philosophy of religion questions
Morality
What is Morality?
“Morality” (Inadequately) Defined
Morality, as an object of moral theorizing, at the very least refers to codes of conduct or systems of rules in a society that are accepted by a group of people, an individual, or all rational persons (or ideal observers). Such codes or rules are supposed to govern human behaviors toward other people and sentient beings. It is typically treated in philosophy as having a descriptive element and a prescriptive element. Its descriptive element refers to what in actuality a group of people or an individual accepts as codes of conduct. Its prescriptive element refers to the demand for such codes or rules to direct actions. It is commonly distinguished from religious laws, positive laws, and etiquettes.
Moral Assumptions that Guide Moral Thinking
Some philosophers, such as Russ Shafer Landau, identify plausible moral assumptions that reasonably constrain moral thinking:
Neither the law nor tradition is immune from moral criticism.
Everyone is morally fallible.
Friendship is valuable.
We are not obligated to do the impossible.
Children bear less moral responsibility than adults.
Justice is a very important moral good.
Deliberately hurting other people requires justification.
Equals ought to be treated equally.
Self-interest is not the only ethical consideration.
Agony is bad.
Might does not make right.
Free and informed requests prevent rights violations.
Features of Moral Rules
OVERRIDING
UNIVERSALIZABLE
UNCONDITIONAL
Morality
OBJECTIVE VS. RELATIVE
“Objective” Defined
A claim p is objective just in case
the truth or falsity of p does not depend on what any claimant of p thinks about the truth or falsity of p
the truth or falsity of p depends on what in actuality obtains in reality.
“Relative” Defined
A claim q is relative just in case the truth or falsity of q depends on what the claimant of q thinks about the truth or falsity of q.
Moral Claim as Objective?
A moral claim p is objective just in case
its truth or falsity is independent of the valuation of an individual moral agent or a group of moral agents
its truth or falsity is dependent on how it corresponds to a morally relevant fact or a set of morally relevant facts (or how it coheres with other morally relevant claims).
Moral Claim as Relative?
A moral claim q is relative just in case its truth or falsity is dependent on the valuation of an individual moral agent or a group of moral agents.
Why Even Bother?
We constantly and inevitably make moral judgments pertaining to behaviors, actions, or ways of thinking of other people. We need to know the statuses of such judgments.
For some people, it is easier to make sense of our moral judgments if they are objective. But it is not clear that they are objective. As a matter of fact, there are reasons for thinking that they are relative.
There are constraints on moral thinking that appear to be intuitively reasonable or plausible. Why do they even appear to be that way?
“Euthyphro”
PLATO
Plato, Socrates, Euthyphro
Plato: author of Euthyphro; inspired by his teacher (Socrates the ideal philosopher)
Socrates: the chief figure in Plato’s dialogues (including Euthyphro); historical Socrates ≠ Plato’s Socrates
Euthyphro: supposedly well-known expert on religious matters
Why Dialogue?
Despite the fact that, according to Julia Annas, Plato is intensely concerned with arguments and bold (but subtle and elusive) ideas, Plato, as the author, detaches himself from his own works through his use of the dialogue format. Why?
Why Dialogue?
It appears that, according to Julia Annas, Plato does not intend to entertain us through his dialogues. Rather, he wants his readers to be engaged with the serious issues that he raises and to be involved in doing philosophy.
It appears that, according to Julia Annas, Plato, by not directly presenting his own position, prevents himself from telling his readers what to think. He wants his readers to do the work of understanding the issues for themselves and to not accept what he thinks about an issue based on his authority.
Meletus on Socrates
Corrupter of the Youth
Inventor of New Gods (a poet as a maker of the gods)
Euthyphro on His Father
Suing his father for his father accidentally and indirectly murdered one of his laborers who, while intoxicated, killed a domestic servant
Initially Impressive Euthyphro
SOCRATES: “I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives—clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him.”
EUTHYPHRO: “I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him…”
Socrates’ Worry: Euthyphro’s Confidence
SOCRATES: “Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?”
EUTHYPHRO: “The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it?”
Piety? Impiety?
SOCRATES: “… And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?”
Piety = Reverence (Substitute: Morally Right)
According to Paul Woodruff, it is a virtue that is traditionally associated with the keeping of oaths, treatments of the weak, family relationships, and respect towards the gods.
Impiety = Irreverence (Substitute: Morally Wrong)
Problem with Piety / Impiety: Euthyphro vs. His Relatives
EUTHYPHRO: “…And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.”
Note: Most Athenians were probably shocked with Euthyphro’s irreverent act of suing his own father. But Euthyphro, on the other hand, was confident that there is something reverent about his act. How can his act be both reverent and irreverent?
Euthyphro’s First Response
EUTHYPHRO: “Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others:—of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.”
Plato’s Response
SOCRATES: “…Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.”
SOCRATES: “Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious? ...Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.”
Euthyphro’s Second Response
EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.
Is the Second Response Better than the First Response?
SOCRATES: “Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell…”
Socrates’ Response
SOCRATES: “…the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?... And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I … differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? ... Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?... And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?... But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?... Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?... But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them…Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?... Then…I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore…in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.”
Euthyphro’s Third Response
EUTHYPHRO: “But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.”
Socrates’ Response
SOCRATES: “…they [humans] do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when? …And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?”
Challenging Euthyphro’s Dogmatism
SOCRATES: “…what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.”
Piety and the Gods
Euthyphro: “…what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.”
Euthyphro’s Dilemma
SOCRATES: “…whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.”
ANSWER (Socrates & Euthyphro): It is loved because it is pious, not pious because it is loved.
Euthyphro’s Contradictory Claims
Euthyphro’s Initial Claim:
x is pious = x pleases the gods
Euthyphro’s Latest Claim:
x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods
Essence vs. Attribute
If (x is pious = x pleases the gods), then (pleasing to the gods = essence of piety).
If (x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods), then (pleasing to the gods = mere attribute of x).
Essence of Piety?
P1. If (x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods), then (pleasing to the gods = mere attribute of x).
P2. If (pleasing to the gods = mere attribute of x), then we still do not know the essence of piety.
P3. x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods.
C. Therefore, we still do not know the essence of piety.
Justice and Piety
Which of the following is true according to Socrates?
All things that are just are pious.
All things that are pious are just and only some things that are just are pious.
If (a), then justice is a part of piety.
If (b), then piety is a part of justice.
Answer: b
What part of justice is piety?
Euthyphro on Two Parts of Justice:
part of justice that attends to the gods
vs.
part of justice that attends to humans
Euthyphro’s Answer:
part of justice that attends to the gods
Piety as the Art of Attending to the Gods
Asking the Gods (Praying)
Giving to the Gods (Sacrificing)
In other words, for Euthyphro, piety is that which is pleasing to the gods.
Socrates’ Concluding Remarks
“What is Piety?” as an Unanswered Question
Challenging Euthyphro’s Dogmatism
Socrates’ Implicit Defense of Himself
Aporia: From Perplexity to Perplexity
Morality & Religion
Is Morality Dependent on or Independent of Religion?
Questions
Why was it important for Socrates, considering his own time, to address the issue on the relationship between morality and religion?
Why is it still important for us to address the same issue today?
Morality as Independent of Religion
Religion
Morality
Peter Singer on Godless Morality
“…over millions of years we have evolved a moral faculty that generates intuitions about right and wrong.”
See web-based moral sense test involving 1,500 subjects.
Louise M. Antony, “Good Minus God”
“…it is a more pious position to hold that morality is independent of the existence of God. If the term “good” is not just an empty epithet that we attach to the Creator, who or whatever that turns out to be, then it must be that the facts about what is good are independent of the other facts about God. If “good” is to have normative force, it must be something that we can understand independently of what is commanded by a powerful omnipresent being…You do not lose morality by giving up God; neither do you necessarily find it by finding Him.”
Morality as Dependent on Religion
MORALITY
RELIGION
1. Religion as Moral Motivation
For some people, religion provides the ultimate justification for why we should be moral.
Fear of God
Afterlife
Problems:
Religiosity does not necessarily make one a better person.
Such kind of moral motivation appears to be morally reprehensible.
2. God as Moral Lawgiver
“If God is dead, then everything is permitted.”
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov
P1. Objective moral norms either come from God or humans.
P2. Humans, as morally fallible beings, cannot be the source of moral norms.
C. Therefore, objective moral norms must come from God.
Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence
“And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God?”
“Notes on the State of Virginia” (1782)
Divine Command Theory
Moral Good
=
God’s Will or What God Commands
Problem with DCT:
P1. Either God has the best possible reasons for forbidding act x or God has no reasons for forbidding x.
P2. If God has no reasons for forbidding x, then God’s decision to forbid x is arbitrary.
P3. If God’s decision to forbid x is arbitrary, then God’s decision to forbid x must be deeply problematic.
P4. If God has the best possible reasons for forbidding x, then God’s will or command is not the reason for the rightness or wrongness of x.
P5. If God’s will or command is not the reason for the rightness or wrongness of x, then DCT is false.
C. Either DCT is deeply problematic or DCT is false.
Another Problem with DCT
P1. If DCT is true, then a morally perfect God can command us to perform an act that we can consider to be obviously immoral.
P2. But a morally perfect God cannot command us to perform such an act.
C. Therefore, DCT is false.
3. God as the Infallible Moral Guide
If God is omniscient, then God must know every single detail of the moral law.
If God is omnibenevolent and omniscient, then God will command us to perform acts that fulfill the demands of the moral law and infallibly guide us to a deeper understanding of the moral law.