Comparative Politics
Elections and Electoral Systems
Democracies are sometimes classified in terms of their electoral system.
An electoral system is a set of laws that regulate electoral competition between candidates or parties or both.
Elections are increasingly used to fill legislative and executive offices around the world.
185 of the world’s 193 independent states now use direct elections to elect people to their lower house of parliament.
Political scientists typically distinguish between electoral systems based on their electoral formula.
1. Majoritarian
2. Proportional
3. Mixed
An electoral formula determines how votes are translated into seats.
A majoritarian electoral system is one in which the candidates or parties that receive the most votes wins.
A single-member district plurality system (SMDP) is one in which individuals cast a single vote for a candidate in a single-member district.
The candidate with the most votes wins.
The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is a system in which voters cast a single candidate-centered vote in a multimember district.
The candidates with the highest number of votes are elected.
Whereas SMDP and SNTV are ‘plurality’ majoritarian electoral systems, the alternative vote is an ‘absolute majority’ majoritarian system.
The alternative vote (AV) is a candidate-centered preference voting system used in single-member districts where voters rank order the candidates.
If a candidate wins an absolute majority of first-preference votes, she is immediately elected.
If no candidate wins an absolute majority, then the candidate with the fewest first-preference votes is eliminated, and her votes are reallocated among the remaining candidates based on the designated second preferences.
This process is repeated until one candidate has obtained an absolute majority of the votes cast (full preferential system) or an absolute majority of the valid votes remaining (optional preferential system).
Richmond Constituency, New South Wales, Australia 1990
The majority-runoff two-round system (TRS) is another ‘absolute majority’ majoritarian electoral system.
In a majority-runoff TRS voters cast a single candidate-centered vote in a single-member district.
Any candidate who obtains an absolute majority in the first round of elections is elected.
If no one obtains an absolute majority, then the top two vote winners go on to compete in a runoff election in the second round.
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A proportional, or proportional representation (PR), electoral system is a quota- or divisor-based electoral system employed in multimember districts.
The rationale behind PR systems is to produce a proportional translation of votes into seats.
Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems come in two main types:
1. List proportional representation systems (List PR)
2. Single transferable vote (STV)
In a list PR system, each party presents a list of candidates to voters in each multimember district.
Parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the votes.
These seats are then allocated among the candidates on their list in various ways.
List PR systems differ in important ways:
1. The precise formula for allocating seats to parties
2. The district magnitude
3. The use of electoral thresholds
4. The type of party list employed
All PR systems employ either quotas or divisors to allocate seats to parties.
A quota is essentially the ‘price’ in terms of votes that a party must ‘pay’ to guarantee themselves a seat in a particular electoral district.
A quota, Q(n), is calculated as
Q(n) = Vd
Md + n
• Vd is the number of valid votes in district d.
• Md is the district magnitude or number of available seats in district d.
• n is the modifier of the quota.
A quota, Q(n), is calculated as
Q(n) = Vd
Md + n
• Hare quota: n = 0.
• Hagenbach-Bischoff quota: n = 1.
• Imperiali quota: n = 2.
• Reinforced imperiali quota: n = 3.
• The Droop quota is the same as the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota plus 1.
What about the ‘remainder’ seats?
What about the ‘remainder’ seats?
The most common method for allocating the remainder seats is the largest remainder method.
A divisor, or highest average, system divides the total number of votes won by each party in a district by a series of numbers (divisors) to obtain quotients.
District seats are then allocated according to which parties have the highest quotients.
The three most common divisor systems are:
• D’Hondt: 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .
• Sainte-Laguë: 1, 3, 5, 7, . . .
• Modified Sainte-Laguë: 1.4, 3, 5, 7, . . .
The key factor influencing the proportionality of an electoral system is the district magnitude.
District magnitude refers to the number of representatives elected in a district.
The larger the district magnitude, the greater the degree of proportionality.
There is considerable variation in the district magnitude across countries.
In 2006 and 2007, Ukraine had a district magnitude of 450.
Serbia currently has a district magnitude of 250.
Historically, Chile has had a district magnitude of 2.
All proportional electoral systems have an electoral threshold.
An electoral threshold is the minimum level of support a party needs to obtain representation.
A natural threshold is a mathematical by-product of the electoral system.
A formal threshold is explicitly written into the electoral law.
Electoral system proportionality is low when the electoral threshold is high.
Electoral thresholds can have negative side-effects.
• In Turkey 2002, so many parties failed to surpass the 10% threshold that fully 46% of all votes were wasted.
• In Poland 1993, 34% of the votes were wasted, allowing the former Communists to return to power.
In a closed party list, the order of candidates elected is determined by the party itself, and voters are not able to express a preference for a particular candidate.
In an open party list, voters can indicate not just their preferred party, but also their favored candidate within that party.
In a free party list, voters have multiple votes that they can allocate either within a single party list or across different party lists.
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The only proportional electoral system that does not employ a party list is the single transferable vote.
The single transferable vote (STV) is a candidate-centered preferential voting system used in multimember districts.
In STV systems, candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are immediately elected.
In successive counts, voters from eliminated candidates and surplus votes from elected candidates are reallocated to the remaining candidates until all of the seats are filled.
STV systems, click here
Australian elections, click here
STV example
• District magnitude is 3.
• 20 voters.
• 5 candidates: Bruce, Shane, Sheila, Glen, and Ella.
• Droop quota: [20/(3 + 1)] + 1 = 6
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A mixed electoral system is one in which voters elect representatives through two different systems, one majoritarian and one proportional.
Most mixed systems employ multiple electoral tiers.
An electoral tier is a level at which votes are translated into seats.
The lowest electoral tier is the district or constituency level. Higher tiers are constituted by grouping together different lower-tier constituencies, typically at the regional or national level.
In a mixed system, it is often the case that a majoritarian system is used in the lowest tier (district level) and a proportional system is used in the upper tier (regional or national level).
There are two basic types of mixed systems.
1. An independent mixed electoral system is one in which the majoritarian and proportional components of the electoral system are implemented independently of one another. Also known as Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM).
2. A dependent mixed electoral system is one in which the application of the proportional formula is dependent on the distribution of seats or votes produced by the majoritarian formula. Also known as Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP).
In most dependent mixed systems, individuals have two votes.
• One vote is for the representative at the district level (candidate vote).
• One vote is for the party list in the higher electoral tier (party vote).
Social Cleavages and Party Systems
A political party can be thought of as a group of people that includes those who hold office and those who help get and keep them there.
Political parties serve four main purposes:
1. Structure the political world
2. Recruitment and socialization of political elite
3. Mobilization of the masses
4. The link between rulers and the ruled
A nonpartisan democracy is a democracy with no official political parties.
A single-party system is one in which only one political party is legally allowed to hold power.
A one-party dominant system is one in which multiple parties may legally operate but in which only one particular party has a realistic chance of gaining power.
A two-party system is one in which only two major political parties have a realistic change of holding power.
A multiparty system is one in which more than two parties have a realistic change of holding power.
Why are some party systems divided primarily along ethnic lines, while others are divided mainly along class, religious, linguistic, or regional ones?
One of the roles of parties is to represent social cleavages.
• Urban-rural cleavage • Confessional cleavage • Secular-clerical cleavage • Class cleavage • Post-materialist cleavage • Ethnic and linguistic cleavages
Individuals have a repertoire of attributes — religion, language, class, gender etc. — that makes them eligible for membership in some identity category.
An attribute is a characteristic that qualifies an individual for membership in an identity category.
• Attributes are given and self-evident.
An identity category is a social group in which an individual can place herself.
• Identity categories are socially constructed.
How attributes map onto actual identity categories depends on the distribution and correlation of those attributes.
A country with uncorrelated attributes has cross-cutting attributes (cleavages).
A country with correlated attributes has reinforcing attributes (cleavages).
North vs. South and French-speaking vs. Dutch-speaking are as equally likely to be activated as French-speaking Northerner, Dutch-speaking Northerner, French-speaking Southerner, or Dutch-speaking Southerner.
The identity categories that are likely to be activated are Dutch-speaking Northerners and French-speaking Southerners.
Electoral rules also influence which cleavages become politicized.
Country A: Gaining national office requires 50% of the vote.
Country B: Gaining national office requires 60% of the vote.
Country A: North vs. South (regional cleavage).
Country B: French vs. Dutch (linguistic cleavage).
The distribution of cleavages also matters.
Country C: Gaining national office requires 60% of the vote.
Country D: Gaining national office requires 60% of the vote.
The distribution of cleavages also matters.
Country C: French vs. Dutch (linguistic cleavage).
Country D: North vs. South (regional cleavage). �
2 3
of Chewas and Tumbukas live in Malawi, and 1 3
live in Zambia.
Puzzle:
• Malawi: Chewas and Tumbukas are arch political enemies.
• Zambia: Chewas and Tumbukas are political allies.
Political Salience of Cultural Difference November 2004
FIGURE 1. Research Sites
Mwase Lundazi, Zambia Kapopo, Malawi
Mkanda, Zambia Mkanda, Malawi
pairs was the fact that Mkanda (Zambia) and Mwase- Lundazi were on the Zambian side of the border and Mkanda (Malawi) and Kapopo were on the Malawian side.
I began my work at each of the four research sites by visiting the local chief to present my credentials and request his permission to carry out interviews in the surrounding area. Having granted his permission, the chief would then provide a messenger to accom- pany my research team to the neighboring subvillages, where we would repeat this process with the local headmen before actually beginning the survey work. Though tedious and time-consuming, such formalities are essential for village-level work of the sort we were undertaking. The time it took for introductions to be made and permissions to be granted allowed for news of our business in the area-and, critically, word
that this business had been approved by the chief-to filter through the community. This was indispensable for securing the willing cooperation of our respon- dents. It was also particularly important given that the survey we were administering required respondents to make candid statements about potentially sensitive subjects.
We interviewed 42 respondents in each of the two Zambian villages and 48 respondents in each of the two Malawian villages, for a total sample of 180. We selected respondents through a random stratified quota sampling procedure (with stratification by gender and age) from every third unrelated household.8 The sur- veys were conducted in the respondent's local language
8 Age categories were 18-26, 26-44, and 45+ years. Each category contains approximately one-third of the voting-age population.
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There are recognizable cultural differences between Chewas and Tumbukas.
• Chewas speak Chichewa, while Tumbukas speak Chitumbuka.
• Chewas dance nyau, while Tumbukas dance vinbuza.
• Chewa parents want a chicken for their daughter, while Tumbuka parents want seven cows.
Would a member of your ethnic group vote for a presidential candidate from the other ethnic group?
• Zambia: 21% said “No”. • Malawi: 61% said “No”.
Would you marry a member from the other ethnic group?
• Zambia: 24% said “No”. • Malawi: 55% said “No”.
Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and enemies in Malawi.
Why?
The two countries employ the same electoral system — SMDP.
They have both had similar party systems.
They are both former British colonies.
Malawi
• Chewas (57%) and Tumbukas (12%).
• Given their size and electoral system, it makes sense to politicize the Chewa-Tumbuka division.
• Malawi Congress Party (MCP) is seen as the Chewa party.
• Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) is seen as the Tumbuka party.
Zambia
• Chewas (7%) and Tumbukas (4%).
• Given their size and electoral system, it does not make sense to politicize the Chewa-Tumbuka division.
• The division is between the Easterners (Chewas and Tumbukas), Northerners, Westerners, and Southerners.
• Chewas and Tumbukas have to work together if they hope to win political power.
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The logic of political competition focuses voter and elite attention on some cleavages and not others.
Politicians seek to build winning political coalitions.
Not all cultural and ethnic divisions become politicized.
Why do some countries have many parties and others have few?
Duverger’s Theory
• Social divisions are the primary driving force behind the formation of parties.
• Electoral institutions influence how social divisions are translated into political parties.
Social cleavages matter.
The more social cleavages there are and the more that these cleavages are cross-cutting, the greater the demand for distinctive representation and the greater the demand for political parties.
Electoral institutions matter.
• Social cleavages create the demand for political parties.
• But electoral institutions determine whether this latent demand for representation leads to the existence of new parties.
• Specifically, non-proportional or non-permissive electoral systems act as a brake on the tendency for social cleavages to be translated into new parties.
Mechanical effect of electoral laws.
• The mechanical effect of electoral laws refers to the way votes are translated into seats.
• When electoral systems are disproportional, the mechanical effect punishes small parties and rewards large parties.
Strategic effect of electoral laws.
• The strategic effect of electoral laws refers to how the way in which votes are translated into seats influences the ‘strategic’ behavior of voters and political elites.
When electoral systems are disproportional, their mechanical effect can be expected to punish small parties and reward large parties.
As a result, voters have an incentive to engage in strategic voting and political elites have an incentive to engage in strategic entry.
Strategic effect of electoral laws.
1. Strategic voting essentially means voting for your most preferred candidate or party that has a realistic chance of winning.
2. Strategic entry refers to the decision by political elites about whether to enter the political scene under the label of their most preferred party or under the label of their most preferred party that has a realistic chance of winning.
Preference ordering: Labour>Liberal Democrat>Conservative
• Sincere voting: Labour • Strategic voting: Liberal Democrat
Imagine that you are an aspiring political entrepreneur who has an interest in environmental politics.
If you lived in Duvergerland, which party would you join – greens, labor, or business?
Strategic entry means that small parties are less likely to attract high-quality candidates and funding, or even form in the first place, in a disproportional country.
Imagine that you are an aspiring political entrepreneur who has an interest in environmental politics.
If you lived in Duvergerland, which party would you join – greens, labor, or business?
Strategic entry means that small parties are less likely to attract high-quality candidates and funding, or even form in the first place, in a disproportional country.
Technically, Duverger’s theory only holds at the district level.
In effect, there can be more parties competing nationally than there are, on average, competing in each district.
A party system is nationalized if the local and national party systems are of similar size.
Principles of Comparative Politics636
government spending increased almost tenfold as a proportion of gross national product as well. In effect, holding national office became increasingly important in the 1930s. Minor parties that were unable to credibly compete for national office were therefore at a strategic disadvantage, and the party system became nationalized.
Hicken (2009) has built on this argument to suggest that the extent to which power is shared between different branches of the national government also matters. If political power is centralized in the national government and this power is not shared between different branches of government, the value of holding national office is especially high. This creates even greater incentives for political parties to solve cross-district coordination problems, such as those highlighted in our Strategic Entry Game. The result is a party system in which Duvergerian dynamics are reflected at both the national and the district level.
Another factor that influences the nationalization of party systems is the presence of presidential elections (M. Golder 2006; Stoll 2015). The presidency is nearly always the most important electoral prize in a presidential democracy. There is typically, however, only a small number of viable presidential candidates because only one person can become the president. Given the importance of the presidency, parties that do not have a viable presidential candidate, even if they are electorally strong in their local regions, are likely to find themselves abandoned by both voters and political entrepreneurs at election time. Parties that have a national base and hence viable presidential candidates will naturally benefit from this strategic
Number of Parties at the National and District Levels in the United States, 1790–1990Figure 14.7
18001790 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
4
3
2
1
0
5
6
7
Year
E ff
e c ti
v e N
u m
b e r
o f
P a rt
ie s National level
District level
Source: Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 331).
What explains the nationalization of party systems?
• Fiscal centralization
• Political centralization
• Concurrent presidential elections
• National cleavage patterns