essay

The Mississippi hustle: corrupting the financial principal-agency relationship at the Mississippi Department of Corrections

David H. McElreath1 & Daniel Adrian Doss2 & Carl Jensen3 & Michael Wigginton4 & Stephen Mallory1 & Leisa S. McElreath1 & Lorri C. Williamson1 & Terry Lyons1 & Walter Flaschka5

Published online: 1 December 2016 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract The financial management of justice system organizations necessitates the invoking and exercising of a fiduciary principal-agency relationship between correc- tions administrators and their respective stakeholders. In the context of correctional operations, this means the principal (the state and, by extension, the citizens) entrusts

Crime Law Soc Change (2017) 68:17–27 DOI 10.1007/s10611-016-9673-z

* Daniel Adrian Doss adoss@uwa.edu

David H. McElreath dhmcel@olemiss.edu

Carl Jensen cjensen1@citadel.edu

Michael Wigginton mwigginton@troy.edu

Stephen Mallory smallory@olemiss.edu

Leisa S. McElreath leisamcelreath@yahoo.com

Lorri C. Williamson ldwillia@olemiss.edu

Terry Lyons tplyons1@olemiss.edu

Walter Flaschka wflaschk@olemiss.edu

1 Department of Legal Studies, University of Mississippi, P.O. Box 1848, University, MS 38677, USA

agency personnel (administrators) to carry out their duties in an ethical fashion to provide maximum benefit to the principals. Although it is expected that justice system administrators are above reproach, such an expectation is not always realistic. This paper examines the Mississippi Hustle criminal investigation that targeted financial corruption in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The Mississippi Hustle incident represented an egregious violation of the financial principal-agency relation- ship with respect to financial fraud and contract scandal. As a result of the investigation, the former corrections commissioner and a former legislator each face decades as inmates within the prison system.

Overview

Approximately 93% of the funds allocated to the correctional operations in Mississippi support the operation of the state’s prisons, while the small remainder, approximately $23 million, funds the supervision of the nearly 40,000 felony offenders on probation, parole, and house arrest [1]. By 2014, Mississippi, with at least 22,000 inmates, claimed the nation’s second-highest incarceration rate [1]. Given the costs of the corrections system, the state of Mississippi explored the cost-saving potential of sentencing reform by creating a task force to examine the system and develop recom- mendations [1]. If enacted, the reforms were expected to control the costs of corrections without compromising public safety [2].

However, the multi-million dollar correctional budget was a tempting target for criminality. A scandal occurred that involved numerous crimes, ranging from sexual encounters to outright fraud. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operation, referred to as the Mississippi Hustle, resulted in the arresting of former Mississippi corrections commissioner Chris Epps and former Mississippi state legislator Cecil McCrory. Both men initially pleaded not guilty to corruption charges involving allegations that McCrory provided at least $700,000 in bribes to Epps, including money for paying off the mortgage on a beachfront condominium home [2]. As a result of the Mississippi Hustle investigation, both men will become inmates within the prison system.

The scenario represents a breach of moral and legal trust regarding the relationship among principals and agents. In other words, given the positions of Epps and McCrory, a breaching of the principal-agency relationship occurred. In this case, the principal- agency relationship consisted of agents (Epps and McCrory) who were supposed to represent the interests of principals (the state and, by extension, the citizens of Mississippi); as agents, they were empowered to make decisions on the principal’s behalf [3]. In such a relationship, agents are expected to act ethically and pursue the best interest of the principals. However, despite the existence of a fiduciary obligation to render decisions that are in the best interests of principals, agents may

2 College of Business, University of West Alabama, Mail Station #24, Livingston, AL 35470, USA 3 Department of Criminal Justice, The Citadel, 171 Moultrie Street, Charleston, SC 29409, USA 4 Department of Criminal Justice, Troy University, Troy, AL 36082, USA 5 Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, University of Mississippi, 620 All American Drive

#129, University, MS 38677, USA

18 D.H. McElreath et al.

exhibit malfeasance by making decisions that are detrimental to the interests of princi- pals [4, 5]. Such malfeasance compromises the principal-agency relationship, breaches its sanctity, and dissolves the trust that exists between both parties [6]. Within the corrections system, breaching and compromising the principal-agency agreement con- tributes to a diminished public confidence toward the ability of officials and the system to perform acceptably and properly [7].

Both Epps and McCrory held positions of great responsibility in which a fiduciary obligation to the stakeholders of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) existed regarding their financial decisions and professional responsibilities. Instead of rendering decisions that were in the best interests of the state, corrections system, and other stakeholders, both men served their personal interests while sacrificing the best interests of stakeholders [8]. Ostensibly, neither man was deterred by the possibility of being caught in the act of criminality despite their decades of experience as prominent, influential leaders within the corrections system. Instead, their breach of trust will likely cause them to serve many years as prison inmates.

The perpetrators: Christopher Epps and Cecil McCrory

The two agents of the Mississippi Hustle scandal were Christopher Epps and Cecil McCrory. Both men were seasoned public servants whose respective careers exhibited much success within the Mississippi corrections systems [9]. Any cursory examinations of both men revealed what appeared to be competent, honest, and straightforward public servants whom were above reproach. However, the Mississippi Hustle investi- gation divulged their criminality.

Epps was the longest-serving Commissioner of Corrections in Mississippi [10]. He started a career in the justice system in 1982, and worked his way through the ranks to eventually direct Mississippi’s Department of Corrections within 20 years. Throughout his career, Epps experienced positions as Chief of Staff, Deputy Commissioner of Institutions, Deputy Commissioner of Community Corrections, Director of Offender Services, Deputy Superintendent, Corrections Case Management Supervisor, Director of Treatment Services, Corrections Case Manager, Disciplinary Hearing Officer/ Investigator and Director of Records for the agency [11]. During 1988, Epps was named Parchman Penitentiary’s deputy superintendent, which involved managing the institution’s daily operations. A few years later, he became deputy commissioner of community relations, and oversaw Mississippi’s probation and parole system [11]. During 2000, newly appointed corrections commissioner Robert Johnson named Epps as his deputy [11]. Two years later, on August 30, 2002, he was appointed to direct the MDOC by Governor Ronnie Musgrove and, in 2004, was reappointed by Governor Haley R. Barbour [11]. He also served in the Mississippi National Guard, retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel [9].

Cecil McCrory was a former legislator who had held a number of elected political positions. This experience provided familiarity with the politics and workings of Mississippi state government. During his period as a legislator, McCrory served on the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review (PEER) (including some time as its chairman). Ironically, the PEER was the same organization that eventually questioned his business deals with the state [12].

The Mississippi Hustle: Corrupting the Financial 19

Overview of the scandal

The Mississippi Hustle investigation began in 2009 when Leake County, Mississippi Sheriff Greg Waggoner voiced concerns to Epps regarding a warden-inmate sex scandal. Grady Sims, the warden of the Walnut Grove Transition Center, allegedly took a female inmate to a motel in Carthage, Mississippi for a suspected sexual encounter. Sims, who was also the mayor of the town of Walnut Grove, served as warden despite having no background in corrections [13].

Sheriff Waggoner reported the allegation to the MDOC. Both Waggoner’s depart- ment and the MDOC investigated the incident. Jointly, investigators from both agencies interviewed female inmates and gathered evidence that they hoped to present to the district attorney. However, before they could proceed, it was alleged that Epps had used his position in an effort to terminate the investigation and to conceal a warden-inmate sex scandal [13]. Because of this information, federal authorities opened an investiga- tion referred to as the Mississippi Hustle [13]. The FBI then initiated many conversa- tions with Waggoner, commenced an investigation against Sims, and eventually inves- tigated Epps [13].

During October 2011, a federal grand jury indicted Sims for one count of sexually assaulting an inmate and one count of directing the inmate to lie to investigators about the encounter [13]. Sims pleaded guilty to the count of directing the inmate to lie, and received a seven-month prison sentence [13]. As the investigation progressed, investi- gators discovered information disclosing a kickback scheme between Epps and McCrory involving millions of dollars [14]. Epps also inherited the private Mississippi prisons when he became commissioner in August, 2002. The prisons represented the legacy of 1990s legislators who viewed them as cost-effective solutions to overcrowding among state institutions. As a state congressman, McCrory sponsored a 1993 bill for privatizing corrections institutions, which perished in the state legislature [2]. However, within three years, Mississippi had opened its first private prison [2].

After leaving the legislature, McCory, reached an agreement with the MDOC to create and open the Walnut Grove Transition Center, a transition center for inmates [13]. Walnut Grove had two separate facilities for housing males and females near the end of their prison sentences and attempted to help them with societal integration. The institution was opened in 2009, and Epps promoted it as a creative way to inexpen- sively hold inmates while integrating them into society [13]. After it opened, Sheriff Waggoner indicated that community members complained to the sheriff’s department because the inmates roamed throughout the community without supervision, and because some inmates were not held within the facility during weekends [13]. Ultimately, the center played a key role in the alleged kickback scheme.

Sheriff Waggoner indicated that it appeared as though McCrory was involved in many of MDOC’s initiatives and projects [13]. Through Epps, the MDOC not only leased from McCrory the properties to house the male and female units, but also awarded McCrory the sole-source contracts to operate them [8, 13]. The transition center housed about 150 men and 100 women among its dormitories [13]. Although still classified as inmates, residents worked outside the facility at pre-approved job sites; otherwise, they remained confined [13]. Residents paid McCrory’s company, American Transition Services, approximately $20 daily for room and board [13]. Also, the company was paid an additional amount of $6 daily per-inmate by the MDOC [13].

20 D.H. McElreath et al.

The investigation resulted in a 49-count indictment against Epps and McCrory regarding their alleged participation in a massive kickback scheme [8]. According to the government, the plan involved Epps taking approximately $1 million in exchange for directing approximately $1 billion in contracts toward organizations that had some relationship with McCrory [8, 13]. According to prosecutors, beginning in 2007, Epps directed prison-services contracts to companies with which McCrory was affiliated as owner or consultant [8, 15]. For example, McCrory’s company was awarded a no-bid contract to provide inmate commissary services in 2007 [8, 15]. It was alleged that, in return, Epps arranged contracts for firms that were owned or advised by McCrory which then operated within the Mississippi prison system [8, 15].

Basically, Epps helped secure lucrative corrections department contracts for private prison companies owned or represented by McCrory [8]. For instance, during 2007, G.T. Enterprises, which was owned by McCrory, was awarded a no-bid contract from the Mississippi Department of Corrections for providing commissary services among correctional facilities [8, 13]. This incident occurred near the time Epps solicited exchange money from McCrory for the contract [8, 13]. McCrory allegedly paid Epps in numerous separate installments that ranged between roughly $3000 and $4000 each [8, 13].

Epps also allegedly approved the assigning of G.T. Enterprise’s commissary services to Centric Group which operated as Keefe Commissary, LLC [8, 13]. The transaction resulted in great profitability for McCrory [8]. In Mississippi, the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review (PEER) ultimately expressed concerns about the Keefe Commissary’s operation [16].

Other no-bid contracts were also incorporated within their scams. For instance, another organization involved within their schemes was AdminPros, which monitored healthcare among Mississippi state prisons in 2011 and among private prisons two years later [8]. Within a letter to the Mississippi State Personnel Board, Epps indicated that AdminPros was the only service vendor that performed inmate Medicaid eligibility services, and was the sole vendor capable of providing the services delineated within a contractual relationship [8]. By doing so, Epps ensured that state business would be diverted to AdminPros via a no-bid contract scenario whereby McCrory would receive a consulting fee [8, 14].

McCrory’s businesses were also involved in Mississippi politics. McCrory, who was a registered lobbyist for several organizations after he lost his seat in the Mississippi legislature to fellow Republican John Moore, also provided campaign funding [12]. Included in McCrory’s client list was the Management and Training Corporation (MTC), a company in Utah, which was hired to operate three private institutions in 2012, and also a fourth prison in 2013 [2]. Epps persuaded MTC to hire McCrory as a consultant, and he personally negotiated the $12,000 fee [2]. Later, Epps and McCrory allegedly split the fee [2].

The allegations indicated that Epps took bribes from McCrory for at least seven years [8, 17]. McCrory was accused of making five- and six-figure deposits to bank accounts as a method of paying off the mortgages that were associated with Mr. Epps’s properties [8]. Additionally, Epps allegedly took an additional cash amount of $900,000, and concealed some of it in his home safe [2]. He also was accused of depositing other monies among various bank accounts and buying cashier’s checks, in amounts of less than $10,000, as a method of avoiding federal reporting requirements

The Mississippi Hustle: Corrupting the Financial 21

[8, 12]. When the FBI searched Epps’ home, they discovered an amount of $69,600 in cash in his safe [18]. His investment account also contained approximately $1 million [19]. According to the federal indictment, McCrory also paid off the mortgage for Epps’ home in a gated Flowood subdivision, prompting Epps to tell McCrory he could acquire and secure anything he desired from the MDOC [8]. Both men pleaded not guilty to these charges.

The indictment and its aftermath raised questions in Mississippi that go beyond how Epps managed, on his public servant’s salary, to accumulate a home in a wealthy, gated suburb; a beach condominium, a high-end Mercedes automobile, and the gold Rolex watch he wore to court on November 6, 2014, when he entered a not- guilty plea [2]. However, on February 25, 2015, Epps pleaded guilty to two federal charges of the original 49 count indictment, which included charges of bribery, wire fraud, money laundering, filing false tax returns and illegal structuring of transactions [20]. In the agreement, Epps also pleaded guilty to conspiracy and filing a false income tax return for 2008, a year in which he indicated his income was $205,540 when it was actually $405,540 [19]. He also agreed to forfeit the money, his home in Flowood, Mississippi, his condominium in Pass Christian, Mississippi, and two Mercedes-Benz vehicles that were purchased with bribe money [19]. Epps also agreed to never again seek or have employment within any public job or office [19]. Given the quantity and severity of the criminal charges to which he pled guilty, Epps faces up to 23 years in prison and $750,000 in fines [21]. As of this writing, he has not been sentenced.

McCrory, the co-conspirator, co-defendant, former legislator, and retired business- man stated in court, during his guilty plea to one count of money laundering conspiracy, that it was Epps who initiated the discussion regarding money for paying off the value of his Flowood home [19]. McCrory must pay $500,000 in fines, and is facing a period of 20 years of imprisonment [21].

The efficacy of examining corruption through the lens of the principal-agency relationship

The details of the scandal indicate that both men were willing participants in a massive bribery scheme despite their respective statuses as public servants. Although many were shocked by the revelations that Epps and McCrory were financially exploiting the corrections system and Mississippians, such incidents are not uncommon. In a study published in 2014, Liu and Mikesell declared Mississippi the most corrupt state in the union; much of that corruption resulted from Bbribe-generating^ behavior, such as that in which Epps and McCrory engaged [22]. Of particular note, Bthe 10 most corrupt states could have reduced their total annual expenditure by an average of $1308 per capita—5.2% of the mean per capita state expenditure—if corruption had been at the average level of the states^ ( [22], p. 346).

Liu and Mikesell’s quantification of the personal cost of corruption underscores an important point that is often overlooked by the average citizen. In addition to moral and ethical costs, corruption produces a financial cost, one that is passed on to the citizenry. Further, this is not an insignificant burden for the citizens of what Forbes Magazine declared to be the Bpoorest state^ in the union in 2014 [23].

22 D.H. McElreath et al.

Public servants are expected to render decisions and conduct themselves morally, ethically, and legally in a manner that contributes toward societal benefit and the best interests of stakeholders. However, at times, reality and expectations are conflicting themes. Certainly, given their behaviors and actions, both Epps and McCrory fell within this category. In most cases, leaders and administrators behave and perform accordingly and legally. However, when failures occur regarding an adherence to responsibility and obligation, the sanctity, trust, and integrity of the principal-agency relationship are dissolved. Any cursory review of the Mississippi Hustle scandal reveals serious breaches of the principal-agency relationship by both Epps and McCrory.

Given the fiduciary costs of Bbribe-generating^ behavior, the principal-agency paradigm offers an excellent model for both understanding the damage from corruption and devising strategies to reduce its effects. In the first place, citizen complacency can result from the twin-misplaced notions that bribery is just Bbusiness as usual^ and Bvictimless.^ The principal-agency relationship, widely accepted in business, suggests that, far from Bbusiness as usual,^ breach of an established relationship is deviant; in both the long and short runs, both parties suffer. When principals are defrauded, they pay in terms of loss of trust, cynicism, and reduced assets. When agents breach the trust, they suffer shame, loss of future earning possibilities, and, in the case of Epps and McCrory, likely incarceration. Further, the Liu and Mikesell [22] formulation provides an estimate in dollar terms of just how much principals can suffer through corrupt acts.

In terms of prevention, the principal-agency model suggests protective mechanisms against breaches of relationship. Traditional dissuasions include rewards for perfor- mance, punitive sanctions, cash flow management, accounting and financial oversight, and humiliation. The salaries earned by many public servants are low compared to the private sector, and rewards can be few. Punitive sanctions may range from termination of employment to imprisonment. Many organizations maintain purposefully some amount of debt that must be serviced as a means of ensuring that fewer cash flows are available for diversion toward unsavory purposes. Additionally, organizations often employ neutral auditors to ensure that accounting and financial records are properly maintained. In many cases, when one is found to have committed some act of criminality, professional and personal humiliation often occurs, and reputations are often unrepairable. Any individual that assumes the responsibilities, duties, and obli- gations of executive administration is well-aware of these tenets.

Given his experience and position, Epps had an awareness of the principal-agency relationship. Instead of fulfilling his fiduciary obligations and responsibilities to the corrections system, inmates, Mississippians, and all other stakeholders, Epps chose volitionally to transgress and breach the sanctity of the principal-agency relationship. Tempted by the lure of criminal gain and secure in the knowledge he could Bget away with it,^ Epps succumbed to temptation.

Epps experienced a long career within the corrections system, ascended through the ranks, and eventually directed Mississippi’s corrections system. He was a knowledge- able, experienced professional with an extensive understanding of prison environments and the catalysts that necessitated imprisonment. Despite this, the fears of imprison- ment or punitive sanctions proved ineffective as deterrents for his behaviors and actions. Epps also understood the financing and cash flows that existed among state agencies thereby providing some knowledge of potential opportunities for exploitation. Despite any mandates of state organizations to control specific expenditures or to

The Mississippi Hustle: Corrupting the Financial 23

perform audits, Epps leveraged his knowledge to divert and to conceal cash flows for his personal benefit. He was favored among his peers and politicians regardless of political or organizational affiliations.

McCrory was a former legislator. At one point in his life, he contributed to the crafting and maintaining of laws. He was neither inexperienced nor novice regarding issues of public trust and confidence. Given this background, he also understood the obligations of the principal-agency relationship. Regardless of the method of deter- rence, none dissuaded McCrory from his roles and actions in the Mississippi Hustle scandal. McCrory willfully performed deeds and entered into agreements that involved criminality. Thus, McCrory also ignored knowledgeably and volitionally his fiduciary responsibilities and obligations regarding the principal-agency relationship.

The alleged decisions, behaviors, and deeds of Epps and McCrory are unjustifiable in any sense. The legal proceedings against them are ongoing at the time of this authorship. Therefore, no reference frame exists for strongly assessing the damages of their actions. Regardless, all Mississippians were affected by this incident. Some may lose confidence and faith in the corrections system and their public officials; trust between factions of the justice system and the general public is tarnished; the reputa- tions of all corrections systems in Mississippi are harmed and may be questioned by many; and each citizens suffered real financial loss. Despite the state’s abilities to audit and control cash flows, some may wonder how Epps and McCrory perpetrated their crimes unabatedly without anyone contemplating and questioning their lifestyles and actions for many years.

Within the context of financial management, Epps and McCrory committed acts of criminality involving financial fraud, bribery, and laundering. Generally, financial management theory incorporates the uses of carrots, sticks, and debt as control methods whereby the potentials of such incidents are dissuaded and/or deterred [6, 24]. Carrots normally involve some type of reward for maintaining acceptable performance and rendering decisions that are both legal and commensurate with the attributes of the principal-agency relationship [6]. Sticks represent the punitive aspects of consequences regarding behaviors and actions, and are used as deterrents for rendering decisions that breach the principal-agency relationship. Both Epps and McCrory now are facing the consequences of their behaviors, decisions, and actions – prison time. Despite their awareness of the illegality of their deeds and their statuses as public servants, they were both undeterred by the potential of being discovered and imprisoned. Thus, the risk of being discovered was an ineffective deterrent with respect to their disregard for law and their obligations within the principal-agency relationship. Organizations may use debt as a method of ensuring that cash flows are constrained and obligated toward specific functions thereby making them unavailable for illicit uses [6]. However, given the high organizational position of power held by Epps, he had an understanding of cash flows within the corrections system. Thus, given his inside knowledge and position of power, he was able to influence the cash flows toward his personal benefits and interests while concealing his illegal actions. Essentially, within the context of traditional financial management and behavioral control mechanisms, any considerations of reward were immaterial (i.e., carrots), the risks of discovery and punishment were ineffective deterrents (i.e., sticks), and considerations of organizational debt were rendered useless and bypassed given the high organizational status and positional powers of Epps.

24 D.H. McElreath et al.

In any case, criminality occurred – whatever their respective motivations. Epps and McCrory broke laws, abused power, breached public trust, and exhibited disregard for the sanctity of the principal-agency relationships. They exploited their professional positions and obligations to reap criminally personal gains. Both men showed a disregard for the principal-agency relationship with Mississippi’s stakeholders and its corrections system. Through time, each of their criminal acts resulted in more crimi- nality. In short, both men proved themselves as criminals who were no better than the inmates whom were entrusted to their care. Now that the crimes of both men are revealed, Epps and McCrory will, in all likelihood, experience a different perspective of the justice system and its corrections components – as inmates.

Conclusions and recommendations

Both Epps and McCrory betrayed public trust, abandoned their fiduciary responsibil- ities and obligations as agents acting upon the behalf of Mississippi’s principals, and chose their respective criminal lifestyles willingly and unabashedly. Mississippi is noted for being one of the most corrupt states and the poorest state in the union [25, 26]. In short, both men became rich by robbing the poorest state in the union. Despite any mechanisms that may have prevented their exploiting Mississippians and the stakeholders of the justice system, both Epps and McCrory successfully perpetrated criminality. Human nature is fallible, and humans are susceptible to their respective, unique temptations. Whatever their motivations, the scandal demonstrates systemic imperfections among Mississippi’s government constructs and business paradigms.

The no-bid contracts were examples of such imperfections. Mississippi’s purchasing requirements allow single-bid, multiple-bid, and no-bid scenarios [27]. The no-bid scenario permits the acquisition of goods or services using emergency procurements [27]. Reasoning to justify any emergency procurement must be made in writing, and approved by the appropriate department head [27]. However, in this instance, Epps headed the prison system. Thus, not only did he make his own emergency procurement requests, he also had the power of approval. This situation reflects a serious shortcom- ing within Mississippi’s bidding and approval processes. In order to lessen the chances of corruption and criminality, individuals overseeing state agencies should be disallowed from approving their own requests. Thus, it is recommended that separate organizational factions and processes exist for procurement requests and their corresponding approvals. By doing so, no sole individual may simultaneously possess sufficient powers to both make procurement requests and approve them. Essentially, such a construct would strengthen regulatory processes, and either eliminate or tighten loopholes.

No methods exist that will ensure completely that criminality such as that exhibited by Epps and McCrory will never again tarnish public offices and organizations. However, certain actions may increase the difficulty of repeating their acts. For instance, the Mississippi Ethics Commission requires the filing of reports by public servants regarding their financial statuses. Specifically, the state of Mississippi requires annual filings from individuals who hold executive positions or oversee state agencies, and whose salaries are derived from funding that originates from the Mississippi Legislature [28].

The Mississippi Hustle: Corrupting the Financial 25

This annual report, known as the Statement of Economic Interest, provides a basis for comparing and contrasting an individual’s self-reported finances and holdings versus other forms of asset records, such as property records, deeds, vehicle titles, court proceedings, annual corporate filings, and so forth. Whenever the lifestyle and the assets of a public official are incommensurate with the monies that are earned within a public sector job, it is recommended that an audit of the individual and state records be performed to investigate the apparent disparity. Beyond the auditing processes, it is recommended that some forms of forensic accounting be invoked to examine financial records with greater scrutiny. Even though a lack of extravagance may not arouse curiosity, random assessments and audits may help ensure that public servants are conducting themselves appropriately.

Despite the obvious benefits of random assessments and audits, in and of them- selves, they may prove insufficient for deterring and/or detecting suspicious activities. In order to lessen the chances of criminality, functions of vertical and horizontal organizational accounting and financial analyses, ratio analysis to identify financial trends over time, surprise inspections, stronger financial and account- ing process controls, periodic background investigations of leadership and management personnel, and an anonymous tip or complaint system within the corrections system may be beneficial [29].

Epps and McCrory are not the first individuals to breach public trust, exploit their positions and stakeholders, and commit acts of crime. Certainly, they shall not be the last individuals to do so, either. Regardless, the state of Mississippi must make every effort to ensure that their successors and any others may not perpetrate such criminal acts. Leveraging the annual Statement of Economic Interest is only one idea that the state may consider as a means of dissuading and discovering acts of criminality. It is the opinion of these authors that mandating and enforcing term limits for all public servants, regardless of performance, may also contribute toward deterring corruption and criminality. Doing so greatly diminishes the possibility of power growth through time. In any case, changing government constructs or implementing new ones toward increasing the difficulty of perpetrating crime by public servants will necessitate much consideration and effort by Mississippi’s legislature and its people.

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