SOC Discussions

When Law and Ethics Collide: Social Control in Child Protective Services

Donald T. Dickson

Social welfare workers in the protective services field*/among them social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists*/are expected to follow the laws of the state in which they practice, but are also bound by their professional code of ethics. Often this does not present a problem, but at times ethical and legal expectations differ. This is particularly problematic where the professionals may be seen as agents of control, reporting possible child abuse, conducting child abuse investigations, inspecting homes, monitoring families, removing children from their homes and the like, often working with or reporting to law enforcement agents where expectations are different and codes of ethics absent. This paper explores the relationship between law and professional ethics, and, in particular, situations in which actions and decisions can be legal yet unethical or ethical but yet illegal. It then analyzes some critical child protective service activities where Child Protective Services (CPS) workers exert significant control over parents and children, and where the legal and ethical requirements may differ. Finally, the paper discusses the problems that CPS professionals face when law and ethics collide, and suggests various steps to resolve some of these conflicts.

Keywords Ethics and Law; Child Protective Services; Law and Social Work; Social Work Ethics; Psychology Ethics; Psychiatry Ethics; Law Ethics and Human Services; Child Abuse

In the United States, social welfare workers in the protective services field, among them social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists, are expected to follow the

laws of the particular state in which they practice and they are also expected to follow the code of ethics of their profession. Often this does not present a problem,

but at times ethical and legal expectations differ. This can be particularly problematic in the field of Child Protective Services (CPS) where, under the various state laws, professionals may function in part as agents of control,

reporting and investigating child abuse, inspecting homes and monitoring families, and at times removing children from their homes, while often working with or

ISSN 1749-6535 print/1749-6543 online/09/030264-20 – 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/17496530903209485

Donald T. Dickson is Professor Emeritus in the School of Social Work, Rutgers University, USA. Correspondence to: Donald T. Dickson, School of Social Work, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA; E-mail: ddickson@rci.rutgers.edu

ETHICS AND SOCIAL WELFARE VOLUME 3 NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER 2009)

reporting to law enforcement agents where expectations are different and codes of ethics may be absent.

In this paper the relationship between law and professional ethics is explored,

followed by an examination of some critical child protective service activities where CPS workers exert significant control over parents and children and where

differing legal and ethical requirements may conflict. Finally, the paper discusses the problems that professionals in CPS face when law and ethics collide, and

suggests various steps to resolve some of these conflicts. Cross-national comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper but, although the focus is

upon laws and practices in the United States and in individual states within the United States, readers from abroad may be able to draw comparisons with their home countries, particularly in the case of the somewhat similar legal systems

found in England and Scotland and relevant professional codes of conduct there.

Law and Professional Ethics

In the human services, law and professional codes of ethics serve similar functions: to promote acceptable behavior and penalize unacceptable behavior.

However, they have different sources, content, enforcement mechanisms, and sanctions. In the United States, the sources of law include federal and state statutes, court decisions and administrative rules and regulations. The sources of

ethical standards are the codes of ethics for various professions, and in the human services, in particular the ethics codes of social workers, psychologists

and psychiatrists.1 In the United States, very different groups make law and determine content of codes of ethics: laws result from actions and decisions by

legislatures, judges, and administrators; codes of ethics are promulgated by professional associations or their sub-committees.

Enforcement mechanisms for laws and codes of ethics are also very different. Laws are enforced by the social control agents of the state, police and other law

enforcement agencies, while codes of ethics are enforced by professional associations. Violations of law are determined by judges, juries, or similar decision makers. Determinations of ethical violations are made by members of

the professional association, for example officers or an ethics committee. Violations of the law may result in fines, probation or imprisonment. These are

not appropriate sanctions for violations of ethical codes. Instead, ethical violations may result in reprimands, suspensions or expulsions from the

profession. In short, while in the United States both laws and codes of ethics set parameters and constraints for professional conduct, they have different

sources, enforcement mechanisms, and sanctions. (Although different, law and ethics may be related: violations of law may be used in determinations of

1. See the National Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers (revised 1999); American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (2002); and American Psychiatric Association, Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry (2006).

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unethical conduct; determinations of unethical conduct may be introduced in

legal actions.)

There is an assumption among many professionals that if one acts ethically

then one is also acting legally or, conversely, if one is acting legally then one is

acting ethically. While this is often the case, it is not always so. This is because

legal and ethical standards, while often complementary and overlapping, are not

coterminous. This is shown in Figure 1.2

Most professionals, most of the time, fall within Square #1, following the law

and comporting with the appropriate professional code of ethics. Some might fall

within Square #4, acting illegally and violating their professional code. Examples

include sexual relations with an underage client, sexual harassment of clients or

staff, fraudulent billing practices, and failure to report child abuse when legally

and ethically mandated to do so. The other two possibilities are more problematic for the professional, since

acting legally may at times be unethical or acting ethically may at times be illegal.

Square #2, ethical but illegal behavior, could include civil disobedience, advising/

assisting clients in termination of life decisions or warning a spouse, sexual or

needle-sharing partner about exposure to an HIV/AIDS infected client where

prohibited by law. Square #3, legal yet unethical behavior, could include private

sexual relations with a present or former competent, consenting adult client in

jurisdictions where this is not illegal, failure to inform clients of limits of

confidential communications, or failure to disclose a fellow worker’s incompe-

tence or impairment. At times, codes of ethics for different professions may differ on whether or

not a proposed course of action, although legally permissible, is unethical. For

example, medicating an incarcerated individual in order to make the individual

competent to stand trial is unethical according to the American Psychological

Association, but ethically permissible according to a brief recently filed by the

American Psychiatric Association.3

Several caveats must be added here. First, the final determination of legality

or illegality is a decision by judge or jury, and the final determination of ethical

or unethical conduct is a decision by the professional association or licensing

board. To be precise, illegal conduct as used here may refer to actual or

potentially illegal conduct, unethical conduct may refer to actual or potentially

unethical conduct: that is conduct which is or appears to be contrary to legal or

2. For more detail, see Dickson (1995, pp. 81�/83). 3. Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166 (2003). Compare American Psychiatric Association et al., ‘Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Respondent, Sell v U.S.’ 2002 U.S. Briefs 5664 with American Psychological Association, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief Sell v. U.S.’ 2002 U.S. Briefs 5664. The American Psychiatric Association Brief states: ‘This case presents no question as to capital punishment, which might involve special considerations.’ That question was presented in Singleton v. Norris (2003), where the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals (the same court which upheld forcible medication in Sell) upheld forcible medication of a prisoner to treat his psychotic symptoms although in so doing Singleton became competent and thus legally could be executed. (The US Supreme Court refused to hear Singleton’s appeal and Singleton was executed on 6 January 2004 by the State of Arkansas. See About.com: Bhttp://crime.about.com/od/death/p/x2_singleton.htm� (accessed 20 June 2009).)

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ethical standards. Second, it is possible to have conduct which could be either ethical or unethical under the same code of ethics depending upon the ethical

standard applied. Usually the professional opts for ethical conduct, but at times this may pose a dilemma, for example whether to warn a client’s sexual partner of the client’s HIV positive condition, thereby unethically breaching confidenti-

ality but ethically trying to forestall infection, or to notify law enforcement agents of a crime committed by a client, thereby unethically breaching

confidentiality but acting to promote public safety. The potential for conflict between law and ethics is forecast in some

professional codes of ethics. The American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles and Code of Conduct states:

If psychologists’ ethical responsibilities conflict with law, regulations, or other governing legal authority, psychologists make known their commitment to the Ethics Code and take steps to resolve the conflict. If the conflict is unresolvable via such means, psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law, regulations, or other governing legal authority.4

Similarly, the National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics provides:

Instances may arise when social workers’ ethical obligations conflict with agency policies or relevant laws or regulations. When such conflicts occur, social workers must make a responsible effort to resolve the conflict in a manner that is consistent with the values, principles, and standards expressed in this Code. If a reasonable resolution of the conflict does not appear possible, social workers should seek proper consultation before making a decision.5

The American Psychiatric Association Code of Ethics states:

It would seem self-evident that a psychiatrist who is a law-breaker might be ethically unsuited to practice his or her profession. When such illegal activities bear directly upon his or her practice, this would obviously be the case.

LEGAL

YES NO

Y E

S

#1 Ethical and Legal

#2 Ethical and Illegal

E T

H IC

A L

N O

#3 Unethical and Legal

#4 Unethical and Illegal

Figure 1 Legal and ethical behaviour: A paradigm

4. American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (2002). 5. National Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers (revised 1999).

WHEN LAW AND ETHICS COLLIDE 267

However, in other instances, illegal activities such as those concerning the right to protest social injustices might not bear on either the image of the psychiatrist or the ability of the specific psychiatrist to treat his or her patient ethically and well. While no committee or board could offer prior assurance that any illegal activity would not be considered unethical, it is conceivable that an individual could violate a law without being guilty of professionally unethical behavior.6

Ethics in Child Protective Services

In the United States, workers in child protective services may, or may not, be

governed by a specific code of professional ethics, depending upon whether or not they have membership in a professional organization. Members of profes-

sional associations for social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists subscribe to codes of ethics; others may be expected to follow these standards. CPS workers

without a professional affiliation may be expected to follow the Child Welfare League of America’s Standards of Practice, which does not have the force of a code of ethics.7 With the movement to professionalize CPS and hire more

workers with advanced professional degrees, an increasing number of workers in CPS may subscribe to a professional code.

Social Control in Child Protective Services

Those working in or with child protective agencies may exert significant control over individuals and families coming within the purview of CPS agencies. For

example, CPS workers receive and make reports of suspected child abuse; decide which reports to follow up; investigate allegations of abuse, including

interviewing children, parents, teachers and neighbors, among others; visit families in their homes and observe home conditions; interview children

suspected of having been abused and at times conduct or are present at physical examinations to establish abuse; decide whether or not to open a CPS

case; monitor children and parents in their homes; conduct removals of children from home on a voluntary or involuntary basis, and monitor children in

foster care. Other human services professionals, and law enforcement agents, may take part in some of these activities.

In American law, most child abuse falls within the area of civil, not criminal,

law and procedure. Therefore, many of the constitutional protections available

6. American Psychiatric Association, The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry (2008 edn). 7. See generally Child Welfare League of America, Standards of Excellence for Services for Abused and Neglected Children and their Families. See also National Association of Social Workers, NASW Standards for Social Work Practice in Child Welfare.

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in a criminal setting, namely the right to a ‘Miranda warning’,8 the right to counsel, the right to know one’s accuser, and protections against self- incrimination, among others, are not automatically available to parents or

guardians in civil child abuse actions.9 While warrantless searches conducted by officials of the state may be prohibited by the US Constitution’s Fourth

Amendment, this protection may not be available in CPS civil abuse situations. Drawing primarily upon published court decisions, the following discussion will

focus on stages in the CPS proceedings where social workers and other professionals who are expected to adhere to a professional code of ethics may

face a conflict between law and ethics. The ethical issues raised are often, but not solely, in the areas of informed consent, confidentiality, and privacy. The examples are illustrative; many others could have been used, and published court

decisions do not necessarily reflect the range and number of non-litigated CPS decisions which go unchallenged.

Reporting Child Abuse

All 50 states in the United States now require the reporting of child abuse and

neglect, although who is a child abuser, what constitutes abuse or neglect, who is mandated to report, and what degree of certainty is required before making a

report varies across jurisdictions. Some states specify that any adult, or any person, subjecting a child to abuse as defined is an abuser;10 others require a relationship between abuser and child, such as parent, guardian or teacher.11

Some states mandate that individuals in certain roles report abuse;12 others

8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The US Supreme Court wrote:

To summarize, we hold that, when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. (Miranda v. Arizona 1966, pp. 438�/39)

9. However, some states may provide some protections by statute, such as a right to counsel if parents cannot afford one. See, for example, N.J.S.A. §9.6-8.43. 10. Cal. Penal Code §11165.3. 11. ‘‘‘Abused or neglected child’’ means a child less than 18 years of age whose parent or guardian, as herein defined inflicts . . .’ (N.J.S.A. §9.6-8.21). 12. Cal. Penal Code §11165.7 (a)(1)-(a)(37) including: ‘A physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, psychologist, dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor, licensed nurse, dental hygienist, optometrist, marriage, family and child counselor, clinical social worker, or any other person who is currently licensed under Division 2’ (§11165.7(a)(1)-(a)-21), but also ranging from teachers to firefighters to animal control officers. See also NY CLS Soc. Ser. §413.

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provide that any person is mandated to report.13 Failure to report child abuse is a

criminal offense in some jurisdictions, and mandated reporters are often

exempted from civil or criminal liability for making a report.

Law, Ethics, and Reporting Child Abuse

Many codes of ethics in the human services address the potential conflict

between protecting confidential information and the legal obligation to report

abuse. For social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists, reporting child abuse

is an exception to broader ethical protections of client confidentiality and

privacy, making child abuse reports both legal and ethical for these profes-

sionals.14

While reporting child abuse revealed in confidential situations is required of

professionals in all three ethical codes, potential problems remain. Here, two

areas will be examined: where the state has extended mandatory child abuse

reporting to any underage sexual activity, and where the state has defined

pregnant women’s substance abuse as reportable child abuse. Both areas involve

situations in which there is conflict between a legal requirement to report and

ethical mandates of client confidentiality and privacy.

13. See, for example, New Jersey Statutes: ‘Any person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts of child abuse shall report the same immediately . . .’ (N.J.S.A. §9.6-8.10). 14. The NASW Code of Ethics provides:

Social workers’ primary responsibility is to promote the well-being of clients. In general, clients’ interests are primary. However, social workers’ responsibility to the larger society or specific legal obligations may on limited occasions supersede the loyalty owed clients, and clients should be so advised. (Examples include when a social worker is required by law to report that a client has abused a child or has threatened to harm self or others.) (NASW Ethical Standard 1.01 Commitment to Clients)

The Ethical Principles of Members of the American Psychological Association state:

Psychologists have a primary obligation and take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained through or stored in any medium, recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by law or established by institutional rules or professional or scientific relationship. (American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles, Standard 4.01 Maintaining Confidentiality)

The American Psychiatric Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics makes no specific mention of child abuse, but more broadly provides: ‘When, in the clinical judgment of the treating psychiatrist, the risk of danger is deemed to be significant, the psychiatrist may reveal confidential information disclosed by the patient’ (American Psychiatric Association, Code of Medical Ethics, §4-8 (2008)). However, the American Psychiatric Association’s Position Statement #199101 states: ‘Psychiatrists need to be informed of the mandatory reporting requirements of all applicable laws. The reporting of maltreatment to the appropriate agency is the responsibility of any psychiatrist, treating either or both children and adults’ (American Psychiatric Association, Child Abuse and Neglect by Adults Position Statement #199101).

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Reporting Sexual Activities of Minors as Child Abuse

In Kansas the Attorney General issued an opinion that a pregnancy under the age of 16 was reportable child abuse and furthermore:

Other situations that might trigger a mandated reporter’s obligation, because sexual activity of a minor becomes known, include a teenage girl or boy who seeks medical attention for a sexually transmitted disease, a teenage girl who seeks medical attention for a pregnancy, or a teenage girl seeking birth control who discloses she has already been sexually active. (Aid For Women v. Foulston 2006, 1102)15

The federal district court, hearing a challenge to the opinion, concluded: ‘So

mandatory reporters are left to try to sort out what must be reported and what may remain confidential. The difficulties are obvious’ (Aid For Women 2006, p. 1107).

The professional’s ethical/legal dilemma of whether to act legally and report all minor sexual activity as potential child abuse or to act ethically and maintain a minor’s confidentiality and privacy was resolved when the court permanently

enjoined the Attorney General’s expansion of the Kansas reporting statute on the grounds that it interfered with a minor’s right to informational privacy (Aid For

Women 2006). A parallel situation occurred in California. There, the State Attorney General

issued a similar opinion.16 The California court described the effect of that opinion:

Departing from the norm of employing trained professional judgment to determine abuse on a case-by-case basis, the opinion in essence declares all minors under 14 who are sexually active to be child abuse victims . . . [T]he mere fact of intercourse alone triggered a reporting obligation even if the trained professional had no other grounds on which to base a reasonable suspicion of actual sexual abuse. If a minor sought prenatal care, abortion or treatment for a sexually transmitted disease, the fact of prior intercourse would be obvious. Under these circumstances, the medical and nonmedical practitioner would be

15. The court noted that defendant District Attorney Foulston ‘testified that she had always interpreted the reporting statute to cover a broad range of activities. In her view . . . the fondling of a fifteen-year-old girl’s breasts would be reportable under all circumstances . . .’ (Aid For Women v. Foulston 2006, pp. 1099�/100). 16. The court wrote that subdivision (a) of section 288 provides:

‘[any] person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony’ . . . The Attorney General concluded that because of this inability to legally consent, the mere fact of intercourse alone triggered a reporting obligation even if the trained professional had no other grounds on which to base a reasonable suspicion of actual sexual abuse. If a minor sought prenatal care, abortion or treatment for a sexually transmitted disease, the fact of prior intercourse would be obvious. Under these circumstances, the medical and nonmedical practitioner would be obligated to report the minor as a victim of abuse, because the act of intercourse alone ‘raises a reasonable suspicion that some other person has engaged in lewd or lascivious acts with the child.’ (Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California v. Van De Kamp 1986, p. 367)

WHEN LAW AND ETHICS COLLIDE 271

obligated to report the minor as a victim of abuse, because the act of intercourse alone ‘raises a reasonable suspicion that some other person has engaged in lewd or lascivious acts with the child.’ (Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California v. Van De Kamp 1986, pp. 361�/62, 367)

The court discussed the impact of the opinion:

The Attorney General’s opinion has a real impact on minors and health professionals statewide . . . The state Department of Health Services is currently conducting statewide training of local family planning agencies, informing them of the requirement to report voluntary consensual conduct of under-14 minors in consonance with the Attorney General’s opinion. The state Department of Social Services has issued a letter to all county welfare and probation departments of similar tenor. In sum, the criminal sanction for nonreporting consensual sexual behavior is very real, and the reporting requirement poses an immediate threat to confidential health care and sexual privacy rights on a statewide basis. (Planned Parenthood Affiliates 1986, p. 368)

The California court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Attorney

General from enforcing the child abuse reporting law as applied to ‘voluntary, consensual sexual behavior among minors under the age of 14, bearing no indicia of actual sexual or other abuse in the judgment of the reporting professional

involved’ (Planned Parenthood Affiliates 1986, p. 382).17

While Kansas and California courts have enjoined enforcement, the issue is not

dead. Bodger (2006) cites a 2005 report stating that as many as 10 other states are considering similar provisions.18 With such provisions, social workers,

psychologists, psychiatrists and others would have to make the difficult choice

17. In a similar situation several years later in another California county, the District Attorney sued a health clinic for civil penalties for failure to report child abuse, and to enjoin the clinic from violating the child abuse reporting statute. The trial court issued a broad injunction, enjoining the clinic from ‘violating section 11166 of the Penal Code by failing in the future to report as child abuse, instances where minors under the age of fourteen (14) are diagnosed as being pregnant, as having a sexually transmitted disease, or as suffering from complications of abortion.’ The majority of the California appellate court reversed, agreeing with the Van De Kamp decision and issuing an injunction, but limiting it to sexual activity between minors under the age of 14. The court held that sexual activity between a minor under 14 and person of ‘disparate age’ was child abuse and required a report. The dissenting judge in Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic argued that both Van De Kamp and the majority in Eichenberger were wrong, and that sexual activity by a minor under the age of 14 should be reported:

Where a health practitioner treats a child under 14, the observed fact that the child either is or has been pregnant or has a sexually transmitted disease alone constitutes reasonable suspicion the child has been the victim of violation of Penal Code section 288 and thus of child abuse. (Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic 1988, p. 774)

18. According to Jessica Bodger:

Increasingly, statutory rape and child abuse reporting requirements are being used to threaten reproductive health clinics with legal prosecution. Life Dynamics president Mark Crutcher, author of the Child Predators report, claims that the attorneys general of at least ten states have requested information from his organization about prosecuting clinics for child sexual abuse. (Bodger 2006, p. 585)

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between acting legally by reporting child abuse but acting unethically by failing to protecting a minor’s right to privacy and confidentiality, or acting ethically by protecting the minor’s privacy and confidentiality rights but acting in violation of

the law.

Maternal Drug Abuse as Child Abuse

Courts in some states have held that an unborn child exposed to drugs or alcohol may be a victim of child abuse; in other states courts have upheld child abuse statutes which include the transmission of alcohol or drugs from mother to child

at the time of birth.19

In Charleston, South Carolina, this approach was extended by the adoption of a

policy to arrest pregnant women seeking treatment for substance abuse. The Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) first instituted a program for drug

testing maternity patients suspected of using cocaine, with referrals for counseling and treatment for those who tested positive. Not satisfied with the

results, the hospital formed a task force including medical, social service and law enforcement representatives to develop a policy for prosecuting drug-abusing

pregnant women. As a result, 10 women receiving care at MUSC were arrested after testing positive for cocaine and later sued on the grounds that there was no informed consent and the testing constituted an illegal search under the US

Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. The case was appealed to the US Supreme Court. The court assumed that

there was no informed consent and held the testing illegal:

The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent . . . In this case . . . it is clear from the record that an initial and continuing focus of the policy was on the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers. Moreover, throughout the development and application of the policy, the Charleston prosecutors and police were extensively involved in the day-to-day administration of the policy . . . In the course of the policy’s administration, they had access to Nurse Brown’s medical files on the women who tested positive, routinely attended the substance abuse team’s meetings, and regularly received copies of team documents discussing the women’s progress. (Ferguson v. City of Charleston 2001, pp. 78, 82�/83)

The court concluded:

While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a duty to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about

19. See Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 48.02 (1)(am), South Carolina: State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635 (2003).

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their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.20 (Ferguson v. City of Charleston 2001, pp. 84�/85; emphasis in original)

Since the program was developed with the cooperation and support of law enforcement agents, human service professionals working in the program could reasonably believe it was legal. Ethically, however, a failure to inform patients of

potential criminal consequences of testing appears to be in violation of the ethical standard of informed consent, and releasing information without a

knowing client waiver appears to be a violation of confidentiality and privacy. Thus those individuals would be acting legally, but unethically.

Law, Ethics and Child Protective Services Investigations

CPS workers are legally required to investigate reports of child abuse to

determine whether there is cause to believe abuse took place and protect the child or children in question. Home visits and interviews are often critical in the

investigation. However, a conflict between law and ethics can occur if the worker does not inform the individual of the purposes of the interview and elicits

information later used in a criminal prosecution. In New Jersey v. P.Z., the issue was whether information obtained by a CPS worker during a home visit, with prior advice and encouragement of the county Prosecutor’s Office, could be used

in a criminal case or was barred for lack of a Miranda21 warning:

On the morning of April 5, Kobran [the CPS worker] spoke to Investigator Joseph Lazzaro at the Prosecutor’s Office and advised him that she planned to interview

20. ‘Information supplied to the patients had no mention of the potential of arrest: The ‘‘To Our Patients’’ letter warned patients of the dangers of prenatal drug use and further stated:

If you are using drugs, please stop! If you are unable to stop, please let your doctor know. We want to help mothers get off drugs for the benefit of both you and your baby. We will provide you counseling about the harms of drug abuse and will make arrangements for you to be seen at the Substance Abuse Clinic. We realize that drug abuse is a very difficult problem and we will do all that we can to help you. If, however, we continue to detect evidence of drug abuse or a failure to follow recommended treatment, we will take action to protect your unborn child. The Charles- town Police, the solicitor’s office, and the Protective Service Division of [the Department of Social Services] are also committed to the protection of unborn and newborn children from the harms of illegal drug abuse.’ (Ferguson v. City of Charleston 2002, p. 380)

21. See footnote 8. See also Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521 (2005), where the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals found that incriminating statements made to a CPS worker during an interview in jail were admissible since there was no showing that the worker was acting for the police:

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the investigating police knew about Ms. Lane- Martines’s interview, that they spoke to her before the interview, that they asked her to question appellant at all or in any particular manner, or that they made any attempt to use her as a conduit for interrogation purposes. Nor is there anything in this record that indicates that it was Ms. Lane-Martines’s intention to investigate on behalf of, or in tandem with, the Crowley police. (Wilkerson v. State 2005, p. 532)

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P.Z. Investigator Lazzaro informed Kobran that, although the Prosecutor’s Office could not interview defendant because he had a lawyer, there was no obstacle to DYFS questioning P.Z. Lazzaro then asked Kobran to report the results of her interview with defendant to the prosecutor . . . Without communicating with defendant’s attorney, Kobran and another caseworker made an unannounced visit to defendant’s home . . . Defendant thought that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss whether he and his wife would regain custody of their children. Still, he told Kobran that his counsel had advised him not to speak to her. (New Jersey v. P.Z. 1997, p. 94)

Kobran encouraged P.Z. to talk, so that they could finish the investigation, and told him that if he cooperated then he might be able to resolve the ‘crisis’. The

New Jersey Supreme Court held that the social worker’s interview was not conducted in a coercive setting, was not a custodial interrogation, and therefore did not require a Miranda warning. The dissent argued that although P.Z. was not

in custody, the setting itself was inherently coercive and the worker was in part acting as an agent of the prosecutor:

The announced purpose of Kobran’s visit was to determine whether the State would return custody of C.Z. to defendant and his wife. For most parents, the fear of losing custody of a child would produce a coercive effect. According to Kobran, that is precisely the effect it produced on defendant . . . Although the State contends that the purpose of the DYFS interview was to discover the cause of C.Z.’s injuries, the record supports the conclusion that another purpose was to elicit an incriminating statement from defendant. At least that is how the Prosecutor’s Office perceived the purpose of the interview. Unknown to defendant at the time he spoke with Kobran, she was acting both for DYFS and for the County Prosecutor . . . In sum, Kobran was a dual agent. For the purpose of resolving whether defendant’s statement is admissible in the criminal prosecu- tion of defendant, Kobran’s more relevant role is as the agent of the Prosecutor. (New Jersey v. P.Z., 1997, pp. 127�/28)

In this situation, the CPS worker was violating no law and was assisting the

Prosecutor’s Office. Ethically, however, the social worker appears to be in violation of the ethical standard of obtaining client informed consent, including the potential consequences of the interview.

Law, Ethics and Child Protective Services Investigations: Searches

In home visits, CPS workers may conduct searches of the home or visual inspections of possibly abused children. Consent may or may not have been

given, but even where there has been consent, issues of control and coercion may influence the parent/caretaker, raising questions of potential violations of ethical standards of privacy and informed consent.

In Darryl H. v. Coler, a federal case challenged the legality of a strip search conducted by a CPS worker:

Following the home interview and observation, both parents accompanied the caseworker to the children’s school . . . The caseworker required the children to

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disrobe. The examination of each child’s body was conducted in a semi-private room near the principal’s office with the other child present. The mother was also present during this procedure and assisted in removing the children’s clothes. The parents maintain, however, that they objected to this inspection. The caseworker claims that no objection was made. The parents allege that, during the search, the door to the principal’s office was partially open and that the examination could be observed by those in the principal’s office. The caseworker claims that the door was closed. (Darryl H. v. Coler 1986, p. 906)

The US Court of Appeals wrote:

It is not permissible to hold, as a matter of law, that the mother’s assistance in the procedure amounted to her consent. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a mother, faced with the strip searching of her two young children in a public building, doing anything other than staying and attempting, by her presence, to alleviate the understandable apprehension of her children. (Darryl H. v. Coler 1986, p. 907)

The court concluded that the search was illegal but found the workers not liable

under the doctrine of qualified immunity.22 While not legally actionable, ethically, the search appears to have been a violation of client informed consent

and privacy. Perhaps more egregious, in Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory

Services (2002), the worker, Strickland, conducted a physical examination of the child with no parental consent:

After entering the house, Strickland explained the purpose of the visit and discussed the report that had been made to CPS. Mrs. Roe asked Strickland whether she should contact an attorney, and Strickland stated, ‘Oh no, no. Don’t worry about it. You don’t need anybody.’

After asking some questions, Strickland told Mrs. Roe that she needed to take pictures of Jackie. Strickland did not give the mother the option of submitting to the examination and pictures or refusing them. Strickland did not disclose the type of pictures or extent of the examination. Strickland acknowledges that she could have requested a medical examination but did not do so.

Strickland asked Mrs. Roe to remove the child’s upper clothing, so she could look for bruises or marks. Strickland found none. Strickland then asked Mrs. Roe to remove Jackie’s underwear, so that Strickland could see if anything was abnormal. Mrs. Roe asked whether it was really necessary, and Strickland responded ‘Oh, don’t worry. It’s more stressful for the parent than it is the child.’ Strickland took pictures of Jackie’s vagina and buttocks in a closed position, and then instructed Mrs. Roe to spread Jackie’s labia and buttocks, so that she could take pictures of the genital and anal areas. Although Mrs. Roe asked a couple of times whether the photographs were necessary, she never requested that Strickland stop. (Roe v. Texas 2002, p. 399)

22. See footnote 28.

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The court found the search was not illegal based on the Texas law existing at the

time. Under a code of ethics, however, the search raises serious ethical questions

of privacy and informed consent.23

Removal of Children: Voluntary Placement Agreements (VPAs)

In a 1977 decision, the US Supreme Court cited statistics estimating that between

50 and 90 percent of children in foster care were voluntary placements (Smith v.

Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform 1977, p. 825, fn. 9).

Voluntary Placement Agreements (VPAs) continue to be used in most states and

for CPS workers may present a serious conflict between law and ethics.24 At the

request of the CPS worker, the parent signs the VPA, often at home and without

legal assistance. Under the agreement, a child may be placed out of home for a

period of 30 days to six months without judicial review. For the parent, the

advantages of the VPA include avoiding going to court and, since the VPA is

voluntary, possible reunification with the child or children, while avoiding more

serious results such as long-term separation under a court order. For the CPS

worker and agency, the advantages lie in the simplicity and ease of the VPA; with

only a signature there can be temporary removal of a child or children with no

need for a court hearing. Yet the voluntary nature of these agreements is not always clear:

The extent to which supposedly ‘voluntary’ placements are in fact voluntary has been questioned . . . For example, it has been said that many ‘voluntary’ placements are in fact coerced by threat of neglect proceedings and are not in fact voluntary in the sense of the product of an informed consent. (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families 1977, p. 834)25

23. However, the court noted:

‘‘The home search cases underscore the strength of Jackie’s privacy interest. As the Seventh Circuit aptly explained in a decision pre-dating its adoption of the special needs test, ‘it does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any known principles of human decency.’’ (Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); note 11’ Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services 2002, p. 406)

24. By 1997, that proportion had dropped to about 11 percent (Ehrle et al. 2001, p. 1). 25. Pearson notes:

The voluntary label is often misleading when applied to such agreements. The agency usually insists that the parents make an immediate decision, and may use tactics or threats that can be characterized as ‘blatantly coercive.’ In addition, the agency may fail to give the often frightened and unsophisticated parents the information they need to understand the serious consequences of such an emergency decision. Unfortunately, such agreements are sometimes treated as routine, voluntary waivers of parental rights. (Pearson 1998, p. 835)

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One commentator has observed:

Because they avoid the necessity of an emergency court hearing, VPAs are the preferred mechanism for placement by many social workers. In some states, more than half the children in foster care were placed there by a VPA. Parents almost never have the benefit of legal counsel when they sign VPAs and are frequently coerced into signing by social workers who threaten that the child will be placed for a longer time period or even permanently removed by court intervention if the parent does not sign. (Sinden 1999, p. 385, n. 194)

At times, courts have voided VPAs for lack of informed consent or due to

coercion. In other decisions, the legality of VPAs has been upheld. Whether legal

or illegal, the underlying ethical issues remain.

Voluntary Placement Agreements: Informed Consent

In In theMatter of David R., the court described the circumstances of the signed

VPA:

A department agent witnessed the signature on the one and one-half page agreement in English of the maternal grandmother who allegedly volunteered to place the child. The maternal grandmother is fluent only in Spanish. Although she had come to the department’s office with a relative who was fluent in English, the department’s agent took her to a separate room for the signing. No interpreter was present.26 (In the Matter of David R. 1979, p. 677)

The New York court voided the VPA: ‘If the signer is ignorant of the language of

the writing, and the contents thereof are misread or misrepresented to him by

the other party, unless the signer be negligent, the writing is void’ (In the Matter

of David R. 1979, p. 677). In a recent North Carolina case the complaint alleged that the trial court

committed error in terminating parental rights when there was no informed

consent in the VPA execution:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion, commit reversible error, and violate respondent/mother’s substantial rights when it ordered her parental rights to be terminated, where respondent/mother was not given an interpreter when she signed a voluntary placement agreement, although she spoke no English, had an IQ of 65, and was undergoing a medical emergency? (In the Matter of J.M.E., 2006, p. 2)

The action was dismissed on other grounds and the mother’s allegations were not

considered by the court.

26. In the Matter of David R., 420 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1979).

278 DICKSON

Voluntary Placement Agreements: Coercion

Another group of decisions document challenges to VPAs on the basis of coercive

tactics by CPS workers. Coercion may consist of explicit threats or a denial of

benefits if the VPA is not signed. An example of the latter is described in a

Delaware Supreme Court decision:

[At] the age of seventeen, and without the guidance or counsel of any independent person who could advise her . . . Judy was required by CPS, as a condition of its assistance, to sign a document called a Voluntary Placement Agreement. This three-page instrument, filled with legal terms and the esoteric language of social workers, was of broad effect. It provided for the ‘placement’ of both Judy and Derek solely because ‘we don’t have a place to stay’. There is no suggestion that Derek was a neglected, abused or abandoned child. (In the Matter of Derek W. Burns 1986, p. 639; emphasis added)

In a Florida decision, In re Interest of J.H., R.H. and J.S. v. Florida, the court

wrote:

Appellant Hall testified at the hearing that she was reluctant to sign the agreement because several portions of it had been left blank. According to Hall, ‘I didn’t think it was right for me to sign a plain piece of paper. How was I supposed to understand that?’ She stated she eventually signed the agreement ‘because they said if I didn’t sign it they was going to tell the judge.’ . . . Thus, the undisputed evidence indicates that the agreement was not entered into voluntarily. (In re Interest of J.H., R.H. and J.S. v. Florida 1985, p. 683)27

Similar threats were described in a 2005 Pennsylvania decision:

The next day, March 16, 2005, defendant George Kuykendall [the CPS worker], visited Walker’s home. Kuykendall informed Walker that Merriweather needed to be removed from Walker’s custody. ‘Under duress’ from Kuykendall and in ‘fear of losing her daughter,’ Walker voluntarily agreed to place Merriweather in foster care and signed a Voluntary Placement Agreement . . . Allegedly, Kuykendall ‘threatened’ Walker that if she did not sign the Voluntary Placement Agreement, ‘a restraining order, or the like, would be obtained preventing Ms. Walker from having any contact whatsoever with her daughter.’ (Merriweather v. City of Philadelphia 2007, pp. 4�/5)

While none of the three professional codes deal directly with coercion, all

contain broader ethical principles of integrity, human dignity, and justice, which

could make the coercion described here as constituting unethical professional

behavior.

27. In a 1997 decision, King v. Olmstead County, the court ruled that threats by CPS workers to take custody of two other children if the parents did not sign a voluntarily agreement to relinquish legal custody of their third child, while ‘seemingly inappropriate’, were not a constitutional violation (King v. Olmstead County 1997, p. 1068).

WHEN LAW AND ETHICS COLLIDE 279

Law, Ethics and Control in Child Protective Services

While actions and decisions of workers in the CPS field are usually both ethical and legal, we have seen that this is not always the case. Some actions may be unethical and illegal. At other times, the human services professionals face real

conflict between legal or ethical decisions. There may be expectations by CPS agencies or pressures from law enforcement entities to select a course of action

which is or appears to be legal, but may be unethical. Adhering to a code of ethics may result in actions which violate the law. These possibilities, inherent in

the differences between law and ethics, become more problematic in Child Protective Services where CPS workers and agencies exert significant power over

families, parents and children. As illustrated above, parents, families, teachers, health professionals and others, when faced with demands from these agents of control, often are reluctant to question policies and practices. Pregnant women

seeking treatment are subject to arrest, interviews take place in spite of contrary advice of counsel, homes are searched, demeaning strip searches are

allowed and even assisted, and VPAs may be signed, even though they are incomplete, not understood or coerced.

Even when actions of the human service agent are later deemed illegal, courts are often reluctant to hold the agents or the agencies liable. Social workers

usually have qualified immunity, and agencies may be protected by sovereign immunity, resulting in no liability even if harm is proven.28

One court observed:

Once again we confront a case in which publicly employed social workers are obliged to make the difficult choice between taking action to protect a child, thereby risking violation of the parents’ rights, and declining to act, thereby risking violation of the child’s rights. In this case the child protection workers, when faced with just this dilemma . . . chose to intervene and interfere with the parents’ rights in the belief that one of the parents may well have been

28. The US Supreme Court stated that there is qualified immunity when ‘government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’ (Harlow v. Fitzferald 1982, p. 818). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). There are exceptions, however. In Calabretta v. Floyd, the US Court of Appeals found no qualified immunity:

But there is a very substantial interest, which forcing the mother to pull the child’s pants down invaded, in the mother’s dignity and authority in relation to her own children in her own home. The strip search as well as the entry stripped the mother of this authority and dignity. The reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals in their homes includes the interests of both parents and children in not having government officials coerce entry in violation of the Fourth Amendment and humiliate the parents in front of the children. An essential aspect of the privacy of the home is the parent’s and the child’s interest in the privacy of their relationship with each other . . . The government’s interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse, but also protecting children’s interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents. (Calabretta v. Floyd 1999, p. 819)

280 DICKSON

responsible for the child’s injury. That decision, it turns out, may have been wrong and has brought upon them a lawsuit seeking substantial damages. But, as unfortunate as the situation is, in a world in which child protective workers can not be expected to be omniscient, this court finds it hard to fault these workers. Indeed, under the facts here, if the modest restrictions placed on the parents’ rights were improper, it is hard to conceive how an effective system of child protection can be maintained. (Dietz v. Dimas 1996, p. 433)

On the other hand, in Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services the court observed:

We also recognize the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials, particularly where such overzealousness may have the effect of discouraging parents or caretakers from communicating with doctors or seeking appropriate medical attention for children with real or potentially life-threatening condi- tions. The consequences of such a chilling effect could be devastating. (Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services 1996, p. 1373)

While some conflicts between law and ethics may be inherent in the role of the CPS worker, others can be limited or even avoided. Limiting CPS worker

discretion, clarifying the role of the CPS worker and changing polices and procedures could obviate some of the problems described above. CPS interviews

which have one purpose of eliciting incriminating information could be prohibited, and, in keeping with ethical behavior, a worker could be required

to instruct the parent or guardian of the purposes of interview and uses of information obtained. Procedures prohibiting strip searches by CPS workers and

requiring consent before entering a home could be adopted.29

Voluntary Placement Agreements have been phased out in some jurisdictions on grounds that they are inherently coercive and do not necessarily further the

purpose of the CPS agency. The CPS agency in the State of New Jersey in a 2004 report pledged that all voluntary placements would be terminated by the year

2005. The agency acknowledged that at the time over 1,300 children were in voluntary placements for over six months without a court hearing, in violation of

state policy. The stated rationale for ending all VPAs was:

In some cases, we utilize voluntary placements to avoid the hard question of whether or not there really was abuse or neglect*/which short-changes the critical scrutiny provided by the courts . . . The utilization of Voluntary

29. For example, in Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services, the court observed:

Strickland argues that a visual body cavity search often can disprove sexual abuse allegations. Perhaps. But their necessity in some cases does not say anything about social workers’ need to perform warrantless (court’s emphasis) searches in non-exigent circumstances. The social worker can take many preliminary steps short of visual body cavity searches, such as interviewing the child and the parents. In non-exigent circum- stances, the worker then has time to obtain a warrant either personally to conduct a visual body cavity search or to have a physician perform it. (Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services 2002, p. 406)

WHEN LAW AND ETHICS COLLIDE 281

Placements deprives parents of legal representation in a judicial setting. When children are placed voluntarily into the care and custody of DYFS [the New Jersey CPS agency] by a parent or guardian, they may languish in out-of-home placement longer than children who are involuntarily placed. (State of New Jersey, Department of Human Services 2004, pp. 50, 143)30

Alternatively, VPAs could require judicial approval, including parental appear-

ance in court with legal representation to insure the agreement was made by a competent individual with full disclosure and without coercion*/critical ele- ments of informed consent.

Along with these changes, it is critical that agencies acknowledge the potential

conflict between law and ethics, and include this in training CPS personnel. If individual workers consider these conflicts before they act, and consult with CPS

supervisors or attorneys, there is greater likelihood that the resulting decision will have been made in consideration of both ethical and legal ramifications.

References

American Psychiatric Association (1991) Child Abuse and Neglect by Adults Position Statement #199101, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC.

American Psychiatric Association (2008) The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC.

American Psychological Association (2002) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC.

Bodger, J. A. (2006) ‘Taking the Sting Out of Reporting Requirements: Reproductive Health Clinics and the Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 56, pp. 583�/609.

Child Welfare League of America (1999) Standards of Excellence for Services for Abused and Neglected Children and their Families, rev. edn, Child Welfare League of America, Washington, DC.

Dickson, D. T. (1995) Law in the Health and Human Services, Free Press, New York. Dickson, D. T. (2005) ‘Involuntary Medication of the Mentally Ill: Changing Scene,

Continuing Controversy’, in Mental Disorders in the Social Environment, ed. S. A. Kirk, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 443�/60.

Ehrle, J., Green, R. & Clark, R. (2001) ‘Children Cared for by Relatives: Who Are They and How Are They Faring?’, in Assessing the New Federalism, Policy Brief B-28, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC, available at: http://www.urban.org/publications/310270. html (accessed 21 September 2009).

National Association of Social Workers (1999) Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers Approved by the 1996 NASW Delegate Assembly and Revised by the 1999 NASW Delegate Assembly, National Association of Social Workers, Washington, DC.

National Association of Social Workers (2005) NASW Standards for Social Work Practice in Child Welfare, National Association of Social Workers, Washington, DC.

Pearson, K. C. (1998) ‘Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’ Fictional Voluntary Separation Decision and a Proposal for Change’, Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 835�/73.

30. State of New Jersey, Department of Human Services (2004), A New Beginning: The Future of Child Welfare in New Jersey.

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Sinden, A. (1999) ‘‘‘Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?’’: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings’, Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, Vol. 11, pp. 339�/96.

State of New Jersey, Department of Human Services (2004) A New Beginning: The Future of Child Welfare in New Jersey, 9 June, State of New Jersey, Department of Human Services, Trenton, NJ.

Court Decisions, Briefs

Aid For Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D.C. Kansas 2006). American Psychiatric Association et al., ‘Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the

Respondent, Sell v. U.S.’ 2002 U.S. Briefs 5664 (January 22, 2003). American Psychological Association, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief Sell v. U.S.’ 2002 U.S. Briefs

5664 (December19, 2002). Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635; 107 S. Ct. 3034; 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F. 3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999). Daryl H. v. Coler, 801 F. 2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986). Dietz v. Dimas, 932 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. NY 1996). Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980). Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic, 249 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1988). Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67; 121 S. Ct. 1281; 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001). Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d.308 (4th Cir. 2002). Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800; 102 S. Ct. 2727; 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). In re Interest of J.H., R.H. and J.S. v. Florida. 480 So. 2d 680 (1985). In the Matter of David R., 420 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1979). In the Matter of Derek W. Burns, 519 A.2d 638 (Del. 1985). In the Matter of J.M.E., N.C. Court of Appeals, Appellant Brief, October 13, 2006 #COA06-

1121. King v. Olmstead County, 117 F. 3d 1065 (8th Cir. 1997). Merriweather v. City of Philadelphia, 2007 Dist. Lexis 36446 (E.D. Pa.2007). New Jersey v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86 (1997). Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California v. Van De Kamp, 226 Cal Rptr. 361 (1986). Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services, 299 F. 3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002). Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166; 123 S. Ct. 2174; 156 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2003). Singleton v. Norris, 319 F. 3d. 1018 (2003). Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816; 97 S. Ct.

2094; 53 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1977). State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635 (2003). Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, 85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996). Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521 (2005).

Statutes

California Penal Code §1165.3. California Penal Code §11165.7 (a)(1)-(a)(37). New Jersey Statutes Annotated §9:6-8.21. New Jersey Statutes Annotated §9:6-8.43. New York Social Services Law §413. Wisconsin Statutes §48.02 (1)(am).

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