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Marshall Field’s becomes Macy’s: understanding retail brand

Marilyn Lavin Department of Marketing, University of Wisconsin – Whitewater,

Whitewater, Wisconsin, USA

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the controversy surrounding the 2006 extension of the Macy brand to the Marshall Field’s stores. Initial reactions, as well as on-going resistance, to the re-branding provide a means of understanding of the strength of retail brand, how it is established and whether “symbols and traditions” may be separated from retail brand per se.

Design/methodology/approach – The effort of Federated Department Stores (later Macy’s Inc.) to rebrand Marshall Field as Macy’s offers a unique opportunity to understand retail brand. This paper relies on news accounts for a chronology of events leading up to and following the Marshall Field’s re-branding as Macy’s. In addition, analysis of postings to the customer-originated fieldsfanschicago blog is used to understand, from the consumer’s viewpoint, how retail brand is formed and to consider the strength of retail brand.

Findings – The paper concludes that retail brand may be as strong as product brand, that personal experience, as well as retailer-controlled variables, is strongly associated with retail brand, and that retailer “symbols and traditions” are an integral component of retail brand.

Originality/value – This paper examines retail brand in the context of the extension of family brand. The use of blog posts permits a first-hand account of how customers perceive retail brand and of how intense their attachment to such brands may be.

Keywords Retailing, Brands, Departments stores, United States of America

Paper type Research paper

Introduction In August 2005, Federated Department Stores paid $11.5 billion to acquire the May Company. By adding the 400 May stores to its own more than 450 outlets, Federated planned to create a national department store chain in the USA that would allow it to compete more effectively against such operators as Target, J.C. Penney, and Kohl’s. Central to the effort was Federated’s intention to use the Macy’s brand to create a unified image for its department store chain. On September 9, 2006, Federated officially re-named all the former May stores. Not all customers, however, approved the change, and Chicago, the home of Marshall Field’s, was the market that especially resisted the transition.

Federated’s experience with the Marshall Field’s name change provides an important opportunity to understand better the factors associated with retail brand strength and to examine the issues that contribute to establishing retail brand. The present paper begins with a review of the literature related to store brand/image and family branding. It then examines, in detail, customer resistance to Federated, whose name was also officially changed to Macy’s in June 2007, as it attempted to re-brand Marshall Field’s. The purpose of this discussion is not to consider whether Marshall Field should have been re-branded the Field’s stores or to propose better means Federated might have

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www.emeraldinsight.com/0959-0552.htm

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Received 3 May 2008 Revised 23 November 2008

Accepted 27 April 2009

International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management

Vol. 37 No. 11, 2009 pp. 993-1007

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0959-0552

DOI 10.1108/09590550910999398

employed. Rather this paper uses the Federated experience and customer reaction to it as a means of considering the strength of retail brand per se, how retail brand is formed, and whether symbols and traditions associated with one brand can be transferred to another.

Literature review Recognizing that “retailer as brand is one of the most important trends in retailing” (Grewal et al., 2004), the Journal of Retailing devoted a special issue to the topics of Retail Brand and Customer Loyalty in 2004. The contributions to the issue indicate that “retail brand” has more than one interpretation. Two articles equated retail brand with private label merchandise (Sayman and Raju, 2004; Sprott and Shimp, 2004), while a major portion of an invited article by Ailawadi and Keller discussed the creation of retailer brand image per se. The latter orientation is in keeping with the purposes of this study. In that work, Ailawai and Keller updated the earlier research by Lindquist (1974) and Mazursky and Jacoby (1986) on store image, and concluded that access, store atmosphere, price and promotion, cross-category product/service assortment, and within-category assortment were the most important determinants of retailer image. They also acknowledged that the absence of an explicit focus have left retail brand issues unresolved.

To the extent that retail “brand” and “image” have either the same or overlapping meaning, the literature related to the latter construct is pertinent. Matineau’s (1958) seminal work suggested that image is related to “functional” factors like those identified by Ailawai and Keller, but he also suggested that “psychological” attributes such as a sense of belonging are also important. Using a behaviorist approach, Kunkel and Berry (1969) argued that store image is the conceptualized or expected reinforcement associated with shopping at a specific store. Hirshman (1981) shifted the focus to cognitive learning, and defined store image as a “subjective phenomenon that results from the acquisition of knowledge about a store as it is perceived relative to other stores and in accordance with the consumer’s unique cognitive framework.” Mazursky and Jacoby (1986) expanded upon Hirschman’s approach, and offered a process-focused definition that considered store image to be:

[. . .] a cognition and/or affect (or set of cognitions and/or affects) which is (are) inferred either from a set of ongoing perceptions and/or memory inputs attaching to the phenomenon and which represent(s) what the phenomenon signifies to the individual.

The literature on “family brand” is also pertinent to the efforts to extend the Macy name. Milberg et al. (1997) and Lane and Jacobson (1997) all found that more accessible negative extension information had greater impact on family brand evaluation, while Loken and John (1993) reported that the salience of both typical and atypical extensions affected family brand evaluation. Ahluwalia and Gurhan-Canli (2000) further showed that accessibility of extension information influences both dilution and enhancement effects. The focus of this literature, however, is the dilution/enhancement effects on the family brand per se; it presumes strength in the brand being extended, and does not consider possibility that the family brand itself may be problematic.

Study questions As noted above, research has associated both functional aspects – access, atmosphere, price, product/service assortments – as well as subjective inputs – personal

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knowledge and memories – with retail brand. In addition, the family brand literature suggests dilution/enhancement effects that may complicate the extension of one retail brand to another. These research streams are relevant to Macy’s effort to re-brand Marshall Field’s.

It might be argued that Marshall Field’s and Macy’s, as mid-range department stores, offered objectively similar access, atmosphere, pricing and promotion, service/merchandise assortments, and within-category assortments as suggested by Ailawai and Keller (2004). However, the earlier work on store image stresses more subjective experiential and evaluative processes. To the extent that those latter brand aspects are idiosyncratically associated with one image/brand – in this particular case, Marshall Field considered a superior brand by its loyal customers – acceptance of the family Macy brand may be resisted.

In the case of Macy’s and Marshall Field’s the physical flagship stores are remarkably similar and lay claim to being, respectively, the largest and second largest in the USA. Both have well-established private labels including Charter Club at Macy’s and Field Gear at Field’s. Both retailers also use hi/lo pricing strategies that include the One Day Sale at Macy’s and Field Days at Marshall Field. Each, however, is strongly tied to a specific home city. Macy’s is one of New York’s major tourist attractions, and its annual Thanksgiving Day Parade (though televised nationally for many decades) has heralded the beginning of the Holiday Season in New York. For its part, Marshall Field’s has similar ties to Chicago. The store on the Loop is considered one of the city’s landmarks, and its annual holiday windows and the 45-foot Christmas tree in its Walnut Room restaurant are well-established traditions in the Windy City.

Since Macy’s and Marshall Fields share many functional similarities but also associated their brands with “traditions” tied to specific cities and childhood memory, the effort to extend the Macy brand to Marshall Field offers an important opportunity to learn about retail brand. In particular, this circumstance offers the opportunity of explore the following issues:

. How attached are consumers to retail “brand” names?

. How important are retail “traditions” such as holiday displays and other activities to retail brand?

. How easily will established private labels associated with one retail brand be accepted by customers who are loyal to the brand that has been replaced?

. How easily will pricing promotions that have been associated with one brand/store image transfer to another retailer?

. How important are historical ties to city/place of origin to store brand/image?

. How easily can subjective experiences associated with retail promotional activities transfer to another retailer.

Method Given the prominence of Federated Department Stores and of its stores in most of the major retail markets in the USA, news organizations closely reported the events leading up to and following the Macy’s name change. Those stories, while not specifically focused on the issues of branding/image, do contain factual information related to the measures Federated undertook to facilitate re-branding its stores. For the purposes of the present paper, they will serve as the means of identifying those activities.

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Press accounts related to customer acceptance of the former Marshall Field’s stores that provide sales estimates for those retail outlets, as well as those that report results of surveys conducted by industry consultants also serve as important sources of data for this paper.

In response to Federated’s announcement of its plan to re-brand Marshall Field’s as Macy’s, the most outraged dissidents started a blog, fieldsfanschicago.org. In recent years, blogs have become very important to marketers because they bring together online communities with similar interests and concerns. Many marketers monitor these postings to discover what consumers like or dislike about their products/services, to identify new product ideas, and to assess their competitive positions. Marketers’ interest in blogs is understandable; the blogs permit consumers an opportunity to freely identify and express themselves on matters of importance to them. For that reason, blogs can also serve as an important resource for understanding topics such as the one under consideration in this research.

To be sure, the postings to fansfieldchicago.org cannot be taken as representative of all or perhaps most of Marshall Field’s customers. They do, however, reflect the feelings of those most upset by Federated’s actions, and they also offer first person accounts of attachment to Marshall Field’s brand. For this reason, blog postings made between September 2006 and March 31, 2008 were used as a means of identifying the factors that the store’s customers believe are most pertinent to the store’s image/brand. Specifically, the following dates were closely scrutinized: September 7-11, 2006, these are the dates immediately preceding and following the Marshall Field name change to Macy; November 24-28, 2006, the first days of the 2006 Holiday sales season; March 1-5, 2007, a period in the Spring selling season; September 7-11, 2007, the days before and after the first anniversary of the re-branding, November 23-27, the first days of the second Holiday selling season after the name change; and February 6 and 7, 2008, the day of and the day following a Macy’s reorganization announcement. For each of these periods, blog posts were tabulated as a means of gauging participants’ engagement with the issue of re-branding, and posts were also classified and counted to determine the issues related to major sources of dissatisfaction with the change.

Findings When Federated announced that its former May stores would be re-branded as Macy’s, Chief Marketing Officer (CEO) Terry Lundgren made clear the reasons for the name change. He noted “We need to think of being a national retailer [. . .] We were competing as regional department stores, and not winning.” With a single name, he argued that Macy’s could use a national advertising campaign, strengthen its negotiating power with vendors, expand its private label programs, and improve its online presence (Timberlake, 2006). Federated was well aware of the difficulties likely to accompany the brand transition, and hired Anne MacDonald, who had overseen marketing for Citibank and had been vice president of brand management for Pizza Hut, as Macy’s CEO. When asked about the changing the century – old store names of the former May stores including Marshall Field’s, MacDonald stated “with an acquisition, you have to understand what the brand is currently delivering and the emotional connection consumers have with the brand”. She further commented that customers would accept the Macy name if the company “were very upfront, very respectful and very involving of the people in each of the communities” (Bryon, 2006).

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Before the re-branding occurred in September 2006, Macy’s singled out Marshall Field’s stores for special attention. Macy’s announced that it would designate the Marshall Field’s flagship store on Chicago’s Loop as “Macy’s at State Street,” and Lundgren pledged “We are fully committed to keeping the legacy of this store alive [. . .]”. As part of this effort, Federated agreed to retain the Marshall Field brass nameplates on the four corners of the flagship building, as well holiday traditions including the animated holiday displays in the store’s windows and the 45-foot Christmas tree in its Walnut Room restaurant. Federated also promised to provide a Frango Viewing Kitchen where store visitors could see Frango candies being covered with chocolate (under May ownership, production of Frango candy – a popular Marshall Field brand – had been outsourced to a company in Pennsylvania), and to refurbish the flagship building over a four-year period (Business Wire, 2006).

Federated’s actions were in keeping with Lundgren’s belief that customers are attached to store symbols and traditions rather than to the retail brand per se. In the case of the Marshall Field name change, he contended that continuation of the store’s holiday activities, returning some aspects of Frango production to Chicago, and the improvement in the condition of the flagship store would compensate for the loss of the Field’s retail brand. Many Marshall Field supporters did not agree with this stand. Even after announcement of Federated’s plans for the Field’s stores, 60,000 Chicagoans signed an online petition asking that the Marshall Field’s name be preserved, while scores of others sent angry letters to Federated in which they threatened to cut up their Field’s charge cards. Lundgren discounted these protests, and claimed that examination of the purchase records of the first 100 letter writers revealed that they accounted for “incredibly little activity” (Barbaro, 2006).

When the re-naming of Marshall Field’s stores as Macy’s officially took place on September 9, 2006, store employees welcomed the shoppers with doughnut holes, coffee and $10 gift cards at Chicago’s State Street store. At the same time, 200 protesters demonstrated outside the building. The comments of the dissidents suggest how they associated the Field’s brand with civic pride and loss of identity. One 68 year-old woman stated, “I hate to see Chicago lose something that helps it be a city and not just a collection of streets”. A 41-year old man with his seven-year old daughter rejected Chicago Mayor Richard Daley’s claim that it was “only a name change;” instead, he believed that “This is just the beginning of changes to come”. And one of the co-organizers of the event argued that the re-branding was a “downgrading,” while another protester agreed that “Macy’s is not as sophisticated and classy as Marshall Field’s” (Hussain, 2006).

The days leading up to and following the name change was one of the most active periods on the fieldsfanschicago blog. As can be seen from Table I, unhappy customers contributed 488 posts during the five days. Comments related to plans to boycott Macy stores, to the September 9 demonstration at the State Street store, and to concerns that press accounts related to the re-branding and demonstration were unfairly favoring Macy’s were the most frequent topics on the blog. However, large numbers of posts echoed the feelings of those interviewed at the September 9 protest; they noted the fact that Marshall Field’s was a Chicago institution with strong roots in the city, bemoaned the substitution of designer and Field’s private labels for what were perceived to be lower quality Macy brands, reported finding the Macy’s stores to be poorly maintained, and expressed distress about the loss of the store associated with childhood and other

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pleasant memories. More than 20 persons from outside the Chicago area also contributed comments; some commiserated with the “Field’s Fans,” and others expressed unhappiness with the fact that Macy’s nameplate had replaced regional retail brands in their localities. The vast majority of the posts supported resistance to the Macy’s re-branding, but seven persons were opposed; and one even suggested “you people need to get a life” (fieldsfanschicago blog).

To build the Macy brand nationwide, the retailer ran a massive advertising campaign using national and cable television as well as newspapers, radio, billboards, and the internet. Macy’s also sent 54-page catalogs to 3.8 million residents in the trading areas of the former May Department Stores which included Marshall Field’s (Cornwell, 2006). Posts to the fieldsfanschiago blog indicate that the promotional campaign did not appeal to all. Several bloggers noted that when they initially saw the red and white ads, they thought they were for the mass merchandise, Target. Another commented, “How do they have the nerve to run them in the Chicago market?” while another noted that the ads “are somewhere between loud, parody, TJMaxx/Marshall’s [. . .]” The catalog did not receive a warmer reception; in fact, “gayle” reported, “I first threw it in the garbage, but changed my mind and fished it out thinking I’d start collecting a paper trail of Macy’s lies” (fieldsfanschiago blog).

In October 2006, Deloitte & Touche surveyed 13,400 shoppers, including 450 in Chicago. The firm found that 41 percent of Chicago respondents were unhappy with the change to Macy’s as compared with 16 percent of shoppers nationwide. In addition, 25 percent of the former Marshall Field customers planned to do less shopping at Macy’s, while only 9 percent of those surveyed in other areas had similar plans. John Salata, a Deloitte partner noted that:

September 7-11, 2006

November 24-28, 2006

March 1-5, 2007

September 7-11, 2007

November 23-27, 2007

Total posts 488 73 39 107 66 Inferior merchandise 27 10 8 26 6 Inferior store atmosphere 21 0 3 6 0 Inferior service 7 5 2 6 2 Pre-/post-demonstration 41 17 0 39 10 Boycott 40 15 9 11 11 Chicago landmark 33 7 4 9 5 Nostalgic remembrance 18 6 0 4 6 Low/no sales 0 2 4 7 0 Terry Lundgren 11 0 0 3 5 Poor promotions 15 0 1 1 0 Press coverage 52 9 3 12 0 Objection to Macy’s replacing other retailers 24 7 0 9 5 Support the change to Macy’s 7 0 0 0 0 Other shopping alternatives 0 5 9 4 4

Note: One blog posting may contain more than one issue

Table I. Issues considered on fieldsfanschicgo.org

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Chicagoans are proud of the traditions that the city was built on, and shopping at Marshall Field’s has been a part of the fabric of the city for a hundred years.

But he predicted the drop in spending would be brief, since because 90 percent of the survey respondents who had actually been in Macy’s State Street store believed the design and service were either unchanged or better (O’Connell, 2006).

For the four-week period ended October 28, 2006, Federated reported the company’s total revenue dropped 7.9 percent – a decline that was attributed to problems concentrated at Marshall Field’s and the other former May stores (Guy, 2006c). Federated officials acknowledged that an inability to wean budget-minded May consumers from the retailer’s customary sales events as well as an inadequate stock of some goods and the need to re-train salespeople about new merchandise assortments contributed to the problems. Karen Hoguet, the company’s Chief Financial Officer, noted, “We have a lot of work in front of us to create a quality selling culture and to execute correctly the localized assortments in the new Macy’s stores” (Guy, 2006a). In the short-term, Federated responded with more promotions and discounts during the 2006 holidays.

The dissidents who posted on the fieldsfanschicago blog noted Federated’s disappointing sales reports. Their entries reflect the fact that at least some of the bloggers had greater knowledge of retail operations than would be expected of average shoppers and were able to both find and understand the implications of financial data. One blogger reported doing a “quick and dirty analysis” of the figures in the November 2 press release and concluded that rumors that sales at the former Marshall Field’s stores had dropped 36 percent might be true, but another commented that “36 percent does seem like a bit of a stretch.” That blogger also reacted to Federated’s call with retail analysts on November 8. He reported that the analysts were considering that there had been as much as a 10 percent decline in same store sales at the former Marshall Field’s outlets, and he noted “If so, this is good news for our cause” (fieldsfanschicago blog).

Several of the posts during autumn 2006 also considered a $10 gift card Federated had sent. One blogger exclaimed, “OMIGOD! Federated is desperate!” Another responded, “Everyone in my household got one [. . .] I think the card will be going strictly to the trash!,” while another post reported that the “gift card is already trashed.” One card recipient, however, recommended that the card be used to purchase children’s hats and mittens, which could then be donated to Goodwill, the Salvation Army or community/church organizations (fieldsfanschicago blog).

Early in November 2006, CEO Terry Lundgren predicted a 3-5 percent increase in Federated same store sales during the upcoming holiday season (Guy, 2006c). However, in the weeks that preceded Thanksgiving, unhappy consumers boycotted and picketed the State Street store each Saturday. Their posts on the fieldsfanschicago blog demonstrate how closely the Marshall Field brand was tied to holiday tradition. One former customer posted: “I feel so sad. No Fields this Christmas, seems unreal,” and another remarked that the Macy Christmas window displays in the State Street store were “just plain and boring to watch.” Even the traditional Christmas tree decorated with Vera Wang ornaments that Federated placed in the Walnut Room Restaurant did not appeal to those upset by the loss of Marshall Field’s. One shopper called it “a sorry effort to appease Chicagoans,” and she vowed never to shop at Macy’s. Remembrances of childhood when the Christmas season included a trip to the Marshall Field’s State Street

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store were also common on the blog during the Holiday season, and one woman urged continuance of the protest “for all the children who treasured the Christmas memories in the world of Marshall Field’s North Pole” (fieldsfanschicago.blog).

Posts to fieldsfanschicago between November 24 and November 28, 2006 numbered 73 – a total, as shown on Table I, reflecting a considerable decrease in blog activity from the earlier five-day period that included the actual Macy re-branding. The comments, however, highlighted the demonstration that took place outside the Chicago State Street store to mark Black Friday – the day after Thanksgiving. This protest, which occurred on the busiest shopping day of the year, featured 12 women dressed in nineteenth century garb who carried signs bearing the words, “Give the Lady What She Wants.” The demonstrators’ attire symbolized Marshall Field’s more than century-old retail position as a retailer of fine goods in Chicago; the slogan on the signs referred to the statement attributed to founder Marshall Field and related to his recognition of the need to provide high levels of service to his customers. The protest was well-received. According to blogger posts, many passing motorists acknowledged the demonstration and honked their car horns as a show of support (fieldsfanschicago blog).

The blog posts from November 2006 also show that former Field’s customers focused on issues similar to those noted at September re-branding to Macy’s. They continued to link Marshall Field’s to Chicago heritage, complained of the lower quality merchandise in the re-branded stores, and vowed never to shop at Macy’s. In addition, they also indicated that specific retailers including Nordstrom’s, Von Maur, Neiman Marcus, and Carson’s provided excellent shopping options for the kinds of products they had previously bought at Marshall Field’s (fieldsfanschicago blog).

Press reports through December 2006 and January 2007 recounted difficulties Federated experienced at the former May stores in general and at Marshall Field’s in particular. Dana Cohen, analyst at Banc of America Securities, suggested that sales at the former Field’s stores in November 2006 were 11 percent lower than in the previous year, and argued that “Federated tried to do too much too quickly” (Guy, 2006b). Federated did not release holiday 2006 sales figures for its newly-re-branded stores, but C. Britt Beemer, chairman and founder of America’s Research Group, reported that the May locations might have lost 10-20 percent of their shoppers to competitors such as J.C. Penney’s and Kohl’s (Cornwell, 2007). And Wendy Liebmann, the president of WSL Strategic Retail, noted Macy’s faced major challenges when she commented:

They are asking shoppers [. . .] to give up a brand that a lot of them have had for a long time and have been emotionally attached to [. . .] To succeed nationally, Macy’s must be consistent in its message [. . .] It’s not enough to have the Macy’s parade (Journal Staff and Wire Report, 2007).

As shown in Table I, posts to the fieldsfanschicago blog were not as numerous between March 1 and 5, 2007 as they were during the earlier five-day periods examined in this paper. But former Field’s customers remained adamant about boycotting “Messy’s” – as they often referred to Macy’s – and they suggested that by refusing to release sales figures from its former Field’s stores, Federated was attempting to conceal the impact of their refusal to shop at the re-branded stores. The bloggers also increasingly noted finding retailers able to satisfy their needs, and they most frequently mentioned Nordstrom’s, Von Maur, and Neiman Marcus as providing reasonable shopping alternatives. Finally, they continued to find problems with Macy’s

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merchandise, and found particular fault with the store’s private labels. Allan, a regular blogger, even argued on March 2 that:

They could have (and should have) made the decision as to which brands were better, and which suppliers were better, and went with those, using their large buying power as leverage. Why not try to sell Field Gear in Cincinnati or LA instead of trying to shove Alfani [a Macy private label], upon Chicago and Minneapolis customers? (fieldsfanschicago blog).

In March 2007, Federated announced plans to change its name to Macy’s Group, Inc., a move that CEO Terry Lundgren called “another important opportunity to reinforce the recent expansion of the Macy’s brand” (Ceron, 2007). But, while the company moved to more forcefully establish its identity, it still continued to attempt to appease angry Chicago customers. As can be seen from Plate 1, the brass “Marshall Field and Company” nameplate continued to dominate a more make-shift Macy logo over the main entrance to the State Street store. In addition, for several weeks in March 2007, shoppers inside the store were greeted with signage that proclaimed “Field Days is back with a new name [. . .] Spring Sale;” as shown in Plate 2, “Field Days” was prominent, while the Macy’s logo was relegated to the lower corner of the placard. Aside from the signage, the sale also was a major departure from Federated’s earlier objective of weaning customers from the heavy price promotions that May had employed to attract budget-conscious shoppers to stores including Marshall Field’s.

In a seeming effort to reach out to unhappy Chicago shoppers, CEO Terry Lundgren in April 2007 announced the return of the Field Gear label. This Marshall Field private label, that had previously been used on a wide assortment of men’s and women’s apparel as well as home furnishings, was, however, to be limited to men’s sweaters and outdoor clothing. Lundgren also acknowledged that sales at the former Field’s stores were continuing to lag projections, but he argued “It’s not so much about the name

Plate 1. Main Entrance, State

Street store

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change;” rather, he suggested that the new merchandise and mail promotions targeting high-spending credit card holders had confused customers (Guy, 2007b).

During the Spring of 2007, Charles Grom, an analyst for JPMorgan Securities Inc., estimated sales in the re-branded Macy’s stores dropped 7 percent. Burt Flickinger III, Managing Director at Strategic Resource Group, specifically identified Chicago as the company’s most problematic market, and he noted that “They made a disastrous decision to throw the Marshall Field’s into Lake Michigan, one of the best brand names in the business” (Jones, 2007). He further stated, “It’s definitely a consumer retail revolt. This is a mistake that is a mess that is going to take years to clear up” (Bloomberg News, 2007). Macy’s reacted to its slumping sales by abandoning its “everyday value” pricing and reverting to the heavy promotions that included the one-day Macy’s savings pass which offered even greater savings possibilities than the former Marshall Field’s coupons (Guy, 2007a).

Efforts to appease consumers unhappy about the loss of Marshall Field’s evidenced no notable success. On September 9, 2007, protesters chanting the Field’s slogan, “Give the Lady What She Wants,” marked the first anniversary of the re-branding of the flagship store with a demonstration that some observers believed drew more people than that in 2006. As seen from Table I, the anniversary evoked a pronounced increase in activity on the fieldsfanschicago blog. The demonstration was a major source of comment; one former customer living in Ohio even posted: “Throwing rationality to the wind, I booked a flight so I can join you tomorrow at the rally.” This protest, like the one a year earlier, received considerable press attention, and bloggers were pleased that the coverage was more positive that that had occurred a year earlier. They also continued to argue for the return of a Chicago icon, denounce the quality of merchandise at Macy’s, and recount experiences with sloppy Macy stores and poor customer service (fieldsfanschicago blog).

Plate 2. In-store signage

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Frank Guzzetta, who had been President of Marshall Field and who became chairman and CEO of the Macy’s North division, noted in November 2007:

There are a lot of people who just can’t get over the Marshall Field’s name change. Those people, no matter how hard we worked at it, have continued to be detractors (Times Union, 2007).

This statement signaled an end to Macy’s efforts to woo former Marshall Field’s customers. Instead, for the 2007 Holiday Season, the retailer focused attention on shoppers who had never had a connection to the State Street store. Macy’s added a wine bar in the Walnut Room, offered free Wi-Fi, and featured denim-fitting clinics; these tactics were designed to appeal to college students and young professionals living in newly-built condos near the State Street store. The initiatives were, in Guzzeta’s words, an effort to “move on” (Times Union, 2007).

For their part, the posters to the fieldsfanschicag blog ignored Macy’s new approach. On Black Friday (November 23) 2007, they reported distributing 8,000 leaflets that outlined their opposition to the Macy’s re-branding and 1,300 lapel buttons that proclaimed “Forever Marshall Field’s” to holiday shoppers near the State Street store. They claimed that this number exceeded the previous total on December 23, 2006 by 250 percent. In addition, the dissidents exchanged information regarding a demonstration they were planning for Sunday, December 2, 2007, reaffirmed their support for the Macy boycott, and re-iterated their belief that Marshall Field’s was a Chicago icon. The season, however, also appeared to re-awaken memories of earlier Christmas seasons, and six bloggers, between November 23 and 27, 2007, recounted how a visit to the Chicago Marshall Field’s store had been an important part of their families’ holiday celebrations (fieldsfanschicago blog).

During the 2007 holiday season and through January 2008, American consumers, in general, curtailed their spending, and most US retailers, including Macy’s, reported poor sales results for the period. Related to these low returns and the fact that, according to one analyst, “the magic of Macy’s just hasn’t occurred,” the retailer announced a restructuring early in February 2008. The new organization placed greater emphasis on merchandising for local audiences rather than the “one size fits all approach” that David Brennan, Head of the Center for Retailing Excellence at the University of St Thomas in Minneapolis, claimed never “gained traction [. . .] in the former Marshall Field’s stores” (Crosby, 2008).

As part of the restructuring, regional offices were to be established in Chicago, Cincinnati, St Louis and Seattle, a move that CEO Lundgren argued would “drive sales growth by improving knowledge at the local level” (Schuster, 2008). He also noted that Macy’s would “continue to invest” in the former Marshall Field flagship store, and further commented that “It’s wonderful to have all of these marketing opportunities with a national brand, but we have to be locally relevant.” One analyst questioned, however, whether Macy’s was truly moving in a new direction, and argued that “These ‘localization initiatives’ sound like the differentiated regional nameplates Macy’s obliterated a year or so ago” (Jones, 2008).

The fieldsfanschicago bloggers reacted quickly to Macy’s plan, and on February 6 and 7, 2008 contributed 49 posts to the discussion board. They provided links to the accounts from Women’s Wear Daily, the Chicago Tribune, and the Chicago Sun-Times, as well as to smaller regional newspapers. They asked “Didn’t ‘market

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localization’ previously exist in the operation of Marshall Field’s, Kaufman’s, Filene’s, Foley’s, Burdines, Famous-Barr, Strawbridge’s, Rich’s and the other regional department stores?” Some suggested that the reorganization was a hopeful sign that their boycott was effective and looked forward to the return of Marshall Field’s; others argued that the changes reflected the likelihood that more decisions would be centralized in New York. Overall, however, the group seemed encouraged by Macy’s change in direction and determined to continue their boycott effort (fieldsfanschicgo blog).

Implications It is not the purpose of this paper to consider whether Macy’s re-branding of the Marshall Field’s stores should have occurred, or whether the effort can be ultimately successful. Rather, this study has attempted to use the Macy re-branding of Marshall Field’s to focus attention on the strength of retail brands, the attachments that consumers may form with a retail brand, and whether brand can be distinguished from history, symbols and traditions. These are the issues reviewed below.

“Brand” is generally associated with consumer products. The foregoing discussion, however, suggests the strength of stores as brands. From the evidence reported above, customers recognized and associated strong brands with both Marshall Field and Macy’s. The Field’s customers, however, also saw such significant differences between the two that some were willing to protest the re-branding of Marshall Field’s and even boycott the renamed Macy’s stores.

Development of product brands is generally associated with massive advertising spending. In the present case, however, many persons unhappy with the Marshall Field change to Macy’s exhibited strong brand attachments developed through personal experience with the store itself. They related the Field’s brand to childhood visits to the highly decorated store during the Christmas selling season and to other shopping trips with parents and grandparents. They claimed strong loyalty to private labels such as Field Gear and Frango. They were pleased with the Field’s merchandise assortments and mentioned only high-end retailers as possible replacements for Field’s. They also related high levels of customer service and a pleasant shopping environment to the Field brand.

Field’s customers also saw the store as a Chicago institution. For them, the flagship store on The Loop was more than a retail outlet; it was a place intimately tied to the history of their city. For them, loss of the brand diminished their hometown’s identity. In addition, those unhappy with the name change recognized store founder Marshall Field’s place in retail history, and they used his slogan, “Give the Lady What She Wants” to demonstrate their resistance to the Macy rebranding.

During months before the name change and for more than a year after it occurred, Macy’s officials including its CEO attempted to respond to customers’ unhappiness with the rebranding. In line with CEO Terry Lundgren’s belief that customers are more attached to “symbols and traditions” than to the retail brand per se, the Marshall Field nameplate remained on Chicago’s State Street store, Frango mints were sold in signature green boxes that bore the Marshall Field name in the former Field’s stores, and Christmas traditions such as the 45 foot tree in the Walnut Room restaurant and decorations in the stores windows continued. Despite these efforts, many customers remained unhappy with the Macy name, and this circumstance suggests the likelihood

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that symbols and traditions associated with a store may, in fact, be inseparable from a retail brand.

Limitations and future research The present discussion of retail brand is based on the single experience of re-branding the Marshall Field’s stores to Macy’s. Because this transition involved two of the largest retail brands in the USA and evoked ongoing resistance, the case is worthy of consideration and offers an important insights related to retail brand. It also raises important issues that should be considered in future research.

The present research shows that both Macy’s and Marshall Field’s are very strong brands with distinct identities. However, both brands were also established during a period of well over 100 years. This circumstance raises questions regarding the brand strength of contemporary retailers that have been operating for only several decades or even less time. Are years of existence related to the strength of a retail brand?

Both Marshall Field’s and Macy’s are department stores, and, as such, used holiday promotions and similar shopping events to attract customers to their stores. Contemporary retailers, by contrast, are more likely to use price promotions to drive traffic and they are also less likely to have store amenities such as restaurants or massive display windows. This situation raises the question of whether the traditional department store, that provides many experiential opportunities for their customers, is more likely to develop stronger brands than other types of retailers.

Finally, contemporary retailers rely heavily on advertising to establish their brands. Because of such promotions, consumers can readily associate logos, slogans, and even colors with specific retail names. But are these retail brands as strong as those brands associated with memories of childhood familial in-store experiences? This too appears to be an issue worthy of future investigation.

Macy’s experience re-branding Marshall Field’s suggests the likelihood that consumers can have strong attachment to a retail brand. Whether the loyalty Field’s customers exhibited is idiosyncratic or extends to many different types of retailers is a question that cannot be answered in the present research. Given the strong feelings that Marshall Field’s customers have demonstrated, however, further study of the factors that contribute to and maintain retail brand should be of interest to both retail academicians and practitioners.

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