade with the passage of time in accordance with a “law of use” (Thorndike, 1914). If you fail to practice a learned habit, such as playing the piano, the habit fades, or decays, spontaneously with time.

However, decay—the idea that memories fade due to the passage of time— cannot explain most instances of forgetting. For one thing, as you’ve seen, memories that appear to have been forgotten can be remembered later under the right retrieval conditions. In addition, people often remember trivial things (such as a joke) for years but forget important things that once received a great deal of practice (such as ele- mentary geometry). Even more significant, just because memories are lost with time doesn’t mean that time alone is the cause. A nail left outside becomes rusty with time, but it is not the passage of time that creates the rust—processes other than time (oxi- dation, in the case of the rusty nail) actually produce the changes.

Retroactive Interference In forgetting, the “other processes”—which are corre- lated with the passage of time but are not created by time—are often the establish- ment of other memories. We constantly learn new things, and these new memories compete, or interfere, with the recovery of old memories. College students tend to move around a lot, so every time you get a new apartment you need to learn a new home address. Once you’ve got the new address memorized it becomes more diffi- cult to retrieve your old address, even if you actively try to remember. The retrieval

decay The proposal that memories are forgotten or lost spontaneously with the passage of time.

Hermann Ebbinghaus (1859–1909)

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Updating Memory | 263

cue “home address” has now become associated with something new; as a result, it loses its capacity to produce the old information. Psychologists use the term retroactive interference to refer to cases where the formation of new memories hurts the retention of old memories.

In a classic study of retroactive interference, Jenkins and Dallenbach (1924) asked two students from Cornell University to live in a laboratory for several weeks and learn lists of nonsense syl- lables either just before bed or early in the morning. The students were tested 1, 2, 4, or 8 hours after learning. The results, which are shown in ●Figure 8.13, were clear: When the students slept dur- ing the delay interval, they remembered more than when they remained awake. A constant amount of time passed in both condi- tions, so a decay theory would predict no differences between the conditions. The findings suggest it was the activities that occurred during the students’ waking hours that produced the information loss. When awake, the students formed new memories, which inter- fered with recovery of the old material.

Proactive Interference It’s not just the learning of new informa- tion that produces forgetting. Previously learned information can also produce interference. Proactive interference occurs when old memories interfere with the recovery of new memories. Suppose English is your native language but you move to Portugal on business. You become fluent in the Portuguese language, but you find it difficult to stop English words or phrases from coming to mind when you talk. You know the Portuguese word for train is “comboio” but you find it hard to suppress saying “train” when you’re speaking in Portuguese (at least for awhile). That’s proactive interference—old memories inter- fere with the recovery of new memories. Prior knowledge and habits interfere with the retention of new material.

Most memory researchers believe that forgetting is usually caused by interfer- ence, although it’s conceivable that decay might operate in certain situations. One possibility is that decay operates when we remember over the very short term—that is, in sensory memory and short-term memory (Barrouillet et al., 2012). It’s also pos- sible that when we learn new material, older memories are “overwritten” and perma- nently lost (Loftus & Loftus, 1980). But generally, we don’t lose material with time; the material simply becomes harder to remember because other things interfere with the retrieval process. As new memories are encoded, old retrieval cues become less effective because those cues are now associated with new things.

Motivated Forgetting Highly unusual or emotional events lead to distinctive, and therefore easy to remem- ber, memory records. The adaptive value of a system that “stamps in” significant events is easy to understand—remembering such events could increase our ability to survive. But what about those cases in which it’s adaptive to forget something, such as a traumatic instance of child abuse or the witnessing of a violent crime?

The idea that the mind might actively repress, or inhibit, certain memory records is an important ingredient of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, as you’ll see when we discuss personality theories in Chapter 12. Freud introduced repression as a “defense mechanism” to push threatening thoughts, memories, and feelings out of conscious awareness. According to Freud, these repressed memories retain the capac- ity to affect behavior at an unconscious level but cannot be remembered in the con- ventional sense. The result is a reduction in the experience of anxiety.

retroactive interference A process in which the formation of new memories hurts the recovery of old memories.

proactive interference A process in which old memories interfere with the recovery of new memories.

repression A defense mechanism that individuals use, unknowingly, to push threatening thoughts, memories, and feelings out of conscious awareness.

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● Figure 8.13 interference and Memory The activities that occur after learning affect how well stored information is remembered. In this study by Jenkins and Dallenbach (1924), the students remembered better if they slept during the retention interval than if they remained awake. Presumably, the waking activities caused interference. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

critical thinking

Can you think of any ways to lessen the influence of proactive interference? Is there any way that you could study information to prevent interference?

264 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

The Evidence for Repression Modern researchers remain undecided about the sci- entific validity of repression. People typically recall more pleasant than unpleasant events (Wagenaar, 1986), and painful experiences, such as the pain associated with childbirth, also seem to be recollected less well with the passage of time (Robinson et al., 1980). There are also many cases, reported mainly in clinical settings, of what appear to be the repression of traumatic experiences.

For example, in one study 475 adults who were undergoing psychotherapy were asked about memories of childhood sexual abuse. Each had reported an incident of abuse during childhood, and each was asked the following specific question: “During the period of time between when the first forced sexual encounter happened and your 18th birthday, was there ever a time when you could not remember the forced sexual experience?” (Briere & Conte, 1993). Fifty-nine percent of the people who answered the question responded “Yes,” suggesting that the memories had been pushed out of con- sciousness for at least some period of time. In another study supporting the same con- clusion, Williams (1992) asked 100 women who had been medically treated for sexual abuse as children—the abuse was documented by hospital and other records—whether they remembered the incident 17 years later. Thirty-eight percent of those responding reported no memory of the abuse, again providing support for the concept of repression.

But does this really mean that the forgetting was caused by repression? It’s possi- ble that people tend to remember positive events because these are the types of events that we rehearse and relate to others. The fact that painful experiences are forgot- ten can be explained in lots of ways—many things are forgotten with the passage of time, especially those that are unlikely to be rehearsed. In fact, victims of childhood sexual abuse often tell researchers that they deliberately try to avoid thinking about the abuse (McNally & Geraerts, 2009). It’s also difficult to understand why some trau- matic memories, such as those typically seen in posttraumatic stress disorder, remain extremely difficult to suppress or forget.

There have been attempts to simulate repression in the laboratory. No, people are not exposed to traumatic events; instead they’re simply asked to actively prevent previously learned material from coming to mind. For example, if you’ve been taught to recall socks every time you’re given the word joy, I might ask you to actively repress thinking about socks the next time you see joy. Under these conditions, there’s some evidence that socks then becomes harder to recall—you’ve suppressed its represen- tation in memory (Anderson & Green, 2001; but see Bulevich et al., 2006). Recent evidence suggests as well that it might be easier to suppress emotionally negative material than positive material (Lambert et al., 2010). But whether the suppression effects observed in the laboratory are the same as those seen in clinical settings remains a matter of dispute (Erdelyi, 2010).

People are more likely to recall pleasant than unpleasant experiences, perhaps because they're reluctant to rehearse unpleasant experiences.

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● concePt review Mechanisms of Forgetting MECHAnisM DEsCRiPTiOn ExAMPlE

Cue dependence One fails to remember an event due to a lack of appropriate cues.

Although Susan would recognize a definition of semantic memory on a multiple-choice test, she can’t think of it for a fill-in-the-blank test.

Decay Memories fade with the passage of time.

After only a month of lessons, and then six years of not playing the piano, Shao forgets how to play.

Proactive interference Old memories interfere with the recovery of new memories.

Bruce is so impressed with the first person he met at the party, he can’t remember the names of those he met later.

Retroactive interference New memories interfere with the recovery of old memories.

Filling out a job application, Seth can remember only his most recent address, not the one before it.

Motivated forgetting Traumatic experiences are forgotten to reduce anxiety.

Jackie can’t remember too much about the day her parents were seriously injured in an accident.

Updating Memory | 265

Whether these laboratory studies really tell us anything about the forgetting of traumatic events remains uncertain. However, as Freud noted, a process of repression might be adaptive if it can prevent or reduce anxiety. It may also be the case that for- gotten events continue to exert indirect influences on behavior in ways that bypass awareness. But the data do suggest that memories, whether “recovered” in therapy or simply in the normal course of everyday activities, should not be taken at face value. It is useful for people to use prior knowledge, as well as current expectations, to help them remember—but perhaps at the cost of sometimes remembering things that didn’t actually happen.

The Neuroscience of Forgetting Forgetting can also be caused by physical problems in the brain, such as those induced by injury or illness. Psychologists use the term amnesia to refer to forgetting that is caused by some kind of physical problem. (Another type of amnesia that’s psychologi- cal in origin arises from something called a dissociative disorder, but we’ll delay our discussion of this kind of forgetting until Chapter 14.)

Types of Amnesia There are two major k inds of amnesia, retrograde and antero- grade. Retrograde amnesia is memory loss for events that happened prior to the point of injury (you can think of retro as meaning backward in time). People who are in automobile accidents, or who receive a sharp blow to the head, often have trouble remembering the events leading directly up to the accident. The mem- ory loss can apply to events that happened only moments before the accident, or the loss can be quite severe; in some cases, patients lose their ability to recall personal experiences that occurred years before the accident. In many cases, for- tunately, these memory losses are not permanent and recover slowly over time (Cermak, 1982).

Anterograde amnesia is memory loss for events that happen after the point of physical damage. People who suffer from anterograde amnesia often seem locked in the past—they’re incapable of forming memories for new experiences. The disorder develops as a result of brain damage, which can occur from the persistent use of alco- hol (a condition called Korsakoff syndrome), from brain infections (such as viral enceph- alitis), or, in some cases, as a by-product of brain surgery. One of the most thoroughly studied amnesic patients, known to researchers as H.M., developed the disorder after surgery was performed to remove large portions of his temporal lobes. The purpose of the operation was to reduce the severity of H.M.’s epileptic seizures; the surgery was successful—his seizures were dramatically reduced—but anterograde amnesia developed as an unexpected side effect.

Over the years, patients such as H.M. have been studied in great detail to deter- mine exactly what kinds of memory processing are lost (Milner, 1966). It was origi- nally believed that such patients fail to acquire new memories because some basic encoding mechanisms have been destroyed. It is now clear, however, that these patients can learn a great deal but must be tested in particular ways. If a patient like H.M. is tested implicitly, on a task that does not require conscious remembering, per- formance can approach or even match normal levels.

In one study, Jacoby and Witherspoon (1982) asked Korsakoff patients with anterograde amnesia to learn homophones for a later memory test. Homophones are words that sound alike but have different meanings and spellings, such as READ and REED. To “bias” a particular interpretation for a given homophone, it was presented as part of a word pair, such as BOOK–READ or, in another condition, SAXOPHONE–REED. (Because the words were presented aloud, the only way to dis- tinguish between the homophones READ and REED was through the accompanying context word BOOK or SAXOPHONE.) Later the amnesics were asked to recognize the words, but they were unable to do so—they seemed to have acquired none of the

amnesia Forgetting that is caused by physical problems in the brain, such as those induced by injury or disease.

retrograde amnesia Memory loss for events that happened prior to the point of brain injury.

anterograde amnesia Memory loss for events that happen after the point of physical injury.

266 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

presented information. In a second test, however, the homophones were simply read aloud by the experimenter, and the patients’ task was to spell the word. Surprisingly, if the amnesics had earlier received the pair BOOK–READ, they spelled the test homophone READ, but if the homophone had been paired with SAXOPHONE, they spelled it REED.

These results indicate that the homophones were learned by the amnesic patients. The way the patients spelled the homophone during the test depended on their prior experience. Other experiments have revealed similar findings. For example, amne- sics are more likely to complete a word fragment (such as E_E_ _AN_) correctly if they’ve seen the word before, but if asked to recall the word, their performance falters (Graf & Schacter, 1985). Patients who suffer from anterograde amnesia fail to retrieve past experiences whenever they must consciously recollect the experience; when the past is assessed indirectly, through a task that does not require conscious remember- ing, these amnesics often perform at normal levels.

Where Are Memories Stored? The study of brain-damaged individuals, such as Korsakoff patients, has encouraged researchers to draw tentative conclusions about how and where memories might be stored in the brain. We touched on this issue in Chapter 3 when we considered biological processes. At that point special atten- tion was paid to a structure called the hippocampus, which most brain researchers believe is critically involved in the formation and storage of memories (Henke, 2010). Damage to the hippocampus, as well as to surrounding structures in the brain, leads to memory problems in a wide variety of species, including humans, monkeys, and rats. Areas surrounding the hippocampus also “light up” in neuroimaging studies when people are asked to recall specific material; in fact, some researchers have sug- gested that it’s even possible to detect specific memories in people by examining the patterns of neural activation around the hippocampus (Chadwick et al., 2010).

However, no single brain structure, or group of structures, is responsible for all instances of remembering and forgetting. Things are vastly interconnected in the brain, and activities in one part of the brain usually depend on activities in other parts. The regions of the brain involved in the storage of memories also depend on the type of processing involved. For example, episodic memory appears to be con- trolled by different brain regions from those involved in learning and remember- ing skills (Gabrieli, 1998). It is also the case that when you remember, the regions of the brain that were activated during original learning are activated again. So, if you formed a visual image of an object when you first studied it, the visual areas of your brain will be reactivated when you retrieve it. If your original encoding was tinged with emotion, the areas of the brain that are involved in emotional processing will

be activated when you remember the event (Danker & Anderson, 2010). There is even some evidence suggest- ing that different brain regions may be involved in the remembering of true and false memories (Gutchess & Schacter, 2012).

Certain kinds of memory loss, such as those found in Alzheimer disease, have been linked to inadequate sup- plies of neurotransmitters in the brain (Francis et al., 2010). But damage to a part of the brain involved in the production of a neurotransmitter (such as acetylcholine) probably has consequences for all regions of the brain that depend on that neurotransmitter. This makes it very difficult to pinpoint where a memory is stored or even where the processing relevant to the storage of memories takes place. Modern technological advances are providing researchers with precise information about activity in the brain, but much remains to be learned about the physical basis of remembering.

This PET scan shows regions of brain activity during auditory stimulation. The arrows point to areas inside the temporal lobes that become active when words are heard; these same areas are thought to be associated with some kinds of memory.

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Psychology For a Reason: What Memory Is For | 267

test yourself Check your knowledge about forgetting and the updating of memory by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Forgetting is usually slow at first and becomes more rapid as time passes. True or False?

2. Most psychologists agree that interference rather than decay is primarily responsible for long-term forgetting. True or False?

3. Proactive interference occurs when what you learn at time 2 inter- feres with what you learned previously at time 1. True or False?

4. Anterograde amnesia blocks the learning of new information. True or False?

5. People recall more pleasant than unpleasant events over time. True or False?

6. Psychologists believe that the hippocampus is involved in some, but not all, instances of remembering. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.4

Time flows continuously, so experiences quickly leave the present and recede backward into the past. To understand the capacity to preserve and recover this past, we considered some of the important problems that our memory systems help us solve.

Remembering Over the Short Term To improve perception and aid comprehension, we have internal processes that help us remember over the short term. In the case of sensory mem- ory, we retain a relatively pure snapshot of the world, or replica of the environmental message. Sensory memories accurately represent the world as recorded by the senses, but they tend to be short lived, lasting on the order of a second or less. Short-term memory, in contrast, is the system used to store, think about, and reason with the message once it has undergone perceptual analysis. Items are typically main- tained in short-term memory in the form of an “inner voice,” and they’re forgotten rapidly in the absence of rehearsal. The capacity, or size, of short-term memory is determined by a trade-off between the factors that lead to forgetting over the short term (either decay or interference) and the time-limited process of rehearsal.

Storing Information for the Long Term To store information over the long term, you need to produce elaborate and dis- tinctive memory records. Focusing on the meaning of the input, relating to-be-remembered information to other things

in memory, and forming visual images of the input all lead to distinctive memory records. Forming a visual image is particularly effective, and many memory aids, or mnemonic devices, are based on the use of imagery. Long-term mem- ory also depends on how information is actually presented: Items presented near the beginning and end of a sequence are remembered well, as are items that have been repeated. Spaced or distributed practice turns out to be more effective than massed practice. Finally, practicing retrieval through self-testing is particularly effective in producing long-term retention.

Recovering Information From Cues Successful remembering depends critically on having the right kinds of retrieval cues. Most forms of forgetting are cue dependent, which means that stored information is not really “lost,” it simply can’t be accessed without the appropriate retrieval cues. Effective retrieval cues are generally those that match the conditions that were present during original learning. It’s also the case that when people recover information from cues, they rely on their general knowledge. The past is often reconstructed, and the reconstruction process leads to adaptive, but sometimes inaccurate, recollections of the past.

Updating Memory Forgetting is a useful process. If we didn’t constantly change and update our k nowledge about the world, our minds would be cluttered with useless

● Psychology For a reason What Memory Is For

268 | CHAPTER 8 Memory

facts, such as where the car was parked last Wednesday. Although the mechanisms of forgetting are still being investigated, it seems unlikely that long-term memories fade as a simple by-product of time. Rather, as we learn new things, previously learned material becomes harder to

access. New memories compete and interfere with recov- ery of the old. With the right k inds of cues, however—cues that discriminate one k ind of occurrence from another— previously forgotten material is refreshed and available for use once again.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

● Memory is defined as the capacity to (1) and (2) information.

Remembering Over the Short Term ● Both (3) and (4) sensory memory retain relatively (5) replicas of an incoming stimulus. With (6) memory, a visual memory or image is retained for about half a second, long enough to help process the incoming message. With (7) memory, a pure sound is held briefly in auditory memory and may help in language processing.

● We use (8) -term memory to store and think about information temporarily, usually as an “inner voice.” Information in short-term memory is quickly (9) if not rehearsed, because of (10) (passing time) or (11) (from the environment). Memory (12) is equal to the amount of information that can be (13) in about (14) seconds, usually seven plus or minus two items. Memory span can be increased through a method called (15) , which involves rearranging information into meaningful patterns. Some researchers have suggested that we have special systems in a “working” memory that handle spatial (visuospatial sketchpad) and verbal (phonological loop) information.

Storing Information for the Long Term ● We recall personal moments with (16) memory. (17) memories are of facts and knowledge about the world. Our knowledge of how to do things is stored in (18) memory.

● (19) has to do with making (20) among experiences, which allows for easier (21) of stored memories. It helps to think about the (22) of an experience, notice (23) , and notice similarities to and (24) from existing knowledge. You can also improve retention by forming mental (25) , by spacing your (26) , and by considering the (27) position of the material.

● Mnemonic devices, which include the method of (28) and the peg-(29) technique, are mental exercises that use visual imagery to help us remember.

Recovering Information From Cues ● Researchers believe that the amount of information that can be remembered or retrieved is dependent on (30) . Good retrieval cues usually (31) the way the information was encoded. The (32) -appropriate processing principle holds that we should study material with the same kinds of (33) processes that will be used during the (34) process.

● (35) are large clusters of related facts about people, activities, and places. Memory schemas are adaptive but can influence what is remembered and may lead to (36) memories.

● When we remember something without conscious awareness, it’s called (37) memory. Prior experience and stored memories may influence implicit memory. We use (38) memory when we make a conscious, deliberate effort to recall something.

Updating Memory ● Ebbinghaus found that (39) forgetting occurs soon after initial exposure to an experience, but (40) forgetting can continue for a long time. Forgetting can be extremely (41) , as it prevents our minds from becoming cluttered with useless information: We need to remember where we parked our car today, not yesterday.

● The simple passage of time (decay) isn’t sufficient to explain most aspects of forgetting. Equally important are (42) interference, in which (43) material interferes with the recovery of old memories, and (44) interference, in which (45) material interferes with the formation and recovery of new memories.

Interactive Summary | 269

● Freud believed that the mind may deliberately inhibit or (46) certain memories as a form of self-protection. Most researchers are undecided about the scientific (47) of this concept. We do sometimes forget traumatic events, but it’s not clear that this forgetting is due to special processes.

● Forgetting caused by a physical problem is called (48) . (49) amnesia is loss of memory for

events that happened (50) the accident or disease; (51) amnesia causes events that happened (52) the trauma to be forgotten. Although the (53) is important in forming new memories, no single structure is responsible for the complex processes of memory. Amnesia may be regulated by the amount or production of certain (54) .

amnesia, 265 anterograde amnesia, 265 chunking, 245 cued recall, 254 decay, 262 distinctiveness, 248 distributed practice, 250 echoic memory, 240 elaboration, 248 encoding, 237 episodic memory, 247 explicit memory, 259 flashbulb memories, 252

forgetting, 261 free recall, 254 iconic memory, 239 implicit memory, 259 long-term memory, 246 memory, 237 memory span, 243 method of loci, 250 mnemonic devices, 250 peg-word method, 251 primacy effect, 250 proactive interference, 263 procedural memory, 247

recency effect, 250 rehearsal, 242 repression, 263 retrieval, 237 retroactive interference, 263 retrograde amnesia, 265 schema, 256 semantic memory, 247 sensory memory, 239 short-term memory, 239 storage, 237 transfer-appropriate processing, 255 visual imagery, 249

Terms to Remember

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professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

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Media Resources

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9 Language and Thought

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Cognitive Processes For?

Communicating With Others Learning Goals The Structure of Language Language Comprehension Language Development Language in Nonhuman Species Is Language an Adaptation? Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.1

Classifying and Categorizing Learning Goals Defining Category Membership Do People Store Category Prototypes? The Hierarchical Structure of Categories

Decision-Making Heuristics Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.4

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Cognitive Processes Are For

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Where Do Categories Come From? Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.2

Solving Problems Learning Goals Representing Problem Information Developing Problem-Solving Strategies Reaching the Aha! Moment: Insight

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Having Difficulty? Take a Break!

Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.3

Making Decisions Learning Goals Framing Decision Alternatives Decision-Making Biases

271

Wayne Inges chuckles silently to himself as he completes the deal. “That’s right,” he says, “center court, floor level—$100 for the pair.” Having paid only $50 for the ticket pair himself, Wayne pockets a tidy little profit. But there are more fools in the world, so he decides to buy the tickets back for $150. With game time approaching, and desperation setting in, this time the pair sells for $200. Can you figure out Wayne’s total profit for the evening?

To find the answer, your mind begins an internal, goal-directed activity called thinking. In its simplest form, thinking involves the internal manipulation of knowledge and ideas. When we think, we act on our knowledge in a directed and purposeful way to solve problems, to reason and make decisions, and to understand and communicate with others. It’s not possible to measure thinking directly, but psychologists learn a lot by watching people think and then listening to their rationales for actions or conclusions.

Let’s see, Wayne made $50 on the first transaction but spent $150 to buy the tick- ets back, so he lost the original $50. He finally sold the pair for $200, so his total profit for the evening must be $50, right? Easy enough. We’ve used our knowledge about the world, and about mathematics in particular, to work systematically toward a goal. It’s easy to see the usefulness of the process. Thinking increases your ability to survive because you can act on your knowledge in precise, systematic, and purposeful ways.

But, as perhaps you guessed, our reasoning in this case is completely wrong. We arrived at the wrong answer, as do many others who try this task. Using a slight varia- tion of the same problem, Maier and Burke (1967) found that people come up with the correct answer less than 40% of the time. The correct answer is $100—Wayne paid out a total of $200 ($50 for the first transaction and $150 for the second) and received $300 back from the buyers. Simple subtraction yields the correct answer of $100.

Why the error? Well, the difficulty comes from thinking about Wayne’s sales as one continuous event rather than as two separate transactions. Try framing the prob- lem slightly differently: Wayne bought tickets for Friday night’s game for $50 and sold them for $100. Next, he bought tickets for Saturday’s game for $150 and sold them for $200. Under these conditions, people almost never make an error. One of the challenges of the modern study of thinking, and problem solving in particular, is to understand why human thought processes sometimes break down and lead to errors.

The topics we’re about to cover—language, forming categories, problem solving, reasoning—are examples of cognition, or reflect the action of cognitive processes. The term cognition refers simply to the activities that underlie all forms of thought. Psychologists

thinking The processes that underlie the mental manipulation of knowledge, usually in an attempt to reach a goal or solve a problem.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Cognitive Processes For?

272 | CHAPTER 9 Language and Thought

who study cognition are generally known as cognitive psychologists, but there is a more diverse field, called cognitive science, that draws on the work of professionals in many disciplines, including linguistics, philosophy, biology, computer science, and engineering. Engineers and computer scientists, for example, often attempt to simu- late reasoning and thought in computer programs (i.e., artificial intelligence).

The usefulness, or adaptive value, of cognition is obvious. As you’ll see shortly, our ability to think, reason, and communicate with others is what sets humans apart from other species. As before, we’ll tackle the chapter content by focusing on a set of specific tasks, or problems, that our cognitive processes help us solve.

Communicating With Others The ability to communicate, especially through writ- ten and spoken language, may well be our greatest success story. No other spe- cies on the planet can claim our knack for transmitting knowledge through speech and writing. Through language production we transmit thoughts, feelings, and needs to others; through language comprehension we learn and understand. We’ll discuss the basics of language, both production and compre- hension, and we’ll consider whether nonhuman animals, particularly other pri- mates, possess even the simplest form of language.

Classifying and Categorizing To make sense of our environment, especially the objects in it, we carve the world into meaningful chunks called categories. Can you imagine a world in which no two things shared features in common, where each encounter with a cat, or a bird, or a snake was a new and unique experi- ence? The ability to see similarities among things, to classify objects and events into meaningful categories, allows us to simplify our environment and make predictions about how to act. We’ll discuss how people define and structure cat- egories, and you’ll see there’s some “fuzziness” to the process.

Solving Problems Think about the dozens of practical problems you face and solve every day. Did you have trouble finding your keys this morning? Have a difficult time choosing what to wear or what to watch on TV? The adaptive value of problem solving should be obvious—if humans couldn’t solve the prob- lem of where to find food and water or how to woo and win the appropriate mate, our species would quickly follow a path to extinction. We’ll discuss the various steps involved in problem solving and some of the pitfalls to avoid.

Making Decisions Finally, when we make decisions, we’re required to choose from among a set of alternatives. An important ingredient of decision making is risk—choices have consequences, and an incorrect decision can lead to an unpleasant or even fatal outcome. Like problem solving, we use certain strat- egies to help us make decisions, and these strategies, although generally quite productive, sometimes lead to irrational conclusions.

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Communicating With Others LEARNING GOALS

● Understand the structure of language. ● Isolate the factors that contribute to language comprehension. ● Identify the major milestones of language development. ● Assess language in nonhuman species. ● Evaluate the possibility that language is an adaptation.

We begin our discussion of thinking, curiously enough, with an extended discus- sion of language. It might seem funny to lump language and thought together, but the two are closely linked: Language importantly influences the way we think. Remember from Chapter 8 how using the word smashed led people to recall things about a car accident that they didn’t when given the word contacted (e.g., broken glass)? Think about the words doctor and secretary—are you likely to picture a man and a woman, respectively? Do you think twice about a sentence such as “The secre- tary hates his boss”? It’s clear that language affects us in ways that extend well beyond simple communication.

According to the linguistic relativity hypothesis, language not only shapes how we think but also how we perceive the world (Whorf, 1956). For example, if your language lacks color terms to distinguish between blue and green, which is the case for some African languages, you might have a difficult time telling those colors apart on a color test. Cross-cultural tests have produced some sup- port for this idea: “What you see when you look at a rainbow actually depends on the language that you speak” (Özgen, 2004, p. 94). Your ability to pick visual targets out of a lineup, such as iden- tifying a cat in a lineup of dogs versus other cats, also depends on whether the stimuli are presented to the right or left hemisphere. When the stim- uli are presented to the left hemisphere, the side of the brain that usually controls language, the makeup of the lineup (other cats versus dogs) mat- ters more, presumably because language is influ- encing your visual ability (Gilbert et al., 2007).

Few psychologists believe that language com- pletely determines how we think or perceive. We all share certain cognitive abilities, those rooted in our evolutionary past, and those abilities are likely to remain intact regardless of language par- ticulars or environmental influences (Newcombe & Uttal, 2006). Language influences how we think and perceive the world, no question about it, but it doesn’t completely determine thought.

The Structure of Language What is language, and how should it be defined? If you think about it, birds commu- nicate effectively through the production of acoustic sequences (songs). Some believe that bees can convey information about the exact location of food through a tail- wagging dance (von Frisch, 1967, but see also Wenner, 1998). Even your dog barks at outdoor noises in what appears to be an effort to communicate. But to qualify as a true language, the communication system must have rules, known collectively as grammar, that enable the communicator to combine symbols to convey meaning.

Bees do a characteristic waggle dance that may communicate information about the location of nectar. But would you say bees have really developed language?

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grammar The rules of language that enable the communicator to combine symbols to convey meaning.

274 | CHAPTER 9 Language and Thought

Grammar provides rules about which combinations of sounds and words are per- missible and which are not. Grammar has three aspects: (1) phonology, the rules for combining sounds to make words; (2) syntax, the rules for combining words to make sentences; and (3) semantics, the rules used to communicate meaning. In English we would never say “The cautious the barked nasty at man poodle.” This particular com- bination of words violates a number of rules of syntax, such as the rule that articles (the) and adjectives (nasty) come before nouns (man). We would also never generate a sentence like “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” Although this is a well-struc- tured sentence, it suffers from a violation of semantics—it has no meaning. We use our knowledge about semantics to pick the appropriate words (perhaps “people” can sleep furiously, but “ideas” cannot) and to infer connections between words and other things in memory (cautious poodles bark at rather than bite nasty people).

Phonemes and Morphemes All human languages possess a hierarchical structure, which ranges from the fundamental sounds of speech to the more complex levels of spoken conversation. At the bottom of the spoken language hierarchy are phonemes, defined as the smallest significant sound units in speech. These speech sounds are produced through a complex coordination of the vocal cords, lungs, lips, tongue, and even the teeth. Table 9.1 lists some examples of phonemes in the English language. Notice there isn’t a simple relationship between a given letter of the alphabet and a phoneme. The letter e, for example, maps onto one kind of speech sound in the word head and a different kind in the word heat.

Babies greet the world with the ability to produce a large number of fundamental speech sounds, but they quickly restrict the number to a much smaller set (Werker & Tees, 1999). English speakers use only about 40 to 45 phonemes; other languages may use considerably more or fewer. Japanese speakers, for example, do not differentiate between the phonemes r and l in their native tongue (which makes it difficult for a native Japanese speaker to hear the difference between race and lace). English speakers do not meaningfully distinguish the p sound in pause from the p sound in camp. In Thai or Hindi, these same sound units carry unique and different meanings. Part of the trick to acquiring a foreign language is mastering the basic phonemes of that language.

At the next level in the hierarchy are morphemes—the smallest units of language that carry meaning. Morphemes usually consist of single words, such as cool or hip, but they can also be prefixes and suffixes. For instance, the word cool contains a single mor- pheme, whereas uncool contains two—the root word cool and the prefix un. The gram- mar of a language dictates the acceptable order of morphemes within a word—uncool has definite meaning in our language, coolun does not. The morpheme s, when placed at the end of a word (oars), designates plural. But the phoneme s, when placed at the begin- ning of that same word (soar), means something entirely different. All told, the average speaker of English knows and uses somewhere between 50,000 and 80,000 morphemes.

phonology Rules governing how sounds should be combined to make words in a language.

syntax Rules governing how words should be combined to form sentences.

semantics The rules used in language to communicate meaning.

phonemes The smallest significant sound units in speech.

morphemes The smallest units in a language that carry meaning.

● tABLE 9.1 Some Examples of English Phonemes

Symbol ExAmPlES Symbol ExAmPlES

b burger, rubble ng sting, ringer

ē easy, zombie oy coil, employ

ě enter, metric r rat, crust

f fungus, phone s stodgy, best

ı̆ icky, wig t tramp, missed

ı̄ ice, shy th that, other

k kitty, ache ŭ ugly, butter

n newt, annoy

Communicating With Others | 275

Words to Sentences At the higher levels of the language hierarchy are words, phrases, and sentences. Words combine to form phrases; phrases, in conjunction with other phrases, form sentences. To illustrate, the sentence “Stephanie kissed the crying boy” contains a noun (Stephanie) and a verb phrase (kissed the crying boy). The verb phrase contains a verb (kissed) and a noun phrase (the crying boy). Perhaps you can remember diagramming sentences in this way in your high school English class (see ●Figure 9.1). Breaking sentences into phrases has psychological meaning—we clearly use phrases when we generate spoken sentences. If I accurately time you speaking, for example, I’ll find that you pause for a moment at the boundaries between major phrases (Boomer, 1965). When you read a sentence, I’ll also find that there are measur- able changes in brain activity that correspond to phrase changes (Rösler et al., 1998).

Language researchers have spent decades trying to figure out the rules people use to combine words into phrases and phrases into sentences. It was once thought that a single set of rules might be discovered that would effectively capture all of the nuances of sentence generation—just apply the rules appropriately to words, and you’ve got language. However, as the linguist Noam Chomsky pointed out, it’s unlikely that such a set of rules exists. To bolster his argument, Chomsky came up with sentences such as “Visiting relatives can be a nuisance.” It’s easy to break this sentence down into its appropriate phrase structure, he argued, but the phrase struc- ture doesn’t tell us what the sentence actually means: Are we annoyed that the rela- tives are visiting, or is it a nuisance to visit relatives? Both meanings apply to the same phrase structure: Visiting relatives—pause—can be a nuisance. Hence, we can- not capture why or how sentences are generated during a meaningful conversation by appealing only to the phrase structure.

Surface and Deep Structure Chomsky (1957) recognized that there’s a difference between the “surface” structure of a sentence and its accompanying, more abstract, “deep” structure. The surface structure of a sentence corresponds to its superfi- cial appearance (the literal ordering of words), whereas deep structure refers to the underlying representation of meaning or the speaker’s intentions. Thus, two sen- tences can have the same surface structure but two different deep structures (the “visiting relatives” example). Or two different surface structures can arise from the

surface structure The literal ordering of words in a sentence.

deep structure The underlying representation of meaning in a sentence.

Stephanie kissed the crying boySentence

StephaniePhrases

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● FiGuRE 9.1 the units of Language Languages have a hierarchical structure that includes the fundamental sounds of speech and the more complex levels of spoken conversation. Complex rules determine how words are combined into phrases and sentences, and how fundamental speech sounds (phonemes) combine to create the smallest units of meaning (morphemes) and words. (© Cengage Learning)

276 | CHAPTER 9 Language and Thought

same deep structure (“Stephanie kissed the crying boy”—“The crying boy was kissed by Stephanie”).

Chomsky suggested that language production requires the transformation of deep structure into an acceptable surface structure (see ●Figure 9.2). Many language researchers accept this point, but there are sharp disagreements about how the trans- formation process actually works (Treiman et al., 2003). There are also disagreements about how best to think about deep structure. The particulars are complex and need not concern us here. The important point is that language is clearly more than sets of words or symbols organized in a fixed and rigid way. In the words of psycholo- gist Steven Pinker, there are “hundreds of millions of trillions of thinkable thoughts” (Pinker, 1997, p. 118), and each can, in principle, be expressed through language and understood. The challenge for language researchers is to discover how this flexibility ultimately comes about.

Language Comprehension The flip side of language production—that is, understanding the structure and rules of grammar—is language comprehension. How do people use their practical knowl- edge about the world, and the general context of the conversation, to decide what information another person is trying to communicate? This is not a trivial problem because language comprehension presents many difficulties: We don’t always hear sounds correctly; words can have many different meanings; the pitch or rhythm in which a phrase is spoken can help or mislead us; and language is full of metaphors that complicate the interpretation process (Lakoff, 1987; Pinker, 1994).

Effective communication seems to rely a great deal on common knowledge among speakers (Clark, 1992; Keysar et al., 1998). When you’re having a conversation with someone about a mutual friend, you can say “That’s typical for him,” and there’s likely to be no comprehension problem. You both know the statement refers to your friend, and you both have no trouble listing examples of your friend’s “typical” behavior. Similarly, when you hear a statement, you don’t simply process the sound

“Visiting relatives can be a nuisance.”

“Stephanie kissed the crying boy.”Surface

Structure

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Deep Structure

● FiGuRE 9.2 Surface Structure and Deep Structure The surface structure of a sentence is its appearance, the literal ordering of words. Deep structure is the meaning of the sentence. This figure shows how the same surface structure—“Visiting relatives can be a nuisance”—can reflect two different deep structures. Similarly, a single deep structure can be transformed into two or more acceptable surface structures. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Based on what you’ve learned about Chomsky’s work, why might it be difficult to program a computer to understand speech?

Communicating With Others | 277

arriving at your ears into words, phrase structures, and sentences. You make a guess about what the speaker is trying to communicate, perhaps even before he or she makes a sound, and then you use this expectation to interpret the sounds you hear. Thus, in an important sense, language comprehension shares properties with percep- tion: Both rely on a combination of top-down and bottom-up processing (McClelland & Elman, 1986).

Pragmatic Rules Language researchers use the term pragmatics to describe how practical knowledge can be used both to comprehend the intentions of speakers and to produce an effective response. Consider your response to an indirect request such as “Could you close the window?” If you process the request directly—that is, if you take its literal interpretation—you might respond, “Yes, I’m capable of putting enough steady pressure on the window to produce closure.” You have answered the question, but clearly you have violated some important pragmatic rules. The speaker was mak- ing a request, not asking you about your ability to perform the task. In fact, if you had answered the question in this way, the speaker would have probably inferred that you were using irony or sarcasm in your reply (Gibbs, 2012).

The pragmatics of language make the study of comprehension processes a chal- lenge. How you interpret someone’s words—be they babblings or profound com- mentary on the hypocrisy of our times—will depend on the shared context of the conversation, as well as on your expectations and beliefs. To facilitate effective commu- nication, good speakers usually follow pragmatic guidelines, or maxims (Grice, 1975):

1. Be informative. 2. Tell the truth. 3. Be relevant. 4. Be clear.

If you choose to answer an indirect request literally (“Yes, I can close the win- dow”), then you’re not being relevant—you’re violating an accepted guideline for communication. If you don’t tell the truth or are purposely vague in answering a request, then you’ll soon have trouble finding people who want to talk with you. By following the simple rules presented here and by assuming the same for your conver- sational partner, you can enhance the ease and flow of conversation.

Of course, the pragmatic guidelines listed above shouldn’t be taken as universal maxims for communication. What constitutes a polite conversation in one culture may be considered inappropriate in another. It’s also better at times to be indirect and even sarcastic when you speak (“Wow, you played well today!”) than direct and blunt (“What a horrible game you just played!”). Using sarcasm can elicit less negative emo- tional reactions from others and may even induce them to think more creatively in problem-solving situations (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011).

Language Development How does language develop? Are humans born with a genetic plan that directs and shapes their communication skills? Or do we acquire language exclusively from expe- rience? Not all people of the world speak the same language, so experience must cer- tainly play an important role. But many language researchers are convinced that babies arrive in the world prepared to learn language, much as they are born pre- pared to walk. There is a regularity to the development of language, as there is to the development of motor skills, that is difficult to explain by appealing only to the envi- ronment (Chomsky, 1986; Pinker, 1994).

The universality of language is apparent even at birth. Most babies cry in simi- lar ways, and they move quickly through vocalization milestones that precede formal language development. By 3 to 5 weeks of age, cooing—repeating vowel sounds like

pragmatics The practical knowledge used to comprehend the intentions of a speaker and to produce an effective response.

278 | CHAPTER 9 Language and Thought

“ooooh” and “aaaaah”—has been added to the baby’s vocalization patterns. Babbling—repeating consonant/ vowel combinations such as “kaka” or “baba”—begins in virtually all babies between the ages of 4 and 6 months. It doesn’t matter where you look in the world, this same sequence—crying then cooing then babbling—is found.

Between the ages of 6 and 18 months, experi- ence begins to play a role, shaping and fine-tuning the baby’s babblings into language-specific sounds. Babies begin to restrict their vocalizations to the phonemes in the language they hear every day from their par- ents or guardians; they even acquire a kind of lan- guage-specific “accent” by around 8 months of age (de Boysson-Bardies et al., 1984; Locke, 1994). Simple words—mama, dada, and so on—appear by the end of the first year, and by 24 months most babies have developed a vocabulary of perhaps 200 to 300 words. Language comprehension also develops rapidly dur- ing this period—in fact, infants develop the ability to understand the words and commands of language faster than they actually learn to produce language.

Child Speak As every parent knows, infants and young children develop rather sophisticated ways to communicate meaningfully, even though their language pro- duction skills may still be limited. An 18-month-old child can point to the bear-shaped jar on the counter and say “ookie” and Mom or Dad immediately knows what the child has in mind. An enormous amount of information can be packed into a single word, even if that word is spoken incorrectly, when its utterance is combined with a gesture or if the utterance occurs in the right context.

As the child approaches the end of his or her second year of life, a phase of tele- graphic speech begins. Telegraphic speech involves combining two words into simple sentences, such as “Daddy bad” or “Give cookie.” It’s called telegraphic speech because, as in a telegram, the child characteristically omits articles (the) and prepositions (at, in) from communications. But a 2-year-old’s first sentences reflect a rudimentary knowl- edge of syntax: Words are almost always spoken in the proper order. For example, a

Infants and small children develop rather sophisticated ways to communicate meaningfully—cooing, kicking, pointing, and so on—even though their overt language skills are limited.

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● CONCEPt REviEw Highlights in Language Development AGE lINGUISTIC HIGHlIGHT(S) INTERPRETATIoN

3–5 weeks Cooing, or the repetition of vowel sounds such as “oooh” and “aaah.”

Cooing is a vocalization milestone that occurs before formal lan- guage development; it is similar across cultures, highlighting the universality of language.

4–6 months Babbling, or the repetition of vowel-consonant combinations such as “kaka” or “baba.”

Babbling is a vocalization milestone that occurs before formal language development; it is similar across cultures, highlighting the universality of language.

6–18 months Vocalizations become specific to the native lan- guage; the first word is spoken by the end of the first year.

Experience plays a role in vocalization as a baby’s babblings are shaped into language-specific sounds. Language comprehension is rapidly developing.

24 months Vocabulary of at least 200 words; child shows telegraphic speech, grammatical two-word combinations.

Speech reflects knowledge of syntax, as words are almost always combined in the proper order.

Preschool years Ability to produce and comprehend sentences. Child is now showing most of the important features of adult syntax.

Communicating With Others | 279

child will reliably say “Want cookie” instead of “Cookie want.” During the rest of the child’s preschool years, up to around age 5 or 6, sentences become increasingly more complex, to the point where the average child of kindergarten age can produce and comprehend sentences that reveal most of the important features of adult syntax.

It’s of enormous interest to psychologists that children develop such sophisticated language skills during their preschool years. After all, few parents sit down with their children and teach them the rules of grammar (such as the differences between pres- ent and past tense). Moreover, as we discussed in Chapter 4, children at this age lack the ability to understand most abstract concepts, so they couldn’t consciously under- stand grammatical rules even if parents took the time to try. Children pick up their language skills implicitly; they automatically learn rules for language production.

The rules children learn during their preschool years are revealed partly by the errors they make. For example, at some point preschoolers acquire the rule “Add ed to the ends of verbs to make them past tense.” Interestingly, children tend to over-gener- alize this rule—they say things like “goed” or “falled,” which are incorrect in English but represent a correct application of the rule. Notice that goed is not something that the child could have learned to use directly from experience. No parent rewards a child for saying goed, nor does a child hear the word being used by his or her parents. Rather, the child appears to be naturally “tuned” to pick up communication rules and apply them generally—even if a rule sometimes leads to an incorrect utterance. This natural tendency to learn and apply rules is then shaped by experience as an adult or peer teaches the child that goed is incorrect.

Language development continues throughout the school years as children fine- tune their articulation skills and knowledge about grammar. Vocabulary expands, as does the child’s ability to communicate abstract concepts. Ultimately, the sophistica- tion of any child’s language ability will depend, at least in part, on his or her level of cognitive development. Children think differently as they age, and their increasingly sophisticated cognitive abilities are reflected in their conversations. Keep this fact in mind as we turn our attention to language abilities in nonhuman species.

Language in Nonhuman Species Psychologists have recognized for decades that nonhuman animals communicate. Anyone who has ever seen a cat indicate that it would rather be inside the house than outside knows this to be true. The question is whether such forms of communication can legitimately be called language. We know that animals sometimes express things symbolically, and there’s little doubt that an animal’s actions can convey meaning. But to qualify as a true language, the animals would need to possess at least a rudi- mentary form of grammar—that is, a set of rules for deciding how symbols can be combined to convey meaning.

Early attempts to foster language development in chimpanzees, in a form resem- bling human speech, were not very successful. Chimps were raised in homes, like surrogate children, in an effort to provide the ideal environment for language devel- opment. In one case, a chimp named Gua was raised along with the researchers’ son, Donald (Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933). Donald and Gua were exposed to the same experi- ences, and careful attention was paid to rewarding the appropriate vocalizations. But in the end, the Kelloggs had merely produced a fine-speaking son and an effectively mute chimp (legend has it that Donald also developed into an excellent tree-climber). Later efforts to teach chimps to speak yielded the same discouraging results (Hayes & Hayes, 1951).

Signs and Symbol Communication These early attempts were misguided, though, because chimps lack the necessary vocal equipment to produce the sounds required for human speech (Hayes, 1952). It’s like a bird trying to teach a human to fly by rais- ing a boy in a nest. Without wings, the boy just isn’t going to fly. For these reasons,

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

In normal conversation, how much meaning do you think is typically communicated nonverbally—such as through frowning or folding your arms?

280 | CHAPTER 9 Language and Thought

subsequent researchers turned to visual communication mediums. Allen Gardner and Beatrice Gardner tried to teach a simplified form of American Sign Language to a chimp named Washoe (Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Gardner et al., 1989). By the age of 4, Washoe was capable of producing about 160 appropriate signs, and apparently she understood a great deal more. Even more impressive was her ability to produce vari- ous word combinations, such as “more fruit” or “gimme tickle.”

In California, David Premack taught a chimp named Sarah to manipulate plas- tic shapes that symbolized words (e.g., a plastic triangle stood for the word banana). Sarah eventually was able to respond to simple symbol-based sentences that were arranged on a magnetic board (such as “Sarah insert banana into pail”; Premack, 1976). In Georgia, pigmy chimpanzees have been taught to communicate by press- ing keys that represent objects such as foods or toys (Rumbaugh, 1977; Savage- Rumbaugh et al., 1986). Again, not only have these chimps learned to associate particular symbols with words or actions, but they’ve shown the capacity to gener- ate combinations of words by pressing the symbols in sequence (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986).

Work in the Georgia laboratory has also shown that pygmy chimpanzees can understand some spoken English. A chimp named Kanzi can press the appropriate symbol key when a word is spoken (e.g., banana). He can also respond appropriately to a variety of spoken commands. When asked “Can you pour the ice water in the potty?” Kanzi picks up the bowl of ice water, heads to the potty, and carefully pours it in (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993). When asked to “Hide the toy gorilla,” Kanzi picks up the toy gorilla and attempts to push it under a fence. Kanzi can even per- form these tasks when the command is presented over headphones; this is impor- tant because it suggests that Kanzi is not simply responding to subtle cues from his handlers.

Is It Really Language? These are very impressive demonstrations and are quite con- vincing when you see them in person or on film. Kanzi even made an appearance on the Oprah Winfrey Show in 2010! But have chimps such as Kanzi really acquired language? The jury is still out. Some psychologists believe that the chimps’ behaviors

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Communicating With Others | 281

simply reflect reinforced learning—like a pigeon who has been taught to peck a key for food—rather than true language ability (Terrace, 1986). At the same time, chimps such as Washoe and Kanzi can apparently generate new combinations of words and respond to requests that have never been given before. Washoe, for example, learned to respond to environmental events by producing novel signs. On seeing a duck for the first time, she reportedly signed “water bird.” Moreover, it’s been shown that chimps can acquire these language skills through observing other chimps, without being trained directly (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986).

This debate is nowhere near a firm resolution. Much of the critical evidence (such as Washoe’s “water bird”) has come primarily from trainer anecdotes, so some ques- tion its scientific value (Wynne, 2007). It’s also possible that some of the novel com- binations generated by the chimps are simply imitations of their trainers. We just don’t know at this point. Most of the psychologists who work with chimps are firmly convinced that the language abilities are real. Kanzi, for example, doesn’t seem to fol- low rigid scripts—he can follow a request that is worded in various ways, which is far beyond what you would expect from a pigeon trained to peck a key.

As you think about this topic for yourself, it’s important to keep in mind that chimpanzees have not evolved to understand or produce human language. Chimps have evolved to solve their own problems—problems that arise from their own unique environments. You should avoid, where possible, adopting too egocentric a view of the world. The human mind has evolved to solve human problems, and those problems may or may not overlap with those of other members of the animal kingdom.

Is Language an Adaptation? Given that language may be a uniquely human characteristic, it’s reasonable to won- der why it developed: Why are humans capable of language but most other species are not? One possibility is that language is an adaptation—that is, it evolved specifi- cally as a result of natural selection. It’s easy to imagine how language might have given an extra advantage to those who possessed it, aiding everything from hunting and gathering to selecting and convincing a mate. Yet, as we’ve discussed in other chapters, it’s notoriously difficult to tell whether a psychological feature is truly an adaptation. It might be that we’re capable of language simply because at some point we evolved big and highly flexible brains.

Proponents of the “language as an adaptation” view (e.g., Pinker, 1994) point to several kinds of evidence: (1) Language is associated with particular regions of the brain (e.g., Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas); (2) children learn language incredibly quickly and, as noted earlier, aren’t taught the rules of language in any kind of sys- tematic fashion; (3) the human ear as well as the human vocal tract seem perfectly tai- lored to meet the needs of speech; (4) some people seem to inherit tendencies to make certain types of grammatical errors. Another consideration is that there doesn’t seem to be a simple relationship between the sophistication of a culture and the complex- ity of the language spoken; one might expect such a relationship if language develop- ment depended strongly on cultural or environmental factors.

Again, though, there are no fossil records to support the evolution of language as there are for certain physical characteristics (such as skull and therefore brain size). Moreover, language is unlikely to have emerged suddenly, in its present form, and some have argued that it’s not easy to see the adaptive advantages that would result from simple or intermediate forms of language (Rose & Rose, 2000). Many of the universal features that we see in language might also be caused by the way our per- ceptual systems develop and operate (Gogate & Hollich, 2010). Like many issues in modern evolutionary psychology, the question of how and why language emerged remains controversial ( Jackendoff & Pinker, 2005).

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test Yourself Check your knowledge about language by answering the following questions. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Choose the term that best fits the following descriptions. Choose your answers from the following: deep structure, morphemes, pragmatics, phonemes, phonology, semantics, surface structure, syntax.

a. The smallest significant sound units in speech:

b. The practical knowledge used to understand the intentions of a speaker and to produce an effective response:

c. The rules governing how words should be combined to form sentences:

d. The smallest units in language that carry meaning:

2. Decide whether each of the following statements about language is true or false.

a. Across the world babies cry, coo, and babble in similar ways. True or False?

b. Children learn the rules of language primarily by copying the words and phrases of their parents. True or False?

c. Telegraphic speech begins toward the end of the child’s second year of life. True or False?

d. Chimpanzees lack the vocal equipment needed to produce human speech. True or False?

e. Chimpanzee Kanzi learned to associate symbols with a variety of words but cannot follow spoken instructions from his trainers. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.1

Classifying and Categorizing LEARNING GOALS

● Understand how categories and category membership are defined. ● Distinguish between prototype and exemplar views of categorization. ● Explain the hierarchical organization of categories.

We now turn our attention to another useful cognitive process—the ability to classify and categorize objects. A category is a class of objects (people, places, or things) that most people agree belong together. “Vegetables” is a category that contains such things as peas, carrots, and Brussels sprouts; “psychologists” is a category that includes researchers, clinicians, and applied persons working in the field. Categories allow us to infer invisible properties about objects (Murphy, 2002). For example, a kite and a doll share important properties as children’s toys even though the two objects bear little physical similarity to each other. Once you’ve successfully categorized something, you can make predictions about the future. You know, for example, that if you’re offered a member of the category “ junk food,” it is likely to taste good but be generally bad for your health.

We’ll divide our discussion of classif ying and categorizing into three main topics. First, what properties of an object make it a member of a particular cat- egory? Second, in mak ing decisions about category membership, do we form and store abstract representations called prototypes? Finally, we’ll end the section by brief ly considering the structure of categories—are they general or highly specif ic?

category A class of objects (people, places, or things) that most people agree belong together.

People automatically classify objects, even other people, into well-defined categories. How would you categorize this individual, and what invisible properties would you infer about him? Can you predict how he might act in a social situation?

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Classifying and Categorizing | 283

Defining Category Membership Researchers have spent a lot of time trying to discover the criteria people use to define category membership. What is it about a sparrow that allows us to classify it so effortlessly as a bird? How do we know that a trout is a member of the category “fish” and not something to be used in the garden?

One possibility is that you can easily classify a sparrow as a “bird” because it has certain features that all members of that category share. For example, to be a member of the category “bird,” a creature might need to have feathers and be able to do things such as sing, fly, and build nests—these are called the necessary or defining features of the category “bird.” If the object has all the defining features, it must be an accept- able member of the category; if the object lacks one or more of these qualities, it must be something else (Medin, 1989). From this standpoint, knowing the right category label for an object is simply a matter of learning the right set of defining features (see ●Figure 9.3).

But there are problems with this view. It works well for mathematical categories such as “square” or “triangle,” but it breaks down for natural objects. Take the category “vehicle,” for example. What are the defining features of a vehicle—something that moves along the ground, has wheels, and can transport people? That applies to cars and trucks, but what about a surf board or a mono- rail train? Surf boards move through water; monorail trains don’t have wheels. What about an elevator, which doesn’t have wheels and doesn’t move along the ground? Research on natural categories such as birds, vehicles, furniture, and so on demonstrates that people have a tough time identifying and agreeing on just what makes up the acceptable defining features of a category (Malt & Smith, 1984; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).

Most natural categories turn out to have fuzzy boundaries. In ●Figure 9.4 you can see a series of objects that collectively tap the fuzzy boundary of the category “cup.” In an experiment by Labov (1973), people were required to name each of these objects. Labov discovered that as the object appeared wider, subjects were increas- ingly likely to dismiss the “cup” label and characterize the object as a “bowl.” But the crossover point was gradual rather than fixed. Even for the object labeled 4, a signifi- cant number of people remained convinced that the object was indeed a cup. Results like these suggest that category members have typical features that are characteristic of the category rather than fixed defining features.

defining features The set of features necessary to make objects acceptable members of a category.

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● FiGuRE 9.3 Defining Features of a Category One way to assign category membership is by defining features. For example, members of the generic category “bird” might be expected to fly regularly, sing, and lay eggs in nests. Unfortunately, people have a tough time identifying and agreeing on the defining features for most natural categories. All of the objects shown here are birds, but they don’t necessarily share the same properties. (Based on Smith, 1989)

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Although categories are usually adaptive, can you think of any instance in which categorizing an object or a person might not be adaptive? How about when you stereotype someone?

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Family Resemblance Another way to think about the idea of typical features is in terms of what Rosch and Mervis (1975) have called family resemblance. Members of the same category will share certain core features, but it isn’t necessary for each mem- ber to have them all. Within an extended family, for instance, there may be a char- acteristic drooping nose, close-set beady eyes, receding hairlines, and a prominent, cleft chin. Cousin Theodore may lack the cleft or the beady eyes, but he could still possess a family resemblance that allows outsiders to easily fit him into the appropri- ate family. For the category “vehicle,” people know that a monorail train doesn’t have wheels, and it’s not shaped anything like a car, but it moves people along the ground and in this sense fits the category label for most people.

Family resemblance is determined by the collection of core features that an object possesses. Again, members of the same category will share many family features, but it’s unlikely that any single member will have them all. If a given object has most of the family features, it will be seen as a good member of the category; if an object has only a few, it will be seen as a poor member of the category. A car, for example, has most of the basic features that people assign to the category “vehicle”; an elevator does not. A robin has most of the features of “bird”; an ostrich or a flamingo has few. Through the notion of family resemblance, we can begin to see how natural catego- ries achieve their fuzzy status. There is no absolute set of criteria for what constitutes a vehicle or a bird; there are only good and poor examples of a class of objects that share features (Rosch et al., 1976).

Do People Store Category Prototypes? Family resemblance, combined with the idea that there are good and poor members of a category, leads us naturally to the concept of a prototype. A prototype is the best or most representative member of a category: A robin, for example, is close to the prototype for the category “bird”; an apple resembles the prototype for “fruit.” Some psychologists believe that we store category prototypes in long-term memory and use them to help decide category membership. If an object, say a small fuzzy creature with a beak, is similar to the prototype for a certain category, “birds,” then we assume that the object must be a member of the prototype’s category (Goldstone & Kersten, 2003).

However, it isn’t necessary to store prototypes to solve categorization problems. Instead, we could simply store all of the category examples (or category exemplars) that we encounter. To decide whether a new object is a member of a specific category, we would then compare the object to all of these stored examples rather than to a sin- gle prototype. If the object is similar to many examples in a particular category, then we would categorize the object as a member of that category (see ●Figure 9.5). Here is the main difference between prototype and exemplar views of categorization: In pro- totype theory, you compare the object to one thing—the prototype; in the exemplar view, the object is compared to many things—the category exemplars.

family resemblance The core features that category members share; a given member of the category may have some but not necessarily all of these features.

prototype The best or most representative member of a category (such as robin for the category “bird”).

category exemplars Specific examples of category members that are stored in long- term memory.

1 2 3 4 5

● FiGuRE 9.4 Fuzzy Category Boundaries Are all of these objects members of the category “cup”? Labov (1973) discovered that as the width of the object increased, the more likely people were to label it as a “bowl.” But the cup category boundary was fuzzy rather than firm; a significant number of people remained convinced that the fourth object was indeed a cup. (Goldstein, B. (1994). Pschology. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Reprinted with permission by Bruce Goldstein.)

Does this elevator fit snugly into your category for “vehicle”? If so, what defining features does it share with other members of the category?

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If you wanted to decide whether your friend Bob fits the category “furniture,” do you think you would compare him to a prototype (such as a couch or a chair), or would you think about all the things that you’ve used as a “seat” in your lifetime?

Classifying and Categorizing | 285

Whether prototypes or exemplars are used in categorization is currently unknown, although many cognitive psychologists favor the exemplar view because people seem to know a lot about the individual members of a category (Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Shaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1992). For example, people seem to know which features go together—such as the fact that small birds are more likely to sing than large birds—and this kind of result is better handled by theories proposing that we store exemplars. Given the flexibility of the human mind, it seems likely that peo- ple can solve categorization problems in many different ways—and, it may depend on the type of category that we’re trying to learn (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Sometimes we may form prototypes; other times we may rely on rules for deciding category membership; and in many situations we may appeal only to category exemplars (e.g., Nosofsky & Little, 2010).

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● FiGuRE 9.5 Prototypes versus Exemplars How do we decide whether an object is a member of a particular category? According to prototype theory, we compare the object to the abstract “best” example of the category (a generic bird). If the new object is similar to the prototype, it is assigned to the prototype’s category. Exemplar theories of categorization propose instead that we compare the new object to all the individual examples of the category that have been stored in memory. Category membership is based on the summed similarity between the new object and the exemplars. (© Cengage Learning)

● CONCEPt REviEw Defining Category Membership VIEW oF CATEGoRIZATIoN bASIS oF CATEGoRIZATIoN ExAmPlE

Defining features Certain features are present that define membership in the category

Inez knows that a robin is a bird, because a robin has all of the features that define a bird, such as feathers, wings, and a beak.

Family resemblance The degree to which category members share certain core features; a prototype is the most representative member of a category.

James knows that a robin is a bird, because it shares common features with other members of the bird family. In fact, “robin” could be consid- ered the prototype for the category “bird.”

Exemplars All category examples (category examplars) that we encounter are used for categorization.

Semhar knows that a robin is a bird, because it matches so many of the examples of birds stored in her memory.

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The Hierarchical Structure of Categories Most objects fit nicely into more than one natural category. The reason, in part, is that virtually all categories have a built-in hierarchical structure—that is, there are catego- ries within categories within categories. Consider the class of “living things.” Under the umbrella of “living things,” we find the category “animals”; under “animals” there are “cats”; under “cats” there are “Siamese cats”; and so on. Most of the time an object, once it’s categorized, can easily be recategorized into other, more general levels. A cat is an animal, a living thing, an object found on the planet Earth, and so on. These lev- els differ from one another in terms of their degree of inclusion. The more general the level, the more inclusive it becomes—there are more examples of living things than animals and more cats than Siamese cats (Murphy & Lassaline, 1997).

Some levels in the category hierarchy also appear to have special properties— they are in a sense psychologically privileged. When we refer to an object during a normal conversation, we tend to use its basic-level category descriptor. Basic-level categories generate the most useful and predictive information. When a furry feline saunters by, you call it a cat, not a living thing or an object found on the planet Earth. The category “cat” provides just the right amount of relevant information. People know you’re talking about a four-legged object with fur (rather than the nondescrip- tive “animal”), but you haven’t burdened the conversation with a needless amount of detail (“There’s an 18-year-old seal-point Siamese that prefers salmon for dinner”).

Basic-level categories tend to be at the intermediate levels of the category hierar- chy (see ●Figure 9.6). The top-level categories, or superordinates, are simply not very descriptive. When people were asked to list the distinguishing features of top-level

categories (such as “living things”), Rosch and her colleagues found that only a few features were actually generated (try it yourself: list the properties that characterize “living things”). At the basic level, more properties were generated, and the generated properties tended to be ones that most members of the category share (Rosch et al., 1976). Basic-level categories are also the category levels first used by children. It is through basic-level categorization that we cut the world into its most informative slices.

Where Do Categories Come From? We’ve considered how useful it is to divide things in the world into cat- egories. Knowing an item is a “cat” means we can predict lots of things about it—it will meow, have lots of fur, eat fish, and it probably won’t like water. We’ve talked a little bit about how people might categorize objects—comparing an object to a prototype or a bunch of exemplars— but where do categories come from? Certainly learning and experience are important. We’re constantly using our experiences to learn about what things go together. A decade ago none of us had a category called “iPhone apps” but we do now. Categories can be unique to a particular culture, age group, or profession.

At the same time, it’s possible that certain categories are special, meaning that we will naturally group certain objects together regardless of our experience or the culture in which we’ve been raised. In Chapter 4 we discussed how children acquire certain kinds of core knowledge early in their development. For example, very young children seem to know the difference between animate (living) and inanimate (non- living) things. Children have fixed ideas about the category “living things” and can generate lots of predictions about how living things will act and develop (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Wellman, 2011). There is even evidence from neuroscience suggesting that specific areas of the brain may be naturally “tuned” to learn about living things (Mahon & Caramazza, 2009).

basic-level categories The level in a category hierarchy that provides the most useful and predictive information; the basic level usually resides at an intermediate level in a category hierarchy.

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● FiGuRE 9.6 Category Hierarchies Virtually all categories have a hierarchical structure—there are categories within categories within categories. Most things, like this cat, fit nicely into several natural category levels. But when people refer to something during normal conversation, they tend to use its intermediate, or basic-level, category label. They call this a “cat” rather than a “living thing,” an “animal,” or an “18-year-old Siamese cat who likes salmon.” (© Cengage Learning)

Solving Problems | 287

People across the world, in very diverse cultures, tend to think about biological categories—such as plants and animals—in the same special ways (Medin & Atran, 2004). These categories are universal, which suggests that we may be born with pre- dispositions to learn and think about their members. Of course, this makes sense from an evolutionary perspective. Being able to classify and make predictions about plants and animals is likely to have helped us survive long enough to reproduce. But as we’ve discussed previously, evolutionary accounts are quite difficult to confirm— sorry, there are no fossilized brains. Still, researchers continue to take evolutionary factors seriously in their accounts of how we think.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about how people form categories by answering the following questions. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. For each of the following statements, decide on the category term that seems most appropriate. Choose from the following: category exemplars, defining features, family resemblance, prototype.

a. It must be a bird because all birds have wings, feathers, and a beak.

b. It must be a bird because it looks like all the other birds that I’ve seen.

c. It must be a bird because it seems to have some features that are typical of birds.

d. It must be a bird because it looks a lot like a robin. 2. When people refer to an object, such as your pet, during normal

conversation, they tend to use what kind of category descriptor? a. Superordinate (“Look, it’s an object on the planet Earth.”) b. Basic level (“Look, it’s a cat.”) c. Subordinate (“Look, it’s a seal-point Siamese.”) d. Functionate (“Look, it’s something to cuddle.”)

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.2

Solving Problems LEARNING GOALS

● Distinguish between well- and ill-defined problems. ● Describe the pitfalls of problem representation. ● Compare algorithms and heuristics. ● Describe the Aha! moment in problem solving.

Now let’s consider some of the thought processes people use when they try to solve problems. Obviously, problem solving is an extremely adaptive skill. When you’re faced with a problem, such as finding a well-paying job, there’s a goal—gainful employment—and uncertainty about how to reach that goal. To study the solution process, psychologists often use problems like the following:

It’s early morning, still dark, and you’re trying to get dressed. Your 2-month- old baby, snuggled in her crib at the foot of the bed, sleeps peacefully after a night of sustained wailing. You can’t turn on the light—she’ll wake up for sure—but the black socks and the blue socks are mixed up in the drawer.

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Let’s see, you recall, I have five pairs of black socks and four pairs of blue socks. How many socks do I need to take out of the drawer to guarantee myself a pair of matching colors?

Notice there’s a goal (selecting a pair of matching socks), and it’s not immedi- ately obvious how to get from the problem to the solution. Psychologists call this a well-defined problem (even though you may have no idea how to solve it) because there is a well-stated goal, a clear starting point, and a relatively easy way to tell when a solution has been reached. Finding a decent job is also a well-defined prob- lem. Other kinds of problems do not have well-stated goals, clear starting points, or effective mechanisms for evaluating progress—these are called ill-defined problems. An example of an ill-defined problem might be discovering the secret of happiness. Maybe you can agree on the starting point (I’m not happy enough), but the goal ( happiness) is pretty tough to define, and it’s not at all clear how to reach that goal or how to measure progress.

Representing Problem Information To solve a problem quickly and correctly, regardless of whether it’s well defined or ill defined, you first need to represent the problem information in the right way. By problem representation, psychologists mean you need to understand exactly what infor- mation you have and how that information can potentially be used. Take the sock problem. The correct answer is three. There are only two colors, so with three sam- ples, you’ll get two that match. This is actually an easy problem, but most people fail to “see” it in the right way. Did you start worrying about the four to five ratio of blue to black? Did you briefly consider calculating some sort of probability? If you fail to detect which information is relevant and which is not, if you get hung up with ratios and probabilities and the like, this can be a very tough problem to solve. Let’s con- sider another example.

well-defined problem A problem with a well- stated goal, a clear starting point, and a relatively easy way to tell when a solution has been obtained.

ill-defined problem A problem, such as the search for “happiness,” that has no well- stated goal, no clear starting point, and no mechanism for evaluating progress.

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Solving Problems | 289

Frank Beach is a butcher who works in a specialty meat shop. He is 5 foot 8 inches tall, his waistline is 35 inches, and he is a stocky guy. What does he weigh?

The answer is—meat. He’s a butcher so he weighs meat. But, of course, your answer depends on how you interpret or represent the problem. If you tried to figure out Frank’s weight, in pounds, then your answer would be wrong. You haven’t repre- sented the problem in the necessary way.

Functional Fixedness People often allow their preconceptions to lock them into an incorrect view of problem information. Consider another example, illustrated in ●Figure 9.7, called the Maier two-string problem (after Maier, 1931). Imagine you’re standing in a room with two lightweight strings hanging from the ceiling. The strings are hung such a distance apart that, when holding one of the strings, you cannot reach the other. Using only a pair of pliers, which happens to be sitting on a table in the room, can you tie the strings together?

This is a reasonably difficult problem because most people have a certain established, or fixed, way of viewing the function of pliers. The solution is to tie the pliers to one of the strings and swing it, like a pendulum, while you hold onto the other string. The correct solution, however, requires you to restructure the way you normally think about pliers. Pliers are good for grabbing and holding, but in this case they can serve as pendulum weights too.

The term functional f ixedness refers to the tendency to see objects, and their functions, in certain f ixed and typical ways. Functional f ixedness can be an obstacle to problem solving because it often prevents you from recognizing the problem- solving tools that are present in the situation. Here’s another one: Try solving the problem illustrated in ●Figure 9.8. You enter a room in which a candle, a box of tacks, some matches, and a hammer lie on a table. You’re told to mount the candle on the wall so that it will still burn prop- erly, using only the objects on the table. Work on the problem for a while before reading on.

functional fixedness The tendency to see objects, and their functions, in certain fixed and typical ways.

● FiGuRE 9.7 the Maier two-String Problem Can you figure out a way to tie these two strings together? Notice there’s a pair of pliers on the table. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

● FiGuRE 9.8 the Duncker Candle Problem Using only the materials shown, figure out a way to mount the candle on the wall. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Okay: The correct solution is to dump the tacks out of the box, mount the box on the wall with one of the tacks, and then put the candle in the box (Duncker, 1945). The problem is difficult because most people see the box only as a device for holding the tacks, not as something that can potentially help solve the problem. They become fixed in their views about the functions of objects and thereby fail to identify and define all of the available problem information correctly. People are more likely to show functional fixedness if they are induced to think about the typical function of the object prior to problem presentation (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005); people are less likely to show the effect if they are encouraged to decompose the object into its com- ponent parts (e.g., the shape of the object and its materials) before they think about its possible uses (McCaffrey, 2012). Functional fixedness is a powerful phenomenon—the effect seems to occur throughout the world, even in cultures with little exposure to advanced technology (German & Barrett, 2005).

Developing Problem-Solving Strategies In addition to representing problem information correctly, you also need an arsenal of problem strategies—techniques that enable you to move systematically toward a prob- lem solution. Two classes of problem strategies can be used, algorithms and heuristics.

Algorithms For some well-defined problems you can use algorithms, which are step-by-step rules or procedures that guarantee a solution. You can use algorithms to solve simple math problems, for example, because there are fixed rules for addi- tion, subtraction, and so on. As long as you use the rules properly, you’ll always arrive at the correct solution. Solving anagrams, such as MBLOPRE, is another case in point. There are seven letters in the word, which means there are 5,040 pos- sible combinations of the letters. If you systematically work out each of the possible sequences, one will eventually provide a solution to the PROBLEM. But it could take a long time.

Computers are often programmed to use algorithms because computers are capable of examining lots of information very quickly. However, algorithms are not always practical strategies for problem solution, even for computers. Consider chess: In principle, it would be possible to use algorithms to play chess—the computer would simply need to consider all of the possible consequences of a particular move. But practically, computers can’t examine all the possible outcomes in a chess game; they can examine only some of them. Overall, there are some 1040 possible game sequences, so even if a computer could calculate a game in less than one- millionth of one-thousandth of a second, it would still require 1021 centuries to examine all the game possibilities (Best, 1989). It could do it; it would just take a very long time. Another problem with algorithms is that they work for only certain kinds of well- defined problems—there is no algorithm, for example, for deciding how to be happy or for deciding on an appropriate career.

Heuristics When it’s not possible to use an algorithm, or when one is not easy to use, people tend to use heuristics, which are problem-solving rules of thumb. To solve an anagram, especially one with seven letters, it’s not smart to use an algorith- mic approach, examining all 5,040 possible letter sequences. Instead, you turn to heu- ristics. You know that English words don’t usually begin with MB, or end with BL, so you can avoid checking out those possibilities. You can use what you know about English words to make guesses about the most likely solution. Heuristics are useful because they can lead to quick and accurate solutions. In natural environments, quick solutions can mean the difference between life and death. An organism can’t spend its time wrapped in thought, systematically working through a long list of solution

algorithms Step-by-step rules or procedures that, if applied correctly, guarantee a problem solution.

heuristics The rules of thumb we use to solve problems; heuristics can usually be applied quickly, but they do not guarantee that a solution will be found.

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possibilities. Instead, it’s adaptive for the organism to guess, as long as it’s a reason- able guess based on what it knows.

One common problem-solving heuristic is means–ends analysis, which attacks problems by devising means, or actions, that reduce the gap between the current starting point and the desired goals, or ends (Newell & Simon, 1972). Typically one applies this strategy by breaking down the problem into a series of more manage- able subgoals, where the appropriate means to an end are clear. Let’s assume that Peter, a normally nonachieving undergraduate, wants to start a relationship with Sonita, the brightest student in his psychology class. Obviously, asking Sonita out immediately is unlikely to succeed, so Peter breaks the problem down into more manageable parts.

First, he reasons, he’ll impress her in class by making an insightful comment dur- ing the lecture. He now has a new goal, acting intelligent in class, for which there is relatively straightforward means—he needs to study hard so he can master the mate- rial. Assuming he’s successful (everyone now thinks he’s an amazingly insightful young man), he devises a new subgoal: making some kind of personal contact with Sonita. Forming a small study group would be a good means to that end, he figures, so he approaches the recently impressed Sonita with the idea. Notice the key ingredi- ents of the problem-solving strategy: Establish where you are, figure out where you want to be, and then devise a means for effectively getting you from here to there. Often, as in Peter’s case, means–ends analysis is made more effective by working sys- tematically through subgoals.

Another effective heuristic is working backward—starting at the goal state and trying to move back toward the starting point. Suppose someone asked you to gen- erate a set of anagrams. How would you proceed? Would you try to generate sets of randomly arranged letters and then see whether a particular sequence forms a word? Of course not. You would start with the solution, the word, and work backward by mixing up the normal letter sequence.

Here’s another example: You’re working on a biology project tracking the growth of bacteria in a petri dish. You know this particular strain of bacteria doubles every 2 hours. After starting the experiment, you discover the petri dish is exactly full after 12 hours. After how many hours was the petri dish exactly half full? To solve this one, it’s better to work backward. If the dish is full after 12 hours, and it takes 2 hours for the bacteria to double, what did the dish look like after 10 hours? This turns out to be the answer, which is arrived at rather simply if the problem is attacked in reverse.

Another useful heuristic is searching for analogies. If you can see a resem- blance between the current problem and some task that you solved in the past, you can quickly obtain an acceptable solution. Imagine a man buys a horse for $60 and sells it for $70. Later, he buys the same horse back for $80 and sells it again for $90. How much money did the man make in the horse-trading business? The attentive reader will not miss this one. It’s a different version of the ticket scalping problem that opened this chapter. If you see the relationship between the two problems, you’re unlikely to commit the problem-solving mistakes you made before.

Mental Set Generally, to solve problems like these, you need to think in creative and novel ways. You may need to look at an everyday object in an unusual way (to break functional fixedness) or even stop using a problem-solving strategy that was successful in the past. Often people adopt mental sets, which are tendencies to rely on particular problem-solving strategies that were successful in the past. For example, military commanders lose battles because they rely on tried-and- true attack strategies that simply fail in their current environment. Likewise, your never-fail strategy for getting excellent grades in high school may no longer work in college. You need to formulate a new strategy that’s appropriate to the situation you’re in now.

means–ends analysis A problem-solving heuristic that involves devising actions, or means, that reduce the distance between the current starting point and the desired end (the goal state).

working backward A problem-solving heuristic that involves starting at the goal state and moving backward toward the starting point to see how the goal state can be reached.

searching for analogies A problem-solving heuristic that involves trying to find a connection between the current problem and some previous problem you have solved successfully.

mental set The tendency to rely on well- established strategies when attempting to solve problems.

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At first glance, concepts such as functional fixedness and mental sets don’t seem very adaptive—so why are they characteristics of how we solve problems? Wouldn’t it be better to consider all possible object uses, or all possible strategies? Actually, the answer is “No.” Most of the time, if you view objects in fixed ways or use fixed strategies that have worked well in the past, you’re likely to be successful. After all, pliers usually do solve problems having to do with holding and grabbing. Many of the problems we’ve dealt with here are actually quite artificial—they’re set up by psychologists in the hope that our “mistakes” will uncover normal problem-solving methods. The fact that we tend to rely on well-established habits of perception and thought is probably an effective overall problem-solving strategy.

Reaching the Aha! Moment: Insight Anyone who has struggled with problems of the type we’ve been considering knows there’s often a moment—an Aha! moment—when everything falls into place. The solution seems to pop magically into mind, a process that psychologists call insight. All the factors we’ve been considering, especially problem representation, play a role in achieving insight, but the process itself remains poorly understood. There’s some suggestion that the Aha! moment is correlated with solution activation in the right cerebral hemisphere (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003), and perhaps the hippocampus in particular ( Jing & Kazuhisa, 2003), but the brain areas involved probably depend on the type of problem being solved (Qui et al., 2010).

Insight has been important historically because it suggests that we often don’t solve problems through slow and steady trial-and-error learning. Aha! solutions seem to appear spontaneously, in an all-or-none fashion, rather than accumulat- ing slowly over trials. This point was first famously demonstrated in chimpanzees by the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler (1925). Köhler was marooned on the Canary Islands during World War I, and he used his free time to experiment with chimpanzees housed in a large outdoor pen. A variety of toys and tools were scat- tered about in the pen—sticks, boxes, poles, and so forth—which Köhler encour- aged the chimps to use in solving problems. For example, he would place food in the pen that was visible, but inaccessible (such as hanging from the ceiling), and record how the chimps managed to reach it. He noticed the chimps would often struggle, failing to get the food, but then suddenly, after seeming to reflect on the situation, they would creatively use a tool (or combination of tools) to secure the food. The solution process wasn’t slow, but sudden and reflective—the chimps seemed to display insight.

Psychologists have tried to study insight systematically in the laboratory, but it can be tough to re-create under controlled conditions. One common strategy is to present people with an insight problem, such as the nine-dot problem shown in ●Figure 9.9, and then affect solution probability by providing hints or other kinds of information. To solve the nine-dot problem, it’s necessary to connect all the dots with exactly four straight lines without lifting the pencil from the paper or retracing. This is an extremely difficult problem to solve, primarily because people are biased perceptually to perceive the nine dots as a square (Maier, 1930). (The solution, shown at the end of the chapter, requires you to break the good figure of the square, drawing outside of the imagined lines.) Researchers have been able to increase performance somewhat through strategy training, such as requiring people to learn visual configurations that resemble the final solution, but performance usually remains low (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004). Other researchers have attempted to get inside the problem-solver’s head—for example, by tracking eye movements or general brain activity during a solution attempt ( Jones, 2003; Lang et al., 2006)— but, unfortunately, the Aha! moment remains largely a mystery to researchers at this point.

insight The moment when a problem solution seems to pop suddenly into one’s mind.

● FiGuRE 9.9 the Nine-Dot Problem Try connecting all nine dots by drawing exactly four straight lines without lifting your pencil from the paper or retracing. (© Cengage Learning)

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test Yourself Check your knowledge about problem solving by answering the following questions. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.3

(continues)

Have you ever been frustrated with a problem and given up, only to find that the solution suddenly and mysteriously appears at a later time? Psychologists refer to this as an incuba- tion effect—sometimes we do better at solv- ing a problem when we stop working on it for a while. What accounts for this effect? Why should putting a problem aside increase the chances of reaching a solution?

One possibility is that our brain continues to work on the problem, even though our con- scious awareness is directed elsewhere. The problem is placed in the background where, over time, our unconscious mind churns out a solution. Unconscious processing probably does play some role in incubation effects, but it’s unlikely that the brain is still working on the problem in any kind of direct way (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). A more likely explanation is that the break simply stops you from thinking about the problem in the wrong way. When people have trouble solving a problem, they often continue with the same ineffective strat- egy, coming up with the same wrong answer again and again. You can get locked into a particular way of viewing the problem com- ponents and can’t break free. As you know, successful problem solving often requires thinking about the problem components in a novel and creative way. When you take a break and stop thinking about the problem, you’re able to approach it later in a fresh and new way. You may even forget about the inef- fective problem-solving strategies you used the first time around.

Another possibility is that during the break, while you’re doing something else, you will come across information that ultimately helps solve the problem. The additional activ- ity may provide clues or hints that lead to a problem breakthrough. Suppose you’re having a difficult time solving an anagram, such as THREAGUD. You stop working on it and turn on a television program that shows a happy Mom with her children, a boy and a girl,

playing nearby. That’s it, you shout—the solu- tion to the anagram is DAUGHTER! The new activity, watching television, provided the nec- essary clue to solve the problem. Regardless of the interpretation, it’s a good idea to take a break from time to time when you’re trying to solve a tough problem. A fresh mind can do wonders for seeing a problem in a new way or simply for renewing your enthusiasm for find- ing a solution.

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Having Difficulty? Take a Break!

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1. Decide whether each of the following problems is well defined or ill defined. Justify your answer.

a. Finding your way to a new restaurant in town: b. Receiving an A in your psychology course: c. Making your lab partner in chemistry fall madly in love with

you: d. Baking a cherry cheesecake that won’t taste like plumber’s

caulk:

2. Try to identify the problem-solving strategy at work in each of the following examples. Choose from the following terms: algo- rithm, means–ends analysis, working backward, searching for analogies.

a. On the final exam Myka looks for connections between the physics problem on the test and the ones he worked on while studying.

b. Rachel needs a three-letter word that begins with R to com- plete the crossword puzzle. She mindlessly considers all pos- sible two-letter combinations, placing them after R until she arrives at an acceptable word.

c. Hector really needs an A in his philosophy class, but he has no idea what it takes. He decides to concentrate on writing a really top-notch first paper.

d. Courtney needs to generate a set of anagrams for a school proj- ect. To generate each anagram, she starts with a word and then scrambles the letters.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.3 (Continued)

Making Decisions LEARNING GOALS

● Understand how “framing” alternatives influences decision making. ● Identify common decision-making biases. ● Describe the common decision-making heuristics. ● Evaluate the pros and cons of using heuristics.

Now let’s discuss decision making, which deals with how we evaluate and choose from among alternatives. Obviously, decision making and problem solving are closely related. When you make a decision, you’re confronted with a set of alternatives, and you must make a choice. The choice is almost always accompanied by risk, so it’s in your interest to evaluate and select among the alternatives with care. Think about the decision of the United States to invade Iraq, or the physician who must choose between risky treatments that may kill or save a patient. Like problem solving, deci- sion making is influenced by how you represent the alternatives in your mind, your personal biases, and by your choice of decision-making strategies. Let’s examine how each of these processes affects the choices we make.

Framing Decision Alternatives The way the alternatives are presented, called framing, can have a dramatic influence on what you decide. In a study by McNeil and colleagues (1982), hospital physicians were asked to choose between two forms of treatment for a patient with lung cancer: either a surgical operation on the lungs or a six-week treatment with radiation. Half of the physicians received the following information prior to making the choice:

Of 100 people having surgery, 10 will die during treatment, 32 will have died by one year, and 66 will have died by five years. Of 100 people having radia- tion therapy, none will die during treatment, 23 will have died by one year, and 78 will have died by five years.

Put yourself in the doctor’s shoes—which would you choose? The other half of the physicians were given the following:

Of 100 people having surgery, 90 will be alive immediately after the treatment, 68 will be alive after one year, and 34 will be alive after five years.

decision making The thought processes involved in evaluating and choosing from among a set of alternatives; it usually involves some kind of risk.

framing The way in which the alternatives in a decision-making situation are structured.

Making Decisions | 295

Of 100 people having radiation therapy, all will be alive immediately after treatment, 77 will be alive after one year, and 22 will be alive after five years.

Do you want to change your mind? Actually, exactly the same information is given in each of these scenarios. The only difference is the treatment outcomes are described, or framed, around who will die or who will survive; the consequences are exactly the same in each case. Believe it or not, the option that physicians choose depends dramatically on the framing: Radiation therapy is chosen 44% of the time when the outcomes are framed in terms of who will die and only 18% of the time when survival rates are given.

This example is unsettling, especially given the medical context, because it sug- gests that human decision making is not always a rational process. No one wants to think that doctors make life-or-death decisions based on how treatment options happen to be framed. Yet it’s not irrational for people to weigh information differ- ently in different situations (Kahneman et al., 1982). When the alternatives were death based, perhaps the doctors simply connected the deaths to the treatment (sur- gery will kill 10 people and radiation none). Alternatively, when the alternatives were framed around who lived, the focus might have been on long-term survival rather than on the hazards of treatment (34 people who receive surgery will be alive after five years, but only 22 radiation patients will survive that long). So you can’t assume the problem information was perceived in the same way in the two framings. You need to take into account how the problem was represented in the mind of the decision maker as well as the kinds of emotions the framing produced: 90% survival after one month sounds good, a 10% death rate sounds frightening (Kahneman, 2011).

Framing experiments have significant implications for everyday decision making. When you’re listening to a sales pitch, as you know, the salesperson typically focuses only on the gains: “Eighty-five percent of the people who bought this product report satisfaction after one year.” Well, that means that 15% of the customers didn’t report satisfaction—if the focus had been on the 15%, would you still be interested in the product? More ominously, think about how politicians or military leaders frame arguments for or against military intervention. Is the focus on saving lives through enhanced security or on the costs of lives lost? The answer is obvious, but tread carefully. How decision alternatives are framed can signifi- cantly affect the final judgment you reach.

Decision-Making Biases Our personal biases also influence our decision making, just as they do when we attempt to solve problems. For example, people show confirma- tion biases when they make decisions. In a nutshell, a confirmation bias is a tendency to seek out and use information that supports and confirms a prior decision or belief. If a therapist, for instance, believes that all instances of depression are caused by traumatic experiences in childhood (they’re not), a confirmation bias might lead the therapist to focus only on childhood troubles during the therapy session.

People also tend to remember information that confirms their preconceptions. When asked to read stories about the sexual activities of men and women, for exam- ple, people tend to remember more negative things about the women—even if each story contains an equal number of positive and negative statements about the char- acters. This occurs, presumably, because of the widespread societal belief, or sexual double standard, that it’s okay for men but not women to engage in sexual activity (Marks & Fraley, 2006). To avoid the confirmation bias, you should actively seek out disconfirming evidence; you should ask questions that allow you to reject or rule out one decision alternative over another.

confirmation bias The tendency to seek out and use information that supports and confirms a prior decision or belief.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think problem solving is a part of decision making, or is decision making a part of problem solving?

How doctors interpret and frame a patient’s treatment options can critically influence the decision-making process.

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Unfortunately, however, we’re also reluctant to believe disconfirming evidence when it occurs. People show belief persistence as well, which means we tend to cling to our initial beliefs even when evidence suggests our belief may be wrong. For exam- ple, the strong believer in ESP continues to assume it exists even though countless experiments have failed to support its existence. There is always a reason, or a ratio- nale, to hold onto the belief. In Chapter 13, which covers social psychology, we’ll dis- cuss in some detail decision-making biases that resemble belief persistence.

Decision-Making Heuristics When people are forced to choose from among a set of alternatives, most rely on heuristics, or rules of thumb, just as they do when solving problems. These strategies simplify the decision-making process and often lead to correct judgments, but they sometimes lead you to the wrong decision.

Representativeness Suppose you’re asked to judge the likelihood of some event fall- ing into class A or B. In such a case you might rely on a rule of thumb called the representativeness heuristic. You make your choice by deciding how “representa- tive” the event seems to the average, or prototypical, member of each class. It’s easiest to demonstrate with an example. Let’s assume your friends, the Renfields, have six children. If B denotes boy and G denotes girl, which of the following two birth order sequences do you think is more likely?

BBBGGG

BGGBGB

If you picked the second alternative, you’re like most people. According to the rules of probability, though, the two outcomes are equally likely. Whether your next child will be a boy or a girl doesn’t depend on the sex of your previous children— each event is independent of the others. Even so, people favor the second alterna- tive because the first sequence clashes with their worldview of randomness. The first sequence just doesn’t look like the outcome of a random process—it’s not representa- tive of what people think “randomness” looks like.

What if you flipped a coin six times and you got six heads? You’d probably think it was a crooked coin. Again, a sequence of six heads isn’t similar to, or representative of, what you think of as a random sequence. You have taken the outcome and compared it to some standard and made your decision accordingly. People often use the repre- sentativeness heuristic to make decisions in real-world settings. For example, clerks in stores use the products that a shopper buys as a way of judging age. If someone loads his or her shopping cart with products normally thought to be representative of an older consumer, the clerk’s estimate of the shopper’s age increases (McCall, 1994).

Using a heuristic such as representativeness is adaptive and beneficial most of the time but, as you’ve seen, it can lead to irrational decisions. Here’s another one: Imagine you’re leafing through a stack of questionnaires that have been filled out by some adult men. One of the respondents lists his height as 6 feet 5 inches, but his answers are so sloppily written that you can’t make out his circled profession—it’s either bank presi- dent or basketball player (NBA). You need to make a choice: Which is he? Most people choose NBA player because the applicant is tall and apparently not interested in care- ful writing (Beyth-Marom & Lichtenstein, 1984). This is not a very rational choice, however, because the odds of someone in the sample being a professional basketball player are extremely low—bank presidents outnumber NBA players by a wide margin (probably at least 50 to 1). In choosing basketball player, people have ignored the base rate, or how likely the event is to occur in the population being sampled.

The representativeness heuristic also dupes people into committing what is called the conjunction error. Consider the following: Linda is 31 years old, single, out- spoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply

belief persistence In decision making, the tendency to cling to initial beliefs when confronted with disconfirming evidence.

representativeness heuristic The tendency to make decisions based on an alternative’s similarity, or representativeness, in relation to an ideal. For example, people decide whether a sequence is random based on how irregular the sequence looks.

Making Decisions | 297

concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and participated in antinu- clear demonstrations. Which of the following alternatives is more likely?

1. Linda is a bank teller. 2. Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement.

In a study conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1983), 85% of the participants judged alternative 2 to be the more likely. Why? Because Linda’s description is more representative of someone active in the feminist movement than it is of a bank teller. But think about it—how can the odds of two things happening together be higher than the likelihood of any one of those events happening alone? Notice the second alternative is actually a subset of the first alternative and therefore cannot be more likely. Those who choose alternative 2 have acted illogically, at least from the stand- point of the rational decision maker.

Availability Sometimes we rely on memory to help us make our decisions. Estimate the likelihood that you’ll forget to turn off your alarm clock on Friday night. If you can easily remember lots of instances in which your Saturday morning sleep was interrupted by a blasting alarm, your estimate of forgetting is likely to be high. You have relied on your previous experiences—particularly those experiences that easily come to mind—as a basis for judging probability. This kind of judgment relies on an availability heuristic. Once again, it’s likely to be adaptive much of the time, but as with the representativeness heuristic, researchers can arrange situations that make this decision-making strategy look boneheaded.

Which do you think is more likely, an English word that begins with the letter K or an English word with K in the third position? By now you’re probably skepti- cal about your first choice, but most people think English words that begin with K are more likely (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In fact, English words with K in the third position are much more common (the ratio is about 3 to 1). Which do you think is more likely, someone dying from any kind of accident or someone dying from a stroke? Accidents, right? It’s not even close. More than twice as many people are likely to die from stroke than from any kind of accident (Slovic et al., 1982). People make the error because examples of the incorrect alternative are more likely to come to mind. It’s easier to think of an English word with K in the first position, and acciden- tal deaths get much more publicity than deaths due to stroke.

Anchoring and Adjustment Judgments are also influenced by starting points—that is, by any initial estimates you might be given. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked peo- ple to estimate the proportion of African countries belonging to the United Nations. Prior to answering, participants were given a number (between 0 and 100) and were asked to pick the correct proportion by moving up or down from this starting point. For example, you might be given the number 10 and asked to estimate the proportion using 10 as a base. For groups that received 10 and 65 as the initial starting points, the estimated proportion of African countries was 25% and 45%, respectively—a whop- ping difference. The judgments were clearly influenced by the initial estimates, or anchors, and people tended to stay relatively close to the starting points as they made their decisions.

In another experiment described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), one group of people was asked to estimate the product of the following numbers:

1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8

whereas a second group was asked to estimate the product of the same numbers pre- sented in reverse order:

8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1

The correct answer in both cases is 40,320. But the first group gave an aver- age estimate of 512, whereas the second group’s estimate averaged 2,250—quite a difference, given that it’s the same problem in both cases. In this example, the early

availability heuristic The tendency to base estimates on the ease with which examples come to mind.

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numbers in the sequence serve as the anchors leading to either low or more moder- ate estimates.

The use (and misuse) of anchors has lots of practical implications. If you’re negotiating to buy a house or a car, be careful about what the seller throws out as an initial offer. If the seller begins with an outrageously high offer, you’re more likely to use that price as an anchor and assume the item is worth more. Estimates given in fine-art auctions have been found to influence the first bids that are given by potential buyers. Stores have been able to increase sales by placing limits on the number of items that can be purchased. Telling people that they can buy only “12 bottles of this magical cleaner” increases people’s estimates of how many bot- tles they want to buy. Trial lawyers can potentially increase or decrease damage amounts by mentioning a ridiculously high or low initial amount to the deciding judge (Kahneman, 2011).

The Value of Heuristics What are we to make of such an imperfect decision maker? As psychologist Reid Hastie (1991) notes, the heuristic tool user described by Kahneman and Tversky is “an image of a decision maker of ‘small brain’ attempting to make do with a limited set of useful, imperfect, and not-too-demanding cognitive subroutines” (p. 136).

Imperfect though heuristics may be, there are several points worth making in their favor. First, heuristics are often surprisingly effective. In fact, in some cases heuristics can lead to more accurate decisions than so-called rational ways of deciding (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Second, heuristics are economical. Optimal, or rational, decision making can be a complex, time-consuming activ- ity. Strategies that lead to quick decisions with little cost are adaptive even if they sometimes lead to error. Third, to act optimally, you must have all the informa- tion needed to calculate a choice; unfortunately, you often don’t have all of this information. In these cases, heuristics become useful tools for pointing you in the right direction.

Moreover, as we discussed in the section on framing effects, the fact that people make errors in artificial laboratory situations is somewhat misleading. We can define what the rational decision might be, based on objective information, but people don’t

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Making Decisions | 299

● CONCEPt REviEw Decision-Making Heuristics HEURISTIC DESCRIPTIoN ExAmPlE

Representativeness We arrive at a decision by comparing the similarity of the object or event to the average member of each class.

Juan meets his new college roommate, Bryce, who is 6’10” and very athletic looking. Juan assumes that Bryce is a basketball player, probably on scholarship.

Availability We estimate the odds of some event occurring on the basis of how easily examples come to mind.

Stella reads so much in the newspaper about car accidents that she believes her chances of dying in a car accident are greater than her chances of dying from a stroke.

Anchoring and adjustment Judgments are influenced by initial estimates.

Stacey holds a garage sale and sells two big items early for a total of $150. Throughout the day, she overestimates how much she is making and in the end is disappointed by her actual profit.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about decision making by picking the term that best fits the following statements. Choose your answer from the following: availability heuristic, anchoring and adjustment heuristic, framing, representativeness heuristic. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Matt used to fly to visit his parents during the Thanksgiving break, but after seeing nonstop coverage of a gory plane acci- dent, he now chooses to drive.

2. Larry, a broker, used to tell people that his mutual fund lost money only 3 times in the past 10 years. Now he tells them that the fund has made money 7 of the past 10 years. He’s noticed a very marked improvement in overall sales of the fund.

3. Kelley sleeps until noon, she parties at night, and she carries around a big backpack the rest of the time. Her neighbor Eileen assumes that Kelley must be a college student.

4. Graham, who made lots of sales early in the morning, estimates that he and Leslie made $700 from their yard sale; Leslie, who had a big afternoon, puts the estimate at $300.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.4

always interpret the decision alternatives in the way the researcher intends. We all bring background knowledge to a situation that affects how we think and behave. In the “Linda is a bank teller” example, for instance, people know there are more bank tellers in the world than feminist bank tellers. People understand a great deal about the frequencies of events in the world—the mistake is made because they’re thinking about a single case, Linda, rather than about probabilities in general (Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer, 1996).

Just because you make decision errors doesn’t mean you’re using ineffective cog- nitive processes. Think back to Chapter 5 and our discussion of perceptual illusions. It’s easy to arrange situations in which you might see or hear things that aren’t really there, but your visual system is still highly adaptive. Just because your visual system can be tricked by an illusion doesn’t mean it’s a bad system. Similarly, when you make decisions, you’re relying on adaptive systems that serve you very well in the majority of situations (Gigerenzer, 1997; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).

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In this chapter we’ve discussed how people use mental or cognitive processes to communicate, categorize, find solu- tions to problems, and decide among alternatives. Each of these topics illustrates how we use cognitive processes, along with existing knowledge, to coexist successfully with our environment.

Communicating With Others To communicate effectively, humans have developed rules (grammar) for combining arbi- trary symbols in meaningful ways to express thoughts, feel- ings, and needs to others. A proper grammar consists of rules for combining sounds (phonology), rules for constructing sen- tences from words (syntax), and rules for meaning (semantics). To understand how language works, language research- ers believe it’s important to distinguish between the surface structure of a sentence—the literal ordering of words—and its deep structure, which represents the speaker’s intentions. To comprehend the communications of others, we rely on mutual knowledge, or pragmatics, to interpret statements or requests that may be riddled with ambiguity.

The sequence of language development turns out to be universal—it doesn’t matter where you look in the world, babies show similar milestones in language development. This finding has led many researchers to conclude that peo- ple are born ready to learn language just like they’re born ready to walk. The ability to produce written and spoken language enables people to gather and transmit knowledge in ways that seem to be one of the truly unique character- istics of the human species. Whether or not language is truly an adaptation (a product of natural selection) remains controversial.

Classifying and Categorizing When we categorize, or put objects into meaningful groups, we create a world that’s more sensible and predictable. Categories enable us to infer invisible properties about objects—if X is a member of category Y, then X will have at least some of the properties of category Y mem- bers. As a result, we can make accurate predictions about the things we encounter. How is category membership defined? Evidence suggests that people often rely on family resemblance. Members of the same category tend to share certain basic or core features. At the same time, categories are remarkably flex- ible; their boundaries are fuzzy, which allows us to classify

things even when those objects may not share all the typical features of the category members. Categories also have struc- tures that are hierarchical—there are categories within catego- ries within categories. An object that fits the category “Siamese cat” also fits the category “animal” or “living thing.” We most commonly assign objects to basic-level categories, which tend to be at intermediate levels of the hierarchy. Although many categories are learned through experience, such as iPhone apps, our brains may have been “tuned” by evolution to acquire cer- tain natural categories (e.g., plants, animals).

Solving Problems When faced with a problem, there is a goal, which may or may not be well defined, and it’s not immedi- ately obvious how to get from the problem to the solution. One of the common pitfalls in problem solving occurs when we allow preconceptions to influence how we represent problem information. For example, most people fall prey to functional fixedness, or the tendency to see objects and their functions in certain fixed ways. Algorithms are procedures that guarantee a solution, but they’re often time-consuming and can’t always be applied. Heuristics are problem-solving rules of thumb that can be applied quickly but don’t always lead to the correct solution. Examples of problem-solving heu- ristics include means–ends analysis, working backward, and searching for analogies. Psychologists are also very interested in insight—the Aha! moment that occurs when solutions sud- denly become available. Unfortunately, little is known about the psychological processes involved.

Making Decisions The study of decision making looks at how we evaluate and choose from among a set of alternatives. When we make decisions, we’re confronted with a set of alternatives and are required to make a choice. Choice in deci- sion making is almost always accompanied by risk, so it’s use- ful to evaluate and select among the alternatives with care. As with problem solving, decision making is influenced by how the alternatives are viewed or represented. For example, how alternatives are framed can affect the decision that is made. We commonly use a variety of decision heuristics, including representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjust- ment. These strategies may not always cause us to make the right decision, but they allow us to move quickly toward the goal and to use past experience.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Cognitive Processes Are For

Interactive Summary | 301

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Communicating With Others ● To qualify as language, a communication system must have (1) , which consists of (a) phonology, the rules for combining (2) to make words; (b) syntax, the rules for combining words to make (3) ; and (c) semantics, the rules for communicating (4) . Languages are hierarchical, ranging from (5) , the smallest significant sound units, and (6) , the smallest meaningful units, to words and sentences. Sentences have (7) structure, the literal ordering of words, and (8) structure, the underlying mean- ing; language production turns deep structure into an acceptable surface structure.

● Effective communication relies heavily on the speakers’ common (9) and a combination of bottom-up and (10) - processing. (11) refers to how we use (12) knowledge to comprehend what someone says and to respond effectively.

● The universality of language is apparent at birth. Crying, cooing, and babbling are important vocalization milestones. Simple words appear by the end of a child’s (13) year. By the age of 2, (14) speech begins: The child communicates without using articles (the) or prepositions (at, in), showing a elementary awareness of (15) . Children often (16) grammatical rules.

● Although the vocal (17) of chimps makes actual speech (18) , some have been taught to communicate with humans through signs and symbols, including American (19) Language. Researchers disagree about whether such achievements represent true (20) .

● Many psychologists assume that language is an (21) , which means it evolved as a result of natural selection. Language is associated with particular regions of the (22) ; children learn language incredibly quickly without specifically being taught the rules; the human (23) and vocal tract seem perfectly tailored to meet the needs of speech; and some people inherit tendencies to make certain types of (24) errors. Even so, the question of how and why language emerged remains controversial.

Classifying and Categorizing ● A (25) is a class of objects—people, places, or things—that belong together. To determine membership in a category, things are classified by their (26) features, which are shared by all (27) . (28) categories usually have (29) boundaries, which suggests that members have (30) rather than fixed features. Family (31) is determined by the collection of (32) features that an object possesses. Members of the same category will share many but not all family features.

● Category membership may be determined by compari- son to a (33) , the one best or most (34) member of a category. Alternatively, we may store category examples, or category (35) , of every category and assign category membership based on comparison to these instances.

● All categories are (36) . (37) level catego- ries generate the most useful and (38) information and are at (39) levels of the category hierarchy. (40) categories are at the top level and aren’t especially (41) .

Solving Problems ● A (42) problem has a well-stated goal, a clear start- ing point, and an easy way to tell when a solution has been reached. The goal and starting point of an (43) -defined problem aren’t (44) , and the problem lacks an effective mechanism for evaluating progress.

● To solve a problem quickly and (45) , you must represent, or understand, the information you have about the problem and how it can be used. Obstacles to problem representation include functional (46) , which is a tendency to see objects and their functions in fixed, typical ways.

● For certain types of well-defined problems we can use (47) , step-by-step procedures that guarantee a solution. When algorithms aren’t feasible, we can try problem-solving (48) , or rules of thumb. The three most common heuristics are (49) analysis, working (50) , and searching for (51) .

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People often adopt (52) sets, a tendency to rely on particular problem-solving strategies that were successful in the past.

● (53) is a process in which a solution seems to “magically” come to mind. The process has been studied in the lab but remains poorly understood.

Making Decisions ● Decisions can be dramatically influenced by (54) , the way alternatives are structured or presented, which in turn influences how the problem is (55) in the mind of the decision maker.

● The (56) bias is the tendency to seek out and use information that confirms a previous decision or long-standing (57) . We also tend to show belief (58) , clinging to our initial beliefs

even when confronted with evidence that counters them.

● When asked to judge the likelihood of an event belonging to a class, we often rely on the (59) heuristic, which means that we arrive at a decision by comparing the similarity of the object or event in question to the average or (60) member of each class. If we use the (61) heuristic, we base our estimates on the ease with which examples of the event come to mind. Our judg- ments are also influenced by starting points, or (62) , which are initial estimates we might be given. Though imperfect, heuristics are adaptive because they lead to (63) and effective decisions with little cost. Even when we don’t have all the important informa- tion about a problem, (64) still help point us in the right direction. However, using heuristics may sometimes lead to (65) in the decision-making process.

algorithms, 290 availability heuristic, 297 basic-level categories, 286 belief persistence, 296 category, 282 category exemplars, 284 confirmation bias, 295 decision making, 294 deep structure, 275 defining features, 283 family resemblance, 284

framing, 294 functional fixedness, 289 grammar, 273 heuristics, 290 ill-defined problem, 288 insight, 292 means–ends analysis, 291 mental set, 291 morphemes, 274 phonemes, 274 phonology, 274

pragmatics, 277 prototype, 284 representativeness

heuristic, 296 searching for analogies, 291 semantics, 274 surface structure, 275 syntax, 274 thinking, 271 well-defined problem, 288 working backward, 291

Terms to Remember

Media Resources | 303

Media Resources

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Solution to the nine-dot problem (see Figure 9.9).

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

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10 Intelligence

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Do Psychologists Study Intelligence?

Conceptualizing Intelligence Learning Goals Psychometrics: Measuring the Mind Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence Multiple Intelligences: Gardner’s Case

Study Approach Multiple Intelligences: Sternberg’s Triarchic

Theory Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.1

Measuring Individual Differences Learning Goals The Components of a Good Test

PSCYHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Psychologists Study Intelligence

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

IQ: The Intelligence Quotient Extremes of Intelligence The Validity of Intelligence Testing Individual Differences Related to Intelligence

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Can Mozart’s Music Make You Smarter?

Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.2

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence Learning Goals The Stability of IQ Nature: The Genetic Argument Nurture: The Environmental Argument The Interaction of Nature and Nurture Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.3

305

On a Saturday morning in October, Jefferson Tarpy drops down his yellow num-ber 2 pencil and glances about the room with a cocky grin. Around him, work- ing feverishly, sit dozens of others, similar in age and general appearance, but with pencils raised and sweat collecting on furrowed brows. Jefferson has finished early, as is his custom, and he’s just aced the most important standardized test of his life. Next stop: medical school, a top residency, a lifetime of security.

Meanwhile, outside in a park across the street, Larry Steinway has also dropped his yellow pencil. But he doesn’t notice. He’ll need to rely on his attendant to recover it. Although physically 22, Larry Steinway’s mind drifts in a world occupied by a 4-year-old’s thoughts and impulses. He uses language haltingly; his hopes for an elementary school education are limited. Still, he responds quickly when his atten- dant asks him to calculate the number of seconds elapsing in 65 years, 14 days, and 15 hours. His answer includes the correct number of leap years and arrives in slightly under a minute and a half.

Overhead, unknown to Larry Steinway, flies a single Clark’s nutcracker in search of a place to deposit his recently harvested supply of pine seeds. On this particu- lar trip, one of many over the past few months, the bird will store its 25,000th seed. Across miles of terrain lie thousands of secret caches, all attributable to this one bird, scattered among the storage locations of other nutcrackers. Over the coming winter months, this bird will successfully revisit its own hiding places, ignoring others, and recover some 80% of the hidden seeds.

Each of these sketches demonstrates behavior that might be characterized as intelligent. What do you think? Certainly we can agree that Jefferson Tarpy fits the description—ace performer on standardized tests, self-assured; he probably gets all A’s and is popular in school. But what about Larry Steinway—someone who is poor at language, who operates at a mental level far below his physical age? Definitely not intelligent, you say; but then how do you explain his extraordinary calculating skills? Isn’t “lightning calculation” an odd but nevertheless intelligent form of behav- ior? Finally, consider the nutcracker. It can’t do geometry or calculus, but could you remember where you put 25,000 seeds scattered across miles of confusing terrain? Don’t you think this remarkable ability to adapt to the harshness of winter is a prime example of intelligent behavior?

When psychologists talk about intelligence, they’re usually referring to individual differences among people—specifically, the differences people show in their ability to

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Do Psychologists Study Intelligence?

Most of us have no trouble accepting that Balamurati Krishna Ambati is “intelligent”—after all, at age 12 he was a third-year premed student at New York University.

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perform tasks. People clearly differ in ability, and the measurement of these dif- ferences is used to define the capacity called “intelligence.” Think about it: If everyone had the same ability to solve math problems or devise creative ideas, the label “intelligent” would be meaningless. Psychologists who study intelli- gence attempt to measure the differences among people and then determine how and why those differences occur. One of the important goals is to use individual differences to predict things such as job performance and success in school. In this chapter, we’ll focus on three fundamental problems facing the intelligence researcher: conceptualizing, measuring, and discovering the source of individual differences in intellectual ability.

Conceptualizing Intelligence Many people talk of intelligence as if it’s some “thing” that’s possessed by a person, such as blue eyes, long fingers, or a slightly crooked gait. Yet we can neither see intelligence nor measure it directly with a stick. Intelligence may not even be best viewed as a single capacity; it may be better seen as a collection of separate abilities. It’s possible that we have multiple intelligences ranging from the more traditional verbal and math skills to musi- cal ability, mechanical ability, or even athletic ability. We’ll discuss how psychol- ogists have attempted to conceptualize intelligence over the years and where the brunt of opinion lies today.

Measuring Individual Differences Regardless of how we may choose to conceptual- ize intelligence, there’s still the practical problem of measuring individual differ- ences. For any particular task, such as performing well in school, there will be a range of abilities. Some people will perform extremely well; others will strug- gle. If these abilities can be measured accurately, through the use of psychologi- cal tests, then it should be possible to tailor your activities to fit your skills. You can be advised not to enter cartography school if your spatial abilities are weak, or you can be steered toward a career as a writer or journalist if your verbal abil- ities are strong. We’ll discuss how intelligence is typically measured and some of the characteristics of effective tests.

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence Does intelligent behavior come primarily from your genetic background or from life experiences? People do differ in abil- ity, but it’s not immediately obvious whether these differences are largely inborn or due simply to one’s environmental history. Is poor map reading a permanent condition, resulting from a lack of the right kind of genes, or can a superior abil- ity to read maps be taught? Because of the wiring in my brain, am I doomed to forever have trouble fixing that leaky faucet in my kitchen, or can I be taught mechanical skills? We’ll discuss the origins of intelligence from the perspective of nature and nurture and address some of the controversies that still surround the study of individual differences.

intelligence An internal capacity or ability that accounts for individual differences in mental test performance and enables us to adapt to ever-changing environments.

Conceptualizing intelligence

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Conceptualizing Intelligence LEARNING GOALS

● Understand the psychometric approach to intelligence, including Spearman’s two-factor theory. ● Distinguish between fluid and crystallized intelligence. ● Evaluate the various theories of multiple intelligences.

When discussing intelligence, it makes sense to consider its adaptive characteristics. If you’re able to maneuver successfully through life, rising to the top of your profes- sion, then most would agree the label “intelligent” aptly describes your abilities. One way to think about intelligence, then, is in terms of your ability to solve the prob- lems that are unique to your environment. The fact that nutcrackers can efficiently hide and relocate thousands of seeds is certainly intelligent from the standpoint of adapting to the harshness of winter (Kamil & Balda, 1990). But conceptualizing intel- ligence simply in terms of adaptability does not tell us much about what accounts for individual differences. People (and nutcrackers) differ in their ability to fit success- fully into their environments, even when they’re faced with similar problems. We need to understand the factors that produce individual differences—remember, that’s the main focus of intelligence researchers. In this section of the chapter, we’ll con- sider several ways of generally conceptualizing intelligence.

Psychometrics: Measuring the Mind We begin with the psychometric approach, which proposes that intelligence is a men- tal capacity that can be understood by analyzing performance on mental tests. The word psychometric literally means “to measure the mind.” Intelligence is deter- mined by administering a variety of tests that measure specific mental skills, such as verbal comprehension, memory, or spatial ability. The results are then analyzed sta- tistically and conclusions are drawn about underlying mental abilities.

One of the first attempts to treat intelligence in this way was developed in the 19th century by Englishman Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911). Galton was a half-cousin of Charles Darwin, and like his famous relative, he was deeply committed to the idea of survival of the fittest. Galton (1869) believed individual differences in ability had their basis in heredity and could be measured through a series of tests of sen- sory discrimination and reaction time. For a small fee, visitors to Galton’s laboratory were given a variety of psychological and physical tests, measuring such things as visual acuity, grip strength, and reaction time to sounds. At the end of the test session, they were handed a card with a detailed record of their scores (Hilgard, 1987; Johnson et al., 1985).

Galton believed he was measuring intel- ligence with his set of tests. He based his belief partly on the fact that there often appeared to be relationships among the various scores received by a particular individual. If a person tended to score high on a certain test, such as sensory acu- ity, he or she tended to score high on other mea- sures as well. This pattern suggested to Galton that each of the separate tests might be tapping into some general ability—a general intelligence that contributed in some way to each of the dif- ferent measured skills.

As it turned out, Galton’s laboratory inves- tigations into the measurement of intelligence

psychometrics The use of psychological tests to measure the mind and mental processes.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Based on this discussion, how reasonable do you think it is to compare the intelligence of people from one culture to another?

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Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911) and his “anthropometric” laboratory, where he measured intellectual ability.

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were unsuccessful. His measurements were crude, and his tests were later shown to be poor predictors of actual intellectual performance, such as academic success (Wissler, 1901). For these and other reasons, his contributions are primarily of his- torical rather than scientific interest. But his methods captured the attention of other researchers, who went on to develop the psychometric approach in a more rigorous way. Among the more influential of those who carried on the Galton tradition was a mathematically inclined psychologist named Charles Spearman (1863–1945).

Spearman and Factor g Charles Spearman’s principal contribution was the develop- ment of a mathematical technique called factor analysis, which is a procedure for ana- lyzing the relationships, or correlations, among test scores. Its purpose is to isolate the various factors that can account for test performance. For example, as Galton suggested, it’s possible that each of us has a single underlying ability— intelligence—that helps to explain our performance on lots of mental tests. Alternatively, there could be multiple factors involved—we might be intelligent in one way, such as in an ability to remember, and not very intelligent in another, such as in mathematical problem solving. Spearman’s technique enabled researchers to study these possibilities in a systematic way.

To get an idea of how factor analysis works, think about star athletes who excel in several sports. It’s natural to assume that good athletes have general athletic ability that reveals itself in a number of ways. If you were to correlate performance across a variety of skills, you should be able to predict how well they’ll perform on one mea- sure of skill, given that you know how well they perform on others. Good athletes, for instance, should run fast, jump high, and have quick reflexes. Correlations exist because presumably an underlying ability—athletic skill—contributes to each of the individual performance measures. Similar logic applies to intelligence: Someone who is high (or low) in intelligence should perform well (or poorly) on many differ- ent kinds of ability tests. If there is general intelligence, you should be able to predict performance on one type of test (such as math) if you know how well the person per- forms on other tests (such as verbal comprehension or spatial ability).

When Spearman (1904) applied factor analysis to the testing of mental ability, he discovered evidence for general intellectual ability. A single factor in the analysis, which he called g (for general intelligence), helped to explain performance on a wide

variety of mental tests. Yet, he discovered that it wasn’t possible to explain individual test scores entirely by referring to g. The corre- lations among the test scores were high but not perfect. He found, for example, that someone who performed extremely well on a test of verbal comprehension did not necessarily excel on a test of spatial ability. He argued, therefore, that it’s necessary to take spe- cific abilities, which he called s (for specific intelligence), that are unique to each individual test into account (see ●Figure 10.1). To predict performance on a test of verbal comprehension, for exam- ple, you need a measure of ability that is specific to verbal com- prehension in addition to g.

Hierarchical Models of Intelligence As you might expect, Spearman’s two-factor analysis of intelligence was quite influ- ential in its time, and it remains influential today (Hunt, 2011). But over the years his conclusions were challenged, especially his concept of general intelligence or g. Psychologist L. L. Thurstone (1938) applied a somewhat different version of factor analysis, as well as a more extensive battery of tests, and discovered evidence for seven “primary mental abilities”: verbal comprehension, ver- bal fluency, numerical ability, spatial ability, memory, perceptual speed, and reasoning. Thurstone rejected Spearman’s notion of a single general intelligence, g. His analysis indicated that these seven primary abilities are largely independent—just because someone is good at verbal reasoning doesn’t mean he or she will

factor analysis A statistical procedure that groups together related items on tests by analyzing the correlations among test scores.

g (general intelligence) According to Spearman, a general factor, derived from factor analysis, that underlies or contributes to performance on a variety of mental tests.

s (specific intelligence) According to Spearman, a specific factor, derived from factor analysis, that is unique to a particular kind of test.

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● FiGuRE 10.1 Spearman’s General and Specific Factors Spearman discovered that to explain performance on a variety of mental tests it was necessary to consider (1) a common factor, called g for general intelligence, that contributes to performance on all of the tests, and (2) specific abilities—labeled here as sI through s 7 —that contribute uniquely to the particular tests. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

Conceptualizing Intelligence | 309

be good at memory or show perceptual speed. If performance on one type of test tells us little or nothing about performance on a second test, it’s unlikely that the two tests are measuring the same general underlying ability.

Psychologists have argued for decades about (a) the proper way to apply factor analysis, (b) the particular kinds of ability tests that should be used, and (c) whether single or multiple factors are needed to explain the test results. But the evidence for a central g is hard to dismiss completely, at least when intelligence is defined by perfor- mance on tests of mental ability. Different intelligence tests have been developed and virtually all these tests find evidence for general intelligence. Moreover, the measure- ments of g correlate very highly across the tests, even though they were developed in different ways (Deary, 2012). For this reason, most modern psychometric theories accept the concept of general intelligence. But g alone is not enough to explain per- formance. Psychologists commonly propose more of a hierarchical structure, such as that shown in ●Figure 10.2. General intelligence, g, occupies a position at the top of the hierarchy, and various subfactors (or abilities) that may or may not operate independently from one another sit at the lower levels. This represents a compro- mise of sorts between Thurstone’s view—that there is more than one primary mental ability—and Spearman’s concept of general intelligence or g.

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Deion Sanders performed at the highest levels in professional football and professional baseball. Do his skills support the existence of a factor tapping general athletic ability?

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

How well does the notion of general intelligence describe you? If you’re good at one subject, does that predict how well you do in others?

● FiGuRE 10.2 Hierarchical Models Many psychologists now propose hierarchical models of intelligence that include elements found in the theories of both Spearman and Thurstone. Like Thurstone, hierarchical models propose separate factors that contribute independently to certain types of tests (for example, factor 1 contributes to tests 1–3, but not to tests 4–9). Like Spearman, these models also assume that each of the separate factors is influenced by an overall g. (© Cengage Learning)

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Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence The evidence for general intelligence is compelling, but what kinds of cognitive abili- ties are involved? What features of the mind enable an individual to perform well across a wide range of tasks, from verbal ability to memory to reasoning? Raymond Cattell and John Horn have suggested that g contains two distinct components, fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1963, 1998; Horn & Cattell, 1966). Fluid intelligence is a measure of your ability to reason abstractly, especially in novel situations, in ways that are relatively uninfluenced by experience. It’s the type of intel- ligence that is probably determined primarily by biological or genetic factors, such as the speed of processing among the neurons in your brain (Deary, 2012). Crystallized intelligence measures acquired knowledge and ability. You learn things about the world, such as how to solve arithmetic problems, and develop abilities based on your level of schooling and other cultural influences.

In most cases, intelligent behavior relies on both fluid and crystallized intelli- gence. For example, as you know from earlier chapters, people differ in their abil- ity to perform several tasks at the same time. If I ask you to solve math problems while remembering a list of words, your ability to perform this dual task generally predicts how well you’ll do on a standard test of intelligence (Engle, 2000; Unsworth et al., 2009). It’s likely that you’re born with a certain amount of conscious capac- ity (or mental resources), which is linked to fluid intelligence, but your performance also depends on what you’ve learned from experience. If you’ve learned to chunk or rehearse effectively (see Chapter 8), then your performance on the dual task will improve. These acquired strategies reflect crystallized intelligence, which develops with experience.

The distinction between fluid and crystallized intelligence is important because it helps to explain how mental abilities change with age and across different cultures (Hunt, 2011; Salthouse, 2012). As you’ll see later in the chapter, fluid and crystallized intelligence should change in somewhat different ways as we age. There are also striking differences in performance on psychometric tests of mental ability across dif- ferent cultures and socioeconomic classes. These differences can’t be easily explained from the perspective of general intelligence, unless we assume that an important part of general intelligence is acquired from experience. Distinguishing between fluid and crystallized intelligence can help explain how people who are born with the same amount of natural (fluid) intelligence can end up performing quite differently on tests of mental ability.

Multiple Intelligences: Gardner’s Case Study Approach Let’s pause momentarily and return to Larry Steinway, that fictional lightning calcu- lator we met earlier. After reading the previous sections, what do you think psycholo- gists with a psychometric bent would have to say about Larry’s intelligence? How does someone with a highly specialized skill—lightning calculation—but with oth- erwise impaired mental abilities fit into these views of intelligence? In some respects Larry has a fast brain, but it’s highly doubtful he could read a map very well or solve a complicated analogy problem. We can be sure that Larry will not perform well on a standardized battery of tests, which means that his assigned value of g will be far lower than average.

Consider also the gifted athlete, who soars high above the basketball rim but has trouble reading his daughter’s nursery rhymes. Or the respected mathematical wizard, full professor at a major university, who has trouble matching her shoes, let alone her socks, in the morning. The point to be made about Larry Steinway, or the athlete, or the professor, is that people sometimes show specialized skills or abilities

fluid intelligence The natural ability to solve problems, reason, and remember; fluid intelligence is thought to be relatively uninfluenced by experience.

crystallized intelligence The knowledge and abilities acquired as a result of experience (as from schooling and cultural influences).

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Which do you think contributes the most to performance on an essay exam: fluid or crystallized intelligence?

Conceptualizing Intelligence | 311

that stand alone and are not representative of a general ability. Spectacular skill can be shown in one area accompanied by profound deficits in another. Perhaps more important, these selective skills are often in areas not traditionally covered by com- monly used intelligence tests.

Howard Gardner (1983, 1993) argues that traditional conceptions of intelligence need to be broadened to include special abilities or talents. He rejects the idea that intelligence can be adequately captured through the analysis of test performance (as used by the psychometric approach). Rather than searching for a single ability called intelligence, we should understand that human behavior is rich in selective tal- ents and abilities: We need a theory of multiple intelligences, not a method for dis- covering a single underlying g. An intelligence (rather than the intelligence) is defined as the ability to solve problems that matter in a specific cultural setting (Walters & Gardner, 1986). Although Gardner believes each of these separate intelligences may be rooted in the biology of the brain, each can be expressed in a variety of ways, depending on one’s culture. When average people around the world are asked to talk about their personal conceptions of intelligence, they almost always describe intelligence in terms of multiple factors or dimensions (Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998).

Rather than studying intelligent behavior in the laboratory, Gardner uses a case study approach. He studies reports of particular individuals with special abilities or talents, such as superior musicians, poets, or scientists. He’s also looked extensively at the effects of damage to the brain. He’s noted, for example, instances in which brain damage affects one kind of ability, such as reasoning and problem solving, yet leaves other abilities, such as musical skill, intact. Based on his research, Gardner (1999; Gardner & Moran, 2006) has identified what he believes to be at least eight distinct kinds of intelligence.

1. Musical intelligence: the type of ability displayed by gifted musicians or child prodigies

2. Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence: the type of ability shown by gifted athletes, dancers, or surgeons who have great control over body movements

3. Logical-mathematical intelligence: the type of ability displayed by superior scien- tists and logical problem solvers

4. Linguistic intelligence: the type of ability shown by great writers or poets who can express themselves verbally

5. Spatial intelligence: the type of ability shown by those with superior navigation skills or an ability to visualize spatial scenes

6. Interpersonal intelligence: the type of ability shown by those who can easily infer other people’s moods, temperaments, or intentions and motivations

7. Intrapersonal intelligence: the ability shown by someone who has great insight into his or her own feelings and emotions

8. Naturalist intelligence: the ability to observe and interact with diverse species in nature; the type of ability shown by a biologist or environmentalist

Notice that some forms of intelligence, as described by Gardner, are covered well by conventional tests of mental ability. Psychometric approaches focus extensively on logical- mathematical intelligence and to some extent on linguistic and spatial intelligence. Moreover, as discussed earlier, some researchers who use the psychometric approach, including Thurstone, have argued that it’s important to distinguish among distinct and independent types of intelligence. But researchers who conceptualize intelligence in this way rarely, if ever, concentrate on intelligences such as musical ability or great athletic skill. The multiple-intelligences approach considerably broadens the conceptualization of intelligence.

multiple intelligences The notion proposed by Howard Gardner that people possess a set of separate and independent “intelligences” ranging from musical to linguistic to interpersonal ability.

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The multiple intelligences approach also fits well with everyday views on intel- ligence. Most people readily accept the idea of multiple intelligences. Gardner’s the- ory has also had a large impact in educational settings. Many schools have designed educational programs around individual students’ strengths and weaknesses among the different measured intelligences (e.g., Denny, 2010). Similar approaches could be applied to assigned tasks and workloads in business and industry. Yet some crit- ics question how much scientific evidence actually supports the theory (Hunt, 2011). Few studies have rigorously evaluated the approach in educational settings; it is dif- ficult as well to define and translate Gardner’s intelligences into testable forms. But the majority of psychologists agree with Gardner that intelligence should be broadly conceived—it’s not simply performance on a battery of primarily verbal-linguistic or sensory tests.

Multiple Intelligences: Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory Robert Sternberg’s triarchic theory of intelligence also proposes that the study of intelligence can be expanded into more practical and applied domains. Sternberg was trained as a cognitive psychologist. As a result, he believes it’s important to understand the mental operations behind the planning and execution of specialized tasks. But he also believes any complete account of intelligence needs to address behavior outside of the laboratory. For example, what is the form of intelligence that enables people to think creatively about problems that arise in everyday life? Furthermore, how does intelligence relate to the practical experience of the individual? Consequently, he accepts the idea that there may be multiple kinds of intelligence. Triarchic means roughly “ruled by threes,” and not surprisingly, Sternberg’s conceptualization of intelligence is divided into three major parts (Sternberg, 1985, 1988b).

Analytical Intelligence Sternberg believes that any complete theory of intelligence must refer in some way to basic analytic skills. Some people are simply better than others at processing information. They’re good at representing (or seeing) problems in the right way and can generate effective strategies for solutions. People with lots of analytical intelligence tend to perform well on conventional tests that measure reason- ing and logical-mathematical ability (such as the SAT). Because most psychometric tests of intelligence require these kinds of abilities, people who are high in analytic intelligence tend to be assigned a high g, for general intelligence. If you know some- one who performs well in school or who claims to be highly intelligent based on a standardized test, he or she is likely to score high on analytic intelligence.

Creative Intelligence Sternberg proposes a second kind of intelligence, creative intelligence, that expresses how well people are able to create, invent, and discover. Performing well on a standardized intelligence test does not guarantee creativity or mean you can apply the skills you’ve mastered in a new way. The world is full of people who are good in school, or who perform well on standardized tests, but can’t seem to think their way out of a paper bag. They lack creativity and seem to have trouble applying what they’ve learned (Sternberg, 1985).

Practical Intelligence Finally, people differ in practical intelligence, a measure of how well people can take ideas and put them into everyday practice. People with practical intelligence solve problems that are uniquely posed by their cultural surroundings. They mold themselves well into existing settings, and they can select new environ- ments, if required, that provide a better fit for their talents. In a nutshell, these indi- viduals have “street smarts”—they size up situations well and act accordingly. You probably know someone who seems to lack analytic skills—who fails school or drops out—but still manages to succeed in life.

triarchic theory Robert Sternberg’s theory of intelligence; it proposes three types of intelligence: analytic, creative, and practical.

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Do you think the average person on the street believes superior artistic or athletic ability qualifies as a type of intelligence?

Conceptualizing Intelligence | 313

Sternberg’s triarchic theory has helped to broaden the concept of intelligence. Like Howard Gardner’s approach, his theory deals with behaviors and skills that aren’t normally covered by the standard psychometric approach. Triarchic theory, like Gardner’s theory, can be applied in classroom settings where particular types of intelligence can be nurtured and developed (Sternberg et al., 2006). Sternberg and his research teams have also conducted rigorous studies to validate his approach—in the laboratory, in classrooms, and in many different cultures (see Sternberg, 2011). Still, even if it is desirable to broaden our conceptualization of intelligence, that doesn’t mean that psychometric approaches to intelligence have no value. As you’ll see in the next section, psychometric tests are often useful in predicting future performance, even though they may be measuring only narrow dimensions of intelligence.

● CONCEPt REviEw Views of Intelligence APPROACH EXAMPLE(S) INTELLIGENCE IS. . .

Psychometric Spearman’s factor g Hierarchical models

A mental capacity that can be understood by analyzing performance on mental tests.

Biological Mental speed Fluid intelligence

Reflected in the speed of mental processing and in performance that is relatively uninfluenced by experience.

Environmental Acquired knowledge Crystallized Intelligence

Based on life experiences, such as schooling and cultural influences.

Multiple intelligence Gardner’s multiple intelligences

Eight proposed abilities that permit an individual to solve problems or fashion products that are of consequence in a particular setting.

Triarchic theory Analytic intelligence Creative intelligence Practical intelligence

The ability to process information analytically; the ability to cope with novel tasks; the ability to solve problems posed by unique cultural surroundings.

test Yourself For each of the following statements, pick the term that best describes the approach to conceptualizing intelligence. Choose your answers from the following: psychometric, multiple intelligences, triarchic theory. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Mitsuko has street smarts—she can mold herself successfully in any situation.

2. Jeremy flunks most of his classes, but he’s a brilliant pianist, so he considers himself to be highly intelligent.

3. Lucy has just finished an exhaustive battery of mental tests; she’s waiting to find out if she has a high g.

4. Natalie wants to understand the concept of intelligence, so she has signed up for a class on factor analysis.

5. Verne shows great insight into the feelings of others, which makes him score high on tests of interpersonal intelligence.

6. Shelia scored a perfect 4.0 GPA in high school but has trouble applying what she’s learned to new situations. She’s beginning to feel that she might not be so intelligent after all.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.1

314 | CHAPTER 10 Intelligence

Measuring Individual Differences LEARNING GOALS

● Understand the components of a good test. ● Describe and evaluate IQ. ● Define intellectual disability and giftedness. ● Assess the validity of IQ tests and the effects of labeling. ● Contrast creativity, emotional intelligence, and tacit knowledge.

We’ve now considered some of the ways psychologists try to conceptualize intel- ligence. However, we have yet to discuss how individual differences are actually measured. People differ. Pick just about any attribute—height, weight, friendli- ness, intelligence—and you’re going to find a scattering, or range, of individual val- ues. Some people are tall, some are short; some people are friendly, some are not. As discussed in the previous section, the study of individual differences is important because many psychological concepts, including intelligence and personality, are defined and measured by individual differences.

If we can measure how you compare to others on a psychological dimension, we can then assess your current and future capabilities. For example, achievement tests measure your current knowledge or competence in a particular subject (such as math or reading). Researchers or teachers can use the results of an achievement test to assess the effectiveness of a learning procedure or a curriculum in a school. We can also use individual differences to make predictions about the future, such as how well you can be expected to do in your chosen profession or whether you’re likely to succeed in college. Aptitude tests measure the ability to learn in a particular area, to acquire the knowledge needed for success in a given domain. Aptitude test results can be used to help choose a career path or even to decide whether to take up something as a hobby, such as car mechanics or the violin.

The Components of a Good Test What are the characteristics of a “good” test—that is, a test that can be expected to provide a good measure of individual differences? Given the need to measure these differences, it’s crucial that the measurement device provide information that is scien- tifically useful. Researchers generally agree on the three characteristics needed for a good test: reliability, validity, and standardization. Please note that these are character- istics of the test, not of the person taking the test.

Reliability The first test characteristic, reliability, is a measure of the consistency of the test results. Reliable tests produce similar scores from one administration to the next. Suppose we want to measure creativity, and we design a test that pro- duces a score from 0 to 100 on a creativity scale. We measure Alan, and he gets a score of 13; we measure Cynthia, and she tops out at 96. Clearly, we conclude, Cynthia is more creative than Alan. But is she really? To be sure about the results, we administer the test again and find that the scores reverse. Sadly, our creativity test lacks reliability—it doesn’t produce consistent scores from one administration to the next.

It’s important for a test to be reliable so we can draw firm conclusions from the results. Cynthia might be more creative than Alan, but the difference in scores could also be due to an artifact, or failing, of the test. On this particular administra- tion Cynthia scored higher, but that’s no guarantee tomorrow’s results will produce the same conclusion. One way to measure a test’s reliability is to give it to the same group of individuals on two separate occasions. Test-retest reliability is then calculated

achievement tests Psychological tests that measure your current level of knowledge or competence in a particular subject.

aptitude tests Psychological tests that measure your ability to learn or acquire knowledge in a particular subject.

reliability A measure of the consistency of test results; reliable tests produce similar scores or indices from one administration to the next.

Measuring Individual Differences | 315

by comparing the scores across the repeated administrations. Often, a correlation coefficient is computed that indicates how well performance on the second test can be predicted from performance on the first. The closer the test-retest correlation comes to a perfect +1.00, the higher the reliability of the test.

Validity The second test characteristic, validity, tells us how well a test measures what it’s supposed to measure. A test can yield reliable data—consistent results across repeated administrations—yet not truly measure the psychological characteristic of interest. If a test of creativity is based on the measurement of shoe size, then the data are likely to be reliable but not valid. Shoe size isn’t going to change much from one measurement to the next, but it has little to do with creativity.

Actually, there are several different forms of validity, three of which we discuss here. Content validity measures whether the content of a test samples broadly across the domain of interest. If you’re trying to get a general measure of creativity, your test should not be limited to one kind of creativity, such as artistic creativity. For the test to have a high degree of content validity, it should probably measure artistic, ver- bal, mechanical, mathematical, and other kinds of creativity.

Sometimes psychologists are interested in designing a test that predicts some future outcome, such as job performance or success in school. For a test to have pre- dictive validity, it must predict this outcome adequately. The SAT is a well-known case in point. The SAT is designed to predict success in college. So to assess its predictive validity, we need to ask whether the SAT predicts college performance as expressed through a measure such as college grade point average. Various studies have shown that the correlation between SAT scores and the grade point averages of college fresh- men is somewhere around +0.50 (Kuncel & Hezlett, 2010). Statistically, this means that we can predict college performance with the SAT to some degree, but our pre- dictive abilities are not perfect.

A third kind of validity, construct validity, measures how well a test applies to a particular theoretical construct. Suppose we have a theory of creativity that’s devel- oped well enough to generate a wide variety of predictions—how creative people act, the kinds of books they read, their susceptibility to mental disorders, and so on. To have high construct validity, our test must predict performance on each of these separate indices of creativity, rather than on just one. If a test has high con- struct validity, its scores tend to vary in ways that are predicted by the theory. So if the theory predicts that creative people are more likely to suffer from depression, then people who score high on the creativity test should have a greater likelihood of depression.

Standardization The third general characteristic of a good test of individual differences is standardization. When you take a test such as the SAT, or any national aptitude or achievement test, you quickly learn that the testing procedures are extremely rigid. You can break the test seal only at a certain time, the instructions are spoken in a monotone by a very serious administrator, and your yellow number 2 pencil must be put down at an exact tick of the clock. These tests are standardized, which means the testing, scoring, and interpretation procedures remain the same across all administrations of the test. Standardization is important because it guaran- tees that all test takers will be treated the same.

In fact, the proper interpretation of a test score absolutely demands standardiza- tion. Remember, we’re concerned with individual differences—it doesn’t make much sense to compare two or more scores if different instructions or scoring procedures have been used across the test sessions. A person’s score on a test of individual differ- ences can be understood only with respect to a reference group, often called a norm group, and everyone within the group must receive the same test and administration procedures. We’ll return to this notion of a norm reference group momentarily when we consider the concept of the IQ.

validity An assessment of how well a test measures what it is supposed to measure.

standardization Keeping the testing, scoring, and interpretation procedures similar across all administrations of a test.

Students regularly take standardized tests that measure achievement or aptitude.

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Pick one of your classes in school. Do you think the tests that you’ve taken so far have been valid? What specific kind of validity are you using as a basis for your answer?

316 | CHAPTER 10 Intelligence

IQ: The Intelligence Quotient The most famous index of intelligence is the IQ, or intelligence quotient. The IQ score comes from performance on a test, and it may well be the most widely applied psychological measure in the world. Yet how can a single number be used to measure intelligence?

This might strike you as odd given our earlier discussion about multiple intel- ligences and the need to establish a wide variety of criteria for what it means to be intelligent. The key to appreciating the IQ, and to understanding why it is so widely applied, is in the concept of validity: What is the IQ designed to measure, and how successfully does it achieve its goal? It turns out that IQ does a reasonably good job of predicting what it was designed to predict.

The intelligence quotient traces back about a hundred years to the work of the French psychologist Alfred Binet and his associate Théodore Simon. In 1904 Binet and Simon were commissioned by the French government to develop a test that would identify children who were considered “dull”—specifically, children who would have a difficult time grasping concepts in school. It was the French govern- ment’s intention to help these children, once they were identified, through special schooling. The mission of the test was primarily practical, not theoretical; the charge was to develop a test that would accurately measure individual differences in future academic performance.

Mental Age Not surprisingly, Binet and Simon designed their test to measure the skills that are needed in school—such as memory, reasoning, and verbal comprehen- sion. The goal was to determine the mental age—or what Binet and Simon called the mental level—of the child, which was defined as the chronological age that best fit the child’s current level of intellectual performance. Mental age is typically calculated by comparing a child’s test score with the average scores for different age groups. For example, let’s suppose that an average 8-year-old is able to compare two objects from memory, recognize parts of a picture that are missing, count backward from 20 to 0, and give the correct day and time. An average 12-year-old might be able to define abstract words, name 60 words in 3 minutes, and discover the meaning of a scrambled sentence. If Jenny, who is 8, is able to solve the problems of the typical 12-year-old, she would be assigned a mental age of 12.

mental age The chronological age that best fits a child’s level of performance on a test of mental ability.

● CONCEPt REviEw Components of a Good Test COMPONENT DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE

Reliability Consistency of test results Taking a test twice should yield similar scores each time.

Validity Does the test measure what it’s supposed to?

Among several measures of validity are the content, predictive, and construct measures.

–Content —The degree to which a test samples broadly across the domain of interest

The items on a test of creativity should cover different types of creativity, such as artistic, mathematical, and verbal.

–Predictive —The degree to which a test predicts some future outcome

Performance on the American College Test (ACT) should correlate with later performance in college classes.

–Construct —The degree to which a test taps into a particular theoretical construct

Performance on a creativity test should correlate with other characteristics or indices thought to be associated with creativity.

Standardization Testing, scoring, and interpretation procedures are the same across all administrations of the test.

Everyone who takes the SAT receives the same instructions, and has to complete the test within the same specified period of time.

Alfred Binet was commissioned by the French government to develop a test that would help teachers identify students who might have a difficult time grasping academic concepts.

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Measuring Individual Differences | 317

Notice that mental age and chronological age do not have to be the same, although they will be on average (an average 8-year-old should solve problems at the average 8-year-old level). Because intelligence tests are given to lots of children, it’s possible to determine average performance for a given age group and then to deter- mine the appropriate mental age for a particular child. By using mental age, Binet and Simon (1916/1973) were able to identify the slow and quick learners and to recom- mend appropriate curriculum adjustments.

In the first two decades of the 20th century, Binet and Simon’s intelligence test was revised several times and was ultimately translated into English for use in North America. The most popular American version was developed by psychologist Lewis Terman at Stanford University; this test later became known as the Stanford-Binet test of intelligence. It was also Terman who popularized the idea of an intelligence quotient (based on an idea originally proposed by German psychologist William Stern), which is defined as follows:

Intelligence quotient (IQ) = Mental age/Chronological age × 100

The IQ is a useful measure because it establishes an easy-to-understand base- line for “average” intelligence—people of average intelligence will have an IQ of 100 because their mental age will always be equal to their chronological age. People with IQs greater than 100 will be above average in intelligence; those below 100 will be below average in intelligence.

Deviation IQ Defining IQ simply in terms of the ratio of mental age to chronological age has some problems. For one thing, it’s hard to compare the meaning of the ratio across different ages. If a 5-year-old performed like a 7-year-old, she would be given an IQ of 140 (7/5 × 100 = 140). But if a 10-year-old scored at the level of a 12-year-old, his IQ would be only 120 (12/10 × 100 = 120). Both are performing at levels 2 years above their chronological age, but they receive very different IQs. Moreover, how much sense does it make to argue that a 30-year-old who performs comparably to a 60-year-old should be given a vastly higher IQ (60/30 × 100 = 200)?

To overcome this problem, most modern intelligence tests retain the term IQ but define it in terms of a deviation, or difference, rather than as a ratio. A deviation IQ still uses 100 as a baseline average, but a 100 IQ is redefined as the average score in the distribution of scores for people of a certain age. A particular person’s IQ is then cal- culated by determining where his or her test score “sits,” relative to the average score obtained by others in the same age group. (Note that age is the norm group used for defining the concept of intelligence.) ●Figure 10.3 shows a frequency distribution of scores that might result from administering a test such as the Stanford-Binet to large groups of people. The average of the distribution is 100, and approximately half of the test takers will produce scores above 100 and the other half below 100.

intelligence quotient (IQ) Mental age divided by chronological age and then multiplied by 100.

deviation IQ An intelligence score that is derived from determining where your performance sits in an age-based distribution of test scores.

● FiGuRE 10.3 the Distribution of iQ Scores IQ scores for a given age group are typically distributed in a bell-shaped, or normal, curve. The average and most frequently occurring IQ score is defined as 100. Roughly 68% of the test takers in this age group receive IQ scores between 115 and 85, one standard deviation above and below the mean. People labeled “gifted,” with an IQ of 130 and above, or “intellectually disabled,” with an IQ of 70 or below, occur infrequently in the overall population. (© Cengage Learning)

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Intellectualy Disabled

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70 2

85 16

Low Average

100 50

115 84

High Average

130 98

Gifted

145 99+

Standard Deviation from the Mean

IQ Score Percentile

Description

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One of the characteristics of modern intelligence tests is their tendency to pro- duce very regular and smooth distributions of scores. Not only will the most com- mon score be 100 (by definition), but roughly 68% of the people who take the test will receive an IQ score between 85 and 115. With a distribution like the one shown in Figure 10.3, we can easily calculate the percentage of the population likely to receive a particular IQ score. You will find, for example, that approximately 98% of the peo- ple who take the test will receive a score at or below 130. Notice once again that IQ in this case is defined in terms of how a score compares to the scores of other people in the same age group.

Extremes of Intelligence Tests such as the Stanford-Binet or the related Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale have been given to thousands and thousands of people. Most people fall within a normal or average range, which covers scores from about 70 to about 130. Individuals who fall above or below this range represent extremes in intelligence.

Intellectual Disability A score of 70 or below on a standard IQ test often leads to a diagnosis of an intellectual disability (formerly known as mental retardation), although other factors (such as daily living skills) contribute to any diagnosis. An intellectual disability must be diagnosed prior to age 18, which means that limita- tions in intellectual functioning arising during adulthood—for example, from brain damage—don’t lead to the diagnosis (American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 2010). Individuals with intellectual disabilities have sig- nificant limitations in adaptive behavior, including conceptual (e.g., literacy), social (interpersonal), and practical (personal care) skills.

What causes intellectual disabilities? There are many possible causes, some genetic and some environmental. Down syndrome, for example, is typically associ- ated with low IQ scores and is caused by a genetic abnormality—usually an extra chromosome. Another genetic condition is phenylketonuria (PKU), a metabolic dis- order associated with a defective enzyme that can lead to a disability if not corrected early in development. Environmental factors during development, such as inade- quate nutrition or illness, can also contribute. In Chapter 4 we talked about the poten- tially damaging effects of teratogens, such as excessive use of alcohol or other drugs, on the intellectual capacity of the developing fetus. There are probably hundreds of potential causes for extremely low IQ scores and, once again, a low IQ score does not guarantee a diagnosis of an intellectual disability.

Although intellectual disabilities are assumed to affect somewhere between 1% and 3% of the population, the vast majority of these people (perhaps 85%) are only mildly affected. With the proper support, most are able to lead independent lives and may not even be recognized by the community as having any serious mental deficiencies. By no means does an intellectual disability imply an inability to learn or prosper. Even the roughly 15% of cases who are diagnosed as moderately to pro- foundly disabled can lead satisfying and fulfilling lives. Numerous agencies such as the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities provide useful information and help to support ongoing research (check out their website here: www.aaidd.org).

Giftedness At the other end of the IQ scale are those considered gifted, with IQs at or above approximately 130. Many studies have tracked the intellectual and social accomplishments of gifted children, partly as a means of checking on the validity of the IQ measure. One of the most famous of these studies was begun in the 1920s by Lewis Terman (1925; Terman & Ogden, 1947). Terman was interested in whether children identified early in life as gifted would be likely to achieve success throughout

intellectual disability A label generally assigned to someone who scores below 70 on a standard IQ test, although other factors, such as one’s ability to adapt to the environment, are also important.

gifted A label generally assigned to someone who scores above 130 on a standard IQ test.

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Do you see any similarities between the way deviation IQ is interpreted and the way you normally interpret your test scores in a class?

Measuring Individual Differences | 319

their lives. The answer, on average, was “Yes”—Terman’s gifted subjects earned more college degrees than average, made more money, wrote more books, generated more successful patents, and so on. Similar results have been found in other studies, most recently for adolescents with exceptional mathematical or verbal reasoning ability (e.g., Lubinski, 2009).

Interestingly, the kids studied by Terman (often known collectively as the “Termites”) turned out to be emotionally stable and socially skilled as well, which is surprising given the bookworm stereotype that people have of highly intelligent people. Many had successful marriages, and their divorce rate was lower than that of the general population (Terman, 1954). More recent studies have generally con- firmed this conclusion: Gifted students tend to score highly on measures of personal and social adjustment; they also show significantly fewer indications of psychologi- cal problems (Martin et al., 2010). In each of these cases, however, the connection between IQ and success is correlational, so it’s best to exercise caution in drawing conclusions. In such studies there are apt to be many potentially confounding fac- tors. To list just one example, high-IQ children tend to come from economically priv- ileged households, which might help account for later success and emotional stability (Tomlinson-Keasey & Little, 1990).

Finally, there are savants, who may show limited intellectual or social function- ing overall but have tremendous “gifts” in a particular domain. Calendrical savants, for example, have the amazing ability to name the weekday corresponding to a par- ticular date, often in a matter of seconds (Cowan et al., 2003). Psychologists have studied savants, and tracked their abilities over time, but remain uncertain about the origins of their remarkable abilities. There’s some evidence that the ability is innate, produced by some kind of atypical brain organization or genetic information (Nurmi et al., 2003), but other studies have found no abnormalities in the brains of savants (Cowan & Frith, 2009). Savants are more likely to be male, and savant skills are often associated with disorders such as childhood autism (Heaton & Wallace, 2004). Experience probably plays a role in the development of the special skills, although many appear not to have been explicitly taught (Cowan & Frith, 2009). Whether most savants truly possess some kind of exceptional cognitive skill, or sim- ply engage in extensive practice of a skill that is rewarded by their peers, remains an open question.

The Validity of Intelligence Testing How valid is IQ as a measure of intellectual ability? Does it truly tap some hidden but powerful feature of the mind that accounts for individual differences? Does it ade- quately measure the ability to adapt and solve the problems of survival? Remember, here we use “validity” in the technical sense: How well does the test measure the thing that it’s supposed to measure? To assess the validity of the IQ, then, we must ask: How well do the tests that produce IQ scores predict their criterion of interest?

The most widely applied intelligence tests today are the Stanford-Binet, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC). These are not the only tests, of course; in fact, if we combine intel- ligence tests with measures of scholastic aptitude, more than a hundred different tests are currently in use. Often these tests are given for the same reason that originally motivated Binet and Simon—to predict some kind of academic performance, usually grades in high school or college. From this perspective, IQ passes the validity test with flying colors: IQ, as measured by Stanford-Binet or the Wechsler tests, typically correlates about +0.50 or higher with school grades (Ceci, 1991; Murray & Wren, 2003). Notice that the correlation isn’t perfect, but it’s reasonably high when you con- sider all of the uncontrolled factors that can affect grades in school (motivation, home environment, participation in extracurricular activities, and so on).

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Critics of IQ often point out that it fails to provide a broad index of intelligence. As we discussed earlier, it’s proper to define intelligence broadly. There are many ways that people can fit successfully into their environments and not all forms of mul- tiple intelligence are measured by traditional IQ tests. This criticism has been widely recognized, however, and efforts have been made to develop tests that measure a variety of abilities. The influential tests of David Wechsler, for example, were devel- oped in part to measure nonverbal aspects of intellectual ability. The Wechsler tests include not only verbal-mathematical questions of the type traditionally found on the Stanford-Binet test but also nonverbal questions requiring things such as the com- pletion or rearrangement of pictures (see ●Figure 10.4). Performance is then broken down into a verbal IQ, a nonverbal (or “performance”) IQ, and an overall IQ based on combining the verbal and nonverbal measures.

Again, most intelligence tests are designed to accomplish some specific result, such as predicting future academic performance, not to provide an index of true intellectual ability. So if you develop a test to predict college performance, it probably isn’t reasonable to expect it to predict creativity, originality, or the ability for deep thought. This also means that intelligence tests can suffer from cultural limitations. A test designed to measure the abilities of high school students in suburbia may not be valid for students in the barrio or from a different region of the world. This doesn’t mean that intelligence tests aren’t useful—you just need to be aware of what the tests were designed to measure.

Labeling Effects Another potentially serious criticism of IQ concerns labeling. You take a test as a child, your IQ is calculated by comparing your performance

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)

Test

Verbal scale

Information

Comprehension

Arithmetic

Description

Taps general range of information.

Tests understanding of social conventions and ability to evaluate past experience.

Tests arithmetic reasoning through verbal problems.

Example

On what continent is France?

Why are children required to go to school?

How many hours will it take to drive 150 miles at 50 miles per hour?

Performance scale

Block design

Picture arrangement

Object assembly

Tests ability to perceive and analyze patterns by presenting designs that must be copied with blocks.

Tests understanding of social situations through a series of pictures that must be arranged in the right sequence to tell a story.

Tests ability to deal with part-to-whole relationships by presenting puzzle pieces that must be assembled to form a complete object.

Assemble blocks to match this design:

Put the pictures in the right order:

Assemble the pieces into a complete object:

1 2 3

● FiGuRE 10.4 Examples from the wAiS The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale measures both verbal and nonverbal aspects of intellectual ability. Included here are samples of the various question types. (From WEITEN, Psychology: Themes and Variations, 3E. © 1995 Cengage Learning.)

Measuring Individual Differences | 321

with that of other kids your age, and the score becomes part of your continuing academic record. Once the IQ label is applied—you’re smart, you’re below aver- age, and so on—expectations are generated in those who have access to your score. A number of studies have shown that intelligence labels influence how teachers interact with their students in the classroom. There is a kind of “rich get richer” and “poor get poorer” effect—the kids with the “smart” label are exposed to more edu- cational opportunities and are treated with more respect. Things are held back from the “slow” kids, so they’re less likely to be exposed to factors that might nurture academic growth.

Labeling effects were particularly serious in the early decades of the 20th century when intelligence tests were first developed. Tests were widely administered—for example, to newly arriving immigrants and to all Army recruits—before the impact of cultural and educational factors on test performance were well understood. As we’ll discuss later, people can perform poorly on an intelligence test because the test has certain built-in biases with respect to language and cultural lifestyle. Imagine, for example, that as part of an intelligence test I ask you to identify the vegetable broc- coli. Easy, but not if you were raised in a culture that did not include broccoli as part of its diet. In such a case you would probably get the question wrong, but it wouldn’t say anything about your intellectual or academic potential.

Researchers were not very sensitive to these concerns when intelligence tests were first developed. The result was that certain population groups, such as immi- grants from Southern and Eastern Europe, generally performed poorly on these tests. Some psychologists even went so far as to label these immigrant groups “feeble- minded” or “defective” based on their test performance. Immigration laws enacted in the 1920s discriminated against poorly performing groups by reducing immigration quotas. Psychologists are now more aware of test bias and have worked very hard to reduce its influence on test performance.

Individual Differences Related to Intelligence To end our discussion of the measurement of individual differences, we’ll briefly con- sider three psychological characteristics that are often associated with the topic of intelligence: creativity, emotional intelligence, and tacit knowledge. None is neces- sarily related to g (general intelligence).

Creativity The term creativity refers to the ability to generate ideas that are origi- nal and novel and have value to the individual or group (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Creative thinkers think in unusual ways, which means they can look at the usual and express it in an unusual way. Creative thinkers tend to see the “big picture” and are able to find connections among things that others might not see. Importantly, however, it’s not just the generation of new and different ideas that makes one creative; those ideas must also be useful and relevant—they must potentially have adaptive value.

How is creativity measured? Psychologists have devised a number of ways to measure individual differences in creative ability. One popular technique is to sup- ply a group of unrelated words, or unrelated objects in a picture, and ask a per- son to generate as many connections among the items as possible (Mednick, 1962; Torrance, 1981). Try it yourself: Take these words—food, catcher, hot—and try to think of a fourth word (or words) that relates to all three. Measures like these reveal individual differences among people—some find this task to be quite easy, others find it extremely hard. Moreover, performance on these creativity tests can then be correlated with other abilities, such as IQ or job success, to see if there is a connection.

What’s the relation between creativity and intelligence? When intelligence is conceptualized in a broad way, creativity fits in nicely as a part of general intellectual

creativity The ability to generate ideas that are original, novel, and useful.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think it makes sense for elementary schools to use “tracking” systems— that is, to divide children early on into different classes based on performance on standardized tests?

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ability. (You’ll remember, for instance, that Sternberg’s triarchic theory includes the concept of creative intelligence.) However, there isn’t a straightforward relationship between creativity and IQ. Correlations between them are usually low (Horn, 1976; Kee, 2005), although positive correlations have been found between creativity and some measures of verbal intelligence (Silvia, 2008). Traditional IQ tests don’t really measure creative thinking, so perhaps it’s not surprising that the correlations are often low.

Emotional Intelligence The second psychological characteristic, emotional intel- ligence, is gaining popularity among psychologists and is worthy of brief note. Emotional intelligence is the ability to perceive, understand, and express emotion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). The concept applies to perceiving and understanding the emotions of others as well as to understanding and control- ling one’s own emotions. Emotions, as you’ll see in Chapter 11, play a large role in behavior, so it’s clearly useful to manage and express them appropriately.

People who score high on emotional intelligence can read others’ emotions well and tend to be empathetic as a result. They’re good at managing conflict, both their own and the conflicts of others. Not surprisingly, emotional intelligence is believed to be an excellent predictor of success in career and social settings. In fact, some have argued that emotional intelligence may be a more important predic- tor of success in life than more traditional conceptions of intelligence (Goleman, 1995). Measures of emotional intelligence do seem to predict success in a variety of contexts, from the workplace, to personal relationships, even to investor behav- ior (Brackett et al., 2011). Tests of emotional intelligence have been applied across the world, in dozens of different cultures, and do a reasonable job of predicting job performance (Zeidner et al., 2008). There’s clearly overlap between emotional intel- ligence and the broad conceptions of intelligence proposed by others (e.g., Gardner and Sternberg), but the similarities and differences have yet to be worked out in a systematic way (Matthews et al., 2005). Research on emotional intelligence is ongo- ing, but the concept is proving useful to psychologists and is widely applied in the workplace (see Cherniss et al., 2006).

Tacit Knowledge Finally, most intelligence tests contain questions that are specific and well defined. You must have certain knowledge to perform well; there are right and wrong answers for each question. There’s also usually only one method for solving the problem. But to succeed in many areas, such as on a job, you often need knowledge and abilities that are not so cut and dried—unspoken rules and strategies that are rarely, if ever, taught formally. This kind of unspoken practical know-how is called tacit knowledge.

Tacit knowledge is rarely assessed on standardized tests of intelligence. It’s a kind of procedural how-to knowledge that isn’t written in books. Instead, it comes primar- ily from experience—from watching and analyzing the behavior of others. Moreover, people clearly differ in their grasp of job-relevant tacit knowledge. Some managers understand the rules for maximizing the performance of their subordinates better than others do. When tacit knowledge is actually measured, by asking people on the job to make ratings about imaginary job scenarios, it seems to do a reasonably good job of predicting job performance. Sternberg and Wagner (1993) found that tacit knowledge correlates significantly with salary, performance ratings, and the prestige of the business or institution where the person is employed. Tacit knowledge also improves with work experience, which is what you would expect. However, tacit knowledge may bear little relation to general ability, as measured by g. In fact, in some cultures negative correlations have been reported—the higher the index of tacit knowledge, the lower the measure of g—suggesting that practical knowledge is some- times emphasized at the expense of academic skills (Cianciolo et al., 2006; Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002). This is a somewhat controversial conclusion, though, as g is widely

emotional intelligence The ability to perceive, understand, and express emotion in ways that are useful and adaptive.

tacit knowledge Unspoken practical knowledge about how to perform well on the job.

Measuring Individual Differences | 323

People are always looking for ways to boost intelligence, especially new parents, who want to do everything possible to improve their newborn’s cognitive functioning. Perhaps you were exposed to Baby Einstein as a child, a line of interactive multimedia products designed to boost language and cognitive ability? Listening to the music of Mozart is also claimed to make you smarter, or at least improve your functioning on cogni- tive tasks. Some years ago, the governor of Georgia actually budgeted money for cas- settes of classical music, which could be given to the parents of each new infant born in the state. Other states have considered requiring that classical music be played in all elementary schools. Most agree that Mozart was a genius, but can his music really make you smarter?

The answer is “yes, and no.” In initial work on this topic, undergraduates showed a significant improvement in their average spatial-reasoning scores after listening to 10 minutes of Mozart’s Sonata for Two Pianos in D Major. Control undergraduates, who spent the same amount of time in silence or listening to relaxation tapes, failed to show similar improvements (Rauscher et al., 1993). Some researchers have had trouble repeat- ing this so-called Mozart effect (Steele et al., 1999), but a number of laboratories have now confirmed the basic finding (see Pietschnig et al., 2010, for a review). If you spend time lis- tening to some elegant classical music, rather than sitting in silence, you’re likely to perform slightly better on some measures of cognitive ability.

What causes the improvement? One pos- sibility is that Mozart’s music, because of its creative and innovative structure, activates

the same portions of the brain that handle spatial-reasoning tasks (Rauscher et al., 1995). On the other hand, maybe people simply enjoy listening to music and are there- fore in a better mood, or more alert, when they’re asked to perform the reasoning tasks. To conclude that Mozart is responsible for the improvement would require experiments to rule out alternative interpretations. In fact, it turns out that listening to a Stephen King short story can also produce a Mozart-like

effect, as long as it’s enjoyable to the listeners (Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999). Moreover, slow and sad selections of classical music fail to produce improvements in spatial reasoning, suggesting that it’s indeed an enhancement in mood or arousal that is responsible for the effect (Thompson et al., 2001).

The Mozart effect is a classic example of how psychological findings can be over- blown, or misused, by the popular press (Waterhouse, 2006). Although the original findings probably have some scientific valid- ity, the improvements were always rela- tively small and lasted only for brief periods. Moreover, the improvements were only shown on particular kinds of spatial-reasoning tasks and not on others. There’s certainly no evi- dence to suggest that listening to 10 minutes of Mozart, or Stephen King, produces last- ing improvements in general intelligence. Listening to something you enjoy simply makes you feel better, and you’re likely to perform better on certain tasks, but it doesn’t really make you smarter in any lasting or sig- nificant way.

By the way, baby media don’t seem to have any positive effect on language devel- opment either. In one recent study, 12- to 18-month old children were exposed to a best-selling DVD that promised improved lan- guage skills. The babies watched the video at least five times a week for four weeks but showed no improvement in language skills compared to a control group that didn’t watch the video. In fact, the video babies actu- ally learned fewer new words than a group of babies who were taught the same words from their parents (DeLoache et al., 2010). The age-old caveat remains true today: Buyer beware!

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Can Mozart’s Music Make You Smarter?

Mozart was a musical genius, but can his music really make you smarter?

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believed to contribute to performance on most, if not all, types of cognitive tasks (Gottfredson, 2003; Hunt, 2011).

The idea that it’s useful to develop and use multiple strategies to perform suc- cessfully is almost certain to be true. We soak up knowledge where we can; and, as we’ve seen in earlier chapters, modeling others is an important vehicle for guiding behavior. As it stands now, however, the concept of tacit knowledge, while intuitively plausible, remains somewhat slippery scientifically. Critics have questioned whether tacit knowledge is really anything different from job knowledge (Schmidt & Hunter, 1993). Although important, measurements of tacit knowledge may simply be indices of what’s been learned on the job.

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Discovering the Sources of Intelligence LEARNING GOALS

● Understand how IQ changes with age. ● Explain how twin studies are used to evaluate genetic contributions to intelligence. ● Understand environmental influences on intelligence and how they interact with genetic influences.

We’ve seen that people differ, and we’ve considered some of the ways to measure those differences. We’ve also discussed methods for conceptualizing the differ- ences—there may be differences in g; or, perhaps, people may lack one or more of the special talents needed for intelligent performance. But what accounts for these differ- ences? Why is one person’s g higher or lower than another person’s g? Can anything be done about these differences, or are they fixed in stone?

There are essentially two ways to explain individual differences in intelligence. First, you can appeal to biology, particularly the internal genetic code—those strands of DNA that determine eye color, thickness of hair, and possibly g. According to this view, intellectual potential is established at conception through some particularly fortunate (or unfortunate) combination of genes. Alternatively, you can appeal to an external cause, specifically the environment. Variations in g might be attributable to one’s past experiences—perhaps Jefferson Tarpy scores high on IQ tests because he was reinforced for intellectual pursuits or went to excellent schools; perhaps Larry Steinway performs poorly because as a child he was exposed to toxins (such as lead paint). In this section, we’ll frame this classic nature–nurture debate and consider the evidence relevant to each position. But first we have a practical issue to consider— how stable is the IQ measure itself ?

test Yourself Check what you know about the measurement of individual differences by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. For each of the following statements, pick the test characteristic that is most appropriate. Choose from the following: reliability, standardization, validity.

a. Donna performs poorly on the SAT, so she takes it again and finds herself performing poorly again:

b. Larry has devised a new test of intelligence, but he finds that it predicts nothing about school performance or success on the job:

c. Chei-Wui wants to see how consistent scores are on his new intelligence test, so he correlates answers across repeated administrations of the test:

d. Robert’s new job is to administer the Graduate Record Exam. He is very careful to keep the testing and scoring

procedures the same for everybody who takes the test:

2. Decide whether each of the following statements is true or false. a. Lucinda has a mental age of 8 and an IQ of 160—this

means that she must be 5 years old chronologically. True or False?

b. Average IQ, based on the deviation IQ method, varies with chronological age. True or False?

c. Lewis has just scored below 70 on his IQ test, which means that he will soon be labeled with an intellectual disability. True or False?

d. Creativity increases with intellectual ability, as measured by IQ. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.2

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence | 325

The Stability of IQ If intelligence is caused primarily by genetic and/or biological factors we might expect intellectual ability to change very little over time or at least remain stable through- out normal adulthood. On the other hand, if intelligence is determined mainly by the environment, we would probably expect to find changes over time: IQ might rise and fall depending on experience or environmental setting. Neither of these arguments is airtight—for instance, your environment might remain constant over time, or the genetic code might express itself throughout your lifetime; it might also be the case that IQ is determined by early experience and remains fixed after a certain point in development. Even so, examining the stability of IQ seems like a reasonable place to start the search.

When intelligence is measured in the standard way, through performance on psy- chometric tests, its stability depends partly on when the measuring process begins. Before the age of about 3 or 4, it’s difficult to get accurate assessments of intellec- tual ability. Infants can’t talk or show lasting attention, so conventional testing pro- cedures can’t be used. Investigators resort to indirect measures, such as recording whether babies choose to look at old or new pictures presented on a screen. There’s evidence that babies who quickly habituate, or lose interest, in response to repeated presentations of the same picture, and who prefer to look at novel pictures when they’re shown, score higher on intelligence tests later in childhood (Bornstein, 1989). In fact, recent studies suggest that measuring an infant’s ability to attend selectively to novel events predicts adult IQ and academic achievement reasonably well (Fagan et al., 2007). Once the child reaches the age of 4 or 5, when more conventional intel- ligence tests can be given, IQ scores predict performance on later IQ tests quite well. So, it’s generally believed that a person’s IQ remains relatively stable from a young age through adulthood.

Longitudinal Studies One of the best ways to measure the stability of IQ is through a longitudinal study, which involves testing the same people repeatedly as they age. The most widely known investigation of the stability of adult intelligence is the Seattle Longitudinal Study, which has examined mental test performance for approximately 5,000 adults ranging in age from 25 through 88 (Schaie, 1983, 1989, 1993, 2005). The participants have been tested in 7-year cycles, dating back to 1956, using a variety of

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tests to measure things such as verbal fluency, inductive reasoning, and spatial abil- ity. Schaie and his colleagues have found great stability in intellectual ability through- out adulthood. From age 25 to about age 60, there appears to be no uniform decline in general intellectual ability, as measured through the test battery (see ●Figure 10.5). After age 60, abilities begin to decline, although the losses are not great. There are also large individual differences—some people show excellent test performance in their 80s, whereas others do not (Schaie, 1998).

It’s difficult to interpret changes in IQ with age because many factors change along with age. Elderly people are more likely to have physical problems, for example, that can affect performance. Declines in intelligence with age also depend on the type of intellectual ability measured. Earlier we discussed the dis- tinction between fluid intelligence, which reflects basic reasoning and processing skills, and crystallized intelligence, which reflects acquired knowledge. The current thinking is that fluid intelligence declines somewhat with age—perhaps because the biology of the brain changes—whereas crystallized intelligence remains con- stant, or perhaps even increases, until late in adulthood (Beier & Ackerman, 2005; Kaufman & Horn, 1996). The brain may become a bit slower with age, but people continue to add knowledge and experiences that help solve the problems of every- day life.

The Flynn Effect Another curious fact about the stability of IQ, although it applies more to populations than to individuals, is that performance on IQ tests seems to be rising steadily and consistently over time. On average, people who take stan- dardized intelligence tests today perform slightly better than people who took similar tests a decade ago, and the same general decade-by-decade increases have been seen since the 1930s (Flynn, 1987, 2007). This trend, known as the Flynn effect, has been documented worldwide, but it remains largely unexplained. Most psychologists believe the environment must be responsible because the world’s gene pool is unlikely to have changed much in the past 70 years (although see Mingroni, 2007).

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● FiGuRE 10.5 the Stability of intellectual Ability Data from the Seattle Longitudinal Study show how performance changes on a variety of mental tasks between the ages of 25 and 88. Notice that average performance is remarkably stable up to about age 60, when some declines are seen. (Data from Schaie, 1983)

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Elderly people are often said to possess wisdom. In what ways do you think the label “wise” differs from the label “intelligent”?

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence | 327

Most explanations of the Flynn effect appeal to factors such as increased nutri- tion or better schooling (Neisser, 1998; Williams, 1998). Better nutrition and health care can certainly lead to better brain functioning, although increases in brain func- tioning probably can’t account for the trend (Nettelbeck & Wilson, 2004). We’re also exposed to new technologies, which, in turn, could help develop abstract thinking. (Think about how sophisticated we are about using cell phones and the Internet.) In addition, more and more children are now placed in day care or preschool, and these experiences might contribute to better performance on standardized tests as well. It’s interesting, though, that most of the improvements are seen on nonverbal portions of intelligence tests, those portions that tap abstract problem-solving ability. It’s difficult to see how these kinds of abilities can be easily learned (Wai & Putallaz, 2011).

Because of the Flynn effect, IQ tests are periodically “renormed” to adjust for the fact that scores are rising. The average score is reset to 100 (remember our ear- lier discussion of deviation IQ), which means you now need to do better on the test, relative to how the test was scored in the past, to receive a given IQ. Some psycholo- gists believe this rescoring process is having unintended effects. For example, sup- pose scores are rising less rapidly for people with borderline intellectual functioning (those with IQ scores around 70). Under the new scoring guidelines, significantly more individuals are likely to be diagnosed with an intellectual disability than in the past. Many other classification decisions are based, in part, on IQ—everything from eligibility for military service to application of the death penalty—so understanding the Flynn effect is likely to remain a priority for psychologists in the future.

Nature: The Genetic Argument A number of early pioneers in intelligence testing, including Galton, believed strongly that individual differences in mental ability are inherited. After all, Galton argued, it’s easy to demonstrate that intellectual skill runs through family lines (remember, his cousin was Charles Darwin, and his grandfather was another famous evolutionist, Erasmus Darwin). But family-tree arguments, used in isolation, aren’t very convinc- ing. Environmental factors, such as social and educational opportunities, can explain why members of the same family might show similar skills. Growing up in a fam- ily that places value on intellectual pursuits determines to some extent what sort of behaviors will be rewarded in a child, or the particular type of role models that will be available. In fairness to Galton, he realized that both inherited and environmental factors are needed to explain mental ability fully—in fact, it was Galton (1869, 1883) who coined the phrase “nature versus nurture.”

To establish a genetic basis for a psychological or physical characteristic, it’s necessary to control for the effects of the environment. In principle, if two people are raised in exactly the same environment and have exactly the same experiences, we can attribute any differences in IQ to inherited factors (nature). In this case, you’ve held any nurturing effects of the environment constant, so any differences must be due to genetics. Alternatively, if two people are born with exactly the same genes but end up with quite different intelligence scores, it must be the environment, not genes, that is responsi- ble (nurture). We can’t perform these kinds of experimental manipulations in the laboratory, for obvious reasons, but we can look for relevant natural comparisons.

Twin Studies As discussed in Chapter 3, psychologists often study identical twins, who share nearly complete genetic overlap, to tease apart the nature and nurture components of mind and behavior. In twin studies, research- ers search for identical twins who have been raised together in the same household or who have been separated at birth through adoption (Bouchard & McGue, 1981;

Some kinds of abilities tend to run in families, such as artistic ability in the Judd family. It’s difficult, though, to separate the influences of nature and nurture.

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T. J. Bouchard et al., 1990). It is assumed that the effects of the environment are similar for the twins raised together but quite different, at least on average, for twins raised apart. If intelligence comes primarily from genetic factors, we would expect identi- cal twins to have very similar intelligence scores, regardless of the environments in which they’ve been raised. One way to measure similarity is by correlation. More spe- cifically, you can attempt to predict the IQ of one twin given the IQ of the other.

If genes are largely responsible for intelligence, we would expect to get a strong positive correlation between IQ scores for identical twins. We wouldn’t necessarily expect it to be exactly +1.00 because of measurement error or other uncontrolled fac- tors. In reviewing the research literature on this issue, Bouchard and McGue (1981) found strong evidence for the genetic position: The IQ scores of identical twins are indeed quite similar, irrespective of the environment in which the twins have been reared. As shown in ●Figure 10.6, the IQ scores for twins reared together showed an average correlation of .86; when reared apart, the average correlation remained strongly positive at .72 (Bouchard & McGue, 1981).

It’s also useful to compare intelligence scores for fraternal twins (who are geneti- cally no more similar than normal siblings) and among unrelated people who have been reared together or apart. In general, the impressive finding is that the closer the overlap in genes, the more similar the resulting IQs. Notice, for example, that the average correlation for adopted siblings who have been reared together (.30) is much lower than the average correlation for identical twins reared apart (.72). Similarity in environmental history is not as strong a predictor of intelligence as similarity in genetic background. Data such as these suggest that genetic history plays an impor- tant role in intelligence, at least when intelligence is measured through conventional IQ testing (see also Plomin et al., 1997).

Heritability Intelligence researchers often use the term heritability to describe the influence of genetic factors on intelligence. Heritability is a mathematical index that represents the extent to which differences within a population can be accounted for by genetic factors. For any group of people, you will find individual differences in IQ scores; heritability measures the role genetic factors play in producing these differ- ences. It’s expressed as a percentage, so if the heritability of intelligence were 100%, all

heritability A mathematical index that represents the extent to which IQ differences in a particular population can be accounted for by genetic factors.

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● FiGuRE 10.6 Nature versus Nurture The horizontal bars show the mean correlation coefficients for pairs of people with differing amounts of genetic overlap who have been reared in similar or different environments. For example, the top bar shows the average correlation for identical twins who have been reared together in the same environment, and the bottom bar shows the correlation coefficient for adopted siblings reared together. Higher correlations mean that the measured IQ scores are more similar. (Data from Bouchard & McGue, 1981)

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence | 329

differences in measured IQ could be explained genetically. Most estimates of the heri- tability of intelligence, derived from twin studies, hover at around 50%, which means that approximately half of the differences in IQ have a genetic basis. Interestingly, the heritability of intelligence appears to increase somewhat with age, at least from child- hood to young adulthood (Haworth et al., 2010).

It’s important to understand that estimates of heritability apply only to groups, not to individuals. A heritability estimate of 50% does not mean that 50% of some- one’s intelligence is due to his or her genes. To see why, imagine two groups of people with the same genetic histories. Group A is placed in a rigidly controlled environment where everyone is treated exactly the same. For group B, the environment is allowed to vary. If IQ scores are influenced by the environment in any way, we would expect the heritability values to be quite different for these two groups, even though the groups’ genetic backgrounds are identical. Because the environment is held constant in group A, all of the differences in measured IQ will be due to genes. In group B, the heritability index will be lower because some of the differences in IQ will be due to environmental effects. Heritability tells us only that for a given group a certain per- centage of the differences in intelligence can be explained by genetic factors.

Nurture: The Environmental Argument Most psychologists agree that intelligence is influenced by genetic factors. This is not really surprising given that cognitive abilities are almost certainly influenced by bio- logical factors, such as the speed or efficiency of neural processing. But did you notice in Figure 10.6 that identical twins reared together have IQs that are more similar than do twins reared apart? This means that individual differences in intelligence can’t be explained completely through genetic background; it’s not even close—the environ- ment clearly plays an important role.

In this section, we’ll consider some environmental influences on IQ by address- ing a controversial topic in the study of intelligence: group differences in IQ. The majority of intelligence researchers agree that there are stable differences in IQ across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups. For example, Asian Americans tend to score higher on standardized intelligence tests, on average, than White European Americans. White Americans, on average, score higher than African Americans and Hispanic Americans (Brody, 1992; Lynn, 1994).

It’s important to understand that group differences in IQ, although stable, reflect average group differences. Not every Asian American scores high on an intelligence test, nor does every African American score low. In fact, the differences among IQ scores within a population (African Americans, Asian Americans, and so on) are much larger than the average differences between groups. This means that a large number of African Americans will score higher than the average White score, just as many Asian Americans will have scores below the average for Whites. The aver- age population differences cannot be applied to single individuals, but the group dif- ferences are real and should be explained. How can we account for these differences? Although some psychologists have suggested that evolutionary and genetic factors are partly responsible for IQ differences among racial and ethnic groups (Rushton & Jensen, 2005), most psychologists favor environmental explanations (Nisbett, 2009). Up to this point, as psychologist Earl Hunt notes, “no genes related to the difference in cognitive skills across the various racial and ethnic groups have ever been discov- ered” (Hunt, 2011, p. 446).

Economic Differences On average, there are significant economic differences among racial/ethnic groups that could contribute to performance, making interpretation of the IQ differences difficult. For example, African Americans and Hispanic Americans in the United States are more likely to live at or below the poverty level. Poverty

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Do you think it’s possible to tease apart the relative contributions of nature and nurture to intelligence by studying animals in the laboratory?

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is often associated with poor nutrition and difficulties in obtaining proper health care, and it may hurt one’s chances to enter adequate schools. African Americans and Hispanic Americans are also much more likely than Whites to suffer racial discrimi- nation. The impact of these factors on intelligence testing is not completely under- stood, although they almost certainly play an important role. African Americans, Whites, and Hispanic Americans tend to live in very different and somewhat isolated worlds. As a consequence, it’s hard to disentangle the effects of the environment from any genetic differences that might contribute to intelligence.

Test Bias It’s also possible that test biases contribute to group differences in IQ scores (Bernal, 1984). Racial/ethnic group differences depend, to a certain extent, on the type of intelligence test administered (Brody, 1992). IQ tests have traditionally been written, administered, and scored by White psychologists. This raises the very real possibility that cultural biases might be contaminating some of the test questions. For example, if I ask you a question such as “Who wrote Faust?” (which once appeared on a Wechsler test), your ability to answer correctly will depend partly on whether your culture places value on exposure to such information. African American psy- chologist Robert L. Williams has shown that when an intelligence test is used that relies heavily on African American terms and expressions, White students who have had limited experience with African American culture perform poorly.

However, psychologists have worked hard to remove bias from standard intel- ligence and achievement tests (Raven et al., 1985); in some cases, the development of “culture-fair” tests has reduced racial differences in measured ability. However, sig- nificant group differences usually remain even after culture-bound questions have been altered or removed. Consequently, bias can contribute to test performance in some instances, but it’s unlikely to be a major determinant of group differences in IQ.

Stereotype Threat While bias in the content of intelligence tests has been reduced, other environmental factors remain a concern. When people take intelligence tests, they have certain expectations about how they’ll perform; these expectations, in turn, can significantly affect the final score. If you’re nervous or expect to bomb the test, you’re less likely to do well. Psychologist Claude Steele and his colleagues argue that African Americans, who understand the negative stereotypes people hold about their intelli- gence, often feel pressured or threatened by stereotypes and perform poorly as a result.

Most psychologists agree that cultural background plays an important role in the measurement and interpretation of intelligence. ©

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Do you think it’s possible to eliminate cultural influences completely from a psychological test?

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In support of this conclusion, Steele and Aronson (1995) found that African Americans performed more poorly on a verbal test when they thought the test was measuring intelligence rather than general problem solving. Everyone in the experi- ment took exactly the same test, but they were led to believe, through instructions, that it was either an intelligence or problem-solving test. Presumably the label “intel- ligence test” activated the negative stereotype, creating pressure and anxiety, and performance suffered as a result. Whether this pressure can account for the differ- ences found between groups on intelligence tests remains uncertain, but stereotype threat is clearly an important factor to consider (Schmader, 2010). We’ll return to the effects of stereotypes on expectations and performance in Chapter 13.

Adoption Studies A more direct test of environmental explanations of racial/eth- nic differences comes from IQ studies of African American children who have been reared in White homes. If the average African American childhood experience leads to skills that do not transfer well to standard tests of intelligence (for whatever rea- son), then we would expect African American children raised in White middle-class homes to have higher IQ scores. In general, this assumption is supported by the data. Scarr and Weinberg (1976) investigated interracial adoptions in Minnesota and found that the average IQ for African American children reared in economically advan- taged White households was significantly higher than the national African American mean score. This finding was confirmed again in later follow-up studies (Waldman, et al. 1994; Weinberg et al., 1992). You certainly shouldn’t conclude from this find- ing that White households are somehow better than other households. The results simply imply that some cultural experiences, particularly those related to socioeco- nomic class, can give one an advantage on the tests currently being used to assess intelligence.

The Interaction of Nature and Nurture So what are we to conclude about the relative contributions of genetics and the envi- ronment to intelligence? Nature–nurture issues are notoriously difficult to resolve, and this is especially true in the politically sensitive area of intelligence (Hunt & Carlson, 2007). It’s extremely difficult to control for the effects of either the environ- ment or genetics. Consider the twin studies—how reasonable is it to assume that twins who have been reared apart have had unrelated environmental experiences? Are adopted children really representative of the racial or ethnic populations from which they have been drawn (Brody, 2007)? It’s difficult to answer these questions because neither the environment nor genetic structure can be manipulated directly in the laboratory (at least for humans).

Given the current evidence, the most reasonable position to take is that intelli- gence, like many other psychological attributes, is determined by a mixture of genes and environment. The genes you inherit from your parents place upper and lower bounds on intellectual ability. Genes may importantly determine how your brain is wired, and possibly the speed of neural transmission, but the expression of your genetic material is strongly influenced by the environment. Nature always works via nurture and vice versa—one can’t happen without the other (Ridley, 2003).

Recall from Chapter 3 that geneticists use the term genotype to refer to the genetic message itself and phenotype to refer to the observable characteristics that actually result from genetic expression. An analogy of the genotype/phenotype relationship that is sometimes used by intelligence researchers compares the development of intel- ligence to the nurturing of flowering plants (Lewontin, 1976). Imagine that we have a packet of virtually identical seeds, and we toss half into a pot containing fertile soil and half into a pot of barren soil (see ●Figure 10.7). The seeds tossed into the poor soil will undoubtedly grow, but their growth will be stunted relative to that of the group

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Suppose we broaden the concept of intelligence to include athletic and artistic ability. Would it bother you to think that these abilities are influenced primarily by genetic factors?

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planted in the rich soil. Because these are virtually iden- tical groups of seeds, containing similar distributions of genetic information, any differences in growth between the pots are due entirely to the environment (the soil). So, too, with intelligence—two people can be born with similar genetic potential, but the degree to which their intellectual potential will “blossom” will depend criti- cally on the environment.

Consider as well that within each handful of seeds there will be variations in genetic information. Some plants will grow larger than others, regardless of the soil in which they’ve been thrown. A similar kind of result would be expected for intelligence—variations in the genetic message will produce individual differences in IQ that cannot be adequately explained by environmental variables. In fact, after analyzing the differences within a pot, we might conclude that all of the differences are due to inherited factors. But even if the differences within a group are due to genes, the differences between groups would still be due to the environment (fertile or bar- ren soil). This kind of insight can help account, in part, for the racial/ethnic differences in IQ discussed earlier. Even though genes may exert a strong influence within a population, between-population differences may still be determined primarily by the environment (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981; Lewontin, 1976).

One other feature of the interaction between nature and nurture is worth noting. . . yet again. Environmental experiences do not occur independent of inherited factors. It’s a two-way street. The environment will partly determine how genetic information is expressed, but so too will genetic information determine experience. If you’re born with three arms, because of some odd combina- tion of inherited factors, your interactions with the world will be quite different from those of a person with two arms. The fact that you have three arms will color your environment—it will determine how you are treated and the range of opportunities to which you are exposed. If you’re born with “smart” genes, then early on you’re likely to be exposed to opportunities that will help you realize your full intellectual potential; conversely, if you’re born “slow,” the environment is likely to shape you away from intellectually nurturing experiences (see ●Figure 10.8). Such is the way of life and of the world.

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● FiGuRE 10.7 Between- and within- Group variation In the plant analogy, all variation in plant height within one pot is due to genetics, but the overall height difference between plants in one pot and plants in the other is attributable to the differing environments (rich soil versus poor soil). (© Cengage Learning)

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● FiGuRE 10.8 Reaction Range Each person may have genes that set limits for intellectual potential (sometimes called a reaction range). In this case, Tom inherited an IQ potential anywhere between 80 and about 112. The IQ that Tom actually obtains (shown as the dark bar) is determined by the kind of environment in which he is reared. Notice that Miguel inherited a greater IQ potential than Tom, but if Tom is raised in an enriched environment, his IQ may actually turn out to be higher than Miguel’s. (© Cengage Learning)

Psychology For a Reason: How Psychologists Study Intelligence | 333

test Yourself Check your knowledge about the sources of intelligence by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Longitudinal studies of intelligence reveal that fluid, but not crystallized, intelligence remains largely constant across the life span. True or False?

2. Twin studies have shown that fraternal twins raised together tend to have more similar IQs than identical twins raised apart. True or False?

3. Most psychologists now believe that genetic factors definitely play a role in intelligence. True or False?

4. A heritability estimate of 70% means that 70% of someone’s intelligence is due to his or her genetic structure. True or False?

5. Test bias is recognized as a possible contributor to measured intelligence, but it’s unlikely to be a strong determinant of group differences in IQ. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.3

You’ve seen in this chapter that psychologists think about intelligence primarily in terms of individual differences. People differ, and we can develop tests that measure these differences effectively. From an analysis of individual differ- ences, psychologists have tried to develop theories of intel- lectual functioning: What kinds of mental processes underlie intelligent thought? We’ve seen that one way to characterize intelligence is by the adaptability of behavior. What makes one species member intelligent, and another not, may be dictated by how well organisms adapt to changing environ- ments and solve the problems of survival. From this perspec- tive, the nutcracker, in its successful search for a cache of seeds, fits the adaptive view of intelligence just as well as the cocky student who aces the SAT. In this chapter our discus- sion revolved around three problems that face researchers of intelligence.

Conceptualizing Intelligence Researchers conceptualize intel- ligence in a number of ways. Proponents of psychometric approaches describe cognitive ability by analyzing perfor- mance on mental tests. They traditionally draw distinctions between a general factor of intelligence, g, which applies broadly, and specific factors, s, which measure separate abil- ities. The idea that intelligence must be broken down into

several, or multiple, kinds of ability remains popular today, although researchers disagree as to how many or what types of intelligence need to be included.

There’s some evidence that performance on traditional tests of mental ability might be related to the speed of pro- cessing among neurons in the brain. The multiple-intelli- gences approach of Howard Gardner and the triarchic theory of Robert Sternberg both suggest that the concept of intelli- gence must be defined broadly. We cannot rely entirely on academic ability to define intelligence—everyday intelligence and street smarts also enhance our ability to adapt.

Measuring Individual Differences Concepts such as intelli- gence really have little meaning outside of the study of indi- vidual differences—it’s how the mental ability of Sam differs from the mental ability of Jennifer that makes the concept of intelligence meaningful. A good test of intelligence has three main characteristics: reliability, validity, and standardization. Understanding the concept of test validity is crucial because it holds the key to appreciating the widespread use of standard- ized measures such as IQ or tests such as the SAT. Researchers who study individual differences are often primarily inter- ested in using test results to make predictions about future success. Will Jennifer perform well in school? Will Sam make

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON How Psychologists Study Intelligence

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it as a graduate student in psychology? As you’ve seen, the IQ test itself was originally developed to measure academic abil- ity, not as some ultimate measure of mental capacity.

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence There are two main ways to explain how differences in intelligence might arise: genetics and the environment. Twin studies provide

convincing evidence that at least some kinds of mental abil- ity are inherited, although how much remains controversial. However, the role of the environment in determining IQ— cultural background, economic status, stereotype threat, and even built-in test biases—cannot be discounted. Intelligence, like many psychological attributes, grows out of an interac- tion between nature and nurture.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Conceptualizing Intelligence ● The (1) approach proposes that intelligence can be understood by statistically analyzing (2) on tests that measure specific mental skills. Spearman used (3) analysis to study the relationships, or (4) , among test scores and to analyze the factors that account for test performance. He proposed that we possess (5) intelligence, or g, as well as specific abilities, or s.

● (6) intelligence is the ability to reason, (7) problems, and remember; it may be influenced by (8) and biological factors. (9) intelligence reflects the (10) and abilities that we acquire from experience.

● Gardner proposed that traditional views of intelligence be broadened to include special (11) or talents that reflect (12) intelligences. He identified (13) kinds of intelligence: musical, bodily- kinesthetic, logical-mathematical, (14) , spatial, interpersonal, (15) , and naturalist.

● Sternberg’s (16) theory of intelligence proposed that intelligence has three main components. (17) intelligence is the ability to process information; (18) intelligence is used in coping with new kinds of tasks; and (19) intelligence has to do with how well people adapt to the environment.

Measuring Individual Differences ● (20) is a measure of the (21) of test results. (22) is whether a test measures what it is supposed to measure. (23) ensures that the testing, scoring, and interpretation procedures are similar every time the test is administered.

● IQ is an index of (24) that was originally designed to identify children who were likely to have trouble in school. A test was developed that would determine a child’s (25) age, which is typically calculated by comparing a child’s test score with the (26) score for (27) age groups. Traditionally, IQ was calculated by dividing mental age by (28) age and

multiplying the quotient by 100. Now, however, a (29) IQ is calculated by determining where a given test score “sits” in relation to the average score.

● An IQ score of 70 or below is associated with an (30) , although several criteria must be met for a formal diagnosis. An IQ of (31) or above indicates (32) .

● Scores on traditional IQ tests (33) well with school test scores or grades, although critics argue that IQ doesn’t reflect the whole range of intellectual ability. (34) effects may occur when teachers’ knowledge of IQ scores affect how they interact with students. The effects of the IQ label were particularly serious during the early 20th century when many immigrants who had not mastered (35) were given intelligence tests and were labeled “feebleminded” or “defective” when they failed to perform well.

● (36) is the ability to generate novel and original ideas. (37) intelligence is the ability to perceive, (38) , and express emotion. (39) knowledge is an unspoken practical know-how that is rarely formally taught and comes primarily from (40) .

Discovering the Sources of Intelligence ● One of the best ways to measure the stability of IQ is through a (41) study, which involves testing the same people repeatedly as they age. Current thinking is that (42) intelligence, which reflects basic (43) skills, may (44) with age, whereas (45) intelligence, which reflects acquired (46) , remains (47) or increases with age. The (48) effect is a trend that has been documented worldwide and shows that performance on IQ tests seems to be rising steadily and consistently over time.

● (49) studies address the role of (50) and (51) on intelligence. Identical twins have very (52) IQ scores, regardless of whether they were raised in the same (53) . (54) is a mathematical index that shows the extent to which IQ differences within a population can be accounted for by

Interactive Summary | 335

(55) factors. Estimates of heritability apply to (56) , not to individuals.

● Most researchers agree that there are stable group (57) in IQ across racial, ethnic, and social lines, which may be explained by (58) differences or test (59) . Adoption studies support the role of the

(60) in explaining group differences. Intelligence is determined by a mixture of (61) and (62) influences. Genes place (63) and lower limits on intellectual ability. However, the environment will partly determine how (64) information is expressed, and genetic information will influence (65) .

achievement tests, 314 aptitude tests, 314 creativity, 321 crystallized intelligence, 310 deviation IQ, 317 emotional intelligence, 322 factor analysis, 308 fluid intelligence, 310

g (general intelligence), 308 gifted, 318 heritability, 328 intellectual disability, 318 intelligence, 306 intelligence quotient

(IQ), 317 mental age, 316

multiple intelligences, 311 psychometrics, 307 reliability, 314 s (specific intelligence), 308 standardization, 315 tacit knowledge, 322 triarchic theory, 312 validity, 315

Terms to Remember

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

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11 Motivation and Emotion

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Motivation and Emotion For?

Activating Behavior Learning Goals Internal Factors: Instincts and Drive External Factors: Incentive Motivation Achievement Motivation Intrinsic Motivation Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.1

Meeting Biological Needs: Hunger and Eating

Learning Goals Internal Factors Controlling Hunger External Factors Controlling Hunger

Are There Basic Emotions? The Emotional Experience: Arousal The Emotional Experience: Subjective

Reactions Theories of Emotion: Body to Mind Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.4

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Motivation and Emotion Are For

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Dietary Variety and Weight Gain

Regulating Body Weight Eating Disorders Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.2

Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior Learning Goals The Sexual Response Cycle Internal Factors External Factors Mate Selection Sexual Orientation Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.3

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion Learning Goals

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You sense only rapid movement at first—then the cool feel of metal on your cheek. You exhale, gasping, as a bony arm wraps itself around your neck. “Welcome to your nightmare, my friend,” a voice growls. “Your wallet or your life.” Inside your sympathetic nervous system jumps into action—releasing epinephrine, targeting the critical organs of the body and the neural communication chains. Your mind, flooded with the arousal, struggles to decide on the best response. But you’re in a psychological meltdown—you see only jumbled images of the sidewalk and nee- dle tracks dotting the arm grasping your neck. You can’t think clearly; in your mind there is only surprise, confusion, and the smothering grip of fear.

Not a very pleasant scenario. Two people, reacting to circumstance, each in a highly activated state. For psychologists, however, the interplay is of special interest. The unfolding action strikes at the core of what psychology is about: understand- ing the causes and motivations of behavior. What factors initiate and direct behav- ior? What causes the criminal to attack the victim? Is it the reinforcing value of money? Is it the loss of control driven by an internal need for drugs? And what about the emotions that accompany the act—fear, excitement, despair? How do emotions enhance our ability to function? Do the emotions themselves motivate and direct behavior?

Motivation refers to the set of factors that initiate and direct behavior, usually toward a goal. If you’re motivated, your behavior becomes activated and goal directed. Hunger is a classic example; something happens in the body or in the environment that stimulates us to pursue food. Rewards can be motivating as well—we’re likely to repeat an action that led to a reward. Emotions are complex psychological events that are often associated with goal-directed behavior. Emotions typically involve (1) a physiological reaction, usually arousal; (2) some kind of expressive reaction, such as a distinctive facial expression; and (3) some kind of subjective experience, such as the conscious feeling of being happy or sad.

Each of the preceding chapters touched in one way or another on the question of why behavior occurs, but we’ll focus our attention here on goal-directed behaviors— those actions specifically related to survival and reproduction.

Activating Behavior Anyone hoping to survive in a changing environment must react quickly to circumstance. You need to anticipate future outcomes and act accordingly,

motivation The set of factors that initiate and direct behavior, usually toward some goal.

emotions Psychological events involving (1) a physiological reaction, usually arousal; (2) some kind of expressive reaction, such as a distinctive facial expression; and (3) some kind of subjective experience, such as the conscious feeling of being happy or sad.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Motivation and Emotion For?

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now, with vigor and persistence. Much of the time our actions are controlled by internal factors that push us in the direction of a goal. For example, if you’re deprived of food or water, a delicate internal balance is disrupted. A specific need is signaled, which you seek to satisfy to restore that internal balance. At other times we’re motivated by external events, things in our environment that exert powerful pulling effects. The sight of an attractive person or a demanding and expectant boss can be sufficient to initiate and direct behavior. We’ll discuss how psychologists think about the “activation” of behavior as well as the general concept of “need.”

Meeting Biological Needs: Hunger and Eating We all need to eat—it’s a requirement of living. Consequently, there must be internal mechanisms that make us hun- gry and interested in eating at regular intervals. To understand how our bodies maintain the proper levels of internal energy, we’ll consider the relevant inter- nal and external cues that activate and control eating. We’ll discuss how the body monitors internal physiological states, using brain mechanisms to check on energy reserves and control our eating behavior. We’ll also discuss how external cues in the environment compel us to eat and how these cues can influ- ence food selection. Whether you like broccoli, reject mushrooms, or happily consume squid depends on a variety of factors, including what you’ve learned about these foods.

Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior Are you “consumed” by sex? Do you have a reasonably intense sexual “appetite”? Unlike eating, sex isn’t neces- sary for individual survival. You can live a perfectly productive life, at least in principle, without ever once engaging in a sexual act. But adequate sexual performance is needed for survival of the species. Consequently, there must be internal systems that help motivate an interest in sex. We’ll discuss some of the biological and psychological mechanisms that motivate sexual behav- ior, as well as some of the physiological characteristics of the human sexual response.

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion Emotions have considerable adaptive significance. Consider anger. Anger occurs in response to an environmental event, usually the perceived misdeed of another, which causes the body to enter a highly aroused state. The arousal activates behavior and leads to reac- tions that may substantially increase (or decrease) the likelihood of survival. Once the emotion gains hold, overt physical expressions arise, particularly easy-to-identify facial expressions. From an adaptive perspective, the sight of an angry person carries important signaling properties—others know to shy away and avoid interaction. As you’ll see, emotions are easy to identify but dif- ficult to define.

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Activating Behavior LEARNING GOALS

●● Compare instinct and drive and their roles in activating behavior. ●● Understand incentive motivation and its role in activating behavior. ●● Compare achievement motivation and intrinsic motivation. ●● Describe Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

What factors activate and control goal-directed behavior? At first, psychologists thought there might be a single source of motivation, based either in the body or in the environment. It’s possible, for example, that we’re born with biological machin- ery that compels us to act in fixed ways regardless of what we learn from experience. But this idea is largely rejected by modern psychologists, who believe instead that no single explanation of goal-directed behavior is likely to be found. The reason is simple: Virtually all forms of behavior are determined by multiple causes. Factors both inside and outside the body contribute to motivation. In the following sections, we’ll consider examples of these influences.

Internal Factors: Instincts and Drive To survive, we all must do certain things. Sleeping, eating, and drinking are activi- ties we need to perform at regular intervals. It makes sense, then, to assume that our motivation to perform these activities comes naturally. Yet just how rigidly con- trolled are human goal-directed behaviors? In nature, birds don’t need to be taught how to build nests in the springtime or to fly south in the winter; cats don’t need to be taught to show interest in small, furry creatures. These are unlearned, characteristic patterns of responding—called instincts—that are controlled by events in the envi- ronment. Instincts share properties with reflexes, which we discussed in Chapter 3, but instincts typically involve more complex patterns of behavior than those covered by simple reflexes.

Human Instincts It’s widely accepted that instincts play a role in nonhuman spe- cies, but psychologists are more skeptical about human behavior. Early on, psycholo- gists followed the lead of Charles Darwin in suggesting that instincts underlie much of human motivation. Humans don’t need to be taught to take care of their young, William James (1890) argued, or to cry as infants, to clean themselves when dirty, or even to play, love, imitate, or be curious. These are ingrained biological “musts” that are as natural to the human as nest building is to the bird.

Yet just because a behavior occurs on a regular basis doesn’t mean it’s instinc- tive—that is, unlearned and characteristic in its display. There’s no way to measure an instinct directly by looking inside the body, so it’s easy to fall into a “naming” trap: Someone shows sympathy for a child in need, and the temptation is to name a corre- sponding sympathy instinct (Holt, 1931). Over the years, psychologists argued about which behaviors qualify as instincts. William James (1890) identified some 20 physi- cal and 17 mental human instincts; William McDougall (1908) was convinced of only 12 (he later changed his mind and increased the number to 17). Without an objective way of verifying that the behavior was truly “unlearned,” instincts eventually fell out of favor as an explanation for goal-directed human behavior.

Today, evolutionary psychologists are seeking to revive the concept of human instincts, although in a more flexible form. Evolutionary psychologists believe that we are born with specific mental “software” that helps control and guide our actions. But those actions need not be as inflexible and characteristic as many of the instincts seen in nonhuman species (Buss, 2012).

instincts Unlearned characteristic patterns of responding that are controlled by specific triggering stimuli in the world.

The factors that initiated and are directing this behavior include internal ones, such as depleted energy resources, and external ones, such as the sight of an attractive meal. Hunting behavior may also be controlled to a certain extent by instincts—unlearned, characteristic patterns of responding that are triggered by specific stimuli.

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Drive Psychologists next turned to the concept of drive. A drive is an internal state that arises in response to a need, such as hunger or thirst. It’s clear that the human body is designed to seek fairly stable and constant internal conditions. For exam- ple, the body needs to maintain an adequate internal supply of fluids and a constant internal temperature. The body maintains its steady state through a process called homeostasis, much like the thermostat in a house maintains a constant internal tem- perature by turning the heat on or off (Cannon, 1929). Once a specific need is detected, drive serves a general activating function—drive energizes the organism, causing it to seek immediate reduction of the need (Berridge, 2004). If your water supply is used up, you’re driven to drink and restore the appropriate balance. Similar processes are assumed to operate for hunger and internal body temperature (see ●Figure 11.1).

When an organism seeks to reduce drive—to restore homeostatic balance—it doesn’t really matter how balance is restored. Drive is a more flexible concept than instinct. People can use what they’ve learned from experience to help them satisfy the need; they’re not stuck with one fixed pattern of behavior that’s triggered only by certain events or stimuli in the environment. You can think about drive as analogous to the running engine of a car. A properly running engine is necessary for the car to move, just as drive is necessary to start goal-directed behavior, but the engine doesn’t determine where the car will travel or how you’ll get across town. But as you’ll see shortly, goal-directed behavior also depends critically on the value, or incentive, of the goal. You’re much more likely to eat if you like the food, even though a wide variety of food options may satisfy the internal need. You sometimes even eat in the absence of need—you have that second brownie just because it looks good.

External Factors: Incentive Motivation As just noted, goal-directed behavior depends partly on what we learn from experi- ence. External rewards, such as money or a good grade, exert powerful pulling and guiding effects on our actions. Generally, whether you’ll be motivated to perform an action depends on the value—positive or negative—of the incentive. For this reason psychologists use the term incentive motivation to help explain goal-directed behav- ior. Whitney is motivated to jog for an extra five minutes so she can eat that extra brownie; Charlie is motivated to avoid the kitchen because of the extra calories (and

guilt) he knows the brownie will produce. Note this type of motivation differs from drive—drive is an internal push that compels a person to action; incentives are exter- nal pulls that tempt people with the prospects of receiv- ing powerful reinforcing or punishing consequences.

Internal factors can interact with external factors in a number of ways. Whether or not you’re thirsty, for example, affects the incentive value of water; water tastes better, and is more rewarding, when you’ve been deprived of it for a while (Blundell & Rogers, 1991; Bolles, 1972). Rewarding you with an end-of-chapter test, thereby motivating you to study, has more of an effect when you’re a high procrastinator—that is, some- one who finds it difficult to find the motivation to study (Tuckman, 1998). Internal states of deprivation can also act as cues for responding. You might learn to perform a certain type of action when you’re thirsty or hungry (Hull, 1943); alternatively, you might learn that hun- ger or thirst means that food or water will be especially rewarding (Davidson, 1993, 1998). Remember, motivated behavior is virtually always jointly determined by inter- nal and external factors. Neither factor alone is sufficient to explain motivation.

drive A psychological state that arises in response to an internal physiological need, such as hunger or thirst.

homeostasis The process through which the body maintains a steady state, such as a constant internal temperature or an adequate amount of fluids.

incentive motivation External factors in the environment that exert pulling effects on our actions.

●● FiGuRE 11.1 Homeostasis It’s adaptive for the body to maintain stable and constant internal conditions. If your internal temperature rises above or falls below an optimal level, you are driven to perform actions that will restore the “steady state.” (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Achievement Motivation Another example is the push for achievement. Each of us, to varying degrees, has an internally driven need for achievement (Atkinson, 1957; McClelland et al., 1953; Murray, 1938). Achievement motivation pushes us to seek success and significant accomplishment in our lives. Are you driven by a need for success? Studies have shown that people who rate high in achievement motivation tend to work harder and more persistently on tasks; they also tend to achieve more than those who rate low in achievement motivation (Atkinson & Raynor, 1974; Cooper, 1983).

However, whether you’ll work hard on any particular task depends on your expectations of success and on how much you value the task (Atkinson, 1957; Molden & Dweck, 2000). You can have a high internal need for achievement but choose not to persist on a task either because you place no value on it or because you lack confidence in your ability to succeed. For example, young children who experi- ence failure on mathematics problems early in life can develop a helpless attitude that prevents them from persisting and succeeding on mathematical tasks later on. Conversely, children who perform well on such tasks gain confidence in their ability and appear motivated to take on similar tasks in the future (Smiley & Dweck, 1994; Wigfield, 1994).

Your achievement goal is important too. It matters whether you’re motivated to master a task—that is, to develop a skill or ability in a given area—or whether you’re simply motivated to do better than someone else (Hulleman et al., 2010). You want to get an A in your psychology class, but is your goal to master psychological science or beat out the other students? People who focus just on performance (beating others) are likely to avoid risky learning opportunities; they are overly concerned with mak- ing errors or not doing well. People who are motivated by mastery are more likely to engage in effortful learning opportunities and seek out challenges (Mangels et al., 2006). Your achievement goal also tells us something about the emotions you’re likely to experience during the task. For example, people driven by a need to perform well are less likely to enjoy the task and tend to be more anxious (Huang, 2011). There even seems to be an effect on memory. People who seek to master a task are more likely to maintain memories about the learning experience after a delay (Murayama & Elliot, 2011).

Parents and teachers play an important part in determining achievement moti- vation and achievement goals. If parents value a task, it’s likely their child will value it too and be more motivated to succeed. What children are told about their perfor- mance on a task is also important. For example, if children are praised for their effort, they tend to work harder, report more enjoyment, and show more interest. On the other hand, if they’re told that performance is tied to an ability such as natural intelli- gence, children show less achievement motivation—especially if they fail or perform poorly on the task (see Elliot & Dweck, 2005).

achievement motivation An internal drive or need for achievement that is possessed by all individuals to varying degrees.

External rewards can exert powerful pulling and guiding effects on our actions.

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●● CONCEPt REviEw General Approaches to Motivation APPROACH SOURCE OF MOTIVATION SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

Instinct Internal Unlearned, characteristic patterns of responding that are controlled by specific trigger- ing mechanisms in the world. They play a role in nonhuman species but are insufficient to explain goal-directed human behavior.

Drive Internal A psychological state that arises in response to a physiological need, such as hunger or thirst. Homeostasis is the process through which the body maintains a steady state. A more flexible concept than instinct, but drive does not explain behavior in the absence of need.

Incentive motivation External Helps to explain goal-directed behavior. People are driven by external rewards that exert powerful pulling and guiding effects on their actions.

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Cultural Factors Every society in the world establishes standards for achieve- ment—the skills and tasks deemed important and unimportant—and these standards influence what the members of the society seek to achieve and perhaps the level of productivity of the society as a whole (McClelland, 1961). For example, whether a society values individual success or collective success seems to affect individual levels of achievement motivation. Middle school athletes in the United States report more self-confidence than comparable students in Korea, and they are more easily moti- vated, presumably because a greater emphasis is placed on individual success in the United States (Kim et al, 2003).

It’s also possible that gender differences in achievement—such as the tendency for men to outperform women in mathematics—are partly tied to such cultural factors. In the United States, for instance, the parents of sons place greater value on success in mathematics than do the parents of daughters (Parsons et al., 1982); at the same time, boys often receive the message that they should study less, which helps explain why girls outperform boys in other subjects (van Houtte, 2004). Consequently, the expectations and values of the parents help to determine the achievement motivation of the children.

Intrinsic Motivation We’ve talked about motivation in terms of internal pushes and external pulls, but we often engage in actions for which there’s no obvious internal or external moti- vational source. A child spends hours carefully coloring a picture or playing with a doll; you might become transfixed by a crossword puzzle or by a long walk on the beach. Certainly there’s no biological need that drives coloring or walk ing. There’s also no clear-cut external incentive: Nobody pays the child for coloring or you for finishing the crossword puzzle. Intrinsic motivation is the term used to describe behaviors that appear to be entirely self-motivated. We engage in the action for its own sake, not because someone offers us a reward or because the action restores some internal homeostatic balance (Lepper et al., 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000).

In fact, it turns out that when we’re intrinsically motivated, supplying an exter- nal reward can actually lower interest in the task. In a classic study by Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973), preschool children who were naturally interested in drawing were asked to draw either for its own sake or to win a “Good Player” certifi- cate. Psychologically, we would expect the external reward to bolster drawing even more than normal—after all, drawing is now followed by a concrete positive conse- quence—but it didn’t. The children in the reward condition showed less interest in drawing a week later. The reward reduced the value of the behavior, making it less rewarding or interesting than it otherwise would have been.

This study has been repeated with other rewards and with activities other than drawing. The story is much the same: External rewards can lower our desire to per- form a task. Once a reward is involved, we’re less likely to enjoy that task for its own sake in the future. This doesn’t always happen, of course, but it does occur in some instances (Henderlong & Lepper, 2002). Think about professional athletes. Many sports fans complain that the external reward of money has ruined professional sports. Even baseball players sometimes complain that the game was more fun back in the sandlot, before millions of dollars entered into the motivational chain.

How can a reward lead to a negative effect? One possibility is people see exter- nal rewards, even praise, as an indirect way of controlling their behavior. Drawing loses its value because it’s now something you’re doing to please the person giving you the reward—you’re no longer drawing simply because it pleases you. Choosing to perform the task, rather than being pulled by an external reward, is an important factor in intrinsic motivation (Patall et al., 2008). Another possibility is the reward degrades the value of the task—for example, the baseball player begins to believe it’s the money that makes him play, rather than love for the game. Recent neuroimaging

intrinsic motivation Goal-directed behavior that seems to be entirely self-motivated.

Children who experience failure on mathematical problems early in life can develop a “helpless” attitude that prevents them from persisting and succeeding in mathematics later in life.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Suppose you spend every Saturday morning volunteering at a local homeless shelter. How do you think your attitude might change if you started receiving a paycheck for your time?

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work suggests that the introduction of an external reward can change how specific reward centers in the brain react to a task that was previously performed without any reward (Murayama et al., 2010). Some researchers have even suggested that traits such as creativity should never be rewarded lest the positive internal value of engag- ing in a creative act be destroyed (Amabile, 1983; Schwartz, 1990).

Not all psychologists are comfortable with these conclusions. External reward enhances creativity under some circumstances, and the negative effects of reward on task motivation only occur in some circumstances (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). For example, in the study by Lepper and colleagues, children did indeed choose to draw less frequently when they were rewarded for drawing, but this effect occurred only when the children expected the reward. When children were given an unex- pected reward for drawing, they later spent more time drawing than a group who had received no reward. Therefore, the negative effect of reward on intrinsic motiva- tion may be related to the expectation or promise of reward rather than to the reward itself (Cameron & Pierce, 1994).

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Most general theories of motivation appeal primarily to biological factors. The body seeks to maintain a delicate internal balance (homeostasis), and if that balance is dis- rupted, we’re motivated to restore it. However, as you’ve just seen, not all needs are biological in origin—for example, the need for achievement (Murray, 1938). For this reason, some psychologists have tried to classify “need,” to determine whether some needs are more basic or important than others.

The need hierarchy proposed by Abraham Maslow is a well-known example. The essential component of Maslow’s theory is the prioritizing of needs: Some needs have special priority and must be satisfied before others. Obviously, if we don’t eat or drink water on a regular basis, we’ll die. Maslow’s theory is often represented as a pyramid, to emphasize the fact that human motivation rests on a foundation of biological and security “musts” (see ●Figure 11.2). It’s only after satisfying the sur- vival needs—such as hunger and thirst—that we can consider more social or spiri- tual needs, such as the need for love or self-esteem. At the top of the structure sits the

need hierarchy The idea popularized by Maslow that human needs are prioritized in a hierarchy.

These food bank volunteers are probably intrinsically motivated; it’s unlikely that they’re expecting any concrete external reward.

Physiological Needs

Safety Needs

Belongingness and Love Needs

Esteem Needs

Self- Actualization

Needs

●● FiGuRE 11.2 A Hierarchy of Needs Maslow proposed that human needs are prioritized: Some must be satisfied before others can be addressed, including physiological and safety needs. At the top of the pyramid is the need for self-actualization, our natural desire to reach our true potential. (© Cengage Learning)

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need for self-actualization, which Maslow believed represented our desire to reach our true potential as human beings.

The pyramid is an appropriate symbol for Maslow’s system because it captures the upward thrust of human motivation. As a humanistic psychologist, Maslow (1954) believed all people have a compelling need to grow, to better themselves as function- ing individuals. Maslow was strongly influenced by people who he felt had reached their fullest potential, such as Thomas Jefferson and Albert Einstein. He used their personality characteristics as a way of defining what it means to sit at the top of the pyramid—to be self-actualized. These characteristics included spontaneity, openness to experience, and a high degree of ethical sensitivity (Mook, 1995; Ryckman, 2008). In his later years Maslow fine-tuned the hierarchy, adding some additional moti- vational levels, but they need not concern us here (see Koltko-Rivera, 2006). We’ll return to humanistic views on personality in Chapter 12.

Probably the most important feature of the Maslow hierarchy is the laddering of needs. Psychologists might disagree about the specific order that Maslow proposed— does the need to belong and be accepted really have higher priority than the need for self- esteem?—but the idea that humans have a wide variety of needs that must be prioritized has been enormously influential. If you have to worry about putting food on the table, and consequently steal from others on a regular basis, you might appear to lack moral or ethical values. But this isn’t necessarily a permanent fixture of your personality—under different circumstances, with a full stomach, you might act extremely ethically.

Applied psychologists have extended Maslow’s ideas to the workplace to help employers better understand the behavior of their employees. Many employers now recognize that an employee’s needs change depending on his or her position in the management hierarchy. When people receive low pay or have poor job security, their work behavior is directed toward satisfying basic needs. Promotion may help satisfy the fundamental needs, but new, perhaps more demanding ones will quickly arise. Employers must be sensitive to the particular needs at each level of the management hierarchy (Muchinsky, 2003). Similar arguments have been applied to student success in academic settings (e.g., Freitas & Leonard, 2011). Madison Avenue has even gotten wind of the idea: Consumers receive individualized ads based on their perceived posi- tion in the hierarchy of needs (Peterson & Park, 2010).

Critics of Maslow’s theory often point to its lack of scientific rigor. Because the various needs are not defined clearly in a way that each can be individually measured, it’s difficult to test the different proposals of the need hierarchy (Wahba & Bridwell, 1976). More recently, efforts have been made to update and revise the hierarchy, based on developments in evolutionary biology (Kenrick et al., 2010). Here, needs are priori- tized based on their evolutionary function—e.g., finding and retaining a good mating partner—as well as on when the needs first appear developmentally.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Turn back to the chapter on development and think about the various personal crises people confront as they age. Is there any way you can tie these crises to the needs that Maslow discussed in his hierarchy?

Abraham Maslow used the personality characteristics of high achievers, such as Thomas Jefferson and Albert Einstein, to define what it means to be self-actualized.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about activating behavior by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.1

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Meeting Biological Needs: Hunger and Eating LEARNING GOALS

●● Understand how internal and external factors influence the desire to eat. ●● Explain how body weight is regulated. ●● Understand obesity and eating disorders.

Why do we eat? Obviously, from a survival standpoint eating is a no-brainer—we need food and water to survive. But we eat for reasons that are more complex than you might think. If you ask children why they eat, they’ll explain they eat “because I’m hungry” or “because my tummy hurts.” An adult’s response will appear more sophisticated, but it usually amounts to much the same thing: “We eat because our bodies need food, internal energy.” This is true; eating is a biologically driven behav- ior. But eating is psychologically driven as well. We sometimes feel hungry when there is no physical need; and, as any dieter knows, a strong will can stop consump- tion even when the physical need is present.

Internal Factors Controlling Hunger Researchers have spent decades trying to understand the internal mechanisms that influence when and why we eat. We know that the body monitors itself, particularly its internal supply of resources, in a number of ways. For example, there’s a connec- tion between the volume and content of food in the stomach and the frequency of neural activity in certain areas of the brain (Sharma et al., 1961). Psychologically, people report little if any hunger or interest in food when their stomach is full, and hunger increases in a relatively direct way as the stomach empties (Sepple & Read, 1989).

Chemical Signals The body regularly checks several important suppliers of internal energy. One critical substance is glucose, a kind of sugar required for energy produc- tion. Receptors in the liver or intestines react to changes in the amount of glucose in the blood, or perhaps to how this sugar is being used by the cells, and appropri- ate signals are communicated upward to the brain. There’s also a hormone called

1. Which of the following statements best captures the difference between an instinct and a drive?

a. A drive is a reflex; an instinct is not. b. Instincts are learned; drives are not. c. Instincts lead to fixed response patterns; drives do not. d. Instincts restore appropriate internal balance; drives do not.

2. Which type of motivation—achievement, incentive, or intrinsic— best describes each of the following behaviors?

a. Whitney never misses her daily jogging session—she loves the brownie she gives herself at the end:

b. Janice spends hours practicing the piano—she just seems to love playing:

c. Candice studies at least six hours a day—she is obsessed with the idea of finishing first in her class:

d. Jerome rarely paints for fun anymore, not since he started teaching art classes at the local college:

3. According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, we can reach our true potential as human beings only after:

a. restoring a proper level of homeostatic balance. b. satisfying basic survival and social needs. c. satisfying our need for achievement. d. eliminating the need for rewards.

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.1 (Continued)

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ghrelin that increases before eating and decreases afterwards. Ghrelin is produced in the stomach and it’s been associated with feelings of hunger (Langlois et al., 2011).

But the main story isn’t about internal signals that push us to eat; it’s about chemi- cal signals that stop us from eating—what are called satiety or satiation signals. People are rarely compelled to eat because of an internal biological deficit, such as a danger- ously low level of glucose. Most of the time we’re pushed by external cues—habits such as the time of day, the sight of tasty food, or even by stress. This makes sense from an evolutionary perspective because our ancestors couldn’t drive down to the nearest fast food restaurant for nourishment; they had to eat whenever food was available or it was safe to eat. We choose to stop eating, or skip a meal, because of internal signals that make us feel full. Probably the most important satiation signal is the hormone cholecys- tokinin (CCK), which is released by the gastrointestinal tract during a meal. CCK trav- els to the brain, which, in turn, suppresses our desire to eat (Woods & D’Alessio, 2008).

Your body also monitors and releases hunger-related hormones based on your total amount of body fat. There is a hormone called leptin that rises and falls with the amount of body fat; high levels of leptin are often found in obese individuals, and leptin levels typically drop when individuals go on a diet (Woods et al., 2000). Leptin plays a critical role in weight loss and if blocked can lead to increased food intake and weight gain. Resistance to leptin is thought to play an important role in the development and maintenance of obesity (Morton et al., 2006). Insulin, a hormone released by the pancreas, also varies with body fat. The body needs insulin to help pump the nutrients present in the blood into the cells, where they can be stored as fat or metabolized into needed energy. At the start of a meal, the brain sends signals to the pancreas to begin the production and release of insulin in preparation for the rise in blood sugar produced by the food. As insulin does its job, the levels of blood sugar go down, and you eventually feel hungry again. If either insuin or leptin are injected into the body, people act as if they have too much body fat and start to reduce their food intake (Woods & D’Alessio, 2008).

Brain Regions Ultimately, of course, the experience of hunger originates in the brain. It’s the activation of brain structures that kick-starts and directs the search for food. A number of years ago it was discovered that if a particular portion of the hypothalamus is lesioned (destroyed) in laboratory animals, a curious transformation occurs. Lesioned animals appear to be hungry all the time and show a striking ten- dency to overeat. In fact, each animal becomes an eating machine—if allowed, it bal- loons up to several times its normal weight (Hetherington & Ranson, 1942). If this

same area is stimulated electrically, rather than destroyed, the opposite pat- tern emerges. Electrical stimulation causes the animal to lose all interest in food, even if there’s a real need for nutrients in the body.

Neuroscientists now believe that the hypothalamus contains receptors that are sensitive to the presence of food-related hormones such as insulin and leptin (Schwartz, 2006). Leptin, for example, binds with receptors in the hypothala- mus that, in turn, enhance the body’s response to satiation signals (stop eating) and lower the reward value of food (e.g., may make food taste less good). Such a process is adaptive because it prevents us from accumulating too many nutri- ents in the blood—more than our bodies can safely handle. Portions of the hindbrain are also critical in the initiation of eating (Grill & Kaplan, 1990), and the hippocampus may be involved as well. You may remember from Chapter 8 that we discussed an amnesic called H.M. who was doomed to live in a kind of perpetual present—he could remember nothing of what happened to him moments before. H.M., who had damage to his temporal lobes and hippocam- pus, also had trouble monitoring his need for food. Sometimes he’d claim to be hungry immediately after finishing a meal. He may have simply forgotten he’d eaten; but as Davidson (1993) points out, he also was clearly unable to use inter- nal signals from his body as cues for hunger or satiety. These data suggest an important role for the hippocampus in feeding behavior.

satiation signals Internal chemical signals, such as the hormone CCK, that reduce our desire to eat.

Such internal factors as the amount of food in the stomach and the amount of glucose in the blood play an important role in making people feel sated after a meal.

If a particular portion of the hypothalamus is destroyed, a rat becomes an eating machine and can balloon up to several times its normal weight.

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External Factors Controlling Hunger It’s a mistake to think about eating as simply a means to satisfy a variety of internal energy needs. We often eat for reasons unrelated to restoring internal homeostatic balance. Haven’t you ever eaten to reduce stress or simply to make yourself feel good? Have you ever eaten to promote social interaction, as in going out to dinner with friends? We all have. People even use food to make ethical statements. For example, some people are vegetarians because they believe it’s wrong to eat other animals.

Eating Habits Most eating habits develop through personal experience and by mod- eling the behavior of others. These learned habits control much of our decision mak- ing about food. I suspect you’re probably used to eating at certain times and in certain places. If you’re offered a tasty snack, how much you eat is determined partly by the time of day—if the offer comes shortly before dinner, you take less than if the offer comes in the middle of the afternoon (Schachter & Gross, 1968). You also know from past experience how much food you can eat and still feel okay. You know, for instance, that if you eat the whole pizza you will probably feel sick afterward, even though the pizza may taste great at the time.

Cultural and ethnic background is another powerful influence (Rozin et al., 1999). Most people who grow up in the United States will not willingly choose to eat dogs or sheep’s eyes, but these are considered delicacies in some parts of the world. Are you hesitant about eating pork or beef ? You probably are if you’re an Orthodox Jew or a native of India. And it’s not just the appearance of food or where it comes from. People around the world often discriminate among eating partners. For exam- ple, members of some social classes would never consider eating with those they con- sider to be social inferiors.

Food Cues The decision to eat is also strongly influenced by the appearance of food cues. Animals know that certain kinds of food taste good, and the sight of these foods is often enough to make them start eating. If hungry rats are taught that a flashing light predicts food, they’ll start eating in the presence of the light even if they’ve been fully fed moments before (Weingarten, 1983). Waiters push the dessert tray under your nose because they know the sight of the sugar-filled array will be more likely to break down your reserve than just hearing about what’s for dessert. Again, your choice of the New York cheesecake with the strawberry sauce is not driven by inter- nal need. Your blood contains plenty of appropriate nutrients—the sight of the food, and its associations with past pleasures, acts as an external pull, motivating your choice to consume. For more information on potential food cues, take a look at the Practical Solutions feature.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Can you think of any factors, besides behavior modeling, that might help to determine eating habits? What about the availability of food—when was the last time you saw sheep’s eyes on the menu at the local diner?

One’s cultural and ethnic background exerts a powerful effect on food selection. Would you be willing to consume the shrimp shown on the left? How about the delicacies on the right?

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Regulating Body Weight What determines everyday body weight? Why are some people thin and others obese? Not surprisingly, internal and external factors combine to regulate body weight. Some factors, such as genetic predisposition, play a particularly important role (Kowalski, 2004). For example, when identical twins—those sharing the same genetic material—are fed identical diets, they tend to gain virtually the same amount of weight. But if two unrelated people are given matched diets, the differences in weight gain can be substantial (Bouchard et al., 1990). I’m sure you know people who seem to eat continuously and never gain weight; others put on wieght after only a small daily increase in caloric intake. In short, the amount of food you eat only partly determines what you normally weigh.

Set Point Researchers used to believe we have a natural body weight, or set point, that more or less controls our tendency to gain or lose weight (Keesey & Powley, 1975). Most people show little variation in weight from year to year, presumably because their bodies manipulate the motivation to eat, as needed, to maintain the appropriate set point weight. When people go on a diet and dip below their natural weight, well over 90% of them eventually gain that weight back (Martin et al., 1991). Here again, the idea is that the body adjusts how much it eats, rebounding after a diet, to produce stability in body weight.

But most researchers now reject the idea of a fixed set point. If there is a set point, it’s a loose one, meaning that there may be upper or lower limits on our general

set point A natural body weight, perhaps produced by genetic factors, that the body seeks to maintain.

Is variety in your diet a good thing? From a nutritional standpoint, of course, it’s essen- tial that you eat foods that deliver needed vitamins and other nutrients. But from a psychological standpoint, variety within a meal can actually make you eat more food. Suppose I let you eat one of your favorite fla- vors of ice cream, as much as you like, and record how much you eat; in a second case, I give you several different types of ice cream and, again, let you eat to your heart’s desire. The evidence indicates you’ll eat signifi- cantly more in the second instance (Raynor & Epstein, 2001).

Variety, particularly the introduction of a new and different food, has a way of coun- teracting fullness, or satiety. This is one of the reasons dessert looks good even though you’ve just pushed away your dinner plate. The effect of variety on consumption, which occurs for both humans and animals, sug- gests that satiety is sensory-specific—that is, eating makes us lose interest in the particu- lar food we’re eating but not necessarily other foods. If people are asked to rate the pleas- antness of sweet foods after eating a meal containing sweet food, their ratings drop;

but the meal has no effect on their rating of savory foods (Rolls et al., 1984). The effect applies to the taste and color of food as well as to its shape and texture. For instance, your pleasantness ratings for hard foods (such as a baguette or an apple) drop after consumption, but not your ratings for soft foods (Guinard & Brun, 1998). Even the addition of condi- ments, such as ketchup, can have an effect. People who have lost interest in eating French fries alone suddenly want more if ketchup is offered as a condiment (Brondel et al., 2009).

Some psychologists have suggested that dietary variety may be a factor in the develop- ment of obesity. It’s possible, for example, that obese individuals show less sensory- specific satiety, which, in turn, causes them to eat more; alternatively, perhaps they show greater levels of sensory-specific satiety, which leads them to eat a greater variety of foods at a meal. Remember, though, obesity is not caused simply by the amount of food consumed—your weight depends on many factors, including genetics. The variety of foods present in a meal can, however, influ- ence weight gain because variety determines how much you eat. One common reason

people give for not finishing a meal is that they’re “tired” of the food (Hetherington, 1996)—variety, of course, works against this tendency. From a practical standpoint, if you want to eat less, try reducing the amount of variety on your plate. Eat right, but cut down on the variety.

●●PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Dietary Variety and Weight Gain

If you want to eat less food, try reducing the amount of variety on your plate.

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weight (Muller et al., 2010). Body weight is determined by a multitude of factors, both internal and external. Genetic factors certainly play an important role: People are born with a certain number of fat cells, and this number may constrain just how much weight they can hope to gain or lose (Faust, 1984). Your metabolic rate—how quickly you burn off calories—is another important internal factor; again, it’s deter- mined in part by your genetic makeup but also by experience. Research in rats indi- cates that nicotine may lower metabolic set point; if so, although speculative, this may help explain why people sometimes gain weight after they stop smoking (Frankham & Cabanac, 2003).

Obesity What causes obesity, the condition characterized by excessive body fat? Obesity rates are on the rise, startlingly so over the past few decades (Corsica & Perri, 2003). Think about how easy it is to get tasty fast food or prepackaged meals or to stuff yourself at an all-you-can-eat buffet. At one time it was thought that overweight people simply lacked sufficient willpower to resist overeating, espe- cially when appealing food was in view (Schachter, 1971). Overweight people are more likely to order a specific dish in a restaurant after a tasty description; they’re also more likely than nonobese people to report that food still tastes good after a filling meal.

Yet to explain obesity by appealing to willpower, or to any one psychological factor, is simplistic and misleading. As noted previously, just because someone eats a lot doesn’t mean he or she will gain excessive amounts of weight. Some people can eat a lot and gain little weight; others gain weight on limited diets. It’s increasingly apparent that genetic factors predispose people to become overweight (Corsica & Perri, 2003). Even so, the ultimate causes of obesity are certain to lie in a complex combination of biology and psychology: metabolic rate, set point, number of fat cells, learned eating habits, cultural role models, level of stress—all contribute in one way or another to weight control.

Given the recent and dramatic increases in obesity rates across the world, it is clear that the environment must be extremely important; in turn, excessive and prolonged weight gains may change how the brain and body function—the brain’s responsiveness to leptin, for instance, may decrease (Morton et al., 2006). Prolonged exposure to high-fat diets may also produce changes in the brain, such as inflamma- tion of critical brain structures, that influence the effectiveness of satiation signals (Smith et al., 2011). Obviously, proper diet, and gaining some control over how much you eat, is important to maintaining a healthy lifestyle; we’ll return to this issue in more detail in Chapter 16.

obesity A weight problem characterized by excessive body fat.

●● CONCEPt REviEw Factors Involved in Hunger TYPE OF FACTOR FACTOR ITS ROLE IN HUNGER

Internal Chemical signals Receptors in the liver respond to changes in the amount of glucose in the blood. The hor- mone ghrelin may play a role in hunger, but most internal signals are designed to stop us from eating. The hormone CCK is an important satiation signal. The hormones insulin and leptin are also important regulators of hunger and are tied to the amount of body fat.

Brain Regions of the hypothalamus help to control eating, but the precise role of each is unclear. Portions of the brain stem also seem important in the initiation of eating.

External Eating habits Learned habits develop through personal experience and modeling the behavior of others. Cultural and ethnic background also play critical roles in when and what you eat.

Food cues Factors such as the attractiveness of food, or its association with past pleasures, can serve as an external pull, motivating eating behavior.

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Eating Disorders The quest for a perfect body shape is a billion-dollar industry with worldwide influence. As you know, society sets weight ideals, often through advertising, and our notions about attractiveness have become closely tied to meeting these standards. Although there are important cultural differences in body weight “ideals,” in Western countries a desire for thinness is commonplace (Swami et al., 2010). If you’re extremely over- weight, you’re more likely to suffer from health problems, so you need to monitor what you eat carefully. But the pursuit of unrealistic weight goals, ones that you can never hope to reach because of your genetic background, can lead to significant psy- chological and physical problems. Unhappiness and depression are the all-too-often by- products of the failure to reach the proper ideal.

Interestingly, people’s assessments of their own weight, and its relation to these standards, are typically inaccurate. In addition, most people are simply wrong about what members of the opposite sex consider to be an ideal body weight (Swami et al., 2010). On average, women tend to think men prefer thinner women than men actu- ally do; when men are asked about their own ideal weight, it tends to be heavier than what the average woman rates as most attractive. Not surprisingly, these mistaken beliefs often help promote a negative body image. A negative body image, in turn, can increase one’s susceptibility to eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and buli- mia nervosa (Polivy & Herman, 2002).

Anorexia Nervosa In a survey of 8th- and 10th-grade students, it was discov- ered that more than 60% of the females and 28% of the males were actively diet- ing (Hunnicutt & Newman, 1993). The concern—some would say obsession—with weight and dieting starts early in Western cultures. For an unfortunate few, the con- sequences can be life threatening. In the condition called anorexia nervosa, other- wise healthy people fail to maintain a normal weight level, typically because they have an irrational fear of being overweight. In such cases, a person can literally be starving to death and still see an overweight person in the mirror. The condition mainly affects young women and usually begins between the ages of 15 and 29 (per- haps as many as 1% of adolescent women are affected). Somewhere between 5% and 10% of those with the disorder will eventually die as a result, either from medical problems or from suicide. This mortality rate is astonishingly high—as high as that

anorexia nervosa An eating disorder diagnosed when an otherwise healthy person refuses to maintain a normal weight level because of an intense fear of being overweight.

Social standards concerning ideal weight have changed considerably over the years. Al

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seen in any form of psychological disorder (Attia, 2010). Not surprisingly, the causes of this disorder are complex and probably involve genetic as well as psychological factors (Keel et al., 2012).

One of the many features associated with anorexia nervosa is the slowing or ceasing of menstruation and associated reproductive functions. This has led some evolutionary psychologists to suggest that a predisposition for anorexia may have served an adaptive function at some point in our evolutionary history—perhaps because it lowered the likelihood of a young girl becoming pregnant in a stressful environment (Anderson & Crawford, 1992). This may have been true at some point in our ancestral past, but anorexia nervosa is certainly not adaptive in modern envi- ronments. Besides interfering with reproductive functions, the condition is associ- ated with low blood pressure, loss of bone density, and gastrointestinal problems. Anorexia nervosa is a very serious and chronic condition that needs immediate and prolonged treatment.

Bulimia Nervosa In the eating disorder known as bulimia nervosa, the principal symptom is binge eating. A binge is an episode in which a person consumes large quan- tities of food, often junk food, in a limited period of time. The condition is marked by a lack of control—the person feels unable to stop the eating or to control the con- tent of the food being consumed. A binging episode is often followed by purging, in which the person induces vomiting or uses laxatives in an effort to stop potential weight gain. Like anorexia, bulimia primarily affects women and is characterized by an obsessive desire to be thin.

Bulimia is also associated with serious medical problems. One of the def in- ing characteristics of bulimia is that the person can appear normal, without the excessive weight loss found in anorexia. Yet repeated vomiting can dam- age the intestines, lead to nutritional problems, and even promote tooth decay. Psychologically, bulimia nervosa is associated with a preoccupation or obsession with weight gain and a fear of becoming obese. Bulimia can be harder to diagnose than anorexia because the bingeing and purging usually occur in private (Polivy & Herman, 2002).

Psychologists originally assumed that eating disorders such as bulimia and anorexia were caused primarily by cultural factors, specifically, the fixation by many Western cultures on staying thin. Anorexia nervosa, in particular, was believed to be a recent phenomenon, rarely diagnosed prior to the 1970s and con- fined largely to the West. However, recent work suggests that anorexia nervosa may be neither recent nor culture bound. Cases can be traced back to medieval times, and the disorder occurs today in all parts of the world. Bulimia nervosa, on the other hand, may follow a different pattern. A large and significant increase in bulimia occurred in the latter half of the 20th century, and little evidence for the condition currently exists outside of cultures with Western influences (see Keel & K lump, 2003).

Related Disorders. Although anorexia and bulimia are the most widely-k nown eating disorders, there are many other conditions. In fact, people with anorexia and bulimia represent a minority of individuals with serious eating problems (Keel et al., 2012). There is a condition k nown as binge eating disorder in which one sees episodes of binge eating, but without the purging seen in bulimia ner- vosa. One can also find people who purge following consumption of normal or small amounts of food (k nown as purging disorder). There are other individuals, typically those suffering from insomnia, who consume large amounts of food at night, a condition called night eating syndrome. At present, psychologists don’t k now how all these conditions relate to one another or their ultimate cause. Not surprisingly, the study and treatment of eating disorders is a hot topic among cli- nicians and researchers.

bulimia nervosa An eating disorder in which the principal symptom is binge eating (consuming large quantities of food) followed by purging, in which the person voluntarily vomits or uses laxatives to prevent weight gain.

This young woman suffers from anorexia nervosa, a condition characterized by an intense fear of being overweight.

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Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior LEARNING GOALS

●● Describe the human sexual response cycle. ●● Consider the role of hormones in sexual behavior. ●● List external influences on sexual behavior. ●● Understand the factors that influence mate selection. ●● Discuss factors that may determine sexual orientation.

Does your world revolve around sex? Maybe not, but sex is still a powerful motiva- tor of people around the world. Every significant culture has well-established rules and guidelines for the teaching and practice of behavior related to courtship, mating, and the sexual act. Just think for a moment about advertising, television, and movies. Enough said.

But where exactly is the need? What problem is solved by the pursuit and comple- tion of the sexual act? Is there some kind of internal sex gauge that monitors sexual deprivation and adjusts behavior accordingly? You certainly won’t die if your goal- directed sexual pursuits fail, as you might from an unsuccessful search for nutrients. So why sex? Why did we evolve a form of reproduction that requires finding a mate as opposed to some kind of asexual reproduction or cloning process? Engaging in a sexual act can put you at risk, either from predators or from disease. It also takes a lot of time and effort to find an appropriate mate—time and energy that might be better spent satisfying basic energy needs.

Evolutionary biologists and psychologists have spent a lot of time considering the costs and benefits of sexual reproduction (e.g., Brockhurst, 2011; Kenrick, 2011). Some have argued that sex introduces genetic variation within the species, which can help individual genes survive and compete in changing environments. But, of course, sex- ual motivation has its advantages within a single lifetime too. In addition to the plea- surable and reinforcing aspects of sex, relationships offer companionship, protection,

test Yourself Check your knowledge about hunger and eating by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. A hormone called ghrelin, which is produced in the stomach, has been associated with feelings of hunger. True or False?

2. The principal symptoms of anorexia nervosa are bingeing and purging. True or False?

3. High levels of a hormone called leptin are often found in obese individuals. True or False?

4. Obesity is primarily caused by poor dietary habits. True or False?

5. Destruction of portions of the hypothalamus can cause a rat to overeat and gain substantial amounts of weight. True or False?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.2

Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior | 353

and love. In this section of the chapter, we’ll consider some of the specifics of sexual motivation, beginning with a brief discussion of the human sexual response cycle. Then we’ll look at the internal and external factors that motivate sexual behavior. We’ll conclude with a look at issues involved in mate selection and sexual orientation.

The Sexual Response Cycle Humans are capable of wide and imaginative varieties of lovemaking, but biologi- cally the sexual response follows a standard four-step sequence (see ●Figure 11.3). As documented by researchers William Masters and Virginia Johnson (1966), who spent years studying the human sexual response in the laboratory, the response cycle begins with an excitement phase. Sexual excitement is characterized by changes in muscle tension, increased heart rate and blood pressure, and a rushing of blood into the genital organs. In men, the increased blood supply causes an erection in the penis; in women, the clitoris swells and the lining of the vaginal walls becomes lubricated.

The excitement phase is followed by a plateau phase, during which sexual arousal continues to increase, at a slower rate, toward a maximum point. The penis becomes fully erect, and vaginal lubrication increases. Other changes begin that are appropriate to the reproductive process—the internal shape of the vagina changes in preparation for the receipt of the sperm-laden semen; the testes of men rise up in preparation for ejaculation. Sexual release is next, in the orgasmic phase, and occurs in the form of rhythmic contractions in the sex organs; in men, these rhythmic con- tractions are accompanied by ejaculation. Interestingly, the subjective experience of the orgasm is apparently quite similar for males and females despite the obvious physiological differences (Mah & Binik, 2002). When asked to review written descrip- tions of the orgasmic experience, outside readers usually can’t tell whether a descrip- tion was written by a man or a woman (Proctor et al., 1974).

The sexual response cycle ends with a resolution phase, during which arousal returns to normal levels and, at least for men, there is a refractory period where fur- ther stimulation fails to produce visible signs of arousal or orgasm. The length of the resolution phase is highly variable—it can last anywhere from a few minutes to sev- eral days—and no one is quite sure exactly what determines when it will end. Age

excitement phase The first component of the human sexual response cycle; it’s characterized by changes in muscle tension, increased heart rate and blood pressure, and a rushing of blood into the genital organs.

plateau phase The second stage in the human sexual response cycle. Arousal continues to increase, although at a slower rate, toward a preorgasm maximum point.

orgasmic phase The third stage in the human sexual response cycle. It’s characterized by rhythmic contractions in the sex organs; in men, ejaculation occurs. There is also the subjective experience of pleasure, which appears to be similar for men and women.

resolution phase The fourth and final stage in the human sexual response cycle. Arousal returns to normal levels. For men, there is a refractory period during which further stimulation fails to produce visible signs of arousal.

Besides reproduction, finding an appropriate mate opens the door for companionship, protection, and love.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Given the importance of the sexual act to the continued survival of the species, do you think there is justification for placing a great deal of emphasis on sex in our theories of behavior and mind (e.g., Freud)?

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and prior frequency of sexual release seem to be important factors, as is the degree of emotional closeness with one’s partner (Crooks & Baur, 2011).

Internal Factors For most animals, including primates, sexual behavior is strongly controlled by chemical messengers (sex hormones) that rise and fall in cycles (Pfaff, 1999). A female rat will assume a characteris- tic posture—signaling she’s ready for mounting and copulation by

the male—but only during the time in her hormonal cycle when she is most likely to become impregnated. She’ll adjust her posture to prepare for the weight of the male, she’ll move her tail aside, and she’ll even approach and nuzzle the male to ensure his attention. But these behaviors are tightly locked to the presence of the appropri- ate hormones—estradiol and progesterone in the case of the female rat. If these hor- mones are absent, the female will show no interest in sex at all, choosing instead to display indifference or hostility toward the sexually active male. If these hormones are injected artificially, sexual receptivity can be induced under conditions in which it would not normally occur (Lisk, 1978). As with the female, sexual behavior of the male rat depends on the presence of the appropriate hormone—testosterone. If tes- tosterone is absent, so too is the desire to have sex.

Hormones and Human Sexuality Humans also show regular variations in the hor- mones relevant to sex and reproduction. These sets of hormones—estrogens in women and androgens in men—play a critical role in physical development, affecting every- thing from the development of the sex organs to the wiring structure of the brain (see Chapter 3). But the initiation and control of adult sexual behavior doesn’t appear to be a matter of simply mixing and matching the right internal chemicals. Human sexual behavior remains largely under our control, although learned social and cul- tural factors exert an influence. Instead of instinctive posturing and fixed courtship rituals, people in most cultures largely choose when, where, and how they engage in sexual activity.

This doesn’t mean that hormones aren’t important in human sexual behavior. There’s some evidence that a woman’s peak of sexual desire occurs in the middle of her menstrual cycle, near the time of ovulation, although the nature of the sexual

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●● FiGuRE 11.3 the Sexual Response Cycle The human sexual response is believed to follow a four-component biological sequence: (1) During an initial excitement phase, arousal increases rapidly. (2) During the plateau phase, arousal increases steadily but more slowly. (3) In the orgasmic phase, sexual release occurs. (4) In the resolution phase, arousal falls back toward normal levels. For men, the resolution phase is characterized by a refractory period during which further stimulation fails to produce visible signs of arousal or orgasm. (Based on Masters & Johnson, 1966)

Animals often show rigid courtship and mating rituals that are largely under the control of internal hormones. ©

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Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior | 355

relationship may matter (Gangestad et al., 2010). There’s also evidence that testos- terone affects both male and female sexual desire. For example, when testosterone levels are reduced sharply—as occurs, for instance, following removal of the tes- tes (medical castration) in men—there’s often a loss of interest in sex. In fact, sex offenders are sometimes treated by administering drugs that block the action of testosterone. But neither males nor females are rigidly controlled by these hor- mones. Some castrated men continue to enjoy and seek out sexual encounters, even without hormone replacement therapy. Similarly, women continue to seek out and enjoy sexual relations after menopause when the levels of female sex hormones decline.

External Factors Rather than appealing to hormones to explain sexual desires, psychologists typically focus instead on the value, or incentive, of the sexual act. Clearly, there’s something about the internal wiring of the brain that makes the sexual act itself immensely rewarding for most people. The sight of an attractive person acts as a signal for something pleasurable, and we are pulled, or motivated, toward an object that may lead to reinforcing sexual release.

Not a very romantic description of sexual desire, to be sure, but it’s the sexual “signals” in our environment that often stim- ulate sexual desire. Both men and women are sexually aroused by explicit visual stimuli, although women, if questioned, are less likely to report the arousal (Peterson & Hyde, 2011). If excite- ment is measured through physiological recording devices, then men and women show similar arousal responses to erotic pictures and movies (Allen et al., 2007). It depends on the nature of the material, though—women show less arousal than men to erotic video clips that don’t also include a romantic component (Rupp & Wallen, 2008). The way people dress and wear their hair, the shapes of their bodies—all contribute to popular conceptions of attractiveness and help to promote sexual interest.

Touch and Smell Touch is another important external source of sexual arousal. When stimulated, certain parts of the body (known commonly as erogenous zones) are highly arousing for most people and may act as one of the few completely natural, or unlearned, arousal sources (although erog- enous zones can develop or be influenced by experience). We frequently communi- cate through touch, and touch is an important source of information in all corners of the world (McDaniel & Anderson, 1998).

In contrast, for many animals odor or smell initiates sexual interest. In Chapter 5 we discussed chemicals called pheromones that are released by the females of many species during periods of receptivity. Pheromones are odor-producing chemicals, and they drive dogs, pigs, and many other creatures into a sexual frenzy. There’s no strong evidence that human pheromones affect sexual desire, but researchers remain open-minded about a possible role (Wyatt, 2009). How a person smells definitely mat- ters—both men and women report that odor is an important factor in selecting a lover (Herz & Cahill, 1997). One recent study found that human tears contain a chemical signal that can affect sexual desire in men. Men who sniffed tears from a woman who had recently cried reported reduced sexual arousal compared to men who sniffed a saline solution (Gelstein et al., 2011). Moreover, as you learned in Chapter 5, women seem to prefer the scent of men who show physical traits suggestive of “good genes,” such as facial symmetry; moreover, these preferences are strongest when the women are most fertile (Thornhill et al., 2003).

Certain smells can be highly arousing, although in humans it’s more learning than biology that makes the perfume industry a success.

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Mate Selection In choosing a mate, what determines who we’ll consider attractive and desirable? Not surprisingly, our conceptions of attractiveness are influenced by both biological and environmental factors (see Chapter 13). Societies have unique cultural definitions of attractiveness, their own rules for attracting a mate, and different views on what kinds of sexual behavior are considered appropriate.

Sexual Scripts Psychologists believe we acquire sexual scripts as we develop— these are learned programs that instruct us on how, why, and what to do in our interactions with sexual partners (Gagnon, 1990; Gagnon & Simon, 1973). Sexual scripts contribute to the differences seen in male and female sexual behavior. Among other things, sexual scripts affect the attitudes we hold toward the sex- ual act. Boys typically learn, for example, to associate sexual intimacy with geni- tal fondling; girls are more likely to identify intimacy with romantic love. These scripts affect expectations and can result in miscommunication between the sexes. For instance, teenage girls who engage in premarital sex often expect to marry their partners, but this expectation is less true for their male partners (Coles & Stokes, 1985). Sexual scripts may also account, in part, for why men sometimes employ aggression or strategies based on force to help them achieve their sexual interests (Ryan, 2004).

Evolutionary Influences Sexual scripts can differ from one culture to the next, but some mating strategies appear to be universal. In nearly every culture men are more likely than women to pursue short-term sexual strategies—brief affairs or one-night stands. For example, at least among college students, most men aren’t bothered very much by the idea of having sexual intercourse with a woman they’ve met only an hour before; for most women, the idea of such casual sex is a “virtual impossibility” (see Buss & Schmidt, 2003). Across all parts of the world, men seem to value attractiveness in a long-term mating partner, usually prefer to mate with women who are on the average younger than themselves, and report wanting more variety in their sexual partners (D. M. Buss, 1989; Schmitt, 2003). Women, on the other hand, tend to place much greater value on a mating part- ner’s financial prospects than men do—a pattern that again holds across the world (see ●Figure 11.4).

The fact that these differences are present in every society suggests there may be adaptive reasons for these gender-based behaviors—or that the behaviors them- selves may be adaptations. Men might pursue multiple sexual partners to increase the likelihood of successful reproduction (Dawkins, 1986). Women might prefer a man of high economic means because the responsibility of rearing and nurturing a child often falls on the woman’s shoulders. Throughout evolutionary history, men and women have faced gender-specific reproductive problems, and their attitudes and mating rituals have probably developed, in part, to help resolve these problems (Buss, 2000, 2004).

At the same time, it’s misleading to focus too much on sex differences—there are many similarities in how men and women view prospective mates (Smiler, 2011). There are also lots of individual differences—for example, not all men actively seek short-term mating partners. It’s also very diff icult to disentangle evolutionary inf luences from what may simply be learned social “roles” (Eagly & Wood, 1999). As noted previously, human sexual behavior shows consider- able f lexibility—the biological forces of nature inf luence but need not determine our f inal behavior. We’ll return to the debate about the roles of biology versus the environment, specif ically with respect to conceptions of attractiveness, in Chapter 13.

sexual scripts Learned cognitive programs that instruct us on how, why, and what to do in our interactions with sexual partners.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Other than through stimulating sexual desire, how might physical attractiveness affect the thoughts and actions of others?

Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior | 357

Sexual Orientation Sexual orientation refers to whether one is sexually and emotionally attracted to members of the same sex or other sex. The term homosexual is applied when the attraction is predominantly to members of the same sex; heterosexual refers to the more typical other-sex attraction. Estimates of the number of people in the United States who fit the description of homosexual vary, ranging from 1 to 2% to perhaps as high as 10%, depending on how the term is defined (Savin-Williams, 2006). Exact numbers are difficult to determine, partly because people are often reluctant to dis- close intimate information about sexual preference. Moreover, in some respects sexual orientation is best seen as a continuum rather than as a category with fixed boundaries. People who are predominantly homosexual sometimes seek out hetero- sexual relationships, and many heterosexuals have had sexual experiences with mem- bers of the same sex.

But what accounts for a sexual and emotional preference for members of the same sex? If the purpose of sexual desire is to procreate—to ensure continuation of the species—in what way can homosexuality be considered adaptive? There’s no simple answer to this question, although certainly same-sex relationships have

sexual orientation A person’s sexual and emotional attraction to members of the same sex or the other sex; homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality are all sexual orientations.

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●● FiGuRE 11.4 Cross-Cultural Mating Strategies Men and women in different parts of the world were asked to rate the importance of physical attractiveness and financial prospects in a long-term partner. On average, men rated physical attractiveness higher than women did, and women were more likely than men to value a partner’s financial prospects. (Data from Buss & Schmitt, 1993)

358 | CHAPTER 11 Motivation and Emotion

nurturing qualities that go well beyond sexual encounters. For many years psycholo- gists believed that homosexuality developed from experience, particularly the expe- riences children have with their parents. Homosexuality was considered to be an abnormal condition that arose from dysfunctional home environments, usually as a consequence of having a domineering mother and a passive father. But this view is no longer widely accepted, primarily because a close examination of family histories revealed that the home environments of heterosexuals and homosexuals are actually quite similar (Bell et al., 1981).

Sexual orientation is likely determined, at least in part, by biological factors. People may, in fact, be “born gay” although the evidence is not completely conclusive. When researcher Simon LeVay (1991) compared the autopsied brains of homosexual and heterosexual men, he discovered that a cluster of neurons associated with the hypothalamus was consistently larger in heterosexual men. Exactly how or why this portion of the brain influences sexual orientation is unknown. There have also been reports suggesting a genetic locus for sexual orientation. For example, twin studies have revealed that if one identical twin is homosexual, there is an approximately 50% chance that the other twin will share the same sexual orientation; for fraternal twins or nontwin brothers and sisters, the likelihood that both will be homosexual is con- siderably lower (Kirk et al., 2000). Systematic analyses of the chromosomes of homo- sexual brothers originally provided evidence for what the researchers believed might be a “gay gene” (Hamer et al., 1993), but these findings have proven difficult to repli- cate (Dawood et al., 2009).

It’s simply too early to tell what all these results mean. The biological findings remain correlational; we simply know that sexual orientation may be associated with certain brain structures or genetic markers—but correlational data don’t allow us to determine the cause of sexual orientation. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that bio- logical factors alone will solve the mysteries of sexual orientation—after all, 50% of identical twins of homosexuals do not share this orientation. The environment is cer- tain to play an important role, but the nature of that role has yet to be determined. Finally, remember that sexual orientation is not really a fixed attribute of a person, like blue eyes or blond hair; we’re attracted to others for many reasons, and there may be multiple pathways and reasons for particular sexual preferences.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about the internal and external factors that control sexual behavior by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. In the human sexual response cycle, the period just prior to orgasm is called the plateau phase. True or False?

2. It is possible to affect sexual desire in men by altering the natu- ral levels of the hormone testosterone in the body. True or False?

3. Across the world, men value attractiveness in a long-term mating partner and universally prefer to mate with women who are, on average, younger than themselves. True or False?

4. Twin studies have revealed that if one identical twin is homosex- ual, there is an approximately 50% chance that the other twin will share the same sexual orientation. True or False?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.3

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion | 359

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion LEARNING GOALS

●● Examine the evidence for and against basic emotions. ●● Understand the role of arousal in emotional experience. ●● Describe the subjective experiences of anger, happiness, and disgust. ●● Differentiate among the James-Lange, Cannon-Bard, and two-factor theories of emotion.

Most psychologists are convinced that motivation and emotion should be closely linked. Both terms, in fact, derive from the Latin movere, meaning “to move.” Many conditions that are motivating also give rise to the experience of emotion. Suppose you’re thirsty and put change into a Coke machine. If the money gets stuck, block- ing your goal, you’re likely to get frustrated and angry. The emotional experience, in turn, produces its own energizing effect on behavior—maybe you start scream- ing and kicking the machine (which may or may not help). It’s difficult to discuss the topic of motivation without also considering emotion.

As we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, emotions are complex psycho- logical events that involve a mixture of reactions: (1) a physiological response (usually arousal), (2) an expressive reaction (distinctive facial expression, body posture, or vocal- ization), and (3) some kind of subjective experience (internal thoughts and feelings). Each of these components is shown in ●Figure 11.5.

Why experience emotions in the first place? Psychologists generally believe emotions help us adapt to rapidly changing environmental conditions. Emotions are powerful motivators of behavior—they help us prioritize our thoughts and force us to focus on finding problem solutions. Physiological arousal, for instance, prepares the body for fight or flight and helps us direct our actions in the face of danger. Through expressive behaviors, such as the characteristic facial grimace of anger, it’s possible to communicate our mental state instantly to others. Emotions can even stimulate social behaviors. People perform better and are more likely to help others when they feel happiness (Hoffman, 1986); people are also more likely to volunteer aid after doing something for which they feel guilt (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969).

Are There Basic Emotions? Can you name all the important emotions? The English language is full of words, lit- erally hundreds in fact, that relate to emotion. But are there hundreds of emotions, or just a basic few? This seems like a simple question, but it’s one that’s perplexed researchers for decades (Russell, 2003). To get a sense of the difficulty, try compil- ing your own list of basic emotions. While you’re at it, ask your friends and see how much you agree. Let’s see: anger, fear, joy… how about interest, loathing, jealousy, or distraction? Psychologists have been compiling their own lists for decades without general agreement.

If forced to choose, most people (including emotion researchers) agree on about a half-dozen. Most lists include anger, fear, happiness, and sadness (Ekman, 1999; Ortony & Turner, 1990). Researchers who believe these emotions are basic, or uni- versal, argue convincingly that certain emotions, such as anger, increase the chances of survival. People also have no trouble recognizing expressions of anger, fear, sad- ness, and happiness in other people, either through facial expressions or emotional vocalizations (Sauter et al., 2010). Paul Ekman and his colleagues asked volunteers to match photographs of grimacing, smiling, or otherwise distinctive facial displays to a number of basic emotion labels. There was wide agreement on six fundamental

Emotion

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Feeling of happiness, anger, fear, etc.

●● FiGuRE 11.5 the Composition of Emotion Emotions are complex experiences that involve (1) a physiological response; (2) an expressive reaction; and (3) some kind of subjective experience. (© Cengage Learning)

360 | CHAPTER 11 Motivation and Emotion

emotions: happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger, and disgust combined with con- tempt (Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1986).

Facial Expressions and Culture One of the signature characteristics of an emotion is a facial expression. Regardless of where you look in the world, people identify facial expressions with emotional states. For example, a furrowed brow and a square mouth with pursed lips tends to signify anger worldwide (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Ekman and Friesen even tested members of a rural, isolated culture in New Guinea. These people had no experience with Western culture, yet they correctly identified the emotions expressed in photographs of Caucasian faces. Similarly, when U.S. col- lege students were later shown photos of the New Guinea people acting out various emotions, they too were able to identify the emotions with a high degree of accuracy. Although it’s not clear that emotion labels necessarily mean the same thing across cultures (Russell, 1994), many researchers are convinced there’s some universal rec- ognition of emotion from facial expressions (Shariff & Tracy, 2011).

The cross-cultural results are important because they suggest the expression of emotion may have a biological or genetic origin. Babies show a wide range of emo- tional expressions at a very young age (Izard, 1994), and even babies who are born blind, or hearing impaired and blind, show facial expressions similar to sighted babies (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973). It appears people may purse their lips and furrow their brow when they’re mad because these tendencies are built directly into the genetic code rather than having been learned. The idea that there are universal facial expressions certainly makes adaptive sense because facial expressions are excellent signals to oth- ers about our current internal state (Ekman & Keltner, 1997).

At the same time, the story is not as simple as it might seem. Facial expressions are clearly signals for emotion, but their interpretation also depends importantly on the context or situation (Barrett et al., 2011). The same scowling face can be per- ceived as signaling anger, disgust, or even puzzlement depending on the situation. If the person is in danger, the expression will likely be seen as fear; but if the same expression is paired with something disgusting (e.g., a person looking at a decaying animal) it will be interpreted as an expression of disgust. This fits in well with the general account of perception that was outlined in Chapter 5. What we perceive is a product of the sensory signal (the facial expression) as well as our general expecta- tion about what is “out there” (top-down processing). This guarantees that the same facial expression, depending on the circumstance, might be interpreted differently by different people.

The Facial-Feedback Hypothesis Feedback from the muscles in the face may even help influence the internal emotional experience. According to the facial- feedback hypothesis, muscles in the face deliver signals to the brain that are then interpreted, depending on the pattern, as subjective emotional states (Tomkins, 1962). Other researchers suggest there may be direct connections between expres- sions and physical changes in the brain. For example, smiling can alter the volume of air that is inhaled through the nose; these changes, in turn, can affect the tem- perature of the brain, which, in turn, might affect mood (McIntosh et al., 1997; Zajonc et al., 1993).

The facial-feedback hypothesis suggests an interesting possibility: If asked to adopt a particular facial expression artificially, will you experience a corresponding change in emotion? In fact, some kinds of forced smiling, frowning, or grimac- ing do appear to modulate emotional reports, although the effects may be small (e.g., Soussignan, 2002). You can try this for yourself: Try forcing yourself to smile or grimace in an exaggerated way. Do you feel any different? Some therapists recom- mend that clients who are depressed literally force themselves to smile when they’re feeling depressed. Here’s another piece of evidence: People who have just received a facial injection of Botox, which paralyzes certain muscles in the face, show changes in their responsiveness to emotional stimuli (Davis et al., 2010).

facial-feedback hypothesis The proposal that muscles in the face deliver signals to the brain that are then interpreted, depending on the pattern, as a subjective emotional state.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Have you ever heard actors talk about how they “become the role” when they’re playing emotional parts? What might a psychologist tell an actor to help him or her understand why this happens?

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion | 361

How Convincing Is the Evidence? The link among facial expressions, biology, and emotion suggests that certain emotions may be universal (Izard, 2007). But does the fact that people universally have facial expressions for fear, anger, or happiness really mean that these emotions are somehow more primary or basic than others? Some psychologists think not. Remember, many psychologists disagree about which emotions belong on the basic list. Does interest, wonder, or guilt belong? How about shame, contempt, or elation? Each of these terms has been identified as basic by at least one prominent emotion researcher. The problem is that humans are capable of an enormous range of emotional experiences. Consider the differences among fear, terror, panic, distress, rage, and anxiety. It is clearly appropriate to use each of these terms in some circumstances and not in others. How can we explain a complex emo- tion such as terror? If it’s not a basic emotion, is it somehow manufactured in the brain by combining or blending more fundamental emotions such as fear, surprise, and possibly anger?

It may not be possible to explain human emotional experiences by combining a set of basic emotions. Rather than basic emotions, some argue, it may be better to

Different emotions are often associated with particular facial expressions. Can you identify the emotion expressed in each of these photos?

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think of basic responses that are shared by a wide variety of emotional experiences (e.g., Barrett, 2006). For example, as noted earlier, the furrowed brow commonly seen in anger is not exclusive to anger but also occurs when people are frustrated, puzzled, or even just working hard on a task. The furrowed brow may occur in any situation in which a person is somehow blocked from reaching a goal; its appearance, by itself, is not sufficient to conclude that the person is angry.

It may help to think about the analogy of human language. There are hundreds of different languages across the world, and each follows certain universal rules (relating to sound and word combinations). But it doesn’t make any sense to argue that some of these languages are more basic than others. Human languages are built up from basic components and share many features in common. Similarly, when people are in the grip of an emotion, they may experience many basic and universal conditions (such as a tendency to smile or frown, approach or avoid), but these are merely the compo- nents of emotion, not the emotions themselves (Russell, 2003; Turner & Ortony, 1992).

The Emotional Experience: Arousal Psychologists may disagree about whether there are basic emotions, but everyone agrees about certain aspects of the emotional experience. Virtually all emotions, for instance, lead to physiological arousal. Muscles tense, heart rate speeds up, and blood pressure and respiration rates skyrocket. These emotional symptoms come from activity of the autonomic nervous system as it prepares the muscles and organs of the body for a fight-or-flight response. We usually experience emotions in situations that are significant for one reason or another—for instance, the car of a drunken driver swerves sharply into our path, or the sound of breaking glass from the basement win- dow startles us awake. It’s adaptive for the body to react quickly in such cases, and the rapid onset of physiological arousal serves that function well.

But emotional arousal can have a negative side as well. Too much arousal can lead to a breakdown in behavioral, biological, or psychological functioning. ●Figure 11.6 shows the relationship that exists between level of arousal and task performance. Notice the pattern looks like an arch or an inverted U. For a given task, as arousal lev- els increase from low to moderate, performance generally rises. Some people perform better under pressure—the track star runs a little faster or jumps a little higher. You may well perform better on a test if the test is particularly important. But too much pressure, which causes too much arousal, causes a sharp drop-off in task performance. Did you have trouble thinking when you took the SAT? Too much emotional pressure creates a level of arousal that hurts rather than helps normal mental functioning.

Understanding the relationship between arousal and performance has helped psychologists interpret behavior in a variety of situations. For example, as you know, people who witness crimes are sometimes inaccurate in their later recollections. One factor that contributes to the poor memory is the high level of arousal generated in crime scenes. If someone holds a gun to your head, your level of arousal is likely to block normal cognitive processing. You’re simply too aroused to process the details of the crime scene effectively. Moreover, as you’ll see in Chapter 13, the relation- ship between arousal and performance also helps us to understand how our behav- ior changes in the presence of other people—our performance is either facilitated or impaired when other people are around, perhaps because the presence of others changes our overall level of arousal.

The Emotional Experience: Subjective Reactions Experiencing an emotion involves much more than a facial expression or a flood of physiological arousal. Your thoughts, your perceptions, and the things you notice in the environment all change when you experience an emotion. But as we discussed

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●● FiGuRE 11.6 Arousal and task Performance For a given task, performance tends to be best at intermediate levels of arousal. Too little or too much arousal often leads to a decrease in performance. (© Cengage Learning)

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion | 363

earlier, it’s difficult to measure the internal experience accurately and reliably. After all, the emotional experience is by definition personal and subjective. We can ask someone what it feels like to be angry, happy, or scared, but the constraints of lan- guage restrict the answers we receive. Some cultures don’t even have a word in their language to describe the concept of an emotion. The Ifaluks of Micronesia, for exam- ple, have only the word niferash, which roughly translates as “our insides” (Lutz, 1982; Matsumoto, 1994).

Anger It is possible to study the conditions that lead to emotions. For example, in the case of anger, people have been asked to keep daily and weekly records, noting the specific situations that made them mad. Most people get angry at least several times a week (but to different degrees); some experience the emotion several times a day (Averill, 1983). Anger clearly serves an adaptive function: It causes us to tackle our problems head on and express our grievances, and it also serves as a signal to others that they should change their ways or avoid interaction.

What causes anger? Not surprisingly, the causes are many (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). If you’re restrained in some way, physically or psychologically, you’re likely to get mad. More generally, people tend to get angry when their expec- tations are violated. If you’re counting on someone to act a certain way, and those expectations are violated, you’ll probably get mad. This is one of the reasons we often get angry at the ones we love. We tend to expect more from the people we love, which, in turn, increases the chances that our expectations will be violated. We also get angry when unpleasant things happen, even if it doesn’t involve the violation of an expectation. I bet you get mad when you trip over something on the sidewalk or bang your knee against a wall. Right? Physical pain, physically unpleasant situations, and major social stresses all reliably lead to anger.

Is the expression of anger healthy psychologically? Psychologists remain unde- cided about the benefits of venting anger or blowing off steam. On one hand, express- ing your feelings may have a cathartic effect: The expression of anger can lead to an emotional release that is ultimately calming. On the other hand, getting physi- cally angry could well increase the chances that you’ll get angry again (Tavris, 1989). When you express anger, and feel the calming effect that follows, you reinforce the anger response. Some psychologists have found that encouraging people to express their feelings of anger or hostility leads to more expressions or feelings of anger in the future (Bushman, 2002). Evidence suggests as well that people who punish a rule-vio- lator actually end up feeling worse than those who don’t exact “revenge” (Carlsmith et al., 2008). The expression of anger can also lead to increased risk-taking and other kinds of self-defeating behavior. We’ll return to the effects of anger, specifically on stress and health, in Chapter 16.

Happiness Understanding that anger arises from violations of expectations also helps account for the experience of happiness. Overall, there is little, if any, relation- ship between observable characteristics such as age, sex, race, or income and the experience of happiness (Myers & Diener, 1995). Instead, people seem to gain or lose happiness as a result of the comparisons they make—either with others (a well- known tendency called social comparison) or with things or experiences from their past (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). People set standards for satisfaction, and they’re happy if those standards are maintained or surpassed. The trouble is that our stan- dards are constantly changing—Eddie and Lucinda may be able to keep up with the Joneses next door, but there’s always the Mendenhalls down the street who just bought that new boat. Once people reach a certain level of satisfaction, they often form a new level, and then another, and never quite attain complete happiness.

Actually, many psychological judgments, not just emotions, are linked to compar- isons with some standard, or adaptation level. You learned in Chapter 5 that whether we will hear one tone as louder than another depends on how loud the standard tone was to begin with. Human judgments are relative—there’s no sense in which a tone is loud, a light is bright, or a person is happy or sad without answering the question, “Relative

364 | CHAPTER 11 Motivation and Emotion

to what?” Even negative events can seem positive if they are placed in the right context. For example, arguing with a spouse is rated more positively if it’s preceded by the rat- ing of an extremely negative event, such as a death in the family (Schwartz & Strack, 1998). A study of athletes at the 1992 Olympic Games revealed that bronze medal win- ners (third place) were actually happier than silver medal winners (second place); pre- sumably, the bronze medalists focused on the accomplishment of winning a medal, whereas the silver medalists saw themselves as failing to reach gold (Medvec, et al., 1995). If asked, most believe that people who are seriously disabled, such a paraplegics, spend the majority of their time in a bad mood. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The well-being of paraplegics tends to be normal most of the time—people adapt, even to the most horrific of circumstances (Kahneman, 2011).

The fact that happiness is relative helps to explain some phenomena that might seem a bit mysterious. Why is the couple who just won the multimillion-dollar lot- tery still bickering? Why is Ed, who recently succeeded in getting the most popular girl in class to hang out with him, now anxiously seeking the attention of someone else? How can that homeless man, with only scraps to eat and tattered clothes, wake up every morning with a smile on his face? Happiness is not some Holy Grail that can be sought and sometimes found—it’s an elusive and fickle condition that depends on constantly changing standards and comparisons.

Disgust Usually included in the group of basic emotions is disgust, a marked aversion toward something distasteful (literally meaning “bad taste”). It’s easy to appreciate the adaptive value of this particular emotion, especially as a mechanism to make certain we select and reject the appropriate foods. The facial expression that typically accom- panies disgust is itself an adaptive reaction to a potentially harmful substance. You wrinkle your nose and your mouth drops open in a characteristic gape. Wrinkling the nose closes off the air passages, cutting off any offending odor; the gaping expression “causes the contents of the mouth to dribble out” (Rozin & Fallon, 1987, p. 24).

Yet there is a psychology to disgust that extends beyond its role in food rejection. To illustrate, suppose you come home one evening and find a cockroach nesting on your toothbrush. Is it conceivable that you would ever use that toothbrush again? Suppose I dropped it into boiling water for a while to ensure sterilization. Would you use it now? Probably not by choice. In a study by Paul Rozin and his colleagues, a dead but sterilized cockroach was dropped into a glass of juice and offered to thirsty

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Expressing and Experiencing Emotion | 365

subjects. Not surprisingly, few people showed any interest in drinking the juice, even though they knew the roach had been sterilized (Rozin et al., 1986). Most people are also reluctant to consume their favorite soup if they witness the bowl being stirred by a never-used comb or fly swatter (Rozin & Fallon, 1987).

The experience of disgust seems to be universal—appearing cross-culturally— but the emotion takes time to develop. For example, if children under age 4 are pre- sented with what adults consider a disgusting odor (feces or synthetic sweat), they tend not to be bothered, or they may even react positively. Children under age 2, as any parent knows, are happy to put just about anything into their mouths, even “dis- gusting” objects. In one study, it was found that 62% of tested children under age 2 would put imitation dog feces in their mouth; 31% would mouth a whole, steril- ized grasshopper (Rozin et al., 1986). Children simply have no conception that these objects are potentially harmful—they must learn what not to put in their mouths.

Theories of Emotion: Body to Mind Emotions are complex events. People subjectively experience happiness or sadness, but they also experience important changes in their body and on their face. Questions about how these various components interact have stumped emotion researchers for decades. For example, what exactly causes the body reaction? Is the arousal caused by the internal subjective experience, or are we happy or sad because our bodies have been induced to react in a particular way?

There are a number of possible explanations (for an overview, see ●Figure 11.7). The most natural argument is that the internal experience drives the physiologi- cal reaction. We tremble, gasp, and increase our heart rate because some event has caused us to become afraid. We feel fear, and our body reacts with physiological arousal. Surprisingly, this straightforward view of emotion has been rejected by emo- tion researchers for more than a century. James (1890) saw the commonsense view as backward: “The more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or trem- ble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful” (p. 1066). Although James believed our interpretation of the situation also plays a role (Ellsworth, 1994; James, 1894), he was convinced that the body reaction occurs before the subjective experience of emotion rather than the other way around.

The James-Lange Theory The idea that the body reaction drives the subjective expe- rience of emotion is known as the James-Lange theory of emotion. Lange is coupled with James because Danish physiologist Carl Lange proposed a similar idea at roughly the same time as James. Why reject the commonsense approach in favor of such a counterintuitive view? Actually, neither James nor Lange presented much evidence in support of this account (other than personal impressions). However, some significant predictions can be derived from their view. For instance, imagine we could somehow reduce or eliminate significant body reactions. The James-Lange theory predicts we should lose the corresponding experience of emotion. To test this idea, interviews have been conducted with people suffering from spinal cord injuries. Because of nerve damage, these people have either lost feeling in major portions of their bodies or at least have reduced sensory feedback. In support of the James-Lange view, some paraplegics have reported a drop-off in the intensity of their emotional experience (for example, anger lost its “heat”; Hohmann, 1966). More recent studies, using neuroim- aging techniques, have reached similar conclusions (Nicotra et al., 2006).

The James-Lange theory also predicts that unique physical changes should accompany each of the different emotional experiences. That is, a particular body response must produce anger, happiness, fear, and so on. But as noted previously, the dominant physiological response during an emotion is arousal, and heart rate

James-Lange theory A theory of emotion that argues that body reactions precede and drive the subjective experience of emotions.

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changes, sweaty palms, and an increased breathing rate seem to be characteristic of virtually all emotions rather than just a select few. Think about how your body feels just before an important exam. How about the feelings you have before an important and long-awaited date? Would you describe the emotions as similar?

Recently, sophisticated measuring devices have enabled researchers to record small, previously undetectable changes in body reactions. These new data may eventually help us to distinguish the body reaction for one emotional state from the body reaction of another (Lang, 1994; Levenson, 1992). No firm conclusions can be drawn at this point, but the evidence increasingly suggests that unique biologi- cal markers are associated with particular emotions (Friedman, 2010; Lench et al., 2011). Neuroimaging studies reveal differences in patterns of brain activity when people experience different emotions (e.g., Panksepp, 2007), although these data remain somewhat controversial (Barrett & Wager, 2006). Establishing definitive links between emotional states and physiological responses is an important step for emo- tion researchers, although perhaps not an unexpected one. After all, anger and hap- piness certainly are experienced differently and therefore must ultimately reflect differences in brain activity.

The Cannon-Bard Theory Historically, it didn’t take too long for critics of the James-Lange theory of emotion to emerge. Physiologist Walter Cannon mounted

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●● FiGuRE 11.7 Four views of Emotion The commonsense view, largely rejected by psychologists, assumes that an environmental stimulus creates a subjective experience (fear), which in turn leads to a physiological reaction (arousal). The James-Lange theory proposes instead that the physical reaction drives the subjective experience. In the Cannon-Bard theory, the physical reaction and the subjective experience are assumed to be largely independent processes. In the two-factor theory, it is the cognitive interpretation and labeling of the physical response that drives the subjective experience. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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an influential attack in the 1920s. Cannon (1927) recognized that the body reacts in essentially the same way to most emotional experiences. He was also convinced that the conscious experience of emotion has a rapid onset—people feel fear immediately after seeing an attacking dog—but the physiological reactions that come from the autonomic nervous system have a relatively slow onset time (glands need to be acti- vated, hormones need to be released into the bloodstream, and so on). Cannon felt the subjective experience of emotion and the associated body reactions are indepen- dent processes. Emotions and arousal may occur together, but one doesn’t cause the other. Cannon’s view was later modified somewhat by Philip Bard, so this approach is now generally known as the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion.

The Schachter and Singer Experiment We’ve now discussed three different theories of emotion: (1) people experience emotions subjectively, which then leads to body reactions such as arousal (the commonsense view); (2) the body generates a characteristic inter- nal reaction, which then produces the appropriate emotional experience ( James-Lange); and (3) body reactions and subjective experiences occur together, but independently (Cannon-Bard). None of these views remains popular among emotion researchers.

The major problem with this trio of emotion theories is that they fail to take into account the cognitive side of emotion. To understand exactly what this means, we need to consider a study that was conducted in the early 1960s by psychologists Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer (see ●Figure 11.8). College students were recruited to participate in an experiment designed to test the effects of vitamin injections on vision. What the students didn’t know, however, was that the vitamin cover story was

Cannon-Bard theory A theory of emotion that argues that body reactions and subjective experiences occur together, but independently.

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That shot must be working: my heart’s racing, hands are sweating . . .

●● FiGuRE 11.8 the Schacter and Singer Experiment Volunteer participants were injected with a drug that produced symptoms of physiological arousal. Half the participants were informed about the drug’s effects; the others were not. When placed in a room with either a euphoric or an angry accomplice, only the uninformed people adopted the same mood. Presumably, the informed participants attributed their arousal symptoms to the drug, whereas the uninformed participants interpreted the symptoms as an emotional experience. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

368 | CHAPTER 11 Motivation and Emotion

a ploy—rather than vitamins, they were actually injected with either a dose of epi- nephrine (which produces physiological arousal symptoms) or a dose of saline (which produces no effects). A second manipulated variable was expectation: Half the people in each of the injection groups were told to expect arousal symptoms—as a side effect of the vitamins—and the other half were told to expect no reaction of any kind.

Now let’s consider what effect these conditions should have on emotional reactions. Suppose you’re sitting in a room, waiting for further instructions from the experimenter, when suddenly your heart begins to race and your palms begin to sweat. According to James-Lange, this arousal should translate into some kind of emotional experience; you might, for example, expect to become scared or irritated. But Schachter and Singer (1962) found that the experience of emotion was determined almost entirely by expectation. Those students who were told to anticipate arousal from the injec- tion showed little emotional reaction to the arousal when it occurred. Only when the arousal was unexpected did people begin to report strong emotions.

More importantly, Schachter and Singer were able to influence the quality of the emotion when it occurred. Joining the participant in the waiting room was a disguised member of the experimental team, introduced as another participant in the experi- ment. Unknown to the real participant, the accomplice was instructed to act in a way that was either playful and euphoric or angry and disagreeable. In later assessments of mood, Schachter and Singer found that aroused but uninformed students tended to adopt the mood of the accomplice. If the accomplice was playful, the students reported feeling happy; if the accomplice was angry, the students reported feeling irritation.

Two-Factor Theory The results of the Schachter and Singer experiment led to what is known as the two-factor theory of emotion. In two-factor theory, autonomic arousal is still a critical determinant of the emotional experience (factor 1). But equally impor- tant is the cognitive appraisal or interpretation of that arousal when it occurs (factor 2). An intense body reaction may be necessary for the full experience of an emotion, but it’s not sufficient. It’s how you interpret the arousal that ultimately determines your subjective emotion. So, you’re scared when you face a venomous snake not only because your body is aroused but also because your mind understands that what’s causing the arousal is dangerous. You label the arousal and thereby determine the emotion that’s experienced.

Like the other theories of emotion we’ve discussed, two-factor theory has gen- erated its share of criticism. For example, some researchers remain convinced that emotions such as anger and fear can arise directly without higher-level interpretation or appraisal (Russell, 2003; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004). However, it’s possible to draw several tentative conclusions. First, it’s reasonably clear that arousal contributes to the experience of emotion. Second, the situation in which the arousal occurs, and our expectations about the source of the arousal, contribute to the emotional experi- ence. Third, rather than saying the body reaction creates the emotion, or vice versa, it’s better to conclude that emotions arise from interactions among several sources: the stimulus event that leads to the reaction, autonomic changes in arousal, and the expectation-based cognitive labels applied to everything involved.

two-factor theory A theory of emotion that argues that the cognitive interpretation, or appraisal, of a body reaction drives the subjective experience of emotion.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

If expectations play an important role in determining whether an emotion will be experienced, would you expect to find cultural differences in the expression of emotion?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.4

(continues)

Psychology For a Reason: What Motivation and Emotion Are For | 369

test Yourself Check your knowledge about expressing and experiencing emotion by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. For each of the following, pick the component of emotion that best fits the situation: body response, expressive reaction, or subjective experience.

a. Sally likes to dance when she’s happy: b. Yolanda grimaces and wrinkles her nose when she sees

spaghetti with clam sauce: c. Mei feels her heart start racing whenever she sees her

boyfriend approach: d. Robert would rather use the words “delighted, glad, pleased,

and excited” to describe how he feels, instead of the word “happy”:

2. Which of the following situations is most likely to produce happiness?

a. Receiving a B on a test when you were expecting a C b. Receiving an A on a test when you were expecting an A

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.4 (Continued)

Motivation, and its intimate companion, emotion, are highly adaptive processes that help you initiate and direct your behavior, maintain your internal energy needs, and even pro- long the species. Each of us simply must do certain things— eat, drink, maintain a constant internal temperature—and psychologists have struggled for decades to discover how the body accomplishes these ends.

Activating Behavior As you’ve seen, motivation depends on an interplay between internal and external factors. Much of the time behavior is controlled by internal factors that compel us in the direction of a goal. Our bodies are constantly mon- itoring internal energy levels, and once a disruption in the homeostatic balance is detected, we seek to restore the bal- ance. In these cases, it’s likely that motivated behavior arises directly as a consequence of biological factors and requires lit- tle direct experience with the environment.

But even something as biologically significant as eating or drinking can’t be explained by appealing only to innate inter- nal factors. All forms of motivated behavior are influenced by external factors as well. External rewards, or incentives, exert powerful pulling and guiding effects on our actions. Understanding motivation then becomes a matter of specify- ing how these external factors interact with internal factors to activate and control behavior. One way in which internal and

external factors interact is described by Maslow’s notion of a needs hierarchy. The essential component of Maslow’s theory is the prioritizing of need: Some needs, especially those crit- ical to survival, must be satisfied before others, such as the need for self-actualization, can be pursued.

Meeting Biological Needs: Hunger and Eating Internally, the body monitors everything from the amount of food in the stomach, to the level of glucose in the blood, to specific hor- mones that both start and stop us from eating. Most of the time we’re perfectly ready to start eating, but the body gen- erates satiation or satiety signals to stop us from eating too much. Although researchers are uncertain about its precise function in controlling eating, the hypothalamus is believed to play an important role. But we also eat for reasons that appear unrelated to restoring homeostatic balance. Food, and particularly eating, is clearly reinforcing. As you’ve seen, people are much more likely to motivate themselves to eat if they like the food—the vigor or intensity with which they respond depends critically on the value, or incentive, of the food. A number of factors, both genetic and environmental, play a role in regulating body weight. Eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa tend to have psycho- logical origins related to body image but may be influenced by genetic factors as well.

●● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Motivation and Emotion Are For

c. Receiving a C on a test when you were expecting to flunk d. Stimulation of the hypothalamus

3. For each of the following, pick the theory of emotion that best fits the situation: James-Lange, Cannon-Bard, or two-factor.

a. I love it when my heart starts racing because it makes me feel happy:

b. I must be in love because she just gave me a wink and my heart is racing:

c. I really feel happy right now and, by the way, my heart is also racing:

d. You’re not really in love, you just drank too much coffee this morning:

370 | CHAPTER 11 Motivation and Emotion

Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior Sexual activity is adaptive for a species because it increases the chances that the species will continue. But on an individual level, sex is also reinforcing, and sexual desire compels us to pursue a mate, thereby opening the door for companionship, protection, and love. The sexual response itself consists of four main phases (excitement, plateau, orgasmic, and resolution). Hormones appear to play much less of a role in controlling sexual desire in humans when compared with other animals. Different cul- tures have different views of attractiveness and different codes of conduct for sexual activity. Many psychologists believe peo- ple acquire sexual scripts that instruct them on how, why, and what to do in their interactions with potential sexual partners. Mate selection and sexual orientation, however, are probably influenced by biological as well as environmental factors.

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion Emotions typically involve a mixture of reactions, including a physiological

response (arousal), a characteristic expressive reaction (such as a distinctive facial expression), and some kind of subjective experience (such as the feeling of happiness or sadness). The physical expression of an emotion enables us to communicate our feelings to others. The internal components—arousal, for example—prepare us for action. Thoughts become priori- tized, and muscles are ready to respond. Emotions are pow- erful adaptive tools: They not only increase the likelihood of survival but also make life itself worth living.

The subjective experience of emotion is often relative— whether we feel happy, for example, seems to depend on the comparisons we make with others and with our past experi- ences. Although a number of theories have tried to explain the relation between arousal and the experience of emotion, most psychologists believe that the experience of emotion depends partly on the presence of a body response—general arousal— and partly on the cognitive appraisals we make about the ori- gin of arousal when it occurs.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Activating Behavior ●● (1) are unlearned responses controlled by specific external triggering stimuli; they do not adequately explain human behavior. A (2) is an inter- nal state that arises in response to a (3) need. Drives lead to more flexible responses than instincts.

●● The term (4) motivation is used to explain (5) directed behavior. The value of the incen- tive—positive or negative—helps determine whether you’ll be motivated to perform a task. An incentive is an external pull with (6) or punishing consequences that helps explain motivated or goal-directed behavior.

●● (7) motivation is an internally driven need for success and accomplishment. People who rate high in achievement motivation tend to work (8) and more persistently on tasks. (9) motiva- tion describes behaviors that are entirely self-motivated. (10) rewards sometimes lower intrinsic moti- vation. (11) factors may explain differences in achievement motivation.

●● Usually represented as a pyramid, Maslow’s (12) of (13) assumes that needs are prioritized and some must be satisfied before others can be met. Fundamental (14) needs are primary; once they have been met we can work toward fulfilling our needs for personal (15) , spiritual meaning, and (16) . At the top of the hierarchy is the need to reach our fullest potential, or to (17) .

Meeting Biological Needs: Hunger and Eating ●● The hormone (18) may play a role in hunger, but most internal signals are designed to stop us from eat- ing. The hormone CCK is an important (19) signal. The hormones insulin and (20) are also important regulators of hunger and are tied to the amount of body fat. Brain areas that signal hunger include the (21) , (22) brain, and the (23) . Eating habits are influenced through (24) , experience, and modeling. Our eating behavior is partly determined by food (25) and their association with past pleasures and discomforts. Cultural factors can also be important.

●● Our natural body weight is probably determined partly by (26) and partly by a (27) point that may loosely influence our tendency to gain or lose weight. (28) rates are on the rise and reflect biological and psychological factors that include (29) rate, number of fat cells, (30) eating habits, cultural role models, and (31) levels.

●● People often make inaccurate assessments of their own weight and its relation to (32) ideals, which can result in a (33) body image and increase one’s susceptibility to eating disorders. (34) nervosa is a condition in which people fail to maintain a normal body weight. (35) nervosa is a condition in which people purge after binge eating.

Interactive Summary | 371

Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior ●● The four phases of the human sexual response cycle are (36) , (37) , (38) , and (39) . Resolution features a (40) period, during which stimulation fails to produce further (41) .

●● Hormones control sexual behavior in most species, but human sexual behavior is also influenced largely by (42) cultural factors. Human hormones related to sexual behavior and reproduction differ by sex: the primary sex hormone in females is (43) and (44) are predominant in males.

●● Touch is an important source of sexual arousal, espe- cially the stimulation of (45) zones. Odors or smells called (46) may initiate sexual behavior in many species, though not necessarily in humans.

●● Attractiveness is strongly influenced by biological and (47) factors. One theory proposes that we acquire sexual (48) that tell us how to interact with sexual partners. Despite individual differ- ences in our scripts, similarities among sexual scripts may be due to (49) influences. In nearly every (50) , men are more likely to value physical attractiveness than women, who usually emphasize finan- cial prospects.

●● (51) and (52) factors influence sexual (53) , or whether a person is attracted to members of the same sex (homosexual) or the other sex (heterosexual).

Expressing and Experiencing Emotion ●● The basic (54) expressions of emotions tend to be universal, which suggests that emotions may be (55) in origin. These basic emotions include (56) , fear, (57) , and sadness. According to the facial-(58) hypothesis, the movement of muscles in the face creates an internal experi- ence that we think of as emotion.

●● Emotions are associated with (59) arousal. Very (60) or low levels of arousal tend to disrupt (61) .

●● Anger is typically associated with having one’s (62) violated. Whether or not it’s healthful to vent anger is (63) . (64) seems to rely on comparing ourselves to others or current experiences with those in the past. (65) is an adaptive emotion that protects us from coming into contact with or ingesting harmful substances and tends to develop with age.

●● The most natural way of relating body to mind is to assume that the subjective experience drives the physical reaction (commonsense view). The James-Lange theory assumes the opposite—that the (66) reac- tion drives the (67) experience of emotion, predicting that unique physical changes should accompany different emotions. The (68) -Bard theory proposes that the subjective experience and the physical reaction are (69) processes. Schacter and Singer’s (70) -factor theory assumes that emotion results from cognitive (71) , or inter- pretation, of autonomic arousal.

achievement motive, 341 anorexia nervosa, 350 bulimia nervosa, 351 Cannon-Bard theory, 367 drive, 340 emotions, 337 excitement phase, 353 facial-feedback hypothesis, 360

homeostasis, 340 incentive motivation, 340 instincts, 339 intrinsic motivation, 342 James-Lange theory, 365 motivation, 337 need hierarchy, 343 obesity, 349

orgasmic phase, 353 plateau phase, 353 resolution phase, 353 satiation signals, 346 set point, 348 sexual orientation,357 sexual scripts, 356 two-factor theory, 368

Terms to Remember

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

372

12 Personality

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Is Personality For?

Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality

Learning Goals The Factor Analytic Approach Allport’s Trait Theory Personality Tests Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.1

Determining How Personality Develops Learning Goals The Psychodynamic Approach

of Freud Humanistic Approaches to Personality

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Social–Cognitive Approaches to Personality

Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.2

Resolving the Person– Situation Debate

Learning Goals The Person–Situation Debate

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS The Value of Self-Monitoring

Genetic Factors in Personality Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.3

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Personality Is For

373

In The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Robert Louis Stevenson explores the dual nature of human personality through the characters of Jekyll and Hyde. Actually, they are one and the same man. Dr. Jekyll transforms himself into the troublesome Mr. Hyde, the personification of evil, by drinking a potion composed of salts and other wholesale chemicals. If you read the novel, you’ll see that the results are disastrous for them “both,” but the thesis is fascinating for the psychologist to consider.

How reasonable is it to assume that behavior is controlled by fixed psychological characteristics or traits? Are we born with a fundamental nature, a set of traits that control our actions throughout our lives? Assuming these traits exist, can we describe them as “good” or “evil”—are humans, like Luke Skywalker in Star Wars, constantly engaged in a battle against the dark side of their nature? As you’ll see in this chapter, some psychologists believe there are indeed multiple sides to human nature, although few would characterize them as good or evil.

Our topic in this chapter is personality, which can be defined as the set of charac- teristics that distinguishes us from others and leads us to act consistently across situ- ations. At its core, the study of personality, like the study of intelligence, is first and foremost the study of individual differences (Cronbach, 1957). People seem to differ in lasting ways: Rowena is outgoing, confident, and friendly; Roger is shy in social settings and has an annoying habit of lying. In a very real sense, personality traits, predispositions to respond in certain ways, define people. Traits make people unique, identifiable, and generally predictable across time. Potentially, we can use personal- ity traits to explain why Rowena’s and Roger’s actions remain stable and consistent across situations.

From an adaptive perspective, remaining consistent in our thoughts and actions, especially if they lead to successful outcomes, makes sense. Most psychologists believe we have traits such as fearfulness or aggressiveness because those traits increase the likelihood of our survival. But the question of where those traits come from (hint: nature or nurture?) has perplexed researchers for decades. As you read this chapter, think back to the issues we considered in Chapter 10 on intelligence— you’ll find many similarities between the study of intelligence and the study of personality.

personality The distinguishing pattern of psychological characteristics— thinking, feeling, and behaving—that differentiates us from others and leads us to act consistently across situations.

trait A stable predisposition to act or behave in a certain way.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Is Personality For?

Are there multiple sides to human nature?

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Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality To understand the concept of person- ality, it’s necessary to consider the whole person. This means you can’t simply record the actions of someone in a restricted situation or even in several situa- tions. You need to measure the enduring aspects of behavior—those things that distinguish you from me consistently across time. Unfortunately, as you’ll see, there’s no simple way of addressing this problem; psychologists have relied on a host of techniques to conceptualize and measure personality.

Determining How Personality Develops What factors in development lead to stable and consistent behavior? It’s one thing to identify and measure a person’s lasting traits but quite another to understand their origin. Where do personality traits come from, and what accounts for the differences among individuals? Why does Roger have that nasty tendency to lie, and why does sweet Rowena always see the sunny side of a rotten situation? It is here, in the study of personality devel- opment, that you’ll find some of the most ambitious and best-known attempts at psychological theory.

Resolving the Person–Situation Debate All major theories of personality assume that the environment shapes behavior. However, because personality consists of those traits that remain the same across situations, we’re faced with a kind of theoretical puzzle. In essence, personality should be something that’s largely independent of the environment. Remember, people are supposed to act the same regardless of the situation. Is behavior really as consistent across situa- tions as many people, including psychologists, assume? In the final section of the chapter, we’ll discuss the evidence—and controversy—that bears on this issue.

Determining how personality develops

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Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality LEARNING GOALS

● Discuss how factor analysis helps identify basic personality traits. ● Distinguish among cardinal, central, and secondary traits. ● Describe self-report inventories and projective personality tests.

It’s not necessary to have a complete understanding of personality to identify and measure differences among people. In fact, we need some formal way of classify- ing individual differences before we can know exactly what needs to be explained. Trait theories are systems for assessing how people differ, particularly how people differ in their tendencies to act consistently across situations. As a general rule, trait theories use a psychometric approach—that is, they seek to identify stable individual differences by analyzing the performances of large groups of people on rating tests or questionnaires.

If you open any dictionary, you’ll find thousands of words that fit the every- day definition of a personality trait. In fact, it’s been estimated that approximately

trait theories Formal systems for assessing how people differ, particularly in their predispositions to respond in certain ways across situations.

Resolving the person-situation debate

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1 out of every 22 words in the English language is a trait-related term (Allport & Odbert, 1936). One goal of the trait theorist is to reduce these thousands of descrip- tive terms to a smaller set of more basic terms—to find a kind of common denomi- nator among groups of terms. For example, when you describe someone with words such as kind, trusting, and warm, you might really be describing a more general char- acteristic of the person, such as agreeableness or pleasantness. The researcher attempts to identify basic traits from among the thousands of personality descriptors that are common in the language. How can this be accomplished?

The Factor Analytic Approach One solution is to use the statistical technique of factor analysis. As we discussed in Chapter 10, factor analysis is a mathematical procedure that’s used to analyze corre- lations among test responses. The goal is to identify a set of factors that collectively predict test performance. To see how this works in the case of personality, imagine asking a large group of people to rate themselves on a variety of personality charac- teristics. For example: “On a scale of 1 to 7, how well do you think the term brooding is characteristic of you?” When we look at the results, we’ll undoubtedly see many individual differences. Some people will see themselves as brooders, others won’t; some people will score high on aggressiveness and competitiveness; others will clas- sify themselves as passive and shy.

However, researchers are really interested in how the trait ratings correlate with one another. Do people who rate themselves as, say, “kind” also tend to rate them- selves as “warm” and “trusting”? More specifically, can we predict someone’s rating on one trait given that we know his or her rating on some other trait? If we can, then it’s reasonable to assume that some general personality characteristic, such as pleas- antness, is being measured by the more specific personality descriptors. This is the logic behind factor analysis—discover the common denominators for personality by noting which terms cluster statistically in a group.

Source Traits and Superfactors Psychologists frequently apply factor analysis to per- sonality data. For practical reasons, it’s common to rely on ratings of personality descriptors, such as “kind” or “warm,” which people give about themselves or others. Psychologist Raymond Cattell was able to use rating data of this sort to identify 16 basic personality factors from a set of traits that originally numbered in the thousands (Cattell et al., 1970). Cattell’s 16 factors, which he called source traits, are listed in ●Figure 12.1. Notice that each factor is shown as a dimension marked by an opposing pole: reserved– outgoing, trusting–suspicious, relaxed–tense, and so on. Any particular individual will have a unique personality profile, reflecting his or her standing on each of the dimen- sions. So, you might be closer to “reserved” than “outgoing,” more “controlled” than “uncontrolled,” and have a tendency to be “tough-minded” rather than “sensitive.”

However, the factors that are discovered depend partly on how the mathemati- cal technique of factor analysis is interpreted. Whereas Cattell reported 16 primary factors (along with some additional secondary or second-order factors), Hans Eysenck proposed only three superfactors: (1) extroversion, which refers roughly to how out- going and sociable you are; (2) neuroticism, which captures your degree of anxiety, worry, or moodiness; and (3) psychoticism, which represents your tendencies to be insensitive, uncaring, or cruel toward others (Eysenck, 1970, 1991). Specific personal- ity descriptors, such as “touchy” or “lively,” are presumed to reflect some combina- tion of each of the three primary dimensions.

The Big Five Psychologists continue to argue about the number of factors that best describe personality, but increasingly the field is settling on a more inter- mediate solution: It is now widely believed that the best solution to the factoring

Try coming up with a set of trait words to describe this individual. What are the chances that your words will apply in all situations?

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problem is to propose f ive basic personality dimensions (McCrae & Costa, 1985, 2003). The aptly-named Big Five personality dimensions include extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. Each is listed in ●Figure 12.2 along with some of the descriptors that identify each trait. So, for example, people who score highly on the extroversion dimension tend to see themselves as talkative, sociable, fun loving, and affectionate. People who are low on extroversion would show the opposite tendencies: untalkative, retiring, sober, and reserved.

Notice that extroversion and neuroticism are two of the three primary dimen- sions suggested by Eysenck. In fact, Eysenck (1991) has argued that psychoticism, his remaining dimension, simply reflects a combination of the Big Five’s agree- ableness, conscientiousness, and perhaps openness (see also Scholte & De Bruyn, 2004). The debate continues, but the consensus today favors the Big Five. Studies have analyzed trait ratings collected from around the world and evidence for a Big Five emerges quite consistently across cultures (Heine & Buchtel, 2009). In addi- tion to supporting the Big Five, the data suggest that the basic structure of person- ality might be universal rather than dependent on cultural background (Allik & McCrae, 2004).

Psychologists have been keenly interested in the measurement of personal- ity traits, especially the extent to which traits such as the Big Five predict behav- ior (Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009). For example, do certain personality traits correlate strongly with academic achievement or work performance? The answer appears to be “yes,” particularly conscientiousness as measured by the Big Five (Poropat, 2009). Not surprisingly, psychologists have also tried to link personality traits to metal health. Recent studies have established significant correlations between Big Five personality traits and anxiety, depressive, and substance use/abuse disorders (Kotov et al., 2010). Assessments of the Big Five traits can even do a reasonable job of predicting couple satisfaction in intimate relationships (Malouff et al., 2009).

Big Five The five dimensions of personality—extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness—that have been isolated through the application of factor analysis.

Outgoing

More Intelligent

Emotionally Stable

Dominant

Happy-Go-Lucky

Conscientious

Venturesome

Sensitive

Suspicious

Imaginative

Shrewd

Apprehensive

Experimenting

Self-Sufficient

Controlled

Tense

Reserved

Less Intelligent

Affected by Feelings

Submissive

Serious

Expedient

Timid

Tough-Minded

Trusting

Practical

Forthright

Self-Assured

Conservative

Group-Dependent

Uncontrolled

Relaxed

● FiGuRE 12.1 A Personality Profile This is a sample personality profile as measured by Cattell’s 16 Personality Factor test. Notice that our personalities are defined by our standing on each of the 16 trait dimensions. (Reprinted with permission from R. B. Cattell, “A 16PF Profile,” in Psychology Today, pp. 40–46. Copyright © 1973 Sussex Publishers, Inc.)

Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality | 377

At the same time, the fact that five (or three) factors can be used to categorize people doesn’t tell us anything about the internal processes that determine a person- ality profile (Hampson, 2012). Some psychologists have also questioned whether all aspects of personality can be captured by any small set of personality dimensions (see Livesley et al., 2003). To understand personality completely, the critics argue, you need to understand the ability of people to change as well as to stay the same across situations. We’ll discuss how the environment affects the consistency of behavior later in the chapter.

Allport’s Trait Theory Like the factor analysts, psychologist Gordon Allport (1897–1967) was convinced that people have personality traits, or “predispositions to respond.” But he wasn’t convinced that the building blocks of personality could be understood from mas- sive statistical analyses of group responses. Allport believed that personality is a measure of one’s uniqueness as an individual. So the proper focus should be on individuals, he argued, not on groups. His approach, which he called idiographic (which means “relating to the individual”), was to study particular individuals in great detail. An advantage of this kind of case study approach is that consistencies in behavior can be recorded across an entire lifetime rather than just in a limited setting (Barenbaum, 1997).

One of Allport’s main contributions was his general classification scheme for identifying personality traits (Allport, 1937). Allport believed some people show car- dinal personality traits. Cardinal traits are the ruling passions that dominate an indi- vidual’s life. If you spend your life huddled in a mountain monastery, rejecting all worldly possessions, your passion “to serve god” would likely satisfy Allport’s descrip- tion of a cardinal trait. Perhaps you know someone whose every thought or action revolves around the pursuit of wealth, fame, or power. People with cardinal traits do not represent the average—these people are driven and highly focused; every action is motivated by a particular goal. We can’t really capture a cardinal trait by applying

cardinal traits Allport’s term to describe personality traits that dominate an individual’s life, such as a passion to serve others or to accumulate wealth.

Ethical, dependable, productive, purposeful

Conscientiousness

Anxious, insecure, guilt-prone, self-conscious

Neuroticism

Openness

Sympathetic, warm, trusting, cooperative

Agreeableness

Talkative, sociable, fun-loving, affectionate

Extroversion

Daring, nonconforming, showing unusually broad interests, imaginative

● FiGuRE 12.2 the Big Five Many psychologists believe that personality is best analyzed in terms of five fundamental personality dimensions. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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a technique such as factor analysis, however, because cardinal traits are uniquely defined by the individual rather than by the group.

Allport believed cardinal traits are rare. Most people have personalities that are controlled by several lasting characteristics, which he labeled central traits. Central traits are the five to ten descriptive terms you would use to describe someone you know. Rowena? She’s outgoing and friendly, very trustworthy, sentimental, and honest to the core. In addition to central traits, Allport suggested that everyone has secondary traits, which are less obvious because they may not always appear in behav- ior; the particular situation, or context, matters. For example, Rowena might also have a secondary trait of “testiness” that shows up only when she goes on an extended diet. Personality characteristics, therefore, can appropriately be described in terms of levels ranging from dominant (cardinal) to representative (central) to occasional (secondary).

Personality Tests There are practical reasons to measure personality traits. Suppose you’re the person- nel director at a large nuclear power plant. You need to hire responsible people to run the plant, people who have the right stuff to handle potentially dangerous materials in an emergency. You wouldn’t want to hire someone like Roger, with his tendency to lie and act compulsively under pressure. How do you decide for a given individual? You can choose from two main categories of personality tests, self-report inventories and projective tests.

Self-Report Inventories The most popular personality tests are self-report inventories, which use a questionnaire format to identify personality characteristics. People are asked to answer questions about how they typically think, act, and feel. Their responses, or self-reports, are compared to test averages compiled from thou- sands of other test takers. As a general rule, self-report inventories are easy to admin- ister, and they paint a reliable picture of how someone differs from the average. Roger, for instance, would probably raise red flags on a number of measures; his answers are likely to show some disregard for social customs (compared to the average) and a marked tendency toward impulsiveness. If you were the personnel director, you

central traits Allport’s term to describe the five to ten descriptive traits that you would use to describe someone you know—friendly, trustworthy, and so on.

secondary traits The less obvious characteristics of an individual’s personality that do not always appear in his or her behavior, such as testiness when on a diet.

self-report inventories Personality tests in which people answer groups of questions about how they typically think, act, and feel; their responses, or self-reports, are then compared to average responses compiled from large groups of prior test takers.

Cardinal traits are ruling passions that dominate a person’s life, such as a compelling need to help others at the expense of personal comfort.

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Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality | 379

could easily make your hiring—or more accurately, no-hire—decision based partly on the test results.

Professionals use many kinds of self-report inventories. Some tests are based on popular trait theories. For example, to assess normal personality traits you can administer the 16 Personality Factor, which is a 187-item questionnaire designed to measure the 16 primary personality factors identified by Cattell (Cattell et al., 1970). Alternatively, there is the NEO-PI-3, which measures your standing on the Big Five personality traits identified in Figure 12.2. The most widely used self-report inventory is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The MMPI contains hun- dreds of true-false questions that people answer about themselves (e.g., “I never get angry”); it’s now available in several revised forms (see Butcher, 2006). The responses are expressed in a personality profile that describes a person’s scores on various sub- scales (see ●Figure 12.3).

In addition to measuring personality characteristics, the MMPI is often used as a technique for diagnosing psychological disorders. A person’s responses are compared to those of average test takers but also to the responses of individuals with known psychological problems. There are records, for example, of how people who suffer from such disorders as paranoia (irrational beliefs of persecution) are likely to answer certain questions. The test responses of someone like Roger can then be compared with the average “paranoia” personality profile to see if he fits the bill. Comparisons of this sort are useful in diagnosing problems and in making judgments about how appropriate an individual might be for a high-risk form of employment.

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● FiGuRE 12.3 MMPi Profiles Psychologists often use the MMPI to help diagnose psychological disorders. A client’s scores on the various clinical scales can be compared to average scores from people who are not suffering from psychological problems, as well as from people who have been diagnosed with specific problems, such as depression or schizophrenia. (Adapted from Weiten, 1995)

380 | CHAPTER 12 Personality

The main advantage of self-report inventories is that they are objective tests— they’re standardized, everyone takes the same test, and they can easily be scored by a computer. There have been literally thousands of studies conducted testing the reli- ability and validity of these measures, especially the MMPI (Ben-Porath, 2003). The fact that the MMPI is one of the most widely applied measures in clinical assessment is one testament to its usefulness. At the same time, self-report inventories depend on the accuracy of the information provided by the test taker. If people choose to be deceptive on the test, or try to make themselves look good in some way, the results can be of little value (Nichols & Greene, 1997).

Projective Personality Tests In a projective personality test, you’re asked to interpret an unstructured or ambiguous stimulus. The assumption is that you’ll “project” your thoughts and true feelings into the stimulus interpretation, thereby revealing elements of your personality. For example, take a look at the inkblot shown in ●Figure 12.4, which is similar to the kind of unstructured stimulus used on the Rorschach test. Clearly, you argue, the inkblot exemplifies the fundamental decay of human society. The image symbolizes the need for aggressive action on the part of all responsible people—we must rise up and defeat the tyranny that, like an out-of-control cancer, is eating away at the virtue and values of common folk. Right? Well…Can you see how someone’s interpretation of such a stimulus might provide insight into his or her per- sonality? If Roger always sees snakes and decaying dragons in the images, whereas Rowena sees butterflies and flowers, it’s not too difficult to infer that they have quite different personalities.

Another popular projective personality test is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). Instead of an inkblot, you’re shown an ambiguous picture, one that might be interpreted in various ways. Think of the Mona Lisa—is she really smiling? What is she actually think ing and feeling? Again, the idea is that you’ll reveal aspects of yourself in the stories you tell. Both the TAT and the Rorschach test use a standardized set of stimuli, so your responses can be compared to other peo- ple who’ve interpreted the same picture. Many psychologists prefer to use tests such as the TAT or the Rorschach, rather than self-report inventories, because projective tests help clients open up and talk about themselves and their problems (Medoff, 2004).

Projective tests allow you to respond freely, in a manner that’s less restrictive than self-report inventories. But this can make the responses hard to interpret: How do we know what your responses truly mean? Psychologists have tried to develop reliable standards for interpreting responses in these kinds of tests. Typically, the researcher or clinician is trained to look for common themes in interpretation (such as a tendency to see death, decay, or aggressiveness) or for qualities such as origi- nality. The clinician might also look for such things as the realistic nature of the interpretation: Does the response really match the perceptual structure of the stim- ulus? If you claim to see a dragon in an inkblot, your general view of the world may slant toward fantasy rather than reality. The degree to which you seek help in your interpretation may also be instructive. For example, people who constantly seek guidance from the clinician before giving an answer are likely to be classified as dependent.

Again, none of the personality assessment procedures we’ve discussed is per- fect, neither self-report inventories nor projective tests. The scoring procedures for projective tests can be somewhat unreliable; it’s not uncommon for administra- tors to arrive at quite different interpretations of the same client’s responses (see Beutler & Berren, 1995). At the same time, evidence suggests that projective tests, particularly the Rorschach test, are reasonably valid and reliable, “roughly on par with other commonly used tests” (Society for Personality Assessment, 2005, p. 220). Personality tests of this sort remain extremely popular and widely used (Masling, 2002).

projective personality test A type of personality test in which individuals are asked to interpret unstructured or ambiguous stimuli.

● FiGuRE 12.4 Projective tests In projective personality tests, we are asked to interpret unstructured or ambiguous stimuli. Our answers are presumed to provide insight into our personalities. What do you see hidden in this inkblot—the fundamental decay of human society? (From KALAT, Introduction to Psychology, 4E. © 1996 Cengage Learning.)

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think there is any connection between the interpretation of projective personality tests and the interpretation of dreams? Could we use dream interpretation as a way of discovering someone’s true personality?

Determining How Personality Develops | 381

Determining How Personality Develops LEARNING GOALS

● Describe Freud’s psychodynamic theory of personality and mind. ● Summarize and evaluate humanistic approaches to personality. ● Describe social–cognitive theories of personality.

As you’ve just seen, we can describe the personality traits of people like Roger or Rowena—perhaps their standing on the Big Five—and there’s a good chance our measurements will be reasonably accurate and reliable. But description is not the same thing as explanation. We may know Rowena has a sunny disposition, but trait theories don’t tell us much about the origins of those characteristics. Why do Roger and Rowena differ? In this section we’ll consider three very different approaches to understanding personality development: the psychodynamic theory of Sigmund Freud, humanistic theories, and social–cognitive theories.

The Psychodynamic Approach of Freud Imagine you are a clinician, and your latest patient, 18-year-old Katharina, complains of persistent physical problems. “I’m often overcome with a frightful choking feel- ing,” she insists. “I have trouble catching my breath and my head begins to spin. I truly think I must be about to die.” Extensive examinations reveal no physical cause;

test Yourself Check your knowledge about conceptualizing and measuring personality by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. For each of the following, identify the personality dimension of the Big Five that the statement best describes. Choose from the following terms: extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness.

a. Joanne is known as a risk-taker; she just loves to bungee jump:

b. It’s hard to get Mimi to stop talking: c. Raphael is very cooperative; he’s virtually always sympathetic

to my needs: d. Mark is very insecure; he always seems to feel guilty about

something: e. Maureen is very productive, and she has very high ethical

standards:

2. For each of the following, pick the personality test that the state- ment best describes. Choose from the following: MMPI, NEO-PI-3, 16 Personality Factor, Rorschach, TAT.

a. An ambiguous picture is shown and the client is asked to make up a story about its contents:

b. An objective self-report inventory that is often used in clinical settings:

c. A test used primarily to measure someone’s standing on the Big Five:

d. A projective personality test using standardized inkblots as stimuli:

e. Designed to create a personality profile representing Cattell’s source traits:

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.1

Sigmund Freud is shown here in 1891, when he was becoming increasingly convinced that certain physical problems might have psychological origins.

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the attacks appear suddenly without warning and seem unrelated to activity or gen- eral health. Katharina herself provides no insight: “There’s nothing in my head when the attacks begin; my mind is a blank.” The only additional information you have about Katharina is that she’s reluctant to involve herself with members of the oppo- site sex and she has a persistent dream in which she appears as a young child pursued from room to room by a shadowy figure.

Think about this case study for a moment. Can you draw any general conclu- sions about Katharina’s personality from an analysis of her symptoms? The case itself is typical of the clinical problems Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) studied in the late 19th century. Remember, Freud was a medical doctor by training. He established a private practice in Vienna, where he specialized in a branch of medicine concerned with dis- orders of the nervous system. Freud routinely encountered patients like Katharina, who seemed to have physical problems without physical causes. He used these cases (known in that time as hysterics) as the basis for his highly influential psychodynamic theory of personality and mind, as well as for his method of treatment known as psychoanalysis.

The Structure of the Mind Freud believed the human mind can be divided into three major parts: the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. The conscious mind contains the contents of current awareness—those things that occupy the focus of your attention at the moment. The preconscious mind contains inactive but acces- sible thoughts and memories—those things that you could easily recall, if desired, but are simply not thinking about at the moment. Finally, the unconscious mind houses all the memories, urges, and conflicts that are beyond awareness. Freud believed that the contents of the unconscious mind exert powerful and long- lasting influences on behavior, despite the fact that they’re hidden and unavailable to consciousness.

From Freud’s perspective, Katharina’s panicky behavior is likely to be caused by forces originating in her unconscious. Consider her dream of being chased by a shadowy figure. She can remember the details—her appearance as a young child, perhaps the color and shapes of the rooms—but her conscious memory of the dream, according to Freud, is unreliable. The parts of the dream she remembers, its manifest content, are merely symbolic of the dream’s true unconscious mean- ing, or latent content. As we discussed in Chapter 6, Freud believed that dreams represent wish fulfillment; dreams are simply one way of gratifying desires or dealing with forbidden conflicts that are normally stored in the unconscious. In Katharina’s case, the shadowy figure may well have arisen from a traumatic child- hood experience—perhaps an unwelcome sexual advance by a relative—or even from her own unconscious desire for a sexual experience. Freud relied heavily on dream interpretation as a technique for mapping out the contents of the uncon- scious mind. Dreams, Freud argued, represent a “royal road” to the unconscious (Freud, 1900/1990).

The Structure of Personality Freud believed that human personality consists of three parts: the id, ego, and superego (see ●Figure 12.5). As a student of biology, Freud was committed to the idea that behavior is influenced by biological forces. He was con- vinced that each of us is born with powerful instinctual drives, particularly related to sex and aggression, which motivate and control our actions. Freud used the term id to represent the portion of personality that is governed by these forces (translated from the Latin, id means “it”). As a component of personality, the id seeks imme- diate satisfaction of natural urges, without concern for the morals and cus- toms of society. It obeys what Freud called the pleasure principle—the pursuit of pleasure through the satisfaction of animalistic urges. Ironically, from an adaptive standpoint, it’s this dark side of personality—the seeker of pleasure—that guarantees survival of the species by motivating a desire for sexual intercourse.

psychodynamic theory An approach to personality development, based largely on the ideas of Sigmund Freud, that holds that much of behavior is governed by unconscious forces.

conscious mind The contents of awareness— those things that occupy the focus of one’s current attention.

unconscious mind The part of the mind that Freud believed housed all the memories, urges, and conflicts that are truly beyond awareness.

preconscious mind The part of the mind that contains all of the inactive but potentially accessible thoughts and memories.

id In Freud’s theory, the portion of personality that is governed by inborn instinctual drives, particularly those related to sex and aggression.

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How do the modern memory concepts of short- and long-term memory relate to Freud’s three-part theory of the mind?

Determining How Personality Develops | 383

At the same time, Freud understood that we’re more than just irrational sex machines. He suggested that the forces of the id are balanced by a moral arm of personality called the superego. The superego is the part of our personality that encourages us to act in an ideal fashion—to act in accordance with the moral customs defined by parents and culture. The superego is shaped by expe- rience, and it acts, in part, as a conscience; it makes us feel good when we act the way we should and feel guilty when our behavior strays from accepted standards. Like the id, the superego is essen- tially irrational—it seeks only moral perfection. Left to its own devices, the superego would undercut or block the more basic urges, even though those urges may help us satisfy fundamental survival needs. The superego follows an idealistic principle: Always act in a proper and ideal fashion as defined by parents and culture.

Sitting between the forces of the id and superego, and acting as a mediator, is the third component of personality—the ego. The ego, which comes from the Latin word for “I,” serves an execu- tive role in Freud’s conception of personality. The ego encourages you to act with reason and deliberation and helps you conform to the requirements of the external world. Freud suggested that the ego obeys a reality principle; it monitors the real world looking for appropriate outlets for the id’s needs, but it also listens intently to the moralistic preaching of the superego. The ego’s goal is com- promise among three demanding masters: the external world, the id, and the superego.

Defense Mechanisms: The Ego’s Arsenal As noted previously, Freud believed we’re unaware of the conflicts that regularly rage among the id, ego, and superego. We consciously experience only the side effects of these battles. For example, Freud believed the experience of anxiety (an unpleasant feeling of dread) often results from confrontations between the ego and the id. But the ego does not enter the battlefield unarmed. Freud proposed that the ego uses a variety of defense mechanisms, which are unconscious processes that can ward off the anxiety that comes from confronta- tion with the id.

The most important weapon in the ego’s arsenal is repression, a process that keeps anxiety-producing thoughts and feelings buried in the unconscious. When a primitive urge from the id rears its ugly head, the ego actively represses the thought or feeling. The urge is blocked, jammed down into the dark recesses of the unconscious. Freud was convinced that we’re particularly likely to repress sexual thoughts or expe- riences. Unrestricted sexual activity is typically discouraged by parents and society— this was particularly true in Freud’s time—so sexual thoughts and feelings must be actively blocked by the reality-driven ego. Repression is a kind of self-deception—the mind deals with the anxiety-producing impulse by acting as if it isn’t there. Similar kinds of self-deception occur with the other defense mechanisms, Freud proposed. For a listing of some of these other important defense mechanisms, along with some examples, take a look at the accompanying Concept Review.

Psychosexual Development To Freud, the unconscious mind is a bubbling cauldron of hidden conflicts, repressed memories, and biological urges. In the case of the biological urges, their origin is relatively clear—people are born with instinc- tual drives for self-preservation and sex. But where do the hidden conflicts come from? Why are people tormented by repressed memories that arise directly from life’s experiences? Freud believed that people travel through stages of psychosexual development in their childhood (Freud, 1905/1962). How children deal with their emerging sexuality importantly affects the way they think and feel when they reach adulthood.

superego In Freud’s theory, the portion of personality that motivates people to act in an ideal fashion, in accordance with the moral customs defined by parents and culture.

ego In Freud’s theory, the portion of personality that induces people to act with reason and deliberation and helps them conform to the requirements of the external world.

defense mechanisms According to Freud, unconscious processes used by the ego to ward off the anxiety that comes from confrontation, usually with the demands of the id.

repression A defense mechanism used to bury anxiety-producing thoughts and feelings in the unconscious.

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What are the adaptive qualities of the superego? What would happen to the human species if the superego always controlled behavior?

● FiGuRE 12.5 Freud’s view of Personality Freud believed that our personalities are influenced by three forces. The id is the unconscious and unrepentant seeker of pleasure; the superego is the moral seeker of ideal behavior; and the ego is the executive that acts in accordance with reality. Just as most of an iceberg lies beneath the water, much of personality operates at an unconscious level. (© Cengage Learning)

Conscious

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Idealistic Principle

Reality Principle

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Each developmental stage is associated with a sensitive region of pleasure, which Freud called an erogenous zone. In roughly the first year of life—during the oral stage—pleasure is derived primarily from sucking and from placing things in the mouth (such as the mother’s breast). In the second year of life, the focus of plea- sure shifts to the anus. During this anal stage, pleasure arises from the process of def- ecation, the passing of feces. From ages 3 through 5, in the phallic stage, the genital regions of the body receive the focus of attention. The child obtains intense gratifica- tion from self-stimulation of the sexual organs.

Freud believed we move through these stages for primarily biological reasons. All organisms, including humans, need to learn how to gain nourishment, control the elimination of waste, and satisfy the sexual drive. Unfortunately, it’s possible to become stalled, or fixated, at a particular stage, which, in turn, can have long-lasting effects on personality. By fixation, Freud meant that a person will continue to act in ways that are appropriate for a particular stage, seeking pleasure in stage-dependent ways, even after he or she has physically matured. There are two primary ways in which the fixation process can occur: First, if the child gains excess gratification from a stage or, second, if the child becomes excessively frustrated. It’s the second of these two situations that has received the most attention.

oral stage The first stage in Freud’s conception of psychosexual development, occurring in the first year of life; in this stage, pleasure is derived primarily from sucking and placing things in the mouth.

anal stage Freud’s second stage of psychosexual development, occurring in the second year of life; pleasure is derived from the process of defecation.

phallic stage Freud’s third stage of psychosexual development, lasting from about age 3 to age 5; pleasure is gained from self- stimulation of the sexual organs.

● CONCEPt REviEw Defense Mechanisms MECHANISM DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE

Repression Anxiety-producing thoughts and feelings are kept buried in the unconscious.

Horace doesn’t remember the horrible fire that nearly killed him when he was a child.

Denial You refuse to believe information that leads to anxiety.

Clay continues to deny that his four-martini lunches are a problem.

Rationalization Explanations are created to deal with threatening thoughts.

Suze explains that she failed the test because the teacher asked the wrong questions.

Projection Unacceptable wishes or feelings are attributed to others.

Lydia deals with her attraction to her married supervisor Bill by accusing fellow employee Kelly of flirting with him.

Reaction formation You behave in a way that is counter or opposite to how you feel.

Although deeply resentful of how his mother treated him as a child, Juan calls her every day and showers her with affection.

Sublimation Unacceptable impulses are channeled into socially acceptable activity.

Tze is rude and critical and likes to put people down. She decides to become a stand-up comic.

Freud believed that people sometimes deal with unacceptable feelings by attributing them to others through a process called projection. Freud might argue that the woman on the left is “projecting” anger from some deeper conflict onto the woman on the right. ©

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Notice the oral and anal stages are associated with the potentially traumatic experiences of weaning and toilet training. Freud emphasized these experiences because a child can become easily frustrated during either process. People who are fixated in the oral stage, Freud believed, continue to derive pleasure from oral activi- ties into adulthood. They become excessive smokers, or overeaters, or people who bite their nails. Fixation at the anal stage might lead to excessive neatness or messi- ness. The pleasure-seeking activities in these instances are symbolic, of course; com- pulsive room cleaning might be a symbolic attempt at the pleasure a child sometimes receives from the retention of feces.

Freud’s interpretation of the phallic stage of psychosexual development was par- ticularly controversial. He was convinced that small children have intense but uncon- scious sexual urges that become focused during this stage toward the opposite-sex parent. Boys become erotically attracted to their mother, a condition Freud called the Oedipus complex (after the Greek tragedy of Oedipus, who unknowingly killed his father and married his mother); girls can become attracted to their father in what has been called the Electra complex (after the mythical Greek Electra, who hated and con- spired to murder her mother). Desire for the opposite-sex parent creates enormous unconscious conflicts in the developing child. Freud believed that many adult sex- ual or relationship problems can be traced back to a failure to resolve these conflicts adequately.

After the age of 5 or 6, boys and girls enter a kind of psychosexual lull—called the latency period—during which their sexual feelings are largely suppressed. During this period, children direct their attention to social concerns, such as developing solid friendships. Beginning with the onset of puberty, one enters the genital stage. Here, sexuality reawakens, but in what Freud considered to be a more direct and appropriate fashion. Erotic tendencies now tend to be directed toward members of the opposite sex.

Adler, Jung, and Horney Freud’s emphasis on the role of sexuality in personality development was received with skepticism by many, even from those who were firmly committed to his general approach. One of the first to split from Freud’s inner circle of disciples was Alfred Adler (1870–1937). Adler disagreed strongly with Freud about the role of early psychosexual experience. He felt the important determinant of personality development was not childhood trauma but rather how we come to deal with a basic sense of inferiority. To Adler, personality arises from our attempts to over- come or compensate for fundamental feelings of inadequacy. Adler was responsible for coining the popular term inferiority complex, a concept, he argued, that motivates a great deal of human behavior. It is our natural drive for superiority that explains motivation, not sexual gratification (Adler, 1927).

Adler was not the only dissenting voice. Other early advocates of Freud’s theory began to break away and offer new and revised forms of the theory. One of the big- gest personal blows to Freud was the departure of his disciple Carl Jung (1875–1961), whom Freud had picked as his intellectual heir. Jung, like Adler, was dissatisfied with Freud’s narrow reliance on sexuality as the dominant source of human motivation. Jung believed instead in the idea of a “general life force,” which he adopted from his extensive study of Eastern religions and mythology. This general life force was sexual in part but included other basic sources of motivation as well, such as the need for cre- ativity ( Jung, 1923).

Among Jung’s more influential ideas was his concept of the collective unconscious. Jung believed that each person has a shared unconscious, in addition to the personal unconscious described by Freud, that’s filled with mystical symbols and universal images that have accumulated over the lifetime of the human species. These symbols are inherited—passed from one generation to the next—and tend to represent enduring concepts (or archetypes), such as god, mother, earth, and water. Actually, the idea that all humans share certain concepts buried deep in a collective unconscious can also be found in the writings of Freud, but Jung expanded on the idea and assigned it a central focus.

latency period Freud’s period of psychosexual development, from age 5 to puberty, during which the child’s sexual feelings are largely suppressed.

genital stage Freud’s final stage of psychosexual development, during which one develops mature sexual relationships with members of the opposite sex.

collective unconscious The notion proposed by Carl Jung that certain kinds of universal symbols and ideas are present in the unconscious of all people.

Through sublimation, unacceptable impulses, such as a desire to hurt others, are channeled into socially acceptable activities.

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Most people deny that they’ve ever had sexual feelings toward their parents. If you were Freud, how would you explain these denials?

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Another blow to Freud was the dissenting voice of Karen Horney (1885–1952), one of the first women to learn and practice psychodynamic theory. Horney agreed with Freud’s basic approach, but she rebelled against what she felt was Freud’s male-domi- nated views of sexuality. Freud had argued in his writings that women are fundamen- tally dissatisfied with their sex—they suffer from what he called penis envy—a view that Horney found unsatisfactory in many ways. She boldly confronted Freud, both personally and in her writings, and offered revised forms of psychodynamic theory that treated women in a more balanced way (Horney, 1967). One of her more lasting theoretical contributions was her insistence that a link exists between the irratio- nal beliefs people hold about themselves and their psychological problems (Horney, 1945). As you’ll see in Chapters 14 and 15, this idea continues to be influential in the conceptualization and treatment of psychological disorders.

Evaluating Psychodynamic Theory Few psychological theories have been as influen- tial as Freud’s. Many of the terms and concepts he introduced—particularly his ideas about the unconscious—have become part of modern language and beliefs. You were probably familiar with such Freudian terms as repression, id, ego, and projection before you opened this psychology text. Moreover, the suggestion that personality is deter- mined in part by how we learn to satisfy basic biological drives, as well as deal effec- tively with the demands of society and the outside world, is still a very modern and widely accepted idea (Bornstein, 2003). But psychodynamic theory, as envisioned by Freud, has steadily lost its influence over the years.

Part of the problem is that many of the ideas Freud proposed lack scientific rigor; he never articulated concepts such as the id, superego, and ego with ringing preci- sion. As a result, it’s been difficult, if not impossible, to subject them to proper sci- entific testing. Consider the concept of repression, which Freud believed to be the bedrock of psychodynamic theory. If repressed memories are hidden behind the veil of the unconscious, expressing themselves only in masked and largely symbolic ways, can we ever be certain that we’ve correctly identified these unconscious influences? Most of the evidence for repression has come from clinical case studies, from indi- viduals who are probably not representative of the general population. Psychologists have been unable to study repression in the laboratory, either because of ethical con- cerns or because it’s unclear what conditions need to be met for repression to occur. Many people have undergone traumatic events in their childhood yet remain psycho- logically healthy (Loftus, 1993).

In addition to the problems of testability and lack of scientific rigor, Freud’s the- ory is often criticized for its biases against women. As mentioned earlier, he painted women as individuals unsatisfied with their gender, who need to come to grips with the fact that they lack a penis. Freud was also reluctant to believe women’s testimoni- als of rape or childhood sexual abuse—he saw these accounts as symbolic expressions of unconscious conflicts rather than as actual events. Many psychologists consider these positions, along with Freud’s general male-oriented approach, to be unrealistic and even distasteful (Masson, 1984; Vitz, 1988).

Humanistic Approaches to Personality There’s another reason many psychologists don’t like Freud’s psychodynamic approach: It paints a very dark picture of human nature. In describing the origins of personality, Freud often compared the mind to a battlefield, where irrational forces are continuously engaged in a struggle for control. According to Freud, our actions are motivated primarily by the need to satisfy animalistic urges related to sex and aggression; our conscious awareness of why we act is misleading and symbolic, representative of conflicts created during toilet training or as a result of being weaned.

Carl Jung believed that everyone shares a collective unconscious filled with mystical symbols and universal images.

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Humanistic psychology is largely a reaction against this pessimistic view of the human spirit. Humanistic psychologists don’t talk about battlefields and conflict; instead, they speak of growth and potential. It’s not animalistic urges that explain personality; it’s the human with our unparalleled capacity for self-awareness, choice, responsibility, and growth. Humanistic psychologists believe each of us can control our own behavioral destiny—we can consciously rise above whatever animalistic urges might be coded in our genes. We’re built and designed for personal growth, to seek our fullest potential, to self-actualize—to become all we are capable of becoming.

To a humanist, there are many ways to explain individual differences in behav- ior. First, each of us is considered to be naturally unique. We’re more than the sum of a set of predictable parts—everyone is a unique and individual whole. Second, the envi- ronment influences the natural growth process. Like plants, people will grow best in fertile and supportive environments; barren environments can’t stop the growth process, but they can prevent us from realizing our own true potential (Rogers, 1963). Third, and perhaps most important, how we act is determined by our unique view of the world—our interpretation of reality. How we view ourselves and the environ- ment guides and motivates our actions. Notice the emphasis here is on conscious mental processes. We’re assumed to be responsible for our own actions, although sometimes our subjective experience of reality is not an accurate reflection of the real world. We’ll consider the views of two prominent humanistic psychologists in this section, Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow.

Carl Rogers and the Self To humanist Carl Rogers (1902–1987), the essence of per- sonality is wrapped up in the concept of the self or, more specifically, the self-concept. He defined the self-concept as an organized set of perceptions about one’s abilities and characteristics—it amounts to that keen sense of oneself, what it means to be “I” or “me.” Rogers believed that the self-concept comes primarily from social inter- actions, particularly the interactions we have with our parents, friends, and other significant role models. The people around us mold and shape our self-image through their ongoing evaluations of our actions.

We rely on the judgments of others to tell us who we truly are and what we can hope to become, Rogers argued, because of a basic need for positive regard. We value what others think of us and consistently seek others’ approval, love, and companion- ship. Unfortunately, in real life conditions of worth tend to be attached to the approval of others. For instance, let’s suppose you come from a family that values education and intellectual pursuits. You, however, couldn’t care less about such things—your inter- ests are in popular music and athletics. To gain acceptance from your parents, you may deny your true feelings and modify your self-concept to bring it more in line with what your parents believe: “I’m not someone who cares about a trivial activity like sports, I’m someone who cares intensely about the pursuit of knowledge.”

But herein lies a major problem, Rogers argued. The self-concept that you work so hard to form inevitably conflicts with what you truly feel from experience. You may decide to spend the evening reading the philosophical musings of Immanuel Kant, but you’ll probably find your mind drifting and your feelings of self-worth diminishing. Rogers called this condition incongruence, which he defined as a dis- crepancy between the image you hold of yourself—your self-concept—and your actual day-to-day experiences. Incongruence leads to the experience of anxiety and ultimately forms the basis for psychological problems. True psychological health, Rogers suggested, comes when the self-concept is congruent (agrees) with your true feelings and experiences—that is, when your opinions and beliefs about yourself accurately reflect your everyday experiences. Chapter 15 outlines what Rogers felt was the appropriate therapeutic solution to conditions of incongruence. To anticipate the discussion just a bit, Rogers was convinced that the therapist’s proper role is to be nonjudgmental—to accept the feelings and actions of the client unconditionally. By eliminating the conditions of worth, the client is able to develop a self-concept more congruent with reality.

humanistic psychology An approach to personality that focuses on people’s unique capacity for choice, responsibility, and growth.

self-concept An organized set of perceptions that we hold about our abilities and characteristics.

positive regard The idea that we value what others think of us and that we constantly seek others’ approval, love, and companionship.

conditions of worth The expectations or standards that we believe others place on us.

incongruence A discrepancy between the image we hold of ourselves—our self- concept—and the sum of all our experiences.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Think about how good it makes you feel to talk to a really close friend. From the perspective of humanistic theory, why should this be the case?

388 | CHAPTER 12 Personality

With respect to personality and its development, Rogers believed that regulari- ties in behavior come largely from the structure of the self-concept. Personality is defined by consistent behavior across situations; people tend to act consistently, he argued, simply because their actions consistently mirror their established self- concept. We act in ways that support our beliefs about ourselves. More often than not we’ll actively seek to protect our self-image. Given a choice, you might consistently choose to read philosophy rather than watch television because it’s consistent with your vision of you. If you chose television, you would need to reconsider who you really are, which is the sort of confrontation that we tend to avoid.

Abraham Maslow and Self-Actualization Although Carl Rogers was committed to the role played by the self-concept, he also believed strongly in the potential for personal growth. We may act defensively and seek to protect a rigid self-concept, but at our core we’re creative people who have the power to fulfill our personal potential. This idea that everyone has a basic need for self-actualization—the need to move forward toward the realization of potential—also plays a pivotal role in Abraham Maslow’s view of personality.

We encountered Maslow’s views in Chapter 11 when we discussed motivation. Maslow believed that human motivation is grounded in the satisfaction of need. There are certain things that humans must do—such as obtain food and water and protect themselves from danger—before their potential can be fully realized. As you saw in Chapter 11, one of Maslow’s main contributions was his proposal of the need hierarchy, shown in ●Figure 12.6, which expresses the order in which needs must be satisfied. Notice that safety and survival needs sit below the need for love and belonging in the need hierarchy. It’s unlikely that you’ll appear to be spiritual or loving if you’re constantly worrying about your next meal. It’s only after the basic needs are satisfied—those related to survival—that the more spiritual side of personality can be developed.

Your personality characteristics will reflect where you’re positioned in the hier- archy of needs. Maslow had a very positive view of human nature. A person may consistently act unkind, defensive, or aggressive, he argued, but these personality traits appear only when one fails to satisfy basic needs—they’ll never be funda- mental to the human spirit. To support this claim, Maslow pointed to the behav- ior of individuals who he felt had progressed through the entire hierarchy. The

self-actualization The ingrained desire to reach one’s true potential as a human being.

Carl Rogers proposed that we have an inborn need for positive regard—we value what others think of us and consistently seek their approval and companionship. ©

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● FiGuRE 12.6 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Maslow proposed that our observable personality characteristics will indicate where we are positioned in the hierarchy of needs. Someone who must worry constantly about biological or safety needs will behave differently from someone who is seeking to satisfy needs at the highest levels of the pyramid. (© Cengage Learning)

Physiological Needs

Safety Needs

Belongingness and Love Needs

Esteem Needs

Self- Actualization

Needs

Determining How Personality Develops | 389

characteristics of human personality, he argued, are highly consistent across individ- uals at the highest levels of the hierarchy. People who are self-actualizing show none of the darker personality traits exhibited by those locked in at lower levels; they tend to be positive, creative, accepting individuals (Leclerc et al., 1998).

Maslow’s conclusions were based largely on the study of particular individuals, people whom he knew and admired. He also studied the personality traits of people who were very successful, such as Albert Einstein, Abraham Lincoln, and Eleanor Roosevelt. All self-actualizing people, he argued, share certain personality traits. They tend to be accepting of themselves and others, to be self-motivated and problem ori- ented, and to have a strong ethical sense and hold democratic values. Self-actualizing people also often undergo what Maslow called peak experiences—emotional, often religious, experiences in which one’s place in a unified universe becomes clear and meaningful. Notice these are all positive traits; self-actualizing people tend to be at peace with themselves and with the world.

Evaluating Humanistic Theories The humanistic approach, with its optimistic empha- sis on positive growth, has had considerable influence in psychology. Concepts such as the self have received a great deal of recent attention and, as you’ll see in Chapter 15, humanistic approaches to psychotherapy are popular and widely applied. The humanistic approach provides a nice balance to the pessimism of Freud. Rather than ignoring conscious influences on behavior, humanists champion personal choice and responsibility. Take a trip to your local bookstore and check the shelves devoted to psychology—you’ll find that many of the books emphasize the control you can exert over your own behavior. This is one indication of the humanists’ widespread impact, especially in tapping the general population’s interest in psychology.

But as contributors to scientific psychology, humanistic psychologists are often criticized (see Funder, 2001). Many of the basic concepts we’ve discussed, such as the potential for growth and self-actualization, are vague and difficult to pin down. It’s also not clear where these tendencies come from and under which conditions they’ll fully express themselves. Remember, too, that the humanists place important emphasis on personal, subjective experience. This means that researchers must often rely on self-reports to generate data, and some question whether self-reports produce reliable and accurate representations of internal psychological processes (Leclerc et al., 1998). So in addition to problems of conceptual vagueness, humanism lacks adequate testability.

The humanistic approach to personality is also criticized for adopting too opti- mistic a view of human nature. The arguments of Rogers and Maslow are partly reactions against the pessimism of Freud. But like Freud, humanistic theorists have adopted a rather extreme view of human nature: People constantly strive for growth, unless constrained in some way by the environment, and are driven to pursue lofty goals. Thus we have the dark view described by Freud (people are driven by uncon- scious animalistic urges) countered by the extremely optimistic views of the human- ists. Many psychologists believe it’s better to adopt a balanced approach: People are neither inherently good nor evil; they sometimes act in self-interested ways that may appear animalistic, but these actions are often adaptive and increase one’s likelihood of survival (Kenrick, 2011). At the same time, placing too much emphasis on uncon- scious biological motives is itself misleading—we undoubtedly exercise considerable conscious control over our behavior.

Social–Cognitive Approaches to Personality One particularly important characteristic of both the psychodynamic and humanis- tic approaches to personality is their emphasis on built-in or natural needs. People are born with animalistic urges that must be satisfied, or they greet the world naturally

Are we all born naturally good, or do we learn to be good because of how we’ve been rewarded?

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good with a compelling need for personal growth. The environment plays a critical role in determining final personality, but the role is essentially secondary—personal experiences and cultural norms merely constrain or enhance the full expression of natural needs.

But what about the possibility that people simply learn to act in consistent ways? Isn’t it possible that Roger’s tendency to lie and Rowena’s outgoing and sunny dis- position come entirely from experience? Maybe Roger stole candy when he was 4 and was rewarded by not being caught; maybe Rowena learned at an early age that smiles are often met with smiles and that a good deed will be returned in kind. According to social–cognitive theories of personality, human experience, not human nature, is the primary cause of personality growth and development. The social side of the approach emphasizes the role of experience; the cognitive side emphasizes how one’s interpretation of the experience plays a significant role in determining what’s actually learned.

Behaviorist Roots Social–cognitive theories were originally influenced by the behav- iorist tradition in psychology. As discussed in Chapter 1, behaviorists believe that psy- chologists should look to observable behavior for answers to psychological questions; the research goal is to understand how behavior changes when rewards and punish- ments are applied. What we call personality, then, could be nothing more than the collective actions we’ve learned to produce in various situations. As with all other animals, if our behavior is rewarded in a particular situation, we’ll be more likely to repeat it the next time we’re in the same situation.

There are three main ways in which people acquire such response tendencies (see Chapter 7). First, through classical conditioning, we learn that certain kinds of events signal other events. Imagine that as a small child Little Albert is frightened in the pres- ence of a white furry rat; he develops a specific fear, or phobia, of small furry animals that continues on into adulthood. His behavior is consistent over time—he panics at the sight of anything small and furry—due in large part to this early childhood expe- rience. Second, through operant conditioning, we learn about the consequences of our behavior. If we’re rewarded in some context for acting aggressively, we’ll tend to act aggressively in the future. If we are repeatedly put down at parties for being outgoing, we’ll learn to be withdrawn and to avoid social situations. Here again it is the environ- ment—one’s past history of rewards and punishments—that is shaping behavior.

The third way that consistencies in behavior can develop is through observational learning, or modeling. We observe the behavior of others around us—especially role models—and imitate the behavior. As we discussed in Chapter 7, it’s adaptive for organ- isms to mimic the behavior of others, because in this way they can learn appropriate behavior without directly experiencing the consequences of an inappropriate action. Rhesus monkeys, for example, learn to show fear in the presence of snakes through modeling their parents’ behavior, not from directly experiencing the negative conse- quences of a bite (Mineka, 1987). Modeling approaches assume that many personality traits come from copying the behavior of others, especially when the behavior of the model regularly leads to positive, reinforcing outcomes (Bandura, 1986; Mischel, 1968).

The Role of Internal Beliefs Very few psychologists actually believe the environ- ment alone determines your personality. This is because the psychological effect of most experiences—positive or negative—depends crucially on how you interpret the experience. Suppose we ask two groups of people to perform a relatively difficult task, such as predicting sequences of numbers. We tell one of the groups that perfor- mance on the task is based on skill; the other group is told that success or failure is due entirely to chance. (Unknown to the participants, we actually rig the procedure so people in both groups will succeed and fail the same number of times.) It turns out that task effort, as well as the amount learned, depends on how much control you think you have over the outcome. People who believe their performance is skill based work harder and learn more from the task (Rotter et al., 1961).

social–cognitive theories An approach to personality that suggests it is human experiences, and interpretations of those experiences, that determine personality growth and development.

How we act and feel often depends on how much control we think we have over the environment. Externals, who perceive little connection between their own actions and rewards, tend to see themselves as powerless and to have low levels of self-esteem.

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Determining How Personality Develops | 391

The important point here is that the groups perform differently even though everyone receives exactly the same number of rewards and punishments. So it’s not only the literal distribution of rewards and punishments that matters; your belief about the origins of those consequences is also important. Some psychologists believe that enduring personality traits are based partly on one’s perceived locus of control— how much control you feel you have over your environment (Rotter, 1966). People who are oriented externally, known as externals, perceive little connection between their own actions and the occurrence of rewards; they tend to see themselves as pow- erless and generally have low levels of self-esteem (Lefcourt, 1982). Internally oriented people, known as internals, view the world as responsive to their actions; they feel confident they can control when rewards and punishments occur. Internally oriented people display high levels of self-confidence and tend to score higher than externally oriented individuals on a variety of academic and social measures (Ryckman, 2004).

Interestingly, U.S. college students seem to be trending toward more of an exter- nal locus of control. Young Americans increasingly believe they have little direct control over what happens in their lives. For example, the average college student in 2002 had more of an external locus of control than 80% of the college students in the early 1960s (Twenge et al., 2004). Why the trend? No one knows for certain, but greater cynicism, negative social trends (including increased media coverage of nega- tive events), and the tendency to adopt a “victim mentality” have all been suggested as reasons. It’s an unfortunate trend because, again, an external locus of control, and its accompanying feelings of powerlessness, is typically associated with a host of neg- ative consequences.

Locus of control is related to another psychological concept called self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986, 2001). Whereas locus of control refers to your beliefs about how much control you can exert over the environment, self-efficacy is defined as the beliefs you hold about your own ability. For example, Raymond might be convinced people can control their environment but feel he personally lacks the skill. In this case, he would be rated as low in self-efficacy, with an internal locus of control. On the other hand, he might be extremely confident in his basic abilities (high self-efficacy) but believe he can do little to control the things around him (external locus of control). Often a person’s degree of self-efficacy is related to particular situations or tasks. You might believe strongly in your ability to excel academically but lack any measure of confidence in your social skills.

locus of control The amount of control that a person feels he or she has over the environment.

self-efficacy The beliefs we hold about our own ability to perform a task or accomplish a goal.

How students cope with the problem of performing well in school depends to a certain extent on their degree of self-efficacy.©

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392 | CHAPTER 12 Personality

Locus of control and self-eff icacy are important concepts. They tell us that what we learn from the environment depends on more than the delivery of rewards and punishments. What you expect and believe about the world and your abilities inf luences the types of tasks you’ll choose to engage in, as well as the effectiveness of rewards and punishments. If you’re convinced you have little or no ability in social settings—your self-eff icacy is low—you’ll either avoid going to parties or act nervous and uncomfortable when you do go. If you feel you have no chance of succeeding in your psychology course because the teaching assistant doesn’t like you—that is, you’ve adopted an external locus of control—your motivation to work hard is likely to be low. Note in these cases your internal beliefs end up affecting your overt behav- ior (avoidance of parties or class), which, in turn, affects the likelihood that you’ll be rewarded. Psychologist Albert Bandura (1986) has referred to this relationship between beliefs, overt behavior, and the environment as one of reciprocal determinism: beliefs, behavior, and the environment interact to shape what’s learned from experience (see ●Figure 12.7). Recent work suggests that the concept of reciprocal determinism can be used effectively to explain performance in academic settings across a variety of cultures (Williams & Williams, 2010).

Evaluating Social–Cognitive Theories Most psychologists believe learning plays an important role in personality development. Furthermore, the idea that cognitive fac- tors help determine what’s learned, rather than just rewards and punishments, is also widely accepted. Critics of the social–cognitive approach simply argue that it is insuf- ficient as a general account of personality development (Feist, 1994; Ryckman, 2008). Social–cognitive theories, for example, tend to neglect the individual as a whole,

reciprocal determinism The idea that beliefs, behavior, and the environment interact to shape what is learned from experience.

Personal/cognitive factors

I’ll never do well in this class.

Environment Behavior

● FiGuRE 12.7 Reciprocal Determinism Bandura proposed that personality is shaped by complex interactions among expectations and beliefs, behavior, and the rewards and punishments delivered by the environment. In this case, expecting failure in class (personal/ cognitive factors) affects studying (behavior), which in turn affects the likelihood of success on the test (environment). The arrows point both ways, suggesting that these factors can all interact. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Carla receives an A in her psychology class but attributes it to the fact that her teacher is easy. Does she have an internal or external locus of control? How confident do you think she is of her own abilities?

Determining How Personality Develops | 393

choosing instead to concentrate on how people have learned to respond in particular situations.

The approach has been criticized as well for failing to emphasize the role of biological and genetic factors in development. Although biological drives and urges may not be the main determinants of personality, biological ancestry can’t be ignored completely. By choosing to focus primarily on the environment, the social–cognitive theorists sometimes ignore important motivational factors that are controlled largely by biological processes. In fairness, social–cognitive theo- ries recognize this limitation and have tried to integrate genetic, biological, and environmental factors into a more general theory of personality development (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 1998).

● CONCEPt REviEw View of Personality Development APPROACH DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE

Psychodynamic Personality can be influenced by forces originating in the unconscious and is made up of three components: id (instinctive urges), ego (conscious decision making), and superego (conscience).

Jane is strongly attracted to men, but her parents are very strict about dating, so her sexual feelings are repressed. As a result she tends to avoid men and is uncomfortable when she is around them.

Humanistic We ultimately control our own behavioral destiny. Personality reflects our uniqueness, as well as our environment and our personal view of the world.

Because of criticism from her parents during childhood, Jane has developed a poor self-concept. She has not experienced unconditional positive regard and as a result feels uncomfort- able with who she is.

Social–cognitive Personality results from an interaction between the experiences delivered by the environment and our interpretations of those experiences.

Jane goes to an all-girls high school and doesn’t encoun- ter many boys. As a result, she’s a bit uncomfortable around them and acts nervous. They then tend to avoid her, and she feels even more uncomfortable.

test Yourself Check your knowledge of how personality develops by deciding whether each of the following statements is most likely to have been made by a psychodynamic, humanistic, or social–cognitive personality theorist. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Ethel talks a lot, but that’s only because she’s trying to cover up her true feelings of inadequacy:

2. Teresa is very demanding, but that’s because her boyfriend always gets her what she wants:

3. Sally can’t help herself—her basic needs are preventing her from realizing her true potential:

4. Sharma seems to be a tireless volunteer, but in truth she secretly resents people in need:

5. Robert isn’t really an intellectual—he just acts that way because both of his parents are famous academics and he desperately wants to please them:

6. Henry is shy because he lacks confidence in his abilities, and he’s convinced that he can’t really influence or control the people around him:

7. Ralph sleeps around a lot, but that’s because he can’t control his animalistic nature:

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.2

394 | CHAPTER 12 Personality

Resolving the Person–Situation Debate LEARNING GOALS

● Discuss the person–situation debate and its resolution. ● Discuss how genetic factors influence personality.

According to social–cognitive theories, behavior is primarily the product of the envi- ronment. As a result, you might be expected to act somewhat inconsistently from one situation to the next. If you’re rewarded for acting bold and aggressive when negoti- ating a deal (such as buying a car), you’ll almost certainly act bold and aggressive in such situations in the future. But if similar actions lead to rejection in the classroom or in social situations, you might very well turn meek and mild in class or at a party. If you think about it, you probably know people who seem to change their behavior at the drop of a hat, acting one way in one situation and quite differently in another.

This kind of reasoning really strikes at the core of personality. Remember, per- sonality is defined in terms of lasting qualities—the characteristics that distinguish us from others and lead us to act consistently across situations. Throughout this chap- ter, we’ve assumed that such characteristics exist and that they can be measured and interpreted. But the assumption of cross-situational consistency in behavior has been challenged by some prominent psychologists, notably Walter Mischel, and the issue has come to be known as the person–situation debate.

The Person–Situation Debate The argument is really a simple one. If people possess unique and enduring personal- ity traits, we should be able to predict their behavior from one situation to the next. If you believe Roger to be dishonest, perhaps because you witnessed him peering over Rowena’s shoulder during a history test, you expect him to be dishonest in the future. You predict he will pocket a dropped wallet or take the money Rowena left lying on the counter. Put more technically, measurements of behavior should correlate across situations; that is, if you know the chances that someone will perform a trait-related action in situation A, you should be able to predict the chances that he or she will per- form a similar action in situation B.

Unfortunately, as Walter Mischel (1968) pointed out decades ago, there’s little evidence for this assumption (see also Peterson, 1968). If you look carefully at stud- ies reporting correlations between measures of behavior that tap a particular kind of personality trait, such as how honest you are at two different points in time, the correlations are almost always low. Whereas a correlation of 1.00 implies perfect behavioral consistency across situations, Mischel found that actual correlations rarely exceeded 0.30 and were sometimes even lower (see also Kenrick & Funder, 1988; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). To say the least, Mischel’s conclusions were quite controversial; in fact, they rocked the foundation of personality theory. Without consistency in behav- ior, the psychological construct of personality has little meaning.

Situational Consistency Despite the data, very few psychologists (including Mischel) reject the concept of personality altogether. People may not always act consistently across situations, but they do tend to act consistently within a situation. For exam- ple, in a famous study by Hartshorne and May (1928), the honesty of schoolchildren was tested by placing them in situations in which they could act dishonestly without much chance of being caught (money was left on a table, cheating on a test was pos- sible, and so on). Little evidence of cross-situational consistency was found, but the children did tend to act the same way in a similar situation. For instance, kids who cheated on a test were not necessarily more likely to steal money, but they were more

person–situation debate A controversial debate centering on whether people really do behave consistently across situations.

Resolving the Person–Situation Debate | 395

likely to cheat on a test again if given the chance. In short, people do act consistently from one situation to the next, as long as the situations are similar (Mischel & Peake, 1982; Mischel & Shoda, 1995).

Moreover, results of the type reported by Hartshorne and May and others (see Mischel, 1968) are based primarily on the observation of single individual behaviors (Did the child steal the money on the table?) rather than on collections of behaviors. To get an accurate estimate of a true personality trait, many psychol- ogists believe, you need to collect lots of observations, not just one; single observa- tions tend to be unreliable and not necessarily representative of true behavior (Epstein, 1979). One reason reliable personality traits are often obtained through psychometric tests (see the earlier discussion of trait theorists) might be because the collected ratings are based on a long history of watching oneself or others behave (Ross & Nisbett, 1991).

In fact, if you record how people act across longer periods of time, rather than in single situations, they tend to act quite consistently. For example, Fleeson (2001) asked people to rate themselves on the Big Five trait adjectives five times a day for a period of several weeks (e.g., How “talkative” were you in the last three hours?). Although people’s ratings on the Big Five dimensions varied a lot over the course of a day, their average ratings over a week were quite stable from one week to the next. For any given Big Five dimension, such as extroversion, we’re apparently capable of a wide range of expression, but our average rating remains stable and unique over time (Fleeson, 2004).

Self-Monitoring Some psychologists have argued that the tendency to act consis- tently or haphazardly across different situations may itself be a kind of personality trait. People differ in the extent to which they engage in self-monitoring, which is the tendency to mold or change your behavior to fit the situation at hand (Snyder, 1974, 1987). People who are high self-monitors attend closely to their present situ- ation and change their behavior to best fit their needs. They’re likely to alter their behavior, and even their stated opinions and beliefs, simply to please someone with whom they’re currently interacting. People who are low self-monitors are less likely to change their actions or beliefs and, consequently, are more likely to show consis- tency in their behavior across situations (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985).

Scales have been developed to measure self-monitoring tendencies. Typically, you’re asked to respond to statements such as the following: “I’m not always the per- son that I appear to be” or “I might deceive people by acting friendly when I really dislike them.” People who score highly on self-monitoring, not surprisingly, are likely to conform to social norms. They also tend to be aware of how their behavior is affecting others. High self-monitors even seem to remember the actions of others bet- ter than low self-monitors, especially when those actions are unexpected or unusual (Beers et al., 1997). Thus, self-monitoring can be quite adaptive: It’s usually in our interest to monitor the environment and change our behavior accordingly (Graziano & Bryant, 1998; Mischel & Shoda, 1998). For more on the practical value of self- monitoring, take a look at the Practical Solutions feature.

A Resolution Most psychologists resolve the person–situation debate by simply assuming that it’s necessary to take both the person and the situation into account. It’s unlikely that either alone is enough to explain behavior or to allow us to predict consis- tency (Mischel, 2004). People interact with situations, and how they behave will depend partly on what’s required by current needs. Personality “traits” will reveal themselves primarily in situations in which they’re relevant (Kenrick et al., 1990) and may not oth- erwise. Similarly, given the right situation, each of us is capable of acting in a way that seems to violate our basic nature. Recognition of the vital role of the person and the situation is so widespread that one prominent personality psychologist proclaimed that the person–situation debate “can at least be declared about 98% over” (Funder, 2001, p. 199). (We’ll return to this issue, and provide some compelling illustrations of the power of the situation, when we take up the general topic of social psychology in Chapter 13.)

self-monitoring The degree to which a person monitors a situation closely and changes his or her behavior accordingly; people who are high self-monitors may not behave consistently across situations.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Decide whether each of your friends is a high or a low self-monitor. Which of them do you prefer to be around—the high self-monitors or the low self-monitors?

396 | CHAPTER 12 Personality

Genetic Factors in Personality There’s other evidence supporting the “person” in personality development. We may be born with certain genetic predispositions—perhaps our brains are wired in a certain way—that cause us to act in consistent ways throughout our lifetime. Indeed, recent neuroimaging work suggests that the Big Five personality traits may be associated with the activation of unique regions in the brain (DeYoung et al., 2010). It’s not unusual for family members to show similar personality traits, although experience could play an important role in producing these similarities. At the same time, brothers and sisters can show strikingly different personality traits, even though they’ve been raised in what seem to be highly similar environ- ments. Observations like these indicate that more than the environment is at work in determining personality.

Twin Data Evidence for genetic factors in personality, as in the study of intel- ligence, comes primarily from twin studies. Identical twins are compared with fraternal twins when the twins have been reared together or apart. There are reports of identical twins who were separated at birth but ended up sharing many of the same personality traits. One example is the identical twins Oscar and

Not surprisingly, your personality traits can play an important role in determining how well you succeed in life. Consider your abil- ity to self-monitor—that is, your capacity to “act like different persons in different situ- ations and with different people” (Snyder, 1995, p. 39). Clearly, if your goal is politics, self-monitoring would be a plus, but people who rate highly in self-monitoring seem also to have advantages in many other professions and activities. For example, high self-monitors tend to get better performance evaluations on the job—from both peers and supervisors (Miller & Cardy, 2000). High self-monitors even get higher tips when employed as wait- ers and waitresses at restaurants (Lynn & Simons, 2000).

Why are high self-monitors successful? One factor is their natural tendency to be good actors—they can tell people what they want to hear in a believable way and then act accordingly. High self-monitors also spend time closely observing their environments and, as a result, tend to be perceptive at reading other people. High self-monitors are good at spotting deception, and they’re usually quite accurate in judging personality characteris- tics (Sanz et al., 1996). The net result is that high self-monitors tend to occupy central and important positions in social networks, which,

in turn, helps them perform well on the job (Ajay et al., 2001).

Should we all try to become high self- monitors, or at least improve on our self- monitoring skills? As with many other person- ality traits, there may be a genetic component to self-monitoring (Gangestad & Simpson, 1993), so it’s possible that our options are limited. And it’s important to note that there are some downsides to the self-monitoring trait. For example, high self-monitors are more concerned with a person’s social status than low self-monitors; they also have dif- ficulty committing to romantic relationships, show less marital satisfaction, and are more likely to divorce (Leone & Hall, 2003). In addition, couples that consist of two high self- monitors are less likely to trust one another than couples consisting of two low self- monitors (Norris & Zweigenhaft, 1999). High self-monitors also tend to stick to well-defined social situations that, in turn, allow them to use established social scripts (Ickes et al., 2006).

From a practical standpoint, it might make sense for employers to pay attention to the self-monitoring trait. It seems clear that self-monitoring is related to job perfor- mance, especially in jobs that require adapt- ing to social situations. People who adapt well

to their environment are more likely to see the rewards it can bring, even at the risk of appearing to be a little inconsistent in their behavior across situations.

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS The Value of Self-Monitoring

Successful politicians are often high self- monitors, which means they attend closely to the situation and behave accordingly.

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Resolving the Person–Situation Debate | 397

Frank—one raised as a Nazi in Czechoslovak ia and the other as a Jew in Trinidad. When they were reunited in 1979, it was discovered that they shared numerous odd but consistent behaviors. For example, they both had a habit of sneezing deliberately in elevators to surprise people, and they both liked to flush toilets before and after use.

However, examples such as these can’t be used to make a convincing scientific case (Horgan, 1993). Coincidences are possible, and some of the more famous reunited twins may have had ulterior motives for manufacturing shared traits (for example, Oscar and his brother eventually sold the rights to their story in Hollywood). More compelling evidence comes from group studies, in which the personality characteristics of large numbers of twins are analyzed. In one such study (Tellegen et al., 1988), 217 pairs of identical twins who had been reared together and 44 pairs of twins who had been reared apart were compared with 114 pairs of fraternal twins reared together and 27 pairs reared apart. Each of the participants was administered the MMPI, which, as you remember from our earlier discussion, is a widely used questionnaire for measuring personality traits.

Some of the results of this study are shown in ●Figure 12.8, for several of the personality traits measured by the MMPI. Of main interest is the similarity between members of a twin pair, expressed in terms of correlation coeff icients.

The Williams sisters share tremendous skill on the tennis court, but do they share similar personalities as well?

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● FiGuRE 12.8 the Genetics of Personality Are identical twins more likely than fraternal twins to share basic personality traits? Does the rearing environment matter? These average correlations from Tellegen and colleagues reveal consistent differences between identical and fraternal twins, irrespective of the rearing environment, suggesting that genetics plays a role in determining personality. The environment also had a significant effect in some cases, but overall it appeared to be less important. (Adapted from “Personality Similarity in Twins Reared Apart and Together,” by A. Tellegen et al., 1988, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1031–1039. Copyright © 1988 by the American Psychological

Association. Adapted by permission of the author.)

398 | CHAPTER 12 Personality

In other words, for a trait such as aggressiveness or positive emotionality, can we predict the score that one twin will receive on the MMPI if we k now the score of the other twin? Correlations close to 1.0 suggest that members of a twin pair share many of the same personality traits. As the f igure indicates, identical twins tend to show higher correlations than fraternal twins, regardless of whether they’ve been reared together or apart. Twins who share the same genes but have been raised in different households tend to have more similar personality traits than fraternal twins who have been raised together. Studies focusing on the Big Five personality dimensions have reached similar conclusions: There appears to be a strong genetic component underlying individual differences in personality measures (K rueger & Johnson, 2008).

Of course, the twin data are based primarily on self-report inventories. Psychologists have rarely conducted studies observing actual behaviors among large groups of twins, so caution is needed before drawing firm conclu- sions (Funder, 2001; Maccoby, 2000). Moreover, as noted in Chapter 10, it’s not necessarily the case that twins reared in separate environments have distinctly different experiences. For example, identical twins look similar and so might be treated by the world in similar ways based on their level of attractiveness (see Chapter 13).

Overall, the twin data do indicate that at least some enduring psychological traits may have their origins in genetic predispositions present at birth (Bouchard, 2004). Not surprisingly, psychologists have argued as well that certain traits are likely to be grounded in genetics because of the adaptive role those traits played in the evolutionary history of our species (e.g., Buss, 2012). Of course, the expression of genetic tendencies depends on the nurturing conditions (the environment): Nature interacts with nurture in determining a person’s final physical and psycho- logical makeup. Therefore, although genes may play a critical role in determin- ing how personality develops, environmental factors are also extremely important (Beer et al., 1998; Plomin et al., 1998).

Does every personality have a dark side, waiting to be expressed by the right environmental conditions? Is it possible that mass murderer Henry Lee Lucas, shown here in prison along with photographs of his victims, was simply born with the wrong kind of genes? ©

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Psychology For A Reason: What Personality Is For | 399

test Yourself Check your knowledge about the person–situation debate by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. In the Hartshorne and May study, kids who cheated on a test were not more likely to steal money, but they were more likely to cheat on a test again if given the chance. True or False?

2. People tend to act consistently from one situation to the next, as long as the situations are similar. True or False?

3. People who are low self-monitors tend to change their behaviors to fit the situation at hand. True or False?

4. Identical twin studies show little evidence for genetic contributions to personality characteristics, as measured by the MMPI. True or False?

5. Most psychologists believe personality traits are revealed in all situations, regardless of the relevance of the trait. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.3

There’s little question in most people’s minds about the status of personality—anyone will tell you that people differ in endur- ing ways. We all have behavioral quirks that distinguish us from others, and we often give the impression of acting consis- tently across situations. If asked, people have little trouble mak- ing judgments about the personality of others. We quickly and without hesitation identify Rowena as friendly and outgoing and Roger as nasty and generally no good. Moreover, as dis- cussed at the beginning of this chapter, it makes adaptive sense to act consistently, especially when particular actions help us to survive and enjoy productive lives. Thus personality is clearly an important and useful feature of what it means to be human.

To psychologists, however, the study of personality has proven to be difficult and elusive. Historically, research- ers have disagreed about how to best approach the topic. As we’ve seen, questions have even been raised about the valid- ity of the concept itself—how useful is personality in describ- ing individual differences in behavior? (Remember, similar issues were raised about the study of intelligence.) Still, the vast majority of psychologists agree that personality is a use- ful construct and that it is needed to describe the full range of human psychological functioning.

Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality Trait theories are formal systems for measuring and identifying personality characteristics, such as emotional stability or extroversion.

Currently, the trait theorists seem to agree that there are five basic personality dimensions—the so-called Big Five (extrover- sion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and open- ness)—that accurately and reliably describe a person’s unique and consistent attributes. Psychometric techniques such as fac- tor analysis, along with the development of personality tests such as the NEO-PI-3 and the MMPI, have proven useful in advancing theory and in applying what we’ve learned about personality to practical settings. For example, the MMPI and the NEO-PI-3 are sometimes used in business settings as part of the decision-making process for hiring new employees.

Determining How Personality Develops Identifying stable personality traits, however, leaves unanswered the general question of how those traits originate. Noted psychologists have developed several grand theories of personality devel- opment, including the psychodynamic approach of Freud, the humanistic perspective of Rogers and Maslow, and the social–cognitive approach of Bandura, Mischel, and others. These theoretical frameworks propose very different mech- anisms for personality development and offer quite differ- ent conceptions of human nature. The pessimism of Freud, with his emphasis on battling unconscious biological urges, is counterbalanced by the optimism of the humanists. From a social–cognitive perspective, the environment and beliefs about controlling that environment produce the consistent

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Personality Is For

400 | CHAPTER 12 Personality

through (34) stages that help determine adult personality.

● (35) psychology developed largely in reaction to Freud’s pessimistic view of human nature. The approach emphasizes self-(36) , choice, (37) , growth, and that we are all unique. According to Carl Rogers, we have a basic need for (38) regard. Problems may arise when we mold our self-concept to satisfy others (conditions of worth), which can lead to (39) , a discrepancy between the true self and experience. Abraham Maslow stressed the drive toward (40) - , using a pyramid to prioritize needs—your personality reflects where you fit in the need hierarchy.

● Social–(41) approaches hold that personal- ity growth and development result from interactions between experiences and how we interpret them (cogni- tions or beliefs). We acquire situation-specific response tendencies through (42) conditioning, operant conditioning, and (43) . According to (44) learning theory, we acquire many personality traits by imitating others. How we (45) our experiences is also critical. Perceived (46) of control—how much power we think we have over our environment—and self- (47) —our beliefs about our own abilities— determine how we ultimately interpret experience and shape its effects on personality.

Resolving the Person–Situation Debate ● The person–situation debate is about whether people are (48) in their behavior from one situation to another. Most psychologists note that although behavior across situations may not be consistent, behavior is usually consistent (49) a situation. The tendency to act consistently or inconsistently may itself be a personality trait, one known as (50) . High self-monitors pay close attention to their own behavior, modifying it as necessary to fit their needs in a situation and are more likely to act (51) across situations. Low self- monitors are less likely to change their beliefs and actions and are more likely to act (52) across situations. Current thinking is that the individual and the situation (53) to produce personality.

actions that define personality. Each of these perspectives has been enormously influential in psychology.

Resolving the Person–Situation Debate The concept of per- sonality demands at least some consistency in behavior across situations. But evidence suggests that cross-situational

consistency in behavior may be low. In light of the person– situation debate, a proper analysis of behavior requires consideration of the interaction between the person and the situation. We must also keep in mind the contribution of genetics to personality—twin studies indicate that there may be a genetic component to enduring behavior.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality ● (1) analysis studies correlations among test responses, with the goal of identifying a set of factors that together predict test performance on a personality test.

● Raymond Cattell identified (2) factors or source traits. Hans (3) argued that personality can best be described in terms of (4) primary dimensions, or superfactors: extroversion, neuroticism, and (5) . The contemporary Big (6) approach holds that extroversion, (7) , openness, (8) , and (9) best describe personality.

● (10) proposed a classification scheme for identifying personality traits. (11) traits are ruling passions that dominate a person’s life. (12) traits are expressed by the (13) to 10 descriptive terms that you’d use to describe someone you know well. (14) traits are less obvious traits that are not always reflected in behavior.

● (15) report inventories are (16) , standardized, fill-in-the-answer tests, such as the (17) Personality Factor and the Minnesota (18) Personality Inventory (MMPI). With (19) personality tests, such as the Rorschach and the Thematic (20) Test (TAT), elements of the test taker’s personality are revealed in the way he or she interprets an unstructured or (21) stimulus.

Determining How Personality Develops ● Sigmund Freud divided the mind into three parts: (22) , (23) , and (24) , and argued that the (25) mind powerfully affects behavior. Dreams are a window into the unconscious and have an external or (26) content and a (27) or latent content. Personality consists of the (28) , which is governed by inborn (29) ; the (30) , which encourages us to act in an ideal fash- ion; and the (31) , which acts to compromise and encourages us to act with reason and deliberation. Conflict among the various aspects of personality results in (32) , which we attempt to combat with (33) mechanisms. As children we progress

Interactive Summary | 401

● Studies with (54) and fraternal twins that have been raised together or apart indicate that (55) factors contribute to personality. Traits measured by the MMPI reveal that identical twins tend to show more

similar traits than (56) twins, whether or not they were raised together. Such data have convinced psycholo- gists that some enduring personality traits are rooted in genetic predispositions present at birth.

Terms to Remember anal stage, 384 Big Five, 376 cardinal traits, 377 central traits, 378 collective unconscious, 385 conditions of worth, 387 conscious mind, 382 defense mechanisms, 383 ego, 383 genital stage, 385 humanistic psychology, 387 id, 382

incongruence, 387 latency period, 385 locus of control, 391 oral stage, 384 personality, 373 person–situation debate, 394 phallic stage, 384 positive regard, 387 preconscious mind, 382 projective personality test, 380 psychodynamic theory, 382 reciprocal determinism, 392

repression, 383 secondary traits, 378 self-actualization, 388 self-concept, 387 self-efficacy, 391 self-monitoring,395 self-report inventories, 378 social–cognitive theories,390 superego, 383 trait, 373 trait theories, 374 unconscious mind, 382

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professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

402

13 Social Psychology

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Social Processes For?

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition

Learning Goals Person Perception: How Do We Form

Impressions of Others?

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Combating Prejudice

Attribution Theory: Attributing Causes to Behavior

Attitudes and Attitude Change Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.1

Determinants of Liking and Loving The Psychology of Romantic Love Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.3

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Social Processes Are For

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Behaving in the Presence of Others: Social Influence

Learning Goals Social Facilitation and Interference Social Influences on Altruism: The

Bystander Effect The Power of the Group Group Decision Making The Power of Authority: Obedience The Role of Culture Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.2

Establishing Relations With Others Learning Goals What Makes a Face Attractive?

403

Social psychology is the discipline that studies how we think about, influence, and relate to other people. As you’ll see shortly, how we think and act changes in characteristic ways when we’re in the presence of others. In fact, the mere pres- ence of other people, as well as their behavior, can be among the most powerful and pervasive of environmental influences. We’ll tackle the topics of social psychology by focusing on three specific social problems that play a vital role in helping us adjust and adapt successfully to our world.

Interpreting the Behavior of Others As social animals, living in a social world, we’re con- stantly trying to interpret the behavior of other people. We form impressions of our friends, teachers, and our colleagues in the workplace—we even form impressions of the people we meet on the street. We develop theories about why people behave the way they do; we form attitudes that help us act adaptively in the presence of particu- lar individuals or groups. At the same time, as you’ll see, there are systematic biases in the interpretation process as well.

Behaving in the Presence of Others Everyone’s behavior is strongly influenced by the social context. For example, sometimes your ability to perform a task will improve when others are present; sometimes your performance falls apart. Your behavior will also be strongly influenced by the presence of authority figures and by the opinions of fellow members in a group. What are the factors that determine when you’ll yield to the demands of others, and what implications do these factors have for the structure of society?

Establishing Relations With Others It’s certainly adaptive to interpret the behavior of others and to change behavior accordingly in their presence. But among our most important social actions are the relationships we form with others. Without attrac- tion and romantic love, it’s unlikely that the human species would survive; but it’s not just mating we need—we rely on the relationships within the family as well as the social structures within society to help protect and nurture us and our offspring.

social psycholgy The discipline that studies how people think about, inflluence, and relate to other people.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Social Processes For?

Interpreting the behavior of others

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404 | CHAPTER 13 Social Psychology

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition LEARNING GOALS

● Discuss how physical attractiveness, stereotypes, and social schemas influence our impressions of others.

● Discuss how we attribute causality to the behavior of others, explaining our biases and errors. ● Explain how attitudes are formed and changed.

We begin our treatment of social psychology with a discussion of how people think about other people—how impressions of others are formed, how causes are attributed to behavior, and the mechanisms that underlie the formation of attitudes about peo- ple and things. Social psychologists typically group these topics together under the title of social cognition, which is the study of how we use cognitive processes—such as perception, memory, and thought—to help make sense of other people as well as ourselves. First up is the topic of person perception, which deals specifically with how we form impressions of others.

Person Perception: How Do We Form Impressions of Others? When we first discussed the topic of perception in Chapter 5, I focused on the processes used to interpret elementary sensations into meaningful wholes. In that chapter you learned that perception is driven by a combination of bottom-up processing—the actual physical sensations received by the sensory equipment—and top-down processing, which takes into account our expectations and beliefs about the world. We do not simply see what’s “out there” in the physical world; our perceptions are also influenced by our expectations of what we’ll find.

A similar kind of analysis applies to the perception of people. When you meet a person for the first time, your initial impressions are influenced by physical factors— attractiveness, facial expression, skin color, clothing—and by your meaningful inter- pretations of those physical features. If you see a sloppily dressed, unshaven man weaving down the street, you’re likely to form a negative first impression, partly because past experiences have taught you to avoid people who fit this description. You could be wrong, of course, but in the face of limited information, it’s usually adaptive to use background knowledge to help predict the possible consequences of an interaction.

Physical Appearance One of the most powerful determinants of a first impression is a person’s physical appearance. In fact, evidence suggests that we can form an initial impression, such as how trustworthy a person might be, after looking at a face for as little as 50 milliseconds (Todorov et al., 2009)! Studies have shown that when we first look at someone who’s physically attractive, we assume that he or she is more intel- ligent, better adjusted, and more socially aware than someone with average looks (Eagly et al., 1991; Feingold, 1992). In general, physically attractive people are also thought to be healthier (Kalick et al., 1998) and more inclined to succeed academi- cally (Chia et al., 1998), and they’re even less likely to get “carded” if they try to buy alcohol (McCall, 1997). These tendencies don’t diminish as we age—the elderly also show a strong tendency to attribute positive personality characteristics to attractive people (Larose & Standing, 1998).

Why do we rely on physical appearance to form a first impression? It seems like a rather shallow way to judge a person. The reason is simple: When you form a first impression, you use the information that’s available. You almost always notice the

social cognition The study of how people use cognitive processes—such as perception, memory, thought, and emotion—to help make sense of other people as well as themselves.

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition | 405

way a person looks, along with his or her facial expression, and perhaps even the way the person is walking or sitting. These raw materials are combined with your back- ground knowledge to generate an expectation of what an encounter with that person might be like (Freeman & Ambady, 2011).

Obviously, judging a book by its cover isn’t always an effective long-term strat- egy for impression formation. Not all people rely on physical appearance to the same extent (Livingston, 2001), and cultural background is important too—some cultures don’t rely on attractiveness as much as others (Wheeler & Kim, 1997). But it can be reasonable in the short term. If the approaching person appears attractive and well kept, at least you know he or she follows some of the accepted standards and norms of the culture. Think about it. If you were in trouble and needed help, whom would you approach—someone with poor personal hygiene and tattered clothes, or some- one neat, clean, and well dressed?

Social Schemas Much of the knowledge we use in social situations comes from social categories or schemas (Bodenhausen et al., 2003). Schemas are general knowl- edge structures stored in memory, such as your knowledge about how houses are constructed or about what it’s like to go to a restaurant or the doctor’s office (see Chapter 8). We use schemas to help us remember but also to help organize and interpret ongoing experience. A schema can be formed about most anything—a person, a place, or a thing. When schemas are about social experiences or people, they’re commonly called social schemas (Fiske, 1993).

Returning to the unshaven, sloppily dressed man on the street, your initial impression is likely to be negative because his tattered appearance activates a common social schema about people. An unkempt appearance is associated with negative social characteristics—such as laziness or even criminal behavior— and his weaving gait signals possible drunkenness. All these things encourage you to categorize the man as “trouble” and make it less likely that you’ll either ask him for help or give help to him if he requests it. Both the man’s physical appearance and his behavior feed into your existing social schema about seedy characters; once he’s been categorized, the schema directs you to alter your behavior accordingly.

social schema A general knowledge structure, stored in long-term memory, that relates to social experiences or people.

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How other people look is likely to activate social schemas that direct and guide your behavior. Social schemas are generally adaptive, but under some circumstances they can lead to inappropriate conclusions or actions.

406 | CHAPTER 13 Social Psychology

Stereotypes When social schemas revolve around the traits and behaviors of groups and their members, they’re called stereotypes. We form stereotypes about many kinds of social groups, from insurance agents to college professors, but the three most common are based on gender, race, and age (Fiske, 1993). Most people carry around a collection of impressions about men and women. For example, men are typically seen as strong, dominant, and aggressive; women are typically seen as sensitive, warm, and dependent (Deaux & Lewis, 1984).

Stereotypes seem to share many of the properties of categories. Not surpris- ingly, some of the more popular theories of how stereotypes are formed resemble the theories of categorization discussed in Chapter 9. For example, prototype theories of stereotypes assume we store abstract representations of the typical features of a group; we then judge particular individuals based on their similarity to the proto- type (Cantor & Mischel, 1978). Exemplar theories assume we store memories of par- ticular individuals, or exemplars, and these individual memories form the basis for stereotypes (Smith & Zárate, 1992). Recent neuroimaging work, however, suggests that stereotypes may represent a unique kind of category knowledge in the brain. When we make decisions about categories of people, as opposed to decisions about nonsocial categories (e.g., fruit), distinctive “social” rather than “semantic” regions of the brain are activated (Contreras et al., 2011).

Stereotypes become “activated” whenever we’re exposed to stereotypic beliefs and actions. For example, men are more likely to behave sexually toward a woman if they’ve recently seen a television commercial in which women were presented as sexual objects (Rudman & Borgida, 1995). Witnessing an African American man engaging in a negative stereotypic behavior influences how a White male evaluates other African American men (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996). Recent exposure to behavior consistent with a stereotype activates, or “primes,” the stereotype, which in turn affects future behavior (Stewart et al., 1998). At the same time, the effects depend importantly on the situation. For example, you are more susceptible to the negative effects of an activated stereotype if you’re angry and less susceptible if you are being praised (Smith & Semin, 2007).

Self-Fulfilling Prophecies Once stereotypes are activated, we expect certain kinds of behavior from members of groups. These expectations can produce what is called the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, which occurs when your expectations about a per- son’s actions cause that person to behave in the expected way (Merton, 1948). If you expect someone to be unreliable and you act in line with your expectations (such as snubbing or avoiding the person), the chances that he or she will assume that role in the future actually increase.

Let’s consider an experiment demonstrating the effect. In a study by Mark Snyder and colleagues (1977), undergraduate men were asked to talk to undergraduate women, whom they had never met, on the telephone. Prior to the conversation, the men were shown a photograph of their prospective telephone partner. The partner appeared as either physically attractive or unattractive. In reality, the photos were of women from another college; they were not really photos of the women participating in the study. The intention of the experimenters was simply to lead the men to believe they were talking to a woman who was attractive or unattractive. As for the women, they were not given a photo of their partner, nor were they told that the man had been biased to think of them in a particular way. All of the telephone calls were taped, and social aspects of the men’s and women’s conversational styles were then rated by judges who were unaware of the men’s assignment group.

Not surprisingly, if the men thought they were talking to an attractive female, their conversational styles were friendly and positive—more so than if their partner had been presented as unattractive. But the important finding of the study focused on the women. It turned out that the women’s conversational styles also differed, depend- ing on whether the man they were talking to thought they were attractive. The women who were presumed by their partners to be attractive were rated by the judges as more

stereotypes The collection of beliefs and impressions held about a group and its members; common stereotypes include those based on gender, race, and age.

self-fulfilling prophecy effect A condition in which our expectations about the actions of another person actually lead that person to behave in the expected way.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think the social schemas that were activated in the telephone study were different for the men and the women? If so, in what way?

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition | 407

friendly, open and poised, and generally more pleasant than the women shown as unattractive. Remember, these women had no idea their male partners had preformed opinions about their attractiveness. Apparently, the friendly, positive conversational styles of the men elicited similar qualities from the women. This is the self-fulfilling prophecy effect—the expectations that we have toward others, along with our actions, can actually influence them to act in the expected way (see ●Figure 13.1).

Self-fulfilling prophecies can have either positive or negative effects on people. As you’ve just seen, if someone expects you to be unattractive, or intellectually challenged, those expectations can bring out the worst in you. One study found that parents’ beliefs about whether their adolescent child would engage in illegal drinking predicted the child’s subsequent drinking behavior—if both parents expected their child to drink illegally, there was a greater chance their child would, in fact, drink illegally. But if a parent thought illegal drinking was unlikely, then this, too, pre- dicted subsequent drinking behavior (Madon et al., 2004). The fact that expectations can importantly shape behavior has many implications for society, especially when it comes to the expectations generated about groups.

Prejudice Stereotypes can lead to rigid interpretations of people. Stereotypes can cause us to overgeneralize and place too much emphasis on the differences that exist between groups (for instance, between men and women) and too little emphasis on the differences that exist within groups. Not all women are nurturing, nor are all men strong. Furthermore, when the beliefs we hold about a group are negative or extreme, stereotypes increase the likelihood of prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice occurs when groups and their members are evaluated in a negative way (although you can also prejudge members of a group in a positive way). Discrimination occurs when those beliefs lead to behaviors that are directed against members of the group. For example, you might be excluded from a job, or even criminally assaulted, just because of negative beliefs activated by your skin color or sexual preference.

Stereotypic beliefs, including those that lead to prejudice, may be automatically acti- vated and not always under our conscious control (Bargh & Williams, 2006). For exam- ple, we discussed how simply witnessing a behavior can be enough to activate prejudicial

prejudice Positive or negative evaluations of a group and its members.

discrimination Behaviors that are directed against members of a group.

She looks nice and she’s very attractive!

Perceiver’s impression of the other person

Produces

Confirms . . .

Corresponding behavior elicited from the other person

“Thank you. It’s going to be

fun talking to you.”

Perceiver’s behavior based on that impression

“You sound like a very nice person.”

Leads to

● FiGuRE 13.1 the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Effect Our impressions of other people can affect how they behave, leading them to act in the expected ways. In the study by Snyder and colleagues (1977), if a male subject thought he was talking to an attractive female on the phone, his conversational style was rated as more friendly and positive—but so too was the conversational style of the woman on the other end. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

408 | CHAPTER 13 Social Psychology

evaluations. Apparently, we don’t even need to be consciously aware of the exposure. In a study by Greenwald and Banaji (1995), words that were consistent with a negative stereo- type about African Americans were flashed on a computer screen at speeds too fast to be noticed. The people who were working at the computers were then more likely to evalu- ate a fictional character as having traits consistent with a negative African American ste- reotype (e.g., aggressive). This suggests that stereotypes can be activated and influence behavior in ways that are not consciously controlled (Devine & Sharp, 2009).

It is also important to distinguish between explicit and implicit prejudice. Explicit prejudice refers to negative attitudes about a group that are consciously endorsed. For example, if asked, a person might willingly admit prejudicial feelings about certain racial groups. Implicit prejudice refers to prejudicial thoughts that come to mind unintention- ally and may not be consciously recognized or controllable (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). For example, a person might claim (and even consciously believe) that he or she has no negative feelings about African Americans, but move to the other side of the street when an African American approaches. There is a disconnect between what the person consciously believes and his or her underlying implicit (or covert) beliefs.

Implicit prejudice is widespread and can be easily measured through implicit tests (Greenwald et al., 2009). For example, presenting a photograph of an African American or White face can affect how pleasant or unpleasant people judge a Chinese ideo- graph to be moments later—even if the face is only presented for a very short duration (e.g., less than a tenth of a second). If briefly presenting an African American face leads someone to rate the ideograph as more unpleasant, compared to when a White face is presented, that would indicate the presence of some implicit prejudice. Again, a per- son can self-report no explicit prejudice but show significant implicit prejudice on such a test. In one study that controlled for the amount of explicit racial prejudice reported, it was found that people who showed implicit racial prejudice were less likely to have voted for Obama than McCain in the 2008 presidential election (Payne et al., 2010).

The good news is that we can reduce the prejudicial feelings that come from ste- reotypes (either explicit or implicit prejudice) through repeated exposure to individu- als in the stereotyped group. For instance, as the amount of social contact between heterosexuals and homosexuals increases, negative feelings decrease (Whitely, 1990). However, there are a number of crucial elements at work in the maintenance of ste- reotypic beliefs. Whether beliefs will change depends on the nature of the social interactions and how representative the contacted individuals are of their stereotyped group. Moreover, the contact must be widespread and repeated; otherwise, people will attempt to defend their stereotypic views by explaining away individual contacts as unrepresentative of the group (Weber & Crocker, 1993).

Being aware of stereotypes can also help. Once you recognize that stereotypical reactions are common, and maybe even automatic, you can take steps to reduce their influence (Wegener & Petty, 1997). One course of action is to consciously adjust your

● CONCEPt REviEw Factors in Person Perception FACToR RolE in PERson PERCEPTion ExAmPlE

Physical appearance We tend to assume that physically attractive individuals are more intelligent, well-adjusted, and socially aware.

Tyrone encounters Michelle at a party. He finds her quite attractive. In addition, he perceives her as very personable, good-humored, and intelligent.

Social schemas We use schemas (e.g., stereotypes) to organize and interpret ongoing experiences.

Tyrone believes most women are sensitive, warm, and dependent. He finds that Michelle’s behavior fits this pattern.

Self-fulfilling prophecies The activation of stereotypes leads to expectations of certain types of behavior. These expectations can cause the person to behave in the expected way.

Tyrone is very attentive toward Michelle at the party, bringing her refreshments and introducing her to all of his friends. Michelle relaxes; she begins to open up and make witty comments.

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition | 409

It’s generally adaptive for us to form stereotypes—they help us categorize our social world and make quick and effi- cient decisions about how to act. But when stereotypes lead to prejudice or discrimina- tion, it’s obviously in our interest to reduce their influence. There are several ways to combat stereotyping and prejudice (Paluck & Green, 2009). As our awareness of the group increases, we’re less prone to nega- tive beliefs and actions. It’s also possible to actively suppress stereotypic beliefs. For example, if undergraduates are asked to write essays about well-defined groups, such as the elderly or African Americans, their essays will show less stereotypic content if they’ve been instructed to actively avoid thinking about group members in precon- ceived ways.

Ironically, when people are instructed to suppress thoughts and beliefs, there is

some evidence for rebound effects. When no longer attempting to suppress them, those very thoughts seem to become more accessible and influential (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Wegner, 1994). For example, after suppression of a stereotype, people are more likely to recollect words consistent with the stereotype and are able to identify stereotypic words more quickly. Therefore, thought suppression may not be the best solution to reducing prejudice and discrimination.

A more promising alternative is to practice taking the perspective of others. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) asked undergradu- ates to write a narrative essay about a day in the life of an elderly man. One group was told to adopt the perspective of the man: “to imagine a day in the life of this individual as if you were this individual, looking at the world through his eyes and walking through

the world in his shoes” (p. 711). Compared to control conditions, those who adopted the man’s perspective produced fewer stereotypic words in their essays and, in fact, tended to write about the subject in a more positive way. Moreover, there were no rebound effects. Similar results were found when White stu- dents were asked to take the perspective of an African American. Among other things, perspective taking increased the participants’ awareness of the continued discrimination that is directed against African Americans (see also Todd et al., 2012).

Negative stereotypes, which form the basis for prejudice and discrimination, are wide- spread and hard to avoid. As our familiar- ity with group members increases, however, the likelihood of prejudice and discrimination decreases. One reason may be that familiar- ity enables us to better see the world through another’s eyes.

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Combating Prejudice

behavior in a way that opposes the presumed influence of the stereotype. For example, if you’re a male interviewing a woman for a job, steer away from questions that relate to typical gender stereotypes. It may even be possible to actively suppress stereotypic thoughts under some circumstances—that is, to prevent stereotypic thoughts from ever entering conscious awareness (e.g., Wyer, 2007). For more information on reduc- ing the negative influence of stereotypic beliefs, see the Practical Solutions feature.

Obviously, using stereotypes to prejudge people can lead to many kinds of discrim- ination, including racism, sexism, and ageism. Stereotypes are not necessarily accurate representations of people, nor can they be expected to apply to all individuals within a group. Yet stereotypes do have adaptive value. They help people carve their social worlds into meaningful chunks, thereby providing a sense of direction about how to act when encountering new people. Stereotyping occurs in every culture of the world, and it’s simply another way in which our minds organize and categorize the world.

Attribution Theory: Attributing Causes to Behavior It’s natural for us to interpret the behavior of others. A wife tries to understand why her husband keeps peeking at his cell phone during their anniversary dinner; a stu- dent tries to understand why the teacher responds to his appeal for a grade change with a curt, “I didn’t give you the grade, you earned the grade.” When people assign causes to behaviors, psychologists refer to these inferences as attributions; attribution theories are concerned primarily with the processes that underlie these inferences of cause and effect (Heider, 1944; Jones & Davis, 1965).

Let’s consider an example of the attribution process at work. Suppose you notice that the mood of your friend Ira improves noticeably on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoons, after he returns from lunch. He smiles a lot, exchanges pleasant- ries, and offers advice freely. These behaviors contrast sharply with his normally gruff manner and generally sour disposition. What accounts for the behavior change?

attributions The inference processes people use to assign cause and effect to behavior.

410 | CHAPTER 13 Social Psychology

According to the covariation model of attribution (Kelley, 1967), the first thing you’ll look for is some factor that happens at the same time as, or covaries with, the behavior change. You’ll try to identify an event or some other factor that’s present when the behavior changes and is absent when the behavior change doesn’t occur. In this par- ticular example, it turns out Ira goes to his aerobic exercise class between 12 p.m. and 1 p.m. on those three days.

But covariation by itself is not a sufficient condition for the attribution of causality, for much the same reason that we can’t infer causality from a simple corre- lation (see Chapter 2). Just because Ira’s mood improves after his exercise class doesn’t mean exercise is the cause of the change—other factors could be involved. According to the covariation model, we rely on three additional pieces of information to help us make the appropriate inference: consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. When assessing consistency, we try to determine whether the change occurs regularly when the causal event is present—does Ira’s mood consistently improve after exercise class? Distinctiveness provides an indication of whether the change occurs uniquely in the presence of the event—does Ira’s mood improve after lunch only if he’s been exercis- ing? Finally, we look for consensus, which tells us whether other people show simi- lar reactions when they’re exposed to the same causal event—is elevation of mood a common reaction to exercising?

Internal Versus External Attributions These three factors—consistency, distinc- tiveness, and consensus—work together to help us form an attribution. In the example we’ve been considering, we’ll probably assume it’s the external event— the exercise class—that’s the cause of Ira’s mood change. People tend to make an external attribution, one that appeals to external causes, when the behavior is high in consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. In the case of Ira’s pleasant mood, it’s highly consistent (it happens every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoon); its occurrence is distinctive (it occurs only after exercise class); and there is a high level of consensus (exercise tends to make people happy).

But what if no single event can be used to explain someone’s behavior? Suppose Ira consistently smiles and acts pleasant in the afternoon, but he also smiles during the mornings and on days he’s skipped the exercise class. Under these conditions it’s doubtful you’ll appeal to the environment to explain his behavior; instead, you’ll make an internal attribution, which means you’ll attribute his pleasant behavior to some internal personality trait or disposition: “Ira just has a great personality; he’s a friendly, pleasant guy.” Internal attributions are common when the consistency of a behavior is high but its distinctiveness and consensus are low. If Ira is pleasant all the time, his behavior after lunch lacks distinctiveness, and you’ll be unlikely to appeal to some lunch activity to explain his behavior. Similarly, if the consensus is low— suppose exercise rarely improves mood for most people—you’ll again resist attributing his pleasantries to this particular event (see ●Figure 13.2).

The Fundamental Attribution Error The attribution process seems logical enough, but we sometimes take shortcuts. We often need to make judgments quickly, and it’s effortful and time-consuming to consider all possible factors logically. So we cut corners in the attribution process. What happens, however, is that these shortcuts tend to produce consistent biases and errors in the judgment process. One of the most common of these biases is the fundamental attribution error (sometimes also known as the correspondence bias): When we interpret another person’s behavior, we tend to overestimate the influence of internal personal factors and underestimate the role of external situational factors ( Jones, 1990; Ross, 1977).

In a classic demonstration of this bias, Jones and Harris (1967) had college stu- dents read essays expressing either positive or negative opinions about Fidel Castro’s Communist regime in Cuba (at the time Castro’s Cuba was a hot topic of discussion). Before reading the essays, one group of students was told that the person writing the essay had been allowed to write freely and choose the position adopted in the

external attribution Attributing the cause of a person’s behavior to an external event or situation in the environment.

internal attribution Attributing the cause of a person’s behavior to an internal personality trait or disposition.

fundamental attribution error When people seek to interpret someone else’s behavior, they tend to overestimate the influence of internal personal factors and underestimate the role of situational factors.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Suppose you were forced to make an attribution quickly, without much time for thought. Do you think quickly formed attributions are more likely to be internal or external? Explain.

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition | 411

text. A second group was told the writer had no choice and had been forced to adopt a particular pro or con position. Afterward, the students in both groups were asked to speculate about the writer’s true opinion on the topic. Thinking logically, you might assume if the writer had been given a choice, then the essay position probably reflected his or her true opinion on Castro. Alternatively, if the writer was simply fol- lowing directions, it would be difficult to tell. To the surprise of the experimenters, however, the students tended to believe the essay always reflected the writer’s true opinion, even when the students knew that the essay writer had been forced to adopt a particular position. This is the fundamental attribution error at work: People tend to attribute an individual’s activities to internal personal factors, even when there are strong situational explanations for the behavior ( Jones, 1990).

Now consider another example: You’re driving down the street, at a perfectly respectable speed, when you glance in your rearview mirror and see a truck bear- ing down on your bumper. You speed up a bit, only to find the truck mirroring your every move. Being tailgated like this is a relatively common experience. But what kind of attribution do you typically make about the driver? Do you attribute the behavior to the person or to the situation? If you’re like most people, your first response is likely to be an internal attribution—you naturally assume that the driver behind you has some severe personality flaw; put simply, the driver is a jerk. You ignore the possibility that situational factors might be compelling the driver to drive fast. Isn’t it possible, for instance, that the driver is late for work or has a sick child in the backseat who is in need of a doctor? These kinds of attributions, which focus on the situation, don’t usually enter our minds because our first tendency is to attribute behavior to an internal personality characteristic.

The Actor–Observer Effect Now let’s switch gears. Think about what happens when you make attributions about your own behavior. Suppose you’re the one doing the tail- gating. Under these conditions, will you blame your tailgating on the fact that you’re a jerk? Probably not. Instead, you’re likely to explain your behavior by appealing to the situation. You’re tailgating, you explain, because you’re late for an appointment,

Ira always smiles on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoons.

Ira smiles a lot with or without exercise.

Exercise rarely makes the people I know happy.

Ira is basically a happy guy.

High Low Low Internal attribution

Covariation Information

Consistency

Attribution

Distinctiveness Consensus

Ira always smiles on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoons.

High

Ira smiles only after his Monday, Wednesday, and Friday exercise class.

High

Exercise makes everyone I know happy.

High

Something about exercise causes Ira to smile.

External attribution

Behavior

Ira smiles a lot on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoons.

● FiGuRE 13.2 the Covariation Model of Attribution When we make internal attributions, we attribute behavior to internal personality characteristics; external attributions assume behavior reflects factors in the environment. In Kelley’s attribution model, whether an internal or external attribution will be made about a particular behavior depends on consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. (© Cengage Learning)

People often think that game show hosts, such as Alex Trebek, are extremely knowledgeable. What attribution processes might underlie such an inference?

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412 | CHAPTER 13 Social Psychology

or because the driver in front of you is simply driving too slowly. Generally, each of us shows what’s called an actor–observer effect—we tend to attribute our own behav- ior to external sources but attribute the behavior of others to internal sources.

One exception to this general rule is the self-serving bias, which means we take internal credit for our actions when those actions produce positive outcomes—such as attributing a solid A on the psychology test to hard work and intelligence. But we’ll blame the situation when our behaviors are questionable or lead to failure. The self- serving bias is adaptive because it bolsters our self-esteem and enables us to project a sense of self-importance and confidence to the world (Snyder, 1989).

These attributional biases have important implications—not just for you but for society as well. The tailgating example is relatively harmless (unless this behavior causes an accident), but consider when the focus is on social problems such as welfare or homelessness. Because of attribution biases, you might naturally attribute, for exam- ple, being on welfare or losing a job to laziness, incompetence, or some other negative internal trait. But in many cases an individual is on welfare or out of work because of situational factors, perhaps because of some catastrophic life event. Attribution biases may have considerable adaptive value—because they allow us to make quick decisions about the causes of behavior—and may even be the products of adaptations rooted in our evolutionary past (Andrews, 2001; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). But they do have a downside; they can lead to misleading or even incorrect conclusions.

Attribution biases are reduced in some situations. For example, you’re less likely to show the self-serving bias if you’re working on a task with someone you know very well. If you’re in a close relationship with your task partner, you’re less likely to take credit for success on the task and assign blame for failure; if you don’t know your partner very well, he or she gets the blame for failure and you take credit for the suc- cess (Sedikides et al., 1998). Your mood also seems to matter. For example, evidence indicates that you’re more likely to show the fundamental attribution error if you’re in a positive mood; if you’re in a negative mood, you’re more willing to blame the sit- uation, rather than the person, for the behavior (Forgas, 1998).

There appear to be cultural differences in these attributional biases as well. For example, people in Eastern cultures are less susceptible to the fundamental attribu- tion error than people in Western cultures (Shepperd et al., 2008). People in Asian cul- tures, as noted previously, are more likely to focus on situational factors than people raised in the West. When asked to make a causal judgment about someone’s behavior, the natural tendency of many Asians is to make a situation-based, external attribu- tion. Although all cultures show the fundamental attribution error under some cir- cumstances, the effect is easier to find among Westerners (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004).

actor–observer effect The overall tendency to attribute our own behavior to external sources but to attribute the behavior of others to internal sources.

self-serving bias The tendency to make internal attributions about one’s own behavior when the outcome is positive and to blame the situation when one’s behavior leads to something negative.

How we interpret risky behavior on the highway depends on who is doing the driving.

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Attitudes and Attitude Change We end our discussion of social cognition by considering attitudes and attitude change. An attitude is simply a positive or negative evaluation, which, in turn, predisposes us to act in certain ways. Like the other forms of social cognition we’ve discussed, attitudes are beneficial for a number of reasons. When they guide behav- ior, attitudes help us remain consistent in our actions and help us use our knowledge about individuals or situations. Attitudes also play an important role in our percep- tion and interpretation of the world. They help us focus our attention on information relevant to our beliefs—particularly information that can help confirm an existing belief. As a result, attitudes may serve a kind of defensive function, protecting peo- ple’s basic beliefs about themselves and others (Fazio, 1986).

The Components of an Attitude Traditionally, social psychologists divide attitudes into three main components: a cognitive component, an affective component, and a behavioral component (Olson & Maio, 2003). The cognitive component represents what people know or believe about the object of their attitude; the affective component is made up of the feelings that the object produces; and the behavioral component is a pre- disposition to act toward the object in a particular way.

To see how these three components work together, let’s suppose you’ve formed an unfavorable attitude toward your landlord. Your attitude rests on a foundation of facts and beliefs about behavior. You know, for instance, that the landlord has raised your rent three times in the last year, that he enters your apartment without first asking per- mission, and that he won’t let you keep your pet cat Kepler without a huge pet deposit. These facts and beliefs form the cognitive component of your attitude. Accompanying these facts are your emotional reactions, which make up the affective component— when you see or think about your landlord, you get angry and slightly sick to your stomach. Finally, the behavioral component of your attitude predisposes you to act in certain ways. You may spend every Sunday reading the classified ads looking for a new apartment, and you may constantly complain about your landlord to anyone who’ll listen. It’s these three factors in combination—cognitive, affective, and behavioral— that compose what psychologists mean by an attitude (see ●Figure 13.3).

Notice the behavioral component of the attitude is described as a predisposition to act. This is an important point to remember because attitudes don’t always directly affect behavior. As you know, people sometimes act in ways that are inconsistent with their attitudes (Ajzen, 2001; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). When directly confronting your landlord, you may be all smiles even though underneath you’re steaming. Attitudes do not always connect with behavior because behavior is usually determined by mul- tiple factors—especially external factors. In some situations it’s simply unwise to express your true feelings, such as when dealing with the landlord. In other situa- tions, people act quickly and mindlessly without considering the true meaning or ramifications of their behavior (Langer, 1989). For example, people often sign peti- tions for activities they may not completely believe in or buy products that they don’t really want, simply because they’re in a hurry and don’t want to be bothered further.

How Are Attitudes Formed? Where do attitudes come from? There are many routes to attitude formation. We use our everyday experiences as the basis for many of our ideas and beliefs. How we interpret those experiences also depends partly on our inborn intellectual and personality traits (Tesser, 1993). Even something as simple as mere exposure can be sufficient to change your feelings about an object (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In classic work by Robert Zajonc (1968), people were shown pho- tographs of undergraduate men taken from a school yearbook. Some of the photos were shown only once or twice; others were shown up to 25 times. Following expo- sure, everyone was asked to give an estimate of how much they liked each of the men shown. The results revealed that the more often a photo had been presented, the more the people claimed to “like” the person shown. It’s not clear exactly how

attitude A positive or negative evaluation which, in turn, predisposes us to act in certain ways; attitudes are typically broken down into cognitive, affective, and behavioral components.

Attitude

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● FiGuRE 13.3 the three Components of Attitudes Social psychologists typically divide attitudes into cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. (© Cengage Learning)

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to interpret this finding, in part because people’s ratings change on a whole host of dimensions following exposure (Mandler et al., 1987). But it demonstrates how easily attitudes can be affected (Zajonc, 2001).

Experience is generally agreed to be the single most important factor affecting attitude formation. For instance, attitudes can be conditioned through experiences of the type discussed in Chapter 7. Events that occur outside of our control can acquire signaling properties, through classical conditioning, and then serve as an initial foun- dation for an attitude (Petty et al., 2001). Advertisers commonly try to manipulate how we feel toward consumer products by pairing the product with something plea- surable, such as an attractive model or a successful athlete. Through operant condi- tioning, attitudes are influenced by the rewards and punishments we receive for our actions. Certainly if you express a tentative opinion on a subject—“We’ve got too much big government in this country”—and this opinion is reinforced by people whom you respect, you’re likely to express this same attitude again. Operant condi- tioning teaches us about the consequences of our behavior, and direct experience of this sort plays a significant role in attitude formation.

Finally, much of what we acquire from experience is the result of observational learning. We model significant others—our parents, peers, teachers, and so on—when it comes to both attitudes and behavior. The political convictions of most people, for example, mirror quite closely the political attitudes of their parents (McGuire, 1985). People use their peers, too, as a kind of reference group for judging the acceptabil- ity of their behaviors and beliefs. All you need to do is take a random sample of the behavior of teenagers in the local mall to see how important modeling behavior can be. Everything from language to musical taste to hairstyle to shoe type is replicated from one teen to the next.

Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion For decades, social psychologists have been interested not only in how attitudes are formed but also in how attitudes can be changed (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). We’re bombarded daily by dozens of persuasive messages from sources in business, politics, religion, and the arts. For obvious rea- sons, psychologists have tried to determine the important ingredients of persuasion: What are the factors that determine whether you’ll be convinced to buy a particular product or support a particular political campaign? According to one popular theory of attitude change, known as the elaboration likelihood model, there are two pri- mary routes to persuasion, one that is central and one that is peripheral (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Wegener & Carlston, 2005).

The central route to persuasion is the most obvious and familiar one. It operates when we’re motivated and inclined to process an incoming persuasive communication with effort, care, and attention; we’ll listen carefully to the argu- ments of the message, then judge those arguments according to their merits. Suppose you’ve recently changed your views on the topic of abortion after lis- tening to a persuasive speaker at your school. If you carefully weighed the qual- ity and strength of the arguments and then changed your attitude accordingly, you’ve been convinced via the central route. Not surprisingly, attitude changes that result from this k ind of central processing tend to be stable and long lasting (Olson & Zanna, 1993).

The peripheral route to persuasion operates when we’re either unable to process the message carefully or are unmotivated to do so. When we process a message peripherally, our attitudes are much more susceptible to change from superficial cues or from mere exposure (Petty & Wegener, 1997). Think about the typical beer commercial on television. You don’t see logical arguments about the quality of the product—you see talking frogs or partying dogs. The same is true for fast-food com- mercials. There’s no discussion of nutrition—again, it’s talking animals or anecdotes about families and minivans. When our motivation to process the message is low, we’re much more likely to be persuaded by source characteristics—things such as celebrity, attractiveness, or power.

elaboration likelihood model A model proposing two primary routes to persuasion and attitude change: a central route, which operates when we are motivated and focusing our attention on the message, and a peripheral route, which operates when we are either unmotivated to process the message or are unable to do so.

source characteristics Features of the person who is presenting a persuasive message, such as his or her attractiveness, amount of power, or fame.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Next time you watch television, notice which commercials rely on logical arguments and which use humor or celebrity endorsers. Do you see any connection between the type of product and the style of persuasion? What kinds of products are more likely to induce us to use central rather than peripheral processing?

How closely do your attitudes mirror the positions and beliefs of your peer group?

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Advertisers typically capitalize on the peripheral route to persuasion because most of the time we don’t process advertisements on television or in magazines with a high level of involvement. We’re also more likely to rely on processing shortcuts (heuristics) to form opinions when we process a message peripherally (Chaiken et al., 1989). For instance, you might adopt a favorable attitude toward an expensive product because you believe that “better products are more expensive,” or you might buy the product endorsed by George Clooney because “Clooney wouldn’t endorse something that isn’t quality.”

The Festinger and Carlsmith Study We can also be persuaded to change our attitudes because of our own actions. In a highly influential study of attitude change conducted by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), male college students were asked to perform some incredibly boring tasks, such as placing sewing spools onto a tray, during an hour ses- sion. At the end of the hour, some of the participants (the experimental group) were given a bogus cover story. They were told that one purpose of the study was to exam- ine the effects of motivation on task performance. The next student, the researcher explained, needed to be told that the experiment was actually filled with interesting and enjoyable tasks. Would they mind going into the adjacent waiting room and tell- ing him that the experiment was interesting and enjoyable? To provide an incentive, the experimenter offered some of the participants a monetary reward of $1 and others a reward of $20.

The point of the offer was to get the members of the experimental group to act in a way that contradicted their true feelings, or attitudes, about the experi- ment. The task was clearly boring, so they were essentially asked to lie for either a small or a large reward. Festinger and Carlsmith were interested in what effect this behavior would have on people’s attitudes about the experiment. After accepting the offer, and trying to convince the next participant, the students’ attitudes about the experimental tasks were assessed through an interview. The researchers found that attitudes about the experimental tasks did indeed change— they became more positive relative to the attitudes of a control group, who had not been asked to lie. Moreover, the positive shift was larger for peo- ple receiving $1 than for those receiving $20. The more money people were paid to act inconsistently with their true feelings, the less likely their attitudes were to change (see ●Figure 13.4).

Cognitive Dissonance These results may seem perplexing. You would probably have predicted that the students receiving $20 would show the greatest attitude change—after all, wouldn’t a large reward have a greater reinforcing effect? The answer, according to Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, is that inconsistent behavior produces tension—or what he called dissonance. Think about it. Which action is going to lead to greater internal turmoil, lying to receive $1 or lying to receive $20? Most people can easily justify a simple white lie when offered a reason- able amount of money, especially when asked by an authority fig- ure (remember that $20 was worth a lot more in the 1950s than it is now). But to lie for a measly $1 is tough to justify—unless, of course, you can justify the action by changing your initial attitude about the task. According to cognitive dissonance theory, if the discrepancy between what you believe and how you act is great, you will either (1) change your behavior or (2) change your beliefs.

Since cognitive dissonance theory was first introduced in the 1950s, hundreds of follow-up studies have been conducted (Aronson, 1992). Most have confirmed Festinger and Carlsmith’s basic finding: When people are induced to act in ways that are inconsistent with their attitudes, their attitudes often change. But

cognitive dissonance The tension produced when people act in a way that is inconsistent with their attitudes.

Why do you suppose this company chose to use George Clooney in its ad?

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● FiGuRE 13.4 Cognitive Dissonance Festinger proposed that attitudes change when there is a discrepancy between what we believe and how we act. Presumably, it was tough to justify lying for a small amount of money, which created a lot of cognitive dissonance, so the subjects in the $1 condition simply changed their original attitude about the task. (Data from Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959)

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not all psychologists are convinced that internal tension, or dissonance, results from acting in ways that are inconsistent with your beliefs. You might, for example, simply feel uncomfortable about your actions (Elliot & Devine, 1994), or you might feel per- sonally responsible for creating an unwanted or negative situation (Blanton et al., 1997; Cooper, 1992). Recent work using neuroimaging techniques provides some support for the original concept of dissonance. As in the Festinger and Carlsmith study, people were asked to act in ways that were inconsistent with their attitudes—but while being scanned in an MRI device! Specifically, they were asked to provide misleading ratings about their comfort level—I feel calm and peaceful in the scanner—in order to put the next participant’s mind at ease. Not surprisingly, “lying” about how they felt caused their subsequent attitudes about scanning to change relative to a control group. But the important finding was that their degree of attitude change was associated with brain regions that are thought to be activated when we hold conflicting thoughts— that is, when we are experiencing cognitive dissonance (van Veen et al., 2009).

Self-Perception Theory One of the best-known alternatives to dissonance theory is psychologist Daryl Bem’s (1967, 1972) self-perception theory. This theory is based on the idea that we are active observers of our own behavior. We learn from our behav- ior and use our actions as a basis for inferring internal beliefs. For example, if I sit down and practice the piano for two hours a day, it must be the case that I like music and think I have at least a bit of musical talent. If I regularly stop for hamburgers and fries for lunch, it must be the case that I like fast food. The basis for the attitude is self- perception—behavior is observed, and attitudes follow from the behavior.

Many experimental findings support these basic ideas. For example, the Festinger and Carlsmith study can be interpreted from this perspective. You observe yourself telling someone that a boring task is interesting, for a measly $1, and conclude that because you engaged in this behavior your attitude toward the task must not have been that negative. In another classic example, known as the foot-in-the-door technique, Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser (1966) convinced a group of California house- holders to sign a petition expressing support for safe driving. Several weeks later, the researchers returned with a request that the householders now place a large and quite ugly “Drive Safely” billboard in their yards. The petition signers were three times more likely to comply with this new request than a control group of people who were not asked to sign a petition. What’s the interpretation? The signing of the original petition triggered self-perception, which then helped shape the attitude: If I signed the petition, then I must be a strong advocate for safe driving (see also Burger & Caldwell, 2003).

A related phenomenon is the lowball technique. You wander into the local electron- ics store to look around. You’re not really ready to buy, but the salesperson offers you a tremendous price on a piece of high-quality equipment. You agree, convinced you’ve received a great deal. The salesperson leaves to finish the paperwork with the manager of the store. He returns a few minutes later with some bad news: The offered price was a mistake—the manager rejected the deal—but he will be able to sell you the equip- ment at a price that is still lower than what most people pay. Reluctantly you agree to buy, even though you probably would have rejected this deal if it had been offered first. In this case, by getting you to agree verbally to the initial purchase, the salesperson has lowered your resistance to buying the product (Burger & Cornelius, 2003).

Of course, there are boundary conditions for these effects—we do not always match our attitudes to our behaviors—but monitoring behavior is clearly an impor- tant ingredient of attitude formation and change. It may be that we’re particularly likely to use our own actions as a guide when we’re unsure or undecided about our attitude. Or we may use our own behavior to see if our attitudes or opinions have recently changed: “Do I still like playing video games? Well, let’s see. I haven’t played a game for a while, so I must not be crazy about them anymore.” It’s adaptive for us to use multiple sources of information for establishing our beliefs, including our own actions.

self-perception theory The idea that people use observations of their own behavior as a basis for inferring their internal beliefs.

We may form attitudes, at least in part, by observing our own behavior. If I regularly eat cheeseburgers, then my attitude about cheeseburgers must be positive.

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● CONCEPt REviEw Roots of Attitudes and Attitude Change mECHAnism DEsCRiPTion ExAmPlE (“WHo sHoulD i voTE FoR?”)

Central route When motivated to process an incoming message, we listen carefully to the arguments given and judge them on their merits.

Jaraan is not sure who to vote for in the governor’s race. He obtains detailed information on the candidates’ views on the major issues and, after considering each, decides on the Democratic candidate.

Peripheral route When we are unable or unwilling to process a message carefully, our attitudes are affected more by superficial cues or mere exposure.

Yvette hasn’t really kept up with the governor’s race but has seen commercials on TV. She gets a kick out of the Republican candi- date’s humorous ad, so she decides to vote for him.

Cognitive dissonance Behavior that is inconsistent with attitudes produces tension (i.e., dissonance). If the tension is large enough, attitudes or behavior will change.

Jeremy has always considered himself a Republican, and he backs his party’s candidate for governor. Lately he’s been dating a woman who is very involved in the Democratic candidate’s campaign. Jeremy finds that his attitudes toward this candidate are becoming more and more favorable.

Self-perception We learn from our behavior, using our actions as a basis for inferring beliefs: Attitudes follow behavior.

Felicia gets a phone call from the third-party campaign headquarters pleading for help. The third party can’t compete with the other two campaigns unless it raises more money for its candidate. Felicia agrees to donate $20 to the cause. Looking back, she decides she must really favor the third-party candidate.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about how we form impressions of others by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Decide whether each of the following statements about person perception is true or false.

a. On average, attractive people are assumed to be more intel- ligent, better adjusted, and more socially aware than people with average looks. True or False?

b. Prototype theories assume that we represent stereotypes with particular individuals, or exemplars. True or False?

c. Stereotypes can be activated automatically and can influence our later behavior in ways that seem to bypass awareness. True or False?

d. Studies suggest that it might be possible to reduce the prejudicial feelings that arise from stereotypes through repeated exposure to individuals in the stereotyped group. True or False?

2. For each of the following, decide whether you are most likely to make an internal or an external attribution for the behavior described.

a. A perfect score on your psychology exam: b. Josie always smiles after her psychology lecture, but everyone

else in the class leaves mad:

c. A failing score on your psychology exam: d. Eagerly anticipating your food, you notice your waiter seems to

spend a lot of time talking to the hostess:

3. Decide whether each of the following statements about attitudes and attitude change is true or false.

a. For an attitude to guide behavior, it should be appropriate or relevant to the situation. True or False?

b. The peripheral route to persuasion operates when our level of involvement in or commitment to a message is high. True or False?

c. According to cognitive dissonance theory, it is inconsistencies between internal beliefs and our actions that lead to attitude change. True or False?

d. Mere exposure can lead to attitude change, but only if we’re processing an incoming communication with care and attention. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.1

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Behaving in the Presence of Others: Social Influence LEARNING GOALS

● Define and discuss social facilitation and interference. ● Describe the bystander effect and diffusion of responsibility. ● Describe how behavior changes in a group setting. ● Discuss some aspects of group decision making. ● Discuss the social implications of the Milgram experiment. ● Discuss how culture affects social influence.

We now turn our attention to the topic of social influence: How is our behavior affected by the presence of others? Obviously, by the word others, social psychologists mean the general social context, but it can have a variety of meanings in practice. Our behavior might change because we interact with a single individual, perhaps an authority figure such as our boss, or by the collective behavior of people in a group. Moreover, as you will soon see, the presence of others can cause us to act in a new or different way or change our attitudes and beliefs.

Social Facilitation and Interference One of the simplest examples of social influence is the phenomenon of social facil- itation. Social facilitation is the enhancement in performance that is sometimes found when we perform in the presence of others. To demonstrate social facilita- tion, you need to compare someone’s task performance in two conditions, when performing alone and when performing in the presence of other people. If per- formance improves when other people are around, you’ve demonstrated social facilitation.

Social facilitation is a widespread effect, occurring in many kinds of social environments and for many kinds of tasks (Aiello & Douthitt, 2001). Motorists drive through intersections faster when another car is traveling in the lane beside

social influence The study of how the behaviors and thoughts of individuals are affected by the presence of others.

social facilitation The enhancement in performance that is sometimes found when an individual performs in the presence of others.

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them (Towler, 1986); people run faster when others are present (Worringham & Messick, 1983); people even eat more when dining out with friends than when eat- ing alone (Clendenen et al., 1994). In fact, the effect is not restricted to humans— ants will excavate dirt more quickly to build their nests when other ants are present (Chen, 1937); hungry chickens will eat more when other chickens observe passively though a clear plastic wall (Tolman, 1968); cockroaches will even run faster down an alleyway when a “spectator” roach watches from a small plastic enclosure (Zajonc et al., 1969).

But there’s another side to the coin. It’s easy to think of examples of how we’ve risen to the occasion and excelled when an audience was present, but the oppo- site can occur as well. Sometimes performing in a crowd impairs performance— we “choke,” a tendency referred to as social interference. Talented Angela, who finally performs Bach’s Invention No. 1 perfectly in her last practice session, finds her fingers fumbling helplessly during the piano recital. Confident Eddie, who thought he had learned his lines to perfection, stands embarrassingly silent on cen- ter stage on opening night. Social interference is the opposite of social facilitation, but both represent cases in which our ability to perform a task is influenced by the presence of others.

Social Influences on Altruism: The Bystander Effect The presence of other people influences whether we show altruism—that is, whether we’ll act in a way that shows unselfish concern for the welfare of others. Both people and animals engage in altruistic behaviors—we help others in need, and these behav- iors may arise, in part, from adaptations rooted in our evolutionary past (Buss, 2012; Stevens & Hauser, 2004). We’re more likely to engage in kin-directed altruism, which means there’s a greater chance we’ll help relatives, but we’ll help strangers under some circumstances—even if it means putting ourselves at risk. Some have suggested that we act altruistically because we anticipate that the favor will be returned in

social interference The impairment in performance that is sometimes found when an individual performs in the presence of others.

altruism Acting in a way that shows unselfish concern for the welfare of others.

When a task is difficult, performing in the presence of others can lead to social interference: What seemed easy in private becomes a nightmare in public.©

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kind—a concept called reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1985). Putting yourself at risk can be adaptive, therefore, because it increases the chances that you’ll be helped in other situations.

Altruistic behavior is strongly controlled by the social environment. Think about the last time you were driving on the highway and noticed some poor person stand- ing alongside his or her disabled car. Did you stop and help? Did you at least pull out your cell phone and inform the police or highway patrol? If you’re like most peo- ple, you probably did nothing. In all likelihood, you failed to accept responsibility for helping—you left that job for someone else.

The problem is more serious than you might think. In March of 1964, while walking home from work at 3:30 a.m., Catherine “Kitty” Genovese was stalked and then brutally attacked by a knife-wielding assailant outside her apartment building in Queens, New York. “Oh my god, he stabbed me!” Kitty screamed. “I’m dying! I’m dying!” Inside the apartment building, awakened by the screams, many of her neigh- bors sat silently listening as the attacker finished the job. Kitty was stabbed repeatedly before she eventually died; in fact, the attacker actually left and came back before finally ending her life. Few in the apartment building came to her aid or called the police (the exact number of people involved remains uncertain; Manning et al., 2007). Did the bystanders simply not want to get involved in such a situation, or was some other, more general psychological process at work?

The reluctance to come to someone’s aid when other people are present, or are assumed to be present, is known generally as the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968). Although it’s relatively easy to document in natural environments, it’s also pos- sible to study the bystander effect in the laboratory. Consider the following scenario. You’ve volunteered to participate in a psychology experiment that involves groups of students discussing the problems of college life. To minimize embarrassment, you’re allowed to sit in a small cubicle where you can communicate with the others via an intercom system. Before the experiment begins, you’re told that one, two, or five other people will be participating. The session begins, and suddenly one of the group members, who had previously mentioned being subject to epileptic seizures, begins to have a seizure. Over the intercom, his voice begins to garble—“Somebody-er-er- help-er-uh-uh-uh”—followed by silence. What do you do? Do you get up and help, or sit where you are?

In the actual experiment, of course, no one had a seizure; the incident was manufactured by the experimenters to observe the bystander effect. There was also only one real participant in the experiment—the “others” were simply voices recorded on tape. The researchers found that whether the real participant would offer some kind of help to the imaginary seizure victim depended on how many other people he or she believed to be present. When the participant was convinced that only one other person was participating in the group, he or she almost imme- diately rose to intervene. But when it was presumed that four others (in addition to the seizure victim) were present, only 62% of the participants offered aid (Darley & Latané, 1968).

Diffusion of Responsibility Most social psychologists are convinced that the behav- ior of the people in these experiments, including the actions of the Queens apartment dwellers, is neither atypical nor representative of general apathy. Instead, the reluc- tance to get involved—to help others—can be explained by appealing once again to the powerful role of social context. We tend not to lend a hand, or get involved, because the presence of others leads to diffusion of responsibility—we believe oth- ers have already done something to help or will soon get involved. If we know that others are present in the situation, and certainly many occupants of the apartment building heard the terrible screams, we allow our sense of responsibility to diffuse, or spread out widely, among the other people presumed to be present.

bystander effect The reluctance to come to the aid of a person in need when other people are present.

diffusion of responsibility The idea that when people know (or think) that others are present in a situation, they allow their sense of responsibility for action to diffuse, or spread out widely, among those who are present.

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The bystander effect is a disturbing but powerful example of social influence. Again, it has been replicated many times in numerous social settings that extend beyond the laboratory (Latané & Nida, 1981). As a general rule, the more witnesses there are, the less likely it is that any one will step forward to offer aid. In fact, this relationship holds even if you simply imagine yourself in a group. One study found that people who imagined themselves eating dinner with 30 of their friends were less likely to pledge money to a charity than people who imagined themselves eating with only 10 people or just one other person (Garcia et al., 2002).

There are exceptions to the rule. For instance, people are more likely to help if they’ve recently observed others being helpful, if they don’t think the people around them have the ability to help, or if they truly perceive the situation as an emergency with high potential danger (Fischer et al., 2006). Dangerous situations lead to higher levels of arousal and more helping (Fischer et al., 2011). Still, diffusion of responsi- bility remains widespread and easy to document. The tendency to diffuse respon- sibility doesn’t mean that people are bad or selfish; it simply provides yet another indication of how behavior can be strongly influenced by social factors. Our behavior changes when we are in the presence of others, and although the forces that produce the bystander effect may not make us feel good about ourselves, this behavior may be adaptive. Stopping to help someone in need could place one in danger—there may be a definite cost to helping behavior—and diffusion of responsibility is one way of reducing the risk.

The Power of the Group The power of social context over human behavior is especially noticeable when we act as members of a well-defined group. Our behavior is shaped not only by the characteristics of the group—its size and the unanimity of its members—but even by the mere fact that we’re in a group. Social psychologists have identified a num- ber of psychological phenomena that illustrate the power of group membership. We’ll consider three in the following sections: social loafing, deindividuation, and conformity.

Social Loafing During our discussion of social facilitation, you learned that a per- son’s performance often changes when others are present. Whether performance improves or declines depends on factors such as the difficulty of the task or one’s general level of arousal. But when participating as a member of a group, most peo- ple show a tendency to engage in social loafing, which means they put out less effort than when they are alone (Latané et al., 1979). Social loafing is easy to dem- onstrate in the laboratory. In one study, volunteer subjects were instructed to clap and cheer as loudly as possible while blindfolded and listening to noise over head- phones. Just before they began the task, the participants were told they would be clapping either with a group of other people or by themselves. When the volun- teers believed they were part of a clapping group, their individual output dropped considerably.

Like many of the phenomena we’ve discussed in this chapter, social loafing is a complex phenomenon. Whether it occurs in a particular situation will depend on many factors, including the importance of the task, the cohesiveness of the group, and the personalities of the group members (Karau & Hart, 1998; Smrt & Karau, 2011). The effect also occurs widely across cultures, although it may be especially common in cultures that stress individuality (Karau & Williams, 1993). Some social psychologists believe there may be a connection between social loafing and the bystander effect. Bibb Latané (1981) has argued that both effects result from diffusion

social loafing The tendency to put out less effort when working in a group compared to when working alone.

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of responsibility. In the bystander effect, people suspect that others either will or have become involved; in social loafing, we assume that others will carry the load. In both cases, the fact that we are simply one of many makes us feel less accountable for our behavior. We fail to step up and take full responsibility, or to work to our fullest capabilities, because the responsibility can be diffused or spread to the other mem- bers of the group.

Deindividuation The fact that we sometimes feel less accountable for our behavior when we’re in a group setting can lead to a phenomenon called deindividuation. Imagine yourself at a particularly lively party: The people around you are acting crazy—they’re drinking too much, damaging the furniture, and some are even beginning to shed their clothes. Are you likely to start doing the same? Some psy- chologists believe that people in large groups lose their sense of individuality. We

can enter a depersonalized state of mind called deindividuation, which increases the chances of engaging in destructive, aggressive, or deviant behavior. Under most circumstances, it’s highly unlikely that you would trash the furniture in a friend’s home. But when you’re part of a large rowdy group, deindividuation can lead you to do things that you might not otherwise do.

Once again, diffusion of responsibility is likely to play a role in such situations. When you’re in a large group, you’re less likely to feel accountable for your actions. You feel anony- mous, which lowers your normal restraints on destructive actions. You also feel less self- conscious—you go along with the group, as a whim, because you’re not thinking about your normal standards, values, and morals. Whether you truly enter a depersonalized state of mind is debatable, but your actions do differ from normal. Some psychologists have argued that deindividuation is simply an example of sit- uation-specific behavior; your behavior is being controlled by an unusual situation, and your actions probably don’t provide much informa- tion about how you typically behave (Postmes & Spears, 1998).

At the same time, deindividuation plays a central role in prejudice, discrimination, and rac- ism (Zimbardo, 2007). Group membership can lead individuals to perform actions, particularly

toward members of an “out-group,” that they would be less likely to perform other- wise. History is full of egregious examples of group-based behavior—e.g., lynching, looting—that are fueled, in part, by deindividuation.

Conformity Another property of group membership is conformity, which occurs when a person’s opinions, feelings, and behaviors start to move toward the group norm. When you’re in a group setting, you feel social pressure, which, in turn, causes you generally to comply, or go along, with the wishes of the group—even though you may not always be aware that you’re doing so. Studies investigating issues of conformity and compliance to group norms are among the oldest and best known of all social psychology experiments.

In one classic study of conformity, psychologist Solomon Asch (1951, 1955) rigged the following experimental setup. People were asked to participate in a

deindividuation The loss of individuality, or depersonalization, that comes from being in a group.

conformity The tendency to comply with the wishes of the group; when people conform, their opinions, feelings, and behaviors generally start to move toward the group norm.

People can feel less accountable for their behavior in a group setting, a phenomenon known as deindividuation.

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simple perception experiment that required them to make judgments about line length. Two cards were shown, one displaying a standard line of a particular length and the other showing three comparison lines of differing lengths. The par- ticipant was required to state aloud which of the three comparison lines was the same length as the standard line (see ●Figure 13.5). The task was really quite sim- ple—there was no question about the correct answer. The catch was that this was a group experiment, and the other members of the group were really confederates of the experimenter—they were not volunteers but rather were there to put social pressure on the true participant.

The confederates were instructed to lie on a certain number of the trials. They were told to give a response, aloud, that was clearly wrong (such as pick- ing comparison line 1 as the correct answer). Asch was mainly concerned with how often these incorrect answers would affect the answers of the real partici- pant. Imagine yourself in this situation—you know the answer is line 2, but four of your fellow participants have already given 1 as a response. Do you conform to the opinions of your peers, even though doing so conflicts with what you know to be true? The results were not particularly encouraging for those who champion individualism. Asch found that in approximately 75% of the sessions people com- plied on at least one of the trials, and the overall rate of conformity was around 37%. Although peer pressure wasn’t always effective in altering behavior—in fact, only 5% of the participants conformed on every trial—it was a powerful influ- ence. In describing his results, Asch (1955) put it this way: “That reasonably intel- ligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white black is a matter of concern” (p. 34).

As you might imagine, the Asch experiments had quite an impact on the psy- chological community. Similar experiments have been conducted on dozens of occasions, not only in the United States but in many other countries around the world. Generally, Asch’s results have held up well, although a number of variables affect whether conformity will occur. Asch himself found, for example, that the rate of compliance dropped dramatically when one of the confederates dissented from the majority and gave the correct answer. It was also discovered that the size of the group is not as important as you might think. Conformity increases as the size of the pressure group gets larger, but it levels off relatively quickly. The pres- sure to conform does not increase directly with group size; after a certain point, usually when the majority group contains three to five members, adding even more pressure has less of an effect (Tanford & Penrod, 1984). Your feelings about the sta- tus of the group as a whole also matter; if you have little or no respect for the other members of the group, you’re less likely to conform. Conformity is particularly

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

When people conform, they act in ways that are inconsistent with their attitudes. What implications should this have for attitude change?

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● FiGuRE 13.5 the Asch Study of Conformity Do you think you would have any trouble choosing the correct comparison line in this task? Asch found that people often conformed to the group opinion. The photo shown here is taken from one of his actual experiments. (© Cengage Learning)

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likely when pressure comes from an in-group —that is, a group of individuals with whom you share features in common or with whom you identify (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).

Why do we conform to the majority opinion? One possibility is that we gener- ally seek approval or rewards in social settings and try to avoid rejection, so we act to please by complying with social customs and norms. Clearly, voicing a dissent- ing opinion increases the risk of rejection by the group, so we choose to conform. Recent neuroimaging studies have suggested that areas of the brain normally associ- ated with the processing of rewards may be involved in social conformity (Klucharev et al., 2011). But it may also be the case that we use the majority group opinion as a source of information. If four or five people around you are convinced that compari- son line 1 is the correct answer, perhaps your perception of the stimulus is flawed in some way. Perhaps your angle of sight is misleading, or your memory for the compar- ison line is wrong. Consequently, you use the opinions of the others in the group as information or evidence about what has really been presented.

It’s best not to underestimate the power of group rejection, though. Ostracism, defined as being excluded and ignored by the group, can have serious psychological and even physical consequences (Williams & Nida, 2011). When excluded or ignored by others, our sense of belongingness, self-esteem, and control is threatened. We feel anger, sadness, and even pain. Even the briefest of encounters, such as a lack of eye contact by others in a social setting, is sufficient to induce such feelings and reactions. Some psychologists believe that our reactions to ostracism may be rooted in our evo- lutionary past—we may even have built-in ostracism detectors—because ostracism from the group in ancestral times decreased the chances of survival (Williams, 2009). Conforming to the group opinion may be a small price to pay to help maintain a mean- ingful existence.

Group Decision Making As you’ve just seen, members of an in-group can exert considerable pressure on one another to conform to the standards or norms of the group. One consequence of these internal pressures is that groups tend to take on behavioral characteristics of their own, especially when group decisions need to be made. Obviously, the psychol- ogy of group decision making is critically important—it affects everything from how verdicts are reached by juries, to how families decide where to go on vacation, to decisions made by Congress. Psychologists have identified two important character- istics of group decision making, group polarization and groupthink.

Group Polarization When members of an in-group arrive at a consensus of opinion, there is a tendency for the group’s opinion to polarize. Group polarization means that the group’s dominant point of view—which is usually determined by the initial views of the majority—becomes stronger and even more extreme with time. Suppose you join a local action group dedicated to exposing corporate corruption. If the group tends to believe initially that corporate corruption is a significant and rising problem, it’s likely that over time you and the rest of the members of the group will become even more convinced of that position. On a more extreme level, similar processes are thought to play a role in the development and maintenance of many terrorist organi- zations (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

What accounts for group polarization? Not surprisingly, some of the same fac- tors that promote conformity promote polarization. For example, group discussions tend to provide information that consolidates initial opinions. Those who enter the group with strong opinions make strong cases for their viewpoint and dissenting viewpoints are less likely to be heard (Stewart & Stasser, 1995). At the same time, the social aspects of the discussion play an important role. People want to be liked by the

in-group A group of individuals with whom one shares features in common or with whom one identifies.

ostracism When one is excluded and ignored by one or more members of a group.

group polarization The tendency for a group’s dominant point of view to become stronger and more extreme with time.

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other members of the group, so they shift their attitude toward the group consensus. You’re more likely to be accepted by the group if you forcefully argue in favor of the group’s dominant viewpoint.

Groupthink The trend toward consensus and polarization of opinion may also be influenced by what psychologists call groupthink: Members of a group become so interested in seeking a consensus of opinion that they start to ignore and even suppress dissenting views. Janis (1982, 1989) found evidence for groupthink when he looked at how well-established in-groups arrived at decisions, particularly policy decisions by members of the government. He and others analyzed a number of watershed events in U.S. policy making, including the decision to escalate the war in Vietnam, the decision by President John F. Kennedy to invade Cuba in 1961, and even the decision by NASA to launch the ill-fated Challenger space shuttle. More recently, scholars have looked for evidence of groupthink in the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 (Badie, 2010).

In an alarming number of the cases he studied, Janis discovered that group members systematically sought consensus at the expense of critical analysis. Group members often acted as if they were trying to convince themselves of the correctness of their position. When alternative views were expressed, those views were either suppressed or dismissed. The management at NASA had clear evidence that freezing launch temperatures might pose a problem for Challenger, but the managers chose to ignore that evidence in the interest of going forward with the mission. The result of groupthink is general closed-mindedness and an overestimation of the uniformity of opinion.

Can groupthink be avoided? According to Janis (1982), it’s possible to counteract groupthink by following certain prescriptions. For instance, it helps to have a leader who seems impartial, one who does not quickly endorse a particular position. One or more members of the group can also be assigned a kind of devil’s advocate role in which they are expected and encouraged to represent a dissenting position. Perhaps most important, however, is the simple recognition by the group that social influences such as groupthink are real phenomena that affect behavior, irrespective of group members’ intelligence or commitment to the truth. Groupthink can be avoided, but it requires reconsidering how group decision making is normally conducted.

groupthink The tendency for members of a group to become so interested in seeking a consensus of opinion that they start to ignore and even suppress dissenting views.

Polarization occurs when a group’s majority opinion becomes stronger and more extreme with time. What’s the likelihood that people in this group will adopt more tolerant views in the future?©

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The Power of Authority: Obedience Up to this point in our discussion of social influence, we’ve concentrated on how behavior is affected by the presence of others, where the others have simply been any individuals who happen to be present in the social context. But in many cases it does matter who these others happen to be—and what roles these people play in your life.

Psychologists use the term obedience to describe the form of compliance that occurs when people respond to the orders of an authority figure. For example, in 1978 in a rural area of Guyana, South America, hundreds of converts to the religious teach- ings of Reverend Jim Jones chose, under his direct orders, to commit mass suicide. Most people find it extremely difficult to understand such events and consider them to be social aberrations committed by people far different from themselves. Admittedly, you might toe the line in front of your boss, and do and say things that you don’t really believe, but murder innocent people? Drink Kool-Aid laced with cyanide? Never.

The Milgram Experiment Psychologist Stanley Milgram (1963) set out to determine just how resistant the average person is to the demands of authority. He placed an advertisement in a local newspaper recruiting men for a study looking at the effects of punishment on learning. The participants were told that for a small fee they would be asked to play one of two roles in the experiment: either a learner, which required memorizing and then recalling lists of word pairs, or a teacher, whose task it would be to administer an electric shock to the learner whenever he made any recall errors. Each session required two participants, one teacher and one learner, and the assign- ment of condition was decided by drawing slips of paper out of a hat.

But things were not exactly what they appeared to be. In fact, in every case the true volunteer, the one who had actually responded to the ad, was picked to be the teacher. The learner was a confederate of the experimenter, someone who was fully informed about the true nature of the study. Although it was set up to look as though he was receiving shocks throughout the session, he was never actually shocked. The idea was to get the confederate to make learning errors and then to assess how will- ing the teacher would be to administer the shock under the authority of a hovering and demanding experimenter.

obedience The form of compliance that occurs when people respond to the orders of an authority figure.

● CONCEPt REviEw Influences of the Group PHEnomEnon DEsCRiPTion

Social facilitation An enhancement in performance sometimes found when we perform in the presence of others. This is especially likely with easy or well-practiced tasks.

Social interference A decline in performance when one is in the presence of others. This is especially likely with tasks that are unique or not well learned.

Bystander effect The reluctance to come to someone’s aid when other people are present. This is characterized by diffusion of responsibility, the tendency to believe that others will help.

Social loafing Most people show a strong tendency to put in less effort when they are working in a group compared to when they work alone.

Deindividuation When in large groups, we can lose our sense of individuality and be more likely to engage in destructive, aggressive, or deviant behavior.

Conformity A person’s opinions, feelings, and behaviors start to move toward the group norm.

influences on Decision making

PHEnomEnon DEsCRiPTion

Group polarization A group’s dominant point of view becomes stronger and even more extreme with time.

Groupthink Members of a group become so interested in seeking a consensus of opinion that they ignore and suppress dissenting views.

Behaving in the Presence of Others: Social Influence | 427

To begin the setup, the unwitting teacher watched as the learner was led away to an adjacent room and hooked up to a shock- administering apparatus. Back in the original room, the teacher was then placed in front of an imposing-looking electrical shock generator, which contained some 30 different switches. It was explained that each switch was able to gen- erate a particular level of shock intensity, rang- ing from 15 volts (Slight Shock), through 150 volts (Strong Shock), and finally up to 450 volts (labeled simply XXX). With the experimenter standing by his side, the teacher was instructed to begin reading and then testing the learner’s memory for the words, via intercom, and to administer a shock whenever the learner failed to call out the correct answer. Moreover, to see how the degree of punishment influenced learn- ing, the teacher was instructed to increase the voltage level of the shock, by moving to a new switch, with each new mistake.

Remember, no one was actually shocked in this experiment; the learner was in on the exper- iment, and he was told to make mistakes con- sistently throughout the session. To add to the cover, he was also instructed to respond vocally and actively to the shocks, via the intercom, whenever they were delivered (the learner’s responses were actually prerecorded). At first, when the shock levels were low, there wasn’t much response. But as the pre- arranged mistakes continued—which, of course, required the teacher to continue increasing the voltage of the shock—loud protests began to come over the intercom. By the time the mistake-prone learner was receiving 150-volt shocks, he was demand- ing to be released from the experiment. By around 300 volts, he was screaming in agony in response to each delivered shock and pounding on the wall; after the 330- volt level, the shocks yielded no response at all—simply silence.

Listening to these disturbing pleas for help did not make the average teacher very comfortable. In fact, most quickly expressed concern over the consequences of the shocking and wanted to discontinue the experiment. But the teacher’s concerns were met with resistance from the authoritative experimenter, who demanded that the shocks go on. “Please continue,” the experimenter responded. “You have no other

Obedience to authority reached shocking levels in 1978 when more than 900 followers of Reverend Jim Jones obeyed his direct orders to commit suicide by drinking a fruit drink laced with cyanide.

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choice, you must go on.” What would you do in this situation? You’re participating in an experiment, which is being conducted in the name of science, but the task requires you to inflict quite a bit of pain and suffering on someone else. Do you blindly go for- ward, delivering shocks in compliance with the requests of the authority figure, or do you quit and give the experimenter a piece of your mind? Of course, this was exactly the question of interest to Milgram—how obedient would people be to the unreason- able requests of an authority figure?

Interestingly, before the experiment began Milgram asked a number of people, including professionals, to predict how much shock participants would be willing to deliver in his task. Most predicted that obedience would be low; the estimates were that only a few people in a thousand would deliver shocks up to 450 volts and that most would defy the experimenter after discomfort was expressed by the learner. In reality, the results were far different. Milgram found that 65% of the 40 people who participated were willing to deliver shocks up to 450 volts, and no one quit before the pounding on the wall started. This means that 26 of the 40 participants went all the way to the final switch—the one with the ominous XXX label—despite the agonized pleas from the learner. This remarkable finding rocked the psychological community and initiated a great deal of subsequent research, as well as a firestorm of controversy.

Controversies and Ethical Concerns Milgram’s (1963) experiment was controversial for two main reasons. First, the manner in which it was conducted raised serious ethical questions. The people in his study were misled from the beginning and became severely distressed during their participation. Milgram observed a num- ber of indications of distress during the experiment—the “teachers” sometimes groaned, bit their lips, trembled, stuttered, and even broke into a sweat. Many crit- ics feel that this kind of psychological manipulation—even though done to advance knowledge—cannot be justified (Baumrind, 1964; Schlenker & Forsyth, 1977). In response, Milgram (1974) argued that his participants were thoroughly debriefed at the end of the experiment—they were told in detail about the true nature of the experiment—and were generally glad they had participated. Follow-up questionnaires sent to the participants months later revealed that only a handful felt negatively about the experiment.

The other major question raised about the experiment concerned the procedure itself. Some critics argued that perhaps the participants had seen through the cover and were simply trying to please the experimenter; others argued that the results, although interesting, had no general applicability beyond the laboratory. People must have assumed that things were okay, these critics reasoned; otherwise no one would have believed that an experiment of this type could be conducted. In response, Milgram again pointed out that his participants tended to get extremely distressed in the setting, which suggests that they couldn’t have figured out the hoax and were expressing their true feelings.

In the 50 years since Milgram’s original experiment was conducted, his general procedure has been repeated, in many countries around the world (for a recent exam- ple using more ethical procedures, see Burger et al, 2011). Few psychologists today question the validity of Milgram’s basic findings, although it’s clear that the degree of compliance depends on many factors. For example, the Milgram experiment was conducted at a prestigious university (Yale); when the same study was conducted in a less prestigious setting—a rundown office building—compliance dropped (although it remained alarmingly high). People were also less likely to comply if the authority figure left the room after explaining the experiment or if the person giving the orders looked ordinary rather than official or scientific (Milgram, 1974). Thus, obedience to authority is not absolute—it depends on the characteristics of the situation, the char- acteristics of the participant, as well as on the characteristics of the person giving the orders (Burger, 2009; Twenge, 2009).

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Why might it be adaptive for us to respond so readily to the demands of an authority figure?

Behaving in the Presence of Others: Social Influence | 429

Finally, a cautionary note: Although behavior can certainly change in the pres- ence of an authority figure, even dramatically in some cases, obedience shouldn’t be used to explain away the actions of people who commit terrible crimes. In the case of Nazi Germany, for example, “I was just following orders” became the standard rallying cry for those accused of some truly horrendous actions. Social psycholo- gists are careful to draw distinctions between obedience to authority, as witnessed in Milgram’s settings, and the cruelties practiced by many executioners in concentration camps (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). There’s no question that we can all be pushed to extremes in the presence of an authority figure, but obedience (or deindividuation) can’t be used as an overriding excuse, or even explanation, for genocide or other hor- rendous acts.

The Role of Culture You’ve now seen how our thoughts and actions change when we’re in the presence of others, particularly groups. The group can exert a powerful influence on members’ judgments, leading to conformity, groupthink, and obedience to authority. In some cases, you may find yourself giving in to the group’s demands at the expense of your own personal convictions.

But is the tendency to conform, or to sacrifice one’s individual desires for the col- lective, necessarily bad? Is conformity or obedience a sign of weakness, or is it a sign of strength? The answer depends partly on the culture in which you are raised. In most Western cultures, such as the United States, people are taught from a very young age to adopt an independent view of the self; that is, people are rewarded for viewing them- selves as unique individuals, with special and distinctive qualities. American children, for example, are likely to be told things like “the squeaky wheel gets the grease.” Be someone different, be an individual with unique qualities—these are the things that count. Although Western cultures certainly value acts of charity or unselfish devotion to others, such acts are typically viewed as reflecting distinctive personal qualities— qualities that make someone stand out as an admirable individual.

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test Yourself Check your knowledge about social influence by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Pick the psychological term that best fits each of these statements. Choose from the following: social facilitation, social loafing, deindividuation, bystander effect, conformity, group polarization, groupthink, obedience.

a. Casey is normally shy and polite, but at the rock concert last night he was loud and shouted obscenities at the police:

b. Megan writes extremely well, but she contributes little to group discussions during class:

c. Sergio is convinced that his study group is dead wrong about their interpretation of the Milgram experiment, but he chooses to nod in agreement with the others in the group:

d. Landlord Sang-Woo notices that the grievances coming from his tenant group have become increasingly more rigid and demand- ing over time:

e. Gabriella never calls 911 when she sees a broken-down car by the side of the road—she assumes everyone has a cell phone:

f. Teresa notices that she always talks more when she’s at a large party:

2. Which of the following situations should lead to the greatest reduction in obedience to authority?

a. The authority figure wears a uniform in front of the teacher. b. The authority figure stands close to the teacher. c. The experiment is conducted in a federal building. d. The experiment is conducted in the teacher’s home.

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.2

In many non-Western cultures, particularly Eastern Asian cultures, people adopt a very different, interdependent view of the self (Markus & K itayama, 1991, 1994). In Japan, for example, children are taught to think of themselves from the perspective of the collective—as members of a group with common goals—rather than as individuals striving to be different. In Japan, children are told, “The nail that stands out gets pounded down.” Such cultural differences are reflected in peo- ple’s inner thoughts and feelings. When asked to write self-descriptions, Eastern Asians are likely to list personal qualities that they share with others (“I come from Kyoto”) and to think they are more similar to others than others are to them. Westerners, in contrast, tend to describe themselves as dissimilar to others, and they use individualistic characteristics (“I’m very talented on the flute”) to describe themselves (Trafimow et al., 1991). The majority of Westerners also tend to think of themselves as above average in intelligence and leadership ability, which is a trend rarely seen among Eastern Asians (Markus & K itayama, 1991).

What do such findings mean? They should reinforce the idea that cultural factors can’t be ignored in the interpretation and study of behavior and mind. Our thoughts and actions are influenced by our efforts to adapt successfully to our individual envi- ronments. As cultural demands on the individual vary, so too will his or her actions. To the individual, these cultural views of the self produce both costs and benefits. For example, those who adopt an independent view of the self tend to score higher on measures of self-esteem and self-efficacy, which, in turn, can increase one’s subjective sense of well-being (Heine & Buchtel, 2009). On the other hand, those who think the world revolves around “me” have trouble securing and maintaining long-term rela- tionships (Robins & Beer, 2001).

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Establishing Relations With Others LEARNING GOALS

● Describe the factors that influence our perception of facial attractiveness. ● Explain the factors that influence us to like or love others. ● Define the components of romantic love and explain the triangular theory.

Social psychology is the discipline that studies how we think about, influence, and relate to other people. So far we’ve dealt with social thought and social influence. We now turn our attention to a third and final component: How do we establish and maintain relations with others? People are not merely objects to be interpreted or forces that exert influences on behavior. For most of us, it is the personal relationships we establish that are paramount in our lives. Most people depend on their interac- tions with friends, lovers, and family not only for protection and sustenance but also to help give meaning to their lives.

We’ve encountered the topic of social relations several times in earlier chapters. In Chapter 4, when we discussed social development, we dealt in detail with the topic of attachment. But in that case we were concerned with how people use social bonds to help solve the problems that arise during development. Infants are born with lim- ited motor skills and somewhat immature perceptual systems; consequently, they need to establish strong bonds with their caregivers to survive. In Chapter 11, when we discussed motivation and emotion, we saw how people use facial expressions to communicate their emotions to others and how people are motivated to secure sexual partners. In this section we’ll consider some of the factors that influence inter- personal attraction, which often forms the basis for relationship development, and then we’ll discuss how psychologists have attempted to tackle the mysterious subject of love.

What Makes a Face Attractive? Few things are as alluring as the sight of an attractive face. Beauty is a powerful moti- vator of behavior, a fact confirmed by the many millions of dollars spent annually on cosmetics and other beauty aids. The concept of attractiveness is important to the psy- chologist because people’s physical appearance often helps shape how their behavior will be interpreted and therefore how they will be treated by others. As you learned earlier in the chapter, people commonly rely on social schemas to form impressions, and there is considerable evidence to suggest that physical attractiveness is used as a basis for generating expectations about others (Eagly et al., 1991). Just think about the words of the 19th-century German poet Johann Schiller: “Physical beauty is the sign of an interior beauty, a spiritual and moral beauty.” Schiller’s insight is certainly not lost on modern advertisers who, as you know, rely heavily on the power of an attrac- tive face to help sell their clients’ products.

An Evolutionary Perspective What exactly is it that makes a face physically beautiful? What are the qualities that determine whether someone’s looks are con- sidered desirable? One way to think about this problem is from the perspective of evolutionary theory. If the purpose of attraction is to secure an ideal mate, then preferably it should be someone with a high reproductive capacity or someone who is able to provide protection for his or her children and compete successfully for needed resources. This kind of reasoning predicts that people should be attracted to opposite-sex members who are youthful, vigorous, and healthy looking because these qualities increase the likelihood of successful reproduction and child rearing (Buss, 2012; Little et al., 2011).

Our relationships with others protect us, nurture us, and give meaning to our lives.

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Another prediction of evolutionary theory is that features of attractiveness should cut across cultural boundaries. If attractiveness is grounded somewhere deep in our genetic ancestry, then it shouldn’t matter much where you are reared and what experiences you have; in general, there should be worldwide agreement about what constitutes attractiveness. Notice this conclusion contrasts sharply with the generally accepted idea that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” but it’s supported, at least in part, by empirical research. A number of studies have found that when ratings of attractiveness are compared cross-culturally, attractive faces share a number of basic structural features (Langlois et al., 2000). It’s also been discovered that babies, within hours of birth, prefer to look at pictures of faces that adults have rated as attractive over faces that have been rated as unattractive (Langlois et al., 1987; Slater et al., 1998). It’s unlikely that we can appeal to experience—that is, sustained exposure to some culturally based definition of beauty—to account for this preference.

Attractive Faces May Be Average Some research suggests that the universality of attractiveness may be partly due to the fact that people are programmed to prefer faces that are average representations of faces in the population (Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Langlois et al., 1994). Average in this case does not necessarily mean common, typical, or frequently occurring faces. Instead, it means prototypical faces—that is, faces that are good representations of the category “faces.” In Chapter 9 we defined category pro- totypes as the best or most representative members of a category—a robin, for exam- ple, is probably close to the prototype for the category “bird.” Accordingly, attractive faces are those that are particularly facelike, or representative of the category of faces.

Langlois and Roggman (1990) supported this view by asking people to rate the attractiveness of average faces that were generated electronically on a computer. To create these faces, hundreds of individual black-and-white photographs, composed of either male or female Caucasians, Asians, and Hispanics, were first scanned by a

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The faces in each row are composites created by averaging either two individual faces (far left), eight faces (middle photos in each row), or 32 faces (far right). The composite faces were created using the averaging process employed by Langlois and Roggman (1977).

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computer and then digitized into matrices of individual gray values. Each of these gray values corresponded to a shade of gray sitting at a particular small location on the scanned face. A whole face was represented by many thousands of these gray val- ues, as they are in a typical newspaper photo or video display. As you probably know, any image you see in a newspaper or on a video monitor is actually a configuration of many rows and columns of individual intensity dots or pixels. When viewed as a whole, the dots blend together to form a familiar image on the page or screen.

The unique feature of the Langlois and Roggman research was that people were sometimes shown faces that were generated by averaging the gray values across a large collection of individual faces. An individual dot in one of these composite faces was set by averaging the values of all the dots at the same relative location in the face pool. The result was a “blended face” that did not look exactly like any one of the individual faces but rather represented a kind of prototype face in the population. Volunteer participants were asked to rate these faces for attractiveness, along with the individual faces that had been used to form the composite. The surprising result was that people generally rated the composite faces as more attractive than the indi- vidual faces (see also Rhodes & Tremewan, 1996).

Why would people prefer faces that are prototypical? Langlois and Roggman offer several reasons. One possibility is that prototypical faces are easy to identify and classify as human faces. Classifying something as a face may not seem like much of task for adults, but it could well be difficult for the newborn infant. It is critical for infants to be able to recognize a looming visual configuration as a face because they are dependent on their social interactions with people for survival. Yet the visual acuity of the newborn is limited, so faces that are particularly face- like may make this critical classification process easier. Another possibility is that people are programmed biologically to prefer prototypical faces because individu- als with average features may be less likely to harbor potentially harmful genetic mutations—that is, they may be “signals” for genetic health. Likewise, faces that are symmetrical in appearance tend to be preferred as well—perhaps, again, because they provide clues about the genetic health of a potential mating partner (Komori et al., 2009; Rhodes, 2006).

The Subjective Components Despite the evidence for universality in how people con- ceive of attractiveness, most psychologists recognize that there is a strong subjec- tive component to the perception of beauty. As discussed in Chapter 11, standards of beauty have changed over time in most cultures of the world. In Western societies, for instance, our icon of beauty, the fashion model, has ranged from a curvaceous bustiness at one point to slender tomboyishness at the next (Silverstein et al., 1986).

It’s also the case that features considered attractive in one culture—pierced noses, liposuctioned thighs, elongated ear lobes—may be considered unattractive in another. Perceptions of attractiveness and beauty also clearly change with experi- ence. We generally rate people we like as more attractive than people we don’t like; moreover, if you’ve just been shown a picture of a strikingly attractive person, your ratings of average-looking people go down (Kenrick et al., 1989). If a male face has been previously paired with a smiling female face, women tend to rate the man’s face as more attractive ( Jones et al., 2007). Beauty is not entirely in the eye of the beholder, as the research of Langlois and Roggman (1990) indicates, but there is indeed a mea- surable subjective component that cannot be ignored.

Determinants of Liking and Loving If you had to list all the things you look for in a friend, what would they be? Understanding? A sense of humor? Intelligence? What if the word husband, wife, or lover was substituted for friend—would the characteristics on your list change? Might

The perception of beauty has subjective components that are culturally dependent.

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you add wealth, security, or attractiveness? If you ask people to create such a list—and psychologists have done so numerous times—most people have no trouble coming up with a wish list of characteristics for “friend” or “marriage partner of my dreams.” But how important do these well-thought-out and carefully chosen factors turn out to be? Do we really form friendships, or choose marriage partners, based on some relationship equation that sums desirable and undesirable attributes in a logical and rational way?

One of the most important lessons of this textbook, and certainly of this chap- ter, is that our behavior is strongly influenced by external forces in the environment. People act the way they do partly because of conscious, internally driven processes but also because the environment shapes and constrains the possible behaviors. In the case of interpersonal attraction, it turns out that the environment often plays a major role in determining both whom you choose to spend time with and whom you consider to be an appropriate mate. As you learned earlier in the chapter, even mere exposure to something can be sufficient to increase its likeability (Zajonc, 1968). People like things that are familiar, even when that familiarity has been created by simple repetition in the environment.

Proximity In a classic study conducted over 60 years ago, psychologist Leon Festinger and his colleagues (1950) analyzed the friendships that formed among students living in an apartment complex near the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Festinger and his colleagues found that they could predict the likelihood of a friendship forming by simply noting the proximity—defined in terms of the closeness of living quarters— between two people in the building. When the students were asked to list their three closest friends, two-thirds of the time they named students who lived in their same apartment complex. Moreover, when a fellow apartment dweller was listed as a friend, two-thirds of the time he or she lived on the same floor as the respondent. Clearly, the choice of friends is strongly influenced by where one lives. People tend to end up with friends who live nearby.

Of course, it isn’t proximity by itself that leads to liking and loving. When some- body lives close by, you see him or her a lot, and it may be the increased exposure that promotes the attraction (Rivera et al., 2010). We’ve already seen that increased expo- sure leads to an increase in rated likeability, but it also provides the opportunity for

Birds of a feather do tend to flock together— our lasting relationships are usually with people who are similar to us.

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interaction. When you consistently interact with someone, mutual feelings of con- nectedness and belonging tend to follow. In a nutshell, familiarity leads to attraction (Reis et al., 2011). You see each other as members of the same in-group—that is, as people who share features in common. In fact, you don’t even have to interact physi- cally with someone for increased liking to occur. Psychologists John Darley and Ellen Berscheid (1967) found that even the anticipation of an interaction with someone you don’t already know can cause you to rate that person as more attractive.

Similarity We also tend to like and form relationships with people who are simi- lar to us. Friends and intimate partners typically resemble each other in age, social status, education level, race, religious beliefs, political attitudes, intelligence, and even physical attractiveness. People who smoke are more likely than nonsmok- ers to initiate a romantic relationship with someone who smokes or who has greater perceived approval for smoking (Etcheverry & Agnew, 2009); we even pick dogs that, at least on some dimensions, seem to resemble us physically (Roy & Christenfeld, 2004). People may report preferring physically attractive mates, but most end up marrying someone who is approximately equal to them in degree of physical attractiveness (Feingold, 1988, 1990). So, if you believe in the idea that “opposites attract,” think again—in reality, it is the birds of a feather that tend con- sistently to flock together.

Although few psychologists question the finding that similarities attract, there are disagreements about how best to interpret this finding. The fact that similarities are found between the physical and attitudinal dimensions of friends and lov- ers doesn’t provide any insight into why these similarities exist. As we discussed in Chapter 2, correlations do not imply causality. One possibility is that we like others who share our beliefs and attitudes because they validate those beliefs, which fur- ther helps convince us that our beliefs are the right ones (Byrne, 1971; Laprelle et al., 1990). The finding that perceived similarity of attitudes is a better predictor of interper- sonal attraction than actual attitudes is consistent with this conclusion (Montoya et al., 2008). Another possibility is that we spend time with others like ourselves because we dislike people who hold different views (Rosenbaum, 1986). It’s not so much that we want to spend time with those who resemble us; it’s that we don’t want to spend time with those who do not.

A third possibility is that environmental factors are responsible. Partners in romantic relationships might be similarly attractive because attractiveness dic- tates to some extent who you can find as a mate. Physically unattractive people, for example, might be unable to attract mates who are more attractive; or it could be that society dictates that attractive people reject those who are less attractive. Socioeconomic class also tends to limit our options. If we are poor and live in a run-down section of town, our interactions are likely to be with people who are members of the same socioeconomic class. Generally, people who live in the same neighborhood, attend the same church, or go off to the same university already share many features in common, and it is from this pool that people typically find their companions.

Reciprocity There’s also a role in the dynamics of interpersonal attraction for reciprocity, or our tendency to return in kind the feelings that are shown toward us. If someone doesn’t like you and displays hostility at every turn, you usually have sim- ilarly negative feelings toward him or her. If someone likes you, or even if you simply think the person likes you, then you tend to like that person back (Curtis & Miller, 1986; Kelley, 1983). In a study by Curtis and Miller (1986), participants were asked to have a conversation with someone who they believed had been told either positive or negative information about them (actually, the conversation partner hadn’t been told anything). If the people believed they were talking to someone who perceived them in a positive light, they tended to be friendlier and more open in their conversation— they acted as if they liked their partner more.

reciprocity The tendency for people to return in kind the feelings that are shown toward them.

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Think about your own relationship experiences. Have you ever felt peer pressure to find a partner who meets a well-defined set of standards? How important were these factors in your decisions?

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Reciprocity helps lead to interpersonal attraction because it is self-fulfilling and because people who like you tend to be reinforcing and accepting of your actions. But it doesn’t always work. If you feel that the positive actions of another are moti- vated for some selfish reason—as part of a con job or to get something such as a pro- motion—then your reaction will typically be negative ( Jones, 1964). Ingratiation, in which a person consciously tries to win the affections of another for some ulterior motive, is likely to backfire as a strategy if it is discovered. We’re attracted to people who like us, but only if we believe and trust their intentions (Montoya & Insko, 2008).

The Psychology of Romantic Love When psychologists study interpersonal attraction, it’s likely to be seen as interesting and important research by most casual observers. But when psychologists turn to the study of “love,” the reactions are often far different. How, you ask, can someone understand, define, or attempt to measure such a thing as love? Love is a topic to be tackled by the poet or the artist, not the questionnaire-laden social psychologist. Perhaps. But as you’ll soon see, that hasn’t stopped psychologists from trying.

Defining Love Psychologists recognize that love is a complex emotion that can be expressed in a variety of forms. There is the love that exists between parent and child, between lovers, between spouses, even between friends. In each case, when it’s mea- sured through a questionnaire, the relationship is typically characterized by the giv- ing and receiving of support, a kind of mutual understanding, and intense personal satisfaction (Fehr & Russell, 1991; Sternberg & Grajek, 1984). Although there may be fundamental similarities in how love is experienced, the amount of love that is reported depends on the type of relationship studied. Women, for example, might report loving their lover more than a best friend but liking their best friend more; men, on the other hand, report liking and loving their lover more than they report these feelings for their friends (Sternberg, 1986).

When the relationship between two individuals is romantic, it is popular to dis- tinguish further between passionate love and companionate love. Passionate love is an intense emotional state characterized by a powerful longing to be with the other person (Hatfield, 1988). For many people, passionate love resembles a ride on a kind of emotional roller coaster—they experience intense joy if the feelings are shared, and intense pain and despair if their feelings are unrequited. Companionate love tends to be less emotional and intense, but its feelings of trust and warmth can be more enduring. Whereas passionate love leads to intense arousal, companionate love leads to self-disclosure—we are willing to reveal our innermost secrets because the rela- tionship sits on a bedrock of trust. It is, of course, possible for both passionate love and companionate love to be present in the same relationship, but this is not always the case.

The Triangular View of Love Psychologist Robert Sternberg (1986, 1999) has argued for what he calls a triangular view of love. He sees love as being composed of three major dimensions—intimacy, passion, and commitment—that vary in relation to one another (see ●Figure 13.6). Intimacy is the emotional component that brings close- ness, connectedness, and warmth to a relationship. Passion is the motivational com- ponent that underlies arousal, physical attraction, and sexual behavior. Commitment is the decision-making arm of love—how willing are the partners to stick with the relationship in times of trouble? All forms of love can be seen as some combination of these three components. For example, according to Sternberg (1986), romantic love is marked by a combination of intimacy and passion (but it may lack commitment), com- panionate love is high in intimacy and commitment (but without passion), and empty love occurs when there is commitment but little or no passion or intimacy.

passionate love An intense emotional state characterized by a powerful longing to be with a specific person; passionate love is marked by a combination of intimacy and passion, but commitment may be lacking.

companionate love A kind of emotional attachment characterized by feelings of trust and companionship; companionate love is marked by a combination of intimacy and commitment, but passion may be lacking.

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In addition to using his triangle as a vehicle for defining love, Sternberg has followed other researchers in attempting to determine how the components of love change over time (see Berscheid, 1985; Hatfield & Rapson, 1993). What patterns have been found? Do couples gain intimacy? Lose passion? Become increasingly willing to commit? It is impossible to predict for any particular rela- tionship, but the theory proposes some general trends. On average, the passion component of love builds early and rapidly in a relationship—it can even be expe- rienced almost immediately on meeting another—but it’s difficult to sustain for long periods (Hatfield et al., 2008). Commitment, on the other hand, is slow to develop but can be quite long lasting. Intimacy, too, is unlikely to be found early in a relationship (there is too much uncertainty), but it grows and maintains itself in most successful relationships. The components of love are fluid, changing over time in ways that reflect the successes and failures of the interactions between the partners (Berscheid, 2010).

Can we predict how long a specific love relationship will last? A number of stud- ies have been conducted on this topic with some surprising results. For instance, it turns out that for college students your roommate is a better judge, on average, of how long your romantic relationship will last than you and your romantic partner (MacDonald & Ross, 1999). It’s also the case that your original ratings of the quality of the relationship correlate more highly with the eventual outcome than your pre- dictions about how long the relationship will last. Often our “hopes” for what a rela- tionship will become are inaccurate; what matters is our ongoing assessment of the quality of the relationship (and, of course, you might consider paying some attention to what your roommate thinks because he or she tends to be more objective about the relationship).

Whether you’ll end up staying in a close relationship depends on many fac- tors, some having little or nothing to do with “love.” For example, people who are highly invested in a relationship—if they share property, friends, or kids—tend to stick it out (Rusbult, Agnew, & Arriaga, 2012). Alternatives matter as well: How easily can you survive on your own, and what are the chances that you’ll find another relationship partner? Strong personal or moral convictions can also lead to stabil- ity in a relationship. You may dislike your partner intensely but feel that it’s wrong to break up a relationship. Satisfaction, or happiness, with your partner is only one determinant of a relationship that lasts (Clark & Grote, 2003).

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● FiGuRE 13.6 the triangular view of Love Robert Sternberg proposed that there are many kinds of love, each defined by the degree of passion, intimacy, and commitment present in the relationship. (Based on Sternberg, 1986)

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

If you had to write a prescription for a successful marriage, how would you rate the dimensions of the triangle?

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test Yourself Check your knowledge about how we establish relationships with other people by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Babies, within hours of birth, show a preference for attractive over unattractive faces. True or False?

2. Blending studies of facial attractiveness indicate that faces that are unusual or distinct tend to receive higher ratings of attrac- tiveness than averaged faces. True or False?

3. Studies have found that if you’ve just been shown a picture of a strikingly attractive person, your ratings of an average-looking person go up. True or False?

4. Friends and intimate partners typically resemble each other in age, social status, education level, race, religious beliefs, political atti- tudes, intelligence, and even physical attractiveness. True or False?

5. According to the triangular theory of love, infatuated love repre- sents passion without intimacy or commitment. True or False?

6. Passionate love typically leads to more feelings of warmth and trust than does companionate love. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.3

Our actions, thoughts, and feelings come from the interac- tions we have with ever-changing environments. Among the most powerful components of these environments are social ones—our thoughts and actions are strongly influenced by the people around us. Social psychology is the discipline that studies how people think about, influence, and relate to oth- ers. In this chapter we tackled the topic areas of social psy- chology from the perspective of three major social problems.

Interpreting the Behavior of Others As we move through the social world, it’s extremely adaptive for us to try and make sense of the people around us. We form initial impressions of others by using the information we have available—such as the physical appearance of the person—and by relying on preexisting knowledge categories, called social schemas, which help us interpret that information. Schemas are use- ful because they can direct our actions in uncertain situa- tions. But schemas can also lead to stereotypes—beliefs about people belonging to groups—which, although useful in many ways, can produce prejudice and discrimination.

Attributions—how we infer the causes of another’s behavior—form another important part of the overall inter- pretation process. When attempting to explain the actions of others, we look for factors that covary with the behavior, and we assess the consistency of the behavior, its distinctiveness,

and whether there is consensus among people. Whether you look for causes in the external environment or within the per- son depends on how these three factors work together. Some basic attribution biases—such as the fundamental attribution error—also help shape our inferences.

Attitudes, which are positive or negative evaluations, are typically separated into three components: a cognitive com- ponent, an affective component, and a behavioral component. Attitude formation is influenced by a number of factors, but direct experience plays a major role. One popular theory of attitude change is the elaboration likelihood model, which proposes that there are central and peripheral routes to per- suasion. A number of studies indicate that when people are induced to act in ways that are inconsistent with their existing attitudes, their attitudes often change as a result.

Behaving in the Presence of Others Psychologists use the term social influence to describe how behavior is affected by other people in one’s environment. Sometimes social influence can produce positive effects, as in social facilitation, and some- times the presence of others hinders performance, as in social interference. The presence of others can also affect our will- ingness to deliver aid to people in need. The bystander effect reveals that we’re generally reluctant to come to someone’s aid when other people are present. One interpretation of this effect

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Social Processes Are For

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Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

appeals to diffusion of responsibility: We believe that others have already done something to help or will soon get involved.

Behavior is also strongly influenced by the social pres- sures of groups and of authority. Participation as a member of a well-defined group can make us conform, which means that our opinions and behaviors will tend to move toward the group norm. Conformity operates on the group level also. It is common for groups to polarize, which means that the group’s dominant point of view tends to become stronger and more extreme with the passage of time. If groupthink is present, members have become so interested in seeking a consensus of opinion that dissenting views are ignored or suppressed. Milgram’s famous experiment on obedience demonstrated that people can be induced by an authority figure to engage in behavior that they would not engage in otherwise. The degree of compliance depends on the characteristics of the situation and on the characteristics of the person giving the orders.

Establishing Relations With Others Often the most meaningful things in our lives are the social relations that we’ve established with others. How are relationships formed? We examined facial attractiveness and discovered that attrac- tiveness may be determined, in part, by innate biological factors. People tend to prefer average, or prototypical, faces— perhaps because they’re easier to identify or signal genetic health. Among the factors that influence liking and loving are familiarity, proximity, similarity, and reciprocity. We’re more likely to be attracted to someone we know, who lives nearby, who is similar to ourselves, and who likes us back. Psychologists have also attempted to understand love, which is typically defined in terms of multiple components—such as intimacy, passion, and commitment. Whether a person ends up in a relationship based on passionate love or compan- ionate love depends on how these components work together in the relationship.

Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition

● Our perceptions of others are guided by bottom-up processing—actual physical sensations—and (1) -down processing—our beliefs and (2) . For example, physical attractiveness significantly shapes our interpretations, and so do existing social schemas and (3) . In the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, social (4) lead us to expect certain kinds of behavior from members of certain groups, and these expectations can cause the expected behavior. Stereotypes also lead to (5) and discrimination. Prejudice can be reduced through repeated exposure to individual members of the stereotyped group or by adopting the perspective of group members.

● Attributions are the causes we assign to behaviors. According to the covariation model, we rely on consis- tency, (6) , and consensus to make the appropriate inference. When a behavior is high on all three dimen- sions, we tend to make (7) attributions—to credit an outside source; when a behavior is high in consistency but low in consensus and distinctiveness, we tend to make (8) attributions—to credit inherent personality traits. When we consider the behavior of others and over- estimate the role of (9) factors and underestimate outside influences, we are making the (10) . The general rule in which we tend to attribute our own behavior to external sources and the behavior of others to internal sources is known as the (11) - . An exception to this rule is a (12) bias, our ten- dency to take credit for actions that produce positive

outcomes and to blame other people when our actions are questionable or lead to failure.

● Attitudes have (13) , (14) , and (15) components. (The behavioral component is a predisposition to behave in a certain way; our attitudes don’t always directly affect our behavior.) Attitudes form primarily from (16) , through classical and (17) conditioning and (18) learning. According to the elaboration (19) model, our atti- tudes can be changed through a (20) route, when we listen carefully to a message and judge it on its mer- its, or through a (21) route, when superficial cues or mere exposure to a message affect us more. According to cognitive (22) theory, inconsistencies between behavior and (23) lead to internal (24) , or dissonance, that is relieved by changing one’s attitude. According to self-(25) theory, we may also use our own behavior as the basis for our attitudes about ourselves.

Behaving in the Presence of Others: Social Influence

● When we’re in the presence of others, social (26) may improve our (27) . Social (28) occurs when being around others (29) our performance.

● The sense of (30) causes us to act out of (31) concern for others. But the (32) effect makes us reluctant to step forward and help when other people are present. A diffusion of (33) comes from believing that someone else has already taken action or will soon get involved.

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● People have a tendency toward social (34) , putting out (35) effort when working with a (36) than when working alone. (37) occurs when we feel less accountable in the presence of others than when we’re on our own. When someone’s opinions, feelings, and behaviors reflect a group norm rather than individual pref- erence, (38) has occurred; this is especially likely if pressure to fit in arises from an in-group with which you share common features or identify with.

● When the (39) point of view within a group becomes stronger and more extreme with time, group (40) has occurred. (41) has occurred when group members become so interested in achieving a (42) of opinion that they (43) and even suppress dissenting views.

● When we respond to the orders of an authority figure or institution, we are showing (44) . In the Milgram experiment, (45) % of the research participants willingly followed orders to deliver electric shocks up to 450 volts to another person, despite the learner’s pleas. The study has been criticized on ethical grounds, as well as for its procedures. However, in the 30 years since the experiment, the general procedure has been repeated and has (46) Milgram’s findings, although the degree of compliance that people will show depends on many factors.

● In most Western cultures, including the United States, people are taught from a very young age to adopt an (47) view of the self; that is, they are rewarded for

viewing themselves as unique individuals. In many non- Western cultures, especially in Asia, people adopt a very different, (48) view of the self. They are taught to consider themselves as members of a group with common goals rather than as individuals striving to be different.

Establishing Relations With Others ● Physical attractiveness powerfully influences our behav- ior. An (49) perspective predicts that we will be attracted to people who look youthful, vigorous, and (50) , or who may be able to provide protection and sustenance, because these qualities increase the like- lihood of successful reproduction and child rearing. The universality of attractiveness may reflect the fact that we seem programmed to prefer faces that represent the average, or represent the category of (51) . The perception of beauty does, however, have a strong (52) component.

● Attraction to others depends on their proximity and (53) to us, and on (54) , the tendency to return feelings that are shown toward us.

● (55) love is an intense emotional state in which one individual is possessed by the powerful longing to be with another. (56) love tends to be less emotional and intense and is characterized by feelings of trust and warmth. According to the (57) theory, the experi- ence of love has three major aspects: (58) , (59) , and (60) , components that change with time.

Terms to Remember actor–observer effect, 412 altruism, 419 attitude, 413 attributions, 409 bystander effect, 420 cognitive dissonance, 415 companionate love, 436 conformity, 422 deindividuation, 422 diffusion of responsibility, 420 discrimination, 407 elaboration likelihood model, 414

external attribution, 410 fundamental attribution error, 410 group polarization, 424 groupthink, 425 in-group, 424 internal attribution, 410 obedience, 426 ostracism, 424 passionate love, 436 prejudice, 407 reciprocity, 435 self-fulfilling prophecy effect, 406

self-perception theory, 416 self-serving bias, 412 social cognition, 404 social facilitation, 418 social influence, 418 social interference, 419 social loafing, 421 social psychology, 403 social schema, 405 source characteristics, 414 stereotypes, 406

Media Resources | 441

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Media Resources

442

14 Psychological Disorders

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Psychological Disorders?

Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior?

Learning Goals Characteristics of Abnormal Behavior The Concept of Insanity The Medical Model: Conceptualizing

Abnormality as a Disease Problems Associated With Labeling Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.1

Classifying Psychological Disorders Learning Goals Anxiety Disorders: Fear and Apprehension Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder

Cognitive Factors: Is It Maladaptive Thoughts and Beliefs?

Environmental Factors: Is It Learned Through Experience?

Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.3

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Psychological Disorders Are

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Somatic Symptom Disorders: Body and Mind

Dissociative Disorders: Disruptions of Identity or Awareness

Depressive and Bipolar Disorders

PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Suicide Prevention

Schizophrenia: Faulty Thought Processes Personality Disorders Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.2

Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental?

Learning Goals Biological Factors: Is It in the Brain or Genes?

443

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Are Psychological Disorders?

“You shouldn’t really be reading this book, you k now. In fact, put it down—now. The author’s intentions are not pure…he doesn’t have your best interest in mind. He wants to convince you that you have no true control over your life. To him, you’re nothing more than a machine shaped by the whims of changing environments; you’re the product of forces outside of your control— biological drives, toilet-training habits, unbalanced mixtures of neurotransmitters in your brain.

“But you and I are more than that—we’re more than the product of brain bio- chemistry or dirty little habits. We have inner control over our lives. You and I are in touch with the essence of the inner one, although perhaps it is only I who recog- nizes this fact at the moment. I’ve stopped you because it’s time to prepare ourselves now…the first of the tribe arrived weeks ago…he’s here, inside my head, and he’s tell- ing me the real truth. There’s nothing to fear…we’re still in control…it will be our choice, not theirs, to submit. And when we do, the truth about the conspiracy will be revealed to all.…”

Imagine being on the receiving end of such a conversation. What would be your reaction? At best, I suspect you’d categorize this person as odd; more likely, you’d label him as disturbed. His thinking is certainly distorted, and he is more than a bit paranoid. But does he suffer from a true psychological disorder needing treatment, or is he simply eccentric? How can we tell? What are the criteria used to define and describe psychological disorders and abnormal behavior? Is distorted thinking merely a personal choice, a way to be different or unique, or is it some- thing more like strep throat or a bladder infection—something that we should try to treat and cure?

In this chapter we will consider the classif ication and treatment of psycho- logical disorders. Obviously, before treating a psychological problem, you must determine whether there is indeed a problem that requires treatment. Mak ing this determination is more diff icult than you might think. Let’s imagine you arrive home tonight and f ind your roommate awake but slumped in a corner with his cap pulled down over his eyes. You ask him to explain, but he tells you to mind your own business. Later that night, you hear sobbing and crying coming from behind his locked bedroom door. His bizarre behavior continues for the next two days. He refuses to respond to questions, he stops going to class, and he

444 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

refuses to eat or clean himself. He’s suffering from a psychological disorder, right? Perhaps. But suppose you learn that his father and mother were just k illed in an automobile accident. What would your reaction be now? Would you conclude that he’s psychologically disturbed or that he’s simply show- ing an intense but normal grief reaction? To help you understand how psy- chologists view psychological disorders, our discussion will revolve around the following three-part question: How do we conceptualize, classify, and understand abnormal behavior? Once you see how psychologists think about abnormality, the stage will be set for treatment, which is covered in depth in Chapter 15.

Conceptualizing Abnormality A person who suffers from one or more psy- chological problems is typically classified as abnormal. Indeed, the terms abnormal and abnormal behavior are often used as roughly equivalent to the term psychological disorder. But over the years, psychologists have struggled with how best to define abnormality. When people behave abnormally, their actions tend to be unusual or dysfunctional, and they often appear to be suffering from considerable personal distress. But for reasons we’ll discuss in the first section of the chapter, none of these criteria alone is sufficient to capture the concept. Most conceptualizations of abnormality rely on multiple criteria.

Classifying Psychological Disorders Even if we reach agreement about the proper way to define abnormality, we still need a means for naming and classifying the underlying disorders that lead to abnormal behavior. Psychologists and psychi- atrists have worked hard to develop a system for the diagnosis and classifica- tion of psychological disorders. There are many kinds of known psychological disorders—ranging from anxiety disorders to depression to schizophrenia— and each is classified by a well-defined set of criteria. Although it’s a common belief among the general public that psychological disorders are idiosyncratic— which means they arise in different ways for different individuals—you’ll see that most disorders actually produce characteristics that are consistent and reliable.

Understanding Psychological Disorders In the final section of the chapter, we’ll discuss how researchers attempt to understand the causes of psychological disorders. What causes an anxiety disorder, depression, or schizophrenia? Do psychological disorders result from some kind of mental breakdown, or are they simply adaptive reactions to stress? If it’s a breakdown, is the cause of the break- down biological or environmental? We’ll consider the major theoretical tools used by mental health professionals to explain abnormal behavior. Not surpris- ingly, the answer to many psychological problems lies partly in biology and partly in the environment.

Conceptualizing abnormality

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Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior? | 445

Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior? LEARNING GOALS

● Evaluate the criteria that have been used to define abnormality. ● Discuss the legal definition of insanity. ● Explain how the medical model classifies and categorizes abnormality. ● Discuss the effects of diagnostic labeling.

When you encounter someone who babbles on about how voices in his or her head are busy plotting a conspiracy, it’s not difficult to categorize this behavior as abnor- mal; clearly, this person is in trouble and in need of some professional help. But sharp dividing lines don’t always exist between normal and abnormal behavior. Sometimes behavior that appears abnormal can turn out to be a reasonable reaction to a stressful event, such as the roommate’s reaction to the death of his parents. It’s also the case that a behavior that seems abnormal in one culture can appear to be perfectly nor- mal in another (Marsella & Yamada, 2000). Entering a trance state and experiencing visual hallucinations is considered abnormal in Western cultures, but in other cul- tures it may not be (Bentall, 1990).

Even within a culture, conceptions of abnormality can change over time. For many years homosexuality was considered abnormal by the psychological community—in fact, it was considered a psychological disorder. But this view of homosexuality is rejected by psychologists today. Fifty years ago, a strong depen- dence on tobacco wouldn’t have raised an eyebrow, but today if you’re hooked on tobacco, you could easily be classified as having a substance-related disorder. Given these changing conceptions, psychologists are justifiably cautious when applying the label of abnormality. Behavior usually must meet a set of criteria before it’s considered abnormal (Frances & Widiger, 2012).

Characteristics of Abnormal Behavior Over the years, researchers have proposed a number of defining criteria for abnor- mality. In each case, as you’ll see, the proposed criteria capture some but not all of the important features of what is agreed to be abnormal behavior.

Statistical Deviance One way to define abnormal behavior is in terms of statistical deviance, or infrequency. Any given behavior, such as arguing with your neighbors or hearing voices, occurs with a certain probability in society at large. Most people have argued with their neighbors at one time or another, but few actually converse with disembodied voices. According to the concept of statistical deviance, a behavior is abnormal if it occurs infrequently among the members of a population. As you’ve learned elsewhere in this text, it’s not unusual for psychologists to classify behavior on the basis of statistical frequency. For example, the term used to define superior intellectual ability—gifted—was defined with respect to statistical frequency as was the concept of an intellectual disability, the term used to define inferior intellectual ability. So it should come as no surprise that statistical frequencies have been used to define abnormality.

But statistical deviance—that is, something that is extreme or different from the average—can’t be used as the sole criterion for labeling a behavior as abnormal. It’s easy to come up with a list of behaviors that are statistically infrequent but are not abnormal in a psychological sense. For example, LeBron James has skills on the basket- ball court that are extreme, and thereby statistically deviant, but to be a great athlete does not make one abnormal. Similarly, only a handful of individuals have reached the

statistical deviance A criterion of abnormality stating that a behavior is abnormal if it occurs infrequently among the members of a population.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Suppose a 70-year-old entered college and started acting exactly the same way as a 20-year-old sophomore. Would you consider his or her behavior to be abnormal?

446 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

intellectual heights of Albert Einstein or Isaac Newton, but superior intelligence is not abnormal in the usual psychological sense of the word. Another problem is the cut-off point: Just how infrequent or unusual must a behavior be to be characterized as abnor- mal? So far, psychologists have failed to produce a satisfactory answer to this question.

Cultural Deviance Another criterion is cultural deviance, which compares a behavior to existing cultural norms. In this case, a behavior would be considered abnormal if it violates the accepted standards of society. For example, it’s not considered normal or acceptable to walk to class in the nude. Such a behavior breaks the established rules of our culture, and if you do it, it’s likely that people will think you have a serious problem.

But once again, cultural deviance by itself fails as a sufficient criterion. Many crim- inals violate the established norms of society—stealing cars or embezzling money, for example. Such behavior might be abnormal by both statistical and cultural standards, but that doesn’t mean all criminals suffer from psychological disorders. There are also many people who suffer from legitimate psychological problems, such as anxiety or depression, who never violate a law or established standard of society. Finally, as we just discussed, behaviors that are abnormal in one culture may be considered normal in another. There are cultures in the world, for instance, where nakedness in public breaks no established cultural rules. People who suffer from psychological disorders may indeed violate cultural norms in some instances, but often they do not.

Emotional Distress A third characteristic of many kinds of abnormal behavior is the presence of personal or emotional distress. People who suffer from psycholog- ical disorders often experience great despair and unhappiness. They feel hopeless, lost, and alienated from others. In fact, it’s the emotional distress that usually leads them to seek professional help for their problems. But not all disorders make peo- ple unhappy; there are lots of people who have little contact with reality but seem perfectly content in their fantasy world. Likewise, there are many distressed people in the world—for example, those who have recently lost a loved one or a job—who would not be classified as abnormal by the psychological community.

Dysfunction A final criterion for abnormality focuses on dysfunction: Has there been a breakdown in normal functioning that prevents the person from successfully

cultural deviance A criterion of abnormality stating that a behavior is abnormal if it violates the rules or accepted standards of society.

emotional distress A criterion of abnormality stating that abnormal behaviors are those that lead to personal distress or emotional upset.

dysfunction A breakdown in normal functioning; abnormal behaviors are those that prevent one from pursuing adaptive strategies.

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Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior? | 447

following adaptive strategies? People who suffer from psycho- logical disorders are often unable to function well in typical daily activities—they may not eat properly, clean themselves, or be able to hold a job. Their ability to think clearly may be impaired, which affects their ability to adapt successfully in their environment. As you’ll see later, the assessment of global functioning—defined as the ability to adapt in social, personal, and occupational environments— often plays a large role in the diagnosis and treatment of psychologi- cal disorders.

Summarizing the Criteria You’ve seen that abnormal behavior can be statistically or culturally deviant, it can involve personal or emo- tional distress, and it can signal impairment or dysfunction. Normal behavior, then, could be any behavior that’s relatively common, does not cause personal distress, or generally leads to adaptive conse- quences. However, none of the criteria that we’ve discussed is suf- ficient to diagnose a person with a psychological disorder. Crying hysterically for hours at a time may be a normal grief reaction, or it may signal a seri- ous disorder. Even a behavior that seems to be clearly abnormal—such as a paranoid delusion that people are out to get you—might be adaptive in some environments. To paraphrase comedian Woody Allen, paranoids can have enemies too.

You should also recognize that “abnormal” and “normal” are not rigid categories. Each of us can relate in one way or another to the criteria of abnormality we’ve just discussed. We all know people who have occasionally acted unusually, suffered from emotional distress, or failed to function well in everyday settings. Many psychological disorders are characterized by behaviors or feelings that are merely exaggerations of normal ones, such as anxiety, feelings of sadness, or concerns about one’s health. Consequently, it’s better to think about normal and abnormal behavior as endpoints on a continuum rather than as nonoverlapping categories (see ●Figure 14.1).

The Concept of Insanity Behavior can mean different things depending on the context in which it occurs— something that’s abnormal in one situation may be quite normal in another. Yet regardless of where you travel in the world, some behaviors will always be recognized as abnormal: Consider the serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer, who admitted butchering, can- nibalizing, and having sex with the dead bodies of more than a dozen young men and boys. Everyone, including the mental health professionals who examined Dahmer, was in agreement—this was a man suffering from some serious psychological problems.

Normal

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Low Emotional distress High

● FiGuRE 14.1 the Normal-to-Abnormal Continuum “Abnormal” and “normal” are not fixed categories but endpoints on a continuum. To a certain degree, everyone has acted unusually, suffered from emotional distress, or failed to follow an adaptive strategy. (© Cengage Learning)

● CONCEPt REviEw Criteria for Defining Abnormality CRITERION DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE

Statistical deviance Behavior that occurs infrequently among the members of a population

Jon goes back to make sure his front door is locked exactly 12 times each morning. As he walks to the door, he mutters over and over, “lock the door…” No one else in the neighborhood does this.

Cultural deviance Behavior that violates the accepted standards of society

Jon notices that each time he comes back to his front door, talking to himself, his neighbors look at him rather nervously, and they tend to avoid him at other times.

Emotional distress Great despair and unhappiness Jon is very distressed by his compulsive behavior.

Dysfunction A breakdown in normal functioning Jon’s routine of checking his front door 12 times every morning has made him late for work a number of times, and his job is in jeopardy.

448 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

But from a legal standpoint Jeffrey Dahmer was judged by a jury to be perfectly sane. Despite the best efforts of his legal team to have him declared mentally unfit, and thus not responsible for his crimes, Dahmer was found legally sane. He stood trial and was convicted of his crimes (later, while serving his life sentence, he was brutally murdered by a fellow inmate). Sounds perplexing, but insanity is a legal con- cept rather than a psychological one.

Its definition varies somewhat from state to state, but insanity is usually defined in terms of the defendant’s thought processes at the time of the crime: A crim- inal is insane, and therefore not guilty by reason of insanity, if, because of a “mental disease,” he or she fails to appreciate or understand that certain actions are wrong in a legal or moral sense (Ogloff et al., 1993). Jeffrey Dahmer was judged capable of understanding the wrongfulness of his actions; as a result, he failed the insanity test, even though he was clearly suffering from serious psychological problems.

Most mental health professionals accept that people with serious psychological dis- orders are sometimes incapable of judging the appropriateness of their actions. As you’ll soon see, psychological disorders can lead to distorted views of the world—affected individuals not only act in ways that are abnormal, but their very thoughts, beliefs, and perceptions of the world can be wildly distorted as well. But exercise caution: It’s impor- tant not to confuse the concept of insanity with the concept of a psychological disorder.

The Medical Model: Conceptualizing Abnormality as a Disease To understand how disorders are classified by the psychological community, we need to discuss the medical model of diagnosis. According to the medical model, abnormal behavior is caused by an underlying disease—a kind of mental illness—that can be cured with the appropriate therapy. This conception of abnormality has been quite influential. As you already know, there are good reasons to believe that behavior is strongly influenced by biological factors, such as the actions of neurotransmitters in the brain. In addition, biomedical therapies, such as the administration of psychoac- tive drugs, are often effective in treating psychological problems. It’s also the case that most psychological disorders can be classified in terms of symptoms. Depression, for example, typically leads to one or more of the following: sad mood, diminished interest in pleasure, difficulty in sleeping, feelings of worthlessness, and so on. The medical influence is deeply ingrained in the very language used by psychologists— they speak of mental health, mental illness, or psychopathology in much the same way a physician describes a medical condition.

But is the medical model an appropriate way to view abnormality? Some researchers believe it’s wrong to draw direct comparisons between physical illness and psychological problems (Szasz, 1961, 2000). Both strep throat and depression lead to a set of reliable symptoms. But we know that strep throat is caused by a physi- cal problem—bacteria; at this point, the cause of depression is still being debated. In addition, people often seek treatment for psychological problems that are perhaps more accurately described as problems in living. How these adjustment problems are interpreted also seems to depend on the particular social or cultural context, which is not the case for most medical conditions. Some kinds of bizarre behavior thought to be abnormal in one culture can be considered normal in another, but strep throat produces fever and pain regardless of the cultural environment.

Problems Associated With Labeling Critics of the medical model also express concern about diagnostic labeling effects. Labeling a psychological problem as an illness or a disorder tends to attach a stigma that can be difficult to overcome (Link & Phelan, 1999). A number of studies have

insanity A legal term usually defined as the inability to understand that certain actions are wrong, in a legal or moral sense, at the time of a crime.

medical model The view that abnormal behavior is symptomatic of an underlying “disease,” which can be “cured” with the appropriate therapy.

diagnostic labeling effects The fact that labels for psychological problems can become self- fulfilling prophecies; the label may make it difficult to recognize normal behavior when it occurs, and it may actually increase the likelihood that a person will act in an abnormal way.

Everyone agrees that Andrea Yates, who drowned her five young children, suffers from severe psychological problems, yet a jury failed to accept that she was legally insane.

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How might acceptance of the medical model influence the availability of treatment options? Might it cause an overemphasis on biological treatments for psychological problems?

Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior? | 449

found that applying the label “mental patient” leads one to interpret an individual’s behavior in a far different light than you would otherwise. In one study, professional therapists watched a videotape of a man describing his personal adjustment prob- lems (Langer & Abelson, 1974). If, prior to viewing the tape, the therapists were told that the man was a mental patient, they rated his adjustment problems more neg- atively than did other therapists who were simply told he was a job applicant (see ●Figure 14.2). People’s expectations, as I’ve stressed in previous chapters, importantly influence how they interpret new information.

The Rosenhan Study In one particularly influential study of labeling effects, David Rosenhan, along with seven other coinvestigators, arrived separately at several psy- chiatric hospitals in the early 1970s with the complaint that they were hearing voices (Rosenhan, 1973). Actually, each of the participants was perfectly normal. They sim- ply adopted the role of a pseudopatient—they feigned, or faked, a disorder to see how labeling would affect their subsequent treatment. On arrival they reported to the psy- chiatric staff that they were hearing a disembodied voice in their head, a voice that repeated things like “empty,” “hollow,” and “thud.” They were all admitted to hospi- tals, and virtually all received the diagnosis of schizophrenia (schizophrenia, as you’ll see later, is a condition characterized by serious disturbances in thought and emotion).

Again, the purpose of the study was to see how an initial diagnosis of schizo- phrenia would affect subsequent treatment. From the point of admission, none of the participants continued to act strangely. In all interactions with the hospital staff, they acted normally and gave no indications that they were suffering from a disorder. However, despite their normal behavior, none of the staff ever recognized them as pseudopatients; indeed, written hospital reports later revealed that the staff members tended to interpret normal behaviors as symptomatic of a disorder. It was the real patients, in fact, who felt the researchers somehow did not belong; several actually voiced their suspicions, claiming, “You’re not crazy. You’re a journalist or a profes- sor” (these comments were partly made in reaction to the fact that the pseudopatients spent time taking notes). Once the pseudopatients had been admitted and labeled as “abnormal,” their behaviors were seen by the staff through the lens of expectation, and normal, sane behavior was never recognized as such. On average, the pseudopa- tients remained in the hospital for 19 days—the stays ranged from under a week to almost two months—and on release all were given the diagnosis of schizophrenia “in remission” (which means not currently active).

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Most mental health professionals are careful not to apply rigid labels to clients because diagnostic labels can become self-fulfilling prophecies.

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450 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

The Rosenhan study is important because it suggests that diagnostic labels can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Once you’re diagnosed, you’re likely to be treated as if you’re suffering from a disorder, and this treatment (1) may make it difficult to rec- ognize normal behavior when it occurs, and (2) may actually increase the likelihood that you’ll act in an abnormal way. If the people in your environment expect you to act abnormally, you may very well start to act in a way that’s consistent with those expec- tations (see Chapter 13).

Since its publication in 1973, the Rosenhan study has been widely analyzed in psy- chological circles. Its lessons about the hazards of labeling are clear. But at the same time, two points about the study are worth noting. First, you should appreciate that the admission of the pseudopatients by the hospital staff, as well as the subsequent diagnoses, were reasonable given the patients’ reported symptoms. The diagnosis of a psychological disorder is often dependent on what the patient reports, and the trained professionals in this case had no reason to assume that the patients were lying or manufacturing symptoms. Second, it’s possible and even reasonable to dispute the claim that the attending staff failed to recognize that the pseudopatients were acting normally. After all, they were released with the label “in remission,” so the staff must have recognized that they were no longer acting in an abnormal way (Spitzer, 1975).

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think it was ethical for Rosenhan and his colleagues to trick the hospital staff? Did the research ends justify the means?

Classifying Psychological Disorders LEARNING GOALS

● Describe the DSM. ● Describe the common anxiety disorders. ● Describe obsessive-compulsive disorder ● Describe somatic symptom disorders. ● Describe dissociative disorders. ● Describe depressive and bipolar disorders. ● Describe the characteristics of schizophrenia. ● Describe the common personality disorders.

test Yourself Check your knowledge of how abnormality is conceptualized by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. When a behavior occurs infrequently among members of a popu- lation, it meets the criterion of cultural deviance. True or False?

2. To receive the diagnosis of a psychological disorder, a person must be suffering from a certain amount of emotional distress. True or False?

3. In many cases, abnormal behaviors are simply exaggerated versions of normal behaviors. True or False?

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.1

4. According to the medical model, psychological disorders can and should be classified in terms of symptoms. True or False?

5. In the Rosenhan study, hospital staff members quickly picked up on the fact that the pseudopatients were no longer acting abnormally. True or False?

Classifying Psychological Disorders | 451

Now, finally, we turn to the actual classification process. As mentioned in the previ- ous section, specific psychological disorders are often diagnosed in terms of defining criteria or symptoms. This is the approach used by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association (2000). From this point forward, I’ll refer to this manual by its more commonly used acro- nym: the DSM. The purpose of the DSM is to provide clinicians with a well-defined classification system, based on objective and measurable criteria, so that reliable diagnoses of psychological disorders can be produced worldwide; it is also designed to coordinate with the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), which covers medical as well as psychological problems. The DSM is intended only for the purposes of diagnosis and classification; it does not suggest therapies or methods of treatment.

How does the classification system work? The DSM contains descriptions, symptoms, and other criteria for diagnosing mental disorders. Each of its chapters is dedicated to a broad diagnostic category (such as depressive disorders or anxiety disorders). However, people are rarely pigeonholed into a single diagnostic category by clinicians because more than one psychological disorder can occur in the same individual. The clinician’s goal is to describe the full range of symptoms, the sever- ity of those symptoms, as well other pertinent information. It is important to know a person’s medical history, for example, because some medical conditions (such as Alzheimer disease) can contribute to abnormal behavior. Environmental or psycho- social problems need to be considered as well. Is the client going through a difficult divorce, or has he or she recently been fired? Finally, it matters to the clinician how someone is functioning in daily life. If the person is so severely impaired that he or she cannot hold a job, go to school, or even keep clean, it may be necessary to initiate a period of hospitalization. ●Figure 14.3 summarizes some of the disorders we’ll be discussing in the following sections and presents data on how likely each disorder is to occur in the population at large.

DSM The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which is used for the diagnosis and classification of psychological disorders.

● FiGuRE 14.3 Prevalence Rates for various Psychological Disorders Each bar shows the percentage of individuals in a sample of more than 8,000 participants who reported suffering from the listed psychological disorder during the previous 12 months or earlier. Note: A given indvidual might have reported suffering from more than one of these disorders concurrently. (Data from Kessler et al., 1994)

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452 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

Anxiety Disorders: Fear and Apprehension We begin with anxiety disorders. Although it may be difficult to understand the par- anoid delusions of the severely disordered, it’s not difficult to understand the appre- hension, worry, and fear that characterize anxiety. Most people understand anxiety because it’s often an important part of our everyday experience. We become anxious when we meet someone new, when awaiting the beginning of an exam, or when a car swerves dangerously close to our path. Moreover, even though the physical and psychological changes that accompany anxiety can seem unpleasant, anxiety is basi- cally an adaptive human response. The physical changes prepare the body to take action—to fight or flee—and thereby increase the chances of survival. The psycho- logical changes cause us to become attentive—we monitor our environment more closely so we’re more apt to notice a potentially dangerous event when it occurs.

But there is a dark side to anxiety. When anxiety becomes too persistent and intense, it interferes with the ability to function. Anxiety disorders are diagnosed when the levels of apprehension and worry become so extreme that overall behav- ior is impaired in some way. For example, if you consistently fail exams because you can’t collect your thoughts, or if you refuse to leave the house because you’re con- vinced you’ll experience a frightening panic attack, you’re likely to be suffering from an anxiety disorder. There are several kinds of anxiety disorders, and each is defined by its own set of diagnostic criteria. We’ll concentrate on some common ones in this section: generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, phobias, and social anxiety disorder.

Generalized Anxiety Disorder The defining characteristic of generalized anxiety disorder is excessive and chronic worrying that lasts for a significant period of time (e.g., several months). The anxiety is “free-floating,” as Freud described it, and can’t be attributed to any single identifiable source. People who suffer from this problem worry in general (which is captured in the name generalized anxiety disorder), and they fret constantly about any number of minor things (Brown et al., 2001). More important, the worrying is unrealistic—there’s usually little, if any, chance that the feared event will actually occur.

People afflicted with generalized anxiety disorder are chronically tense. Not surprisingly, they often report a range of physical symptoms, especially muscle ten- sion and fatigue, and they’re likely to have trouble sleeping and become easily irri- tated as well. They’re also likely to spend a lot of time worrying about the future and avoiding events with possible negative outcomes (Andrews et al., 2010). Such symptoms are easy to understand—after all, these people are living in a world of per- petual worry; the worst, they assume, is always about to happen.

Panic Disorder Generalized anxiety is marked by chronic, unfocused worrying. In panic disorder, people suffer from recurrent episodes, or attacks, of extremely intense fear or dread. A panic attack is a sudden and alarming event, and it can make you feel as if you’re about to die (or, sometimes, go crazy). Panic attacks are brief, but they produce high levels of anxiety and, as a result, are accompanied by a collection of physical symptoms: a pounding heart, shortness of breath, sweating, nausea, chest pains, and so on. These symptoms can be devastating experiences, and they often lead to persistent concern about the possibility of having additional attacks (Barlow, 2002). It’s worth noting that a single isolated panic attack is not sufficient for diagnosis of a panic disorder; the attacks need to occur repeatedly.

Panic disorder is sometimes associated with an additional complication, called agoraphobia, that comes from the worry that further panic attacks might occur. Agoraphobia—which translates from the Greek as “fear of the marketplace”—causes people to restrict their normal activities in an extreme way (Sanchez-Meca et al., 2010). People with agoraphobia typically avoid crowded or public places, such as shop- ping malls or restaurants, because they’re afraid they’ll experience a panic attack and

anxiety disorders A class of disorders marked by excessive apprehension and worry that in turn impairs normal functioning.

generalized anxiety disorder Excessive worrying, or free-floating anxiety, that lasts and cannot be attributed to any single identifiable source.

panic disorder A condition marked by recurrent discrete episodes or attacks of extremely intense fear or dread.

agoraphobia An anxiety disorder that causes an individual to restrict his or her normal activities; someone suffering from agoraphobia tends to avoid public places out of fear that a panic attack will occur.

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Classifying Psychological Disorders | 453

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● FiGuRE 14.4 Prevalence Rates for various Phobias Each bar shows the percentage of people in a large sample who reported suffering from a particular kind of phobia. (Data from Agras, Sylvester, & Oliveau, 1969)

be unable to cope effectively with the situation (especially the accompanying physi- cal symptoms). In severe cases, people with agoraphobia might simply refuse to leave their house; home, they reason, is the only really safe place in the world. For obvious reasons, both panic disorder and agoraphobia can significantly reduce one’s ability to function successfully.

Phobic Disorder The defining feature of phobic disorder (or specific phobia) is a highly focused fear of a specific object or situation—such as a bug, a snake, flying, heights, an animal, a closed place, or a storm. Like the other anxiety disorders we’ve discussed, phobias are irrational, which means that the level of anxiety the object or situation produces is in no way justified by reality. Elevators do fall, snakes can bite, planes do crash—but these events are rare and do not justify daily worry. Many peo- ple show mild forms of phobic reactions—and, again, in some cases the object of the anxiety might indeed be dangerous (some snakes do kill)—but in specific phobic disorder the fear and distress can be severely disabling. To avoid the anxiety-producing object or situation, people with specific phobias might significantly disrupt their normal routines; they may avoid work or school or travel in the slight chance that they will encounter the object of their fear.

Specific phobias typically revolve around one of four classes of fear-inducing objects or situations: (1) animals (insects, snakes, dogs, and the like), (2) natural environments (storms, heights, water, and the like), (3) blood-injection-injury (the sight of blood or even the thought of an injection), and (4) specific situations (fears associated with public transportation or closed-in places). There are other phobias as well—such as fear of choking or fear of costumed characters—that don’t fit easily into these established categories. Most people who suffer from phobias tend to have more than one, and often more than one type (Stinson et al., 2007). For a look at how likely the various phobias are to occur among the general population see ●Figure 14.4.

Social Anxiety Disorder Also known as social phobia, social anxiety disorder occurs when people become extremely anxious and self-conscious in everyday social situations. People with this disorder often have an excessive fear of being watched

phobic disorder (or specific phobia) A highly focused fear of a specific object or situation.

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social anxiety disorder Intense fear of being watched, judged, and embarrassed in social situations.

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454 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

and judged by others and of performing actions that might embarrass them. Like the other anxiety disorders, social anxiety disorder is often accompanied by physical symptoms (blushing, sweating, trembling, nausea), which only magnify the level of worry. The disorder might manifest itself only in very specific situations, such talk- ing to other people, or it can occur broadly across a variety of social situations. Social anxiety disorder is recognized currently as one of the most common psychological disorders (Swinson, 2005).

Gender and Culture In general, women are more likely to suffer from anxiety dis- orders than men, although this trend differs somewhat across cultures (Barlow & Durand, 2012). About two-thirds of those with generalized anxiety disorder are women, three-fourths with agoraphobia, and the ratio of women to men for specific phobias could be as high as 4 to 1. Why is there a sex difference? Researchers are not certain, although most current accounts focus on cultural explanations (Arrindell et al., 2003). Men are typically raised to “tough things out,” which means they’re less likely to report the symptoms of anxiety or seek treatment. Men are also more likely to “treat” the symptoms of anxiety by turning to alcohol or drugs (with sometimes devastating consequences). Other factors could be involved as well, such as physiolog- ical reactivity or genetic vulnerabilities (see McLean & Anderson, 2009).

Anxiety disorders occur in all cultures of the world, but the focus of the anxiety can differ, as well as the chances that the disorder will be reported. For example, for unknown reasons, Hispanics and Asians in the United States have a somewhat lower risk of developing a specific phobia than White Americans (Stinson et al., 2007). In developing countries, people are more likely to focus on the physical symptoms of anxiety and tend not to report the subjective feelings associated with panic, dread, or worry. Culture undoubtedly plays a significant role in the onset of these disorders as well, but we’ll delay our discussion of this possibility until later in the chapter.

Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder Obsessive–compulsive disorder is characterized by persistent, uncontrollable thoughts and urges, called obsessions, or by the presence of a compelling need to per- form one or more actions repeatedly, which is called a compulsion. Have you ever had part of a song or jingle ramble endlessly through your head—one that keeps repeat- ing despite your best efforts to stop it? This is somewhat like an obsession, although in obsessive–compulsive disorder the obsessions tend to focus on fears (such as being contaminated by germs), doubts (such as forgetting to turn off the stove), and impulses (such as hurting oneself or another).

obsessive–compulsive disorder An disorder that manifests itself through persistent and uncontrollable thoughts, called obsessions, or by the compelling need to perform repetitive acts, called compulsions.

● CONCEPt REviEw Anxiety Disorders DISORDER DESCRIPTION

Generalized anxiety disorder Excessive and chronic worrying that lasts for a significant period. Accompanied by excessive autonomic activity (e.g., increased respiration, heart rate).

Panic disorder Recurrent episodes or “attacks” of extremely intense fear or dread. Sometimes accompanied by agoraphobia, the fear of being in public due to anticipation of another panic attack.

Specific phobia A highly focused fear of a specific object or situation. Most focus on animals, natural environments, blood–injection–injury, or specific situations.

Social anxiety disorder Marked fear or anxiety about one or more social situations. The individual fears that he will act in a way or show anxiety that will lead to a negative evaluation in a social setting.

Classifying Psychological Disorders | 455

Compulsions consist of cleaning or checking or other actions that prevent unwanted thoughts or urges from occurring. For example, you might repeat the alphabet aloud over and over in an effort to divert your thinking away from a fright- ening or inappropriate aggressive or sexual impulse. Generally, compulsive behaviors are designed to reduce the anxiety or distress caused by obsessions. In extreme cases, the compulsions are so repetitive and ritualistic that they essentially prevent the suf- ferer from leading anything resembling a normal life. Some people become house- bound, relentlessly cleaning rooms; others feel irresistibly compelled to leave work 10 to 15 times a day to check and make sure the stove wasn’t left on. Interestingly, in the majority of such cases the suffering individuals understand that their actions are irrational and of little adaptive value. The disorder simply compels the action.

Not surprisingly, obsessive-compulsive disorder is usually associated with anxiety. In fact, the disorder is sometimes classified as an anxiety disorder. However, not all obsessions or compulsions generate marked anxiety or distress. For this reason, some mental health professionals believe it should be classified as its own diagnostic category.

Somatic Symptom Disorders: Body and Mind A common phenomenon, called the medical student syndrome, often plagues medical students as they first learn about the various diseases of the body. The students find that the symptoms described in class, or in the text, are increasingly familiar and per- sonal. A deep pain that appears suddenly in the night is interpreted as a signal for the final stages of pancreatic cancer; that darkening blemish on the forehead becomes the rare form of skin cancer that often accompanies AIDS. In almost every case the stu- dent is perfectly healthy, but the mind plays its tricks, and the student fears the worst.

Mental health professionals classify psychological problems that focus on the physical body as somatic symptom disorders (Rief et al., 2011). These disorders are also known generally as somatoform disorders (soma means “body”). Obviously, like medical students, most people have experienced imagined illnesses at some point in their lives. You’re probably familiar with the everyday term “hypochondriac” (or hypochondriasis), which refers to someone who worries about illness or physical symptoms. But when the worry is excessive, and not typically grounded in any physi- cal reality, a true psychological disorder may be indicated.

The key characteristic of somatic symptom disorders is a persistent preoccu- pation with health. People with these disorders can have specific body complaints (such as continuing pain) or they can simply worry excessively about the possibility of contracting a serious disease. The pain in the side, the slight case of indigestion, the occasional irregular heartbeat—each might be interpreted as symptomatic of a serious medical condition. Moreover, unlike the situation for the normal medical stu- dent, these preoccupations persist for months and often cause significant distress and impaired functioning. People suffering from somatic symptom disorders typically devote a great deal of their time and energy to these symptoms or health concerns. Constant medical check-ups may be requested, or doctors can be avoided out of fear that the suspected diagnosis will be confirmed.

One kind of somatic symptom disorder, called conversion disorder, produces real physical or neurological impairment. Someone with a conversion disorder might report being blind, or paralyzed, or unable to speak; he or she might even experi- ence seizures resembling those found in epilepsy or other neurological disorders (Bowman, 1998). These are not feigned symptoms; that is, these problems are not intentionally produced by the individual to gain sympathy or attention. These are real problems, although no physical cause can be discovered. Neuroscientists are using imaging techniques in an effort to understand how and why the brain produces the physical effects (e.g., de Lange et al., 2007).

somatic symptom disorders Psychological disorders that focus on the physical body. These disorders can be associated with specific body complaints (such as continuing pain) and/or excessive worry about the possibility of contracting a serious disease.

conversion disorder The presence of real physical problems, such as blindness or paralysis, that seem to have no identifiable physical cause.

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Obviously, in such cases there’s always the possibility that a true neurological or other physical problem does exist; physical problems are indeed sometimes misdiag- nosed as conversion disorder. But when the reported problems disappear after effec- tive therapy, a psychological origin is usually indicated. You may remember from our discussion of personality in Chapter 12 that Sigmund Freud often used his psycho- analytic techniques to treat patients with conversion disorder (although the problem was known as hysteria in his day). In fact, the term conversion, as used here, originates from psychodynamic theory and Freud’s proposal that unconscious conflicts have been converted into a physical form.

Gender and Culture Somatic symptom disorders occur somewhat more frequently in women than in men, but the differences are not large (Kirmayer et al., 2003). Each of the disorders occurs cross-culturally as well, but there are some unique expres- sions in specific cultures. A condition called koro, for example, occurs mainly in Asian men—it’s characterized by a persistent fear that the genitals will retract into the abdomen. A related condition, known as dhat, occurs mainly in India and is char- acterized by anxiety associated with the loss of semen from sexual activity (Ranjith et al., 2004).

Dissociative Disorders: Disruptions of Identity or Awareness Dissociative disorders are defined by the separation, or dissociation, of conscious awareness from previous thoughts or memories. People affected by these disorders lose memory for some specific aspect of their life, or even their entire sense of iden- tity. The theme of the confused amnesiac, searching for his or her lost identity, has been explored repeatedly in films throughout the years. We’ll focus our attention on three types of dissociative disorder: dissociative amnesia, dissociative fugue, and dis- sociative identity disorder.

Dissociative Amnesia In Chapter 8, when we tackled remembering and forgetting, we discussed various kinds of amnesia, or the inability to remember or retain per- sonal experiences. It was noted that amnesia could result from either physical fac- tors (such as brain damage) or psychological factors (such as traumatic stress). In dissociative amnesia, which is assumed to be psychological in origin, the person is unable to remember important personal information. The amnesia can be general, as in the failure to remember one’s identity or family history, or it can be localized, such as the failure to remember a specific traumatic life experience. In dissociative amnesia, the forgetting can last for hours or years. It often disappears as mysteriously as it arose.

Dissociative Fugue In dissociative fugue, there is also a loss of personal identity— people forget who they are—but it’s accompanied by an escape or flight from the home environment (fugue literally means “flight”). Imagine leaving for work or school as usual only to “awaken” some time later in a different city or state. Sometimes the fugue state can last months or even years; some individuals experiencing this disor- der have even adopted different identities in their new locale. Recovery can be sudden and often complete, but affected individuals will typically claim that they have no knowledge of their activities during the blackout period.

Dissociative Identity Disorder In what is perhaps the most baffling of all dissociative disorders, dissociative identity disorder, a person alternates among what appear to be two or more distinct identities or personality states (hence the alternative name, multiple personality disorder).

dissociative disorders A class of disorders characterized by the separation, or dissociation, of conscious awareness from previous thoughts or memories.

dissociative amnesia A psychological disorder characterized by an inability to remember important personal information.

dissociative fugue A loss of personal identity that is often accompanied by a flight from home.

dissociative identity disorder A condition in which an individual alternates between what appear to be two or more distinct identities or personalities (also known as multiple personality disorder).

Classifying Psychological Disorders | 457

In dissociative identity disorder, the unique personalities or identities appear to take control of one’s thoughts and actions, one personality at a time. More important, the personality in control will profess to have only limited awareness of the other per- sonality inhabitants. Commonly, there is interpersonality amnesia, which means that events experienced while the person is inhabited by personality A cannot be remem- bered when he or she is occupied by personality B (Eich et al., 1997). It’s for this reason that the disorder is classified as dissociative—there is a separation of current conscious awareness from prior thoughts and memories. Dozens of different identities may be involved, including both males and females, and a given identity will tend to have unique physical attributes, such as a distinct tone of voice, facial expression, hand- writing style, or behavioral habit.

Controversy often surrounds the diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder. First, this disorder often co-occurs with other psychological problems (such as depression and somatic symptom disorders), so it’s difficult to pinpoint the ultimate cause of any particular symptom (Ross et al., 1990). Second, although each of the observed personalities may be distinguished on the basis of personality tests or physiological measures, we still cannot be completely sure about the origins of these differences— other factors, such as mood or arousal differences, may partly account for the distinct performance patterns (Fahy, 1988; Lilienfeld, 1994). Third, recent studies have found that the interpersonality “amnesia” that helps to characterize the disorder is found only with certain kinds of memory tests (e.g., Huntjens et al., 2007).

Finally, several studies have shown that it’s relatively easy to fake or simulate multiple personalities (Spanos et al., 1985). This raises the possibility that people with dissociative identity disorder may actually be role playing, perhaps in a way compa- rable to those who have been hypnotized. As you might recall from Chapter 6, many psychologists question whether hypnosis truly represents some kind of dissociated state; instead, hypnotized people often seem eager to please the hypnotist by acting in accordance with a hypnotized role. This is not necessarily a conscious choice made by those who have been hypnotized; instead, it may represent a kind of unconscious or involuntary compliance (Lynn et al., 1990). Some researchers are convinced that dissociative identity disorder is best interpreted as a kind of self-hypnosis that arises partly to please the therapist. There has been an unusually rapid rise in the number of cases of dissociative identity disorder as the disorder has been publicized in the media and in movies, which lends support to the role-playing hypothesis.

Despite the controversy, dissociative identity disorder has been retained as a diagnostic category. It does seem clear that not all aspects of the disorder can be consciously faked (Kluft, 1991). Highly specific physiological differences have been reported across personalities—such as differences in visual acuity or eye muscle bal- ance (Miller, 1989)—and it seems unlikely that such things could be easily faked (see ●Figure 14.5). There also appear to be certain similarities in the past histories of affected individuals that have convinced many of the validity of the diagnosis. For example, the occurrence of abuse, usually sexual or physical, tends to be a significant predictor of the disorder (Sar et al., 2007). The diagnosis of dissociative identity disor- der remains controversial, but it is considered to be a legitimate disorder by the psy- chological community at large (Gleaves et al., 2001).

Depressive and Bipolar Disorders From time to time everyone experiences depression, that overwhelming feeling that things are completely hopeless and sad. For most, thankfully, the experience is brief; moreover, most of us can usually account for our depressed mood by pointing to a particular experience or event in our lives: We failed the test; our beloved pet died; our once-trusted romantic partner now prefers the affections of another. But when an extreme mood swing is not short lived and is accompanied by other symptoms, such

Kenneth Bianchi, known as the Hillside Strangler, claimed that he could not be held responsible for the rape and murder of several California women because he suffered from dissociative identity disorder. The evidence presented at trial suggested that Bianchi was faking the disorder; he was later convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

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as a prolonged loss of appetite and a negative self-concept, a depressive disorder may be present. Depressive disorders are characterized by prolonged and disabling dis- ruptions in emotional state.

A major depressive episode is usually marked by feelings of intense sadness and worthlessness. When you enter a major depressive episode, the world is seen through a kind of dark filter. You feel extremely sad and full of self-doubt, and the environ- ment seems overwhelming, imposing, and full of obstacles that can’t be overcome. This worldview of a depressed person is a particularly grim aspect of the disorder—if you’re depressed, the future seems hopeless with little or no possibility of a reprieve. Moreover, the negative self-image seems to be grounded in reality; depressed people are absolutely convinced about the truth of their hopelessness, which tragically leads some to consider suicide as their only outlet.

Major depression is more than just feeling sad. You literally view and interpret the world differently when you’re depressed, which tends to feed back and confirm your negative self-concept. Normal activities are interpreted as indicating some dire consequence (for example, if a friend fails to call, it must mean the friend no lon- ger cares). As you’ll see in the next chapter, one of the goals of therapy in treating depression is to change depressed individuals’ thought patterns—to make them see the world in a more realistic way.

Mental health professionals distinguish among several types of depressive dis- orders, based partly on the length and severity of the depressive episode. For exam- ple, a major depressive episode can be classified as recurrent, which means that it has occurred more than once in an individual’s lifetime (but separated by a period of at least two months). There is also a condition called dysthymic disorder, in which the depressive symptoms tend to be milder and less disruptive but more chronic. Most major depressive episodes end after a period of weeks or months and the person returns to normal, but people affected by dysthymic disorder show a relatively con- tinuous depressed mood for a period of at least two years.

Bipolar Disorder In a major depressive episode, depression typically runs its course, and the individual returns to a normal state. The depression may occur again, but the disorder is defined by a mood shift in only one direction—toward the negative. In bipolar disorder, one experiences mood shifts in two directions, traveling from the depths of depression (a major depressive episode) to a hyperactive, euphoric condition called a manic episode. When in a manic state, people act as if they’re on top of the world—they are hyperactive, talkative, and seem to have little need for sleep. These symptoms may seem positive and desirable, but they’re balanced by tendencies toward grandiosity, distractibility, and risk taking. In a manic state, a person might attempt a remarkable feat—such as scaling the Statue of Liberty—or perhaps will go on a sudden spending spree, cashing in all his or her savings. People who are experiencing mania report feeling great, but their thinking is far from normal or rational. Their speech can appear disrupted because they shift rapidly from one fleeting thought to another.

To be classified as a manic episode, this abnormally elevated mood state must last for at least a week, although it can last for significantly longer. Like a depres- sive episode, the manic state typically goes away, even without treatment, and the person either returns to normal or roller-coasters into another depressive episode. People who suffer from bipolar disorders live lives of extreme highs and lows. Not surprisingly, their ability to function normally in society is often severely impaired. Moreover, tragically, it’s been estimated that as many as 19% of individuals who are affected with bipolar disorder eventually end up committing suicide (Ostacher & Eidelman, 2006).

Suicide As just noted, suicide can be one fatal consequence of suffering from a mood-related disorder such as bipolar disorder. It’s worth pausing for a moment and considering suicide because it’s a significant problem worldwide. Suicide is the third leading cause of death among adolescents. Suicide is highest for White males, at least

depressive disorders Prolonged and disabling disruptions in emotional state.

major depressive episode A type of disorder characterized by depressed mood and other symptoms.

bipolar disorder A type of disorder in which the person experiences disordered mood shifts in two directions—from depression to a manic state.

manic episode A disordered state in which the person becomes hyperactive, talkative, and has a decreased need for sleep; a person in a manic state may engage in activities that are self-destructive or dangerous.

Classifying Psychological Disorders | 459

in the United States. Men are 4 to 5 times more likely to commit suicide than women (although women are more likely to attempt suicide), and the average suicide rates for minorities are often reported to be lower than those for Whites (Colucci & Martin, 2007). The vast majority of people who kill themselves suffer from some kind of psychological disorder (Garland & Zigler, 1993).

What are the risk factors associated with sui- cide? In addition to a psychological disorder, many different factors can be involved. Alcohol use and abuse are particularly likely in adolescent suicides, present in perhaps the majority of suicides. Another important factor is the sudden occurrence of a very stressful event—something like the death of a loved one, failure or rejection in a personal relationship, or even a natural disaster. Evidence suggests that suicide rates increase after natural disasters, such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes (Krug et al., 1998). Suicide may also be contagious: There are increased suicide rates following widely publicized suicides, especially among adolescents, suggesting that imitation or modeling is an important factor (Gould & Kramer, 2001).

Among the most significant predictors of suicide are prior suicide attempts and suicidal thoughts. Among adolescents there is somewhere between a 3:1 and 6:1 ratio of serious suicidal thoughts to actual suicide attempts. Not everyone who thinks about suicide makes an attempt—and the ratio of attempted suicides to successful suicides is estimated to be about 11:1. But suicidal thinking is a serious warning sign. Treatment options for the psychological conditions associated with suicide are dis- cussed in Chapter 15, but a variety of intervention programs are used to tackle the suicide problem nationally. For example, the Centers for Disease Control recom- mends that teams of mental health professionals be sent to schools, for counseling and screening, whenever a student or visible member of the community commits sui- cide. Moreover, most cities and towns now have 24-hour suicide hotline services that enable people in need to voice their concerns and learn alternative ways of dealing with their crises. Most psychologists are optimistic that as the risk factors associated with suicide are identified, and treatment options become more accessible, suicide rates can be slowed or reversed (Kosky et al., 1998). For more on the prevention of sui- cide, take a look at the Practical Solutions feature.

Gender and Culture As noted previously, women are significantly more likely to attempt suicide than men (although men are more often successful); overall, women are more likely to report, and be treated for, major depression which may help explain the trend (Hammen, 2003). Cross-cultural studies have found that the rates of major depression are higher for women across the world, ranging from developing coun- tries to major industrialized nations. Interestingly, though, there doesn’t appear to be a similar sex difference for bipolar disorder.

The symptoms reported for major depression are also quite similar across the world, particularly loss of energy, insomnia, and thoughts of death or suicide. People’s internal thoughts about depression, however, do seem to depend partly on their cultural worldview. For example, in cultures stressing individuality, such as Western nations, people talk about their symptoms in terms of their personal iden- tity (“I feel blue”); in cultures stressing an interdependent (collective) view of the self, symptoms might be described in terms of the group (“Our life has lost its meaning”) (cf. Barlow & Durand, 2012).

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Schizophrenia: Faulty Thought Processes For most of the psychological disorders considered so far, you probably experienced at least a glimmer of recognition. Everyone can identify with anxiety, the occasional obses- sive thought, or even a slight case of depression. It’s only when these tendencies become excessive and interfere with normal functioning that someone is likely to be diagnosed with an actual psychological disorder. But in the case of schizophrenia, which trans- lates literally as “split mind,” the psychological changes can be so profound that one is thrust into a world that bears little resemblance to everyday experience. A person with schizophrenia lives in an internal world marked by thought processes that have gone awry; delusions, hallucinations, and generally disordered thinking become the norm.

Schizophrenia is a bit unusual compared to the other disorders we’ve considered because it doesn’t always reveal itself in the same way; whereas everyone who suffers from an anxiety disorder feels apprehensive, or in depression feels sad, the symptoms of schizophrenia are not necessarily shared by all affected individuals. Schizophrenia is a complex disorder that is expressed in a variety of complex ways—no single symp- tom must be present for the diagnosis to be applied (Walker et al., 2004).

Despite the translation of schizophrenia as “split mind,” it’s not the same thing as a dissociative identity disorder. Schizophrenia leads to faulty thought processes and inappropriate emotions—not to dissociations among distinct personality types. In fact, when the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1908) originally introduced the term schizophrenia, he was referring primarily to the fact that affected individuals have trouble holding onto a consistent line of thought. Their thinking is disorganized; their thought lines and associations seem to split apart and move forward in inconsis- tent ways. Both schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder are serious psycho- logical problems, but they fall into different diagnostic categories.

Diagnostic Symptoms There are three main types of symptoms in schizophre- nia: positive, negative, and cognitive. Positive symptoms usually include observable

schizophrenia A class of disorders characterized by fundamental disturbances in thought processes, emotion, or behavior.

Suicide is relatively rare in childhood and early adolescence but increases significantly in the late teens and early 20s. Suicide is now the third leading cause of death among young adults. Although the causes of suicide are many, and may differ from early to late adulthood, psychologists are attempting to isolate the factors that can lead to prevention (at any age). Let’s consider some recommendations being offered to reduce suicide among young adults (see Gould & Kramer, 2001):

1. Gatekeeper Training. Most professionals are convinced that suicidal youths are unde- ridentified. There is a compelling need to train members of the community to recog- nize the warning signs of suicide and to of- fer educated assistance. We need programs to train people who come in contact with potential suicides—both in schools and in the community. Interestingly, current research indicates that it may be better to train school officials (teachers, coaches,

counselors) to screen for potential victims because student-centered educational pro- grams have met with limited success.

2. Skills Training. Rather than focusing on student programs that deal specifically with suicide and its prevention, it may be more effective to develop programs that teach students basic problem-solving, decision-making, and communication skills. Life-skills training and teaching gen- eral coping strategies can reduce the risk factors typically associated with suicide (Eggert et al., 1995). By teaching students skills to handle the problems that arise in day-to-day living, we increase their self- esteem and their ability to handle stress- ors in the environment.

3. Increase Media Awareness. Social learning and modeling can significantly increase the risk of suicide among the young. Con- siderable evidence supports contagion effects (copycat suicides). When suicidal behavior is given wide exposure in the

media, even fictional suicides in mov- ies, it can be followed by a significant increase in the number of suicides and suicide attempts (Gould, 2001). Members of the media should be educated about the risks associated with modeling suicide and encouraged to reduce the amount or emphasis of such coverage.

4. Crisis Centers. Crisis centers, or suicide hotlines, are an important and widely available method for reducing suicide risk. Suicides are often associated with sig- nificant traumatic or stressful events, so providing a social network for someone in need is clearly a useful strategy. Unfortu- nately, significant risk groups tend not to take advantage of these centers. For exam- ple, young White females are the most fre- quent users of telephone hotlines—males tend to stay away. Accordingly, although effective for the groups that use them, crisis centers are not a compete solution to suicide prevention.

● PRACtiCAL SOLutiONS Suicide Prevention

Classifying Psychological Disorders | 461

expressions of abnormal behavior, such as delusions or hallucinations; negative symp- toms consist of deficits in behavior, such as an inability to express emotion; cognitive symptoms include difficulties in memory and decision making and in the ability to sustain attention. At least two or more characteristic symptoms should be present for the diagnosis of schizophrenia, but a particular person may have many or only a few. As with the other disorders we’ve considered, these symptoms must last for a signifi- cant period of time, they must cause social or job distress, and they cannot be due to the effects of a general medical condition or to the use of a drug or medication.

Let’s consider some of the major positive symptoms of schizophrenia in more detail. As noted earlier, one of the main problems in schizophrenia is distorted or dis- organized thinking. People with schizophrenia often suffer from delusions, which are thoughts with inappropriate content. If someone sitting next to you in class leaned over and claimed to be Elvis in disguise, or Jesus Christ, or Adolf Hitler, the con- tent of his or her thoughts would clearly be inappropriate or deviant—this individual would be suffering from a delusion.

It’s also not unusual for people with schizophrenia to report distorted percep- tions of the world. For them, objects can seem to change their shape or size; dis- tances can be perceived in ways that are different from reality. Frequently, the hallucinations—which are perceptions that have no basis in external stimulation—are auditory. People with schizophrenia claim to hear disembodied voices in their heads, giving them commands or commenting on the quality of their activities (“You’re an idiot,” “You should stay away from that person,” and so on). Some researchers believe these voices may originate from the same areas of the brain that control language production. It may be the case that people with schizophrenia are actually “listening” to their inner voice (see Chapter 8) but fail to recognize the voice as their own. Instead, they falsely attribute the source of the voice to something external (Allen et al., 2007; Lutterveld et al., 2011).

Other positive symptoms of schizophrenia include disorganized speech and cata- tonia. Sometimes the speech patterns of a person with schizophrenia appear jumbled and incoherent; he or she jumps repeatedly from one disconnected topic to another (“I went to the beach today where the moon pulls the rabbit out of the hat. I’m the world’s greatest cook, but that’s because volcanic magma heats the glaciers and makes the water and the sand.”) It’s as if the mind has lost its internal editor—ideas or thoughts no longer flow in a connected way. In addition to displaying speech prob- lems, someone with schizophrenia can behave in ways that are quite disorganized and bizarre. The person might engage in repetitive activities, such as swirling his or her arms repeatedly, or will appear to laugh or cry at inappropriate times. When catatonia is present, people may adopt a peculiar stance or position and remain immobile for hours, or they may wildly and suddenly change position for no apparent reason.

Negative symptoms of schizophrenia are expressed by the elimination or reduc- tion of normal behavior. For example, it’s common for people with schizophrenia to display restricted or flat affect, which means they show little or no emotional reaction to events. Show someone with restricted affect an extremely funny movie or a tragic, heartrending photo, and the person is unlikely to crack a smile or shed a tear. People with schizophrenia may also refuse to engage in the most basic and important of every- day activities. They may refuse to speak, or interact socially, and they may even refuse to wash themselves, to eat, or to get dressed. Activities that are pleasurable to most people become unpleasurable or uninteresting to some individuals with schizophrenia.

Finally, the cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia can be more subtle and difficult to detect, often appearing only after neuropsychological testing. Schizophrenia can produce marked deficits in the ability to absorb information and process it effectively. People with schizophrenia usually have difficulties associated with “working mem- ory,” that portion of our memory system that enables us to maintain information in consciousness and use it in ongoing tasks (Forbes et al., 2009). People with schizophre- nia often have difficulty concentrating and integrating thoughts and feelings. There is evidence suggesting that cognitive difficulties may be apparent even before the onset of the more severe symptoms discussed above (Reichenberg & Harvey, 2007).

Highlighted in this PET scan are areas of the brain that appear to be selectively activated during auditory and visual hallucinations. A young man suffering from schizophrenia was asked to press a button, initiating the scan, every time he experienced a hallucination.

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For obvious reasons, people with schizophrenia are often unable to cope suc- cessfully at school or at work. In many cases, their behavior becomes so maladaptive that hospitalization is required. As you’ll see later in the chapter, there are reasons to believe that people with schizophrenia may be suffering from problems in the brain itself—fundamental neurological problems may cause the bizarre thinking and behaviors that plague people affected with the disorder.

Gender and Culture Researchers remain uncertain about how gender affects the likeli- hood of developing schizophrenia. Historically, it’s been assumed that men and women are equally likely to develop the disorder, but recent research suggests that men are at greater risk (McGrath et al., 2008). Moreover, men tend to develop the disorder earlier in life, about four years earlier on average, whereas women show an increased risk of developing schizophrenia in later years. For unknown reasons, women are also more likely than men to benefit favorably from treatment (Walker et al., 2004).

Schizophrenia is a worldwide phenomenon, occurring in every studied racial and cultural group. However, there are differences in the rates of diagnosis—for example, more African Americans are diagnosed with schizophrenia than Whites—and people seem to recover better in some cultures than in others (Kulhara & Chakrabarti, 2001). These patterns are puzzling to researchers and poorly understood. Some researchers have suggested that the racial differences in diagnosis may be related to bias or dis- crimination (Goater et al., 1999), but other possibilities remain, including differences in genetic susceptibility (Barlow & Durand, 2012).

Personality Disorders Personality disorders are chronic or enduring patterns of behavior that lead to significant impairments in social functioning. People with personality disorders tend to act in inflexible and maladaptive ways; they show impairments in personality func- tioning and possess “pathological” personality traits (Skodol et al., 2011). For example, one might show an exaggerated sense of entitlement, as in narcissistic personality disorder, which leads to excessive attempts to attract and be the focus of admira- tion. One of the best-known examples of a personality disorder, occurring mainly in males, is the antisocial personality disorder. People with this type of disorder lack empathy, are self-centered, and show little respect for social customs or norms. They act as if they have no conscience—they lie, cheat, or steal at the drop of a hat and show no remorse for their actions if caught. Someone with antisocial personal- ity disorder is likely to have no qualms about committing criminal acts, even murder. Many end up with long criminal records and spend significant periods of time in jail (Cunningham & Reidy, 1998). Another common personality disorder is borderline personality disorder, which affects mainly young women. This disorder is associ- ated with a poor self-image, an inability to regulate emotions, and can be associated with aggression, self-injury, and substance abuse. People with borderline personality disorder often have unstable patterns of social relationships.

Many mental health professionals believe personality disorders are unique because they tend to be more ingrained and inflexible than the other major clinical syndromes we’ve discussed. These are not problems that typically appear and disap- pear over time, which is the case with many psychological disorders. These problems reflect basic personality and, as a result, tend to continue throughout adulthood and are resistant to therapy.

Because personality disorders are linked to personality, some mental health pro- fessionals have argued that it’s wrong to think of them as disorders in the same sense as a phobia or depression (Gunderson, 1992; Trull & McCrae, 1994). In Chapter 12 we discussed the idea that personality can be defined by the Big Five personality dimen- sions (McCrae & Costa, 1985). Some researchers have argued that it’s better to think

personality disorders Chronic or enduring patterns of behavior that lead to significant impairments in social functioning.

narcissistic personality disorder a personality disorder characterized by an exaggerated sense of entitlement, which leads to excessive attempts to attract and be the focus of attention.

antisocial personality disorder A personality disorder characterized by little, if any, respect for social laws, customs, or norms.

borderline personality disorder A personality disorder characterized by problems with emotional regulation, social relationships, and sense of self.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Think back to our earlier discussion of how to conceptualize abnormality. Do you think personality disorders should be labeled as “abnormal” behaviors?

In catatonia, a symptom of schizophrenia, the affected person adopts a peculiar stance or position and remains immobile for hours.

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Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental? | 463

about people with personality disorders as simply extreme or deviant on one or more of these five dimensions—extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroti- cism, and openness. For example, the dimension of agreeableness measures the extent to which an individual is kind, warm, and trusting. It’s possible that people classified with a antisocial personality disorder may simply lie near an extreme pole on the agreeableness scale—they trust almost no one. At present, debate continues about the proper way to think about personality disorders, and it remains uncertain whether the Big Five will be sufficient to account for the complexities of the disorders (Samuel & Widiger, 2008).

test Yourself Check your knowledge about how psychological disorders are classified by picking the diagnostic category that best describes each of the following behavior patterns. Pick from among the following terms: anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, somatic symptom disorder, dissociative disorder, depressive disorder, schizophrenia, personality disorder. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Sharma is convinced that the ringing in her ears means she has a brain tumor, even though a variety of doctors can find nothing wrong:

2. Gabriella is a checker—she often drives home five or six times a day to make sure she hasn’t left the oven on:

3. Kunal hasn’t left his house for 6 years—it’s the only place he really feels safe:

4. Otto hates himself. He’s convinced that he’s worthless, stupid, and unlovable. No one can convince him otherwise:

5. Sergio is found wandering aimlessly in the park. When questioned, he can’t remember who he is or how he got to the park:

6. Roger is a habitual con artist with little regard for the truth. He steals regularly and feels no guilt or remorse about his actions:

7. Melissa is convinced that her psychology professor is beaming his thoughts directly into her brain; she feels empowered and ready to complete her takeover of the world:

8. Billy shows little or no emotional reaction to events in his world; in fact, he usually stands in the corner for hours at a time with his right arm resting on his head:

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.2

Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental? LEARNING GOALS

● Explain how biological and genetic factors can contribute to psychological disorders. ● Discuss how maladaptive thoughts can contribute to psychological disorders. ● Explain how environmental factors can contribute to psychological disorders.

The DSM is designed to provide a reliable way for mental health professionals to diagnose psychological problems. The word reliable in this case refers to whether

464 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

professional clinicians will tend to arrive at the same or similar diagnoses for people with a given set of symptoms. Still, it’s important to remember that the DSM is only a classification system—it does not indicate anything about the root cause, or etiol- ogy, of the underlying disorder. What factors, alone or in combination, conspire to produce a major clinical syndrome like depression, anxiety, or schizophrenia? The answer—in a nutshell—is that we don’t know for sure. But most current explanations, as well as most approaches to therapy, appeal to biological, cognitive, or environmental factors.

The recognition that psychological disorders are influenced by these three factors is sometimes called the bio-psycho-social perspective. Biological fac- tors (bio) include physiological problems with the body, particularly the brain, and genetic influences that are present at birth. Cognitive factors (psycho) include our beliefs, styles of thought, and any other psychological mechanisms that potentially influence behavior. Finally, environmental factors (social) include what we learn from the environment, cultural influences, and how other people treat us in our daily lives. We’ll consider each of these three major factors in greater detail in the following sections.

Biological Factors: Is It in the Brain or Genes? Over the past several decades, there have been significant advances in our understand- ing of the brain and its functions. Most researchers are now convinced that at least some kinds of abnormal behavior result directly from brain dysfunction. The disordered thoughts of schizophrenia, for example, may be partly due to a mal- functioning brain. What’s the evidence? Biological accounts are typically supported by two kinds of findings. First, it’s been discovered that abnormal brain chemistry or abnormal brain structures accompany some kinds of mental disorders. Second, it turns out that a number of psychological disorders may have a powerful genetic component—psychological disorders tend to run in families in ways that can’t be easily explained by environmental histories. We discussed some of these findings in Chapter 3; we’ll review and expand on that discussion here.

Neurotransmitter Imbalances As you may recall from Chapter 3, schizophrenia has been linked to the neurotransmitter dopamine (Snyder, 1976), or possibly to an inter- action between dopamine and other neurotransmitters (Iverson & Iverson, 2007). Support for the link has come primarily from studying how different drugs affect

bio-psycho-social perspective The idea that psychological disorders are influenced, or caused, by a combination of biological, psychological (cognitive), and social (environmental) factors.

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These PET scans, taken from a person diagnosed with schizophrenia (right) and from one without the disorder (left), show dramatic differences in brain activity levels. The blue and green areas show relatively low activity.

Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental? | 465

the disorder. Among the most effective treatments for schizophrenia are medications that act as dopamine antagonists, which means they reduce or block dopamine use in the brain. Medications that increase the level of dopamine in the brain can also produce side effects that resemble the symptoms found in schizophrenia. Abnormal dopamine levels are probably not the only cause of schizophrenia—for example, not all people with schizophrenia are helped by dopamine-reducing medications—but problems in brain neurochemistry are widely believed to be involved in the disor- der. Currently, the neurotransmitters glutamate, GABA, and serotonin are also being considered as factors in the development and maintenance of schizophrenia (e.g., Moghaddam & Javitt, 2012).

Neurotransmitter imbalances may also contribute to mood disorders, such as manic episodes and depression. Once again, most of the effective medications for these problems act by altering the actions of neurotransmitters in the brain. Fluoxetine (more commonly known by its brand name, Prozac) is one of the most commonly prescribed treatments for depression; it acts by slowing the reuptake of serotonin, thereby prolonging the neurotransmitter’s effectiveness. More generally, depression and mania have been linked to neurotransmitters called monoamines, which include serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine. Researchers currently believe these neurotransmitters are involved in the regulation of mood, although the specifics have yet to be worked out (Carr & Lucki, 2011). It’s unlikely that mood disorders are caused by an inadequate supply of any one of these neurotransmitters. Instead, a decrease in one may have multiple effects on the others. A decrease in sero- tonin, for instance, may permit the levels of other neurotransmitters in the brain to vary more widely; these more complex interactions probably work together in some way to alter mood abnormally. Research suggests that stress hormones, such as corti- sol, may play a role as well in mood disorders such as depression (Sher, 2004).

Structural Problems In addition to neurochemical problems, such as imbalances in neurotransmitters, there may also be structural problems in the brains of people suf- fering from serious psychological problems. In the case of schizophrenia, anatomical and brain-imaging studies have revealed that people with schizophrenia tend to have larger ventricles, which are the liquid-filled cavities in the brain (Sayo et al., 2012). (For reasons that are not yet clear, increased ventricle size tends to be more likely in men who suffer from schizophrenia.) Larger ventricles are associated with the loss, or shrinkage, of brain tissue, which may help explain some instances of schizophrenia (Osuji et al., 2007). There’s also evidence that activity in the frontal areas of the brain may be abnormally low in schizophrenia patients (Berman & Weinberger, 1990). Although it’s not clear why these activity levels are low, decreased brain activity in certain prefrontal regions may directly or indirectly alter the neural pathways asso- ciated with the neurotransmitter dopamine (Davis et al., 1991). Postmortem studies have also found abnormalities in how neurons are interconnected in certain regions of the brain, suggesting that schizophrenia may involve faulty wiring in the neural circuits (Walker et al., 2004).

These data are convincing, but it’s important to remember that not all people with schizophrenia show these kinds of neurological problems; not all people with schizophrenia have larger ventricles or show lower frontal lobe activity. Moreover, not all people who have been diagnosed with depression respond to drug therapies that alter the levels or actions of monoamines. So we’re left with a somewhat cloudy picture. There’s little doubt that psychological disorders are sometimes associated with observable abnormalities in brain chemistry or function. But whether these fac- tors are the true cause of disorders such as schizophrenia or depression, or simply one cause, or occur somehow as a consequence of having the disorder, is not currently known.

Genetic Contributions Increasingly, researchers are concluding that people may inherit predispositions toward abnormality. For example, the odds that any particular

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Based on our earlier discussion of schizophrenia, can you think of any reason people diagnosed with schizophrenia might not all show the same neurological problems?

Schizophrenia is sometimes associated with structural abnormalities. The top scan is taken from someone with schizophrenia. Notice that the central, wingshaped ventricles are larger than in the normal control brain shown on the bottom.

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individual in the population will develop schizophrenia are roughly 1 in 100. But if you have a brother, sister, or parent with the disorder, the odds increase dramati- cally, perhaps to 1 in 10. If you have an identical twin—someone who has essentially the same genetic information as you do—and your twin has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, the odds that you will develop the disorder during your lifetime jump to about 1 in 2 (Gottesman, 1991) (see ●Figure 14.6). Notice that the disorder can’t be explained entirely by appealing to genetic factors—otherwise, identical twins would always share the disorder—but these data suggest that genetic background plays a significant role (see also, Gejman et al., 2011).

As you know from our many discussions of the nature–nurture issue through- out this book, it’s not easy to separate inherited characteristics from those acquired through experience. Just because there’s a family history of a disorder doesn’t mean the cause is genetic; family members are typically raised in similar environments, so experience could account for the shared psychological problems. In the case of schizophrenia, however, even when children are adopted and raised apart from their biological parents, there still appears to be a familial link. Adopted children who have biological parents with schizophrenia are more likely to be diagnosed with schizo- phrenia themselves, even if they’ve had little or no contact with the parents (Tienari et al., 2006).

A similar pattern emerges with depressive disorders. Depression and bipolar dis- order tend to run in families, and the concordance rate, which measures the likeli- hood of sharing a disorder, is quite high between identical twins. A number of studies have shown that if one twin is diagnosed with depression, there is a 50% or greater chance that the other twin will also be diagnosed with depression; the concordance

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● FiGuRE 14.6 the Genetics of Schizophrenia Each bar shows the risk of developing schizophrenia when one or more relatives have been diagnosed with the disorder. In general, the closer an individual is genetically to the person with schizophrenia, the more likely he or she is to develop the disorder. (Based on Gottesman, 1991)

Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental? | 467

rate may be even higher for bipolar disorders (Gershon, 1990). It is also the case that adoptees with biological parents who suffer from a mood disorder are themselves more likely to suffer from a mood disorder. It’s the biological history rather than the environmental history that, on average, predicts the chances of becoming affected.

Genetic factors help predict the likelihood that someone will suffer from certain psychological disorders, but genetic factors are not sufficient to explain abnormal behavior. Once again, having an identical twin with schizophrenia or bipolar disor- der does not guarantee that you’ll have a similar problem. Your genetic code may predispose you to a disorder—it may set the stage—but other environmental factors must be present for the disorder to actually develop (Schneider & Deldin, 2001). For example, problems during childbirth, such as the development of an infectious dis- ease or exposure to an environmental stressor, may help to explain why one twin eventually develops schizophrenia whereas the other does not (McNeil et al., 2000). Anxiety disorders may be likely to occur in people who are born with sensitive tem- peraments, but experience will determine whether a full-blown disorder actually develops. To repeat a common theme, it is the interaction between nature and nur- ture that is important.

Cognitive Factors: Is It Maladaptive Thoughts and Beliefs? If you look closely into the mind of someone with a psychological disorder, you’ll often find disordered styles of thinking. People with anxiety disorders, somatic symp- tom disorders, or the other disorders we’ve discussed typically believe things about themselves or about the world that have little or no basis in reality. Robert, who is depressed, is convinced that he lacks ability and drive, even though he is a successful banker. Jill, who suffers from agoraphobia, refuses to leave her house because she’s convinced that something terrible will happen outside, even though she can think of no real reason for this belief.

Many psychologists feel that such faulty beliefs may be more than symptoms of an underlying disorder—they may contribute to, or even cause, the disorder itself. To see how this might work, suppose I’m able to convince you, by feeding you false but convincing reports, that evil extraterrestrials have landed in a nearby city. Your anxi- ety level would certainly shoot up, and there’s little question your behavior would change. You might not leave your house, and you might end up spending a lot of your time huddled under a table in your basement. This is abnormal behavior, but it would be rational if the underlying cause of the behavior—the belief that the world may end soon—is true. Many people with psychological disorders act the way they do because they have incorrect beliefs. If you’re absolutely convinced that you’re no good and can never succeed at anything, it’s not surprising that you withdraw from social situa- tions and fail to secure steady employment.

Maladaptive Attributions Psychologists use the term attribution to refer to the pro- cesses involved in assigning causality to a behavior (see Chapter 13). When you fail at something, like a test or a new job, you attribute the failure to a cause, such as your own incompetence or the lousy teacher. It turns out that people who have psychological disorders, particularly depression, have relatively distinctive and predictable attributional or explanatory styles. Unfortunately, the attributions are often maladaptive, which means they lead to behaviors that are abnormal or unproductive.

As ●Figure 14.7 shows, when something bad happens to a person prone to depres- sion, he or she is likely to explain it in terms of internal (“I’m to blame rather than the situation”), stable (long lasting), and global (widespread) attributions (Abramson et al., 1989; Barlow, 2002). Let’s suppose you fail a test at school. If you’re depressed, you’ll

468 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

probably attribute that failure to some personal inadequacy (inter- nal) that is likely to be long lasting (stable) and that will apply in lots of situations other than school (global). People who are not prone to depression tend to have more flexible explanatory styles. They might attribute the failure to some external source (“I’ve got a rotten teacher”) and consider the failure to be unstable (“I had a bad day”), and they’ll probably make a specific rather than global attribution. Nondepressed people have less of a tendency to overgeneralize from a situation at school to other areas of life.

Learned Helplessness What produces these different explanatory styles? It’s difficult to know whether people who make maladap- tive attributions do so because they’re depressed or whether it’s the unfortunate explanatory style that creates the depression. Some researchers believe that prolonged experience with failure may be one contributing factor. According to the learned helplessness the- ory of depression (Seligman, 1975), if individuals repeatedly fail while

attempting to control their environment, they acquire a general sense of helplessness. They give up and become passive, which, the theory proposes, leads to depression. Still, it’s unlikely that we can account for all forms of depression by appealing only to repeated failure. Experience with failure may be a necessary condition for acquiring depression, but it is not a sufficient condition. Many people fail repeatedly yet show no tendencies toward depression.

Moreover, it isn’t really the failure that leads to depression but rather one’s attri- butions about the failure. Instead of learning to be helpless, it may be the sense of hopelessness—the belief that things cannot become better because of internal, stable, and global factors—that is more likely to produce depression, at least in some people ( Joiner et al., 2001). Whether this sense of hopelessness can be explained by appealing to experience alone, such as emotional maltreatment during childhood, or to some interaction between experience and biological or genetic predispositions remains to be seen (Alloy et al., 2001).

Environmental Factors: Is It Learned Through Experience? All theories of psychological disorders ultimately appeal either directly or indirectly to environmental factors. Even if a researcher believes a disorder such as schizo- phrenia is primarily caused by a genetically induced problem in the brain, it’s still necessary to explain why identical twins don’t always share the disorder. Experience clearly plays a pivotal role. Similarly, the irrational beliefs and explanatory styles that characterize depression must be learned somewhere, although two people with the same experiences may not always share the same set of beliefs. Once again, experi- ence is the bedrock on which the psychological interpretation is built.

The Role of Culture As we’ve discussed throughout this chapter, cultural factors also play an obvious and important role (Harper, 2001). Although the symptoms of most serious psychological disorders—such as schizophrenia and depression—are generally similar across the world, culture-based differences do exist. For example, the types of delusions found in schizophrenia depend to a certain extent on cultural background (Tateyama et al., 1998). Different cultural groups may also be more or less likely to show symptoms of disorders because of cultural “rules” for expressing emotion and action (Manson, 1995). If an individual lives in a culture that discour- ages the expression of emotion, then depression will be somewhat harder to detect and treat.

learned helplessness A general sense of helplessness that is acquired when people repeatedly fail in their attempts to control their environment; learned helplessness may play a role in depression.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Try to identify your own attributional style. Do you tend to attribute outcomes to global, stable, and internal causes?

“I was born stupid.”

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my courses.”

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● FiGuRE 14.7 Maladaptive thoughts in Depression Depressed individuals tend to attribute failure to internal, stable, and global conditions. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental? | 469

People’s cultural background may also determine the chances that they’ll be exposed to environmental events that could trigger the onset of psychological dis- orders. Obviously, those who live somewhere in the world where war or extreme poverty is a way of life are likely to encounter more stressful events, which, in com- bination with a genetic predisposition, could lead to psychological problems. Cultural goals or ideals can also influence psychological health. For example, living in a soci- ety that places enormous emphasis on weight ideals can increase the chances that individuals will suffer from an eating disorder (see Chapter 11). (You’ll learn more about how cultural ideals and stressors in everyday life can affect your physical and psychological health in Chapter 16.)

Conditioning Disorders A number of mental health professionals feel that at least some psychological disorders may be learned. People can learn to act and think abnormally in the same way they might learn how to bake a cake, make friends, or avoid talking in class. Experts with this view of abnormality propose that learning principles of the type discussed in Chapter 7 help explain why psychological disorders develop and how they can be best treated. A specific phobia, for example, could be acquired through classical conditioning; an individual might learn to associate a par- ticular stimulus or event with something that makes him or her afraid. Alternatively, people might learn to act abnormally through operant conditioning because they’ve been reinforced for those actions. Acting in a strange way thus becomes more likely than it was before.

Learning theorists believe that modeling, or observational learning, might play a particularly important role in the development of some psychological disorders. As we discussed in Chapter 7, there are reasons to believe that phobias can be acquired through modeling (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Some of the best evidence has come from animal studies, where it’s possible to control how the fear reaction is initially learned. Rhesus monkeys who are raised in the wild show an extremely strong fear response to snakes; monkeys who have been reared in the laboratory will show a similar reaction, but only if they’ve witnessed other monkeys reacting fearfully when snakes are introduced into the cage. So it’s not necessary for the animal to experi- ence something negative directly, such as getting attacked and bitten by the snake; the animal can acquire its fear simply by watching other monkeys act afraid (Cook & Mineka, 1989). Modeling in this case makes adaptive sense because appropriate actions can be learned without directly experiencing negative consequences.

The monkey data are important because they show how modeling can lead to the acquisition of a strong fear response. Obviously, for monkeys in the wild it’s quite adaptive to be afraid of snakes. For humans, we know that modeling is also a pow- erful way to learn, but the evidence that modeling underlies phobias—which, after all, are essentially irrational fears—is still indirect at this point. We know that many people with phobias can’t remember having a traumatic experience with the object of their fear (Rachman, 1990). It’s also the case that phobias tend to run in families—if your father is afraid of heights, there’s an increased chance that you’ll share that same fear (Fyer et al., 1990). This kind of evidence is consistent with a modeling account of phobias, but it doesn’t preclude alternative accounts. It seems likely, for instance, that some kind of biological predisposition might also be needed (Czajkowski et al., 2011).

As with the biological, genetic, and cognitive factors we’ve considered, it’s unlikely that learning principles alone will be able to account for why people develop psychological disorders. People probably can’t learn the delusional thought pat- terns of schizophrenia, for example, although stressful events in the environment undoubtedly play an important role in this disorder (Walker et al., 2004). Even with phobias, which may be largely learning based, it’s probably necessary to be predis- posed to anxiety for a full-blown phobia to develop (Barlow, 2002). Experience plays a significant role in the development of most psychological disorders, but it doesn’t act alone. Behavior, both normal and abnormal, is virtually always produced by multiple causes.

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you suffer from any kind of phobia? Can you trace the fear to any particular experience in your life? Does anyone else in your family share the same fear?

470 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

● CONCEPt REviEw Causes of Psychological Disorders fACTOR DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE

Biological Physiological problems, particularly in the brain. Could include neurotransmitter imbalances, structural problems, and genetic influences.

Danae feels extremely depressed. She goes to a psychologist who asks her whether anyone else in her family has suffered from depression. Danae reports that her mother and grand- mother did have bouts of severe depression.

Cognitive Our beliefs and styles of thought, such as maladaptive attributions and a sense of hopelessness.

Danae is struggling with her studies. She receives a D on a big exam. She is disgusted with herself and keeps thinking, “How could I be so stupid? I am such a loser!”

Environmental The influence of experience and culture. Cultural background, events, and learning all have an impact on psychological disorders.

Danae’s family has always struggled financially, and now her parents are going through a nasty divorce. Danae acts disruptively because it’s one of the few ways she can get any attention from them.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about how psychologists have attempted to understand psychological disorders by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Which of the following biological conditions is most likely to be a contributing factor in schizophrenia? a. Slowed reuptake of the neurotransmitter serotonin b. Excessive amounts of the neurotransmitter dopamine c. Smaller-than-normal ventricles in the brain d. Increased random activity in the frontal lobes

2. Studies examining the genetics of schizophrenia have discovered that: a. Schizophrenia is a learned rather than an inherited disorder. b. Living with two parents with schizophrenia increases your risk

of developing schizophrenia by about 65%. c. Identical twins are more likely to develop schizophrenia than

fraternal twins. d. If your identical twin has schizophrenia, you have about a

50% chance of developing the disorder yourself.

3. Psychologists studying depression have found that depressed people tend to make the following kinds of personal attributions: a. External, stable, and global b. Internal, unstable, and global c. Internal, stable, and specific d. Internal, stable, and global

4. Studies examining how monkeys develop a strong fear response to snakes have been used to support which of the following accounts of specific phobias? a. Operant conditioning b. Observational learning c. Learned helplessness d. Classical conditioning

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.3

Psychology For A Reason: What Psychological Disorders Are | 471

In this chapter we’ve considered what happens when a person’s thoughts and actions become disordered. Most mental health professionals believe it’s possible and useful to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior. In addition, as you’ve seen, a relatively precise and rigorous classification system exists for the diagnosis and labeling of psychological disorders when they occur. But what are the implications for our general theme of an adaptive mind? It hardly seems adaptive to suffer from a psychological disorder—in fact, lack of adaptiveness is often used as a criterion for labeling a behavior as abnormal.

It’s important to keep in mind that abnormal behaviors are often simply extreme versions of behaviors that otherwise have adaptive qualities. Anxiety, for instance, is an adaptive body response that prepares us for action and helps keep us vigilant in our surroundings. It becomes a problem only in its extreme form, when it is prolonged and chronic enough to impair normal functioning. Sigmund Freud believed certain kinds of psychologically based amnesias are adaptive because they prevent traumatic memories from intruding into con- scious awareness. To paraphrase William Shakespeare, there may indeed be a bit of method in madness. On the other hand, it’s also reasonable to propose that psychological disorders represent a kind of breakdown in the system. In particular, schizophrenia may arise from faulty brain functioning— the system ceases to be adaptive because it no longer has the capacity to function properly.

Conceptualizing Abnormality Conceptualizing abnormal beha- vior turns out to be a rather difficult thing to do. A num- ber of criteria have been proposed, including the notions of statistical and cultural deviance. By deviance, psychologists typically mean behavior that is unusual in some way, either with respect to its statistical likelihood or with respect to the accepted norms of the culture. Abnormality can also be defined in terms of emotional distress or dysfunction. None of these criteria alone is sufficient to capture the concept. The concept of abnormality is usually defined by a combination of these factors.

Currently, many mental health professionals conceive of abnormal behavior from a medical model. According to this view, psychological disorders are best described as “illnesses” that can be “cured” through appropriate treatment. There are advantages and disadvantages to this approach, and it should not be taken too literally. Physical illnesses often have clearly identifiable causes, but this is seldom true for psychological disorders. Also of concern are the effects of diagnostic label- ing of disorders: Diagnostic labels can sometimes become self-fulfilling prophecies, which can make it harder for a suffering person to recover.

Classifying Psychological Disorders Most mental health pro- fessionals rely on the DSM, which lists objective criteria for the diagnosis of psychological disorders. Anxiety disorders are diagnosed when a person’s apprehension and worry become so extreme that behavior is impaired. Generalized anxiety disorder is characterized by chronic worrying that can’t be attributed to any obvious source. Phobias are highly focused fears of specific objects or events. Obsessive– compulsive disorders are characterized by the presence of persistent, uncontrollable thoughts (obsessions) or by compelling needs to perform actions repetitively (compulsions).

In somatic symptom disorders, the focus revolves around the body: You might have a persistent preoccupation with the possibility that you’ve contracted a serious disease, or you might appear to suffer from an actual physical problem that has no identifiable physical cause (conversion disorder).

In dissociative disorders, the person appears to separate, or dissociate, previous thoughts and memories from current conscious awareness. These disorders include dissociative amnesia, dissociative fugue states, and the more controversial dissociative identity disorder, in which the person appears to have two or more distinct personalities.

Depressive disorders are associated with prolonged dis- ruptions in emotional state. In bipolar disorder, an individual alternates between the highs of mania and the lows of depres- sion. Schizophrenia, the final clinical syndrome we discussed, is characterized by distorted thoughts and perceptions. The symptoms of schizophrenia include delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized speech and behavior. Negative symptoms include restricted or flat affect, which means that the person shows little or no emotional reaction to events. People with personality disorders show impairments in personality func- tioning and possess “pathological” personality traits. The net result is chronic or enduring patterns of behavior that lead to significant impairments in social functioning.

Understanding Psychological Disorders Mental health profes- sionals currently believe that the root cause, or etiology, of most disorders lies in a combination of biological, cognitive, and environmental factors. Some disorders may result from disordered or malfunctioning brains. There’s evidence to sup- port the idea that some psychological problems result from neurotransmitter problems or perhaps from structural prob- lems in brain anatomy. Many psychological disorders also appear to have a genetic basis—individuals may inherit a pre- disposition for a particular kind of problem.

Psychological disorders are also typically characterized by maladaptive thinking, and it has been suggested that mal- adaptive beliefs and attributions contribute to the appearance

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Psychological Disorders Are

472 | CHAPTER 14 Psychological Disorders

of abnormal behavior. Depressed individuals, for example, tend to attribute negative events to internal, stable, and global causes; these attributions are often associated with a sense of hopelessness, or the faulty belief that things cannot get better.

Finally, all theories of psychological disorders rely in one form or another on the environment. For example, your

cultural background may play a role in the expression of bio- logical or genetic predispositions and may even determine the kinds of personal attributions you make. It’s possible that some psychological problems may arise almost entirely from environmental influences. It’s possible that people learn to act abnormally, either through conditioning or through model- ing the behavior of significant people around them.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior?

● “Abnormal” and “normal” are best understood as ends of a (1) rather than as distinct categories. Statistical (2) refers to behavior that occurs infrequently among members of a population. (3) deviance is a criterion used to compare behaviors to current cultural (4) . The extent of (5) distress is also relevant in evaluating whether a condition is abnormal. A final criterion is the extent of (6) , a break- down in the ability to perform typical daily activities.

● “Insanity” is a (7) concept, not a (8) one. A criminal is insane, and therefore not guilty by rea- son of insanity, if, because of a mental condition, he or she fails to (9) at the time of the crime that certain actions are wrong in a (10) or (11) sense.

● According to the (12) model, abnormal behav- ior is caused by an underlying (13) . This model is influential, and (14) have been developed that are effective in treating a variety of psychological disorders. Some researchers feel that it is difficult to make direct comparisons between (15) and psychological illnesses.

● Critics of the medical model are concerned that (16) a psychological disorder as an illness attaches a (17) to the person that is hard to overcome. Research has shown that labeling someone as “abnormal” can lead people to interpret (18) behaviors as signs of a (19) disorder.

Classifying Psychological Disorders: The DSM ● The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of Mental Disorders is a well-defined (20) system for psychological disorders. Based on (21) and (22) criteria, it contains descriptions, symp- toms, and other criteria for diagnosing mental disorders. The DSM does (23) suggest therapies or methods of treatment.

● A person may be diagnosed with an (24) disor- der if the level of (25) and worry is so extreme that behavior is impaired. (26) anxiety disorder is characterized by excessive, chronic, and unfocused worrying. (27) disorder is characterized by (28) attacks of intense (29) or dread and is sometimes complicated by (30) , the fear of being in public. The defining feature of a specific (31) is a highly focused fear of a particular object or situation. In (32) – disorder, a person suffers from persistent thoughts (obsessions) or the compelling need to perform actions (compulsions).

● (33) disorders are associated with the (34) body. A healthy person suffers from persistent physical symptoms or misinterprets normal bodily signs as evidence of (35) . In (36) disorder, there is real physical impairment with no apparent physical cause.

● People with a (37) disorder have a loss of memory. In (38) amnesia, a person is unable to remember important personal information. Dissociative (39) involves a loss of personal (40) followed by a flight from home. A person with dissociative (41) disorder alternates among distinct (42) or identity states; controversy surrounds such a diagnosis.

● Prolonged emotional disruptions are known as (43) disorders. A major (44) episode is characterized by numerous symptoms, which may include loss of interest in daily activities, chronic fatigue, trouble concentrating, and suicidal thoughts. A person with (45) disorder alternates between (46) and the hyperactive euphoria associated with (47) . A bipolar disorder may result in (48) ; risk factors include substance abuse, a sud- den very stressful event, the recent occurrence of other suicides, and prior suicide attempts and suicidal thoughts.

● Schizophrenia is a class of disorders that is characterized by fundamental disturbances in thought processes, (49) , or behavior. Both (50) and

Interactive Summary | 473

negative symptoms are associated with schizophrenia. Positive symptoms include (51) , thoughts with bizarre content and (52) , perceptions that aren’t triggered by external stimuli. Negative symptoms involve the elimination or reduction of normal behavior such as (53) affect, showing little emotional reaction. Other symptoms can include (54) , a general physical immobility or sudden wild adjustment of position, and disorganized (55) .

● In (56) disorders, chronic behavior patterns lead to significant impairment in (57) functioning. (58) personality disorder features an exagger- ated sense of self and the need to attract the attention of others; a person with (59) personality disorder shows little or no respect for social norms. Some psycholo- gists believe that people with these disorders are simply at an extreme on one or more of the Big (60) personality dimensions.

Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental?

● Some psychological disorders coincide with abnormal brain (61) or structure. Many psychological disorders

have a strong (62) basis; people may inherit a predisposition toward certain disorders. Schizophrenia has been linked to an oversupply of (63) , and to the interaction of dopamine and other neurotransmitters such as glutamate, GABA, and (64) . Depressive disorders may also reflect (65) imbalances.

● People with psychological disorders (especially depres- sion) have distinctive and predictable (66) styles. Someone with a tendency toward depression is likely to respond to a negative event with (67) , stable, and (68) attributions. According to the (69) theory of depression, people who repeatedly fail to (70) their environment give up and may have a sense of hopelessness, which leads to depression.

● (71) plays a pivotal role in psychological disorders. For example, (72) can affect whether you will be exposed to an event that triggers the onset of a disorder and how the disorder will be (73) . Some psychologists believe that certain disorders can be (74) through (75) conditioning or modeling, such as a phobia, or through operant conditioning.

Media Resources

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

Terms to Remember agoraphobia, 452 antisocial personality disorder, 462 anxiety disorders, 452 bio-psycho-social perspective, 464 bipolar disorder, 458 borderline personality disorder, 462 conversion disorder, 455 cultural deviance, 446 depressive disorders, 458 diagnostic labeling effects, 448 dissociative amnesia, 456

dissociative disorders, 456 dissociative fugue, 456 dissociative identity disorder, 456 DSM, 451 dysfunction, 446 emotional distress, 446 generalized anxiety disorder, 452 insanity, 448 learned helplessness, 468 major depressive episode, 458 manic episode, 458

medical model, 448 narcissistic personality disorder, 462 obsessive–compulsive disorder, 454 panic disorder, 452 personality disorders, 462 phobic disorder, 453 schizophrenia, 460 social anxiety disorder, 453 somatic symptom disorders, 455 statistical deviance, 445

474

15 Therapy

Psychology For A reAson What Is Psychotherapy For?

Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies

Learning Goals Drug Therapies Electroconvulsive Therapy Psychosurgery Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.1

Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies Learning Goals Psychoanalysis: Resolving Unconscious

Conflicts Cognitive Therapies: Changing Maladaptive

Beliefs

PrAcTIcAl solUTIons Choosing a Therapist

Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.4

Psychology For A reAson What Psychotherapy Is For

chAPTer revIew Interactive Summary Terms to Remember

Humanistic Therapies: Treating the Human Spirit

Group Therapy Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.2

Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies

Learning Goals Conditioning Techniques Applying Rewards and Punishments Social Skills Training Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.3

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy Learning Goals Clinical Evaluation Research Common Factors Across Psychotherapies

475

If you’re hearing voices in your head, and you’re convinced that the alien takeover is on schedule for next Tuesday, it’s likely you’re having trouble leading a normal life. You probably can’t hold a job or make lasting friends, and you may even have difficulty carrying on a meaningful conversation. Clearly, you need some kind of treatment—psychotherapy—to deal with your mental, emotional, and behavioral problems. But as you’ll discover in this chapter, even those with less severe distur- bances can benefit from the right kind of therapy. Suppose Carlos turns down the job of national sales manager simply because he’s afraid of flying; what if Julie spends most of her time alone in her apartment because she’s convinced she’ll embarrass her- self in social settings?

Treatment options are available to tackle these kinds of problems in everyday liv- ing as well—psychotherapy isn’t just for the severely impaired. Mental health profes- sionals have a variety of tools at their disposal to help people regain their ability to function well in their surroundings. The particular tool used by the therapist depends on a number of factors, including the specific type of disorder being treated and the personality of the person seeking treatment. Treatment can be administered in a vari- ety of ways. Some people respond well to one-on-one encounters with a therapist; others thrive best in group settings. As we discussed in Chapter 1, good therapists tailor the treatment to meet the needs of the particular client. This doesn’t mean that therapists must abandon all theoretical orientations, but it does require flexibility. Good therapists recognize that a method that works for one person can be ineffective for another.

As you saw in Chapter 14, when psychologists study the cause of a psychological disorder, they usually look for contributions from biological, cognitive, or environ- mental factors. Abnormal behavior can be caused by problems in the brain, irrational beliefs, environmental experiences, or some combination of these factors. As a result, most kinds of psychotherapy are specifically designed to treat either the body, the mind, or the environment.

Treating the Body Abnormal functioning in the brain is thought to contribute to a number of disorders. Schizophrenia, for example, might be due in part to imbalances in neurotransmitters; depression and mania have also been linked to the activities of

psychotherapy Treatment designed to help people deal with mental, emotional, or behavioral problems.

● Psychology For A reAson What Is Psychotherapy For?

476 | CHAPTER 15 Therapy

neurotransmitters. To address these kinds of problems, it makes sense to con- sider treating the body itself through biomedical therapies. One option might be to administer a drug that restores the proper balance of neurotransmitters; other options might include surgery to fix the damage that exists in a particular region of the brain or even the use of electric shock treatment.

Treating the Mind Psychological disorders are often associated with abnor- mal thoughts and beliefs. Many psychologists are convinced that the key to improvement is insight—you must gain awareness of your own thought pro- cesses. When you think of psychotherapy, do you imagine someone lying on a couch talking about dreams and early childhood experiences? Although this stereotypical image is accurate in some respects, you’ll see in the discussion of insight therapies that many therapists have abandoned the couch, as well as the emphasis on dreams and early experiences. What remains is the idea that exploring one’s thought processes can be an effective tool for solving psychological problems.

Treating the Environment Psychologists also accept that certain kinds of dis- orders might be learned. We might learn to think and act in abnormal ways in much the same way that we acquire other thoughts and actions—through operant conditioning, classical conditioning, or by modeling the actions of oth- ers. Behavioral therapies use basic learning principles to change dysfunctional behaviors into adaptive behaviors. For example, if experience has taught you to associate high places with disabling fear, it might be possible to alter the associa- tion either through extinction or by counterconditioning relaxation to replace the fear.

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy Do all forms of therapy work, or are some more effective than others? Therapy can be a costly and time-consum- ing process, so it’s important to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the intervention. A number of studies have been conducted comparing people who have undergone therapy with those left untreated. Although many studies demonstrate the effectiveness of psychotherapy, some of the findings may surprise you.

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Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies | 477

Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies LEARNING GOALS

●● Explain how drug therapies are used to treat psychological disorders. ●● Discuss and evaluate electroconvulsive therapy. ●● Explain why psychosurgery is sometimes used to treat psychological disorders.

Psychological disorders have been around since the beginning of recorded history. And for just as long, people have speculated about what causes abnormal behavior and have offered remedies for its treatment. At one time it was popular to appeal to supernatural forces: People who exhibited bizarre or deviant behavior were believed to be possessed by evil spirits or demons. The cure, if we can call it that, was to tor- ture the sufferer in an effort to drive out the evil inhabitants.

But not all serious thinkers adopted such views. In fact, more than 2000 years ago Hippocrates (469–377 b.c.) and his followers suggested that psychological disorders should be treated as products of the body. Hippocrates believed people get depressed or exhibit manic episodes for much the same reason we fall victim to the common cold—the body and brain, and hence the mind, are affected by some kind of “dis- ease.” Hippocrates even went so far as to recommend changes in diet and exercise as a way of treating depression, a course of action that many modern therapists consider appropriate today.

The medical approach to understanding disorders gained scientific respectability in the 19th and early 20th centuries as researchers began to establish links between known physical problems and the symptoms of psychological disorders. By the end of the 19th century it was recognized that the venereal disease syphilis is respon- sible not only for a steady deterioration in physical health (and eventually death) but also for the appearance of paranoia and hallucinations. Establishing a link between syphilis and mental problems was an important step in the eventual development of biologically based therapies. Early “cures” for the disease included injecting suffer- ers with the blood of malaria patients in an effort to induce a high fever that would “burn out” the syphilis bacteria; today, of course, doctors use antibiotics to treat syphilis.

In this section of the chapter we’ll consider several modern biological approaches to the treatment of psychological disorders. Biomedical therapies use physiological interventions to reduce or eliminate the symptoms of psychological disorders. By far the most popular approach is treatment with medication, and we’ll consider this approach first, but other biomedical therapies are available, including electroconvul- sive therapy and psychosurgery.

Drug Therapies The psychological community recognized the remarkable potential of drug therapy in the early 1950s when two French psychiatrists, Jean Delay and Pierre Deniker, reported success in treating the positive symptoms of schizophrenia with a drug called chlorpromazine (often sold under the brand name Thorazine). Patients suffering from delusions and hallucinations showed considerable improvement after using the drug. Since that time, dozens of other drugs have proved successful in treating a wide variety of psychological disorders. In fact, specific medications are now available to treat most of the disorders we considered in Chapter 14—everything from obsessive– compulsive disorder to depression. Unfortunately, these drugs do not work for all people, and as you’ll see, some drugs have disturbing side effects. But they’ve helped thousands, and in many ways they’ve revolutionized the mental health profession.

biomedical therapies Biologically based treatments for reducing or eliminating the symptoms of psychological disorders.

This engraving from 1598 shows an early form of “therapy” for psychological disorders— drilling holes in the head to promote the release of evil spirits.

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478 | CHAPTER 15 Therapy

Antipsychotic Drugs Medications that treat the positive symptoms of schizophrenia—for exam- ple, delusions or hallucinations—are commonly called antipsychotic drugs. Chlorpromazine is an example of such a drug, but a number of others are also available. The majority of these antipsychotic drugs are believed to act on the neurotransmitter dopamine in the brain. As we discussed in Chapter 14, many research- ers believe schizophrenia is caused partly by abnormalities in the regulation of dopamine. Chlorpromazine acts as a dopamine antagonist, meaning that it blocks or slows down the use of dopamine in the brain (e.g., Weiden, 2007; see ● Figure 15.1). The fact that dopamine antago- nists work so well in treating positive symptoms is considered strong support for the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia (Walker et al., 2004).

But dopamine antagonists don’t work for all sufferers of schizophrenia. Moreover, these drugs tend to work almost exclusively on posi- tive symptoms. The negative symptoms of schizophrenia, such as the sharp decline in the normal expression of emotions, are rarely affected by the administration of traditional antipsychotic medications. Antipsychotic drugs can also produce unwanted and persistent side

effects in some people, including drowsiness, difficulties in concentrating, blurry vision, and movement disorders. One particularly serious side effect is a condition called tardive dyskinesia, which produces involuntary movements of the tongue, jaw, mouth, and face. These side effects can be permanent, and they act as a two-edged sword: Not only are they extremely uncomfortable, but they increase the chances that the patient will stop taking the medication. Without the medication, of course, the positive symptoms of the disorder are likely to reemerge.

Newer medications, including clozapine and risperidone, work well for people who don’t respond to the more traditional dopamine antagonists (Chakos et al., 2001). These medications do not produce movement side effects such as tardive dyskine- sia, although medical complications can still be a concern. From a research stand- point, the effectiveness of the newer second-generation medications is noteworthy because they don’t work by simply regulating the amount of dopamine in the brain. It’s believed they affect a number of neurotransmitters, including dopamine and serotonin (Richtand et al., 2007). This suggests that dopamine alone, as we noted in Chapter 14, can’t account entirely for schizophrenic disorders. Recently, researchers have begun to focus extensively on the neurotransmitter glutamate. Some evidence suggests that altering presynaptic levels of glutamate may be an important key to reducing the symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia (Moghaddam & Javitt, 2012).

Antidepressant Drugs The 1950s also witnessed the introduction of medications for treating manic episodes and depression. Depressive disorders have been linked to several neurotransmitters, including norepinephrine and serotonin. Antidepressant drugs act by modulating the availability or effectiveness of these neurotransmitters. The group of antidepressants called tricyclics, for example, alter mood by acting pri- marily on norepinephrine; tricyclics apparently allow norepinephrine to linger in synapses longer than normal, which eventually modulates its effectiveness. The most commonly prescribed antidepressants act on serotonin. So-called selective serotonin

antipsychotic drugs Medications that reduce the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.

crITIcAl ThInkIng

Just because dopamine antagonists reduce the positive symptoms of schizophrenia does not necessarily mean that dopamine causes schizophrenia. Why not?

antidepressant drugs Medications that modulate the availability or effectiveness of the neurotransmitters implicated in “depressive” disorders.

●● FIgUre 15.1 Dopamine Antagonists Some antipsychotic medications act as antagonists, which means they block or slow down the action of neurotransmitters in the brain. Here, a dopamine antagonist binds with the receptor membrane, blocking the neurotransmitter. (© Cengage Learning)

Dopamine is released.

Neural impulse arrives at terminal button.

Dopamine antagonists ( ) prevent dopamine from binding

to membrane receptors ( ).

Vesicle containing dopamine ( )

Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies | 479

reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) block the reabsorption (or reuptake) of serotonin into the neuron, thereby allowing it to linger longer in the synapse and continue to activate receptor neurons (see ● Figure 15.2). Commonly prescribed examples of SSRIs include Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft.

Researchers don’t know exactly how or why these medications affect mood, although experimental research (usually with animals) continues to suggest that sero- tonin is important (e.g., Carr & Lucki, 2011). Fortunately, existing medications do work well for many individuals affected with depression. It’s been estimated that sus- tained use of antidepressants successfully controls depression in well over 50% of all depressed people, although some of the benefits may be due to placebolike effects (Kirsch, 2010). On the downside, it can take several weeks for these medications to begin working (the time period may differ across the different types of antidepres- sants), and potential side effects must be monitored. SSRIs, for example, can produce agitation or restlessness, difficulty sleeping, weight gain, and even diminished sexual desire.

Effective medications are also available for treating bipolar disorders, which pro- duce mood swings between depression and hyperactive manic episodes. Bipolar dis- orders are usually treated by administering a common salt called lithium carbonate. Lithium is more effective for bipolar disorder than other antidepressants because it works well on mania; it puts people on a more even keel and helps to prevent the reoccurrence of future manic episodes. But it, too, needs to be monitored closely because lithium use can lead to a variety of medical complications (Smith et al., 2010).

Antianxiety Drugs For the treatment of psychological problems associated with anxiety, mental health professionals typically use antianxiety drugs, known more generally as tranquilizers. Tranquilizers come from a class of chemicals called benzodi- azepines—Valium and Xanax are popular brand names—and they are quite effective

antianxiety drugs Medications that reduce tension and anxiety.

●● FIgUre 15.2 reuptake Blockers Some kinds of antidepressant medications block the reabsorption of neurotransmitters, which then linger longer in the synapse and continue to activate receptor neurons. Prozac is in the class of antidepressants that block the reabsorption of serotonin. (© Cengage Learning)

Serotonin is released.

Neural impulse arrives at terminal button.

Vesicle containing serotonin ( )

Prozac ( ) prevents normal reuptake of serotonin by the presynaptic cell.

Serotonin binds to receptor ( ) and triggers a postsynaptic response.

480 | CHAPTER 15 Therapy

for reducing tension and anxiety. In the mid-1970s it was estimated that 10 to 20% of adults in the Western world were “popping” tranquilizers (Greenblatt & Shader, 1978), which gives you some idea of their widespread use. In recent years tranquilizer use has been on the decline, primarily because mental health professionals recognize a downside to their continued use.

Most benzodiazepines appear to work on the neurotransmitter GABA, which produces primarily inhibitory effects. The effectiveness of GABA increases after tak- ing the drug, which leads to a lowering of excitation in affected neurons (Gielen et al., 2012). Potential side effects include drowsiness, impaired motor coordination, and possible psychological dependence (Wells & Carter, 2006). Tranquilizers can act as a psychological crutch after lengthy use, so the majority of clinicians now recommend that they be used primarily as a short-term remedy for anxiety rather than as a long- term cure. Newer antianxiety drugs, such as buspirone, may not produce the same degree of dependency. Increasingly, however, therapists are finding that antidepres- sants, particularly SSRIs, are effective in treating anxiety disorders, and they’re now being widely prescribed (Golden, 2004).

Electroconvulsive Therapy When traditional medications fail, particularly for depression, clinicians sometimes turn to a more controversial form of biomedical therapy: shock treatment. As you know, the language of the nervous system is partly electrical in nature. If electric shock is administered to the brain, a brief brain seizure will occur that produces, among other things, convulsions and loss of consciousness. When electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) was first introduced in the 1930s, it was a terrifying and hazardous procedure; patients suffered serious side effects that included the occasional broken bone from the convulsions. Modern applications of ECT are much less physically traumatic; the patient is given a light anesthetic and medications that relax the mus- cles so injuries won’t occur.

Many mental health professionals believe ECT is a reasonably safe and effec- tive form of treatment for people who suffer from severe depression. It’s used almost exclusively for depression, although some clinicians believe it benefits other psycho- logical problems as well (Fink, 2001). It’s considered to be a treatment of last resort, to be used only when people have shown little or no response to antidepressant drugs or other conventional forms of psychotherapy. Controlled research studies have found that ECT is successful some 50 to 70% of the time in lessening the symptoms of depression in people who have not otherwise responded to treatment (Carney et al.,

electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) A treatment used primarily for depression in which a brief electric current is delivered to the brain.

●● concePT revIew Drug Therapies TyPE of DRug TREATmEnT usED in ExAmPlEs AnD EffECTs

Antipsychotic Positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized speech

Chlorpromazine is a dopamine antagonist. It blocks or impedes the flow of dopamine in the brain. Clozapine has proven effective in alleviating some symp- toms of schizophrenia.

Antidepressants Depressive disorders Tricyclics alter mood by acting primarily on norepinephrine, allowing it to linger in synapses longer. Fluoxetine (e.g., Prozac) works primarily on serotonin, blocking its reuptake into the neuron. Lithium carbonate is used to treat bipolar disorder.

Antianxiety Psychological problems associated with anxiety

Tranquilizers come from a class of chemicals called benzodiazepines. They appear to work on the neurotransmitter GABA, which produces primarily inhibi- tory effects. The result is a lowering of excitation in affected neurons, reducing tension and anxiety.

Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies | 481

2003). Typically, these studies involve direct com- parisons between depressed people who receive ECT and those who undergo the same procedural preparations but don’t actually receive the shock.

Controversies Despite the demonstrated effec- tiveness of ECT as a treatment for severe depres- sion, the procedure remains controversial for several reasons. First, no one is certain exactly why the treatment works. It’s possible that shock- ing the brain affects the release of neurotrans- mitters or changes some structural feature of the brain, but at present there’s no definitive answer as to why the procedure changes mood. Second, ECT produces side effects, particularly confusion and a loss of memory for events surrounding the treatment (e.g., McCall, 2007). These side effects are usually temporary, and they’re not serious for most people, but they remain a concern. Third, people who receive ECT for depression have a relatively high relapse rate, which means they’re likely to tailspin into another depressive episode at some point (McCall, 2001). Finally, some researchers are concerned that ECT might cause permanent brain damage. Effective ECT usually requires repeated administrations of the shock over several weeks, and it’s not known what long-term effects these treatments have on the brain.

Is ECT worth the risks? The answer depends on the needs of the particular person. If you’re deeply depressed and no other treatment options have provided relief, or if the side effects of traditional medications cannot be tolerated, ECT can be a lifesaver. Many clinicians believe that if it comes down to a desperate choice between ending your life and suffering some confusion and memory loss, trying ECT is certainly worth the risk. Newer treatment options on the horizon may eventually prove more effective and have fewer side effects. For example, there is a procedure called magnetic seizure therapy, that uses magnetic fields to induce brief seizures in the cortex, without the electrical stimulation of brain structures involved in memory. Early evidence suggests that this technique may be effective in treating depression, without some of the side effects associated with ECT (Allan & Ebmeier, 2011).

Psychosurgery There is a direct connection between biological problems in the brain and some psy- chological disorders. People suffering from schizophrenia, for example, sometimes show structural abnormalities in the brain. It makes sense, then, to consider the pos- sibility of direct intervention, through brain surgery, to fix these problems perma- nently. Certainly if your appendix or gall bladder was infected and the diseased organ was creating a whole host of physical symptoms, you wouldn’t think twice about fix- ing the problem with surgery. Wouldn’t it be nice if we could just remove the part of the brain that is causing the psychological problem?

Actually, the use of psychosurgery—surgery that destroys or alters tissue in the brain in an effort to affect behavior—has been around for decades. In the 1930s, a surgical procedure called the prefrontal lobotomy was pioneered by a Portuguese physician, Egas Moniz (and later in the United States by Walter Freeman and James

crITIcAl ThInkIng

Imagine you’re treating a severely depressed person who is clearly suicidal. Remember, drug therapies can take weeks to work. Would you consider ECT for such a person? How about an elderly patient who refuses to eat, just wants to die, and cannot be given medications because of side effects?

psychosurgery Surgery that destroys or alters tissues in the brain in an effort to affect behavior.

ECT is a reasonably safe and effective form of treatment for patients suffering from severe depression, but it is still considered controversial by mental health professionals.

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482 | CHAPTER 15 Therapy

Watts). The operation involved a crude sepa- ration of the frontal lobes from the rest of the brain. The surgery was designed to sever vari- ous connections in the brain’s circuitry in the hope that it might produce calming tenden- cies in disturbed patients. The procedure was widely used for several decades, and, in fact, Moniz was awarded the Nobel Prize for his work in 1949. But prefrontal lobotomies even- tually fell into disrepute. Many patients were killed by the procedure, and it produced seri- ous cognitive deficits in many others. They lost their ability to plan and coordinate actions, capabilities associated with activity in the frontal lobes.

Psychosurgery is still used as a way of treating problems that have failed to respond to conventional forms of therapy, but its use is exceedingly rare. One modern form of psy- chosurgery, called a cingulotomy, is sometimes used to treat obsessive–compulsive disorder and severe forms of depression ( Jenike, 1998;

Matthews & Eljamel, 2003). The surgery destroys a small portion of tissue in the lim- bic system of the brain. As with ECT, however, physicians really have no idea why this procedure works, nor can they explain why it works in some people but not in oth- ers. It’s another treatment of last resort that has proven effective for some but has not gained wide acceptance among the general psychological community. As our under- standing of the brain increases, however, it seems likely that surgical approaches to treatment may rise in popularity (Read & Greenberg, 2009).

Dr. Walter Freeman is shown here in 1949, demonstrating psychosurgery. He is inserting an instrument under the patient’s upper eyelid to sever certain neural connections in the brain and thereby relieve symptoms of a psychological disorder. Operations of this type are no longer performed.

Test yourself Check your knowledge about biomedical therapies by answering the following questions. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Pick the psychological disorder that is best treated by each of the following therapies or medications. Choose your answers from among the following: depression, manic episode, general- ized anxiety disorder, schizophrenia.

a. Clozapine: b. Prozac: c. Cingulotomy: d. ECT: e. Benzodiazepine:

2. Which of the following statements about ECT (electroconvulsive therapy) is false?

a. ECT is an effective treatment for depression. b. Researchers are uncertain how ECT works. c. ECT can produce confusion and some memory loss. d. ECT is used regularly to treat schizophrenia.

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.1

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Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies LEARNING GOALS

●● Evaluate psychoanalysis as a form of insight therapy. ●● Evaluate cognitive therapies. ●● Evaluate humanistic therapies. ●● Discuss group and family therapy.

People who suffer from psychological disorders often carry around faulty or irratio- nal beliefs about the world and about themselves. Many clinicians are convinced that the proper role for the therapist is to confront these irrational thoughts and beliefs directly through what are called insight therapies. Insight therapies are designed to give clients self-knowledge, or insight, into the content of their thought processes, usually through extensive one-on-one verbal interactions. The hope is that with insight people will adopt a more realistic, adaptive view of the world and change their behavior accordingly.

There are many types of insight therapy. We’ll consider three in this section: psy- choanalysis, cognitive therapies, and humanistic approaches. Most other insight therapies are related in one form or another to these three main approaches. The common thread is the belief that cognitive or mental insight can produce significant changes in one’s psychological condition. The therapies differ in the kinds of beliefs or memo- ries that are considered to be important and in how the client’s insight can best be obtained. Finally, we’ll end this section by briefly discussing the value of group and family therapy.

Psychoanalysis: Resolving Unconscious Conflicts Probably the best-known insight therapy is psychoanalysis, which comes originally from the work of Sigmund Freud. As you may remember from Chapter 12, Freud placed enormous emphasis on the concept of the unconscious mind. He believed that each of us houses a kind of hidden reservoir that is filled with memories, primitive urges, and conflicts. We can’t directly think about the urges and memories stored in the unconscious mind, but they affect our behavior nonetheless. Freud believed that through psychoanalysis these hidden impulses and memories can be brought to the surface of awareness, thereby freeing us from unwanted thoughts and behaviors.

Freud based his theory primarily on case studies. He routinely treated patients with troubling psychological problems, and he discovered he could often help these people by getting them to recall and relive traumatic experiences they had apparently forgotten, or repressed. Freud was particularly interested in the emotionally signifi- cant experiences of childhood because he believed that during childhood we progress through a number of psychologically “fragile” stages of psychosexual development (see Chapter 12). Traumatic experiences are, by definition, anxiety provoking and therefore difficult for the young mind to deal with, so they’re buried in the uncon- scious. Although no longer consciously available, these experiences continue to affect behavior.

The Tools of Psychoanalysis The goal of psychoanalysis is to help uncover, and thereby relive, unconscious conflicts. Obviously, because people are unaware of the conflicts, the therapist needs certain tools to access the contents of the unconscious mind. Freud liked to compare psychoanalysis to excavating a buried city, but instead of picks and shovels his tools were the uncensored expressions and feelings of his patients. Freud relied heavily on a technique called free association, in which people

insight therapies Treatments designed to give clients self-knowledge, or insight, into the contents of their thought processes.

psychoanalysis Freud’s method of treatment that attempts to bring hidden impulses and memories, which are locked in the unconscious, to the surface of awareness, thereby freeing the client from disordered thoughts and behaviors.

free association A technique used in psychoanalysis to explore the contents of the unconscious; clients are asked to freely express whatever thoughts and feelings happen to come into their minds.

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were asked to relax and freely express whatever thoughts and feelings happened to come into their minds. To the untrained eye, the result was a series of meaningless and unrelated streams of thought, but to Freud these free associations represented symbolic clues to the contents of the unconscious.

Freud’s other important therapeutic tool was dreams. Through dream analysis, he felt the therapist was handed a royal road to the unconscious. As we discussed in Chapter 6, Freud was convinced that dreams are partly a psychological mechanism for wish fulfillment, a way to satisfy hidden desires that are too anxiety provoking to come to consciousness directly. The storyline of dreams, he believed, is largely symbolic— there is a hidden meaning to dreams, a latent content, that reveals the unconscious. This latent content can be contrasted with the actual events and symbols of the dream, which Freud called its manifest content. Freud encouraged his patients to describe their dreams so he could acquire further clues in his search for hidden psychological truth.

Resistance and Transference In classic psychoanalysis, the therapist seeks to under- stand the contents of the unconscious, but it’s really the client who needs the insight. The therapist can’t simply relay the hidden meanings that he or she uncovers—expla- nation is not enough. Instead, the individual needs to face the emotional conflicts directly and relive them, and the therapist acts only as a kind of learned guide. But the journey toward insight is not an easy one, and the therapist must usually maneu- ver around a number of roadblocks. For example, people typically go through periods in which they are uncooperative. They show resistance, which is an unconsciously motivated attempt to subvert or hinder the therapy.

Why would people try to block their own therapy? Hidden conflicts are anxi- ety provoking, so people use defense mechanisms to reduce the anxiety. As Freud (1912/1964) put it, “Resistance accompanies the treatment at every step; every single association, every act of the patient’s . . . represents a compromise between the forces aiming at cure and those opposing it” (p. 140). The resistance can express itself in a variety of ways; the client might become inattentive, claim to forget dreams, skip therapy sessions, or argue with the directions suggested by the therapist.

Overcoming resistance is a major challenge for the therapist. Freud believed that a turning point comes when the client begins to show a type of resistance called transference. Transference occurs when thoughts or feelings are expressed toward the therapist that are actually representative of the way the client feels about other significant people in his or her life. He or she “transfers” feelings of love, hate, or dependence onto a substitute figure, the therapist. Depending on the repressed feel- ings being tapped, the client might turn the therapist into an object of passionate love or into a hated and despised individual (see ● Figure 15.3).

Transference is a significant event in analysis because it means that the client’s hidden memories and conflicts are close to the surface of consciousness. The client is fully aware of the strong feelings he or she is experiencing—although the object of those feelings is inappropriate—and this gives the therapist an opportunity to help the client work through what those feelings might mean. The person is no lon- ger in denial of powerful emotional urges—they’re right there on the surface, ready to be dealt with. At the same time, it’s important for the therapist to recognize that the client’s feelings at this point are symbolic. It’s not uncommon for the patient to express feelings of strong sexual desire for the therapist, for example, and it would be inappropriate and unethical for the therapist to take them as literal truth (American Psychological Association, 2002a).

Current Applications Classical psychoanalysis, as practiced by Freud and his contem- poraries, is very time-consuming. It can take years for the analyst to excavate the secrets of the unconscious, and the client needs to be properly prepared to accept the insights when they’re delivered. Remember, the client is setting up roadblocks throughout the process. So this kind of therapy is certainly far from a quick fix. It’s not only time-consuming but also expensive.

dream analysis A technique used in psychoanalysis; Freud believed that dreams are symbolic and contain important information about the unconscious.

resistance In psychoanalysis, a person’s unconsciously motivated attempts to subvert or hinder the process of therapy.

transference In psychoanalysis, the patient’s expression of thoughts or feelings toward the therapist that are actually representative of the way the patient feels about other significant people in his or her life.

crITIcAl ThInkIng

What do you think Freud would have thought about the value of biomedical therapies? Would he have supported or rejected the idea of treating psychological disorders through medications, ECT, or psychosurgery?

Sigmund Freud used the analysis of dreams, even his own, as the “royal road” to understanding the contents of the unconscious mind.

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For these reasons, modern practitioners of psychoanalysis often streamline the therapeutic process (Coren, 2001). Briefer forms of therapy encourage the therapist to take a more active role. Rather than waiting for people to find insight themselves, the analyst is much more willing to offer interpretations in the early stages of therapy. Instead of waiting for transference to occur on its own, the analyst might encourage role playing in an attempt to get the person to deal with deep-seated feelings. Using these tech- niques, progress can occur in weeks or months rather than requir- ing years of analysis (see Charman, 2004).

In addition to increasing the speed of treatment, modern versions of psychoanalysis are often tailored to meet the needs of the particular client. No attempt is made to excavate and recon- struct the person’s entire personality; instead, the analyst focuses on selective defense mechanisms or conflicts that are more per- tinent to the individual’s symptoms. Often a greater empha- sis is placed on improving the client’s interpersonal and social skills, and less attention is given to sexual and aggressive drives. Because these forms of treatment differ from classical psycho- analysis, they usually go by the more general term psychodynamic therapy.

Cognitive Therapies: Changing Maladaptive Beliefs According to Freud’s theory, a person’s conscious thoughts, beliefs, and feelings are important primarily because they provide clues to the inner workings of the unconscious mind. Cognitive therapies, in contrast, place a much greater emphasis on the conscious beliefs themselves, rather than on what those beliefs may mean symbolically. Cognitive therapists assume that irrational beliefs and negative thoughts are primarily responsible for psychological disorders. If you can change the negative thoughts and beliefs, the psychological disorder will be changed as well.

Let’s take depression as an example. People who are depressed usually don’t think productively. They view them- selves as essentially worthless and unlovable, and they see little chance that things will change for the better in the future. Thinking in such a way clouds the interpre- tation of normal events; everyday experiences are passed through a kind of nega- tive filter, which means that depressed people often jump to irrational conclusions. For instance, a depressed woman whose husband arrives home slightly late from work might be immediately convinced that her husband is having an affair. The depressed student who fails the test might see the F as confirmation of a dull and stupid mind.

Cognitive therapists believe it’s not direct experience, such as failure on a test, that actually produces depression. Think about it. It’s not particularly diffi- cult to fail a test—just stop going to class or refrain from studying. The F by itself doesn’t logically mean much. You can fail a test for many reasons, and most of these reasons have nothing to do with your intrinsic worth as a human being. But in the mind of a depressed person, the event (failing the test) is accompanied by an irrational belief (“I’m incredibly stupid”), and it’s this belief that leads to negative emotional consequences (feeling sad and depressed). Thus, it’s the interpretation of the event, not the event itself, that leads to problems (Beck, 1991; Ellis, 1962, 1993; see ● Figure 15.4.)

cognitive therapies Treatments designed to remove irrational beliefs and negative thoughts that are presumed to be responsible for psychological disorders.

“ I know I’m late. I ... uh... couldn’t find my dream notes.”

Resistance

Transference “You really understand me. I cherish our time together.”

●● FIgUre 15.3 resistance and Transference Freud believed that uncooperative actions by the client, which he called resistance, were unconsciously motivated attempts to subvert the therapeutic process. Through transference, Freud believed, clients transfer unconscious feelings for significant others onto the therapist. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

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Rational-Emotive Therapy The goal of cognitive therapy, then, is to remove these irrational beliefs. But how can irrational beliefs be changed? One technique is to challenge the beliefs directly, through active and aggressive confrontation. In rational-emotive therapy, developed by Albert Ellis, the therapist acts as a cross- examiner, verbally questioning the client’s irrational thought processes. Here’s an excerpt from an exchange between a therapist practicing rational-emotive therapy and a client showing signs of depressed thinking (from Walen et al., 1992, pp. 204–205):

Therapist: You really believe that you’re an utterly worthless person. By defi- nition, that means that you’re doing things poorly. Can you prove to me that that’s correct? Client: But I’ve failed at so many things. Therapist: Just how many? Client: I’ve lost my job, my wife is threatening to leave me, I don’t get along with my kids—my whole life’s a mess! Therapist: Well, let me make two points. First of all, that’s not every aspect of your life. Second, you seem to take total responsibility for all of those events, rather than only partial responsibility. Client: But even if I’m not totally responsible, I’m still a failure. Therapist: No. You’ve failed at those things. There are other things you haven’t failed at. Client: Like what? Therapist: You still manage to get up every morning, you keep up appear- ances, you manage your finances well considering your economic plight— there’s lots of things you do well. Client: But they don’t count! Therapist: They don’t count to you right now because you’re overly con- cerned with negative issues, but they certainly do count. There are lots of people who don’t do those things well. Are they failures? Client: No, but . . .

rational-emotive therapy A form of cognitive therapy in which the therapist acts as a kind of cross-examiner, verbally assaulting the client’s irrational thought processes.

●● FIgUre 15.4 The cognitive view of Depression Cognitive therapists believe that internal thoughts and beliefs, not direct experience, lead to depression. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

“I’m incredibly stupid!”

Irrational Beliefs

Depression

Emotional Reaction

Actual Causal Relationship

Observed Causal Relationship

Event

Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies | 487

Therapist: You know, Jack, you’re one of the most conceited people I’ve ever met! Client: What do you mean? I’ve just been telling you how lousy I am! Therapist: The fact that you hold two different standards tells me how con- ceited you are. You hold much higher standards for yourself than for anyone else, which implies that you think you’re much better than others. It’s okay for those lowly slobs to have problems, but not a terrific person like you. Isn’t that contradictory to your notion that you’re worthless? Client: Hmmmmm. Therapist: How about instead of rating yourself as worthless, you just accept the failings that you do have and try your best to improve them? Client: That sounds sensible.

Therapist: Let’s take one of those problem areas now and see how we can improve things . . .

The important part of rational-emotive therapy is the therapist’s attack on the rationality of the client’s beliefs. The therapist points out the irrationality of the cli- ent’s thought processes, sometimes in a confrontational manner, in the hope that the negative beliefs will ultimately be rejected, lessening their emotional consequences. Albert Ellis (1962) outlined what he believed to be the irrational beliefs that affect most people who seek treatment for psychological disorders. The therapist tries initially to pinpoint which of these beliefs the client holds, so they can be changed accordingly. Here are a few examples from Ellis’ list:

1. I must be loved and approved of by every significant person in my life, and if I’m not, it’s awful.

2. It’s awful when things are not the way I’d like them to be. 3. I should be very anxious about events that are uncertain or potentially dangerous. 4. I am not worthwhile unless I am thoroughly competent, adequate, and

achieving at all times, or at least most of the time in at least one major area. 5. I need someone stronger than myself on whom to depend or rely.

What makes these beliefs irrational is their inflexibility and absoluteness. I must be loved and approved; I must be thoroughly competent; I need someone stronger than myself. The client firmly believes things must be a particular way or something awful or catastrophic will happen. Ellis has used the term musterbation to refer to this kind of irrational thinking. Any time you find yourself thinking that something must be a particular way, you’re guilty of musterbation.

Beck’s Cognitive Therapy Although all forms of cognitive therapy focus on changing irrational thought processes, not all treatments are as harsh as rational-emotive therapy. The rational-emotive ther- apist will essentially lecture—and in some instances even belittle—the client in an effort to attack faulty beliefs. Other cognitive therapies, such as the treat- ment procedures pioneered by Aaron Beck, take a more subtle tack. Rather than directly confronting clients, Beck suggests it’s more therapeutic for clients to identify negative forms of thinking themselves. The therapist acts as an adviser, or coinvestigator, helping clients discover their own unique kinds of faulty beliefs (Beck & Dozois, 2011).

In a sense, clients who undergo Beck ’s cogni- tive therapy are asked to become psychological

crITIcAl ThInkIng

Where do you think these irrational beliefs come from? Is it possible that people are taught to think in absolute and inflexible ways by their parents, role models, or by the general culture?

Albert Ellis developed rational-emotive therapy to help free people from irrational thoughts and beliefs.

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detectives. Part of the therapy involves extensive record keeping or “homework.” Between therapeutic sessions, Beck asks his clients to record their automatic (or knee-jerk) thoughts and emotions in a notebook as they experience various situations during the day. Clients are then asked to write rational responses to those thoughts and emotions, as if they were scientists evaluating data. Is the thought justified by the actual event? What’s the evidence for and against the conclusions that I reached? The therapist hopes clients will eventually discover the contra- dictions and irrationality in their thinking and realign their beliefs accordingly (see ● Figure 15.5).

Humanistic Therapies: Treating the Human Spirit In cognitive therapy, the goal is for clients to gain insight into their faulty and irra- tional ways of thinking. In classical psychoanalysis, the focus is on hidden conflicts and desires. In humanistic therapy, the therapist tries to help the client gain insight into his or her own fundamental self-worth and value as a human. Therapy is a process of discovering one’s own unique potential, one’s natural capacity to grow and better oneself as a human being.

Humanistic therapists believe that people are capable of controlling their own behavior—we can help “fix” our own problems—because each of us has free will. We sometimes lose sight of our potential for change because we’re concerned about what others think of us and of our actions. We let others control how we think and feel. It

humanistic therapy Treatments designed to help clients gain insight into their fundamental self-worth and value as human beings.

Actual event leading to unpleasant emotion, or

Stream of thoughts, daydreams or recol- lections, leading to unpleasant emotion.

Explanation: When you experience an unpleasant emotion, note the situation that seemed to stimulate the emotion. (If the emotion occurred while you were thinking, daydreaming, etc., please note this.) Then note the automatic thought associated with the emotion. Record the degree to which you believe this thought: 0% = not at all, 100% = completely. In rating degree of emotion: 1 = a trace, 100 = the most intense possible.

Specify sad/ anxious/ angry, etc.

Rate degree of emotion, 1–100.

Record automatic thought(s) that preceded emotion(s).

Rate belief in auto- matic thought(s), 0–100%.

Write rational response to automatic thought(s).

Rate belief in rational response, 0–100%.

Rerate belief in automatic thought(s), 0–100%.

Specify and rate subsequent emotions, 0–100.

7/15 Audre didn't return my phone call.

She's out walking the dog so she hasn't had the time to call back. 70%

1. 35 % 15 %

2. Relieved – 35

People don't like talking to me – 75%

I'm incompetent. 65 %

Anxious – 75 Sad – 55

Angry – 40

Situation Emotion(s) Automatic Thought(s) Rational Response Outcome

●● FIgUre 15.5 homework From a cognitive Therapist During cognitive therapy, people are often asked to record their automatic thoughts and emotions in a daily log, which requires the person to construct a rational response to the situation and then rerate the emotional reaction. (Adapted from “Depression,” by A. T. Beck and J. E. Young. In D. H. Barlow (Ed.), Clinical Handbook of Psychological Disorders: A Step by Step Treatment Manual, pp. 667–668.)

Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies | 489

is the therapist’s job to help clients rediscover their natural self-worth—to help them get back in touch with their own true feelings, desires, and needs—by acting as a con- fidant and friend.

Client-Centered Therapy Humanistic therapies resemble cognitive therapies in their emphasis on conscious thought processes. But the goal is not to criticize or correct irrational thinking; quite the contrary, it’s to be totally supportive in all respects. The therapist’s proper role is to be nonjudgmental, which means the cli- ent should be accepted unconditionally. According to humanistic therapists such as Carl Rogers, the most effective form of therapy is client centered—it is the cli- ent, not the therapist, who ultimately holds the key to psychological health and happiness.

We discussed the theoretical ideas of humanistic psychologists, especially Carl Rogers, in some detail in Chapter 12. Rogers was convinced that most psychological problems originate from incongruence, which he defined as the discrepancy between our self-concept and the reality of our everyday experiences. People often hold an inaccurate view of themselves and their abilities, Rogers argued, because of an ingrained need for positive regard—they seek the approval, love, and companionship of significant others (such as their parents). But these significant others tend to attach conditions of worth to their approval: They demand that we think and act in ways that may not be consistent with our true inner feelings. Improvement comes from provid- ing a warm and supportive environment—without conditions of worth—that will encourage clients to accept themselves as they truly are.

In client-centered therapy, the therapist seeks to provide three essential core qualities to the client: genuineness, unconditional positive regard, and empathy. As the client’s confidant, the therapist must be completely genuine—he or she must act without phoniness and express true feelings in an open and honest way. The second quality, unconditional positive regard, means that the therapist cannot place condi- tions of worth on the client. The therapist must be totally accepting and respectful of

client-centered therapy A form of humanistic therapy proposing that it is the client, not the therapist, who holds the key to psychological health and happiness; the therapist’s role is to provide genuineness, unconditional positive regard, and empathy.

In humanistic therapies, the therapist tries to provide a completely supportive environment, which allows clients to rediscover their natural self-worth.

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the client at all times, even if the client thinks and acts in a way that seems irrational or inappropriate. Remember, humanists believe all people are essentially good—they simply need to be placed in an environment that will nurture their natural tendencies toward positive growth.

The third quality, empathy, is achieved when the therapist is able to truly under- stand and accept what the client is feeling—to see things from the client’s perspec- tive. Through empathy, the therapist acquires the capacity to reflect those feelings back in a way that helps the client gain insight into him- or herself. Consider the fol- lowing interaction between Carl Rogers and one of his clients, a woman coming to grips with deep feelings of betrayal and hurt that she’s tried to cover up (from Rogers, 1961, p. 94):

Client: I never did really know. But it’s—you know, it’s almost a physical thing. It’s—it’s sort of as though I were looking within myself at all kinds of—nerve endings and bits of things that have been sort of mashed. Rogers: As though some of the most delicate aspects of you physically almost have been crushed or hurt. Client: Yes. And you know, I do get the feeling, “Oh, you poor thing.” (Pause) Rogers: Just can’t help but feel very deeply sorry for the person that is you. Client: I don’t think I feel sorry for the whole person; it’s a certain aspect of the thing. Rogers: Sorry to see the hurt. Client: Yeah.

Notice that Rogers reflects back the feelings of the client in a completely non- judgmental fashion. He is seeking to understand and empathize with her feelings, thereby validating their existence and helping her to work through them. Notice also that it’s the client, not the therapist, who is doing the analyzing. Client-centered therapy is based on the idea that it’s the clients who understand what truly hurts them psychologically, and it’s the clients who have the best sense of how to pro- ceed with therapy. All the therapist can do is provide the right kind of supportive environment and help clients recognize their own self-worth and trust their own instincts.

Other Humanistic Approaches Client-centered therapy is the most popular form of humanistic therapy, but it’s not the only one. Gestalt therapy, developed by Fritz Perls (1969; Perls et al., 1951), also places the burden of treatment in the hands of a “natu- rally good” client, but the approach is far less gentle and nondirective than client-cen- tered therapy. In Gestalt therapy, clients are actively encouraged—even forced—to express their feelings openly. The emphasis is on the “here and now,” and the ther- apist uses a variety of techniques to get the client to open up. For example, in the “empty chair” technique, clients are asked to project their feelings onto an empty chair in the room and then, literally, “talk ” to those feelings (or to the person who is the source of those feelings). The idea is that only through fully understanding and overtly expressing oneself as a whole person (the word Gestalt roughly translates from the German as “whole”), can a person hope to take responsibility for those feel- ings and change them for the better.

Another group of humanistic treatments is known collectively as existential thera- pies. Existential therapists believe psychological problems originate from the anxiet- ies created by personal choices, such as whether to stay in school, get married, or quit a job. These fundamental choices—choices that relate to one’s daily existence as a human being—are often difficult to face, and individuals may choose not to deal with them directly. Existential therapists encourage their clients to accept responsibility for these decisions, but in a supportive environment that encourages positive growth (Yalom & Josselson, 2010).

crITIcAl ThInkIng

Think about the interactions you’ve had with a really close friend. Do you see any similarities to the client-centered approach advocated by Carl Rogers?

Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies | 491

Group Therapy Therapy is commonly perceived as a one-on-one experience—you and the therapist sit alone in a room discussing your problems. But there is no principled reason why the therapies we’ve been discussing can’t be conducted in group rather than individ- ual sessions. In group therapy, you join other people who are undergoing treatment for a similar problem. Typically, group sessions include the therapist and somewhere between 4 and 15 clients, although there are few hard-and-fast rules for conducting group sessions; for example, in some cases there may be more than one therapist involved in the session (Yalom, 2005).

At first glance, the idea of group therapy seems troubling to most people. After all, who wants to talk about their personal problems in front of others? It’s hard enough to open up to one person—the therapist—but at least he or she is a trained profes- sional. Yet groups offer a number of advantages over individual sessions (MacKenzie, 2000). First, group therapy can be much more cost effective because the therapist can meet with multiple clients at the same time. Second, hearing other people talk about problems that match your own can be educational. You can learn about their strate- gies for coping with problems, and you can see firsthand how their symptoms com- pare to your own. Third, and perhaps most important, when you hear testimonies from other people, it’s easier to realize that you’re not alone—you’re not the only person who is suffering from psychological problems. As you’ll discover later in this chapter, empathy is a very important predictor of success in therapy. Group settings can improve the trusting relationship you have with your therapist as well as with other people who share your problem.

Family Therapy One place where group therapy can be particularly appropriate is with the family. Rather than just treating an individual, in family therapy the thera- pist treats the family as whole, as a kind of social system. Clearly, if one member of a family suffers from a psychological problem, such as depression, all family members tend to be affected, and all can benefit from treatment. Moreover, the family envi- ronment can play either a positive or a negative role in helping a particular family member recover from a psychological problem. If the family understands the disor- der and what’s necessary for treatment, the odds of successful treatment go up con- siderably. Family therapists work on ways to improve interpersonal communication and collaboration among family members.

group therapy A form of therapy in which several people are treated simultaneously in the same setting.

family therapy A form of group therapy in which the therapist treats the family as whole, as a kind of social system. The goals of the treatment are often to improve interpersonal communication and collaboration.

●● concePT revIew Insight Approaches to Psychotherapy APPRoACH PsyCHoPATHology ATTRiBuTED To APPRoACH To TREATmEnT foR DEPREssion

Psychoanalysis Unconscious conflict, often rooted in childhood trauma

Debbie is depressed because of repressed fears that her parents don’t really love her. They were not very affectionate while she was growing up. Her therapist tries to get Debbie to talk about her childhood relationship with her parents.

Cognitive Conscious processes, including irrational beliefs and negative thoughts

Troy is having a tough time with his parents. They want him to major in busi- ness, which he hates. He feels like a terrible person for not following his parents’ wishes; after all, they’re paying his tuition. His therapist attempts to show him that disagreeing with his parents over his college major does not reflect badly on him as a person.

Humanistic Problems with self-concept, or incongru- ence between self-concept and reality

Azra feels guilty. She plans on having only one child, but her parents would like lots of grandchildren, and Azra is an only child. Azra feels bad about herself and her failure to gain acceptance from her parents. Her therapist listens as Azra describes her feelings and tries to be warm, supportive, and open to what she is saying.

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Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies LEARNING GOALS

●● Explain how conditioning techniques can be used in therapy. ●● Explain how rewards and punishments can be used in therapy.

Traditional insight therapists address psychological problems by searching the minds of their clients for hidden conflicts, faulty beliefs, or damaged self-worth. But there are alternative approaches to therapy that focus more on behavior than thoughts or memories. Behavioral therapies are designed to change unwanted or maladaptive behavior through the application of basic learning principles. Behavioral therapies are often used in conjunction with other therapies, particu- larly cognitive therapies, but they can be quite effective when used alone (Spiegler & Guevremont, 2010).

As we discussed in Chapter 14, many psychologists are convinced that psycholog- ical problems can be learned, or acquired, as a result of experience. Afraid of snakes? Perhaps you had a frightening experience at some point in your life—you may have been bitten by a snake—and this experience caused you to associate snakes with a negative emotional consequence. The snake isn’t symbolic of some hidden sexual conflict—you just learned that when snakes are around you can be bitten; as a result, snakes have become “signals” for something bad.

If you believe that a psychological problem has been learned, it doesn’t make sense to spend months or years searching for a hidden reason for the problem. It’s better to treat the surface symptoms by learning something new. More productive

behavioral therapies Treatments designed to change behavior through the use of established learning techniques.

Test yourself Check your knowledge of insight therapies by matching each of the following statements to a type of therapy. Choose from among the following: psychoanalysis, Gestalt therapy, rational-emotive therapy, Beck’s cognitive therapy, client-centered therapy, family therapy. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. “You think you’re worthless? Well, I’m sitting here spending time with you so how can you be completely worthless? It’s a ridiculous idea.”

2. “I want you to keep a record of your thoughts, and the situations that produce them, so that you can judge whether those thoughts are really appropriate given the situation.”

3. “Don’t leave. Sit down and tell me again about the dream you had last night.”

4. “You feel pain, deep pain, and you just can’t get beyond the hurt that you feel inside.”

5. “Talk to the chair . . . be the chair. Open up and let your true feelings come out.”

6. “It’s not just your problem. Each of you needs to communicate better and learn to work together to solve problems and avoid conflicts.”

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.2

Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies | 493

actions need to be rewarded, or the negative associations you’ve formed need to be extinguished or counteracted. We’ll consider several behavioral approaches in this section of the chapter, beginning with an effective technique for treating phobias that is based on the principles of classical conditioning.

Conditioning Techniques In Chapter 7 we discussed how dogs and people learn about the signaling properties of events. In Pavlov’s classic experiments, dogs learned that one event, called the conditioned stimulus, signaled the occurrence of a second event, called the unconditioned stimulus. After pairing the conditioned stimulus and the uncon- ditioned stimulus together in time, Pavlov found that his dogs responded to the conditioned stimulus in a way that anticipated the arrival of the unconditioned stimulus. For example, if a bell (the conditioned stimulus) was repeatedly pre- sented just prior to food (the unconditioned stimulus), the dogs would begin to drool (the conditioned response) to the bell in anticipation of the food. Pavlov also showed that this conditioned response, the drooling, was sensitive to how well the conditioned stimulus predicted the occurrence of the unconditioned stimulus: If the bell was rung repeatedly after conditioning but the food was no longer pre- sented, the dog eventually stopped drooling to the bell (a procedure Pavlov called extinction).

Now let’s consider the case of a specific phobia, such as fear of snakes. Specific phobias are highly focused fears of objects or situations. When the feared object is present, it produces an intense anxiety reaction. In the 1920s, psychologist Mary Cover Jones proposed that such intense fear reactions can be treated as if they’re clas- sically conditioned responses. A snake produces fear because some kind of earlier experience has taught you to associate snakes with something fearful. Perhaps while standing near one as a child, your brother or sister screamed in terror, thereby scaring you. Jones’s analysis suggested a treatment: It might be possible to eliminate phobias by teaching a new association between the feared object and something pleasurable. As she reported in 1924, she was able to use this logic to treat a little boy’s fear of rab- bits. She fed the boy some tasty food in the presence of the rabbit, which extinguished the association between the rabbit and an earlier negative experience and replaced it with a more pleasurable association ( Jones, 1924).

Systematic Desensitization The treatment pioneered by Mary Cover Jones was later refined by psychiatrist Joseph Wolpe into a technique known as systematic desensitization (Wolpe, 1958, 1982). As with Jones’s approach, systematic desensiti- zation uses counterconditioning as a way of reducing the fear and anxiety that have become associated with a specific object or event. The therapist attempts to replace the negative association with something relaxing and pleasurable. It’s a gradual pro- cess that involves three major steps:

1. The therapist helps the client construct an anxiety hierarchy, which is an ordered list of situations that lead to fearful reactions. The client is asked to imagine a series of anxiety-provoking situations, beginning with the least fear-arousing and ending with the feared situation itself.

2. The therapist spends time teaching the client ways to achieve deep muscle relax- ation. A state of deep relaxation is incompatible with the experience of anxiety— you can’t be afraid and relaxed at the same time.

3. With the help of the therapist the client then attempts to work through the anxi- ety hierarchy, forming an image of each of the scenes while maintaining the state of relaxation. The idea is to pair the images of fearful situations with the pleasurable state of relaxation so as to extinguish the old negative association and replace it with something relaxing.

crITIcAl ThInkIng

Can you think of a role that reinforcement might play in maintaining a phobia? Isn’t it true that every time you stay away from a snake you avoid being bitten?

systematic desensitization A technique that uses counterconditioning and extinction to reduce the fear and anxiety that have become associated with a specific object or event.

crITIcAl ThInkIng

In what ways is shaping, which we discussed in Chapter 7, similar to and different from the procedures of systematic desensitization?

Psychologist Mary Cover Jones proposed that intense fear reactions could be treated as if they were classically conditioned responses.

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Let’s imagine you have a deep, irrational fear of flying in an airplane. Treatment starts by having you create a list of flying-related situations that cause you to feel increasingly anxious. Next, you would receive lessons in how to relax yourself fully. Finally, you would begin working through your hierarchy. Perhaps you might start by simply imagining a picture of an airplane. If you can remain relaxed under these conditions, the therapist will direct you to move up the hierarchy to the next most stressful situation—perhaps imagining the airplane actually taking off. Gradually, over time, you will learn to relax in increasingly more stressful situations, even to the point where you can imagine yourself strapped in the seat as the plane rolls down the runway. If you can stay relaxed—which is incompatible with fear and anxiety—the fearful association with planes should extinguish and be replaced by an association that is neutral or positive. Eventually, when you move to a real situation, the learning will generalize and you will no longer be afraid to fly in a plane. This type of therapy is summarized in ● Figure 15.6 using another specific phobia—the fear of snakes.

The idea that we can reduce our fear by confronting the very thing that we fear the most has been extremely effective in the treatment of phobic disorders. Interestingly, though, it turns out that repeated exposure to the feared object or event may be what matters most. Many clinicians today find that neither progressive muscle relaxation nor construction of the hierarchy is necessary for improvements to occur. Simple exposure to the feared object is often sufficient for improvement; in fact, therapists have been using advances in virtual reality technology to expose clients to virtual examples of their feared object with great success (Powers & Emmelkamp, 2008).

Aversion Therapy Systematic desensitization attempts to eliminate unpleasant associ- ations by replacing them with pleasant ones. In aversion therapy, the therapist tries to replace a pleasant reaction to a harmful stimulus with something unpleasant, such as making the client feel bad rather than good after smoking a cigarette or having a drink of alcohol. Once again, the idea is to use a kind of counterconditioning, but the goal is to make the target situation something to be avoided rather than approached.

In the case of alcohol dependency, it’s possible to give people a drug (Antabuse) that causes them to be become nauseated and vomit if they take a drink of alcohol. The drug interacts with alcohol, causing extreme discomfort. Under these condi- tions, the person who is drinking learns a new association that helps combat the alco- hol dependency—drinking leads to an unpleasant feeling. A similar technique can be used for smoking, wherein drugs containing certain chemicals leave an extremely bad taste in one’s mouth after smoking. The old association connecting pleasure with smoking is replaced by a new association that connects smoking with a terrible taste.

aversion therapy A treatment for replacing a positive reaction to a harmful stimulus, such as alcohol, with something negative, such as feeling nauseated. Aversion therapy replaces positive associations with negative ones, such as making a smoker feel bad rather than good after having a cigarette.

●● FIgUre 15.6 systematic Desensitization After learning relaxation techniques, the client works slowly through an anxiety hierarchy. At first she simply imagines the feared object. Eventually, the relaxation response can be maintained while she experiences the actual feared situation. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies | 495

Aversion therapy can be quite effective if the cli- ent takes the aversive drug for a sufficient period of time. However, people who undergo aversion ther- apy are often reluctant to continue the treatment unless they’re closely supervised. If the client stops the treatment and returns to normal drinking or smoking, the newly learned negative association will extinguish and be replaced by the old, positive asso- ciation. Ethical concerns have also been raised about this form of treatment. Although those who partic- ipate do so voluntarily, they are often people who are desperately seeking a solution to their problems. Because the treatment directly induces extremely unpleasant experiences, many therapists are con- vinced that it should be used only as a treatment of last resort.

Applying Rewards and Punishments As we discussed in Chapter 7, it’s possible to change behavior by teaching people about the direct consequences of their behavior. You can be shaped, through the application of rewards and punishments, away from abnormal actions and toward more normal behaviors. Although aversion therapy involves elements of punishment—the act of drinking is followed by an extremely unpleasant consequence—its goal is mainly to replace prior pleasant emotional associations with unpleasant ones. Behavioral ther- apies that use rewards and punishments are designed to modify specific unwanted behaviors by teaching people about the consequences of their actions.

Token Economies Shaping behavior through the delivery of rewards has been par- ticularly effective in institutional settings. When people are confined to mental hos- pitals or other kinds of institutions, it’s usually because they can’t cope successfully without constant supervision. If people can’t care for themselves—if they don’t wash, eat proper foods, or protect themselves from harm—they need a structured environ- ment around them. In institutional settings, therapists have found that setting up token economies—in which patients are rewarded for behaving appropriately—can be quite effective in teaching patients how to cope with the realities of everyday life (e.g., Seegert, 2003).

In a token economy, institutionalized patients are rewarded with small tokens (such as poker chips) whenever they engage in an appropriate activity. Certain rules are established and explained to the patient, which determine when tokens are handed out (or taken away). For example, if Forrest, who is suffering from schizo- phrenia, takes his medication without complaint, he is given a plastic token. Candita might receive tokens for getting out of bed in the morning, washing her hair, and brushing her teeth. The tokens can later be exchanged for certain privileges, such as being able to watch a movie or stay in a private room. Similarly, if a patient acts in an inappropriate manner, the therapist might choose to take tokens away as a form of punishment. This technique is called a token economy because it represents a volun- tary exchange of goods and services—the patient exchanges appropriate behavior for the privileges that tokens provide.

Token economies are highly successful in helping patients develop the skills they’ll need to function well inside and outside of the institution. Not only do the everyday maintenance activities of the patients improve, but social behavior and even vocational skills can be shaped using token rewards. Token economies have also been

token economy A type of behavioral therapy in which patients are rewarded with small tokens when they act in an appropriate way; the tokens can then be exchanged for certain privileges.

Aversion therapy replaces positive associations with negative ones, such as making a smoker feel bad rather than good after having a cigarette.

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used in classroom settings to reward children for showing appropriate individual and group behavior and even to increase participation in large college courses (Boniecki & Moore, 2003).

Punishment Token economies tend to be based primarily on the application of reward as a way of changing unwanted behaviors. But as we’ve seen, punishment can also be an effective way to teach people about the consequences of their behav- ior. And, indeed, there are instances in which therapists feel that following a behavior with an aversive stimulus (sometimes even a shock) or removing something pleasant is justified. Consider someone who is extremely self-destructive—perhaps a disturbed child who continually bangs his or her head against the wall. Under these conditions, the safe delivery of an aversive event can reduce these self-destructive behaviors, thereby preventing serious injury (Lovaas, 1987; Lovaas et al., 1973).

But punishment is rarely used as the sole kind of behavioral intervention, for several reasons. First, punishment has side effects—for example, it can damage the working relationship between the therapist and the client. Second, punishment by itself only teaches someone what not to do; it doesn’t teach someone the appropriate way to act. Third, punishing someone who is in the grips of a psychological disorder raises ethical concerns. We can’t be sure the person on the receiving end of the aver- sive event approves of the treatment, even though the therapist may be convinced it’s in the client’s best interest.

Social Skills Training Serious psychological disorders can have a devastating effect on a person’s ability to function successfully in virtually all environments, especially social ones. In schizo- phrenia, for example, social or occupational dysfunction is one of the defining charac- teristics of the disorder. Patients with schizophrenia tend to isolate themselves from others, and when they do interact socially, they typically act in odd or peculiar ways.

In such cases, therapists face a practical problem: How can they improve the social skills of the person with the disorder? This is a particularly important con- cern in schizophrenia, which is often difficult to treat. Even with medication, many patients suffer relapses of symptoms, and some symptoms of the disorder, including social withdrawal and flat affect, cannot be treated effectively with conventional psy- choactive drugs. For these reasons, therapists sometimes turn to social skills training, which is a form of behavioral therapy that uses modeling and reinforcement to shape appropriate adjustment skills.

Social skills training is usually a multistep process. To teach conversational skills, for example, the therapist might begin with a discussion of appropriate verbal responses in a conversation, followed by a videotaped demonstration. The patient is then asked to “role play” an actual conversation, and the therapist provides either cor- rective feedback or positive reinforcement. “Homework ” might then be assigned, in which the patient is encouraged to practice his or her skills outside of the training ses- sion, preferably in new situations. If the training is conducted in an institutional set- ting, such as a mental hospital, the therapist must monitor the patient’s subsequent interactions carefully so that appropriate reinforcement can be delivered.

Social skills training usually takes place over many sessions, and it’s often combined with other forms of treatment (such as psychoactive drugs or some form of insight ther- apy). The application of these simple learning principles—positive reinforcement and modeling—can lead to significant improvements in social functioning, and in the qual- ity of life for individuals affected with psychological disorders (Kurtz & Mueser, 2008). Remember, one of the most important goals of any therapy is to improve a person’s ability to function in everyday situations; at times focusing on specific symptoms— even something as simple as knowing how to answer a casual question in an appropri- ate way—can make an enormous difference in the life of a troubled individual.

Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies | 497

●● concePT revIew Behavioral Therapies APPRoACH BAsED on THE iDEA THAT THERAPEuTiC APPRoACH

Systematic desensitization Intense anxiety is the result of classically conditioned associations.

Uses counterconditioning to reduce the fear and anxiety that are associated with a particu- lar object or event. The therapist attempts to replace a negative association with something relaxing and pleasurable.

Aversion therapy Problem behaviors are based partly on classically conditioned associations.

The therapist tries to replace a pleasant reac- tion to a harmful stimulus with an unpleasant reaction. For example, the pleasurable reac- tion associated with smoking is replaced by a new association between smoking and a terrible taste.

Token economy Behavior can be changed by teaching people about the direct consequences of their behavior.

Therapist and patient have a voluntary exchange of goods and services—the patient exchanges appropriate behavior for privileges provided by tokens.

Punishment

Social skills training

Behavior can be changed by teaching people about the direct consequences of their behavior.

Behavior can be changed using modeling and reinforcement

An inappropriate (e.g., self-injurious) behavior is followed by an aversive stimulus or by the removal of a pleasant stimulus.

Therapist models behavior and provides correc- tive feedback to “role playing” patient.

Test yourself Check your knowledge about behavioral therapies by answering the following questions. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. According to the classical conditioning account of phobias, the feared stimulus, such as a snake, acts as a(n):

a. unconditioned stimulus. b. conditioned stimulus. c. conditioned response. d. conditioned reinforcer.

2. In systematic desensitization, the fear that has become associ- ated with a specific object or event is reduced through:

a. counterconditioning and extinction. b. second-order conditioning. c. delivery of an aversive consequence. d. token rewards.

3. Which of the following is not a major concern in aversion therapy? a. Clients cannot truly give informed and voluntary consent. b. Effective punishments can’t be delivered because pain thresh-

olds are high. c. Clients are often reluctant to continue treatment. d. Newly learned negative associations can extinguish.

4. In a token economy, the token acts as which of the following? a. conditioned stimulus b. punishment c. conditioned inhibitor d. reinforcement

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.3

498 | CHAPTER 15 Therapy

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy LEARNING GOALS

●● Discuss the major findings of clinical evaluation research. ●● Describe the factors that are common across psychotherapies.

When people make the decision to enter therapy, they do so because they’re in need of help. Carlos is unable to advance his career in sales because of his extreme fear of flying; Julie lives a life of quiet desperation, mostly alone in her room, because she suffers from a social phobia. We’ve now examined the major types of therapy, but we’ve said little about their relative effectiveness. How well does psychotherapy actu- ally work? Are all forms of therapy equally effective, or do some forms of therapy work better than others?

To assess the effectiveness of any therapy requires carefully controlled research. As discussed in Chapter 2, just because someone’s behavior changes after a manip- ulation doesn’t mean it was the manipulation that caused the change. Someone might enter therapy and leave improved some time later, but the change could have occurred for reasons unrelated to the actual treatment. Perhaps the person simply improved spontaneously over time. Most people who get the flu improve over time—even if they never see a doctor—and it could be that the same kind of thing happens with psychological disorders. A control group—in which no treat- ment is given—is needed to confirm that the therapy was indeed responsible for the improvement. Fortunately, a number of such controlled research studies have been conducted.

Clinical Evaluation Research Let’s begin by considering a famous example of a clinical eval- uation study (Sloane et al., 1975). In this study, conducted at a Philadelphia psychiatric clinic in the mid-1970s, men and women who were seeking treatment primarily for anxiety disorders were assigned at random to one of three treatment conditions. One group of patients was assigned to therapists experienced in the practice of psychodynamic techniques (the analysis of uncon- scious conflicts and memories); a second group was assigned to experienced behavioral therapists (using systematic desensitiza- tion and other learning-based techniques); a third group—the control group—was placed on a “waiting list” and received no immediate treatment. After four months, an independent team of therapists, who were unaware of the treatment assignments, was called in to evaluate the progress of the patients in each of the three groups.

The results were somewhat surprising. The good news is that the therapies clearly worked. As shown in ● Figure 15.7, the peo- ple who were given either psychodynamic or behavioral therapy showed significantly more improvement after four months than the people who were left on the waiting list (although it’s interest- ing to note that the waiting list people improved also). But there were no significant differences between the two treatment con- ditions—the behavioral approach worked just as well as the psy- chodynamic approach. Even more surprising was the finding that eight months later, at a year-end follow-up assessment, the patients in the control group had essentially caught up with the treatment

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Is it ethical to assign patients who are seeking help for their psychological problems to a no-treatment control?

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●● FIgUre 15.7 evaluating Forms of Treatment After four months, people receiving therapy showed significantly fewer severe symptoms than people in the control group, but there were no significant differences in the results of behavioral and psychodynamic therapy. (Data from Sloane et al., 1975)

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy | 499

patients—they had improved enough to be comparable to the patients in the other two groups. Thus, the treatments worked, but it seems that their primary effect was simply to speed up natural improvement.

Meta-Analysis The Philadelphia study is important because it’s an example of how evaluation research should be conducted—random assignment to groups, the use of a no-treatment control, and an independent assessment procedure (Wolpe, 1975). Since that study was first reported, hundreds of other studies have been conducted (although not all have included the same rigorous control procedures). Rather than picking and choosing from among these studies, mental health professionals often rely on a technique called meta-analysis to help them draw conclusions about this research. In a meta-analysis, many different studies are compared statistically on some common evaluation measure. The comparison standard is usually something called an effect size, which is essentially a standardized measure of the difference between treatment and control conditions.

In one of the first extensive meta-analytic studies, Smith and colleagues analyzed the results of 475 research studies designed to evaluate one or more forms of psycho- therapy (Smith & Glass, 1977; Smith et al., 1980). Although the individual studies cov- ered a wide range of psychological problems and therapeutic techniques, in each case it was possible to compare a treatment condition to some kind of control condition (usually an untreated group). Smith and colleagues reached two major conclusions from their meta-analysis of the data. First, there was a consistent and large treatment advantage (see ● Figure 15.8). People who experienced some kind of active psycho- therapy were better off, on average, than roughly 80% of the people who were left untreated. Second, when the various kinds of psychotherapy were compared, few, if any, differences were found. It really didn’t matter whether the patient was receiv- ing an insight therapy or a behavioral therapy—all produced the same amount of improvement (see also Wampold et al., 1997).

There have been hundreds of other attempts to meta-analyze evaluation studies. Some have sought to exercise more control over the research quality of the studies included (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993); others have attempted to extend the areas of exam- ination to include client characteristics, experience of the therapist, or length of the treatment (Lambert & Bergin, 1994). In general, the findings support two main con- clusions: Therapy works, and the effects of therapy are long-lasting. For example, one review of meta-analysis studies, which examined some 302 published meta-analyses,

meta-analysis A statistical technique used to compare findings across many different research studies; comparisons are based on some common evaluation measure, such as the difference between treatment and control conditions.

●● FIgUre 15.8 The effectiveness of Psychotherapy In a meta-analysis that assessed hundreds of clinical evaluation studies, people who experienced some form of active psychotherapy were better off, on average, than roughly 80% of the people who were not treated. (Data from Smith et al., 1980)

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found that only six produced negative effect sizes (which means that patients under- going therapy actually got worse than untreated controls), and that the vast majority were overwhelmingly positive (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993).

Controversies There is widespread agreement among professionals that psycho- therapy works, but clinical evaluation studies remain the subject of debate. For example, what should constitute the proper evaluation control? Let’s return to the Philadelphia experiment in which two treatment groups (psychodynamic and behavioral) were compared with a group containing people who were left on a wait- ing list. Remember, the control patients actually got considerably better over time, to a point at which, after a year, they had improved to the same levels as the treat- ment groups. Psychologists call this kind of improvement in the absence of treat- ment spontaneous remission, and it’s been estimated that psychological disorders may improve on their own as much as 30% or more of the time (Eysenck, 1952; Rutherford et al., 2012).

But did the people who were left on the waiting list in the Philadelphia experi- ment really receive no treatment? This is a difficult question to answer—it depends on how you define treatment. Although these people received no formal psycho- therapy, they were given initial psychological tests and were called frequently and given support. Their simple involvement in the study, along with the expectation that they would be receiving some help, may itself have acted as a kind of therapy. Similar effects are commonly found with many placebo controls, in which clients are given attention and support but not formal therapy. Many critics have argued that these no- treatment conditions actually involve factors—such as social support—that are com- mon to most forms of therapy (see Lambert, 2005). We’ll return to this issue in the next section.

The finding that all types of psychotherapy are equally effective has also been questioned (Budd & Hughes, 2009). It’s probably reasonable to assume that certain treatments work best for certain kinds of problems. For example, cognitive therapies may be particularly effective for treating depression or its relapse (Tolin, 2010), and behavioral therapies may be consistently effective for combating anxiety disorders such as specific phobias (Choy et al., 2007). But even if the treatment is matched to the problem, client variables can also influence the effectiveness of the therapy. Not all people have the desire or capacity to respond to rational, verbal arguments of the type used by some cognitive therapists, or to the probing questions of the psychoana- lyst. As a result, it’s very difficult to conduct an evaluation study that properly takes all of these factors into account. Moreover, often one finds a correlation between a particular form of therapy and an effective outcome, but the causal mechanisms behind the improvement remain mysterious (Kazdin, 2007).

Common Factors Across Psychotherapies Clinical researchers have also considered the possibility that there may be common, nonspecific factors shared by all therapies, regardless of surface differences. Although the various therapies we’ve considered seem to be very different, and they’re clearly driven by very different assumptions about human psychology, they do share features in common (Grencavage & Norcross, 1990; Rosenzweig, 1936). Michael Lambert and Allen Bergin (1994) have suggested that these common factors can be grouped into three main categories: support factors, learning factors, and action factors.

Support Factors Virtually all therapies that produce positive outcomes provide tan- gible support for the client. People who enter therapy find themselves face to face with a person who is willing to accept and understand their problems. Both the

spontaneous remission Improvement in a psychological disorder without treatment— that is, simply as a function of the passage of time.

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy | 501

therapist and the client have a common goal, which is to help the client get better. Regardless of their theoretical orientation—psychodynamic, cognitive, behavioral, or humanistic—effective therapists are clearly interested in listening to and reassuring their clients and in developing a positive, trusting relationship. A number of studies have found a strong correlation between the amount of empathy that the therapist establishes with the client and the effectiveness of the treatment (Lafferty et al., 1991).

It’s also important that the client and the therapist form a therapeutic alliance, which means that the client and the therapist must work together to deal with the

At some point in your life, you might find yourself in need of a psychotherapist. Perhaps you’ll experience a simple problem in liv- ing, or maybe something more serious. What should you do? Given our discussion about the relative effectiveness of the various treat- ment options, it might seem natural to con- clude that it doesn’t make much difference whom you choose. But remember, one of the best predictors of treatment success is the amount of empathy between the client and the therapist. Therefore, it’s critical that you find someone you trust and with whom you feel comfortable interacting. The level of trust you feel with the therapist is very important;

don’t be afraid to shop around a bit to find the right person.

Currently, most psychotherapists describe themselves as eclectic in their orientation. This means they’re willing to pick and choose from among treatment options to find the techniques that work best for the individual client. It used to be the case that therapists would align themselves with a particular approach or “school”—such as psychoanaly- sis or behavior therapy—but in one survey of 800 therapists, 68% of those responding described their orientation as eclectic (Jensen et al, 1990). You can expect most therapists to be flexible in their approach, and if one

form of treatment is not yielding results—or if you feel uncomfortable with the approach— you can expect the therapist to be open to trying something different. Effective therapy requires open communication, and the thera- pist is dependent on your feedback as a client throughout the treatment process.

Mental health professionals also recognize that cultural factors are important in both the diagnosis and the treatment of psychologi- cal disorders (Gaw, 2001). For many years, cultural barriers made it difficult for members of ethnic minorities to use and benefit from mental health resources. Language differ- ences between the client and the therapist clearly undermine effective communication, as do differences between the therapist’s and the client’s worldview. To take a case in point, many Asians feel uncomfortable with open self-disclosure and the expression of emotions. As a result, it’s unlikely that many Asians will benefit from Western therapists who encourage “letting it all hang out” (Sue et al., 1994).

Does this mean you should always seek a therapist with a cultural background identical to your own? Not necessarily. For one thing, there is still a shortage of therapists from eth- nic minorities in the United States (Mays & Albee, 1992). This means that finding a cul- tural match may be difficult. Moreover, with the increased exposure to cultural influences, many therapists are now making concerted efforts to become culturally sensitive. In fact, special training programs are now available to help therapists break down some of the barri- ers that exist for clients from diverse cultural backgrounds. By gaining knowledge about a variety of customs and lifestyles and work- ing directly with culturally diverse clients, therapists hope to remove barriers to effective empathy.

●●PrAcTIcAl solUTIons Choosing a Therapist

Cultural barriers sometimes prevent members of ethnic minorities from benefiting from mental health resources. It’s essential for a therapist to be sensitive to a client’s cultural background and general worldview.

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Test yourself Check your knowledge about evaluating and choosing psychotherapy by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (you will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Psychological disorders may improve on their own as much as 30% or more of the time. True or False?

2. According to most meta-analytic studies, people who experience active psychotherapy are better off, on average, than roughly 80% of the people who are left untreated. True or False?

3. Most evaluation studies show that specific disorders, such as depression, require specific forms of therapy, such as psychoanalysis. True or False?

4. One factor common to all forms of psychotherapy is the need to investigate the traumatic events of childhood. True or False?

5. In choosing a therapist, perhaps the most important factor is empathy—finding someone you trust and with whom you feel comfortable. True or False?

●● Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.4

problems at hand. If the client perceives the therapeutic alliance to be strong, and works hard to maintain a strong alliance, there is a greater chance that the therapy will be successful (Zuroff & Blatt, 2006).

Learning Factors When people go through therapy, they learn things about them- selves. They learn about their thought processes, or about their behavior, or about important factors in their past that might be contributing to current discomforts. Effective therapists often act as mirrors, reflecting a client’s beliefs and actions in ways that provide critical insight. Regardless of the method of treatment, effective therapists also give feedback about how various experiences relate to one another. They point out connections among experiences—how we might behave and think similarly across different situations. People are often helped because they’re given a reason or a rationale for their problems.

To take a case in point, consider the homework assignments common in cogni- tive therapy. Here, the client is simply asked to list the specific situations that led to unpleasant thoughts (emotions) and to provide alternative responses. Even without the development of rational response alternatives, it’s useful simply to know the par- ticular situations that make you upset or unhappy. If you learn, for instance, that you tend to get emotionally upset regularly after talking to an old boyfriend or girlfriend, then you can work to avoid encounters in the future. Knowledge is useful, and ther- apy is an excellent vehicle for learning things about yourself.

Action Factors Finally, all forms of therapy ultimately provide people with a set of specific suggestions for action. Troubled clients might be asked to face their fears, take risks, or directly test irrational beliefs. They might be given specific strategies for coping with anxiety or training in how to relax. Irrespective of the specific sugges- tions, providing clients with a tangible course of action may be sufficient to give them hope and allow them to feel in control of their problem.

Psychology For A Reason: What Psychotherapy Is For | 503

In this chapter, we’ve discussed the various tools therapists use to treat psychological disorders. In each case, the goal of the therapist is to find a way to improve the client’s abil- ity to function successfully in the world. As you’ve seen, most forms of therapy address one or more of the three basic factors thought to contribute to psychological disorders: biological factors, cognitive factors, and environmental factors.

Treating the Body Therapies that use medical interventions to treat the symptoms of psychological problems are called bio- medical therapies. The idea that psychological disorders might be treated as illnesses, in the same way that physicians might treat the common cold, has a long history in human thought. The most popular form of biomedical therapy is drug ther- apy, in which certain medications are given to affect thought and mood by altering the actions of neurotransmitters in the brain. Antipsychotic drugs, for example, reduce the symptoms of schizophrenia by acting as antagonists to the neurotrans- mitter dopamine in the brain. The antidepressant drug Prozac acts on the neurotransmitter serotonin, and antianxiety drugs—tranquilizers—are believed to act on neurotransmit- ters in the brain that have primarily inhibitory effects.

In the event that drug therapies fail, mental health pro- fessionals sometimes turn to other forms of biomedical intervention, such as electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and psychosurgery. Shock therapy is used to treat severe forms of depression, but usually only if more conventional forms of treatment have failed. No one is completely sure why the administration of electric shock affects mood, but there’s wide agreement that ECT works for many patients. Even more con- troversial than ECT is psychosurgery, in which some portion of the brain is destroyed or altered in an attempt to eliminate the symptoms of a mental disorder. The infamous prefron- tal lobotomies of yesteryear are no longer conducted (partly because they produced unacceptable side effects), but some kinds of surgical intervention in the brain are still used.

Treating the Mind In insight therapy, the psychotherapist attempts to treat psychological problems by helping clients gain insight, or self-knowledge, into the contents of their thought processes. Usually, this insight is obtained through prolonged verbal, one-on-one interactions between the ther- apist and the client. Perhaps the best-known form of insight therapy is Freudian psychoanalysis. The goal of psychoanaly- sis is to help the client uncover and relive conflicts that have been hidden in the unconscious mind. The psychoanalyst uses such techniques as free association and dream analysis to help probe the contents of the unconscious. As hidden con- flicts begin to surface during the course of therapy, the client will typically show what Freud called resistance—an attempt to hinder the progress of therapy—and transference, in which the client transfers feelings about others onto the therapist.

Cognitive therapists believe that psychological problems come primarily from irrational beliefs and thought processes. The therapist attempts to change the client’s negative beliefs and thoughts by actively attacking them in verbal exchanges. The therapist points out the irrationality of negative thoughts, using evidence where possible, in the hope that the client will reject the beliefs, thereby lessening their emotional conse- quences. Less aggressive forms of cognitive therapy encour- age clients to analyse the rationality of their own thoughts and beliefs through homework assignments. Humanistic thera- pies have a quite different goal. Here, the idea is to help clients gain insight into their own self-worth and value as humans. It is the client, not the therapist, who holds the key to self- improvement. Humanistic therapists view therapy as a pro- cess of discovering one’s natural tendencies toward growth and free will. In client-centered therapy, the therapist tries to provide an approving and nonjudgmental environment, thereby allowing the client to better recognize and trust his or her own true instincts.

Treating the Environment Behavioral therapies are designed to treat actual behavior rather than inner thought processes. Behavioral therapists assume that many kinds of psychologi- cal problems have been learned and can be treated through the application of learning principles. With countercondi- tioning techniques, for example, the therapist attempts to replace learned associations that are negative with new, plea- surable associations. Thus, in systematic desensitization, spe- cific phobias are treated by having the client (1) construct an anxiety hierarchy of fear-inducing situations, (2) learn relaxation techniques, and (3) work through the anxiety hierarchy, imagining each of the scenes while maintaining a feeling of relaxation. Pairing the feared object with relax- ation is intended to extinguish the old, negative association and replace it with something pleasurable. Other behavioral therapies make use of rewards and punishments to change behavior. In token economies, patients are rewarded with small tokens whenever they engage in normal or appropriate behaviors. The tokens can then be exchanged later for more tangible rewards or privileges. Social skills training uses both reinforcement and modeling to encourage more adaptive behavior.

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy Evaluating any form of psychotherapy requires controlled research in which treat- ment groups are compared with appropriate control condi- tions. Hundreds of such studies have been conducted, and meta-analyses of their results typically reach two main con- clusions. First, people who receive psychotherapy do signifi- cantly better than those left untreated. Second, those positive effects are often long-lasting. Although there are sometimes few, if any, advantages found for one type of psychotherapy

●● Psychology For A reAson What Psychotherapy Is For

504 | CHAPTER 15 Therapy

over another, certain forms of therapy do seem to work best for particular types of psychological disorders.

One reason most forms of treatment are effective may be that common factors are shared by all psychotherapies. These common factors can be grouped into three main categories: support, learning, and action. All therapists provide some kind of support for their clients, and thera- pist empathy has been shown to be important to outcome

success. All forms of therapy also help clients learn about themselves and their behavior, and clients are provided with specific prescriptions for action or behavior change. In choosing a therapist, it’s critical that you find someone you trust and with whom you feel comfortable interacting. Cultural factors are also important, because for therapy to work the therapist must be sensitive to the client’s cultural worldview.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies ●● Most typical antipsychotic drugs work primarily on the neurotransmitter (1) and are used to treat schizophrenia. These medications, which include chlor- promazine (Thorazine), are limited in their effectiveness, and side effects may include (2) dyskine- sia, which produces disabling involuntary movements. Clozapine and risperidone are newer antipsychotics that act on several neurotransmitters and help people who don’t respond to typical antipsychotic medication. (3) drugs also modulate the effectiveness of neurotransmit- ters, particularly norepinephrine and (4) . (5) disorders have traditionally been treated with the common salt (6) carbonate. (7) medications, or tranquilizers, are in a class of drugs called benzodiazepines, which work primarily on the neurotrans- mitter (8) .

●● Many professionals believe that (9) therapy (ECT) is a reasonably (10) and effective treat- ment 50 to 70% of the time for (11) depression, though it is usually used as a last resort. The treatment is controversial for a number of reasons. No one completely understands why it is effective, and it can produce tempo- rary side effects such as (12) and memory loss.

●● (13) affects behavior by destroying or altering (14) tissue. (15) lobotomy (now in disrepute) produces calming effects in disturbed patients. Although cingulotomy is sometimes used to treat obses- sive– (16) disorder and severe forms of depres- sion, psychosurgery is performed very (17) .

Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies ●● Sigmund Freud believed that (18) brings hid- den memories and impulses to awareness, freeing the cli- ent from unwanted thoughts and behaviors. The tools used to uncover unconscious conflicts include (19) association and (20) analysis. (21) , seen in unconsciously motivated attempts to hinder ther- apy, and (22) , where a client begins to express thoughts and feelings toward the therapist that are really

how he or she feels about other people, also provide clues about (23) conflicts. Modern psychoanalysts (24) the therapeutic process, which is often tailored to meet specific individual needs.

●● (25) therapists emphasize the contents of the (26) mind, believing that irrational beliefs and negative thoughts inf luence our interpretations of events. In (27) -emotive therapy the therapist cross-examines the client, challenging (28) thought processes. Aaron Beck ’s (29) ther- apy helps clients more subtly to identif y their own faulty beliefs through record-keeping and other types of homework.

●● In (30) therapy, clients gain insight into their own fundamental self-worth and (31) . Client-(32) therapy supports the client in all respects. The key to improvement is a warm supportive environment that helps the client overcome (33) , a discrepancy between the (34) and the real- ity of our everyday experiences. The therapist provides genuineness, unconditional (35) regard, and empathy. (36) therapy is a version of humanistic therapy that encourages and even forces clients to express their feelings openly.

●● (37) therapy brings together clients who are experiencing (38) problems. (39) therapy treats the family as a social system; the therapist helps members improve their (40) communica- tion styles and learn to collaborate with each other.

Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies ●● A person with a phobia associates a certain object or situa- tion with (41) . (42) techniques may be used to change the association to something pleasurable. In (43) the therapist uses (44) to sys- tematically associate relaxation with feared objects, as rated in an anxiety (45) . In (46) therapy a pleasant reaction to a harmful stimulus, such as alcohol, is replaced with an unpleasant reaction and results in a new association.

Interactive Summary | 505

●● People can be shaped by (47) and (48) to give up abnormal behaviors in exchange for functional ones. In a (49) economy, whenever institution- alized patients engage in an appropriate activity they are rewarded with tokens that they can exchange for (50) . (51) may also be effective in teaching people to understand the (52) of their actions and is sometimes used to discourage self-injurious behavior. (53) skills training is a form of behav- ioral therapy that uses modeling and reinforcement to shape appropriate adjustment skills.

Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy ●● A study that compared psychodynamic and (54) therapies with a control condition demonstrated that therapy clearly worked, but that there were no reliable

(55) in the effectiveness of the two approaches. A (56) -analysis of psychotherapy evaluation studies also showed that therapy works and that the effects are long-lasting. In addition, some problems may improve on their own through spontaneous (57) . Although all kinds of therapy show similar effectiveness, certain kinds of treatment may work best with certain kinds of problems.

●● All forms of therapy involve (58) , (59) , and (60) factors. The therapist provides support for the client by expressing understanding and empathy. People in therapy usually learn something about themselves, and all therapies offer suggestions for action. Such common factors may account for the finding that various approaches are equally (61) .

Terms to Remember antianxiety drugs, 479 antidepressant drugs, 478 antipsychotic drugs, 478 aversion therapy, 494 behavioral therapies, 492 biomedical therapies, 477 client-centered therapy, 489 cognitive therapies, 485 dream analysis, 484

electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), 480

family therapy, 491 free association, 483 group therapy, 491 humanistic therapy, 488 insight therapies, 483 meta-analysis, 499 psychoanalysis, 483

psychosurgery, 481 psychotherapy, 475 rational-emotive therapy, 486 resistance, 484 spontaneous remission, 500 systematic desensitization, 493 token economy, 495 transference, 484

Media Resources

If your professor has assigned Aplia: 1. Sign in to your account. 2. Complete the corresponding exercises as required by your

professor. 3. When finished, click “Grade It Now” to see which areas

you have mastered, which areas need more work, and detailed explanations of every answer.

Psychology CourseMate Go to CengageBrain.com to access Psychology CourseMate, where you will find an interactive eBook, glossaries, flash cards, quizzes, videos, and more.

506

16 Stress and Health

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Is the Connection Between Stress and

Health?

Experiencing Stress Learning Goals The Stress Response Cognitive Appraisal External Sources of Stress Internal Sources of Stress Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.1

Reacting to Prolonged Stress Learning Goals Physical Consequences of Stress Psychological Consequences of Stress Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.2

Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.4

PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON The Connection Between Stress and Health

CHAPtER REviEw Interactive Summary Terms to Remember Media Resources

Reducing and Coping With Stress Learning Goals Relaxation Techniques Social Support

PRACtiCAL SOLUtiONS Pet Support

Reappraising the Situation Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.3

Living a Healthy Lifestyle Learning Goals Get Fit: The Value of Aerobic Exercise Don’t Smoke: Tobacco and Health Eat Right: The Value of Proper Nutrition Avoid Risky Behavior: Protect Yourself From

Disease

507

Push, push, push. It hits you from all sides—school, work, relationships, fam-ily. Although we can’t claim exclusive rights to the “age of stress,” we certainly live in a demanding time. Everybody expects something from us, and they seem to want it now. Your teachers expect the subject matter to be learned, the paper written; your boss expects overtime in addition to your regular hours; your parents expect that weekly phone call, delivered in a pleasant and friendly tone. Add in the constant threat of a terrorist attack or a further breakdown in the international scene, and . . . well, enough said. Is it any wonder you can’t seem to shake that cold, or that you feel the need to leave the antacid tablets by your bedside at night?

Our focus is the general topic of health psychology. Health psychology is part of a broad movement, known as behavioral medicine, that seeks to understand the role of biological, psychological, environmental, and cultural factors in the promotion of physical health and the prevention of illness. Not surprisingly, health psychologists are particularly interested in psychological and environmental contributions to health (e.g., Matthews & Gallo, 2011). They tend to focus on questions such as these: Are there particular personality characteristics that determine who becomes sick or who will recover from illness? Can the same theories that have been used successfully to diagnose and treat psychological disorders be applied to the promotion of physical health? Is it possible to identify the kinds of working environments that lead to illness or promote recovery? Are there specific strategies, or lifestyle choices, that reduce the likelihood of getting sick?

Stress is an adaptive reaction to events in the world, but prolonged exposure to stressful environments can have a negative impact on health. Our discussion revolves around four key issues related to stress and to health psychology in general.

Experiencing Stress Everyone has an intuitive sense of what stress is, but the term can be defined in a variety of ways. We’ll discuss some of the meanings of the term as well as various components of the stress response. Health psychologists conceive of stress not as a single reaction, such as a sudden release of activating hormones, but rather as an extended response that occurs over time.

Reacting to Prolonged Stress The human body is usually well equipped to deal with unexpected trauma by activating those systems that are needed to respond to the emer- gency. But if the threat continues for an extended period of time, the body’s defenses

health psychology The study of how biological, psychological, environmental, and cultural factors are involved in physical health and the prevention of illness.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON What Is the Connection Between Stress and Health?

508 | CHAPTER 16 Stress and Health

begin to break down. We’ll consider some of the physical consequences of prolonged expo- sure to stress, including the role stress plays in the immune system.

Reducing and Coping With Stress Given that pro- longed exposure to stress can have negative long-term consequences, psychologists have developed specific treatment methods for reducing and controlling stress. A number of techniques are available for managing stress, and we’ll consider some of them later in the chapter.

Living a Healthy Lifestyle Whether you’ll remain healthy throughout your life depends impor- tantly on the lifestyle habits you choose. Obviously, if you choose to engage in risky

behaviors—such as smoking, failing to get adequate nutrition, or practicing unsafe sex—you increase your chances of illness or death. Health psychologists have joined with other professionals, including physicians, to offer prescriptions for a healthful lifestyle. We’ll discuss some of these recommendations along with their foundations in psychological theory.

Experiencing Stress LEARNING GOALS

● Describe the stress response. ● Explain the function of cognitive appraisal as part of the stress response. ● Discuss external sources of stress. ● Discuss internal sources of stress.

“Stress” is one of those concepts that’s easy to identify but difficult to define precisely. Part of the problem is that the term can be used in a variety of ways. For example, we frequently describe stress as if it was an actual stimulus (such as an event or a person) that places a demand on us or threatens our well-being (“That final next week is going to kill me”). On the other hand, we’re just as likely to describe stress as a physical response or reaction that we feel (“I’m really stressed out”). To complicate matters even further, whether we feel stress depends on how we interpret the situation we’re in (Lazarus, 1966, 2007). Consequently, some researchers describe stress as an internal psychologi- cal process through which external events are interpreted as threatening or demanding.

For our purposes, we’ll define stress as the physical and psychological reac- tion people have to demanding situations, and we’ll refer to the demanding or threatening situations that produce stress as stressors. For example, the jackknifed tractor trailer blocking your speedy route home from school is a stressor, whereas your fuming physical and emotional reaction to it is stress. First, we’ll consider some of the physical and psychological characteristics of stress; then we’ll examine the external and internal factors that contribute to stress.

stress People’s physical and psychological reactions to demanding situations.

stressors The demanding or threatening situations that produce stress.

Living in the “age of stress”

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The Stress Response If you’re like most people, you probably think stress is a bad thing. Certainly when you’re “stressed out,” you tend to feel lousy, and there’s no question that extended exposure to stressful situations can have long-term negative consequences. But it’s important to understand that stress is in many ways an adaptive reaction. When you’re in a threatening situation, or when someone is placing demands on you, it’s important that your body become activated so you can respond to the threat in the most appropriate way. The experience of stress does exactly that, at least initially—it activates you (Korte et al., 2005).

Physiological Reactions In the 1930s, a physician named Hans Selye (1936, 1952, 1974) introduced an influential model of the stress reaction that he called the general adaptation syndrome (GAS). Selye was convinced that our reaction to stressful situations is general and nonspecific, by which he meant that people are biologically programmed to respond to most threats in the same way. He was ini- tially led to this idea as a medical student when he was struck by the similarities he saw among his patients. Across wildly different illnesses and injuries, his patients seemed to share a “syndrome of just being sick ” that suggested to Selye that the body was reacting to each threatening situation in a very general way (no matter what the illness or the injury). Later, working in the laboratory with rats, he was able to confirm his hypothesis under controlled experimental conditions. Rats subjected to a variety of different kinds of threat—cold, heat, shock, restraint—produced a similar pattern of responses.

Selye’s concept of the GAS proposes that the body reacts to threat in three stages, or phases (see ●Figure 16.1). The first phase, the alarm reaction, corresponds to the adaptive fight-or-flight response we’ve discussed in previous chapters (Cannon, 1932). The body becomes energized, through activation of the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, and hormones are released by the glands of the endocrine system. Heart rate and respiration rate increase, as does blood flow to the muscles; each of these actions helps prepare the body for immediate defensive or eva- sive action. The alarm reaction enables us to get out of life-threatening jams, but it’s extremely intense and can’t be sustained for long periods without serious negative consequences (even death).

If the threat continues but is not serious enough to demand a continued alarm reaction, the body enters a resistance phase. During this phase, the body adjusts its physiological reaction to reduce, or cope with, the still-present threat. Arousal lev- els remain higher than normal, but the body is capable of replenishing at least some of its resources. During the resistance phase, people are able to function reason- ably well, but they’re particularly susceptible to other stressors in the environment and may begin to suffer from health problems, or what Selye called “diseases of adaptation.”

Finally, if the person is unable to find a way to neu- tralize the threat, the body eventually enters the exhaus- tion phase of the GAS. The body simply can’t continue to maintain a high state of readiness for extended periods of time. Eventually, energy reserves become so taxed and depleted that the body starts to give up. During this period, resistance declines to the point at which the stress reaction becomes more and more maladaptive. Death, or some kind of irreversible damage, becomes a real possibility.

Selye’s notion of the GAS has remained influential over the years. But researchers no longer believe the body’s reaction to threat is as general and nonspecific as

general adaptation syndrome (GAS) Hans Selye’s model of stress as a general, nonspecific reaction that occurs in three phases: alarm, resistance, and exhaustion.

● FiGURE 16.1 the General Adaptation Syndrome Hans Selye proposed that the body reacts to threat or demand in three stages or phases: (1) an alarm reaction that corresponds to the fight-or-flight response; (2) resistance, during which the body adjusts its reaction in an effort to cope with a threat that is still present; and (3) exhaustion, which occurs when the body’s energy reserves become so depleted that it starts to give up. (© Cengage Learning)

General Adaptation Syndrome

Fight-or-flight response

Alarm

Body adjusts to continuing threat

Resistance

Energy resources depleted: body starts to give up

Exhaustion

Prolonged exposure to stress can lead to physical and psychological problems.

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Selye suggested. Different stressors may well produce somewhat different patterns of response in the body (Goldstein & Kopin, 2007). Moreover, as you’ll see a little later, the stress reaction depends on the cognitive interpretation, or appraisal, of the threat- ening situation.

Psychological Reactions Stress is not just a physiological reaction to threat; there are also emotional and behavioral components to the reaction. We’ll consider the psycho- logical consequences of prolonged exposure to stressful situations later in the chap- ter, but emotional reactions are an important part of the stress response regardless of when or how long it occurs. Fear is a common reaction to threat, as is anger. Stressful situations can also lead to feelings of sadness, dejection, or even grief (Lazarus, 1991). These emotional reactions further suggest that stress is not completely general and nonspecific—people are capable of responding emotionally to different stressors in very different ways.

The psychological experience of stress is not even necessarily negative. Stress can have significant short- and long-term psychological benefits. For example, one study that examined the psychological characteristics of people who suffered from frequent physical illness found them to be more understanding (empathetic) of oth- ers and more tolerant of uncertainty (Haan, 1977). Stressful situations require peo- ple to use their skills and to interact with the environment. As individuals deal with stress, they often learn useful things about themselves and their abilities (Haan, 1993). Moreover, people who can successfully resolve a stressful situation gain confidence in their abilities. Laboratory work has even found that rats allowed to escape from shock, thereby reducing stress, have better-functioning immune systems than rats who receive no shock (Laudenslager et al., 1983). A similar reac- tion may happen to people: Stress may, at times, lead to the release of hormones that are health enhancing (de K loet et al., 2005). Stress can also lead to positive emotions that help people replenish their resources and cope more effectively (Folkman, 2008).

Male–Female Differences Although the basic physiological stress reaction (i.e., activa- tion of the sympathetic nervous system) is similar between males and females, some psychologists believe there are important behavioral differences. For example, rather than showing the typical fight-or-flight response, which is characteristic of males, females seem predisposed to react to stressors with “tending and befriending” behav- ior (Taylor, 2002, 2006). Because of evolutionary pressures, females may have evolved to respond by tending and protecting offspring (in addition to themselves) rather than fighting or fleeing the scene.

According to Taylor and her colleagues, it’s more adaptive for males to react to potential harm by being aggressive or fleeing; females are faced with different pres- sures, especially the care of the young, and often lack the necessary physical equip- ment to ward off threats through aggression. Although women can certainly become physically aggressive in some settings, aggression and flight are secondary reactions to threat. Instead, the first line of defense is to protect and calm offspring, which increases the chances of offspring survival. In addition, compared to males, females appear more likely to create and maintain social networks that potentially can aid in protecting themselves and their offspring (Taylor & Master, 2011).

The proposal that males and females differ fundamentally in their behavioral reactions to stressors is somewhat controversial—especially the idea that sex- specific stress reactions may be adaptations arising from evolutionary pressures (Geary & Flinn, 2002). However, sex differences appear across the animal king- dom and may have some basis in the biology of male and female brains. As Taylor and her colleagues note, the vast majority of research on the behavioral compo- nents of the stress response has been conducted on males, so much remains to be learned about the role of sex differences in the basic stress response (also see Lupien et al., 2009).

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Just because two things occur together, such as illness and empathy, doesn’t mean that one causes the other. How would you determine whether physical illness truly causes increased empathy?

The early stages of the stress response are clearly adaptive because they help initiate a fight-or-flight response.

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Cognitive Appraisal Most psychologists are convinced that stress is closely related to emotion because the experience of stress is critically influenced by the way we perceive or appraise the sit- uation (Lazarus, 1993, 2007). To feel stress, it’s necessary (1) to perceive there’s some kind of demand or threat present, and (2) to conclude that you may not have adequate resources available to deal with that threat. If you have a black belt in the martial arts, then the sudden appearance of an unarmed thug is not likely to cause much stress—the threat is there, but you have adequate defensive resources should you need to use them.

This idea that our stress reaction depends on the cognitive appraisal of the situa- tion is reminiscent of what we know about the experience of emotions. As you may remember from Chapter 11, the same physiological reaction can lead to different emo- tional experiences, depending on how we interpret the arousal experienced. The same is true for stress. Identical environmental events can lead to two very different stress reactions, depending on how the event is interpreted. Consider an upcoming exam: Everyone in the class receives the same test, but not everyone will feel the same amount of stress. Those people who are prepared for the exam—the people like you who read the chapter and engage in self-testing—are likely to feel less stress. Again, you perceive the threat, but you have adequate resources to deal with it (see ●Figure 16.2). The converse is also true—dangerous situations must be perceived as dangerous for a stress response to be produced. A small child doesn’t necessarily understand that a loaded gun is dangerous and may feel no stress while handling it.

There’s a great deal of support for cognitive appraisal in the experience of stress (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004). In one study of elementary school children, urine samples were taken from the children on both normal school days and on days when they were about to take standardized achievement tests. The urine sample mea- sured the amount of cortisol, an important stress hormone, that each child produced (notice that the researchers provided an operational definition of stress in terms of the amount of hormone measured). Not surprisingly, more cortisol was found on test days, suggesting a higher level of stress, but the increase in stress depended on the child’s previously recorded overall intelligence score. The children with higher intel- ligence scores showed less of a stress reaction on test days, presumably because they considered the test to be less of a threat (Tennes & Kreye, 1985).

External Sources of Stress Because the stress reaction depends on one’s appraisal of the situation, it’s impossi- ble to compile an exhaustive list of life’s stressors. We can never predict how every- one will react to an environmental event, even though it may seem clearly stressful to the majority. All we can do is catalogue external situations, or life events, that induce stress reactions in most individuals. We’ll consider three major classes of exter- nal stressors in this section: significant life events, daily hassles, and general factors in the environment.

cognitive appraisal The idea that to feel stress you need to perceive a threat and come to the conclusion that you may not have adequate resources to deal with the threat.

● FiGURE 16.2 Cognitive Appraisal Whether an event will create stress depends on how that event is interpreted. A stress reaction is more likely if you feel your resources are inadequate to deal with the potential threat. (© Cengage Learning 2014)

Stress activation of sympathetic system

Event is threatening or demanding.

Event is not threatening or demanding.

No stress

Evaluation of event

Event

512 | CHAPTER 16 Stress and Health

Significant Life Events Certain events are virtually guaranteed to produce stress. We can all agree that the death of a loved one or getting fired from a job is likely to produce an extended stress reaction in most people. On a larger scale, natural disas- ters or catastrophes—such as the terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001—unquestionably produce stress that is prolonged and wide- spread. In the case of September 11, a national phone survey conducted three to five days after the attack found that more than 44% of the people surveyed reported one or more substantial symptoms of stress, and more than 90% reported feeling symp- toms of stress to at least some degree (Schuster et al., 2001).

Many studies have found clear links between such events and subsequent physi- cal and psychological problems, particularly for the September 11 attack (e.g., Heim et al., 2004). In the seven months following the 1980 volcanic eruption of Mount Saint Helens in Washington state, one nearby town reported more than a 30% increase in the number of hospital emergency room visits compared to a similar period in the year prior to the eruption (Adams & Adams, 1984; see ●Figure 16.3). These visits were not for injuries directly caused by the eruption but rather for gen- eral health problems that may have been created or enhanced by the experience of stress.

Over the years researchers have tried to compile lists of external life stress- ors. The best-known example is the Social Readjustment Rating Scale, which was put together by researchers Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe (1967). Holmes and Rahe interviewed thousands of people who were suffering from health problems and then tried to determine whether certain kinds of events preceded the onset of the health problems. The results are shown in Table 16.1, which lists the various sig- nificant life events mentioned by the people interviewed, ranked in terms of “life change units” (roughly representing the amount of adjustment the event caused in the person’s life).

There are two interesting things to notice about the results shown in the table. First, most of these life events are connected with some kind of change in day-to-day activities. This suggests that the disruption caused by the event is just as important as the event itself in causing the stress reaction. People feel stress, in part, because something happens that requires them to alter their ways or life- style. Second, notice that many of the events listed in the table are actually quite positive. For example, marriage and retirement make the top 10. Even vacations and Christmas make the list. This is not really too surprising if you think about it, because each is associated with some kind of temporary or long-lasting disruption of normal routines.

● FiGURE 16.3 Reacting to a Natural Disaster The data shown here present the mean monthly hospital emergency room visits, mental health crisis line calls, and number of clients served by a community alcohol center for comparable time periods before and after the eruption of Mount Saint Helens in 1980. (Data from Adams & Adams, 1984)

Predisaster Postdisaster

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● tAbLE 16.1 Social Readjustment Rating Scale

RAnk LifE EvEnT PoinT vALuE

1 Death of spouse 100

2 Divorce 73

3 Marital separation 65

4 Jail term 63

5 Death of close family member 63

6 Personal injury or illness 53

7 Marriage 50

8 Fired at work 47

9 Marital reconciliation 45

10 Retirement 45

11 Change in health of family member 44

12 Pregnancy 40

13 Sex difficulties 39

14 Gain of new family member 39

15 Business readjustment 39

16 Change in financial state 38

17 Death of close friend 37

18 Change to different line of work 36

19 Change in number of arguments with spouse 35

20 Mortgage over $10,000 31

21 Foreclosure of mortgage or loan 30

22 Change in responsibilities at work 29

23 Son or daughter leaving home 29

24 Trouble with in-laws 29

25 Outstanding personal achievement 28

26 Wife begins or stops work 26

27 Begin or end school 26

28 Change in living conditions 25

29 Revision of personal habits 24

30 Trouble with boss 23

31 Change in work hours or conditions 20

32 Change in residence 20

33 Change in schools 20

34 Change in recreation 19

35 Change in church activities 19

36 Change in social activities 18

37 Mortgage or loan less than $10,000 17

38 Change in sleeping habits 16

39 Change in number of family get-togethers 15

40 Change in eating habits 15

41 Vacation 13

42 Christmas 12

43 Minor violations of the law 11

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The results listed in Table 16.1 are more than 50 years old, but they continue to be used by researchers to predict the likelihood of stress. Dozens of studies have found significant correlations between these rankings and various measures of stress, including physical and psychological problems (see Cooper & Dewe, 2007). However, not all experts are satisfied with the methods that were used to devise the scale, and it’s been revised to take into account such factors as gender, age, and amount of educa- tion (Hobson & Delunas, 2001; Miller & Rahe, 1997). Remember as well that change by itself does not necessarily lead to stress reactions in all individuals. So you can’t automatically assume that if one of these events happens to you, you’ll feel stress. It’s how you appraise the event that’s really important, along with your assessment of whether you have adequate resources to deal with the life change when it occurs.

Daily Hassles It’s not just the big events that cause problems. The little things, the daily irritations and hassles of life, also contribute significantly to the experience of stress. Think about how you feel when you’re stuck in a long checkout line at the market, when someone’s tailgating you on the freeway, or when you’re hungry and you’ve waited a half hour or more for your order at a restaurant. Some psychologists believe the cumulative effect of such daily hassles may actually be more important in creating lasting stress than are significant life events (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Miller, 1993). Kanner and colleagues (1981) developed a Hassles Scale, and it seems to predict the likelihood of physical and mental health problems. The more hassles you experience in your daily life, the more likely you’ll experience health problems. Included on the scale are such things as concern about one’s weight and physical appearance, home maintenance, and worries about misplacing or losing something. There is even a version of the Hassles Scale that is specifically designed to measure hassles among university students (Pett & Johnson, 2005).

Environmental Factors The environment is also a significant source for stress. Noise is a good example. Think about how difficult it is to study when someone is talking loudly nearby or how irritated you get when you’re roused from sleep by the whir- ring, clanging sounds of the morning garbage truck. Chronic exposure to noise inter- feres with everyday activities, and it’s been linked with stress-related disorders such as ulcers and high blood pressure (Evans, 1997; Nagar & Panady, 1987) and with a general decline in the perceived quality of life (Evans et al., 1995). Schoolchildren experience more stress when they’re exposed to chronic noise, and cognitive mea- sures (such as reading comprehension) appear to suffer (Haines et al., 2001).

Another environmental factor is crowding. The more people who live or work around you, the more likely you’ll experience a stress reaction (Regoeczi, 2003). Living in a crowded environment makes us generally more susceptible to health problems and increases the likelihood of aggression. People who live in high-rise apartment buildings, filled with tenants, are more likely to behave aggressively than those who live in apartment buildings with fewer floors (Bell et al., 1990). The effects of crowding on health and aggression have also been studied extensively in prison settings—inmates who live in crowded environments suffer more health problems and are more likely to act aggressively than inmates housed in less crowded environ- ments (Haney, 2006; Paulus, 1988).

Crowding and noise are two examples of environmental stressors, but there are many others. For example, stress and health have been closely linked to the family social environment, peer interactions, conditions in the workplace, socioeconomic class, and the general characteristics of the neighborhood in which you live (Cutrona et al., 2006). There is, in fact, an entire specialty in psychology—called environmental psychology —devoted to the study of environmental effects on behavior and health. Environmental psychologists have shown particular interest in the psychology of urban living because living in a large city is likely to expose one to a variety of

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Try listing and ranking the life events that cause, or have caused, you the most stress. Do your rank orderings differ from those listed in Table 16.1?

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Suppose you discover a group of people living in a crowded and noisy environment who show little or no stress reaction. How would you interpret your findings?

environmental psychology A specialty area in psychology devoted to the study of environmental effects on behavior and health, such as the effects of crowding or noise.

Experiencing Stress | 515

environmental stressors (particularly noise and crowding). In general, people suc- cumb to stress when they’re forced to live in situations in which there is excessive stimulation, movement is constrained, or resources are limited.

Internal Sources of Stress As you’re now aware, no single event or set of living conditions will automatically lead to stress in everyone. Stressors are very much in the eye of the beholder, which means we need to know something about the internal characteristics of an individ- ual before we can predict how he or she will react to a stressor. But what exactly are these internal characteristics? We’ll consider three in this section: perceived control, explanatory style, and personality.

Perceived Control To experience stress, you need to perceive a threat or some kind of demand, and you need to feel you lack the resources to deal effectively with that threat. This second part of the appraisal process, the assessment of resources, is influ- enced by a psychological construct called perceived control, which is the amount of influence you feel you have over the situation and your reaction to it. Perceived control significantly affects the amount of stress you’ll experience. If you perceive a demand or threat and you think you have no control over the situation, your body is likely to react with arousal, the release of stress hormones, and there will be changes in the activities of your immune system (Brosschot et al., 1998). If the situation con- tinues for a prolonged period, negative physical and psychological consequences are likely to result.

Many examples, both scientific and anecdotal, support the link between per- ceived control and stress (Leotti et al., 2010). Early in the manned space program, for instance, the Mercury astronauts insisted that manual controls and windows be placed in the orbiting space capsule. Although not necessary from an engineering standpoint, doing so gave the astronauts a sense of control over their environment, which reduced their stress. In laboratory studies, animals that are exposed to shocks

perceived control The amount of influence you feel you have over a situation and your reaction to it.

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that they can stop by turning a wheel are less likely to develop ulcers than animals who receive the same amount of shock but cannot control it (Weiss, 1977). Moreover, people with an internal locus of control, those who feel they generally have control over the events in their environment, show less of a stress response when allowed to control a stressor in the laboratory than people with an external locus of control (Bollini et al., 2004). Finally, anxious individuals who feel they lack control after a heart attack are more likely to suffer complications than those with high perceived control (Moser et al., 2007).

Explanatory Style The cognitive appraisal process, and therefore susceptibility to stress, is also influenced by one’s general style of thinking. At several points we’ve discussed the importance of attributions, or our conclusions about cause and effect. People offer different kinds of explanations for the positive and negative events that occur in their world. For example, someone with an internal, stable, and global explanatory style is likely to attribute a negative event to some long- lasting personal inadequacy that applies in lots of situations: “My spouse left me because I’m witless; I’ve always been witless, and I can never hope to convince any- one otherwise.”

We’ve seen elsewhere that a person’s explanatory style contributes to psychologi- cal disorders such as depression (see Chapter 14). Perhaps not surprisingly, explana- tory style has also been linked to physical health and susceptibility to stress. People who consistently make internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events suffer from increased stress-related health problems in midlife as well as later in life (Kamen-Siegel et al., 1991; Peterson et al., 1988). In one particularly intriguing study, Peterson and Seligman (1987) analyzed the explanatory styles of 94 members of the Baseball Hall of Fame who had played at some point between 1900 and 1950. Many of these players were dead at the time of the study, so the researchers had to glean the players’ explanatory styles from stories and quotations in old newspapers. The players with negative explanatory styles were found, on average, to have lived shorter lives. More recently, it was found that baseball players who smiled intensely during their official team photograph tended to live longer than players who refused to smile or showed only partial smiles (Abel & Kruger, 2010).

Personality Characteristics Both perceived control and explanatory style are related more generally to personality. Previously, we defined personality as the set of psychological characteristics that distinguishes us from others and leads us to act consistently across situations. Explanatory style may be linked to a personality char- acteristic such as optimism—the belief that good things will happen—which some psychologists have argued is a relatively enduring trait that changes little over a life- time (Scheier & Carver, 1993). Optimism scales have been developed and used to look for a connection between personality and health. In one study, optimism was assessed on the day before a group of men underwent coronary bypass surgery. The optimists reacted physiologically to the surgery in ways that lowered the risk of heart attack; they also recovered more quickly after the surgery (Scheier et al., 1989). Optimistic people reported less pain, better physical functioning, experienced fewer physical symptoms, and were less likely to be rehospitalized after heart surgery than people with a pessimistic outlook (Rasmussen et al., 2009). Other studies have demonstrated links between psychosocial factors such as optimism and improved functioning of the immune system (see Antoni & Lutgendorf, 2007).

An optimistic view of life can clearly reduce stress. In one study, rescue and recovery workers at the crash site of an airline accident (USAir Flight 427) were studied two, six, nine, and twelve months after the crash. Those individuals who maintained an optimistic outlook reported less stress and generally better cop- ing strategies. They also tended to have better social support networks and thereby improved resources for dealing with the stress associated with the accident (Dougall

Experiencing Stress | 517

et al., 2001). Consequently, an optimistic outlook not only can help you establish and maintain friends but it may help you live longer too (Smith, 2006).

The most widely recognized personality character- istics that have been linked to stress-related health disor- ders, particularly coronary heart disease, are the famous Type A and Type B behavior patterns. You’re familiar with the Type A personality: hard driving, ambitious, easily annoyed, and impatient. Those with a Type A personality seem to be immersed in a sea of perpetual self-imposed stress; they’re too busy to notice or enjoy the things around them because they’re engaged in a relentless pur- suit of success. Type B personality types are essentially people who lack the Type A attributes—they put them- selves under less pressure and appear more relaxed.

The connection between Type A behavior pat- terns and heart disease was first noted by cardiologists Meyer Friedman and Ray Rosenman (1974). Friedman and Rosenman were interested in explaining why only some people with known risk factors for heart disease—such as smoking, obesity, inactivity, and so on—actually develop heart problems. People can appear to have identical risk pro- files but end up healthy in one instance and disease prone in another. Friedman and Rosenman proposed that the solution lies in the connection between personality and stress. People who are psychologically prone to stress—Type A personalities—will prove more susceptible to diseases of the heart.

Recent work suggests that a more complete answer lies in further analyzing the Type A behavior pattern or personality, which turns out to be quite complex. To be classified as a Type A personality requires that a person be rated on a number of dimensions—competitiveness, ambition, hostility, and so on—and not all of these attributes are equally important. Researchers now believe it’s probably hostility, anger, or the expression of anger—what are sometimes called Type D (or “distressed”) personality characteristics—that are most responsible for producing subsequent cor- onary artery disease (O’Dell et al., 2011). Other researchers have detected a relation- ship between emotional intelligence, which taps one’s ability to deal effectively with emotions, and general health (Martins et al., 2010).

● CONCEPt REviEw Sources of Stress ExTERnAL

SouRce DeScRiPtion

Significant life events Major life events associated with a change in day-to-day activities; they can be positive (e.g., getting married) or negative (e.g., death of a loved one)

Daily hassles Daily irritations and hassles, such as getting stuck in traffic

Environmental factors Stressors present in the environment, such as noise and crowding

inTERnAL

SouRce DeScRiPtion

Perceived control The amount of influence you feel you have over a situation. A sense of control often lessens the stress.

Explanatory style One’s general style of thinking about and explaining events. People who make internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events are more likely to suffer from stress-related health problems.

Personality characteristics optimism (the belief that good things will happen) generally reduces stress. Hostility, anger, and an inability to deal effectively with emotions have also been associated with elevated stress and heart problems.

Individuals who are prone to hostility or the expression of anger—what is sometimes called a Type D (or “distressed”) personality—appear to be at increased risk for subsequent heart disease.

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Reacting to Prolonged Stress LEARNING GOALS

● Describe the physical consequences of prolonged stress. ● Describe the psychological consequences of prolonged stress.

There’s a definite connection between prolonged stress and physical and psychologi- cal health. Stress is an adaptive reaction to threat—it helps us to survive. But when it’s prolonged, when we’re not able to reduce or eliminate the perceived threat, the mind and body start to break down. If the stress reaction is extreme enough, the break- down can be sudden and may even result in death; in most cases, however, the effects are gradual and reveal themselves slowly through a growing list of physical and psy- chological problems. In this section of the chapter, we’ll consider the nature of these breakdowns and how and why they occur.

Physical Consequences of Stress Stress has been implicated in a wide variety of health problems. In addition to ulcers and heart disease, stress has been linked to everything from the common cold to chronic back pain, multiple sclerosis, and even cancer (Schneiderman et al., 2001).

test Yourself Check your knowledge about the stress response by answering each of the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Hans Selye’s concept of the general adaptation syndrome (GAS) proposes that the body reacts to stress in three phases. Which of the following shows the correct sequence of these phases?

a. Resistance, alarm, exhaustion b. Exhaustion, resistance, alarm c. Alarm, resistance, exhaustion d. Exhaustion, alarm, resistance

2. The experience of stress is related to the experience of emotion in which of the following ways?

a. The experience of stress, like emotion, is an inevitable reac- tion to threat.

b. The experience of stress, like emotion, is accompanied by very distinctive facial expressions.

c. The experience of stress, like emotion, depends on the appraisal of the event rather than on the event itself.

d. The experience of different kinds of stress, like emotion, leads to highly specific kinds of body reactions.

3. According to the Social Readjustment Rating Scale, which of the following events is most likely to cause stress-related health problems?

a. Marriage b. Death of a close friend c. Sex difficulties d. Trouble with your boss

4. Which of the following internal characteristics is least likely to be associated with stress-related health problems?

a. Low levels of perceived control b. Type D behavior pattern c. An optimistic outlook d. Internal, stable, and global attributions

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Most of the scientific evidence is correlational, which means a statistical relationship has been found between health problems, such as heart disease, and some measure- ment of stress. Large numbers of people are interviewed, and health histories as well as stress levels are measured. The net result is that we can predict whether someone, on average, will have an increased chance of developing a particular kind of health problem by knowing the amount of stress that person experiences on a regular basis. But this doesn’t tell us whether a causal relationship exists between stress and illness. To determine that, we must turn to experimental research.

It’s difficult to conduct experimental research on stress and health for obvi- ous ethical reasons. Ethically, we can’t randomly divide people into groups, sub- ject some of them to high levels of stress, and then monitor the later consequences of that manipulation on health. But experimental studies have been conducted on groups of people who have been previously identified as having either a high or low level of stress in their lives. In one study (Cohen et al., 1993), people with high and low levels of stress were given nasal drops that either contained or did not contain a common cold virus. It was a double-blind study, so neither the participants nor the researchers were aware during the course of the study who was getting the actual virus and who was not. Afterward, when the assignments were decoded, it was found that the high-stress people who received the virus were the ones most likely to show cold symptoms. Living a stressful life apparently lowers one’s ability to fight off disease.

The Immune Response To understand why stress increases susceptibility to illness, we need to consider the human immune system, a complex defense system that’s constantly on the lookout for foreign substances, such as viruses or bacteria. The primary weapons of the immune system are lymphocytes, which are specialized white blood cells that attack and destroy most of these foreign invaders. Stress can lower the immune response by decreasing the number of lymphocytes in the bloodstream. Stress can also suppress the response of the lymphocytes to foreign substances that have invaded the body, and can even lead to the reactivation of latent viruses (Marketon & Glaser, 2008). Prolonged stress can also lead to chronic low- grade inflammation in the body that, in turn, is associated with negative long-term health consequences (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2010). The mechanisms that produce these changes are not completely understood, although the prolonged release of stress hormones into the bloodstream probably plays a significant role.

Several investigations have shown that stressful life events directly affect the immune response. Medical students, on average, have fewer lymphocytes in their blood during a period of final exams compared to levels found before exams (Kiecolt- Glaser et al., 1984); they’re also more likely to get sick during exams. People who have recently had a spouse or loved one die also show a suppressed immune response. One investigative team tracked the immune response in men married to women with advanced breast cancer. Samples of the men’s blood were taken during a period of months preceding and following their wives’ deaths. On average, the existing lym- phocytes in blood samples drawn after the wives had died showed a weaker response to foreign substances (Schleifer et al., 1983).

The fact that stress weakens the immune system has led researchers to wonder about the effects of stress on more chronic illnesses, such as cancer. In the labora- tory it’s been shown that stress can increase the growth rate of cancerous tumors in animals (Antoni & Lutgendorf, 2007). There have also been reports that cancer patients who are optimistic, or who are given therapy to help reduce anxiety and depression, survive longer than patients who are hopeless or depressed (Andersen, 1992; Spiegel et al., 1989). Stress may affect not only the body’s ability to fight can- cer but also the likelihood that cancer cells will form in the first place (Antoni & Lutgendorf, 2007).

At present, however, researchers remain cautious about the link between psy- chology, the immune system, and cancer. Not all studies have found associations

lymphocytes Specialized white blood cells that have the job of attacking foreign substances, such as viruses and bacteria.

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between psychological factors and cancer, and the fact that data linking cancer to stress have often come from correlational studies means that it’s difficult to draw conclusions about cause and effect. It’s possible that “stressful” people, on average, have a greater risk of acquiring cancer because they tend to engage in unhealthful behaviors—such as smoking—as a way of dealing with the stress. It may also be the case that people who are optimistic about their survival from cancer tend to comply more with the recommenda- tions of their doctors. Although there may be a statis- tical association between stress and cancer, that does not necessarily mean that stress is causing cancer by compromising the functioning of the immune sys- tem. In addition, some researchers have questioned whether psychotherapy actually increases the like- lihood of survival among cancer patients (Boesen & Johansen, 2008).

Cardiovascular Disease Health psychologists have also intensively studied the well-documented rela- tionship between stress and cardiovascular disease

(problems connected with the heart and blood vessels). We discussed the connection between personality characteristics and heart problems earlier, but we left the mech- anisms through which stress undermines cardiovascular health unspecified. The two most important risk factors in heart disease are (1) high cholesterol levels in the blood, and (2) high blood pressure. Prolonged exposure to stress increases both of these risk factors (Kubzansky & Adler, 2010).

Increased blood pressure, a natural by-product of the stress response, is gener- ally helpful over the short term in preparing us to react to a threat. But if the elevated pressure continues, it causes wear and tear on the blood vessels in the body, which can lead to both cardiovascular disease and kidney problems. Stress can also directly affect the level of cholesterol in the blood. When college students are anticipating an upcoming exam, samples of their blood show higher levels of cholesterol (Van Doornen & Van Blokland, 1987). It’s possible that when people sense threat, the body directs the blood flow to the muscles and away from internal organs, such as the liver, that remove fat and cholesterol from the blood.

Psychological Consequences of Stress Think about how you feel when you’re “stressed out.” That recurring cold or sour stomach seems like it’ll never go away. But the mental and emotional changes can be just as profound. You feel anxious, out of control, emotionally drained, and, after a while, possibly even sad and depressed. Stress is not a pleasant experience, and if the stress reaction is intense enough, or if it continues long enough, serious psychological problems can result.

Psychologists are convinced that stressful life events play a significant role in the onset of many psychological disorders. If you interview people who have suffered from major depression or a bipolar disorder, you’ll find that most have experienced some kind of major stressor just before or early into the depressive episode—they got fired from their job, they moved to a new town, they’re mired in a nasty divorce, and so on (Barlow & Durand, 2012). Stress has been implicated in the onset of schizophre- nia as well. Several studies have shown that stressful life events tend to precede the development of schizophrenic episodes (e.g., Tessner et al., 2011).

People who are subjected to chronic stress by environmental conditions can have weakened immune systems.

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But, importantly, not all people who experience intense stress go on to develop serious psychological problems. In fact, the majority of people who experience a traumatic life stressor do not subsequently develop psychological disorders. Psychologists assume there must be some kind of vulnerability, perhaps rooted in the genetic recipe, before stress leads to an extreme disorder such as major depres- sion or schizophrenia.

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder You’re familiar with this scenario: Soldier returns home from war, shell shocked, suffering from sleepless nights and flashbacks of trau- matic episodes in battle. Hollywood has exploited this image to the point where the “unstable Vietnam vet” has become an unfortunate part of our collective sense of the Vietnam experience. In reality, the vast majority of soldiers who returned from Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan have experienced no long-term psychological prob- lems. At the same time, psychologists do recognize that exposure to extreme stress can produce a serious psychological condition known as posttraumatic stress disor- der. This disorder is not limited to battle veterans; it can occur in any individual who has undergone a traumatic episode, such as a physical attack, rape, or a natural disaster.

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is associated with a variety of diagnostic symptoms. Many of these symptoms are, in fact, typical and normal reactions to traumatic events. But in PTSD, the individual fails to recover from the event and the symptoms persist for an extended period of time (Friedman et al., 2011).

1. Recurrent recollections or flashbacks. The person relives the traumatic event in some way. These recurrences or flashbacks can take the form of persistent thoughts or images of the traumatic scene, and they can even involve vivid hallucinations; the affected person seems at times to be reexperiencing the event—fighting the battle anew or fending off the attacker.

2. Avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma. People with PTSD actively try to avoid anything that reminds them of the event. This avoidance behavior can lead to significant disruptions in normal social functioning as the person turns away from friends and loved ones who in some way remind him or her of the trauma.

3. Chronic arousal symptoms. These symptoms can include sleep problems, irritabil- ity or outbursts of anger, and difficulties in concentrating.

4. Negative changes in mood and cognition. PTSD often affects mood, leading to persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs. In some cases, it can also lead to changes in cognitive functioning, such as an inability to remember things about the traumatic event.

Obviously, PTSD is a disabling condition, not only for the individuals who are directly affected but also for family and friends. The cause of the disor- der is clear—traumatic stress—but the reason only some people who experience trauma develop post- traumatic stress disorder remains a mystery. There’s evidence that the intensity of the trauma may be impor- tant. For example, Vietnam veterans who were in heavy combat were significantly more likely to develop posttraumatic stress disorder than those serving in non- combat roles (Goldberg et al., 1990). But, once again, this doesn’t explain why the disorder remains relatively rare even among people who have experienced extreme trauma. As with most psychological disorders, the chances that posttraumatic stress disorder will develop undoubtedly depend on a complex mix of biological and environmental factors (Broekman et al., 2007).

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

How might the onset of a psychological disorder, such as depression, be an adaptive reaction to prolonged stress?

posttraumatic stress disorder A trauma-based anxiety disorder characterized by flashbacks, avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event, and chronic arousal symptoms.

Traumatic events can lead to prolonged stress reactions, including PTSD in some individuals.

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Burnout Stress does not need to be extreme to produce unpleasant psychological consequences. In the 1970s, the term burnout was introduced by psychologists to describe a syndrome that develops in certain people who are exposed to stressful situ- ations that are demanding but not necessarily traumatic (Freudenberger, 1974; Maslach, 1976). Although the term burnout has become a household word, to psy- chologists it refers to “a state of physical, emotional, and mental exhaustion caused by long-term involvement in emotionally demanding situations” (Pines & Aronson, 1988, p. 9). When burnout occurs, individuals essentially lose their spirit—they become emotionally drained, they feel used up, and they lose their sense of personal accomplishment.

As with PTSD, stress is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for producing burnout. Not everyone who has a demanding and stressful job becomes burned out. Burnout seems to occur only in idealistic individuals—people who have entered their careers with a high sense of motivation and commitment. In the words of psychol- ogist Ayala Pines (1993), “You cannot burn out unless you were ‘on fire’ initially” (p. 386). Because burnout primarily affects highly motivated individuals, it can have a high cost for organizations as well as for the individual. People who suffer from burnout lose their edge on the job—they become disillusioned with their work, are frequently absent from the job, and usually are at increased risk for a host of physical problems (Maslach & Leiter, 2008).

Why does burnout occur? The underlying cause may well be related to a loss of meaning in life (Pines, 1993) or to a loss of control in the workplace (McKnight & Glass, 1995). People who are subject to burnout are usually those who think of their work as a kind of “calling.” They use success on the job as a way of validating their existence. They identify so closely with their work that when failure happens, their entire life loses meaning. Failure is much more likely when the job is demanding and taxes the individual’s resources, which is probably the reason stress is typically asso- ciated with the syndrome. If the overall stress levels can be reduced, perhaps by pro- viding a better support system within the work environment, burnout is less likely to occur (see Leiter & Maslach, 2005; Maslach et al., 2001).

burnout A state of physical, emotional, and mental exhaustion created by long-term involvement in an emotionally demanding situation.

● CONCEPt REviEw Consequences of Stress PHYsiCAL

StReSS AffectS nAtuRe of the effect

Immune response Stressful events directly affect the immune response, lowering the number of disease-fighting lymphocytes and causing chronic low-grade inflammation.

Cardiovascular disease Increased blood pressure from prolonged stress causes wear and tear on blood vessels, which can lead to cardiovascular disease.

PsYCHoLogiCAL

StReSS LeADS to nAtuRe of the effect

Posttraumatic stress disorder

A serious psychological condition that can result from exposure to extreme stress. PTSD is characterized by flashbacks, avoidance of trauma-associated stimuli, chronic arousal symptoms, and negative changes in mood and cognition.

Burnout A state of physical, emotional, and mental exhaustion caused by long-term involvement in emotionally demanding situations. It seems to occur in idealistic individuals who are highly motivated, perhaps due to a loss of control or a loss of meaning in life.

Reducing and Coping With Stress | 523

Reducing and Coping With Stress LEARNING GOALS

● Explain how relaxation techniques can be used to reduce stress. ● Explain how stress can be managed through cognitive reappraisal of the stressful situation.

Because stress is associated with so many physical and psychological problems, it’s obviously important to develop techniques for reducing stress. Unfortunately, stress- ors are often outside of our direct control—you can’t prevent the tornado that skirts your town or the death of a valued friend from accident or illness. But techniques are available for coping with stressors when they’re present. Coping is a term psycholo- gists use to describe efforts to manage conditions of threat or demand that tax one’s resources (Lazarus, 1993). In this section, we’ll consider three coping strategies for controlling or reducing stress: (1) relaxation techniques, (2) effective social support systems, and (3) learning to reappraise the environment in a less threatening way.

Relaxation Techniques By definition, the stress response is incompatible with relaxation. You cannot be pre- pared to fight or flee if your body is calm, relaxed, and free from arousal-inducing stress hormones. Studies have shown that high-stress individuals can reduce the phys- ically threatening components of the stress reaction—such as high blood pressure— by simply practicing a regimen of relaxation techniques. You may remember that we discussed how relaxation can be used effectively in the treatment of anxiety disorders (Chapter 15); similar relaxation techniques have proven effective in reducing long- term stress.

coping Efforts to manage or master conditions of threat or demand that tax one’s resources.

test Yourself Check your knowledge about reacting to stress by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Lymphocytes are the primary weapons of the human immune system. true or false?

2. Much of the data linking cancer and stress have come from cor- relational studies; researchers are unable, therefore, to draw firm conclusions about cause and effect. true or false?

3. Stress is known to affect blood pressure, but no links have been established between stress and cholesterol levels. true or false?

4. Posttraumatic stress disorder is a common reaction to experienc- ing a traumatic event. true or false?

5. Burnout is more likely to occur in people who use success on the job as a way of giving life meaning. true or false?

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A number of relaxation procedures are available to help manage stress. In progres- sive muscle relaxation, you’re taught to concentrate on specific muscle groups in the body, to note whether there is any tension, and then to relax those specific groups. Often in progressive relaxation you learn to address muscle groups in sequence. For example, you might begin with the muscle groups in the neck, move to the shoulders, and so on, first tensing and then relaxing each group. In this way you learn to pay attention to how muscles in your body feel when tense or relaxed. Progressive relax- ation has been used successfully to treat a variety of stress-related health problems, everything from tension headaches to sleep problems (see Dolbier & Rush, 2012). In a related technique, called autogenic relaxation, you’re taught to focus on directing blood flow toward tense muscle groups, “warming” and relaxing each group; once again, autogenic relaxation has proven beneficial in treating stress-related conditions (Friedlander et al., 1997).

Relaxation techniques are sometimes accompanied by meditation training. We discussed some of the benefits of meditation in Chapter 6. Meditation essentially involves learning how to relax, using techniques similar to progressive muscle relax- ation. But you’re also taught some time-tested mental exercises, such as repeating a string of words or sounds over and over in your head. The mental repetition focuses awareness and helps prevent potentially distracting or stress-producing thoughts from interfering with the relaxation response. (For instance, if you’re concentrat- ing on repeating the phrase “I’m at one with the universe,” you can’t simultaneously be worrying about whether the relaxation technique is working.) Daily meditation sessions clearly help people deal with stress-related arousal and are likely to prevent the later development of health problems such as high blood pressure (Rainforth et al., 2007).

Biofeedback The goal of relaxation training is to lower components of the stress response, such as blood pressure, heart rate, and muscle tension. For example, if stress-related headaches are caused by tension in the muscles of the head and scalp, then people should be able to reduce or eliminate the pain by relaxing these specific muscle groups. Some researchers have suggested that it helps to give people feed- back—biofeedback—about the effectiveness of their relaxation efforts. With biofeed- back, monitoring equipment provides a continuous reading of your physiological state. In the case of tension headaches, the feedback would indicate the tension levels in the muscles of the head; for blood pressure or heart rate, you would be able to read your blood pressure and heart rate directly from appropriate monitoring equipment.

Not surprisingly, biofeedback works. When people are given information about how well their relaxation efforts are succeeding, compared with control subjects who are given no feedback, it’s easier to control the relevant physiological response

biofeedback Specific physiological feedback people are given about the effectiveness of their relaxation efforts.

Exercise, meditation, and even social support can be excellent vehicles for coping with stress.

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(Nestoriuc & Martin, 2007). But interestingly, it’s also the subsequent feeling of con- trol that leads to reductions in the stress response. In one study on tension headaches, three groups of people were given a feedback signal that they were led to believe indi- cated a successful lowering of muscle tension in their foreheads. Actually, unknown to them, the signal had three different meanings: In one group, it appeared only when participants successfully increased the amount of tension in their foreheads; in a sec- ond group, the signal appeared whenever the amount of tension decreased; in a third group, it appeared when tension levels remained the same. Remarkably, despite the misleading feedback in two of the groups, everyone reported headache improvement (see ●Figure 16.4). Apparently, feeling that you have some control over your body can be sufficient to lower stress-induced pain (Andrasik & Holroyd, 1980). Remember, whether you’ll experience a stress response depends on a cognitive appraisal of your resources. If you feel you have the ability to control the threat or demand, even if that control is illusory, you’re less likely to experience stress.

Social Support Although it may seem like a cliché, having a good friend to lean on during a time of stress really does matter. Psychologists use the term social support to refer to the resources we receive from other people or groups, often in the form of comfort, car- ing, or help. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that social support can improve one’s psychological and physical health (Taylor, 2007). People with well- established social support systems are less likely to suffer a second heart attack (Case et al., 1992), are more likely to survive life-threatening cancer (Chou et al., 2012), and are less likely to consider suicide if they’re infected with HIV (Schneider et al., 1991). Other studies have established that social support plays a role in lowering the likeli- hood of depression and in speeding recovery (Marroquin, 2011).

Social support probably helps reduce stress for many reasons. Some evidence suggests that social support helps people learn how to regulate their emotions more effectively (Marroquin, 2011). Another likely possibility is that social contacts help people maintain a healthful lifestyle. Friends and family push you out the door for your morning jog, force you to take your medications, or encourage you to visit the doctor regularly. Family and friends also bolster your confidence in times of stress, so you’re more likely to feel that you have the necessary resources to cope with the demand. In a time of loss, such as immediately after the death of a spouse, social sup- port lowers the chances that a grieving person will engage in unhealthful behaviors, such as drinking. (For a discussion of how pets can act as a form of positive social support, see the Practical Solutions feature.)

social support The resources we receive from other people or groups, often in the form of comfort, caring, or help.

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● FiGURE 16.4 biofeedback, Perceived Control, and Stress People in three groups were led to believe that they could lower the amount of muscle tension in their foreheads through biofeedback. Actually, they learned to increase, decrease, or keep the tension levels the same. Yet all three groups showed significant improvement in headache symptoms, irrespective of condition. Apparently, the mere fact that the people believed they were lowering the tension levels was sufficient to produce improvement. Also shown are the data for controls who received no biofeedback. (Data from Andrasik & Holroyd, 1980)

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Having a loved one or a good friend to talk to about your problems makes a difference, and that friend doesn’t even need to be human. The companionship of pets—dogs, cats, even birds—has repeatedly been found to be an effective form of social support. Heart attack victims who own pets, for example, are more likely to survive the first year after the attack than are non–pet owners. Correlational stud- ies among the elderly have found that pet ownership is inversely related to the severity of psychological problems: People who are attached to their pets are less likely to show the symptoms of depression (Garrity et al., 1989). Ownership of a dog, in particular, is an excellent predictor of whether or not an elderly person will feel the need to visit a doc- tor (Siegel, 1990).

There’s some evidence to suggest that having a pet may even be a more effective buffer against stress than having a human companion. In an experiment conducted by Karen Allen and her colleagues (1991), female dog owners agreed to have several physiological reactions monitored while they tried to solve relatively difficult math prob- lems. Prior to starting the task, the women were randomly divided into three groups. In one group, the women were allowed to have their dog with them in the room while com- pleting the math task. In a second group, no dogs were allowed, but each woman was allowed the presence of a close human friend. In the third group, no social support was pres- ent during the testing.

A variety of physiological reactions were measured, including heart rate and blood pressure. Not surprisingly, solving diffi- cult math problems led directly to stress- related arousal—heart rate increased, as did blood pressure. But the amount of reactiv- ity depended on the group: The women who were allowed to have their dog with them showed the lowest arousal effects com- pared to the women in the other two groups (see ●Figure 16.5). The presence of the pet apparently acted as an effective buffer against stress. The surprise finding of the study was that having a close human friend sit nearby while solving the math problems actually led to the highest relative stress reaction.

Does this mean that pets are more thera- peutic than friends or loved ones? For some people in some situations, the answer may well be “Yes.” Allen and her colleagues argued that pets are often effective buffers against stress because they’re essentially nonevaluative. Pets don’t make value judg- ments about their caretakers. Your dog or cat doesn’t care one bit about how well you’re doing on some math task, but your close human friend might. A friend’s expectations can place added pressure on you as you per- form an already stressful task. A woman who participated in the study by Allen and col- leagues put it this way: “Pets never withhold their love, they never get angry and leave, and they never go out looking for new own- ers” (p. 588). Another woman offered the

following: “Whereas husbands may come and go, and children may grow up and leave home, a ‘dog is forever’” (p. 588). The opin- ions of these women may not be shared by everyone, nor do you need to hold these strong views to appreciate the value of pet companionship. The data simply indicate that pets can be an important part of your social network and that they can clearly help you cope with stress.

● PRACtiCAL SOLUtiONS Pet Support

● FiGURE 16.5 Pets as Stress Moderators In one study, a pet’s presence during a stressful task significantly lowered the stress reaction (measured here in terms of pulse rate) compared to when a friend was present or to a control condition in which neither a friend nor a pet was present. (Data from Allen et al., 1991)

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It’s also the case that having someone to talk things over with can help you cope with stress. James Pennebaker (1990) has conducted a number of studies in which col- lege students were encouraged to talk or write about upsetting events in their lives (everything from a divorce in the family to fears about the future). When compared to the control students, who were asked to talk or write about trivial things, the stu- dents who opened up showed improved immune functioning and were less likely to visit the college health center over the next several months. Pennebaker has found similar benefits for people who lived through natural disasters (such as earthquakes) or were part of the Holocaust. Opening up, talking about things, and confiding in others really seems to help people cope (Pennebaker & Chung, 2007).

At the same time, psychologists recognize that social support can have a negative side as well. If you’ve come to depend on another for support and that support is no lon- ger delivered, your ability to cope can be compromised. Social support can also reduce self-reliance in some people, which may produce psychological distress and impair their ability to cope. Whether people respond favorably to social support and the receipt of aid, or consider it to be a meddling nuisance, depends to some extent on how much control they feel they have over their own actions and the outcomes of their actions.

Reappraising the Situation When thinking about how to cope with stress, it’s important to remember that it’s not the sudden life event or the daily hassle that actually leads us to experience stress— it’s our interpretation of the event that really matters. Even the death of a spouse or the occurrence of a natural disaster, cruel as it may seem, will create significant stress only if the event is appraised in a negative way. Imagine if your spouse were suffer- ing from an incurable disease, one that produced extreme and persistent pain. Under these conditions, death could be seen as a kind of blessing.

Remember, too, that many instances of stress are caused by the little things, the daily hassles of life. Getting stuck in traffic, or in the wrong line at the supermarket, makes us feel stressed only because we have a tendency to “catastrophize” the situa- tion: “This is absolutely awful . . . I can’t stand waiting here any longer . . . I’m going to get home late, and my family will be mad.” It’s not the delay that creates the stress, it’s the things we tell ourselves about the delay that cause the problems. As a result,

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think it’s possible that people who are healthier tend to get more social support than those who are sick? Might this fact account for the correlation?

The support of family and friends can be especially helpful when the environment itself acts as a stressor.

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many psychologists feel that stress can be managed effectively through logical reanal- ysis and positive reappraisal. If you can interpret the hassle in a more logical and posi- tive manner, you can reduce or eliminate the stress reaction.

Stress management techniques that rely on cognitive reappraisal take a variety of forms. For instance, you can be taught to focus on certain aspects of the situation that distract you from catastrophizing. If you’re stuck in the wrong checkout line, rather than concentrating on how you “must” get home on time, pick up one of the tabloids and read about the latest sighting of Elvis. Alternatively, try using your past experi- ences to reappraise the consequences: “Let’s see, this certainly is not the first time I’ve been stuck in a checkout line, and my family and friends still think I’m okay.” Another approach would be to analyze the situation logically and derive alternatives for the future: “Every time I come to the market at 5:30, right after work, I get stuck in a line—maybe if I wait and go after dinner, there will be less of a wait.”

Some stress management programs recommend that clients keep daily records of the specific situations that have led to stress, as well as the specific symptoms and thoughts that arose (an example is shown in ●Figure 16.6). The value of a stress record is that it allows the client to recognize any unrealistic thoughts or conclusions on the spot because they need to be written down. With time, clients get a pretty good idea of the situations that lead to the highest stress, and they gain insight into the thought processes that produce their reactions. As each unrealistic thought is recognized, the client can work at reappraising the situation and confronting any negative attitudes or beliefs (Barlow, et al., 2001).

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

What’s the link between these stress management programs and the techniques used in cognitive therapies, such as rational- emotive therapy?

● FiGURE 16.6 A Daily Stress Record Stress management programs often recommend that clients keep daily records of situations that lead to stress, along with the specific symptoms and thoughts that arise. (From D. H. Barlow, R. M. Rapee, & L. C. Reisner, “Daily Stress Record,” Mastering Stress 2001—A LifeStyle Approach, p. 12. Copyright © 2001.

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Living a Healthy Lifestyle LEARNING GOALS

● Discuss the physical and psychological benefits of aerobic exercise. ● Discuss the consequences of tobacco use and explain why quitting smoking is so difficult. ● Discuss the value of proper nutrition. ● Describe the different types of prevention programs and explain how they’re used to target AIDS.

One of the challenges of the health psychology movement is to devise a compre- hensive and workable framework for health promotion (Leventhal et al., 2008). In offering prescriptions for healthful lifestyles, psychologists recognize that not all risk factors can be controlled. Men, for example, have a greater risk of developing heart disease than women, at least prior to around age 50, and the elderly are at a greater risk of developing a whole host of health-related problems. Obviously, people have no control over heredity, and they can’t help the fact that they grow old. But there are lifestyle choices that can make a difference.

Get Fit: The Value of Aerobic Exercise Exercise is an excellent example of an activity that can have a substantial positive impact on physical and psychological health, especially if the exercise is sustained and aerobic. Aerobic exercise consists of high-intensity activities that increase both heart rate and

aerobic exercise High-intensity activities, such as running and swimming, that increase both heart rate and oxygen consumption.

test Yourself Check on your knowledge about stress management techniques by answering the following questions. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Relaxation techniques, such as meditation or progressive muscle relaxation, appear to work because:

a. They promote a sense of “connectedness” with the therapist. b. They lead to positive cognitive reappraisals. c. The stress response is incompatible with relaxation. d. They cause you to open up and express feelings.

2. Biofeedback may be effective for managing stress because it: a. Gives you a feeling of control. b. Leads to muscle relaxation. c. Trains neurons to fire in sequence. d. Works well with meditation.

3. Which of the following statements about the influence of social support on stress is false?

a. Social contacts help you maintain a healthy lifestyle. b. Social support increases the chances that you’ll open up and

express feelings.

c. Social support can reduce the chances of a second heart attack.

d. Social support makes it easier to cope if the support is no longer delivered.

4. Elroy no longer fumes when he gets stuck in traffic because he’s stopped catastrophizing about the consequences. Which of the following stress management techniques is Elroy probably using?

a. Cognitive reappraisal b. Autogenic relaxation c. Progressive muscle relaxation d. Cathartic exploration

● Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.3

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oxygen consumption, such as fast walking, run- ning, dancing, rowing, swimming, and so on. Regular aerobic exercise improves cardiovascu- lar fitness over the long term and, on average, increases the chances that you’ll live longer.

Psychologically, regular exercise improves mood and makes people more resistant to the effects of stressors. Much of the evidence is correlational (studies have shown statistical relationships between the regularity of exer- cise and reported mental health), but con- trolled experimental studies have reached the same conclusion (Ströhle, 2009). For exam- ple, in a study by McCann and Holmes (1984), volunteer female college students who were suffering from mild depression were asked to (1) engage in a regular program of aero- bic exercise, (2) learn relaxation techniques, or (3) do nothing. After 10 weeks the aerobic exercise group showed the largest improve-

ment in mood. Other work indicates that 30 minutes of moderate exercise daily may be sufficient to improve mood (Hansen et al., 2001). In another study of stress resis- tance, men were randomly assigned to exercise conditions that involved either aero- bic activity or nonaerobic strength-and-flexibility training. After 12 weeks of training, the men in the aerobic group showed lower blood pressure and heart rate when they were exposed to situations involving mental stress (Blumenthal et al., 1988).

Researchers have yet to understand fully how or why exercise improves psy- chological health and functioning. Over the short term, vigorous exercise increases the amount of oxygen that reaches the brain, which undoubtedly improves cogni- tive functioning, and sustained exercise may alter mood-inducing neurotransmitters in the brain. It is also clearly the case that aerobic exercise, as it improves cardio- vascular health, will lessen the physiological effects of the stress reaction. But there may also be placebolike effects involved: People who choose to exercise regularly are convinced they’re going to improve their health, and they subsequently rate them- selves as more psychologically healthy than they may in fact be (Pierce et al., 1993). Sticking to a exercise routine may also increase one’s sense of self-control or self-effi- cacy which, in turn, leads to a more positive self-concept (Ströhle, 2009).

Don’t Smoke: Tobacco and Health Virtually everyone knows that smoking or the oral ingestion (chewing) of tobacco is bad for your health. There is no shortage of correlational and experimental studies available to document this fact. Few researchers question, for example, that smoking contributes annually to hundreds of thousands of deaths in the United States alone, from associated heart disease, cancer, stroke, and emphysema. And it’s not just the smokers who are affected—the babies of women who smoke during pregnancy tend to have lower birth weights and are at increased risk for birth defects; even people who are simply exposed to smoke secondhand may suffer from subsequent health problems. So why, given that it is so damaging to their health, do people smoke?

First, despite what you might have heard on television (especially from tobacco company executives), smoking is recognized to be addictive by the vast majority of mainstream researchers in the health-related sciences (Swan et al., 2003). Many peo- ple who smoke regularly become dependent on their daily dosage, and when they try to quit, they suffer physical and psychological withdrawal symptoms. Established

Regular exercise is an important ingredient in a healthful lifestyle.

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criteria for a diagnosis of tobacco withdrawal include insomnia, irritability, diffi- culty concentrating, and increased appetite or weight gain. The symptoms of with- drawal can be severe enough to cause a significant disruption in normal everyday functioning. This conclusion, of course, comes as no surprise to anyone who has ever tried to quit smoking after prolonged use.

The reinforcing effects of cigarette smoking can be explained by chemical reac- tions in the brain and to factors in the culture at large. Within the brain, it takes only seconds for nicotine—the active agent in cigarette smoke—to stimulate the cen- tral nervous system, elevating heart rate, blood pressure, and mood. Many smokers report that cigarettes not only improve mood but help alleviate anxiety and stress. At the same time, tobacco companies launch advertising campaigns designed to make smoking appear desirable. Tobacco use is identified with role models—often thin, vigorous, and healthy people on horseback or frolicking on the beach—or is associ- ated with independence and nonconformity. Unfortunately, these types of advertis- ing campaigns are often particularly effective for those in adolescence, which is the time when most smokers begin their habit.

You’ve probably heard the saying that the best way to stop smoking is never to start. It’s undoubtedly true because, once started, tobacco use is a difficult habit to break. The psychological and physical withdrawal symptoms associated with tobacco use make quitting extraordinarily difficult. Furthermore, cues in the environment (such as seeing someone else smoking) regularly trigger the habit (Tiffany et al., 2000). A variety of smoking cessation techniques that rely on psychological princi- ples have been developed, but they tend to be effective only over the short term. For example, some programs use learning principles to “punish” tobacco use and encour- age users to replace positive associations with negative ones. These programs often prove effective initially, but in the long run the vast majority of smokers return to the habit. In the words of Mark Twain: “To cease smoking is the easiest thing I ever did; I ought to know because I’ve done it a thousand times.”

But the news is not all bad. There has been a significant drop in the percentage of people who smoke in the United States and Canada, especially over the past two or three decades. In the mid-1960s, for example, a little over 40% of people in the United States smoked; today the number has dropped to around 20%, and approxi- mately 70% of those who currently smoke want to quit (Swan et al., 2003). More and more people are quitting—although often only after many relapses. Perhaps more significantly, large numbers of people are choosing never to start.

Eat Right: The Value of Proper Nutrition In Chapter 11 we dealt with the adaptive problem of how to motivate eating behavior. Obviously, to maintain proper functioning of body and mind, people need to consume the necessary amounts of food. In our earlier discussion of eating, we didn’t pay too much attention to the quality of the food that people consume; instead, our concern was mainly with the internal and external factors that underlie the motivation to eat. But proper nutrition is vitally important in maintaining a healthful body and mind, and health psychologists are engaged in a vigorous campaign to improve people’s dietary habits. Tobacco companies often associate their products with healthy, vigorous lifestyles.

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The dietary habits of most North Americans leave much to be desired. After a long period of relative stability, overweight and obesity rates in the United States began to increase in the 1980s and have continued to increase to the present day. Currently, more than one-third of U.S. adults are classified as obese (Ogden et al., 2012). To put this number in some perspective, in the year 2000 no U.S. state had an obesity rate of 30% or more; by 2010, that number had increased to 12. At present, there isn’t a single state in the U.S that has an obesity rate below 20%. Our diet tends to be too high in calories, fat, cholesterol, sugar, protein, and salt. High-fat diets have been linked to heart disease, stroke, and several kinds of cancer, as well as to obesity. Diets that are high in cholesterol contribute to heart disease because the cholesterol can lodge in the walls of arteries, leading to a hardening and narrowing that restricts blood flow. Of course, not everyone who maintains a diet high in fat or cholesterol will develop these problems (because genetic predispositions are also a factor), but there’s no question that many people eat themselves into an early grave.

Given the overwhelming amount of evidence linking diet to health, why don’t people eat better? For many people, it’s not the amount of food they eat but their choice of food that creates the problems. Consider the following: A baked potato has 0.5% of its calories as fat; when that same potato is french fried, it has 42% of its calo- ries as fat (Winikoff, 1983). Everyone has a handy list of reasons for choosing to eat fast food, including the fact that it tastes good. But from a nutritional standpoint, fast foods tend to come up short because they’re packed with fat and sodium. The best advice is to avoid foods with too much fat, cholesterol, sugar, and sodium. This is not a new message for you, I’m sure, but remember: You’re now much more sophisticated about the psychological factors that influence your choice of foods (see Chapter 11).

Avoid Risky Behavior: Protect Yourself From Disease Choosing a healthful lifestyle requires having the right kind of information about how to prevent health-impairing habits. Health psychologists often distinguish among three main types of prevention programs (Winett, 1995): 1. Primary prevention is designed to educate the public as a whole in ways to reduce

or eliminate a problem before it starts. Teaching children about the potential hazards of smoking or drug use is an example of primary prevention.

2. Secondary prevention involves the early identification of risk factors in specific population groups, such as checking for HIV infection in intravenous drug users or looking for early signs of disease through screening.

3. Tertiary prevention seeks to handle and contain an illness or habit once it has been acquired. All three types of prevention programs are needed, but stopping an illness or habit

before it starts—primary prevention—obviously has greater long-term significance.

AIDS Living in the age of AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) dramati- cally underscores the need for primary prevention programs. As you know, AIDS is an infectious disease that involves a gradual weakening and disabling of the immune system. AIDS is “acquired,” meaning that it’s not a by-product of the genetic code, and it develops as a result of infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). HIV does its damage by attacking cells in the immune system, which leaves the body unable to fight off opportunistic infections that would otherwise be controlled. The disease AIDS is diagnosed in the latter stages of HIV infection when the immune sys- tem has been sufficiently compromised.

Because infection with HIV can lead to AIDS and death, it’s crucial that all three types of prevention programs be initiated, with special emphasis on primary preven- tion (e.g., Burton et al., 2010). Infection with HIV is preventable when the proper steps are taken to control its transmission. HIV is transmitted through contact with bodily fluids, particularly blood and semen. The virus is found in saliva, urine, and tears,

CRitiCAL tHiNkiNG

Do you think there’s a connection between age and the chances of living a healthy lifestyle? If so, why do you think this is?

AIDS Acquired immune deficiency syndrome, a disease that gradually weakens and disables the immune system.

Living a Healthy Lifestyle | 533

but the amount is so small that infection through casual contact—even kissing—is extremely unlikely. The most likely means of transmission is through sexual con- tact or sharing intravenous needles with someone infected with the virus. The use of latex condoms during sexual activity dramatically reduces the chances of infection.

Although AIDS and HIV infection are medical conditions, psychologists have two important roles to play. First, the only effective way to control widespread HIV transmission is to prevent risk-taking behavior. The public needs to be educated about how HIV spreads, and the many misconceptions that currently exist need to be countered. For example, there are still people who are convinced that AIDS is a homosexual problem only, despite the fact that the disease can be—and is being— readily transmitted through heterosexual contact. Indeed, in most parts of the world unprotected heterosexual contact is primarily responsible for spreading the virus. The other key role being played by psychologists in the AIDS epidemic is a therapeu- tic one. Once infected, people with HIV are subjected to an overwhelming amount of stress. Not only are these individuals faced with the prospects of an early death, but they must face the stigma that often accompanies the disease. Psychologists are actively involved in establishing treatment programs that can help AIDS patients cope with their disease (Antoni, 2011).

Primary prevention is crucial in battling the AIDS epidemic.

test Yourself Check your knowledge of living a healthy lifestyle by deciding whether each of the following statements is true or false. (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

1. Aerobic exercise improves cardiovascular health and general mood but produces few changes in the physiological effects of the stress reaction. true or false?

2. Smoking is recognized to be addictive by the vast majority of main- stream researchers in the health-related sciences. true or false?

3. For many people, it’s not the amount of food they eat but their choice of food that creates health problems. true or false?

4. Teaching children about the hazards of smoking or drugs would be classified as an example of secondary prevention. true or false?

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The close relationship between thoughts and emotions and the physical reactions of the body means that understand- ing and promoting physical health requires some attention to psychological factors. Health psychology is part of a broader movement, called behavioral medicine, that seeks to under- stand the medical consequences of the interaction between body and mind. Health psychologists are especially interested in the psychological and environmental factors—everything from personality characteristics to the work environment— that both produce illness and affect the likelihood of recovery.

Experiencing Stress Stress has historically been a somewhat difficult concept to define. It can be conceived of as a stim- ulus, as a response, or as a process through which external events are interpreted as threatening or demanding. We chose to treat stress as the physical and psychological reaction to demanding situations. The stress response is often treated as an extended reaction that occurs in phases. According to the general adaptation syndrome proposed by Hans Selye, the body initially reacts to threat with a highly adaptive fight- or-flight response (although there may be gender differences in the behavioral response); if the threat continues, the body goes through resistance and exhaustion phases that make it vulnerable to disease.

To experience stress, it’s necessary to both perceive a threat and feel that you lack the necessary resources to deal with it effectively. This means that identical environmental events can lead to very different stress reactions, depending on how the situation is interpreted. Overall, however, it is possible to identify some common sources of stress. External sources of stress include significant life events, daily hassles, and environ- mental factors such as noise and crowding. Internal sources of stress include perceived control—how much influence you feel you have over the situation—and explanatory style.

Certain personality characteristics have been linked to stress. Individuals who are prone to hostility or the expression of anger—what is sometimes called a Type D (or “distressed”) personality—appear to be at increased risk for subsequent heart disease.

Reacting to Prolonged Stress Stress is an adaptive reaction to threat, but if the threat is extended over time, both body and mind can start to break down. Stress has been implicated in a wide variety of health problems, ranging from heart dis- ease to the common cold. A number of studies have shown that prolonged stress can affect immune functioning, which

is the body’s method for fighting off disease. Stress can com- promise the immune response by either lowering the number of specialized white blood cells (lymphocytes) or by somehow suppressing the response of those lymphocytes to foreign sub- stances that have invaded the body. Evidence suggests that stress can also lead to chronic low-grade inflammation in the body.

Two chronic psychological consequences of pro- longed stress are posttraumatic stress disorder and burn- out. Posttraumatic stress disorder results from exposure to extreme trauma, such as that experienced during battle or as a result of a physical assault. The symptoms of the disor- der include flashbacks in which the traumatic event is reex- perienced, avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma, chronic arousal problems, and negative changes in mood and cognition. Burnout is a term that psychologists use to describe a state of physical, emotional, and mental exhaustion that sometimes develops after prolonged stress.

Reducing and Coping With Stress We use coping strategies to manage conditions of threat that tax our resources. Effective coping techniques include relaxation training, the use of social support, and reappraisal. The stress response is incom- patible with relaxation, and relaxation training can help lower components of the stress response (such as blood pressure and heart rate). In progressive muscle relaxation training, the cli- ent is taught to concentrate on specific muscle groups in the body, note whether they seem tense, and then relax those specific groups. Sometimes it’s useful to provide biofeedback as well.

Additional evidence indicates that social support—the resources received from other people—can also help you cope effectively with stress. Friends and family help us maintain a healthful lifestyle, boost confidence, or simply provide an avenue for us to open up and express our feelings. Talking about things and confiding in others really seem to help peo- ple deal with stress. Finally, because stress depends on how you interpret the threatening or demanding situation, it can often be managed effectively through cognitive reappraisal. You can be taught to reinterpret significant life events or daily hassles in a less stressful way. Some stress management pro- grams encourage clients to keep daily stress records. By iden- tifying the kinds of situations that create stress, as well as the negative thoughts those situations produce, you become bet- ter prepared to reinterpret those situations and thoughts in a more adaptive manner.

● PSYCHOLOGY FOR A REASON The Connection Between Stress and Health

Psychology For A Reason: The Connection Between Stress and Health | 535

Living a Healthy Lifestyle Aerobic exercise is one exam- ple of an activity that can have a positive effect on physical and psychological health. Regular exercise improves mood and makes people more resistant to the effects of stressors. Another lifestyle choice that directly affects physical health is the decision not to smoke. Smoking and other tobacco use contribute to hundreds of thousands of deaths annually in the United States alone, from associated heart disease, can- cer, stroke, and emphysema. Tobacco use stimulates activity in the central nervous system, which is immediately reinforc- ing, but prolonged use leads to addiction or dependence that can be difficult to overcome.

Proper nutrition is another important ingredient in main- taining a healthy body and mind. The North American diet tends to be too high in calories, fat, cholesterol, sugar, protein, and salt. Poor dietary habits can lead to significant long-term health problems. Finally, maintaining a healthful lifestyle includes avoiding risky behaviors and preventing disease. For example, psychologists are playing an important role in the AIDS epidemic by educating the public about risky behavior, and through the establishment of treatment programs they’re helping AIDS patients cope with the psychological effects of the disease.

Interactive Summary (You will find the answers in the Appendix.)

Experiencing Stress ● According to the general (1) syndrome (GAS), we respond to threats or demands in (2) phases. The (3) reaction corresponds to the fight-or- flight response; during the (4) stage the body adjusts its reaction to cope with the continuing threat; finally, if we can’t neutralize the effect, the (5) phase sets in. Common psychological reactions to stress include (6) anger, (7) , dejection, and grief.

● Most psychologists believe stress is closely related to the experience of (8) . How stress is experienced is affected by how people (9) the situation they’re in. A greater stress response will be produced if people per- ceive a threat directly and believe that their resources are inadequate to deal with it.

● (10) life events can create a great deal of stress. According to the (11) Readjustment Rating Scale, both positive and (12) life events that are associ- ated with (13) may produce stress. Psychologists recognize that (14) hassles and environmental factors such as (15) and crowding are important determinants of chronic stress. (16) psychology is devoted to the study of environmental effects on behavior and health.

● (17) control is how much influence we believe we have over a situation. Generally, the less perceived control,

the (18) the resulting stress. (19) style can also contribute to stress and influence health. People with Type D personalities are hostile and angry, stress-produc- ing characteristics linked with (20) disease.

Reacting to Prolonged Stress ● Stress lowers the (21) response, and therefore decreases either the number of (22) or their ability to respond to the presence of foreign substances. The link between stress and the immune system has led to specu- lation about a possible relationship between stress and illnesses such as cancer, although researchers offer such conclusions cautiously. Prolonged exposure to stress is also associated with (23) blood pressure and high (24) , which are major risk factors in cardiovascular disease.

● Psychologists are convinced that (25) life events may produce (26) disorders, possibly through an interaction with (27) vulnerability. Extreme stress produced by traumatic experiences is sometimes associated with (28) stress disorder, which is characterized by (29) , avoidance of trauma-associated stimuli, and chronic arousal symptoms. (30) , another effect of prolonged stress, is a state of emotional and men- tal (31) caused by lasting involvement in situations that are emotionally demanding. Burnout may be caused by loss of (32) in the workplace or of (33) in life.

536 | CHAPTER 16 Stress and Health

Reducing and Coping With Stress ● Stress is incompatible with (34) , which is an effec- tive stress reducer. Progressive (35) relaxation involves concentrating on specific muscle groups, not- ing tension and deliberately relaxing the affected areas. In (36) relaxation, the focus is on directing blood flow toward specific muscle groups, warming and relax- ing them. (37) is also an effective relaxation tech- nique. (38) has been shown to facilitate relaxation by providing information about the effectiveness of the techniques the person is using. (39) support helps to reduce stress but may have a negative effect as well in certain situations.

● How we (40) events partly determines how stress- ful they are, so many stress management techniques involve cognitive (41) . This may include focusing on aspects of the situation that aren’t upsetting, which pre- vents the reaction that a catastrophe has occurred, or ana- lyzing the situation in a logical fashion.

Living a Healthy Lifestyle ● (42) exercise increases heart rate and oxygen consumption and can have a highly positive impact on both (43) and (44) health. It can improve (45) and increase (46) to stressors. Why exercise improves functioning hasn’t been exactly

determined, but it may involve improved cardiovascular and cognitive function and alterations in mood-enhanc- ing chemicals.

● Correlational and experimental evidence have demon- strated the link between (47) use and serious (48) problems. Smoking seems to produce (49) reactions in the brain that reinforce the habit. Although many smokers fail to quit because tobacco is highly (50) and is associated with (51) effects, smoking rates have been on the decline.

● Proper (52) is vital to a healthy (53) and (54) , yet in the United States many people main- tain a diet that is high in calories, cholesterol, fat, and other substances that are damaging when consumed in excess. Nutritional problems usually have to do with the (55) of food that is eaten, not necessarily the amount.

● (56) prevention is aimed at reducing health problems or eliminating them (57) they start. (58) prevention involves early identification of risk factors in specific (59) . (60) prevention seeks to handle and contain an illness that has already developed. The prevalence of AIDS underscores the important need for a special emphasis on (61) prevention programs.

aerobic exercise, 529 AIDS, 532 biofeedback, 524 burnout, 522 cognitive appraisal, 511 coping, 523

environmental psychology, 514 general adaptation syndrome

(GAS), 509 health psychology, 507 lymphocytes, 519 perceived control, 515

posttraumatic stress disorder, 521 social support, 525 stress, 508 stressors, 508

Terms to Remember

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Media Resources

A-1

● Appendix

Chapter 1 Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.1 1. False. Internal thoughts and feelings are often studied by

psychologists; a thought or a feeling can be considered as a type of behavior when it is revealed through written or spoken expression.

2. True. 3. True. 4. False. Psychiatrists are medical doctors who receive

specialized training in psychology, but their interests do not differ in any fundamental way from those of psychologists. Both psychologists and psychiatrists work on severe psychological problems such as a schizophrenia.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.2 1. b. Most psychologists believe that mental events arise

entirely from activity in the brain. 2. Functionalists and structuralists used the technique

of introspection to understand immediate conscious experience. The structuralists believed that it was best to break the mind down into basic parts, much as a chemist would seek to understand a chemical compound. The functionalists were influenced by Darwin’s views on natural selection and focused primarily on the purpose and adaptive value of mental events. Behaviorism, founded by John Watson, steered psychology away from the study of immediate conscious experience to an emphasis on behavior.

3. d. Psychoanalysis often places a strong emphasis on hidden urges and memories related to sex and aggression.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 1.3 1. c. Clinical psychologists who adopt an eclectic approach

often consider the preferences of the client, as well as the type of problem presented, in deciding on the most appropriate therapy.

2. Over the past several decades, psychologists have returned to the study of internal mental phenomena such as consciousness. This shift away from strict behaviorism has been labeled the cognitive revolution. An important factor that helped fuel this revolution was the development of the computer, which became a model of sorts for the human mind. Developments in biology are also playing an important role in shaping modern psychology and in creating effective treatments for psychological problems.

3. True. 4. b. Our cultural background can influence how we think,

reason, and remember.

Interactive Summary 1. behavior 2. mind 3. observation 4. behavior 5. Clinical 6. Applied 7. Research 8. philosophy 9. physiology 10. Descartes 11. mind 12. Empiricism 13. Nativism 14. Darwin 15. genes or nature 16. experience or nurture 17. Structuralism 18. Functionalism 19. Behaviorism 20. psychoanalysis 21. unconscious 22. Humanistic 23. Calkins 24. Washburn 25. Wooley 26. Ladd-Franklin 27. Martin 28. Howard 29. Bernal 30. Eclectic 31. memory 32. chemical 33. Evolutionary 34. values

Chapter 2 Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.1 1. The middle point in an ordered set of scores is the

median. 2. The case study technique, which focuses on the

study of a single instance of behavior, is open to criticism because its results may lack external validity.

3. When behavior changes as a result of the observation process, the recorded data are said to suffer from a problem of reactivity.

A-2 | Appendix

4. The descriptive research technique used to gather limited amounts of information from many people is called a survey.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.2 1. negative 2. positive 3. positive 4. zero

Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.3 1. In experimental research, the researcher actively manipulates

the environment to observe its effect on behavior. The aspect of the environment that is manipulated is called the independent variable; the behavior of interest is measured by the dependent variable. To draw conclusions about cause and effect, the experimenter must make certain that the independent variable is the only thing changing systematically in the environment.

2. b. The independent variable—Tom Cruise versus Barney—is not the only thing changing across the groups.

3. c. increases the chances that participant differences will be equally represented in each group.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 2.4 1. Psychologists have a responsibility to respect the rights

and dignity of other people. To ensure that research participants are treated ethically, psychologists use (a) informed consent, which means that everyone is fully informed about the potential risks of the project, (b) confidentiality, which assures the participant’s rights to privacy will be maintained, and (c) debriefing, which is designed to provide more information about the purpose and procedures of the research.

2. c. is justified, but only under some circumstances. 3. c. animals can give no informed consent.

Interactive Summary 1. hypothesis 2. Descriptive 3. observe 4. Naturalistic observation 5. noninterfering 6. Case 7. hypotheses 8. responses 9. representative 10. individual 11. regularities 12. hypotheses 13. Descriptive 14. Inferential 15. correlation 16. variables 17. predict 18. causality 19. experimental control

20. experimental 21. environment 22. hypothesis 23. independent 24. manipulated 25. dependent 26. measured 27. control 28. independent 29. two 30. control group 31. experimental 32. single-blind 33. double-blind 34. experimenter 35. controls 36. participate 37. Debriefing 38. Confidentiality 39. control 40. humane

Chapter 3 Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.1 1. The soma is the main body of the cell, where excitatory

and inhibitory messages combine. 2. The axon is the long tail-like part of a neuron that serves

as the cell’s main transmitter device. 3. The action potential is the all-or-none electrical signal that

leads to the release of chemical messengers. 4. The dendrites are the branchlike fibers that extend

outward and receive messages from other neurons. 5. Each is an example of a neurotransmitter.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.2 1. The hindbrain is the primitive part of the brain that

controls basic life support functions such as heart rate and respiration.

2. The hypothalamus is a structure thought to be involved in a variety of motivated activities, including eating, drinking, and sexual behavior.

3. The frontal lobes are believed to be involved in higher- order thought processes (such as planning) as well as the initiation of motor movements.

4. The cerebellum is a structure near the base of the brain that is involved in coordination of complex activities such as walking.

5. An EEG is a device used to monitor gross electrical activity in the brain.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.3 1. nervous system 2. endocrine system 3. endocrine system 4. endocrine system 5. nervous system

Appendix | A-3

Recall-Monitor-Recall 3.4 1. False. Reading and writing skills developed too recently in

the history of the species to be adaptations. 2. Genotype refers to the actual genetic information inherited

from your biological parents. 3. Dominant genes play a stronger role. 4. Psychologists study genetic effects in identical twins

because they have essentially the same genetic material.

Interactive Summary 1. neuroscience 2. integrate 3. electrochemically 4. dendrites 5. axons 6. Interneurons 7. Motor 8. behavioral 9. chemically 10. activation 11. spinal cord 12. axons 13. autonomic 14. somatic 15. organ 16. lesions 17. electrodes 18. electroencephalograph (EEG) 19. positron emission tomography (PET) 20. hindbrain 21. pons 22. midbrain 23. forebrain 24. limbic 25. lateralized 26. hormones 27. pituitary 28. endocrine 29. survival 30. Adaptations 31. chromosomes 32. Genes 33. recessive 34. Family 35. twin 36. fraternal 37. environmental

Chapter 4 Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.1 1. False. The period from implantation to the end of the

eighth week is called the embryonic period. 2. True. 3. False. The cells increase in size and complexity, not in

number. The number of glial cells in the brain, however, may increase with age.

4. False. The timing of motor development is determined primarily by nature—the genetic code—although the environment may play some role.

5. False. We all lose brain cells with age, but the vast majority of people over 70 will not develop dementia.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.2 1. a. Reward. In the reward technique, the baby is given

reinforcement when he or she performs a movement, such as kicking a leg, in response to a presented event.

b. Habituation. The decline in responsiveness to repeated presentations, called habituation, can be used to infer that the baby recognizes that elements of the event have been repeated.

c. Cross-sectional. In a cross-sectional design, different age groups are studied at the same time.

d. Longitudinal. In a longitudinal design, the same individual is tested repeatedly across the life span.

2. a. Conservation. Conservation refers to the ability to recognize that certain physical properties of an object, such as mass, remain the same despite changes in the object’s appearance.

3. a. Conventional. According to Kohlberg, individuals at the conventional level of moral reasoning decide the correctness of actions on the basis of whether or not the action disrupts the social order.

b. Postconventional. At the postconventional level, moral reasoning is based on abstract principles that may or may not conflict with accepted standards.

c. Preconventional. At the preconventional level, moral decisions are made on the basis of the action’s immediate consequences.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 4.3 1. a. secure b. avoidant c. resistant d. resistant 2. d. Not all teenagers suffer anxiety during this period. 3. False. Gender identity is already being formed by age 2 or 3. 4. a. False. Most elderly people are not sick and disabled,

although certainly physical problems do increase with age. b. False. Some stereotypes about the elderly are positive,

such as the belief that all elderly are wise and kind. c. False. Research suggests the opposite. d. False. Research suggests that most elderly prefer to

strive to keep on living in such circumstances.

Interactive Summary 1. Zygote 2. germinal 3. implantation 4. embryonic 5. fetal 6. 7 7. plasticity 8. predictable

A-4 | Appendix

9. Adolescence 10. psychological 11. puberty 12. physically 13. dementia 14. preference 15. habituation 16. rewarding 17. sensory 18. shapes 19. schemata 20. assimilation 21. accommodation 22. sensorimotor 23. preoperational 24. operational 25. formal 26. preconventional 27. conventional 28. postconventional 29. gut 30. attachment 31. contact 32. Temperament 33. strange 34. secure 35. avoidant 36. psychosocial 37. autonomy 38. inferiority 39. role 40. gender roles 41. schema 42. Ageism 43. myths 44. stages 45. bargaining

Chapter 5 Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.1 1. a. Fovea. The “central pit” is where the cone receptors

tend to be located. b. Cones. These receptors are responsible for visual acuity,

or our ability to see fine detail. c. Accommodation. Through this process, the lens

changes its shape temporarily to help focus light. d. Retina. This “film” at the back of the eye contains the

light-sensitive receptor cells. e. Cornea. This is the protective outer covering of the eye. 2. a. False. The majority of visual messages are analyzed in

the lateral geniculate and primary visual cortex, although some messages are relayed to the superior colliculus.

b. True. c. True. d. True.

3. a. Top-down processing. This is the part of perception that is controlled by our beliefs and expectations about how the world is organized.

b. Perceptual constancy. This can be defined as perceiving an object, or its properties, to remain the same even though the physical message delivered to the eyes is changing.

c. Phi phenomenon. This is an illusion of motion. d. Convergence. This depth cue is based on calculating

the degree to which the two eyes have turned inward. e. Recognition by components. This is the view that

object perception is based on the analysis of simple building blocks, called geons.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.2 1. True. 2. False. Place, not frequency, theory proposes that the

location of activation on the basilar membrane is a critical cue for pitch.

3. False. Hair cells are located in the cochlea, not the pinna, and they are “bent” by movement of the basilar membrane.

4. False. Figure-ground organization occurs in hearing as well as in vision.

5. True.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.3 1. b. Our perception of temperature is influenced by the

changes that occur from one environment to the next. 2. c. Psychological factors are thought to somehow block

pain messages from reaching higher neural centers. 3. d. The vestibular sacs are part of the structures of the

inner ear.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.4 1. Chemoreceptors. The general term for receptor cells that

are activated by invisible molecules scattered about the air or dissolved in liquids.

2. Olfactory bulb. One of the main brain destinations for odor messages.

3. Flavor. A psychological term used to describe the entire gustatory experience.

4. Olfaction. The technical name for the sense of smell. 5. Gustation. The technical name for the sense of taste.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 5.5 1. False. There is no single point in an intensity curve at

which detection reliably begins. 2. True. 3. False. Detection of a jnd in magnitude depends on the

intensity of the standard. 4. True.

Interactive Summary 1. eye 2. pupil 3. lens

Appendix | A-5

4. retina 5. rods 6. cones 7. optic chiasm 8. thalamus 9. Feature detectors 10. three 11. opponent-process theory 12. top-down 13. proximity 14. closure 15. binocular 16. depth 17. constancy 18. frequency 19. amplitude 20. eardrum 21. cochlea 22. basilar membrane 23. brain 24. place theory 25. hair cells 26. frequency 27. auditory cortex 28. expectations 29. organize 30. localization 31. time 32. intensity 33. pressure-sensitive 34. somatosensory 35. parietal 36. increasing 37. changes 38. gate-control 39. spinal cord 40. brain 41. endorphins 42. Kinesthesia 43. position 44. somatosensory 45. vestibular 46. acceleration 47. Semicircular 48. olfaction 49. chemoreceptors 50. nasal 51. bulb 52. thalamus 53. absolute threshold 54. 50 55. signal detection 56. false 57. difference threshold 58. magnitude 59. detected

60. just noticeable difference 61. adaptation 62. stimulus 63. sensitivity 64. constant

Chapter 6 Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.1 1. False. The cocktail party effect suggests that we do at least

some monitoring of unattended messages. We hear our name when it’s spoken from across the room.

2. True. 3. True. 4. False. In visual neglect, damage to the right side of the

brain means that people will fail to recognize things on the left side of the body.

5. False. Although some aspects of attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder may be learned, most researchers believe that some kind of neurological problem also contributes to the disorder.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.2 1. a. Theta waves. The characteristic pattern found in stage

N1 sleep. b. K complex. Often triggered by loud noises during stage

N2 sleep. c. Delta activity. Another name for the slow-wave patterns

that are found during stage N3 sleep. d. REM sleep. The characteristic pattern of paradoxical sleep. 2. c. Cats sleep more than cows. 3. a. Insomnia. Difficulty initiating and maintaining sleep. b. Night terror. Sleeper awakens suddenly, screaming, but

the EEG pattern indicates a period of non-REM sleep. c. Sleep apnea. Sleeper repeatedly stops breathing during the

night, usually for short periods lasting more than 1 minute. d. Nightmare. An anxiety-producing dream that usually

occurs during the REM stage of sleep.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.3 1. Stimulant. Increases central nervous system activity. 2. Opiate. Reduces pain by mimicking the brain’s own

natural pain-reducing chemicals. 3. Depressant. Tends to produce inhibitory effects by

increasing the effectiveness of the neurotransmitter GABA. 4. Hallucinogen. Distorts perception and may lead to

flashbacks. 5. Stimulant. The type of active ingredient in your morning

coffee.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 6.4 1. False. The EEG patterns of a hypnotized person more

closely resemble the patterns found when you’re awake, not asleep.

2. False. Hypnosis increases the chances of fabrication and does not generally lead to better memory.

A-6 | Appendix

3. True. 4. False. Hilgard’s experiments support the idea of hypnotic

dissociations. 5. True.

Interactive Summary 1. Attention 2. priorities 3. limits 4. neurons 5. dichotic listening 6. monitor 7. awareness 8. cocktail party effect 9. Automaticity 10. fast 11. attention 12. conscious 13. divided 14. neglect 15. parietal 16. left 17. distractibility 18. clocks 19. rhythms 20. waking 21. hormone 22. circadian 23. 90 24. height or amplitude 25. three 26. slow 27. 90 28. repair 29. survival 30. mental 31. memories 32. wish fulfillment 33. synthesis 34. random 35. threats 36. hypersomnia 37. narcolepsy 38. dyssomnias 39. terrors 40. parasomnias 41. neurotransmitters 42. mental 43. drug tolerance 44. psychological 45. dependency 46. Depressants 47. alcohol 48. increase 49. pain 50. Hallucinogens

51. perception 52. environmental 53. familiarity 54. set 55. suggestibility 56. relaxed 57. pain 58. enhance 59. relaxation 60. dissociations 61. consciousness 62. social 63. awareness 64. anxiety

Chapter 7 Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.1 1. sensitization 2. orienting response 3. habituation 4. habituation

Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.2 1. a. The unconditioned stimulus is the screaming. b. The unconditioned response is wincing and covering

your ears. c. The conditioned stimulus is the sound of running

water. d. The conditioned response is wincing. 2. a. The unconditioned stimulus is the puff of air. b. The unconditioned response is blinking. c. The conditioned stimulus is the word ready. d. The conditioned response is the urge to blink. 3. d. Extinction. It’s likely that the stimuli presented in the

experiment (soft furry things) occurred again many times in Albert’s life without the accompanying loud noise. So, the association was extinguished.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.3 1. a. Negative punishment. Arriving home late is punished

by the removal of freedom. b. Positive reinforcement. The bonus is presented to

increase the chances of similar sales behavior again. c. Positive punishment. The ticket is delivered to lower

the likelihood of speeding in a school zone (although one might argue that the ticket also removes something positive—money).

d. Positive reinforcement. Crying increases because Mom delivers a kiss and a story.

e. Positive punishment. Dad delivers a stern lecture for crying, which lowers the likelihood of crying in his presence.

2. a. Variable-ratio. Reinforcement depends on the number of calls, but the number of calls is not constant or predictable.

Appendix | A-7

b. Fixed-ratio. Reinforcement always occurs when she goes to a rally.

c. Variable-interval. Reinforcement cannot be predicted and depends on the passage of time rather than the number of responses.

d. Fixed-ratio. Reinforcement is delivered after a fixed number of purchases.

e. Variable-interval. Reinforcement is not predictable and depends on the passage of time.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 7.4 1. False. Observational learning often applies to our own

behavior—we learn to act in a certain way by observing a role model.

2. True. 3. False. Our beliefs about how well we can perform a task

(self-efficacy) plays an important role in observational learning.

4. True. 5. True.

Interactive Summary 1. behavior 2. experience 3. prioritize 4. Habituation 5. increases 6. signaling 7. predicts 8. unconditioned 9. response 10. conditioned 11. information 12. different 13. US 14. second- 15. new 16. generalization 17. discrimination 18. different 19. US 20. extinction 21. inhibition 22. absence 23. Operant 24. consequences 25. effect 26. strengthened 27. weakened 28. discriminative 29. Positive 30. increases 31. increases 32. reinforcers 33. decreases 34. Negative

35. decreases 36. reinforcement 37. continuous 38. partial 39. fixed 40. ratio 41. interval 42. variable 43. shaping 44. approximations 45. biological 46. Observational 47. positive 48. rewarded 49. adaptive 50. reduce 51. increase

Chapter 8 Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.1 1. sensory memory 2. sensory memory 3. short-term memory 4. sensory memory 5. short-term memory 6. sensory memory 7. short-term memory 8. short-term memory

Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.2 1. a. semantic b. episodic c. semantic d. procedural e. procedural 2. c. Form a visual image of each word. 3. a. Method of loci. A mnemonic device in which you

visualize items sitting in different locations. b. Distinctiveness. The appropriate term to use when

you notice how an item is different from other things in memory.

c. Elaboration. The formation of connections between an item and other things in memory.

d. Peg-word technique. The formation of an image linking the to-be-remembered item to a specific cue.

e. Elaboration. The process of engaging in relational processing.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.3 1. Schema. An organized knowledge package in long-term

memory. 2. Implicit memory. Remembering without awareness. 3. Transfer-appropriate processing. Studying for a multiple

choice test by writing your own multiple-choice questions. 4. Free recall. Remembering without using external cues.

A-8 | Appendix

Recall-Monitor-Recall 8.4 1. False. Most forgetting occurs early and is followed by

more gradual loss. 2. True. 3. False. Proactive interference occurs when prior learning

interferes with later remembering. 4. False. People with anterorgrade amnesia can learn new

things, but they lose the ability to access those memories consciously.

5. True. 6. True.

Interactive Summary 1. preserve 2. recover 3. visual 4. auditory 5. exact 6. iconic 7. echoic 8. short 9. forgotten 10. decay 11. interference 12. span 13. rehearsed 14. two 15. chunking 16. episodic 17. Semantic 18. procedural 19. Elaboration 20. connections 21. retrieval 22. meaning 23. relationships 24. differences 25. images 26. repetitions 27. sequence 28. loci 29. word 30. cues 31. match 32. transfer 33. mental 34. retrieval 35. Schemas 36. false 37. implicit 38. explicit 39. most 40. gradual 41. adaptive 42. retroactive 43. new

44. proactive 45. old 46. repress 47. validity 48. amnesia 49. Retrograde 50. before 51. anterograde 52. after 53. hippocampus 54. neurotransmitters

Chapter 9 Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.1 1. a. Phonemes. The smallest significant sound units in

speech. b. Pragmatics. The practical knowledge used to

understand the intentions of a speaker and produce an effective response.

c. Syntax. The rules governing how words should be combined into sentences.

d. Morphemes. The smallest units in a language that carry meaning.

2. a. True. b. False. Babies appear to learn language rules implicitly

and often produce phrases, and commit errors, that they never hear from their parents.

c. True. d. True. e. False. Kanzi appears able to understand and follow

spoken requests from his trainers.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.2 1. a. defining features b. category exemplars c. family resemblance d. prototype 2. b. basic level (“Look, it’s a cat.”)

Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.3 1. a. well-defined problem b. well-defined problem c. ill-defined problem d. ill-defined problem 2. a. searching for analogies b. algorithm c. means-ends analysis d. working backward

Recall-Monitor-Recall 9.4 1. availability heuristic 2. framing 3. representativeness heuristic 4. anchoring and adjustment

Appendix | A-9

Interactive Summary 1. grammar 2. sounds 3. sentences 4. meaning 5. phonemes 6. morphemes 7. surface 8. deep 9. knowledge 10. top-down 11. Pragmatics 12. practical 13. first 14. telegraphic 15. syntax 16. overgeneralize 17. anatomy or tract 18. impossible 19. Sign 20. language 21. adaptation 22. brain 23. ear 24. grammatical 25. category 26. defining 27. members 28. Natural 29. fuzzy 30. typical 31. resemblance 32. core 33. prototype 34. representative 35. exemplars 36. hierarchical 37. Basic- 38. predictive 39. intermediate 40. Superordinate 41. descriptive 42. well-defined 43. ill 44. clear 45. correctly 46. fixedness 47. algorithms 48. heuristics 49. means-ends 50. backward 51. analogies 52. mental 53. Insight 54. framing 55. represented

56. confirmation 57. belief 58. persistence 59. representativeness 60. prototypical 61. availability 62. anchors 63. quick 64. heuristics 65. errors

Chapter 10 Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.1 1. Triarchic theory. “Street smarts” is an example of practical

intelligence. 2. Multiple intelligences. Musical ability is considered to be a

type of intelligence in Gardner’s theory. 3. Psychometric. Intelligence is measured by analyzing

performance on mental tests. 4. Psychometric. Factor analysis is a statistical technique

used to analyze test performance. 5. Multiple intelligence. Insight into the feelings of others is

a type of intelligence in Gardner’s theory. 6. Triarchic theory. Applying what’s been learned to new

situations is a kind of creative intelligence.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.2 1. a. Reliability. Donna’s performance is consistent across

testing. b. Validity. Larry’s new test doesn’t measure what it’s

supposed to measure. c. Reliability. Chei-Wui is checking on the consistency of

test scores. d. Standardization. Robert makes certain that the testing

and scoring procedures are the same for everybody who takes the test.

2. a. True. b. False. Average IQ, based on the deviation IQ method, is

always 100 regardless of age. c. False. The diagnosis of an intellectual disability depends

on many factors, such as one’s ability to adapt. d. False. Creativity doesn’t correlate very highly

with IQ.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 10.3 1. False. Fluid intelligence shows some decline over the

life span. 2. False. Identical twins reared apart tend to have

more similar IQs than fraternal twins raised together.

3. True. 4. False. Heritability tells us only that, for a given group, a

certain percentage of the differences in intelligence can be explained by genetic factors.

5. True.

A-10 | Appendix

Interactive Summary 1. psychometric 2. performance 3. factor 4. correlations 5. general 6. Fluid 7. solve 8. genetic 9. Crystallized 10. knowledge 11. abilities 12. multiple 13. eight 14. linguistic 15. intrapersonal 16. triarchic 17. Analytic 18. creative 19. practical 20. Reliability 21. consistency 22. Validity 23. Standardization 24. intelligence 25. mental 26. average 27. different 28. chronological 29. deviation 30. intellectual disability 31. 130 32. giftedness 33. correlate 34. Labeling 35. English 36. Creativity 37. Emotional 38. understand 39. Tacit 40. experience 41. longitudinal 42. fluid 43. reasoning 44. decline 45. crystallized 46. knowledge 47. constant 48. Flynn 49. Twin 50. genetics 51. environment 52. similar 53. environment 54. Heritability

55. genetic 56. groups 57. differences 58. economic 59. bias 60. environment 61. genetic 62. environmental 63. upper 64. genetic 65. experience

Chapter 11 Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.1 1. c. Instincts lead to fixed response patterns; drives

do not. 2. a. Incentive motivation. Whitney jogs because of the

reward. b. Intrinsic motivation. Janice’s playing is

self-motivated. c. Achievement motivation. Candice studies to satisfy a

need for achievement. d. Intrinsic motivation. Jerome has become less motivated

because of the reward. 3. b. Satisfying basic survival and social needs.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.2 1. True. Ghrelin is produced in the stomach and it’s been

associated with feelings of hunger. 2. False. Bingeing and purging are the principal symptoms

of bulimia nervosa. 3. True. High levels of leptin are often found in obese

individuals. 4. False. Obesity is caused by many factors, not necessarily

poor dietary habits. 5. True. Destruction of the hypothalamus can lead to

overeating in the rat.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.3 1. True 2. True. 3. True. 4. True.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 11.4 1. a. Dancing is an expressive reaction. b. Grimacing and wrinkling her nose is an expressive

reaction. c. A racing heart is a body response. d. Robert is telling us about his subjective

experience. 2. c. Receiving a C when you expected to flunk is the largest

change in expectation (i.e., adaptation level). 3. a. James-Lange

Appendix | A-11

b. two-factor c. Cannon-Bard d. two-factor

Interactive Summary 1. Instincts 2. drive 3. physiological 4. incentive 5. goal 6. reinforcing 7. Achievement 8. harder 9. Intrinsic 10. External 11. Cultural 12. hierarchy 13. needs 14. biological 15. security 16. relationships 17. self-actualize 18. grehlin 19. satiation 20. leptin 21. hypothalamus 22. hind 23. hippocampus 24. learning 25. cues 26. genetics 27. set 28. Obesity 29. metabolic 30. learned 31. stress 32. cultural 33. negative 34. Anorexia 35. Bulimia 36. excitement 37. plateau 38. orgasm 39. resolution 40. refractory 41. arousal 42. learned 43. estrogen 44. androgens 45. erogenous 46. pheromones 47. cultural 48. scripts 49. evolutionary 50. culture

51. Biological 52. environmental 53. orientation 54. facial 55. biological 56. anger 57. happiness 58. feedback 59. physiological 60. high 61. performance 62. expectations 63. controversial 64. Happiness 65. Disgust 66. physical 67. subjective 68. Cannon 69. independent 70. two 71. appraisal

Chapter 12 Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.1 1. a. openness b. extroversion c. agreeableness d. neuroticism e. conscientiousness 2. a. TAT b. MMPI c. NEO-PI-3 d. Rorschach e. 16 personality factor

Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.2 1. psychodynamic 2. social-cognitive 3. humanistic 4. psychodynamic 5. humanistic 6. social-cognitive 7. psychodynamic

Recall-Monitor-Recall 12.3 1. True. 2. True. 3. False. High self-monitors tend to adapt their behavior to

the situation. 4. False. Genetics appears to play a significant role in

personality as measured by the MMPI. 5. False. Personality traits may only reveal themselves if they

are relevant, or needed, in the situation.

A-12 | Appendix

Interactive Summary 1. Factor 2. 16 3. Eysenck 4. three 5. psychoticism 6. Five 7. agreeableness 8. neurocitism 9. conscientiousness 10. Allport 11. Cardinal 12. Central 13. 5 14. Secondary 15. Self 16. objective 17. 16 18. Multiphasic 19. projective 20. Apperception 21. ambiguous 22. conscious 23. preconscious 24. unconscious 25. unconscious 26. manifest 27. hidden 28. id 29. drives 30. superego 31. ego 32. anxiety 33. defense 34. psychosexual 35. Humanistic 36. awareness 37. responsibility 38. positive 39. incongruence 40. self-actualization 41. cognitive 42. classical 43. modeling 44. social 45. interpret 46. locus 47. efficacy 48. consistent 49. within 50. self-monitoring 51. inconsistent 52. consistent 53. interact 54. identical 55. genetic 56. fraternal

Chapter 13 Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.1 1. a. True. b. False. Exemplar, not prototype, theories assume that

we represent stereotypes with particular individuals, or exemplars.

c. True. d. True. 2. a. internal b. internal c. external d. internal 3. a. True. b. False. The central, not peripheral, route to persuasion

operates when our level of involvement in or commitment to a message is high.

c. True. d. False. Mere exposure is most likely to lead to attitude

change when we’re processing a message peripherally.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.2 1. a. deindividuation b. social loafing, although conformity is also a possibility c. conformity d. group polarization e. bystander effect f. social facilitation 2. d. The experiment is conducted in the teacher’s home.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 13.3 1. True. 2. False. Averaged faces tend to be rated as most attractive. 3. False. Your ratings would go down. 4. True. 5. True. 6. False. Companionate love typically leads to more feelings

of warmth and trust.

Interactive Summary 1. top 2. expectations 3. stereotypes 4. schemas 5. prejudice 6. distinctiveness 7. external 8. internal 9. internal 10. fundamental attribution error 11. actor-observer effect 12. self-serving 13. cognitive 14. affective 15. behavioral 16. experience 17. operant

Appendix | A-13

18. observational 19. likelihood 20. central 21. peripheral 22. dissonance 23. attitudes 24. tension 25. perception 26. facilitation 27. performance 28. interference 29. impairs 30. altruism 31. unselfish 32. bystander 33. responsibility 34. loafing 35. less 36. group 37. Deindividuation 38. conformity 39. dominant 40. polarization 41. Groupthink 42. consensus 43. ignore 44. obedience 45. 65 46. validated 47. independent 48. interdependent 49. evolutionary 50. healthy 51. faces 52. subjective 53. similarity 54. reciprocity 55. Passionate 56. Companionate 57. triangular 58. intimacy 59. passion 60. commitment

Chapter 14 Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.1 1. False. When a behavior occurs infrequently among

members of a population, it meets the criterion of statistical deviance.

2. False. Not all people with psychological disorders are emotionally distressed.

3. True. 4. True. 5. False. In many cases, hospital staff members appeared

not to notice or classify the pseudopatients’ behavior as normal—at least not quickly.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.2 1. somatic symptom disorder (hypochondriasis or

conversion disorder) 2. obsessive-compulsive disorder 3. anxiety disorder (panic disorder, agoraphobia) 4. depressive disorder 5. dissociative disorder (dissociative fugue) 6. personality disorder (antisocial personality disorder) 7. schizophrenia (paranoia) 8. schizophrenia (catatonia)

Recall-Monitor-Recall 14.3 1. b. Excessive amounts of the neurotransmitter dopamine. 2. d. If your identical twin has schizophrenia, you have

about a 50% chance of developing the disorder yourself. 3. d. Internal, stable, and global 4. b. Observational learning

Interactive Summary 1. continuum 2. deviance 3. Cultural 4. norms 5. emotional 6. dysfunction 7. legal 8. psychological 9. understand 10. legal 11. moral 12. medical 13. disease 14. medications 15. physical 16. labeling 17. stigma 18. normal 19. mental 20. classification 21. objective 22. measurable 23. not 24. anxiety 25. apprehension 26. Generalized 27. Panic 28. sudden 29. fear 30. agoraphobia 31. phobia 32. obsessive-compulsive 33. Somatic symptom 34. physical 35. disease 36. conversion 37. dissociative 38. dissociative 39. fugue

A-14 | Appendix

40. identity 41. identity 42. personalities 43. depressive 44. depressive 45. bipolar 46. depression 47. mania 48. suicide 49. emotion 50. positive 51. delusions 52. hallucinations 53. restricted or flat 54. catatonia 55. speech 56. personality 57. social 58. Narcissistic 59. antisocial 60. Five 61. chemistry 62. genetic 63. dopamine 64. serotonin 65. neurotransmitter 66. explanatory 67. internal 68. global 69. learned helplessness 70. control 71. Experience 72. culture 73. expressed 74. learned 75. classical

Chapter 15 Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.1 1. a. schizophrenia b. depression c. depression d. depression e. generalized anxiety disorder 2. d. ECT is used regularly to treat schizophrenia.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.2 1. rational-emotive therapy 2. Beck’s cognitive therapy 3. psychoanalysis 4. client-centered therapy 5. Gestalt therapy 6. family therapy

Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.3 1. b. conditioned stimulus.

2. a. counterconditioning and extinction. 3. b. Effective punishments can’t be delivered because pain

thresholds are high. 4. d. reinforcement

Recall-Monitor-Recall 15.4 1. True. 2. True. 3. False. Many evaluation studies show that the particular

form of treatment doesn’t matter. 4. False. Some types of treatment, such as most behavioral

therapies, show concern only for the present symptoms. 5. True.

Interactive Summary 1. dopamine 2. tardive 3. Antidepressant 4. serotonin 5. Bipolar 6. lithium 7. Antianxiety 8. GABA 9. electroconvulsive 10. safe 11. severe 12. confusion 13. Psychosurgery 14. brain 15. Prefrontal 16. compulsive 17. rarely 18. psychoanalysis 19. free 20. dream 21. Resistance 22. transference 23. unconscious 24. streamline 25. Cognitive 26. conscious 27. rational 28. faulty or irrational 29. cognitive 30. humanistic 31. value 32. centered 33. incongruence 34. self-concept 35. positive 36. Gestalt 37. Group 38. similar 39. Family 40. interpersonal 41. anxiety 42. Conditioning

Appendix | A-15

43. systematic desensitization 44. counterconditioning 45. hierarchy 46. aversion 47. rewards 48. punishments 49. token 50. privileges 51. Punishments 52. consequences 53. Social 54. behavioral 55. differences 56. meta 57. remission 58. support 59. learning 60. action 61. effective

Chapter 16 Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.1 1. c. alarm, resistance, exhaustion 2. c. The experience of stress, like emotion, depends on the

appraisal of the event rather than on the event itself. 3. a. marriage 4. c. an optimistic outlook

Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.2 1. True. 2. True. 3. False. Stress has been shown to affect cholesterol levels. 4. False. Most people who suffer trauma do not develop

posttraumatic stress disorder. 5. True.

Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.3 1. c. The stress response is incompatible with relaxation. 2. a. gives you a feeling of control. 3. d. Social support makes it easier to cope if the support is

no longer delivered. 4. a. cognitive reappraisal

Recall-Monitor-Recall 16.4 1. False. Aerobic exercise can lessen the physiological effects

of the stress reaction. 2. True. 3. True. 4. False. Teaching children about the hazards of smoking

or drugs would be classified as an example of primary prevention.

Interactive Summary 1. adaptation 2. three 3. alarm 4. resistance

5. exhaustion 6. fear 7. sadness 8. emotion 9. appraise 10. Significant 11. Social 12. negative 13. change 14. daily 15. noise 16. Environmental 17. Perceived 18. greater 19. Explanatory 20. heart 21. immune 22. lymphocytes 23. high 24. cholesterol 25. stressful 26. psychological 27. genetic 28. posttraumatic 29. flashbacks 30. Burnout 31. exhaustion 32. control 33. meaning 34. relaxation 35. muscle 36. autogenic 37. Meditation 38. Biofeedback 39. Social 40. interpret 41. reappraisal 42. Aerobic 43. physical 44. mental or psychological 45. mood 46. resistance 47. tobacco 48. health 49. chemical 50. addictive 51. withdrawal 52. nutrition 53. body 54. mind 55. type 56. Primary 57. before 58. Secondary 59. populations 60. Tertiary 61. primary

G-1

● Glossary

absolute threshold The level of intensity that lifts a stimulus over the threshold of conscious awareness; it’s usually defined as the intensity level at which people can detect the presence of the stimulus 50% of the time. accommodation In vision, the process through which the lens changes its shape temporarily to help focus light on the retina. accommodation (Piaget) The process through which we change or modify existing schemata to accommodate new experiences. acetylcholine A neurotransmitter that plays multiple roles in the central and peripheral nervous systems, including the excitation of muscle contractions. achievement motivation An internal drive or need for achievement that is possessed by all individuals to varying degrees. achievement tests Psychological tests that measure your current level of knowledge or competence in a particular subject. action potential The all-or-none electrical signal that travels down a neuron’s axon. activation-synthesis hypothesis The idea that dreams rep- resent the brain’s attempt to make sense of the random pat- terns of neural activity generated during sleep. actor–observer effect The overall tendency to attribute our own behavior to external sources but to attribute the behav- ior of others to internal sources. adaptation A trait that has been selected for by nature because it increases the reproductive “fitness” of the organism. aerobic exercise High-intensity activities, such as running and swimming, that increase both heart rate and oxygen consumption. ageism Discrimination or prejudice against an individual based on physical age. agoraphobia An anxiety disorder that causes an individual to restrict his or her normal activities; someone suffering from agoraphobia tends to avoid public places out of fear that a panic attack will occur. AIDS Acquired immune deficiency syndrome, a disease that gradually weakens and disables the immune system. algorithms Step-by-step rules or procedures that, if applied correctly, guarantee a problem solution. alpha waves The pattern of brain activity observed in some- one who is in a relaxed state. altruism Acting in a way that shows unselfish concern for the welfare of others.

amnesia Forgetting that is caused by physical problems in the brain, such as those induced by injury or disease. anal stage Freud’s second stage of psychosexual develop- ment, occurring in the second year of life; pleasure is derived from the process of defecation. anorexia nervosa An eating disorder diagnosed when an otherwise healthy person refuses to maintain a normal weight level because of an intense fear of being overweight. anterograde amnesia Memory loss for events that happen after the point of physical injury. antianxiety drugs Medications that reduce tension and anxiety. antidepressant drugs Medications that modulate the avail- ability or effectiveness of the neurotransmitters implicated in mood disorders. antipsychotic drugs Medications that reduce the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. antisocial personality disorder A personality disorder char- acterized by little, if any, respect for social laws, customs, or norms. anxiety disorders A class of disorders marked by exces- sive apprehension and worry that in turn impairs normal functioning. applied psychologists Psychologists who extend the prin- ciples of scientific psychology to practical problems in the world. aptitude tests Psychological tests that measure your ability to learn or acquire knowledge in a particular subject. assimilation The process through which we fit—or assimi- late—new experiences into existing schemata. attachments Strong emotional ties formed to one or more intimate companions. attention The internal processes used to set priorities for mental functioning. attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) A psychological disorder marked by difficulties in concentrat- ing or in sustaining attention for extended periods; can be associated with hyperactivity. attitude A positive or negative evaluation which, in turn, predisposes us to act in certain ways; attitudes are typi- cally broken down into cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. attributions The inference processes people use to assign cause and effect to behavior. automaticity Fast and effortless processing that requires little or no focused attention.

G-2 | Glossary

autonomic system The collection of nerves that controls the more automatic needs of the body (such as heart rate, diges- tion, blood pressure); part of the peripheral nervous system. availability heuristic The tendency to base estimates on the ease with which examples come to mind. aversion therapy A treatment for replacing a positive reac- tion to a harmful stimulus, such as alcohol, with something negative, such as feeling nauseated. Aversion therapy replaces positive associations with negative ones, such as making a smoker feel bad rather than good after having a cigarette. axon The long tail-like part of a neuron that serves as the cell’s transmitter. basic-level categories The level in a category hierarchy that provides the most useful and predictive information; the ba- sic level usually resides at an intermediate level in a category hierarchy. basilar membrane A flexible membrane running through the cochlea that, through its movement, displaces the audi- tory receptor cells, or hair cells. behavior Observable actions such as moving about, talking, gesturing, and so on; behaviors can also refer to the activities of cells and to thoughts and feelings. behavioral therapies Treatments designed to change behav- ior through the use of established learning techniques. behaviorism A school of psychology proposing that the only proper subject matter of psychology is observable behavior rather than immediate conscious experience. belief persistence In decision making, the tendency to cling to initial beliefs when confronted with disconfirming evidence. Big Five The five dimensions of personality—extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and open- ness—that have been isolated through the application of fac- tor analysis. binocular depth cues Cues for depth that depend on com- parisons between the two eyes. biofeedback Specific physiological feedback people are given about the effectiveness of their relaxation efforts. biological clocks Brain structures that schedule rhythmic variations in bodily functions by triggering them at the appropriate times. biomedical therapies Biologically based treatments for reducing or eliminating the symptoms of psychological disorders. bio-psycho-social perspective The idea that psychological dis- orders are influenced, or caused, by a combination of biological, psychological (cognitive), and social (environmental) factors. bipolar disorder A type of mood disorder in which the per- son experiences disordered mood shifts in two directions— from depression to a manic state. blind spot The point where the optic nerve leaves the back of the eye. borderline personality disorder A personality disorder characterized by problems with emotional regulation, social relationships, and sense of self.

bottom-up processing Processing that is controlled by the physical message delivered to the senses. brightness The aspect of the visual experience that changes with light intensity; in general, as the intensity of light increases, so does its perceived brightness. bulimia nervosa An eating disorder in which the principal symptom is binge eating (consuming large quantities of food) followed by purging, in which the person voluntarily vomits or uses laxatives to prevent weight gain. burnout A state of physical, emotional, and mental exhaus- tion created by long-term involvement in an emotionally demanding situation. bystander effect The reluctance to come to the aid of a per- son in need when other people are present. Cannon-Bard theory A theory of emotion that argues that body reactions and subjective experiences occur together, but independently. cardinal traits Allport’s term to describe personality traits that dominate an individual’s life, such as a passion to serve others or to accumulate wealth. case study A descriptive research technique in which the effort is focused on a single case, usually an individual. category A class of objects (people, places, or things) that most people agree belong together. category exemplars Specific examples of category members that are stored in long-term memory. central nervous system The brain and the spinal cord. central traits Allport’s term to describe the five to ten descriptive traits that you would use to describe someone you know—friendly, trustworthy, and so on. cerebellum A hindbrain structure at the base of the brain that is involved in the coordination of complex motor skills. cerebral cortex The outer layer of the brain, considered to be the seat of higher mental processes. chemoreceptors Receptor cells that react to invisible mole- cules scattered about in the air or dissolved in liquids, leading to the senses of smell and taste. chunking A short-term memory strategy that involves rear- ranging incoming information into meaningful or familiar patterns. circadian rhythms Biological activities that rise and fall in accordance with a 24-hour cycle. classical conditioning A set of procedures used to inves- tigate how organisms learn about the signaling properties of events. Classical conditioning involves learning relations between events—conditioned and unconditioned stimuli— that occur outside of one’s control. client-centered therapy A form of humanistic therapy pro- posing that it is the client, not the therapist, who holds the key to psychological health and happiness; the therapist’s role is to provide genuineness, unconditional positive regard, and empathy. clinical psychologists Psychologists who specialize in the diagnosis and treatment of psychological problems.

Glossary | G-3

cochlea The bony, snail-shaped sound processor in the inner ear where sound is translated into nerve impulses. cocktail party effect The ability to focus on one auditory message and ignore others; also refers to the tendency to notice when your name suddenly appears in a message that you’ve been actively ignoring. cognitive appraisal The idea that to feel stress you need to perceive a threat and come to the conclusion that you may not have adequate resources to deal with the threat. cognitive dissonance The tension produced when people act in a way that is inconsistent with their attitudes. cognitive revolution The shift away from strict behavior- ism, begun in the 1950s, characterized by renewed interest in fundamental problems of consciousness and internal mental processes. cognitive therapies Treatments designed to remove irra- tional beliefs and negative thoughts that are presumed to be responsible for psychological disorders. cold fibers Neurons that respond to a cooling of the skin by increasing the production of neural impulses. collective unconscious The notion proposed by Carl Jung that certain kinds of universal symbols and ideas are present in the unconscious of all people. companionate love A kind of emotional attachment charac- terized by feelings of trust and companionship; companion- ate love is marked by a combination of intimacy and commit- ment, but passion may be lacking. computerized tomography scan (CT scan) The use of highly focused beams of X-rays to construct detailed anatom- ical maps of the living brain. concrete operational period Piaget’s third stage of cogni- tive dev elopment, lasting from ages 7 to 11. Children acquire the capacity to perform a number of mental operations but still lack the ability for abstract reasoning. conditioned inhibition Learning that an event signals the absence of the unconditioned stimulus. conditioned reinforcer A stimulus that has acquired rein- forcing properties through prior learning. conditioned response (CR) The acquired response that is produced by the conditioned stimulus in anticipation of the unconditioned stimulus. conditioned stimulus (CS) The neutral stimulus that is paired with the unconditioned stimulus during classical conditioning. conditions of worth The expectations or standards that we believe others place on us. cones Receptor cells in the central portion of the retina that transduce light energy into neural messages; they operate best when light levels are high, and they are primarily responsible for the ability to sense color. confidentiality The principle that personal information obtained from a participant in research or therapy should not be revealed without the individual’s permission.

confirmation bias The tendency to seek out and use infor- mation that supports and confirms a prior decision or belief. conformity The tendency to comply with the wishes of the group; when people conform, their opinions, feelings, and behaviors generally start to move toward the group norm. confounding variable An uncontrolled variable that changes along with the independent variable. conscious mind The contents of awareness—those things that occupy the focus of one’s current attention. consciousness The subjective awareness of internal and external events. conventional level In Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, the stage in which actions are judged to be right or wrong based on whether they maintain or disrupt the social order. convergence A binocular cue for depth that is based on the extent to which the two eyes move inward, or converge, when looking at an object. conversion disorder The presence of real physical problems, such as blindness or paralysis, that seem to have no identifi- able physical cause. coping Efforts to manage or master conditions of threat or demand that tax one’s resources. cornea The transparent and protective outer covering of the eye. corpus callosum The collection of nerve fibers that con- nects the two cerebral hemispheres and allows information to pass from one side to the other. correlation A statistic that indicates whether two variables vary together in a systematic way; correlation coefficients vary from +1.00 to –1.00. creativity The ability to generate ideas that are original, novel, and useful. cross-sectional design A research design in which people of different ages are compared at the same time. crystallized intelligence The knowledge and abilities acquired as a result of experience (as from schooling and cultural influences). cued recall A testing condition in which people are given an explicit retrieval cue to help them remember. cultural deviance A criterion of abnormality stating that a behavior is abnormal if it violates the rules or accepted stan- dards of society. culture The shared values, customs, and beliefs of a group or community. dark adaptation The process through which the eyes adjust to dim light. debriefing At the conclusion of an experimental session, informing the participants about the general purpose of the experiment, including any deception that was involved. decay The proposal that memories are forgotten or lost spontaneously with the passage of time. decision making The thought processes involved in evaluat- ing and choosing from among a set of alternatives; it usually involves some kind of risk.

G-4 | Glossary

deep structure The underlying representation of meaning in a sentence. defense mechanisms According to Freud, unconscious pro- cesses used by the ego to ward off the anxiety that comes from confrontation, usually with the demands of the id. defining features The set of features necessary to make objects acceptable members of a category. deindividuation The loss of individuality, or depersonaliza- tion, that comes from being in a group. delta activity The pattern of brain activity observed in stage N3 sleep; it’s characterized by synchronized slow waves. Also called slow-wave sleep. dementia Physically based losses in mental functioning. dendrites The fibers that extend outward from a neuron and receive information from other neurons. dependent variable The behavior that is measured or observed in an experiment. depressants A class of drugs that slow or depress the ongo- ing activity of the central nervous system. depressive disorders Prolonged and disabling disruptions in emotional state. descriptive research Methods designed to observe and describe behavior. descriptive statistics Mathematical techniques that help researchers describe their data. development The age-related physical, intellectual, social, and personal changes that occur throughout an individual’s lifetime. deviation IQ An intelligence score that is derived from determining where your performance sits in an age-based distribution of test scores. diagnostic labeling effects The fact that labels for psycho- logical problems can become self-fulfilling prophecies; the label may make it difficult to recognize normal behavior when it occurs, and it may actually increase the likelihood that a person will act in an abnormal way. dichotic listening Different auditory messages are presented separately and simultaneously to each ear. The subject’s task is to repeat aloud one message while ignoring the other. difference threshold The smallest detectable difference in the magnitude of two stimuli. diffusion of responsibility The idea that when people know (or think) that others are present in a situation, they allow their sense of responsibility for action to diffuse, or spread out widely, among those who are present. discrimination Behaviors that are directed against members of a group. discriminative stimulus The stimulus situation that sets the occasion for a response to be followed by reinforcement or punishment. dissociative amnesia A psychological disorder characterized by an inability to remember important personal information. dissociative disorders A class of disorders characterized by the separation, or dissociation, of conscious awareness from previous thoughts or memories.

dissociative fugue A loss of personal identity that is often accompanied by a flight from home. dissociative identity disorder A condition in which an individual alternates between what appear to be two or more distinct identities or personalities (also known as multiple personality disorder). distinctiveness Refers to how unique or different a memory record is from other things in memory. Distinctive memory records tend to be recalled well. distributed practice Spacing the repetitions of to-be-remem- bered information over time. dopamine A neurotransmitter that has been linked to reward and pleasure systems in the brain; decreased levels have been linked to Parkinson disease, and increased levels have been linked to schizophrenia. double-blind study Neither participants nor research observers are aware of who has been assigned to the experimental and control groups; it’s used to control for both participant and experimenter expectancies. dream analysis A technique used in psychoanalysis; Freud believed that dreams are symbolic and contain important information about the unconscious. drive A psychological state that arises in response to an internal physiological need, such as hunger or thirst. drug dependency A condition in which one experiences a physical or a psychological need for continued use of a drug. drug tolerance An adaptation made by the body to com- pensate for the continued use of a drug, such that increasing amounts of the drug are needed to produce the same physical and behavioral effects. DSM The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which is used for the diagnosis and classification of psycho- logical disorders. dysfunction A breakdown in normal functioning; abnormal behaviors are those that prevent one from pursuing adaptive strategies. echoic memory The system that produces and stores audi- tory sensory memories. eclectic approach The idea that it’s useful to select infor- mation from several sources rather than to rely entirely on a single perspective or school of thought. ego In Freud’s theory, the portion of personality that induces people to act with reason and deliberation and helps them conform to the requirements of the external world. egocentrism The tendency to see the world from one’s own unique perspective only; a characteristic of thinking in the preoperational period of development. elaboration An encoding process that involves the forma- tion of connections between to-be-remembered input and other information in memory. elaboration likelihood model A model proposing two pri- mary routes to persuasion and attitude change: a central route, which operates when we are motivated and focusing our attention on the message, and a peripheral route, which operates when we are either unmotivated to process the mes- sage or are unable to do so.

Glossary | G-5

electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) A treatment used primar- ily for depression in which a brief electric current is delivered to the brain. electroencephalograph (EEG) A device used to monitor the gross electrical activity of the brain. embryonic period The period of prenatal development last- ing from implantation to the end of the eighth week. emotional distress A criterion of abnormality stating that abnormal behaviors are those that lead to personal distress or emotional upset. emotional intelligence The ability to perceive, understand, and express emotion in ways that are useful and adaptive. emotions Psychological events involving (1) a physiological reaction, usually arousal; (2) some kind of expressive reac- tion, such as a distinctive facial expression; and (3) some kind of subjective experience, such as the conscious feeling of being happy or sad. empiricism The idea that knowledge comes directly from experience. encoding The processes that determine and control how memories are formed. endocrine system A network of glands that uses the blood- stream, rather than neurons, to send chemical messages that regulate growth and other internal functions. endorphins Morphinelike chemicals that act as the brain’s natural painkillers. environmental psychology A specialty area in psychology devoted to the study of environmental effects on behavior and health, such as the effects of crowding or noise. episodic memory A memory for a particular event, or epi- sode, that happened to you personally, such as remembering what you ate for breakfast this morning or where you went on vacation last year. evolutionary psychology A movement proposing that we’re born with mental processes and “software” that were acquired through natural selection in our ancestral past and help us to solve specific adaptive problems. excitement phase The first component of the human sexual response cycle; it’s characterized by changes in muscle ten- sion, increased heart rate and blood pressure, and a rushing of blood into the genital organs. experimental research A technique in which the investiga- tor actively manipulates the environment to observe its effect on behavior. explicit memory Conscious, willful remembering. external attribution Attributing the cause of a per- son’s behavior to an external event or situation in the environment. external validity The extent to which results generalize to other situations or are representative of real life. extinction Presenting a conditioned stimulus repeatedly, after conditioning, without the unconditioned stimulus, resulting in a loss in responding.

facial-feedback hypothesis The proposal that mus- cles in the face deliver signals to the brain that are then interpreted, depending on the pattern, as a subjective emotional state. factor analysis A statistical procedure that groups together related items on tests by analyzing the correlations among test scores. family resemblance The core features that category mem- bers share; a given member of the category may have some but not necessarily all of these features. family studies The similarities and differences among bio- logical (blood) relatives are studied to help discover the role heredity plays in physical or psychological traits. family therapy A form of group therapy in which the therapist treats the family as whole, as a kind of social system. The goals of the treatment are often to improve interpersonal communication and collaboration. feature detectors Cells in the visual cortex that respond to very specific visual events, such as bars of light at particular orientations. fetal period The period of prenatal development lasting from the ninth week until birth. fixed-interval (FI) schedule A schedule in which the reinforcement is delivered for the first response that occurs following a fixed interval of time. fixed-ratio (FR) schedule A schedule in which the number of responses required for reinforcement is fixed and does not change. flashbulb memories Rich memory records of the circum- stances surrounding emotionally significant and surprising events. flavor A psychological term used to describe the gustatory experience. Flavor is influenced by taste, smell, and the visual appearance of food, as well as by expectations about the food’s quality. fluid intelligence The natural ability to solve problems, reason, and remember; fluid intelligence is thought to be relatively uninfluenced by experience. forebrain The outer portion of the brain, including the cerebral cortex and the structures of the limbic system. forgetting The loss of accessibility to previously stored material. formal operational period Piaget’s last stage of cognitive development; thought processes become adultlike, and peo- ple gain mastery over abstract thinking. fovea The “central pit” area in the retina where the cone receptors are located. framing The way in which the alternatives in a decision- making situation are structured. free association A technique used in psychoanalysis to explore the contents of the unconscious; clients are asked to freely express whatever thoughts and feelings happen to come into their minds.

G-6 | Glossary

free recall A testing condition in which a person is asked to remember information without explicit retrieval cues. frequency theory The idea that pitch perception is deter- mined partly by the frequency of neural impulses traveling up the auditory pathway. frontal lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemi- sphere of the cerebral cortex, located on the top front of the brain; it contains the motor cortex and may be involved in higher-level thought processes. functional fixedness The tendency to see objects, and their functions, in certain fixed and typical ways. functionalism An early school of psychology; functionalists believed that the proper way to understand mind and behav- ior is to first analyze their function and purpose. fundamental attribution error When people seek to inter- pret someone else’s behavior, they tend to overestimate the influence of internal personal factors and underestimate the role of situational factors. g (general intelligence) According to Spearman, a general factor, derived from factor analysis, that underlies or contrib- utes to performance on a variety of mental tests. gamma-amino-butyric acid (GABA) A neurotransmitter that may play a role in the regulation of anxiety; it generally produces inhibitory effects. gate-control theory The idea that neural impulses gener- ated by pain receptors can be blocked, or gated, in the spinal cord by signals produced in the brain. gender roles Specific patterns of behavior that are consistent with how society dictates males and females should act. general adaptation syndrome (GAS) Hans Selye’s model of stress as a general, nonspecific reaction that occurs in three phases: alarm, resistance, and exhaustion. generalized anxiety disorder Excessive worrying, or free- floating anxiety, that lasts for at least six months and that cannot be attributed to any single identifiable source. genes Segments of chromosomes that contain instructions for influencing and creating particular hereditary characteristics. genital stage Freud’s final stage of psychosexual develop- ment, during which one develops mature sexual relationships with members of the opposite sex. genotype The actual genetic information inherited from one’s parents. germinal period The period in prenatal development from conception to implantation of the fertilized egg in the wall of the uterus. Gestalt principles of organization The organizing prin- ciples of perception proposed by the Gestalt psychologists. These principles include the laws of proximity, similarity, closure, continuation, and common fate. Gestalt psychology A movement proposing that certain organizing principles of perception are innate and cannot be altered by experience. gifted A label generally assigned to someone who scores above 130 on a standard IQ test.

glial cells Cells that fill in space between neurons, remove waste, or help neurons to communicate efficiently. glutamate The most common neurotransmitter in the brain. grammar The rules of language that enable the communica- tor to combine symbols to convey meaning. group polarization The tendency for a group’s dominant point of view to become stronger and more extreme with time. group therapy A form of therapy in which several people are treated simultaneously in the same setting. groupthink The tendency for members of a group to become so interested in seeking a consensus of opinion that they start to ignore and even suppress dissenting views. gustation The sense of taste. habituation The decline in the tendency to respond to an event that has become familiar through repeated exposure. hallucinogens A class of drugs that tends to disrupt normal mental and emotional functioning, including distorting per- ception and altering reality. health psychology The study of how biological, psychologi- cal, environmental, and cultural factors are involved in physi- cal health and the prevention of illness. heritability A mathematical index that represents the extent to which IQ differences in a particular population can be accounted for by genetic factors. heuristics The rules of thumb we use to solve problems; heuristics can usually be applied quickly, but they do not guarantee that a solution will be found. hindbrain A primitive part of the brain that sits at the junc- ture point where the brain and spinal cord merge. Structures in the hindbrain, including the medulla, pons, and reticular formation, act as the basic life-support system for the body. homeostasis The process through which the body main- tains a steady state, such as a constant internal temperature or an adequate amount of fluids. hormones Chemicals released into the blood by the various endocrine glands to help control a variety of internal regula- tory functions. hue The dimension of light that produces color; hue is typi- cally determined by the wavelength of light reflecting from an object. humanistic psychology A movement in psychology and approach to personality that focuses on people’s unique capacity for choice, responsibility and growth. humanistic therapy Treatments designed to help clients gain insight into their fundamental self-worth and value as human beings. hypersomnia (or hypersomnolence) A chronic condition marked by excessive sleepiness. hypnosis A form of social interaction that produces a height- ened state of suggestibility in a willing participant. hypnotic dissociation A hypnotically induced splitting of consciousness during which multiple forms of awareness exist.

Glossary | G-7

hypnotic hypermnesia The supposed enhancement in memory that occurs under hypnosis; there is little if any evi- dence to support the existence of this effect. hypothalamus A forebrain structure thought to play a role in the regulation of various motivational activities, including eating, drinking, and sexual behavior. iconic memory The system that produces and stores visual sensory memories. id In Freud’s theory, the portion of personality that is gov- erned by inborn instinctual drives, particularly those related to sex and aggression. ill-defined problem A problem, such as the search for “hap- piness,” that has no well-stated goal, no clear starting point, and no mechanism for evaluating progress. implicit memory Remembering that occurs in the absence of conscious awareness or willful intent. incentive motivation External factors in the environment that exert pulling effects on our actions. incongruence A discrepancy between the image we hold of ourselves—our self-concept—and the sum of all our experiences. independent variable The aspect of the environment that is manipulated in an experiment. It must consist of at least two conditions. inferential statistics Mathematical techniques that help researchers decide whether data are representative of a population or whether differences among observations can be attributed to chance. informed consent The principle that before consenting to participate in research, people should be fully informed about any significant factors that could affect their willingness to participate. in-group A group of individuals with whom one shares fea- tures in common or with whom one identifies. insanity A legal term usually defined as the inability to understand that certain actions are wrong, in a legal or moral sense, at the time of a crime. insight The moment when a problem solution seems to pop suddenly into one’s mind. insight therapies Treatments designed to give clients self- knowledge, or insight, into the contents of their thought processes. insomnia A chronic condition marked by difficulties in initi- ating or maintaining sleep, lasting for a period of at least one month. instincts Unlearned characteristic patterns of respond- ing that are controlled by specific triggering stimuli in the world. intellectual disability A label generally assigned to some- one who scores below 70 on a standard IQ test, although other factors, such as one’s ability to adapt to the environ- ment, are also important.

intelligence An internal capacity or ability that accounts for individual differences in mental test performance and enables us to adapt to ever-changing environments. intelligence quotient (IQ) Mental age divided by chrono- logical age and then multiplied by 100. internal attribution Attributing the cause of a person’s be- havior to an internal personality trait or disposition. internal validity The extent to which an experiment has effectively controlled for confounding variables; internally valid experiments allow for the determination of causality. interneurons Cells that transfer information from one neu- ron to another; interneurons make no direct contact with the outside world. intrinsic motivation Goal-directed behavior that seems to be entirely self-motivated. iris The ring of colored tissue surrounding the pupil. James-Lange theory A theory of emotion that argues that body reactions precede and drive the subjective experience of emotions. kinesthesia In perception, the ability to sense the position and movement of one’s body parts. latency period Freud’s period of psychosexual development, from age 5 to puberty, during which the child’s sexual feel- ings are largely suppressed. latent content According to Freud, the true psychological meaning of dream symbols. law of effect If a response in a particular situation is fol- lowed by a satisfying consequence, it will be strengthened. If a response in a particular situation is followed by an unsatis- fying consequence, it will be weakened. learned helplessness A general sense of helplessness that is acquired when people repeatedly fail in their attempts to con- trol their environment; learned helplessness may play a role in depression. learning A relatively permanent change in behavior, or potential behavior, that results from experience. lens The flexible piece of tissue that helps focus light toward the back of the eye. light The small part of the electromagnetic spectrum that is processed by the visual system. limbic system A system of structures thought to be involved in motivational and emotional behaviors (the amygdala) and memory (the hippocampus). locus of control The amount of control that a person feels he or she has over the environment. longitudinal design A research design in which the same people are studied or tested repeatedly over time. long-term memory The system used to maintain informa- tion for extended periods of time. lymphocytes Specialized white blood cells that have the job of attacking foreign substances, such as viruses and bacteria.

G-8 | Glossary

magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) A device that uses magnetic fields and radio-wave pulses to construct detailed, three-dimensional images of the brain; “functional” MRIs can be used to map changes in blood oxygen use as a func- tion of task activity. major depressive episode A type of depressive disorder characterized by depressed mood and other symptoms. manic episode A disordered state in which the person becomes hyperactive, talkative, and has a decreased need for sleep; a person in a manic state may engage in activities that are self-destructive or dangerous. manifest content According to Freud, the actual symbols and events experienced in a dream. mean The arithmetic average of a set of scores. means–ends analysis A problem-solving heuristic that involves devising actions, or means, that reduce the distance between the current starting point and the desired end (the goal state). median The middle point in an ordered set of scores; half of the scores fall at or below the median score, and half fall at or above the median score. medical model The view that abnormal behavior is symp- tomatic of an underlying “disease,” which can be “cured” with the appropriate therapy. meditation A technique for self-induced manipulation of awareness, often used for the purpose of relaxation and self-reflection. memory The capacity to preserve and recover information. memory span The number of items that can be recalled from short-term memory in their proper presentation order on half of the tested memory trials. menopause The period during which a woman’s menstrual cycle slows down and finally stops. mental age The chronological age that best fits a child’s level of performance on a test of mental ability. mental set The tendency to rely on well-established strate- gies when attempting to solve problems. meta-analysis A statistical technique used to compare find- ings across many different research studies; comparisons are based on some common evaluation measure, such as the dif- ference between treatment and control conditions. method of loci A mnemonic device in which you choose some pathway, such as moving through the rooms in your house, and then form visual images of the to-be-remembered items sitting in locations along the pathway. midbrain The middle portion of the brain, containing such structures as the tectum, superior colliculus, and inferior col- liculus; midbrain structures serve as neural relay stations and may help coordinate reactions to sensory events. middle ear The portion between the eardrum and the cochlea containing three small bones (the malleus, incus, and stapes) that help to intensify and prepare the sound vibrations for passage into the inner ear.

mind The contents and processes of subjective experience: sensations, thoughts, and emotions. mnemonic devices Special mental tricks that help people think about material in ways that improve later memory. Most mnemonic devices require the use of visual imagery. mode The most frequently occurring score in a set of scores. modeling The natural tendency to imitate the behavior of significant others. monocular depth cues Cues for depth that require input from only one eye. morality The ability to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate actions. morphemes The smallest units in a language that carry meaning. motivation The set of factors that initiate and direct behav- ior, usually toward some goal. motor neurons Cells that carry information away from the central nervous system to the muscles and glands that di- rectly produce behavior. multiple intelligences The notion proposed by Howard Gardner that people possess a set of separate and independent “intelligences” ranging from musical to linguistic to interper- sonal ability. mutation A spontaneous change in the genetic material that occurs during the gene replication process. myelin sheath An insulating material that protects the axon and helps to speed up neural transmission. narcissistic personality disorder a personality disorder characterized by an exaggerated sense of entitlement, which leads to excessive attempts to attract and be the focus of attention. narcolepsy A rare sleep disorder characterized by sudden extreme sleepiness. nativism The idea that some knowledge is innate, or present at birth. naturalistic observation A descriptive research technique that records naturally occurring behavior as opposed to behavior produced in the laboratory. need hierarchy The idea popularized by Maslow that hu- man needs are prioritized in a hierarchy. negative punishment An event that, when removed after a re- sponse, lowers the likelihood of that response occurring again. negative reinforcement An event that, when removed after a response, increases the likelihood of that response occurring again. nerves Bundles of axons that make up neural “transmission cables.” neurons The cells in the nervous system that receive and transmit information. neuroscience An interdisciplinary field of study directed at understanding the brain and its relation to behavior. neurotransmitters Chemical messengers that relay infor- mation from one neuron to the next.

Glossary | G-9

nightmares Frightening and anxiety-arousing dreams that occur primarily during the REM stage of sleep. night terrors Terrifying experiences, which occur mainly in children, in which the sleeper awakens suddenly in an extreme state of panic. obedience The form of compliance that occurs when people respond to the orders of an authority figure. obesity A weight problem characterized by excessive body fat. object permanence The ability to recognize that objects still exist when they’re no longer in sight. observational learning Learning by observing the experience of others. obsessive–compulsive disorder An disorder that manifests itself through persistent and uncontrollable thoughts, called obsessions, or by the compelling need to perform repetitive acts, called compulsions. occipital lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemi- sphere of the cerebral cortex, located at the back of the brain; visual processing is controlled there. olfaction The sense of smell. operant conditioning A procedure for studying how organ- isms learn about the consequences of their own voluntary actions (also called instrumental conditioning). operational definitions Definitions that specify how concepts can be observed and measured. opiates Drugs that reduce anxiety, lower sensitivity to pain, and elevate mood; opiates often act to depress nervous system activity. opponent-process theory A theory of color vision propos- ing that cells in the visual pathway increase their activation levels to one color and decrease their activation levels to another color—for example, increasing to red and decreasing to green. oral stage The first stage in Freud’s conception of psycho- sexual development, occurring in the first year of life; in this stage, pleasure is derived primarily from sucking and placing things in the mouth. orgasmic phase The third stage in the human sexual response cycle. It’s characterized by rhythmic contractions in the sex organs; in men, ejaculation occurs. There is also the subjective experience of pleasure, which appears to be similar for men and women. orienting response An inborn tendency to notice and respond to novel or surprising events. ostracism When one is excluded and ignored by one or more members of a group. pain An adaptive response by the body to any stimulus that is intense enough to cause tissue damage. panic disorder A condition marked by recurrent discrete episodes or attacks of extremely intense fear or dread. parietal lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemi- sphere of the cerebral cortex, located roughly on the top middle portion of the brain; it contains the somatosensory cortex, which controls the sense of touch.

partial reinforcement schedule A schedule in which reinforcement is delivered only some of the time after the response has occurred. passionate love An intense emotional state characterized by a powerful longing to be with a specific person; passionate love is marked by a combination of intimacy and passion, but commitment may be lacking. peg-word method A mnemonic device in which you form visual images connecting to-be-remembered items with retrieval cues, or pegs. perceived control The amount of influence you feel you have over a situation and your reaction to it. perception The collection of processes used to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of sensations. perceptual constancy Perceiving the properties of an object to remain the same even though the physical properties of the sensory message are changing. perceptual illusions Inappropriate interpretations of physical reality. Perceptual illusions often occur as a result of the brain’s using otherwise adaptive organizing principles. peripheral nervous system The network of nerves that links the central nervous system with the rest of the body. personal identity A sense of who one is as an individual and how well one measures up against peers. personality The distinguishing pattern of psychological characteristics—thinking, feeling, and behaving—that differ- entiates us from others and leads us to act consistently across situations. personality disorders Chronic or enduring patterns of behavior that lead to significant impairments in social functioning. person–situation debate A controversial debate centering on whether people really do behave consistently across situations. phallic stage Freud’s third stage of psychosexual develop- ment, lasting from about age 3 to age 5; pleasure is gained from self-stimulation of the sexual organs. phenotype A person’s observable characteristics, such as red hair. The phenotype is controlled mainly by the genotype, but it can also be influenced by the environment. phi phenomenon An illusion of movement that occurs when stationary lights are flashed in succession. phobic disorder (or specific phobia) A highly focused fear of a specific object or situation. phonemes The smallest significant sound units in speech. phonology Rules governing how sounds should be com- bined to make words in a language. pinna The external flap of tissue normally referred to as the “ear”; it helps capture sounds. pitch The psychological experience that results from the auditory processing of a particular frequency of sound. pituitary gland A kind of master gland in the body that con- trols the release of hormones in response to signals from the hypothalamus.

G-10 | Glossary

placebo An inactive, or inert, substance that resembles an experimental substance. place theory The idea that the location of auditory receptor cells activated by movement of the basilar membrane under- lies the perception of pitch. plateau phase The second stage in the human sexual response cycle. Arousal continues to increase, although at a slower rate, toward a preorgasm maximum point. positive punishment An event that, when presented after a response, lowers the likelihood of that response occurring again. positive regard The idea that we value what others think of us and that we constantly seek others’ approval, love, and companionship. positive reinforcement An event that, when presented after a response, increases the likelihood of that response. positron emission tomography (PET) A method for mea- suring how radioactive substances are absorbed in the brain; it can be used to detect how specific tasks activate different areas of the living brain. postconventional level Kohlberg’s highest level of moral development, in which moral actions are judged on the basis of a personal code of ethics that is general and abstract and that may not agree with societal norms. posttraumatic stress disorder A trauma-based anxiety disorder characterized by flashbacks, avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event, and chronic arousal symptoms. pragmatics The practical knowledge used to compre- hend the intentions of a speaker and to produce an effective response. preconscious mind The part of the mind that contains all of the inactive but potentially accessible thoughts and memories. preconventional level In Kohlberg’s theory, the lowest level of moral development, in which decisions about right and wrong are made primarily in terms of external consequences. prejudice Positive or negative evaluations of a group and its members. preoperational period Piaget’s second stage of cognitive development, lasting from ages 2 to about 7; children begin to think symbolically but often lack the ability to perform mental operations such as conservation. primacy effect The better memory of items near the begin- ning of a memorized list. principle of conservation The ability to recognize that the physical properties of an object remain the same despite superficial changes in the object’s appearance. proactive interference A process in which old memories interfere with the recovery of new memories. procedural memory Knowledge about how to do things, such as riding a bike or swinging a golf club. projective personality test A type of personality test in which individuals are asked to interpret unstructured or am- biguous stimuli.

prototype The best or most representative member of a cat- egory (such as robin for the category “bird”). psychiatrists Medical doctors who specialize in the diagno- sis and treatment of psychological problems. psychoactive drugs Drugs that affect behavior and mental processes through alterations of conscious awareness. psychoanalysis A term used by Freud to describe his theory of mind and system of therapy; also Freud’s method of treat- ment that attempts to bring hidden impulses and memories, which are locked in the unconscious, to the surface of aware- ness, thereby freeing the client from disordered thoughts and behaviors. psychodynamic theory An approach to personality develop- ment, based largely on the ideas of Sigmund Freud, that holds that much of behavior is governed by unconscious forces. psychology The scientific study of behavior and mind. psychometrics The use of psychological tests to measure the mind and mental processes. psychophysics A field of psychology in which researchers search for ways to describe the transition from the physical stimulus to the psychological experience of that stimulus. psychosurgery Surgery that destroys or alters tissues in the brain in an effort to affect behavior. psychotherapy Treatment designed to help people deal with mental, emotional, or behavioral problems. puberty The period during which a person reaches sexual maturity and is potentially capable of producing offspring. punishment Consequences that decrease the likelihood of responding in a similar way again. pupil The hole in the center of the eye that allows light to enter. random assignment A technique ensuring that each partici- pant in an experiment has an equal chance of being assigned to any of the conditions in the experiment. random sampling A procedure guaranteeing that everyone in the population has an equal likelihood of being selected for the sample. range The difference between the largest and smallest scores in a distribution. rational-emotive therapy A form of cognitive therapy in which the therapist acts as a kind of cross-examiner, verbally assaulting the client’s irrational thought processes. reactivity When behavior changes as a result of the observa- tion process. recency effect The better memory of items near the end of a memorized list. receptive field In vision, the portion of the retina that, when stimulated, causes the activity of higher order neurons to change. reciprocal determinism The idea that beliefs, behavior, and the environment interact to shape what is learned from experience. reciprocity The tendency for people to return in kind the feelings that are shown toward them.

Glossary | G-11

recognition by components The idea proposed by Bieder- man that people recognize objects perceptually via smaller components called geons. reflexes Largely automatic body reactions—such as the knee jerk—that are controlled primarily by spinal cord pathways. refractory period The period of time following an action potential when more action potentials cannot be generated. rehearsal A strategic process that helps to maintain short-term memories indefinitely through the use of internal repetition. reinforcement Response consequences that increase the likelihood of responding in a similar way again. reliability A measure of the consistency of test results; reli- able tests produce similar scores or indices from one adminis- tration to the next. REM rebound The tendency to increase time spent in REM sleep after REM deprivation. REM sleep A stage of sleep characterized by rapid eye move- ments and low-amplitude, irregular EEG patterns resembling those found in the waking brain. REM is typically associated with dreaming. representativeness heuristic The tendency to make decisions based on an alternative’s similarity, or representa- tiveness, in relation to an ideal. For example, people decide whether a sequence is random based on how irregular the sequence looks. repression A defense mechanism that individuals use, unknowingly, to push threatening thoughts, memories, and feelings out of conscious awareness. research psychologists Psychologists who try to discover the basic principles of behavior and mind. resistance In psychoanalysis, a person’s unconsciously moti- vated attempts to subvert or hinder the process of therapy. resolution phase The fourth and final stage in the human sexual response cycle. Arousal returns to normal levels. For men, there is a refractory period during which further stimu- lation fails to produce visible signs of arousal. resting potential The tiny electrical charge in place between the inside and the outside of the resting neuron. retina The thin layer of tissue that covers the back of the eye and contains the light-sensitive receptor cells for vision. retinal disparity A binocular cue for depth that is based on location differences between the images in each eye. retrieval The processes that determine and control how memories are recovered and translated into performance. retroactive interference A process in which the formation of new memories hurts the recovery of old memories. retrograde amnesia Memory loss for events that happened prior to the point of brain injury. rods Receptor cells in the retina, located mainly around the sides, that transduce light energy into neural messages; these visual receptors are highly sensitive and are active in dim light.

satiation signals Internal chemical signals, such as the hor- mone CCK, that reduce our desire to eat. schedule of reinforcement A rule that is used to determine when particular responses will be reinforced. schema An organized knowledge structure in long-term memory. schemata Mental models of the world that we use to guide and interpret our experiences. schizophrenia A class of disorders characterized by fun- damental disturbances in thought processes, emotion, or behavior. scientific method A multistep technique that generates empirical knowledge—that is, knowledge derived from systematic observations of the world. searching for analogies A problem-solving heuristic that in- volves trying to find a connection between the current prob- lem and some previous problem you have solved successfully. secondary traits The less obvious characteristics of an individual’s personality that do not always appear in his or her behavior, such as testiness when on a diet. second-order conditioning A procedure in which an estab- lished conditioned stimulus is used to condition a second neu- tral stimulus. self-actualization The ingrained desire to reach one’s true potential as a human being. self-concept An organized set of perceptions that we hold about our abilities and characteristics. self-efficacy The beliefs we hold about our own ability to perform a task or accomplish a goal. self-fulfilling prophecy effect A condition in which our expectations about the actions of another person actually lead that person to behave in the expected way. self-monitoring The degree to which a person monitors a situation closely and changes his or her behavior accordingly; people who are high self-monitors may not behave consis- tently across situations. self-perception theory The idea that people use obser- vations of their own behavior as a basis for inferring their internal beliefs. self-report inventories Personality tests in which people answer groups of questions about how they typically think, act, and feel; their responses, or self-reports, are then com- pared to average responses compiled from large groups of prior test takers. self-serving bias The tendency to make internal attribu- tions about one’s own behavior when the outcome is posi- tive and to blame the situation when one’s behavior leads to something negative. semantic memory Knowledge about the world, stored as facts that make little or no reference to one’s personal experiences. semantics The rules used in language to communicate meaning.

G-12 | Glossary

semicircular canals A receptor system attached to the inner ear that responds to movement and acceleration and to changes in upright posture. sensations The elementary components, or building blocks, of an experience (such as a pattern of light and dark, a bitter taste, or a change in temperature). sensitization Increased responsiveness, or sensitivity, to an event that has been repeated. sensorimotor period Piaget’s first stage of cognitive devel- opment, lasting from birth to about 2 years of age; schemata revolve around sensory and motor abilities. sensory adaptation The tendency of sensory systems to reduce sensitivity to a stimulus source that remains constant. sensory memory An exact replica of an environmental mes- sage, which usually lasts for a second or less. sensory neurons Cells that carry environmental messages toward the spinal cord and brain. serotonin A neurotransmitter that has been linked to sleep, dreaming, and general arousal and may also be involved in some psychological disorders such as depression and schizophrenia. set point A natural body weight, perhaps produced by genetic factors, that the body seeks to maintain. sexual orientation A person’s sexual and emotional attraction to members of the same sex or the other sex; homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality are all sexual orientations. sexual scripts Learned cognitive programs that instruct us on how, why, and what to do in our interactions with sexual partners. shaping A procedure in which reinforcement is delivered for successive approximations of the desired response. short-term memory A limited-capacity system that we use to hold information after it has been analyzed for periods last- ing less than a minute or two. signal detection A technique used to determine the ability of someone to detect the presence of a stimulus. single-blind study Experimental participants do not know to which condition they have been assigned (e.g., experimental versus control); it’s used to control for participant expectancies. sleepwalking The sleeper arises during sleep and wanders about. social anxiety disorder Intense fear of being watched, judged, and embarrassed in social situations. social cognition The study of how people use cognitive pro- cesses—such as perception, memory, thought, and emotion— to help make sense of other people as well as themselves. social–cognitive theories An approach to personality that suggests it is human experiences, and interpretations of those experiences, that determine personality growth and development. social facilitation The enhancement in performance that is sometimes found when an individual performs in the pres- ence of others.

social influence The study of how the behaviors and thoughts of individuals are affected by the presence of others. social interference The impairment in performance that is sometimes found when an individual performs in the pres- ence of others. social loafing The tendency to put out less effort when working in a group compared to when working alone. social psycholgy The discipline that studies how people think about, inflluence, and relate to other people. social schema A general knowledge structure, stored in long-term memory, that relates to social experiences or people. social support The resources we receive from other people or groups, often in the form of comfort, caring, or help. soma The cell body of a neuron. somatic system The collection of nerves that transmits in- formation toward the brain and connects to the skeletal muscles to initiate movement; part of the peripheral nervous system. somatic symptom disorders Psychological disorders that focus on the physical body. These disorders can be associated with specific body complaints (such as continuing pain) and/ or excessive worry about the possibility of contracting a seri- ous disease. sound The physical message delivered to the auditory sys- tem; a mechanical energy that requires a medium such as air or water in order to move. source characteristics Features of the person who is pre- senting a persuasive message, such as his or her attractive- ness, amount of power, or fame. s (specific intelligence) According to Spearman, a specific factor, derived from factor analysis, that is unique to a partic- ular kind of test. spontaneous recovery The recovery of an extinguished con- ditioned response after a period of nonexposure to the condi- tioned stimulus. spontaneous remission Improvement in a psychological dis- order without treatment—that is, simply as a function of the passage of time. standard deviation An indication of how much individual scores differ or vary from the mean. standardization Keeping the testing, scoring, and inter- pretation procedures similar across all administrations of a test. statistical deviance A criterion of abnormality stating that a behavior is abnormal if it occurs infrequently among the members of a population. stereotypes The collection of beliefs and impressions held about a group and its members; common stereotypes include those based on gender, race, and age. stimulants A class of drugs that increase central nervous sys- tem activity, enhancing neural transmission.

Glossary | G-13

stimulus discrimination Responding differently to a new stimulus than how one responds to an established condi- tioned stimulus. stimulus generalization Responding to a new stimulus in a way similar to the response produced by an established con- ditioned stimulus. storage The processes that determine and control how memories are stored and kept over time. strange situation test Gradually subjecting a child to a stressful situation and observing his or her behavior toward the parent or caregiver. This test is used to classify children according to type of attachment—secure, resistant, avoidant, or disorganized/disoriented. stress People’s physical and psychological reactions to demanding situations. stressors The demanding or threatening situations that pro- duce stress. structuralism An early school of psychology; structuralists tried to understand the mind by breaking it down into basic parts, much as a chemist might try to understand a chemical compound. superego In Freud’s theory, the portion of personality that motivates people to act in an ideal fashion, in accordance with the moral customs defined by parents and culture. surface structure The literal ordering of words in a sentence. survey A descriptive research technique designed to gather limited amounts of information from many people, usually by administering some kind of questionnaire. synapse The small gap between the terminal buttons of a neuron and the dendrite or cell body of another neuron. syntax Rules governing how words should be combined to form sentences. systematic desensitization A technique that uses coun- terconditioning and extinction to reduce the fear and anxi- ety that have become associated with a specif ic object or event. systematic introspection An early technique used to study the mind; systematic introspection required people to look inward and describe their own experiences. tacit knowledge Unspoken practical knowledge about how to perform well on the job. taste buds The receptor cells on the tongue. temperament A child’s general level of emotional reactivity. temporal lobe One of four anatomical regions of each hemi- sphere of the cerebral cortex, located roughly on the sides of the brain; it’s involved in certain aspects of speech and lan- guage perception. teratogens Environmental agents—such as disease organ- isms or drugs—that can potentially damage the developing embryo or fetus. terminal buttons The tiny swellings at the end of the axon that contain chemicals important to neural transmission.

thalamus A relay station in the forebrain thought to be an important gathering point for input from the senses. theta waves The pattern of brain activity observed in stage 1 sleep. thinking The processes that underlie the mental manipula- tion of knowledge, usually in an attempt to reach a goal or solve a problem. token economy A type of behavioral therapy in which patients are rewarded with small tokens when they act in an appropriate way; the tokens can then be exchanged for certain privileges. top-down processing Processing that is controlled by one’s beliefs and expectations about how the world is organized. trait A stable predisposition to act or behave in a certain way. trait theories Formal systems for assessing how people dif- fer, particularly in their predispositions to respond in certain ways across situations. transduction The process by which external messages are translated into the internal language of the brain. transfer-appropriate processing The idea that the likeli- hood of correct retrieval is increased if a person uses the same kind of mental processes during testing that he or she used during encoding. transference In psychoanalysis, the patient’s expression of thoughts or feelings toward the therapist that are actually representative of the way the patient feels about other signifi- cant people in his or her life triarchic theory Robert Sternberg’s theory of intelligence; it proposes three types of intelligence: analytic, creative, and practical. trichromatic theory A theory of color vision proposing that color information is extracted by comparing the relative acti- vations of three different types of cone receptors. twin studies Identical twins, who share genetic material, are compared to fraternal twins in an effort to determine the roles heredity and environment play in psychological traits. two-factor theory A theory of emotion that argues that the cognitive interpretation, or appraisal, of a body reaction drives the subjective experience of emotion. tympanic membrane The eardrum, which responds to incoming sound waves by vibrating. unconditioned response (UR) The observable response that is produced automatically, prior to training, on presentation of an unconditioned stimulus. unconditioned stimulus (US) A stimulus that automatically leads to an observable response prior to any training. unconscious mind The part of the mind that Freud believed housed all the memories, urges, and conflicts that are truly beyond awareness. validity An assessment of how well a test measures what it is supposed to measure. variability A measure of how much the scores in a distribu- tion of scores differ from one another.

G-14 | Glossary

variable-interval (VI) schedule A schedule in which the allotted time before a response will yield reinforcement varies from trial to trial. variable-ratio (VR) schedule A schedule in which a certain number of responses are required for reinforcement, but the number of required responses typically changes. vestibular sacs Organs of the inner ear that contain recep- tors thought to be primarily responsible for balance. visual acuity The ability to process fine detail in vision. visual imagery The processes used to construct an internal visual image. visual neglect A complex disorder of attention characterized by a tendency to ignore things that appear on one side of the body (usually the left side). warm fibers Neurons that respond vigorously when the temperature of the skin increases.

Weber’s law The principle stating that the ability to notice a difference in the magnitude of two stimuli is a constant pro- portion of the size of the standard stimulus. Psychologically, the more intense a stimulus is to begin with, the more in- tense it will need to become for one to notice a change. well-defined problem A problem with a well-stated goal, a clear starting point, and a relatively easy way to tell when a solution has been obtained. withdrawal Physical reactions, such as sweating, vomiting, changes in heart rate, or tremors, that occur when a person stops taking certain drugs after continued use. working backward A problem-solving heuristic that involves starting at the goal state and moving backward toward the starting point to see how the goal state can be reached. zygote The fertilized human egg, containing 23 chromo- somes from the father and 23 chromosomes from the mother.

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A Abdullaev, Y. G., 76 Abel, E. L., 516 Abelson, R. P., 449 Abramson, L. Y., 69, 467 Achenbach, T. M., 123 Ackerman, P. L., 326 Adair, R., 188 Adams, G. R., 512 Adams, M. J., 249 Adams, P. R., 512 Adeyemo, S. A., 193 Adler, A., 385 Adler, G. K., 520 Adolphs, R., 73 Aggelton, J. P., 255 Agnew, C. R., 435, 437 Agras, W. S., 453 Ahern, J., 33 Aiello, J. R., 418 Ainsworth, M. D. S., 116–117 Ajay, M., 396 Ajzen, I., 413 Albee, G. W., 501 Allan, C. L., 481 Allen, K. M., 526 Allen, M., 355 Allen, P., 461 Allik, J., 376 Allison, T., 184 Alloy, L. B., 69, 468 Allport, G. W., 375, 377 Amabile, T. M., 321, 343 Ambady, N., 405 American Association on Intellectual and

Developmental Disabilities, 318 American Psychiatric Association, 451 American Psychological Association, 6, 49, 50,

52, 484 Andersen, B. L., 519 Anderson, C. A., 41, 48, 231 Anderson, E. R., 454 Anderson, J. L., 351 Anderson, J. R., 266 Anderson, M. C., 264 Anderson, P. A., 355 Andrasik, F., 525 Andrews, G., 452 Andrews, P. W., 412 Angell, J. R., 14 Antoni, M. H., 516, 519, 533 Apgar, V., 93 Araoz, D. L., 197

Aronson, E., 415, 522 Aronson, J. A., 331 Arrindell, W. A., 454 Arriaga, X. B., 437 Arterberry, M. E., 102 Asch, S., 422, 423 Aserinsky, E., 181 Ashby, F. G., 285 Atkinson, J. W., 341 Atkinson, R. C., 243, 252 Atran, S., 287 Attia, E., 351 Averbach, E., 240 Averell, L., 261 Averill, J. R., 363 Axel, A., 161

B Baddeley, A. D., 241, 242, 245 Badie, D., 425 Bagwell, C. L., 118 Bahrick, H. P., 262 Baillargeon, R., 108 Balda, R. P., 307 Banaji, M. R., 408, 413 Bandura, A., 230, 231, 390, 391, 392 Barber, T. X., 199 Barenbaum, N. B., 377 Bargh, J. A., 407 Bargones, J. Y., 103 Barlow, D. H., 64, 452, 454, 459, 462, 467, 469,

520, 528 Barrett, H. C., 290 Barrett, L. F., 11, 360, 362, 366 Barrouillet, P., 243, 263 Bartlett, F., 257 Bastien, C., 183 Battelli, L., 148 Battisti, R. A., 194 Bauer, P. J., 101 Baumeister, R. F., 171, 172 Baumrind, D., 426–428 Baur, K., 354 Bavelier, D., 242 Beauchamp, G. K., 162 Beck, A. T., 485, 487–488, 488 Beck, J., 93 Becker, H. C., 191 Beer, J. S., 430 Beers, J. M., 395, 398 Behrmann, M., 140 Beier, M. E., 326 Békésy, G. von, 154

Bell, A. P., 358 Bell, J., 52 Bell, P. A., 514 Belsky, J., 119 Bem, D. J., 416 Bem, S. L., 124 Ben-Porath, Y. S., 380 Benson, H., 199 Bentall, 1990, 445 Bergin, A. E., 499, 500 Bergmann, B. M., 185 Berkowitz, L., 363 Berman, K. F., 465 Bernal, E. M., 330 Berndt, T. J., 118 Bernstein, I. L., 213 Bernstsen, D., 262 Berntsen, D., 262 Berren, M. R., 380 Berridge, K. C., 340, 368 Berscheid, E., 435, 437 Bertenthal, B. I., 97 Best, J. B., 290 Beutler, L. E., 380 Beyth-Marom, R., 296 Biederman, I., 145 Bigelow, H. J., 74 Binet, A., 317 Binik, Y. M., 353 Bisiach, E., 177 Bjork, R. A., 261 Blagrove, M., 187 Blakemore, S., 98 Blanchard-Fields, F., 98 Blanton, H., 416 Blatt, S. J., 502 Bleuler, E., 460 Block, J. J., 231 Blumenthal, J. A., 530 Blundell, J. E., 340 Blunt, J. R., 9, 250 Bodenhausen, G. V., 405, 408, 409 Boesen, E. H., 520 Bogen, J. E., 78 Bohn, A., 262 Bohner, D., 414 Bolla, K. I., 194 Bolles, R. C., 11, 13, 340 Bollini, A. M., 516 Boniecki, K. A., 496 Boomer, D. S., 275 Borgida, E., 406 Boring, E. G., 5 Bornstein, M. H., 142, 325, 386

● Name Index

I-1

I-2 | Name Index

Bortz, W. M., 126 Bouchard, C., 348 Bouchard, T. J. Jr., 86, 327, 328, 398 Bouton, M. E., 216 Bowden, E. M., 292 Bower, T. G. R., 108 Bowlby, J., 114 Bowman, E. S., 455 Boynton, R. M., 141 Brackett, A. A., 322 Bregman, A. S., 155 Breland, K., 227 Breland, M., 227 Brennan, P. A., 162 Bridwell, L. G., 344 Briere, J., 264 Broadbent, D. E., 173 Broberg, D. J., 213 Broca, P., 68 Brockhurst, M. A., 352 Brody, N., 329, 330, 331 Broekman, B. F. P., 521 Broesch, T., 120 Brondel, L., 348 Brooks, J. L., 144 Brooks-Gunn, J., 120 Brosschot, J. F., 515 Brown, R., 252 Brown, T. A., 452 Bruce, D., 32 Brun, P., 348 Bryant, W. H. M, 395 Buchtel, E. E., 376, 430 Buck, L., 161 Budd, R., 500 Buell, S. J., 98 Bulevich, J. B., 264 Buller, D., 21 Burger, J. M., 416, 428 Burke, R. J., 271 Burton, J., 532 Bush, G., 178 Bushman, B. J., 41, 48, 231, 232, 363 Buss, A. H., 356 Buss, D. M., 12, 20, 84, 339, 356,

398, 419, 431 Butcher, J. N., 379 Butterworth, J., 120 Byrne, D., 435

C Cabanac, M., 349 Cacioppo, J. T., 363, 414 Cahill, E. D., 355 Cain, M. E., 51 Calder, A. J., 140, 177 Caldwell, D. F., 416 Cameron, J., 343

Campbell, D. T., 30 Campbell, K., 183 Campos, J. J., 103 Cannon, W. B., 340, 367, 509 Cantor, N., 406 Capaldi, E. J., 18 Caramazza, A., 286 Cardy, R. L., 396 Carlsmith, J. M., 359, 415 Carlsmith, K. M., 363 Carlson, J., 331 Carlston, D. E., 414 Carney, S., 480 Carr, G. V., 465, 479 Carstensen, L. L., 124 Carter, K., 480 Cartwright, R., 187 Carver, C. S., 516 Case, R. B., 525 Casey, D. A., 63 Caspi, A., 116 Castle, L., 178 Cattell, R. B., 310, 375, 376, 379 Cavanaugh, J. C., 98 Ceci, S. J., 319 Cermak, L. S., 265 Chabris, C. F., 259 Chadwick, J. J., 266 Chaiken, S., 415 Chakos, M., 478 Chakrabarti, S., 462 Chang, Y., 97 Charil, A., 93 Charman D. P., 485 Chase, W. G., 245 Chen, S. C., 419 Cherniss, C., 322 Cherry, E. C., 173, 173 Chess, S., 115–116 Chia, R. C., 404 Child Care Action Campaign, 120 Chiu, C., 21 Chomsky, N., 275, 277 Chou, A. F., 525 Choy, Y., 500 Christenfeld, N., 435 Chrysikou, E. G., 290 Chumlea, W. C., 97 Chun, M. M., 173 Chung, C. K., 527 Cialdini, R. B., 423, 429 Ciancolo, A. T., 322 Cicchetti, D. V., 184 Cichy, R. M., 242 Cicirelli, V. G., 126 Clark, H. H., 276 Clark, M. S., 437 Clarke, S., 177 Clendenen, V. I., 419 Coe, W. C., 199

Cohen, S., 519 Cole, M., 109 Cole, R. P., 210 Coleman, P. D., 98 Coles, R., 356 Collins, R. L., 124 Collins, W. A., 117 Coltheart, M., 240 Coltheart, V., 240 Colucci, E., 459 Confer, J. C., 84 Conrad, R., 242 Conte, J., 264 Contreras, J. M., 406 Cook, M., 469 Cook, T. D., 30 Cooper, C. L., 514 Cooper, J., 416 Cooper, W. H., 341 Corballis, M. C., 92 Coren, A., 485 Coren, S., 143, 185 Coriell, A. S., 240 Cornelius, T., 416 Corsica, J. A., 349 Cosmides, L., 21, 84 Costa, P. T., Jr., 122, 376, 462 Costanzo, R. H., 159 Cowan, N., 241 Cowan, R., 319 Craig, J. C., 158 Craig, K. D., 231 Craik, F. I. M., 248 Crain, B. R., 231 Crawford, C. B., 351 Crocker, J., 408 Cronan-Hillix, W. A., 14 Cronbach, L. J., 373 Crooks, R., 354 Crowder, R. G., 240 Cunningham, M. D., 462 Curtis, R. C., 435 Cutrona, C. E., 514 Czajkowski, N., 469

D Dackis, C. A., 193 D’Alessio, D. A., 346 Dallenbach, K. M., 263 Dang-Vu, T. T., 181 Daniels, H., 109 Danker, J. F., 266 Darley, J. M., 420, 435 Darwin, C., 12 Davidson, R. J., 78 Davidson, T. L., 340, 346 Davis, J. I., 360 Davis, K. E., 409

Name Index | I-3

Davis, K. L., 465 Dawkins, R., 20, 84, 356 Dawood, K., 358 de Boyssoon-Bardies, B., 278 De Bruyn, E., 376 de Gelder, B., 140 De Houwer, J., 174–175 de Kloet, E. R., 510 de Lange, F. P., 455 Dearing, E., 119 Deary, I. J., 309, 310 Deaux, K., 406 DeBruyn, B., 140 DeCasper, A. J., 102, 103 Deci, E. L., 342 Deese, J., 258 deGelder, B., 140 Degenhardt, L., 191 Deldin, P. J., 467 DeLoache, J. S., 323 DeLucia, C. A., 101 Delunas, L., 514 Dement, W. C., 183 Dennet, D. C., 12 Dennis, M. G., 96 Dennis, W., 96 Denny, M., 312 Dess, N. K., 51–52 DeValois, K. K., 142 DeValois, R. L., 142 Devine, P. G., 416 Devine, P. J., 408 Dewe, P., 514 Dewey, J., 14 DeYoung, C. G., 396 Di Muccio, C., 48 Dickel, N., 414 Dickinson, S., 145 Diener, E., 363 Dinges, D. F., 184 Dishion, T. J., 118 Dittmar, H., 33 Dixon, W. E., Jr., 115 Dolbier, C. L., 524 Domhoff, G., 187 Domjan, M., 211, 228 Doolittle, B., 143 Doty, R. L., 162 Dougall, A. L., 516 Douthitt, E. A., 418 Dozois, D. J. A., 487 Drevets, W. C., 158 Drews, F. A., 176 Driver, J., 144 Duncker, K., 289, 290 Dunlosky, J., 9 Dupont, P., 140 Durand, V. M., 64, 454, 459, 462, 520 Durie, D. J., 187 Dweck, C. S., 341

E Eagleman, D., 3, Eagly, A. H., 356, 404, 431 Earles, J. A., 34 Ebbinghaus, H., 261 Ebmeier, K. P., 481 Edelman, G. M., 186 Eden, K. J., 98 Efron, R., 241 Egan, D., 245 Eggert, L. L., 460 Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., 360 Eich, E., 457 Eidelman, P., 458 Eisenberger, R., 343 Ekman, P., 359, 360 Eljamel, M. S., 482 Elliot, A. J., 341, 416 Ellis, A., 487 Ellis, W. D., 11 Ellman, S. J., 184, 186 Ellsworth, P. C., 365 Elman, J. L., 277 Else-Quest, N. M., 17 Emmelkamp, P. M. G., 494 Engle, R. W., 310 Enns, J. T., 143 Epstein, L. H., 207, 348 Epstein, S., 395 Erdelyi, M. H., 264 Erickson, M. H., 197 Erikson, E., 120, 121 Etcheverry, P. E., 435 Evans, G. W., 514 Eysenck, H. J., 331, 375, 376, 500

F Fagan, J. F., 17, 325 Fahy, T. A., 457 Fallon, A. E., 364, 365 Fantz, R. L., 100 Faust, I. M., 349 Fazio, R. H., 413 Fearon, R. P., 117 Fedorenko, E., 140 Fehr, B., 436 Feingold, A., 404, 435 Feist, J., 392 Ferris, C. F., 73 Ferster, C. B., 224 Festinger, L., 31, 415, 434 Fiedler, K., 299 Fifer, W. P., 102 Fine, C., 82 Fink, M., 480 Fischer. P., 421 Fishbein, M., 413

Fiske, S. T., 70, 405–406 Fiss, H., 187 Flaxman, S. M., 94 Fleeson, W., 376, 395 Fleishman, E. A., 262 Flinn, M. V., 510 Flynn, J. R., 326 Foer, J., 250 Folkman, S., 510, 511, 514 Forbes, N. F., 461 Forgas, J. P., 412 Forsyth, D. R., 428 Fraley, R. C., 295 Frances, A. J., 445 Francis, P. T., 266 Frankham, C., 349 Franklin, S. R., 217 Fraser, S. C., 416 Freedman, J. L., 416 Freeman, J. B., 405 Freeman, W., 482 Freitas, F. A., 344 Freud, S., 15, 382–383,

484–485 Freudenberger, H. J., 522 Friedlander, L., 524 Friedman, B. H., 366 Friedman, M., 517 Friedman, M. J., 521 Friesen, W. V., 360 Frith, C., 319 Frueh, T., 124 Fu, G., 112 Fukada, K., 244 Funder, D. C., 389, 394, 395, 398 Fyer, A. J., 469

G Gabrieli, J. D. E., 266 Gagnon, J., 356 Gagnon, J. H., 356 Gainotti, G., 77 Gaissmaier, W., 298, 299 Galanter, E., 18 Galef, B. G., 230 Galinsky, A. D., 409 Gallagher, M. P., 376 Gallese, V., 77 Gallistel, C. R., 69, 211 Gallo, L. C., 507 Galton, F., 307, 327 Gandelman, R., 103 Gangestad, S. W., 12, 355,

395, 396 Gao, T., 148 Garcia, J., 228 Garcia, S. M., 421 Gardner, B. T., 280

I-4 | Name Index

Gardner, E. B., 159 Gardner, H., 311 Gardner, R. A., 280 Gardner, W. L., 363 Garland, A. F., 459 Garrity, T. F., 526 Gaw, A. C., 501 Gawronski, B., 408 Gazzaniga, M. S., 78, 79 Geary, D. C., 510 Geiselman, R. E., 197 Gejman, P. V., 466 Gelman, S. A., 110 Gelstein, S., 355 Geraerts, E., 264 Gerbner, G., 231 German, T. P., 290 Gershon, E. S., 467 Gibbon, J., 211 Gibbs, J. C., 112 Gibbs, R. W., Jr., 277 Gibson, E. J., 103 Gielen, M. C., 480 Gigerenzer, G., 298, 299 Gilbert, A. L., 273 Gilligan, C., 112, 121 Glaser, B. J., 126 Glaser, R., 519 Glass, D. C., 522 Glass, G. V., 499 Gleaves, D. H., 457 Glenberg, A. M., 77 Glendon, A. I., 262 Gluck, J. P., 52 Goater, N., 462 Godwin-Jones, R., 251 Gogate, L., 281 Goldberg, J., 521 Golden, R. N., 480 Goldstein, B., 284 Goldstein, D. S., 510 Goldstein, N. J., 424, 429 Goldstone, R. L., 284 Goleman, D., 322 Goodall, J., 31 Gopie, N., 260 Gopnik, A., 101, 108 Gore-Felton, C., 34 Gottesman, I. I., 466 Gottfredson, L. S., 323 Gould, M. S., 459–460 Gould, R. L., 122 Gould, S. J., 21, 84 Grace, A. A., 63 Grace, R. C., 207, 224 Graf, P., 260, 266 Graffen, N. F., 196 Grajek, S., 436 Graziano, W. G., 395 Green, C., 264

Green, D. P., 409 Greenberg, B. D., 482 Greenberg, D. L., 252 Greenblatt, D. J., 480 Greene, D., 342 Greene, R. L., 380 Greenwald, A. G., 27, 408, 413 Grencavage, L. M., 500 Grice, D. E., 277 Grill, H. J., 346 Gross, A. E., 359 Gross, L., 231, 347 Grote, N. K., 437 Groves, P. M., 207 Guerin, S. A., 70 Guevremont, D. C., 492 Guinard, J. X., 348 Gunderson, J. G., 462 Gutchess, A. H., 266

H Haan, N., 510 Hadjikhani, N., 140 Haidt, J., 113 Haines, M. M., 514 Hall, I., 396 Hall, L. K., 262 Hall, M. L., 242 Halligan, P. W., 177, 196, 199 Halpern, D. F., 82 Hamer, D. H., 358 Hamilton, W. D., 20 Hammen, C., 459 Hampson, S. E., 377 Haney, C., 514 Hannan, A. J., 95 Hansen, C. J., 530 Harlow, H. F., 115 Harmon-Jones, E., 363 Harmon, T. M., 197 Harper, G., 468 Harris, J. R., 118 Harris, V. A., 410 Harsch, N., 252 Hart, J. W., 421 Hartshorne, H., 394 Hartup, W. W., 118 Harvey, P. D., 461 Hasher, L., 176 Hasselmo, M. E., 64, 73, 140 Hastie, R., 298 Hatfield, 1988, 436–437 Hatfield, E., 437 Hauri, P., 1982, 182 Hauser, M. D., 419 Hawken, M. J., 142 Haworth, C. M. A., 329 Hayes, C., 279

Hayes, K. J., 279 Hayne, H., 255 He, S., 95 Hearst, E., 217 Heathcote, A., 261 Heaton, P., 319 Hedlund, J., 322 Heider, F., 409 Heil, M., 81 Heim, C., 512 Heine, S. J., 376, 430 Henderlong, J., 342 Henderson-King, E. I., 406 Henke, K., 260, 266 Hennessey, B. A., 321 Herman, C. P., 350, 351 Herz, R. S., 355 Hetherington, A. W., 346 Hetherington, M. M., 348 Hezlett, S. A., 40, 315 Hilgard, E. R., 13, 196, 198, 307 Hill, J., 95, 244 Hines, M., 82, 123 Hintzman, D. L., 285 Hirsh, I. J., 155 Hitch, G., 245 Hobson, C. J., 514 Hobson, J. A., 186, 187 Hodges, J., 115 Hodges, S., 32 Hoffman, M. L., 359 Hohmann, G. W., 365 Holland, J., 82 Hollerback, J., 145 Hollich, G., 281 Holmes, D. S., 200, 530 Holmes, T. H., 512 Holroyd, K. A., 525 Holt, E. B., 339 Hopkins, B., 96 Horgan, J., 397 Horn, J. L., 310, 322, 326 Horney, K., 386 Horton, J. C., 76 Houle, M., 197 Hser, Y., 192 Huang, C., 341 Hubbel, J. C., 51 Hubel, D. H., 139 Hughes, I,, 500 Hull, C. L., 15, 340 Hulleman, 341 Hunnicutt, C. P., 350 Hunt, R. R., 248 Hunt, E., 308, 310, 312, 323,

329, 331 Hunter, J. E., 323 Huntjens, R. J. C., 457 Hurvich, L. M., 142 Hyde, J. S., 355

Name Index | I-5

I Iacoboni, M., 77, 230 Iani, C., 199 Iber, C., 183 Ickes, W., 396 Inoue-Nakamura, N., 230 Insko, C. A., 436 Iverson, L. L., 464 Iverson, S. D., 464 Izard, C. E., 360, 361

J Jack, F., 255 Jackendoff, R., 281 Jacoby, L. L., 265 James, D. K., 103 James, W., 13, 14, 16, 339, 365 Jameson, D., 142 Janis, I. L., 425 Jaskiw, G. E., 63 Javitt, D., 465, 478 Jenike, M. A., 482 Jenkins, H. M., 217 Jenkins, J. G., 263 Jensen, A. R., 329 Jensen, J. P., 501 Jing, L., 292 Johansen, C., 520 Johnson, B. J., 125 Johnson, J. D., 194 Johnson, M. H., 102 Johnson, M. M., 514 Johnson, R. C., 307 Johnson, S. P., 103 Johnson, V. E., 354 Johnson, W., 398 Johnston, W. A., 176 Joiner, T. E., Jr., 468 Jones, B. C., 433 Jones, E. E., 409, 410, 436 Jones, G., 292 Jones, M. C., 493 Jones, R. T., 194 Jonides, J., 246 Josselson, R., 490 Jung-Beeman, M., 292 Jung, C. G., 385

K Kahneman, D., 295, 297, 298, 364 Kail, R., 97, 98 Kalat, J. W., 67, 380 Kalick, S. M., 404 Kamil, A. C., 307 Kamin, L., 211, 331 Kamin-Siegel, 516

Kanner, A. D., 514 Kaplan, J. M., 346 Kaplin, R. M., 34 Karau, S. J., 421 Karpicke, J. D., 9 Karpicke, J. S., 9, 250 Karremans, J. C., 27 Kaufman, A. S., 326 Kaufman, J. C., 311 Kavanau, J. L., 184 Kazdin, A. E., 500 Kazuhisa, N., 292 Kee, K. H., 322 Keefe, K., 118 Keel, P. K., 351 Keesey, R. E., 348 Kelley, H. H., 410, 435 Kellman, P. J., 102 Kellogg, L. A., 279 Kellogg, W. N., 279 Keltner, D., 360 Kenrick, D. T., 344, 352, 389, 394, 395, 433 Kerns, R. D., 196 Kershaw, T. C., 292 Kersten, A., 284 Kesebir, S., 113 Kessen, W., 142 Kessler, R. C., 461 Key, W. B., 27 Keysar, B., 276 Kiecolt-Glase, J. K., 519 Kihlstrom, J., 197, 198 Kim, B. J., 342 Kim, Y., 405 Kimble, G. A., 222 Kimmel, A. J., 50 Kimura, D., 17, 82 Kinzler, K. D., 108, 110, 286 Kipp, K., 115 Kirk, K. M., 358 Kirmayer, L. J., 455 Kirsch, I., 479 Kitayama, S., 22, 412, 430 Kite, M. E., 125 Klatzky, R. L., 157, 160 Kleitman, N., 181 Klucharev, V., 424 Kluft, R. P., 457 Klump, K. L., 351 Knapp, S. J., 49 Koch, C., 177 Koelling, R. A., 228 Köhler, W., 292 Kohlberg, L., 111 Kolb, B., 73 Koltko-Rivera, M. E., 344 Kometer, M., 193 Komori, M., 433 Koob, A., 59 Kopin, I. J., 510

Korte, S. M., 509 Kosky, R. J., 459 Kosslyn, S. M., 145, 242 Kotov, R., 376 Kotz, S. A., 79 Kowalski, T. J., 348 Kraemer, P. J., 156 Kramer, P. D., 191 Kramer, R. A., 459–460 Kreye, M., 511 Krowitz, A., 103 Krueger, R. F., 398 Kruger, M. L., 516 Kübler-Ross, E., 125 Kubzansky, L. D., 520 Kulhara, P., 462 Kulick, J., 252 Kuncel, N. R., 40, 315 Kurtz, M. M., 496 Kurzban, R., 84

L Labov , W., 283 Lafferty, P., 501 Laiacona, M., 82 Lakoff , G., 276 Lamb, M. E., 117, 118 Lambert, A. J., 264 Lambert, M. J., 499, 500 Landauer, T. K., 244 Lang, P. J., 366 Lang, S., 292 Langer, A., 103 Langer, E. J., 413, 449 Langlois, J. H., 346, 432, 432–433 Laprelle, J., 435 Larose, H., 404 Lassaline, M. E., 286 Latané, B., 420, 421 Latta, F., 188 Laudenslager, M. L., 510 Lavie, P., 180 Lawton, M. P., 125 Lazarus, R. S., 508, 510, 511, 514, 523 Lecendreux, M., 189 Leclerc, G., 389 Lederman, S.J., 157, 160 LeDoux, J. E., 78 Lefcourt, H. M., 391 Lehman, D. R., 21 Leiter, M. P., 522 Lench, H. C., 366 Lenneberg, E. H., 92 Leon, M. I., 69 Leonard, L. J., 344 Leone, C., 396 Leotti, L. A., 515 Lepper, M. R., 342

I-6 | Name Index

LeVay, S., 358 Levenson, R. W., 366 Leventhal, H., 529 Levin, R., 189 Levine, G., 28 Levinson, D. J., 122 Lewandowsky, S., 243 Lewis, J. W., 72 Lewis, L. L., 406 Lewis, M., 120 Lewontin, R., 331, 332 Lewontin, R. C., 21 Libet, B., 171 Lichtenstein, S., 296 Lieberman, K., 242 Lilienfeld, S. O., 457 Lim, J., 184 Lindsay, D. S., 33 Link, B. G., 448 Lipsey, M. W., 499, 500 Lipton, R. C., 115 Lisk, R. D., 354 Liston, C.,178 Little, A. C., 431 Little, D. R., 285 Little, T. D., 319 Livesley, W. J., 377 Livingston, R. W., 405 Locke, J. L., 278 Lockhart, R. S., 248, 255 Loftus, E. L., 257–258, 258, 263, 386 Loftus, G. R., 263 Logan, G. D., 176 Lorenz, K. Z., 31 Lovaas, O. I., 496 Lubinski, D., 319 Lucki, I., 465, 479 Luders, E., 200 Lupien, S. J., 510 Luria, A. R., 261 Lutgendorf, S., 516, 519 Lutterveld, R. V., 461 Lutz, C., 363 Lynn, M., 396 Lynn, R., 329 Lynn, S. J., 199, 457

M Maccoby, E., 398 MacDonald, T. K., 437 Macrae, C. N., 409 MacKenzie, K. R., 491 Madden, M., 176 Maddox, W. T., 285 Madon, S., 407 Mah, K., 353 Mahon, B. Z., 286 Maier, N. R. F., 271, 289, 292 Maio, G. R., 413

Malouff, J. M., 376 Malt, B. C., 283 Manaseki-Holland, S., 96–97 Mandler, G., 414 Mangels, J. A., 341 Manson, S. M., 468 Marcia, J. E., 121 Marcus, D. E., 123 Marketon, J. I., 519 Marks, M. J., 295 Markus, H., 430 Marra, C., 76 Marroquin, B., 525 Marsella, A. J., 445 Marshall, J. C., 177 Martens, A., 125 Martin, A., 68, 525 Martin, C. L., 123 Martin, G., 459 Martin, L. T., 319 Martin, R. J., 348 Martin, K. M., 255 Martins, A., 517 Marx, M. W., 14 Masicampo, E. J., 172 Maslach, C., 522 Masling, J., 380 Maslow, A. H., 16, 343–344,

387–389 Mason, J. R., 230 Masson, J. R., 386 Master, S. L., 510 Masters, W. H., 353–354 Masuda, T., 412 Matsumoto, D., 109, 363 Matsuzawa, T., 230 Mattay, V. S., 178 Matthews, G., 322 Matthews, K., 98, 482, 507 Mattson, S. N., 94, 95 May, A., 394 Mayer, J. D., 322 Mays, V. M., 501 McCaffrey, T., 290 McCall, M., 296, 404 McCall, W. V., 481 McCann, I. L., 530 McCarley, R. W., 186 McCauley, C., 424 McClelland, D. C., 341, 342 McClelland, J. L., 277 McConkey, K. M., 198 McCrae, R. R., 122, 376, 462 McDaniel, M. A., 248 McDaniel, E., 355 McDermott, J. H., 155 McDermott, K. B., 258, 260 McDougall, W., 339 McGhee, P. E., 124 McGrath, J., 17, 462 McGue, M., 327, 328

McGuire, W. J., 414 McIntosh, D. N., 360 McKenna, S. P., 262 McKnight, J. D., 522 McLean, C. P., 454 McMillan, C. T., 247 McNally, R. J., 264 McNeil, J. J., 294 McNeil, T. F., 467 Medin, D. L., 283, 285, 287 Mednick, S. A., 321 Medoff, D., 380 Medvec, V. H., 364 Melamed, B. G., 231 Melton, A. W., 245 Meltzoff, A. N., 114 Melzack, R., 159 Merikle, P. M., 27 Merton, R., 406 Mervis, C. B., 283–284 Messick, D. M., 419 Mignot, E., 188–189 Milgram, S., 426–428 Miller, C., 123 Miller, G. A., 18, 243 Miller, J. S., 396 Miller, K., 435 Miller, M. A., 514 Miller, N. S., 193 Miller, R. R., 207, 210, 224 Miller, S. D., 457 Milner, B., 265 Mineka, S., 228, 230, 390, 469 Mingroni, M. A., 326 Miron-Spektor, E., 277 Mischel, W., 390, 393, 394,

395, 406 Mistlin, A. M., 140 Moghaddam, B., 465, 478 Molden, D. C., 341 Montoya, A. G., 436 Montoya, R. M., 435 Mook, D. G., 344 Moore, S., 496 Moors, A., 174–175 Moran, S., 311 Moray, N., 174 Morelli, G., 117 Moret, V., 197 Morewedge, C. K., 187 Morgan, L. L., 151 Morris, A. S., 122 Mortelmans, L., 140 Morton, G. J., 346, 349 Moser, D. K., 516 Moskalenko, S., 424 Moskowitz, G. B., 409 Moskowitz, J. T., 511 Moulton, E. A., 72 Mozell, M. M., 161 Muchinsky, P. M., 344

Name Index | I-7

Mueser, K. T., 496 Muller, M. J., 349 Murayama, K., 341, 343 Murphy, G. L., 282, 286 Murray, C., 319 Murray, H. A., 341, 343, 380 Myers, D. G., 363

N Nadon, R., 197 Nagar, D., 514 Nairne, J. S., 14, 240, 241, 245, 252, 255, 261 Nantais, K. M., 323 Nathan, D., 32 Neath, I., 240, 250 Neisser, U., 18, 32, 239, 252, 327 Nellis, D. W., 213 Nesbitt, R. E., 406 Nestoriuc, Y., 525 Nettlebeck, T., 327 Newcomb, A. F., 118 Newcombe, N. S., 108, 273 Newell, A., 291 Newman, I. A., 350 Newman, J. D., 155 Nichols, D. S., 380 Nickerson, R. S., 249 Nicolaus, L. K., 213 Nicotra, A., 365 Nida, S. A., 421, 424 Nielsen, T., 189 Nisbett, R. E., 22, 329, 342, 394–395, 406 Nithianantharajah, J., 95 Norcross, J. C., 500 Norris, S. L., 396 Norton, M. I., 187 Nosofsky, R. M., 285 Nowakowski, R. S., 95 Nummenmaa, L., 177 Nurmi, E. L., 319

O Oakley, D. A., 196, 199 Oberauer, K., 243 O’Boyle, E. H., Jr., 34 Odbert, H. H., 375 O’Dell, K. R., 517 Offer, D., 121 Ogden, C. L., 531 Ogden, M., 318 Ogloff, J. R. P., 448 Ohlsson, S., 292 Öhman, A., 228, 230 Olds, J., 69 Oliveau, D., 453 Olson, J. M., 413, 414 O’Mahony, M., 161 Orban, G. A., 140

Ormerod, T. C., 293 Orne, M. T., 30, 198 Ornstein, P. A., 104 Ortony, A., 359, 362 Osherson, D. N., 145 Ostacher, M. J., 458 Osuji, I. J., 465 Overton, W. F., 123 Özgen, E., 273

P Paivio, A., 252 Pallier, C., 155 Palmer, J. C., 257–258 Palmore, E. B., 124, 125 Paluck, E. L., 409 Panady, J., 514 Pandeirada, J. N. S., 261 Panksepp, J., 366 Park, N., 344 Parker, J. F. Jr., 262 Parkinson, S., 28 Parsons, J. E., 342 Patall, E. A., 342 Paulus, P. B., 514 Paus, T., 98 Pavlov, I., 5, 209–210, 212, 214, 216–218, 493 Payne, B. K., 408 Payne, J. D., 184 Peake, P. K., 395 Pearlstone, Z., 253 Peissig, J. J., 140, 145 Pennebaker, J. W., 527 Penfield, W., 69 Penrod, S., 422 Perls, F., 490 Perot, P., 69 Perrett, D. I., 140 Perri, M. G., 349 Perry, J. L., 51–52 Pert, C. B., 64, 65 Peterson, A. C., 121 Peterson, C., 344, 516 Peterson, D. R., 394 Peterson, J. L., 355 Peterson, L., 243 Peterson, M., 243 Pett, M. A., 514 Petty, R. E., 408, 414 Pfaff, D. W., 354 Phelan, J. C., 448 Phillips, C. M., 232 Piaget, J., 104–109, 111, 122, 124 Pickles, J. O., 155 Pierce, T. W., 530 Pierce, W. D., 343 Pietschnig, J., 323 Pinel, J., 68 Pines, A., 522

Pinker, S., 11, 12, 276–277, 281 Plomin, R., 328, 398 Plous, S., 51 Polivy, J., 350–351 Poole, D. A., 33 Popli, A. P., 63 Poropat, A. E., 376 Porter, R. H., 103 Posner, M. I., 76, 177 Postmes, T., 422 Powers, M. B., 494 Powley, T. L., 348 Pratt, G. J., 196, 197 Prentice, D. A., 70 Pribram, K. H., 18 Price, D. D., 159 Proctor, F., 353 Proctor, R. W., 18 Profet, M., 94 Proffitt, D. R., 151 Provence, S. A., 115 Przedborski, S., 72 Putallaz, M., 327 Pyc, M. A., 250

Q Qui, J., 292

R Rachman, S. J., 469 Rahe, R. H., 512, 514 Rainforth, M. V., 524 Rainie, L., 176 Rakic, P., 95 Ramachandran, V. S., 68, 74, 77 Ranjith, G., 456 Ranson, S. W., 346 Rapee, R. M., 528 Rapson, R. L., 437 Rasmussen, H. N., 516 Raugh, M. R., 252 Rauscher, F. W., 323 Raven, J. C., 330 Rawson, K. A., 9, 250 Raynor, H. A., 348 Raynor, J. O., 341 Raznahan, A., 82 Read, C. N., 482 Read, M. N., 345 Recanzone, G. H., 155 Rechtschaffen, A., 185 Redelmeier, D. A., 176 Ree, M. J., 34 Regoeczi, W. C., 514 Reichenberg, A., 461 Reidinger, R. F., 230 Reidy, T. J., 462 Reis, H. T., 435

I-8 | Name Index

Reisner, L. C., 528 Rescorla, R. A., 209, 210, 217 Revonsuo, A., 187 Rhodes, G., 433 Rhodes, M., 110 Richardson, R. C., 84 Richtand, N. M., 478 Ridley, M., 12, 85, 331 Rief, W., 455 Rivera, M. T., 434 Roberts, G. M. P., 193 Robins, R. W., 430 Robinson, J. O., 264 Roediger, H. L. III, 9, 258, 260 Rogers, C. R., 16, 387, 489–490 Rogers, P. J., 340 Roggman, L. A., 432–433 Rolls, B. J., 348 Romans, S. E., 97 Rosch, E., 283–284, 284, 286 Rose, H., 281 Rose, S., 281 Rosenbaum, M. E., 435 Rosenhan, D. L., 31, 448 Rosenman, R., 517 Rosenthal, R., 30, 33, 47 Rösler, F., 275 Rosnow, R. L., 30, 33 Ross, C. A., 457 Ross, L., 394–395, 410 Ross, M., 437 Rothbart, M. K., 116, 177 Rothbaum, F., 117 Rotter, J. B., 390, 391 Rovee-Collier, C., 101 Roy, M. M., 435 Rozin, P., 347, 364, 365 Rubin, D. C., 262 Ruble, D. N., 123 Rudman, L. A., 406 Rumbaugh, D. M., 280 Rupp, H. A., 355 Rusbult, C. E., 437 Rusconi, M. L., 177 Rush, T. E., 524 Rushton, J. P., 329 Russell, J. A., 359, 360, 362, 368, 436 Rutherford, B. R., 500 Ryan, K. M., 342, 356 Ryckman, R. M., 344, 391, 392

S Saccuzzo, D. P., 34 Sachdev, P., 99 Sacks, O., 32 Salovey, P., 322 Salthouse, T. A., 97, 98, 310 Samuel, D. B., 463

Sanchez-Meca, J., 452 Sanson, A., 48 Sanz, J., 396 Sar, V., 457 Sarbin, T. R., 199 Saron, C. D., 78 Saucier, D. A., 51 Saudino, K. J., 116 Sauter, D. A., 359 Savage-Rumbaugh, S., 280, 281 Savin-Williams, R. C., 357 Sayo, A., 465 Scarr, S., 331 Schachter, S., 347, 349, 368 Schacter, D. L., 70, 266 Schaffer, M. M., 285 Schaie, K. W., 326 Schaller, M., 21 Scheier, M. F., 516 Schellenberg, E. G., 323 Schirmer, A., 79 Schleifer, S. J., 519 Schlenker, B. R., 428 Schmader, T., 331 Schmidt, D. P., 356 Schmidt, F. L., 323 Schmitt, D. P., 356 Schneider, F., 467 Schneider, S. G., 525 Schneider, W., 176 Schneiderman, N., 518, 519 Scholl, B. J., 148 Scholte, R., 376 Schonert-Reichl, K. A., 121 Schulkind, M. D., 262 Schuster, M. A., 512 Schwartz, B., 245, 343 Schwartz, M. W., 346 Schwartz, N., 364 Schyns, P. G., 143 Sedikides, C., 412 Seegert, C. R., 495 Seeman, T. E., 200 Sehgal, M. H., 188–189 Seligman, M. E. P., 468, 516 Selye, H., 509 Semin, G. R., 406 Sepple, C. P., 345 Seyle, H., 509 Shader, R. I., 480 Shaffer, D. R., 115 Shaffer, M. M., 285 Shapley, R., 142 Shariff, A. F., 360 Sharma, K. N., 345 Sharp, L. B., 408 Shepard, G. M., 161–162 Shepard, R. N., 150 Shepperd, J., 412 Sher, L., 465

Sherman, P. W., 94 Shields, S. A., 82 Shiffrin, R. M., 176, 243 Shirley, M. M., 96 Shoda, Y., 393, 395 Siegel, J. M., 526 Siegel, L. J., 231 Siegel, S., 216 Siegler, R. S., 108 Silverstein, B., 433 Silvia, P. J., 322 Simmelhag, V. L., 229 Simon, H. A., 245, 291 Simon, T., 317 Simon, W., 356 Simons, D. J., 259 Simons, T., 396 Simpson, J. A., 12, 396 Sincich, L. C., 76 Singer, J. E., 368 Sio, U. N., 293 Siqueland, E. R., 101 Skanes, H. E., 27 Skinner, B. F., 15, 221, 224, 227, 229 Skodol, A. E., 462 Sloane, R. B., 498 Slovic, P., 297 Smiler, A. P., 356 Smiley, P. A., 341 Smith, D. J., 479 Smith, E., 349 Smith, E. E., 283 Smith, E. R., 406 Smith, M. L., 499 Smith, P. H., 115 Smith, T. W., 517 Smrt, D. L., 421 Snowden, P. T., 143 Snyder, C. R., 412 Snyder, M., 395, 396, 406–407 Snyder, S. H., 64, 464 Society for Personality

Assessment, 380 Soussignan, R., 360 Spanos, N. P., 199, 457 Spearman, C., 308 Spears, R., 422 Spelke, E. S., 108, 110, 286 Spence, M. J., 103 Sperling, G., 240 Sperry, R. W., 78 Spiegel, D., 197, 519 Spiegler, M. D., 492 Spitz, R. A., 115 Spitzer, R. L., 450 St. Jacques, P. L., 70 Staddon, J. E. R., 229 Standing, L., 404 Stanley, J. C., 30 Stasser, G., 424

Name Index | I-9

Steele, C. M., 331 Steele, K. M., 323 Steinberg, L., 122 Stern, W., 317 Sternberg, R. J., 311, 312, 313,

322, 436 Stevens, S. S., 28 Stevens, J. R., 419 Stevens, N., 118 Stewart, D. D., 424 Stewart, T. L., 406 Stickgold, R., 184 Stinson, F. S., 453, 454 Stokes, G., 356 Strack, F., 364 Strauss, A. L., 126 Strauss, J. R., 98 Strayer, D. L., 176 Ströhle, A., 530 Sue, S., 501 Sufta, K. J., 159 Surprenant, A. M., 250 Swami, V., 350 Swan, G. E., 530, 531 Swinson, R. P., 454 Sylvester, D., 453 Szasz, T, 448

T Tanford, S., 423 Tanner, J. M., 97 Tarr, M. J., 140, 145 Tateyama, M., 468 Tavris, C., 363 Taylor, F. W., 14 Taylor, S. E., 510, 525 Tees, R. C., 274 Teki, S., 72 Tellegen, A., 397 Temple, J. L., 207 Tennes, K., 511 Terman, L. M., 318, 319 Terrace, H. S., 281 Tesser, A., 413 Tessner, K. D., 520 Thiran, A. B., 177 Thomas, A., 115–116 Thompson, R. F., 207 Thompson, W. F., 323 Thorndike, E. L., 14, 220, 262 Thornhill, R., 162, 355 Thurstone, L. L., 308 Tinbergen, N., 207 Tibshirani, R. J., 176 Tichener, E., 13 Tienari, P., 466 Tiffany, S. T., 531 Tipsord, J. M., 118

Tizard, B., 115 Todd, A. R., 409 Todorov, A., 70, 404 Tolin, D. F., 500 Tolman, C. W., 419 Tomkins, S. S., 360 Tomlinson-Keasey, C., 319 Tooby, J., 21, 84 Torrance, E. P., 321 Towler, G., 419 Tracy, J. L., 360 Trafimow, D., 430 Travis, F., 200 Treiman, R. A., 276 Treisman, A., 174–175 Tremewan, T., 433 Trivers, R., 412, 420 Trull, T. J., 462 Tsuchiya, N., 177 Tuckman, B. W., 340 Tulving, E., 247, 248, 253 Turati, C., 102 Turner, T. J., 359, 362 Tversky, A., 297 Twenge, J. M., 391, 428

U Ulrich, R. E., 51 U.S. Department of Transportation, 176 Unsworth, N. M., 310 Uskul, A. K., 22 Uttal, D. H., 273

V Valenzuela, M., 99 Valli, K., 187 Van Blokland, R., 520 van Boxtel, J., 146 Van Cauter, E., 188 Van Doornen, L. J., 520 Vanhaudenhuyse, A., 197 van Houtte, M., 342 van Veen, V., 416 Verbruggen, A., 140 Vitz, P. C., 386 Vogel, G. W., 186 Vollenweider, F. X., 193 von Frisch, K., 273 Von Hippel, W., 412 Vygotsky, L., 109

W Wagenaar, W. A., 264 Wager, T. D., 366 Wagman, J. B., 151

Wagner, R. K., 322 Wahba, M. A., 344 Wai, J., 327 Waldman, I. D., 331 Walen, S. T., 486 Walk, R. D., 103 Walker, E., 460, 462, 465,

469, 478 Walker, L. J., 112 Walker, M. P., 184 Wall, P. D., 159 Wallace, G. L., 319 Wallace, R. K., 200 Wallen, K., 355 Wallhagen, M. I., 124 Walters, J. M., 311 Wampold, B. E., 499 Wandell, B. A., 140 Ward, L. M., 143 Washburn, M. F., 17 Waterhouse, L., 323 Watson, C. S., 155 Watson, J. B., 14, 20 Webb, W. B., 13, 30, 31 Weber, R., 408 Wegener, D. T., 408, 414 Wegner, D. M., 409 Weiden, P. J., 478 Weinberg, R. A., 331 Weinberger, D. R., 465 Weingarten, H. P., 347 Weisberg, R. W., 290 Weisel, T. N., 139 Weiskopf, S., 142 Weiss, J. M., 516 Weiten, W., 221, 320, 379 Wellman, 111, 286 Wells, A., 480 Wenner, A., 273 Werker, J. F., 274 Werner, L. A., 103 Wernicke, C., 68 Wertsch, J. V., 109 Wever, E. G., 154 Wexler, M., 146 Wheeler, L., 405 Wheeler, M. A., 247 Whishaw, I. Q, 73 Whitbourne, S. K., 98, 123 Whitely, B. E., Jr., 408 Whorf, B. L., 273 Wicker, B., 77 Widiger, T. A., 445, 463 Wigfield, A., 341 Williams, E. L., 407 Williams, K., 217, 392 Williams, K. D., 421, 424 Williams, L. M., 264 Williams, T., 392 Williams, W. M., 327

I-10 | Name Index

Wilson, C., 327 Wilson, D. B., 499, 500 Wilson, E. O., 162 Winawer, J., 140 Winett, R. A., 532 Winikoff, B., 532 Winkielman, P., 368 Wissler, C., 308 Witherington, D. C., 103 Witherspoon, D., 265 Witt, J. K., 151 Wittig, B. A., 116 Wollberg, Z., 155 Wolpe, J., 492, 493, 499 Wood, W., 356 Woods, S. C., 346 Wooley, H. T., 17 Worringham, C. J., 419

Wren, C. T., 319 Wundt, W., 13 Wyatt, T. D., 355 Wyer, N. A., 409 Wylie, K. R., 98 Wynne, C. D. L., 281

Y Yalom, I. D., 490, 491 Yamada, A. M., 445 Yang, T. T., 73 Yapko, M., 33, 34, 197 Yates, F. A., 250 Young, J. E., 488 Young, L., 113

Z Zacks, R. R., 176 Zadra, A., 187 Zahori, D. M., 213 Zajonc, R. B., 360, 413–414, 419, 434 Zanna, M. P., 414 Zárate, M. A., 406 Zatorre, R. J., 155 Zeidner, M., 322 Zelazo, P. R., 96 Zigler, E., 459 Zimbardo, P., 422 Zimmerman, R. R., 115 Zinbarg, R., 469 Zufall, F., 162 Zuroff, D. C., 502 Zweigenhaft, R. L., 396

A Abnormal behavior, 445–450

characteristics of, 445–447 diagnostic labeling effects, 448–450 insanity, 447–448 medical model, 448

Absolute grading, 37 Absolute threshold, 164 Acceptance, 125 Accommodation, 104–105, 134

vision and, 133 Acetylcholine, 62 Achievement motivation, 341, 341–342 Achievement tests, 34, 314 Acquisition, 218 Action, perception of, 151 Action potential, 61–62 Activation-synthesis hypothesis, 186–187 Actor-observer effect, 411–412 Adaptation, 83–84

genetics and, 83–86 language as, 281–282

Adaptation level, 363 ADHD (attention deficit/hyperactivity

disorder), 177–179 Adler, Alfred, 385–386 Adolescence, 97

identity crisis and, 121 physical development in, 97

Adoption studies, 327, 331 of intelligence, 331

Adrenal glands, 81 Adulthood, 121–122 Aerobic exercise, 529 Afferent nerve pathways, 66 African Americans, 329, 331

IQ test scores of, 329 stereotype threat and, 330

Afterimage, 142 Ageism, 124–125 Aging

body and, 98 brain and, 98–99 developmental crises in, 121–122 hearing loss and, 154 intelligence and, 325 neurons and, 99 reaction time and, 98 social/personal development and, 124–125 vision and, 133

Agonists, 64 Agoraphobia, 452–453 Agreeableness, 376

Aha! moment, 292–294 AIDS, 532–534 Ainsworth, Mary, 116 Algorithms, 290 Allport, Gordon, 377 Allport’s trait theory, 377–378 Alpha waves, 182 Altered states of consciousness, 195–200

hypnosis and, 196–198 psychoactive drugs and, 190–195

Alternatives, framing, 294–295 Altruism, social inf luence on, 419–421 Alzheimer disease, 63, 98–99, 126, 266 American Psychological Association

(APA), 13, 17 on animal research, 50–52 code of ethics of, 50, 51

American Sign Language, 242, 280 Amnesia, 265

types of, 265–266 Amygdala, 73 Anal stage, 384 Analogies, searching for, 291 Analytic intelligence, 312 Anchoring and adjustment heuristic, 297–299 Androgens, 354 Angell, James Rowland, 14 Anger, 125, 363, 510 The Animal Mind (Washburn), 17 Animals

biological constraints on learning, 227–228 contact comfort and, 114–115 ethics of research with, 49–53 law of effect and, 220–221 observational learning in, 230 sleep in, 185 superstitious behavior in, 229

Anorexia nervosa, 350–351 Antagonists, 64 Anterograde amnesia, 265 Antianxiety drugs, 479–480 Antidepressant drugs, 478–479 Antipsychotic drugs, 478 Antisocial personality disorder, 462 Anxiety, 64, 383 Anxiety disorders, 452–454

gender and culture, 454 Anxiety hierarchy, 493 Applied psychologists, 7–8 Approximations, 227 Aptitude tests, 34, 314 Aqueous humor, 135 Archetypes, 385 Aristotle, 10, 11

Arousal, 359 in emotion, 362–365

Asch, Solomon, 422 Asch study of conformity, 423 Asian Americans

IQ test scores of, 329 Assimilation, 104–105 Attachment, 114

contact comfort and, 114–115 early vs. later behavior, 117–118 formation of, 114 origins of, 114–115 temperament and, 115–116 types of, 116–117

Attention, 173, 173–179 attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder

(ADHD), 177–179 automaticity, 175–177 cell phones and driving, 176 dichotic listening, 173–174 disorders of, 177 visual neglect, 178

Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 177, 177–179

Attitudes, 413 central and peripheral routes to persuasion,

414–415 changes in, 413–417 cognitive dissonance, 415–416 components of, 413 Festinger and Carlsmith study of, 415 formation of, 413–414 self-perception theory of, 416

Attractiveness evolutionary perspective on, 431–432 facial, 431–433 physical appearance, 404 self-fulfilling prophecies and, 406–407 subjective components of, 433

Attribution theory, 409–412 actor-observer effect, 411–412 internal vs external attributions, 410

Attributions, 409 fundamental attribution error, 410–411

Auditory cortex, 153, 155 Auditory nerve, 153, 154 Auditory perception, 155–156 Authority, power of, 426–429 Autism, 319 Autogenic relaxation, 524 Automaticity, 175, 175–177 Autonomic system, 67 Autonomy vs. shame or doubt stage, 121 Availability heuristic, 297, 299

● Subject Index

I-11

I-12 | Subject Index

Aversion therapy, 494–495 Avoidant attachment, 117 Axon, 60 Axon hillock, 61

B Babbling, 278 Backward conditioning, 209 Bandura, Albert, 231, 392 Barbituates, 192 Bargaining, 125 Bartlett, Frederick, 257 Basic-level categories, 286 Basilar membrane, 153 Bears, biological clocks of, 180 Beck, Aaron, 487 Beck’s Cognitive Therapy, 487–488 Bees, communication and, 273 Behavior, 6. See also Classical conditioning;

Operant conditioning genes and, 85–86

Behavior modification, 15 Behavioral neuroscientists, 8 Behavioral therapies, 492–498

applying rewards and punishments, 495–496

conditioning techniques, 493–495 defined, 492 social skills training, 496–498

Behaviorism, 14–15, 390 Belief persistence, 296 Bernal, Martha, 17 Berstein, Ilene, 213 Beyoncé, 212 Bianchi, Kenneth (the Hillside

Strangler), 457 Bias

confirmation, 295 in decision making, 295–296 experimental research and, 295–296 in intelligence tests, 330 self-serving, 412

Big Five personality dimensions, 375–376 Binge eating, 351 Binge eating disorder, 351 Binocular depth cue, 146–147 Bio-psycho-social perspective, 464 Biofeedback, 524 Biological clocks, 180–181 Biological factors, 19–20 Biological processes, 56–89 Biological rhythms, 180 Biomedical therapies, 477–483

defined, 477 drug therapies, 477–480 electroconvulsive therapy, 480–481 psychosurgery, 481–483

Bipolar cells, 135 Bipolar disorder, 458

Bisexuality, 358 Bleuler, Eugen, 460 Blind controls, 47 Blind spot, 135, 137 Blocking, 211 Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, 311 Body weight. See also Anorexia nervosa;

Eating disorders; Obesity dietary variety and weight gain, 348 regulating, 348–349

Borderline personality disorder, 462 Bottom-up processing, 143, 277 Brain. See also Brain damage;

specific structures activating, 68–69 aging of, 98–99 divided, 77–79 drugs and, 64–65 function, determining, 68–72 gender differences and, 81–82 hemispheres of, 78–79 hunger and, 346, 349 during infancy, 95–97 memory and, 266–267 monitoring, 69–70 during puberty, 97 specificity in, 19 splitting the, 78–80 structures and functions of, 71–79

Brain damage memory and, 245 moral reasoning and, 113 studying brain function from, 68–72

Breaks, in problem solving, 293 Brightness, 133 Broca’s area, 68, 281

speech production and, 75 Bulimia nervosa, 351 Burnout, 522 Bush, George W., 252 Bystander effect, 420, 426

C Calkins, Mary Whiton, 16 Cannon-Bard theory of emotion, 366–367 Cannon, Walter, 366 Cardinal traits, 377 Cardiovascular disease, prolonged

stress and, 520 Cartilage, 153 Case studies, 32, 35 Castro, Fidel, 410–411 Catatonia, 461 Categories, 282–287. See also Cognitive

processes defined, 282 defining features of, 276, 283 defining membership in, 283–285 evolution of, 286–287

family resemblance, 284 fuzzy boundaries, 284 hierarchical structure of, 285–286 prototypes vs. exemplars, 284–285

Category exemplars, 284 Cats, operant conditioning, 221 Cattell, Raymond, 310, 375, 376 Cell phones, driving and, 176 Center for Disease Control, 459 Center-surround receptive fields, 137 Central executive, 245 Central nervous system, 66–67 Central route to persuasion, 414–415, 417 Central tendencies, measures of, 35 Central traits, 378 Cerebellum, 72 Cerebral cortex, 72–76 Challenger (space shuttle) disaster, 252 Chemoreceptors, 161 Chemotherapy, taste aversions and, 213 Child Care Action Campaign, 120 Children

developmental crises in, 120–121 intelligence testing and, 325 language development in, 277–279 in nomadic societies, 109 preception in, 106

Chimpanzees, language and, 279–281 Chomsky, Noam, 275–276 Chromosomes, 84 Chunking, 244–245 Cingulotomy, 482 Circadian rhythms, 180 Classical conditioning, 209–219, 390. See also

Operant conditioning attitudes and, 414 cognitive view of, 212 conditioned inhibition, 217–219 defined, 209 extinction, 216–217 factors affecting, 212 forming the CS-US Connection, 210–211 second-order conditioning, 212–214 spontaneous recovery, 217 stimulus discrimination, 215 stimulus generalization, 214–215 taste aversions and, 213 terminology of, 209–210 vs operant conditioning, 220

Classifying and categorizing. See Categories Client-centered therapy, 489 Clinical psychologists, 6–7 Clooney, George, 415 Closure, 144 Cocaine, 64, 193 Cochlea, 152, 153 Cocktail party effect, 174 Codes of ethics, 50, 51 Cognitive appraisal, 368, 511 Cognitive dissonance, 415–417 Cognitive factors, 18–19

Subject Index | I-13

Cognitive processes, 270–303. See also Language; Social cognition

decision making, 294–299 function of, 271–272 problem solving, 287–294

Cognitive psychologists, 8 Cognitive revolution, 18 Cognitive therapies, 485 Cold fibers, 158 Collective unconscious, 385 Color afterimage, 142 Color blindness, 141 Color vision, 141–142 Commitment, in triangular view of love, 436 Common fate, 145 Common knowledge, 276 Communication. See also Language

language comprehension, 276–277 language development, 277–279 in nonhuman species, 279–281 with others, 273–282

Communication network, 65 Companionate love, 436 Computerized tomography scan (CT scan), 69 Concrete operational period, 106–107 Conditioned inhibition, 217–219 Conditioned reinforcers, 223 Conditioned response (CR), 209, 211–212 Conditioned stimulus (CS), 209 Conditions of worth, 387 Cones, 135–136 Confidentiality, 50 Confirmation bias, 295 Conformity, 422–424, 426 Confounding variables, 45 Conjunction error, 296 Conscientiousness, 376 Conscious mind, 382 Consciousness, 14, 170–203

altered states of, 195–200 induced states of, 195–200 psychoactive drugs and, 190–191 purpose of, 171–172 sleeping, dreaming and, 179–189

Consensus, 410 Conservation, principle of, 106 Consistency, 410 Constancy cues, 149 Construct validity, 315 Contact comfort, 114–115. See also Attachment Content validity, 315 Continuation, 144 Control group, 44 Conventional level, of moral development, 111 Convergence, 146, 147 Conversion disorder, 455 Cooing, 278 Coping, 523 Core knowledge, 110–111 Cornea, 134, 135 Corpus callosum, 78

Correlation, 45 Correlation coefficient, 39 Correlational research, 38–42, 53 Correlations

causality and, 41 patterns and, 41

Cortex, specialization in, 75 Counseling psychologist, 6 Counterconditioning, 493 Covariation model of attribution, 411 Crack, 193 Creative intelligence, 312 Creativity, 321–322 Cross-sectional design, 101–102 Crowding, 514 Crystallized intelligence, 310 Cued recall, 254 Cultural deviance, 446 Cultural differences, fundamental attribution

error and, 410–411 Culture, 12

achievement motivation and, 342 eating habits and, 347 facial expressions and, 360 as factor in psychology, 21–22 intellectual development and, 109–110 mate selection and, 356–357 moral development and, 112–113 perceptual illusions and, 149–150

Curare, 64

D Dahmer, Jeffrey, 448 Daily hassles, stress and, 513 Daily stress record, 528 Dark adaptation, 137–138 Darwin, Charles, 11–12, 83, 307, 339

evolutionary psychology and, 20 theory of evolution, 11–12

Davis, Bette, 124 Day care, 118–120 Death and dying, 125–126 Debriefing, 50 Decay, 243, 262 Decibels (dB), 152 Decision making, 294–299. See also Cognitive

processes; Cognitive processes biases in, 295–296 framing alternatives, 294–295 heuristics in, 290–291, 296–299

Deep structure, of sentences, 275–276 Deepwater Horizon disaster, Gulf of

Mexico, 298 Defense mechanisms, 383, 384 Defining features, 283, 285 Deindividuation, 422, 426 Delta activity, 183 Dementia, 98 Dendrites, 60

Denial, 125, 384 Dependent variables, 43–44 Depolarization, 61 Depressants, 191–192 Depression, 125

death and, 126 Depressive and bipolar disorders, 457–459

gender and culture, 459 Depressive disorders, 458 Depth, illusion of, 147, 150 Depth perception, 145–148 Descartes, René, 10 Descriptive research, 30–35

case studies, 32, 35 naturalistic observation, 31–32 other methods vs, 35, 53 statistics, 35–38 surveys, 32–34, 35

Descriptive statistics, 38 Development, 91

defined. See also Human development Developmental psychologists, 8 Deviation IQ, 310, 317–318 Diagnostic labeling effects, 448 Dichotic listening, 173, 173–174 Dichotic listening technique, 174 Difference threshholds, 165 Diffusion of responsibility, 420–421 Discrimination, 407 Discriminative stimulus, 221 Disgust, 364–365 Disorganized/disoriented attachment, 117 Dissociative amnesia, 456 Dissociative disorders, 456–457 Dissociative fugue, 456 Dissociative identity disorder, 456–457 Distinctiveness, 248, 410

in memory, 248 Distractor task experiment, 243 Distributed practice, 250 Divided attention task, 176 DNA, 84. See also Genetics Dogs, classical conditioning and, 210–211, 218 Dominant gene, 85 Dopamine, 62, 72, 478 Dopamine agonists, 478 Double-blind study, 48 Down syndrome, 318 Dr. Phil, 5 Dream analysis, 484 Dreaming

function of, 185–188 sleep and, 179–189

Drive, 340 Driving, cell phones and, 176 Drug abuse, 190 Drug dependency, 191 Drug tolerance, 191 Drugs, psychoactive. See Psychoactive drugs DSM (The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders), 451

I-14 | Subject Index

Duncker candle problem, 289 Dysfunction, 446, 446–447 Dyssomnias, 187–189 Dysthymic disorder, 458

E Eagleman, David, 5 Ear drum, 153 Ear, structure of, 152–154. See also hearing “Ear-switching” experiment (Treisman), 175 Eating disorders, 350–351 Eating habits, 347. See also Hunger Ebbinghaus forgetting curve, 261 Ebbinghaus, Hermann, 261–262 Echoic memory, 239–241 Eclectic approach, 18 Economic differences, intelligence tests and,

329–330 Ecstacy, 193 ECT (Electroconvulsive therapy)

controversies about, 481 Edges, 136 EEG. See Electroencephalograph (EEG) Efferent nerve pathways, 66 Effron, 241 Ego, 383 Egocentrism, 106 Einstein, Albert, 344, 389 Elaboration, 248 Elaboration, in long-term memory, 247–250 Elaboration likelihood model, 414 Electra complex, 385 Electrical brain stimulation, 69 Electrochemical language, 60–65 Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), 480 Electroencephalograph (EEG), 69, 181

sleep and, 182 Electromagnetic spectrum, 134 Ellis, Albert, 486–487 Embryonic period, 92 Emotion, 336–371

anger, 363 arousal in, 359, 362–365 basic, 359–362 Cannon-Bard theory of, 366–367 common sense view of, 366 composition of, 359 defined, 337 disgust, 364–365 facial expressions and culture, 360 facial-feedback hypothesis, 360–361 happiness, 363–364 James-Lange theory of, 365–366 purpose of, 337–338 Schachter and Singer experiment, 367–368 subjective reactions, 362–365 theories of, 365–369 two-factor theory of, 366, 368–369

Emotional distress, 446

Emotional intelligence, 322 Empiricism, 10 Encoding, 237–238 Encoding-retrieval match, 254–255 End-of-life decisions, 126 Endocrine system, 58, 81–82 Endorphins, 64, 159 Environmental factors

in prenatal development, 93–95 stress and, 513

Environmental psychology, 514 Epinephrine, 81 Episodic memory, 247 Erikson, Erik, 120–123

on adolescence and young adulthood, 121 on adulthood, middle age, and

beyond, 121–122 crises of development and, 120–121 evaluation of theory of, 122–123 on infancy and childhood, 120–121 stage theory of personal identity

development, 122 Errogenous zones, 355 Estrogen, 80, 354 Ethics of research, 49–52 Evolution

adaptations and, 83–86 attractiveness and, 432 theory of, 11–12

Evolutionary psychology, 20–21 Exams, studying for, 257 Excitatory messages, 62 Excitement phase, 353 Exemplar theories, 406 Exemplars, 285 Existential therapy, 490 Experience matters, 95 Experimental control, 44–45 Experimental group, 44 Experimental research, 42–43

expectancies and biases in, 46–48 experimental control, 44–45 experimental method and, 45–46 generalizing experimental

conclusions, 48 independent and dependent

variables, 43–44 other methods vs, 53

Explanatory style, 516 Explicit memory, 259 Explicit prejudice, 408 Expressive reaction, 337 External attribution, 410 External validity, 30 Extinction, 216–218 Extroversion, 375–376 Eye. See also Vision

rods and cones, 135, 136 structure of, 135

Eye, inner, in memory, 242 Eysenck, Hans, 375, 376

F Fabrications, 197 Faces

recognition of, 68 visual perception of, 140

Facial attractiveness, 431–433. See also Attractiveness

Facial expressions, culture and, 360 Facial features, infant preference for, 100, 102 Facial-feedback hypothesis, 360–361 Factor analysis, 308, 375–377 Factor g. See g (general intelligence) Family resemblances, 284, 285 Family studies, 85 Family therapy, 491 Fear, 510 Feature detectors, 139 Festinger and Carlsmith study, 415 Fetal alcohol syndrome, 94, 95 Fetal period, 93 FI (fixed-interval) schedule, 226 Fight-or-f light Response, 80 Fight-or-f light response, 509 Figure-ground perspective, 144 Fixed-interval (FI) schedule, 226 Fixed-ratio (FR) schedule, 224, 224–225 Flashbacks, 521 Flashbulb memories, 252 Flavor, 162 Fluid intelligence, 310 Fluoxetine (Prozac), 191 Flynn effect, 326–327 Food cues, 347, 349 Forebrain, 72–74 Forensic psychologists, 7 Forgetting, 261. See also Memory

mechanisms of, 263–264 motivated, 263–264 neuroscience of, 265–267 rate of, 261–262 reasons for, 262–263 short-term, 242–243

Formal operational period, 107 Fovea, 135 FR (fixed-ration) schedule, 224–225 Framing, 294, 294–295 Fraser, Scott, 416 Free association, 483 Free recall, 254 Freedman, Jonathan, 416 Freeman, Walter, 481 Frequency, 152 Frequency theory, 154 Freud, Sigmund, 5, 15, 32, 382, 385–386, 483, 485

on defense mechanism, 383 on dreams as wish fulfillment, 186 free association and, 483–484 on psychoanalysis, 15–16 on psychodynamic approach to

personality, 381–386

Subject Index | I-15

on psychosexual development, 383–385 repression and, 263 on structure of the mind, 382 view of personality, 380 women and, 386

Friendship, social development and, 118 Frolove, Dr., 212 Frontal lobe, 74 Functional fixedness, 289–290 Functional MRI, 70 Functionalism, 13–14 Fundamental attribution error, 410–411 Fuzzy boundaries, 283

G g (general intelligence), 308 Gage, Phineas, 72, 74–75 Galef 1985, 230 Galton, Sir Francis, 307 Gamma-amino-butyric acid (GABA), 64 Ganglion cells, 136 Gardner, Allen, 280 Gardner, Beatrice, 280 Gardner, Howard, 310–312 Gate-control theory, 159 Gates, Bill, 446 Gender determination, genetics and, 94 Gender differences

achievement motivation, 342 moral reasoning, 112

Gender identity, 123 nature vs. nurture in, 123–124

Gender-related stereotypes observational learning and, 231

Gender roles, 123 Gender schemas, 124 General adaptation syndrome (GAS), 509 Generalized anxiety disorder, 452 Genes, 84–86 Genetic principles, 84–85 Genetics

behavior and, 85–86 natural selection and adaptations

in, 83–86 personality and, 396–399

Genital stage, 385 Genotype, 85, 331 Genovese, Catherine “Kitty”, 420 Geons, 145 Germinal period, 92 Gestalt principles of organization, 143–145 Gestalt psychology, 11 Gestalt therapy, 490 Ghrelin, 346 Giftedness, 318–319 Gilligan, Carol, 112 Glial cells, 59 Glucose, 345 Glutamate, 62

Grading, 37 Grammar, 273 Grief, 510 Groundhog Day, 237 Group behavior. See also Social inf luence

conformity, 422–424 deindividuation, 422 group polarization, 424–425 groupthink, 425 inf luences of the group, 426 power of the group, 421–424 social loafing, 421–422

Group decision making, 424–426 Group polarization, 424–426 Group therapy, 491 Groupthink, 425, 426 Gustation, 162

H Habituation, 101, 206–208 Hair cells, 153 Hall, G. Stanley, 13 Hallucinations, 193 Hallucinogens, 193–194 Happiness, 363–364 Harlow, Harry, 114–115 Hassles Scale, 514 Haze, 147 Health psychology, 507 Healthy lifestyles, 529–534

aerobic exercise, 529–530 AIDS prevention, 532–533 nutrition, 531–532 smoking and, 530–531

Hearing, 152–156 auditory cortex, 155 auditory perception, 155–156 ear structure, 152–154 identifying message components of,

154–155 of infants, 102 loss of, 154 noise and, 154 organizing the auditory message, 155–156 pitch detection, 154 sound localization, 156 translating the message, 152–154

Hemispheres, brain, 78, 78–79 Hemispheric specialization

Left hemisphere, 78 Right hemisphere, 78

Hering, Ewald, 142 Heritability, 328–329 Hertz, 152 Heterosexuality, 358 Heuristics, 290–291, 415

anchoring and adjustment, 297–298 availability, 297 decision-making, 296–299

defined, 290 problem solving, 132 representativeness, 296–297 search for analogies, 291 value of, 298

Hierarchical models of intelligence, 308–309 Hindbrain, 71–72 Hippocampus, 73, 266 Hispanic Americans, 329 Holmes, Thomas, 512 Homeostasis, 340 Homosexuality, 357–358 Hopi babies, motor development of, 96 Hormones, 80, 354–355 Horn, John, 310 Horney, Karen, 386 Howard, Ruth, 17 Hue, 133 Human development, 90–129. See also specific

stages of development developmental crises in, 125–126 gender-role, 123–125 intellectual, 100–107 physical, 92–99 prenatal, 92–95 social/personal development, 114–126

Human factors psychologists, 7 Human instincts, 339 Humanistic psychology, 15–16, 386–389 Humanistic therapy, 488 Hunger, 345–352

body weight and, 348–349 brain regions and, 346 chemical signals of, 345, 349 eating disorders and, 350–351 eating habits and, 347, 349 external factors controlling, 347–348 food cues and, 347, 349 internal factors controlling, 345–346

Hunt, Earl, 329 Hyperpolarization, 61 Hypersomnia, 188 Hypnosis, 196

analgesic effects and, 198–199 explanation of, 198–199 memory enhancement and, 197–198 opinions about, 33 phenomenon of, 196–198 social role playing explanation for, 198–199

Hypnotic dissociation, 198 Hypnotic hypermnesia, 197 Hypothalamus, 73 Hysterics, 382

I Iconic memory, 239–241 Id, 382 Identity crisis, 121 Idiographic approach, 377

I-16 | Subject Index

Ifaluks, emotion in, 362 Ill-defined problem, 288 Illusion of depth, 147, 150 Illusion of motion, 148 Illusory contours, 143 Immigrants, 321 Immune response, prolonged stress and,

519–520 Implicit memory, 259 Implicit prejudice, 408 In-group, 424 Incentive motivation, 340 Incongruence, 387 Incubation effect, 293 Incus (anvil), 152–153 Independent variables, 43–44 Industrial/organizational psychologists, 7 Industry vs. inferiority stage, 121 Infants

facial expressions and, 360 facial feature preferences of, 102 intelligence testing and, 325 language development and, 277–278 preception and, 102–104

Inferential statistics, 38 Inferiority, 385 Inferiority complex, 385 Informed consent, 38, 49–50 Inhibitory messages, 62 Inner ear, 153 Insanity, 447–448

defined, 448 Insight, 292, 292–294 Insight therapies, 483, 483–492

cognitive therapies, 485–488 group therapy, 491–492 humanistic therapies, 488–491 psychoanalysis, 483–485

Insomnia, 187 Instrumental conditioning, 219 Insulin, 346 Integrity vs despair stage, 122 Intellectual, 100–107 Intellectual development

core knowledge and, 110–111 investigation tools, 100–102 moral development, 111–113 perceptual growth, 102–106 Piaget on, 104–107

Intellectual disability, 318 Intelligence, 28, 304–335, 318

analytic, 312 between- and within-group variation, 332 bodily-kinesthetic, 311 conceptualizing, 307–314 creative, 312 creativity and, 321–322 crystallized, 310 emotional, 322 environment and, 329–331 extremes of, 318–319

f luid, 310 Flynn effect, 326–327 genetic basis for, 327–329 genetics vs environment in, 328 giftedness, 318–319 hierarchical models of, 308–309 how psychologists study, 305–306 individual differences related

to, 321–323 intellectual disability, 318 interaction of nature and nurture in,

331–333 interpersonal, 311 intrapersonal, 311 labeling effects of, 320–321 linguistic, 311 logical-mathematical, 311 longitudinal studies, 325–326 measuring individual differences in,

314–324 Mozart’s music and, 323 multiple intelligences, 310–313 musical, 311 naturalistic, 311 practical, 312 psychometrics and, 307–309 sources of, 324–333 spatial, 311 tacit knowledge and, 322–323 triarchic theory of, 312–313 views of, 313

Intelligence quotient (IQ), 316–318 Intelligence tests

adoption studies and, 331 biases in, 330 components of, 314–316 culture-fair, 330 distribution of IQ scores, 317 economic differences and, 329–330 inf luence of cultural factors and, 321 stability of results of, 325–327 standardization and, 315 stereotype threat and, 330–331 twin studies and, 327–328 validity of, 315, 319–321

Intensity, 133 Interference, in memory, 243, 261 Internal attribution, 410 Internal validity, 45 Interneurons, 58 Interpersonal intelligence, 311 Intimacy vs isolation stage, 121 Intrapersonal intelligence, 311 Intrinsic motivation, 342–343 IQ (intelligence quotient), 316–318 Iris, 134, 135

J James-Lange theory of emotion, 365–366 James, William, 14, 220, 365

Japan, attachments in, 117 Jefferson, Thomas, 344 Jet lag, 180 Johnson, Virginia, 353 Jones, Mary Cover, 493 Jung, Carl, 385–386

K K Complexes, 182–183 Kant, Immanuel, 11 Kennedy, John F., 252 Kinesthesia, 159–160 Knowledge, sources of, 11–13 Kohlberg, Lawrence, stage theory

of, 111–112 KÖhler, Wolfgang, 292 Korea, achievement motivation in, 342 Korsakoff syndrome, 265 Kübler-Ross, Elizabeth, 125–126

L L-dopa, 63 Labeling effects, 320–321 Ladd-Franklin, Christine, 17 Lange, Carl, 365 Language, 270–303. See also Cognitive

processes as adaptation, 281–282 “Child Speak ” and, 278–279 communication with others, 273–282 comprehension of, 276–277 development of, 277–278 in nonhuman species, 279–281 structure of, 273–276 units of, 275

Latency period, 385 Latent content, 186 Lateral geniculate nucleus, 138 Law of closure, 144 Law of common fate, 145 Law of effect, 220–221 Law of good continuation, 144 Law of proximity, 144 Law of similarity, 144 Learned helplessness, 468 Learning, 204–235

biological constraints on, 227–228 classical conditioning, 209–219 defined, 205 habituation, 206–208 observational, 206–209, 229–232 operant conditioning, 219–229 sensitization, 206–208

Left hemisphere, 75 Left motor cortex, 75 Lens, 134, 135 Leptin, 346 Lesion, 68

Subject Index | I-17

Light, 133 biological rhythms and, 181 electromagnetic spectrum and, 134 wavelengths of, 134

Liking, determinants of, 433–436 Limbic system, 73 Lincoln, Abraham, 389 Linear perspective, 146, 147 Linguistic intelligence, 311 Linguistic relativity hypothesis, 273 Listening, dichotic, 173–174 Lloyd Peterson, 243 Locus of control, 391 Logical-mathematical intelligence, 311 Long-term memory, 246, 246–253

elaboration in, 247–250 mnemonic devices, 250–253 varieties of, 246–247

Longitudinal design, 101–102 Longitudinal studies of intelligence, 325–326 Loudness, 152 Love, 433–436 Lowball technique, 416 Lucas, Henry Lee, 398 Lymphocytes, 519 Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), 193

M Ma, Yo-Yo, 446 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 70 Magnetic seizure therapy, 481 Maier two-string problem, 289 Major depressive episode, 458 Maladaptive attributions, 467–468 Malleus (hammer), 152, 153 The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat

(Sacks), 32 Manic episode, 458 Manifest content, 186 Mantra, 199 Mapping, 7–8 Marijuana, 193–194 Martin, Lilian, 17 Maslow, Abraham, 343–344, 387–389 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 342–345, 388 Masters, William, 353 Mate selection, 356–357

cross-cultural strategies, 357 Mathematics, gender and achievement

motivation in, 342 McCain, John, 408 McDougal, William, 339 Mean, 35 Meaning, elaboration and, 248 Means-ends analysis, 291 Median, 35 Medical model, 448 Medicare, 124 Meditation, 199, 199–200

Medulla, 71 Memory, 28, 236–269

basic processes of, 238 brain and, 266–267 chunking, 244–245 echoic, 239–240, 241 elaboration in, 247–250 encoding-retrieval match and, 254–255 function of, 237–239 hypnosis and, 197–198 iconic, 239–241 implicit, 259 inner eye in, 242 inner voice in, 242 long-term, 246–253 mnemonic devices, 250–253 naturalistic observation of, 31 reconstructive remembering and, 256–259 repression and, 263 retrieval cues in, 253–260 sensory, 239–240 short-term, 239–246 transfer-appropriate processing in, 255–256 updating, 261–267 working memory model. See also

Short-term memory Memory loss, 63 Memory schemas, 256–258 Memory span, 243 Menarche, 97 Menopause, 98 Mental age, 316, 316–317 Mental hospitals, participant observation

in, 31 Mental retardation, 318 Mental sets, 291–292 Mercury astronauts, control and, 515 Mesmer, Anton, 196 Mesmer, Franz Anton, 195 Meta-analysis, 499 Method of loci, 250, 251 Midbrain, 72 Middle ear, 152, 153 “Midlife crisis”, 122 Milgram experiment, 426–429 Mind, 6 Mind-body problem, 10–11 Mind, structure of, 382 The Mind’s Eye (Sacks), 32 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

(MMPI), 379 Mirror neurons, 75, 77, 230 Mischel, Walter, 394 MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality

Inventory), 379 Mnemonic devices, 250–253 Mode, 35 Modeling, 230–231, 390. See also Observational

learning Mongooses, classical conditioning in, 213 Moniz, Egas, 481–482

Monkeys fear and, 469 observational learning in, 229 visual cortex in, 140

Monocular depth cues, 146, 147 Moral development, 111–113

gut reactions and, 113 stage theory of, 112

Morality, 111 Morphemes, 274, 274–275 Motion perception, 148 Motivated forgetting, 263–264 Motivation, 336–371

achievement, 341–342 activating behavior, 339–345 drive, 339–340 general approaches to, 341 incentive, 340 instincts, 339–340 intrinsic, 342–343 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 342–345 purpose of, 337–338

Motor cortex, 75 Motor development, 96 Motor neurons, 58 Mount Saint Helens, volcanic eruption of, 512 Mozart Effect, 323 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 176, 322 Müller-Lyer Illusion, 150 Multiple intelligences, 310–313 Multiple personality disorder, 456

optical changes and, 457 Museums, naturalistic observation in, 31–32 Musical intelligence, 311 Mutation, 85 Myelin sheath, 59

N Narcissistic personality disorder, 462 Narcolepsy, 188 Nativism, 11 Natural selection, 11, 83–86 Naturalist intelligence, 311 Naturalistic observation, 31 Nature

nurture vs, 11–12 via nurture, 12

Necker cube, 131, 142 Need hierarchy, 343 Negative correlations, 38–39 Negative punishment, 223 Negative reinforcement, 222 Nellis, David, 213 Nerves, 66 Nervous system, 66–67 Neurons, 58

aging and, 99 anatomy of, 60 communication network, 65 components of, 60

I-18 | Subject Index

Neurons (continued) firing rate of, 65 during infancy, 95–97 mirror, 77 transmission of information, 60–65 types, 58

Neuroscience, 57 Neuroticism, 375, 376 Neurotransmitters, 57, 64

as chemical messengers, 62–63 New Guinea, facial expressions in, 360 Nicolaus, Lowell, 213 Nicotine, 64, 190 Night eating syndrome, 351 Night terrors, 189 Nightmares, 189 Nine-dot problem, 292 Nociceptors, 159 Nodes of Ranvier, 62 Noise, hearing loss and, 154 Norepinephrine, 81 Normal-to-abnormal continuum, 447 Novelty, infant preference for, 100 Nurture

vs. nature, 11–12 nature via, 12

O Obama, Barack, 408 Obedience, 426–429 Obesity, 349, 532 Object permanence, 105, 108 Object recognition, 145 Observation, naturalistic, 31 Observational learning, 229–232, 414

defined, 230 practical considerations, 231–232

Obsessive-compulsive disorder, 454–455 Occipital lobes, 76, 138 Oedipus complex, 385 Olfaction, 161 Olfactory bulb, 161 Olfactory illusions, 161 Openness, 376 Operant conditioning, 219–229, 390. See also

Classical conditioning biological constraints on learning, 227–228 cats and, 221 defined, 219 discriminative stimulus, 221 law of effect, 220–221 personality and, 390 punishment, 223–224 reinforcement, 222–223 schedules of reinforcement, 224–226 shaping, 227 superstitious behavior, 229 vs classical conditioning, 220

Operational definitions, 28 Opiates, 192

Opponent-process theory, 141–142 Optic chiasm, 138 Optic nerve, 135–136, 138 Optical changes across personalities, 457 Optimism, 516 Oral stage, 384 Orgasmic phase, 353 Orienting response, 206 Ostracism, 424 “Other mind problem”, 110 Outer ear, 153 Oval window, 153 Overlap, 147

P Pain, 158–159 Pain gate, 159 Panic disorder, 452–453 Papillae, 163 Parasomnias, 189 Parasympathetic division, of autonomic

system, 67 Parietal lobe, 75 Parkinson disease, 62–63, 72 Partial reinforcement schedule, 224 Partial report technique, 240–241 Participant observation, 31 Passionate love, 436 Pattern of activation, 65 Pavlov, Ivan, 5, 217

classical conditioning and, 210, 218 conditioned stimulus and, 212 dogs and, 209–210, 493 extinction and, 217 second-order conditioning, 212 spontaneous recovery, 216–217 on stimulus generalization, 214

Peak experiences, 389 Peers, social development and, 118 Peg-word method, 251 Penis envy, 386 Perceived control, 515 Perception, 131

action and, 151 adaptive problems of, 132 in childhood, 104–105 experience and, 131 in infancy, 102–104 prior knowledge and, 143 sensations and, 130–169

Perceptual constancies, 148–149 Perceptual illusions, 149–150 Peripheral nervous system, 66–67 Peripheral route to persuasion, 414–415, 417 Person perception, 404–409

factors in, 408 physical appearance, 404–405 prejudice, 407–409 self-fulfilling prophecies and, 406–407 social schemas, 405

Person-situation debate, 394–399 Personal identity formation, 120–121 Personality, 372–401

Allport’s trait theory of, 377–378 Big Five dimensions of, 375–376 characteristics, 516 conceptualizing and measuring, 374–381 defense mechanisms, 383 defined, 373 development of, 381–393 factor analysis of, 375–377 genetic factors in, 396–399 humanistic approaches to, 386–389, 393 person-situation debate, 394–399 profile of, 376 psychodynamic approach to, 381–386, 393 purpose of, 373–374 role of internal beliefs in, 390–392 social-cognitive approaches to, 389–393 structure of, 382–383

Personality characteristics, 516 Personality disorders, 462–463 Personality psychologists, 8 Personality tests, 378–381 Persuasion, central and peripheral

routes to, 414–415 PET scanning, 140 Pet support, 526 Peterson Distractor Task, 243 Peterson, Margaret, 243 Phallic stage, 384 Phenotype, 85, 331 Phenylketonuria (PKU), 318 Pheromones, 162, 355 Phi phenomenon, 148 Phobic disorder, 453, 493 Phonemes, 274–275 Phonological loop, 245 Phonology, 274 Physical appearance, 408

perceptions from, 404–405 Physical development, 92–99. See also Human

development aging, 98 becoming an adult, 96–99 from crawling to walking, 96–97 during infancy, 95–97 prenatal, 92–95, 93 from toddlerhood to adolescence, 97

Physiological reactions to stress, 509–510 Piaget, Jean, 104–109, 111, 122, 124

on assimilation and accommodation, 104–105

challenges to developmental theory of, 108–109

on concrete operational period, 106–107 development of thought and, 104–107 on formal operational period, 107 on preoperational period, 105–106 on sensorimotor period, 105 stages of cognitive development, 107

Subject Index | I-19

Pigeons, operant conditioning and, 218, 229 Pigs, operant conditioning and, 227 Pineal gland, 10 Pinker, Stephen, 276 Pinna, 152, 152–153 Pitch, 152 Pitch detection, 154 Pituitary gland, 80 Place theory, 154 Placebo, 47 Plasticity, 95 Plateau phase, 353 Plato, 10 Pleasure principle, 382 Pons, 71 Ponzo Illusion, 150 Positive correlations, 38–39 Positive punishment, 223 Positive regard, 387 Positive reinforcement, 222 Positron emission tomography (PET), 70 Postconventional level, of moral

development, 112 Posttraumatic stress disorder, 521–522 Practical intelligence, 312 Pragmatics, 277 Preconscious mind, 382 Preconventional level, of moral development,

111 Predictive validity, 315 Preference technique, 99–101 Prefrontal lobotomy, 74, 481–482 Prejudice, 407–409 Premack, David, 280 Prenatal development, 92–95 Preoperational period, 105–106 Pressure amplitude, 152 Primacy effect, 250 Primary colors, 141 Principle of conservation, 106 Proactive interference, 250, 263 Problem solving. See also Cognitive processes

algorithms in, 290 anchoring and adjustment heuristics and,

297–298 availability heuristic in, 297 dreaming and, 187 functional fixedness and, 289–290 heuristics in, 290–291 insight in, 292–294 mental sets in, 291–292 representative heuristic in, 296–297 representing problem information,

288–290 strategies for, 290–292

Procedural memory, 247 Projection, 384 Projective personality tests, 380 Prosopagnosia, 140 Prototype, 284 Prototype theories, 406

Prototypes, 284–285 Proximity, 144

social relations and, 434–435 Prozac, 64 Psychiatrists, 7 Psychoactive drugs, 190–195

actions and effects, 190–191 brain and, 64–65 categories of, 191–194 depressants, 191–192 hallucinogens, 193–194 psychological factors in drug use, 194–195 stimulants, 192–193

Psychoanalysis, 15, 382, 483 current applications, 484–485 resistance and transference, 484 tools of, 483

Psychodynamic theory, 381–386, 382 evaluation of, 386

Psychodynamic therapy, 485 Psychological disorders, 442–473

anxiety disorders, 452–454 biological factors in, 464–467 brain abnormalities and, 465 classifying, 450–463 cognitive factors in, 467–468 conditioning disorders, 469 culture and, 468–369 depressive and bipolar disorders,

457–459 dissociative disorders, 456–457 environmental factors in, 468–470 genetic contributions to, 465 neurotransmitter imbalances, 464–465 obsessive-compulsive disorder, 454–455 prevalence rates, 451 schizophrenia, 460–462 somatic symptom disorders, 455–456 understanding, 463–470

Psychological research, tools of, 26–55 Psychologists

categories of, 5–8 investigating mind and behavior, 27 work of, 6–9

Psychology, 5. See also Social Psychology behaviorist, 390 cultural factors in, 21–22 defined, 5 evolutionary, 20–21 first schools of, 12–15 first women in, 16–17 focus of modern, 18–22 function of, 3 functional problems in, 4 history of, 10–18 humanistic, 15–16, 386–389 introduction to, 2–25 as science, 12–15

Psychometrics, 307, 307–309 Psychophysics, 163–166 Psychosexual development, 383–385

Psychosurgery, 481 Psychotherapy, 475, 498–503

clinical evaluation research, 498–500 common factors across psychotherapies,

500–502 controversies about, 500 effectiveness of, 499

Psychotherapy, common factors action factors, 502 learning factors, 502 support factors, 500

Psychoticism, 375 Puberty, 97 Punishment, 223–224, 496

reinforcement vs, 224 Pupil, 134–135 Purging disorder, 351

R Racoons, operant conditioning and, 227 Rahe, Richard, 512 Ramachandran, V. S., 68 Random assignment, 45–46 Random sampling, 34 Range, 36 Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, 183 Rational-emotive therapy, 486–487 Rationalization, 384 Rats

classical conditioning, 220 operant conditioning, 220

Rayner, Rosalie, 214–215 Reaction formation, 384 Reaction range, 332 Reaction time, aging and, 98 Reactivity, 30 Reagan, Ronald, 252 Recency effect, 250 Receptive fields, 136 Receptor sensitivity curves, 141 Recessive gene, 85 Reciprocal altruism, 420 Reciprocal determinism, 392 Reciprocity, social relations

and, 435–436 Recognition by components, 145 Recognition test, 249 Ref lexes, 59, 339

Descartes on, 10 pathways, 59

Refractory period, 65, 154 Rehearsal, 242 Reinforcement, 222–223

conditioned reinforcers, 223 defined, 222 negative, 222 positive, 222 punishment vs, 223–224, 224 schedules of, 224–226

I-20 | Subject Index

Relational processing, 248 Relationships with others, 431–438. See also

Social inf luence determinants of liking and loving, 433–436 facial attractiveness and, 431–433 proximity and, 434–435 reciprocity and, 435–436 romantic love, 436–438 similarity and, 435

Relative grading, 37 Reliability, 314

test, 314–315 REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, 183

function of, 185–187 REM rebound, 186 Repetition, memory and, 249–250 Representativeness, 296–297 Representativeness heuristic, 296–297, 299 Repression, 263, 383, 384 Research

correlational, 38–41 descriptive, 30–35, 53 designs of, 101, 102 ethics of, 49–52

Research psychologists, 8 Resistance, 484 Resistant attachment, 117 Resolution phase, 353 Resting potential, 60–61, 61 Reticular formation, 71, 76 Retina, 135–138 Retinal disparity, 146–147 Retrieval, in memory, 237–238, 250, 253–260

defined, 237 encoding-retrieval match, 254–255 implicit memory, 259 memory schemas, 256–258 reconstructive remembering, 256–259 transfer-appropriate processing, 255–256

Retroactive interference, 262–263 Retrograde amnesia, 265 Reuptake blockers, 479 Rewards, 101 Right hemisphere, 75 Right somatosensory cortex, 75 Ritalin, 178–179 Rods, 135–136 Rogers, Carl, 16, 387, 489–490 Role of culture in social psychology, 429–431 Romantic love, 436–438 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 389 Rooting ref lex, 105 Rorschach test, 380 Rosenhan Study, 449–450 Rules of thumb. See Heuristics

S s (specific intelligence), 308 Sacks, Oliver, 32

Sadness, 359, 510 Sampling techniques, 33–34 Satiation signals, 346 Savants, 319 Savings method, 261 Scatter plots, 39, 39–40 Schachter and Singer

experiment, 367–368 Schacter, Stanley, 367 Schedules of reinforcement, 224–227 Schemata, 104, 256 Schizophrenia, 62–63, 460–462

culture and, 462, 468 diagnostic symptoms, 460–462 gender and, 462 gender and culture, 462 genes and, 85 genetics and, 466 neurotransmitter imbalances, 464

School psychologists, 7 Scientific method, 27–28 Searching for analogies heuristic, 291 Seattle Longitudinal Study, 326 Second-order conditioning, 212–214, 218 Secondary traits, 378 Secure attachment, 116 Self-actualization, 344, 388–389 Self-concept, 387 Self-efficacy, 391 Self-fulfilling prophecies, 406–408 Self-monitoring, 395–396 Self-perception theory, 416–417 Self-report inventories, 378–380 Self-serving bias, 412 Selye, Hans, 509 Semantic memory, 247 Semantics, 274 Semicircular canals, 153, 160 Sensations, 131

adaptive problems of, 132 perception and, 130–169

SenseCam, 32 Sensitization, 206–208, 213 Sensorimotor period, 105 Sensory adaptation, 165–166 Sensory memory, 239–240 Sensory neurons, 58 Sentences, 275 September 11 terrorist attack, 252 Serial position curve, 250 Serotonin, 64 Set point, 348–349 Sexual abuse memories, 264 Sexual behavior, 352–358

evolutionary inf luences on, 356 external factors in, 355 hormones and, 354–355 internal factors in, 354–355 mate selection, 356–357 sexual orientation, 357–358 sexual response cycle, 353–355

smell and, 355 touch and, 355

Sexual maturation, 97. See also Puberty Sexual orientation, 357–358

biological factors and, 358 Sexual response cycle, 353–355 Sexual scripts, 356 Shading, 147 Shakespeare, William, 180 Shape constancy, 148 Shaping, 227, 390 Short-term forgetting, 242–243 Short-term memory, 239–246

capacity of, 243–244 chunking, 244–245 inner eye in, 242 inner voice in, 242 short-term forgetting, 242–243

Signal detection, 164 Significant life events, stress and, 512 Signs, communication with, 279–280 Similarity, 144

social relations and, 435 Simple cell, 139 Simpson, O. J., 252 Simulated participants, 199 Simultaneous conditioning, 209 Singer, Jerome, 367 Single-blind study, 47 Situational consistency, 394–395 Sixteen Factor Personality Test, 376 Skinner, B.F., 15, 221, 227, 229 Skinner boxes, 15 Sleep, 179–189

animals and, 185 biological rhythms, 180 characteristics of, 180–184 cycles of, 183–184 disorders of, 187–189 function of, 184–185, 188 REM. See Rapid eye movement (REM)

sleep repairing and restoration value of, 184 stages of, 182–183 survival value of, 184

Sleep apnea, 188 Sleep cycles, 183–184 Sleep deprivation, 185 Sleep splindles, 182 Smell, sense of, 161–163, 355 Social anxiety disorder, 453–454 Social cognition, 404–418

attitudes and attitude change, 413–417 attribution theory, 409–412 defined, 404 person perception, 404–409 physical appearance, 404–405 prejudice, 407–409 self-fulfilling prophecies and, 406–407 social schemas, 405 stereotypes and, 404–409

Subject Index | I-21

Social-cognitive theories, 389–393 Social comparison, 363 Social facilitation, 418–419, 426 Social inf luence, 418–428

on altruism, 419–421 bystander effect, 419–421 conformity, 422–424 deindividuation, 422 diffusion of responsibility, 420–421 group decision making, 424–426 power of authority, 426–429 role of culture, 429–431 social facilitation and interference, 418–419 social loafing, 421–422

Social interference, 426 Social learning, 124. See also Observational

learning Social loafing, 421–422, 426 Social/personal development, 114–126, 120.

See also Human development aging, 124–125 attachment formation, 114 attachment origins, 114–115 attachment types, 116–117 day care and, 118–119 death and dying, 125–126 early attachments and later behavior,

117–118 gender-role, 123–124 personal identity formation, 120–121

Social psychologists, 8 Social psychology, 402–441

attitudes and attitude change, 413–417 attribution theory, 409–412 authority in, 426–429 bystander effect, 419–421 culture in, 429–431, 429–431 establishing relations with others, 431–438 person perception, 404–409 social cognition, 404–418 social facilitation and interference, 418–419 social inf luence, 418–428

Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 512–513 Social relations. See Relationships with others Social role playing, hypnosis as, 198–199 Social schemas, 405, 408 Social support, 525 Soma, 60 Somatic symptom disorders, 455

gender and culture, 456 Somatic system, 66 Somatosensory cortex, 75, 157 Sonata for Two Pianos in D Major

(Mozart), 323 Sound, 152 Sound localization, 156 Source characteristics, 414 Source traits, 375 Spatial intelligence, 311 Spearman, Charles, 307–308 Sperling, George, 240

Split-brain patients, 78–80 Spontaneous recovery, 216–218 Spontaneous remission, 500 Stage theory, of moral development

(Kohlberg), 111–112 Standard deviation, 36 Standard difference threshold, 165 Standardization, 315 Stanford-Binet, 319 Stanford-Binet test of intelligence, 317 Stapes (stirrup), 152–153 Star Wars, 373 State theory, of psychosocial crises (Erikson),

120–121 Statistical deviance, 445–446, 455 Statistics, 35–38 Steele, Claude, 330 Stereogram, 147, 152 Stereotype threat, 330–331 Stereotypes, 406

of elderly, 125 gender-related, 231 person perception and, 404–409

Sternberg, Robert, 312–313 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 373 Stimulants, 192, 192–193 Stimulus detection, 164–165 Stimulus discrimination, 215, 218 Stimulus generalization, 214–215, 218 Storage, 237, 237–238 The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde

(Stevenson), 373 Strange situation test, 116 Stress, 508

cognitive appraisal, 511 consequences of, 522 experiencing, 508–518 external sources of, 511–515 gender differences and, 510 health and, 506–535 internal sources of, 515–518 male and female reactions to, 510–511 natural disasters and, 512 physical consequences of stress, 518–520 physiological reactions to, 509–510 prolonged, 517–523 psychological consequences of stress,

520–523 psychological reactions to, 510 significant life events and, 512 sources of, 508, 517 the stress response, 509–510

Stress reduction, 523–529 pets and, 526 reappraising the situation, 527–529 relaxation techniques, 523–525 social support, 525–527

Structuralism, 13 Studying for exams, 257 Subjective experience, 337 Subliminal inf luence, 28, 44

Sublimination, 384 Substantia nigra, 72 Suicide, 458–459

culture and, 459 gender and, 459

Suicide prevention, 460 Superego, 383 Superfactors, 375 Superior colliculus, 138 Superordinates, 286 Superstitious behavior, 229 Surface structure, of sentences,

275–276 Surveys, 32–35 Survival value of sleep, 184 Symbol communication, 279–280 Sympathetic division, of autonomic

system, 67 Synapse, 66 Syntax, 274 Systematic desensitization, 493–494 Systematic introspection, 13

T Tachistoscope, 240 Tacit knowledge, 322–323 Taste, 161–163 Taste aversions, 213 Taste buds, 163 Tectum, 76 Television

aggression and, 43–44, 48, 231 gender-related stereotypes and, 231

The Tell-Tale Brain (Ramachandran), 68 Temperament, 115–116 Temperature, 158 Temporal lobe, 76, 153 Teratogens, 93 Terman, Lewis, 318–319 Terminal buttons, 60, 76 Test-retest reliability, 314–315 Testing, research on, 9 Testosterone, 80, 93 Tests. See also Intelligence tests

components of, 316 personality, 378–381 projective personality, 380 psychological, 34–35 recognition, 249 standardization and, 315

Thalamus, 73 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders (DSM), 451 Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), 380 Therapy, 474–505

behavioral therapies, 492–498 biomedical therapies, 477–483

Therapy (continued) choosing a therapist, 501

I-22 | Subject Index

insight therapies, 483–492 psychotherapy, 498–503

Theta waves, 182 Thinking, 271. See also Cognitive Processes Third variables, 41–42 Thorndike, 221 Thorndike, Edward Lee, 220–221 Threat simulation, dreams as, 187 Three-D movies, 147 Tichener, Edward, 13 Toddlers, 99 Token economies, 495–496 Tolerance, to drugs, 215–216 Top-down processing, 143, 277 Topographic organization, 75 Touch, 157–159, 355 Trait theories, 374 Traits, 373, 377–378. See also Personality Tranquilizers, 192 Transduction, 133, 135 Transfer-appropriate processing,

255–256 Transference, 484 Triangular view of love, 436–437 Triarchic theory, 312–313, 322 Trichromatic theory, 141–142 Trust vs mistrust stage, 120 Twain, Mark (Samuel Clemens), 531 Twin studies, 86, 328, 396–398

intelligence testing, 327–328 personality and, 398 sexual orientation and, 358 weight and, 348

Two-factor theory of emotion, 368–369 Tympanic membrane, 152, 153 Type A personality, 517 Type B personality, 517

U Unconditioned response (UR), 209 Unconditioned stimulus (US), 209 Unconscious, 15 Unconscious mind, 382 United States National Transportation Safety

Board, 176 U.S. Department of Transportation, 176

V Validity, 315, 322

of intelligence tests, 319–321 Valium, 64 Variability, measures of, 36–37 Variable-interval (VI) schedule, 226 Variable-ratio (VR) schedules, 225, 225–226 Variables

confounding, 45 dependent, 43–44 independent, 43–44 third, 41–42

Vestibular sacs, 160 Vestibular sense, 160 VI (variable-interval) schedule, 226 Vicarious reinforcement, 230 Vietnam veterans, posttraumatic stress

disorder and, 521 View-Master, 147 Vision, 133–152

color, 141–142 dark adaptation, 137–138 depth perception, 145–148 Gestalt principles of organization, 143–145 identifying message components of,

138–142 of infants, 102 light and, 133–135 motion perception, 148 object recognition, 145 perception of action and, 151 perceptual constancies, 148–149 perceptual illusions, 149–150 retinal processing, 135–137 stable interpretations and, 142 structure of eye, 135 translating the message, 133–138 visual cortex, 139–140 visual pathways, 138

Visual acuity, 135 Visual cortex, 139–140 Visual imagery, 249 Visual neglect, 177–178 Visual perception, 142 Visual processing, 78 Visuospatial sketchpad, 245 Vitreous humor, 135

Vocalizations, 278 Voice, inner, in memory, 242 Volleys, 154 von Helmholtz, Hermann, 141 VR (variable-ratio) schedule, 225–226 Vygotsky, Lev, 109

W WAIS (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), 317 “The War of the Ghosts” (North American

Indian folktale), 257 Warm fibers, 158 Washburn, Margaret Floy, 17 Watson, John B., 14, 20, 214–215 Watts, James, 481 Wavelength, 133 Weber’s law, 165 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS),

317, 319 Wechsler, David, 320 Well-defined problem, 288 Wernicke’s area, 68, 76, 281 White Americans, IQ test scores of, 329 Wish fulfillment, 186 Withdrawal, 191 Women in psychology, 16–17. See also Gender

differences Wooley, Helen Thompson, 17 Words, 275 Working backward, 291 Working memory model, 245. See also

Short-term memory World Trade Center, 252 Wundt, Wilhelm, 12–13

Y Yapko, Michael, 33–34 Yates, Andrea, 448 Young, Thomas, 141

Z Zero Correlations, 40 Zone of proximal development, 110 Zygote, 92

I-23

Culture Influences Abnormality cultural deviance, 446 cultural differences, 445 Achievement motivation, cultural factors, 342 African Americans culturally sensitive therapy for, 501 economic status of, 329 IQ test scores of, 331 schizophrenia in, 462 stereotype vulnerability and, 331 Asian Americans discomfort with disclosure in therapy, 501 IQ test scores of, 329 Asians attributional biases among, 412 interdependent focus of, 429–430 psychotherapy and, 501 Cross-cultural inf luences, 21–22 Cross-cultural mate selection, 356–357 Cultural deviance, 446 Cultural differences adulthood rites of passage, 98 anxiety disorders, 454 beauty concept, 432–433 conformity, 422–424, 429 developmental milestones and, 96 eating habits, 347 facial expressions, 360 fundamental attribution error, 412 gender differences in achievement, 341, 342 intellectual development, 109–110 IQ tests and, 321

in mood disorders, 459 morality, 112–113 perceptual illusions and, 149–150 schizophrenia in, 462 social loafing, 421, 421–422 somatoform disorders, 456 suicide, 459 therapist choice, 501 visual processing and, 143 Cultural differences, mating strategies,

356–357, 357 Ethnic/racial minorities intelligence tests and, 321 schizophrenia in, 462 shortage of therapists for, 501 suicide rates among, 459 Hispanics anxiety disorders among, 454 economic status of, 329 Hopi babies, developmental milestones and, 96 Japan, cultural differences of, 117, 429–430 Morning sickness, global universality of, 92 Nomadic societies, development of spatial

skills, 109 Prejudice, 407–409 Racial diversity, benefits of, 21 Role of culture in social psychology, 429–431 Stereotypes of race, 406 Therapies, cultural factors, 501 Vygotsky, Lev, on importance of culture, 22 White Americans IQ test scores and, 329 schizophrenia and, 462 suicide rates, 458–459

Gender Female pioneers in psychology,

16–17 Gender differences, 81–82 in achievement, 341 anxiety disorders and, 454 in brain function, 81–82 color blindness, 141 eating disorders, 350–351 endocrine system and, 16–17 in mood disorders, 458–459 morality, 112–113 in phobias, 454 in schizophrenia, 462 in sexual behavior, 358 in somatoform disorders, 456 stereotypes of, 231, 406 in suicide, 459 Gender roles, 123, 406 Gender schema theory, 124 Genetics and sexual orientation, 358 Homosexuality, 357–358 Hormones, gender effect, 82 Nature and nurture in sexual orientation,

123–124, 358 Psychodynamic theory, as male-oriented, 386 Same-sex relationships, 357–358 Stereotypes of gender, 231, 409, 454 Twin studies of sexual orientation, 358 Women menarche, 97 menopause, 97–98, 355 in psychology, 16–17

● Theme Index

Cover
Title
Statement
Copyright
Dedication
About the Author
Brief Contents
Contents
Preface
Half Title
Ch 1: An Introduction to Psychology

Introduction��
Defining and Describing Psychology
Tracing the Development of Psychology: A Brief History
Identifying the Focus of Modern Psychology
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 2: The Tools of Psychological Research

Introduction��
Observing Behavior: Descriptive Research
Predicting Behavior: Correlational Research
Explaining Behavior: Experimental Research
The Ethics of Research: Human and Animal Guidelines
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 3: Biological Processes

Introduction��
Communicating Internally: Connecting World and Brain
Initiating Behavior: A Division of Labor
Regulating Growth and Internal Functions: Extended Communication
Adapting and Transmitting the Genetic Code
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 4: Human Development

Introduction��
Developing Physically
Developing Intellectually
Developing Socially and Personally
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 5: Sensation and Perception

Introduction��
Vision: The World of Color and Form
Hearing: Identifying and Localizing Sounds
The Skin and Body Senses: From Touch to Movement
The Chemical Senses: Smell and Taste
From the Physical to the Psychological
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 6: Consciousness

Introduction��
Setting Priorities for Mental Functioning: Attention
Sleeping and Dreaming
Altering Awareness: Psychoactive Drugs
Altering Awareness: Induced States
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 7: Learning From Experience

Introduction��
Learning About Events: Noticing and Ignoring
Learning What Events Signal: Classical Conditioning
Learning About the Consequences of Behavior: Operant Conditioning
Learning From Others: Observational Learning
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 8: Memory

Introduction��
Remembering Over the Short Term
Storing Information for the Long Term
Recovering Information From Cues
Updating Memory
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 9: Language and Thought

Introduction��
Communicating With Others
Classifying and Categorizing
Solving Problems
Making Decisions
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 10: Intelligence

Introduction��
Conceptualizing Intelligence
Measuring Individual Differences
Discovering the Sources of Intelligence
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 11: Motivation and Emotion

Introduction��
Activating Behavior
Meeting Biological Needs: Hunger and Eating
Meeting Biological Needs: Sexual Behavior
Expressing and Experiencing Emotion
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 12: Personality

Introduction��
Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality
Determining How Personality Develops
Resolving the Person–Situation Debate
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 13: Social Psychology

Introduction��
Interpreting the Behavior of Others: Social Cognition
Behaving in the Presence of Others: Social Influence
Establishing Relations With Others
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 14: Psychological Disorders

Introduction��
Conceptualizing Abnormality: What Is Abnormal Behavior?
Classifying Psychological Disorders
Understanding Psychological Disorders: Biological, Cognitive, or Environmental?
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 15: Therapy

Introduction��
Treating the Body: Biomedical Therapies
Treating the Mind: Insight Therapies
Treating the Environment: Behavioral Therapies
Evaluating and Choosing Psychotherapy
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Ch 16: Stress and Health

Introduction��
Experiencing Stress
Reacting to Prolonged Stress
Reducing and Coping With Stress
Living a Healthy Lifestyle
Interactive Summary
Terms to Remember
Media Resources

Appendix
Glossary
References
Name Index
Subject Index
Theme Index