ACCT 352 question
MacDERMID, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Jackie DEITER, Defendant–Appellee.
(Second Circuit Court of Appeals 2012)
This appeal calls on us to decide whether a court in Connecticut may properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant who, while domiciled and working in Canada, is alleged to have accessed a computer server located in Connecticut to misappropriate confidential information belonging to her employer. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Eginton, J.) dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, reasoning that the defendant had not used a computer in Connecticut and consequently was not amenable to long-arm jurisdiction. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–59b(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). We hold that, consistent with due process, the Connecticut statute authorizes jurisdiction, and we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff–Appellant MacDermid, Inc. is a specialty chemical company with its principal place of business in Waterbury, Connecticut. Defendant–Appellee Jackie Deiter lives near Toronto in Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada, and she was employed in Canada by MacDermid's Canadian subsidiary, MacDermid Chemicals, Inc., as an account manager from May 2008 until her termination in April 2011.
The facts that were adduced on Deiter's Rule 12(b)(2) motion and are not disputed show that MacDermid stores proprietary and confidential electronic data on computer servers that it maintains in Waterbury and that employees of MacDermid Chemicals can access that information only by accessing the Waterbury servers. The record reflects that employees of MacDermid and its subsidiaries are, as a condition of employment, made aware of the housing of the companies' email system and their confidential and proprietary information in Waterbury. The record further reflects that Deiter agreed in writing to safeguard and to properly use MacDermid's confidential information and that she was not authorized to transfer such information to a personal email account.
For reasons not relevant here, MacDermid Chemicals decided to terminate Deiter effective April 7, 2011. Deiter became aware of her impending termination and, just prior to it, forwarded from her MacDermid email account to her personal email account allegedly confidential and proprietary MacDermid data files. Deiter had to access MacDermid's Waterbury computer servers both to obtain and to email the files.
MacDermid then sued Deiter in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging unauthorized access and misuse of a computer system and misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 53a–251 and 35–51 et seq. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and the Connecticut long-arm statute. Deiter moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that the long-arm statute did not reach Deiter's conduct and dismissed the complaint. MacDermid appealed.
In order for the district court to have jurisdiction over Deiter, it must be proper under both the Connecticut long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chloe, 616 F.3d at 163–65.
I.
Connecticut's long-arm statute provides that:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual․ who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state․; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state․ if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; ․ or (5) uses a computer, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53–451, or a computer network, as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of said section, located within the state.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–59b(a). The statute incorporates the following definitions:
(1) “Computer” means an electronic, magnetic or optical device or group of devices that, pursuant to a computer program, human instruction or permanent instructions contained in the device or group of devices, can automatically perform computer operations with or on computer data and can communicate the results to another computer or to a person. “Computer” includes any connected or directly related device, equipment or facility that enables the computer to store, retrieve or communicate computer programs, computer data or the results of computer operations to or from a person, another computer or another device․
(3) “Computer network” means a set of related, remotely connected devices and any communications facilities including more than one computer with the capability to transmit data among them through the communications facilities.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53–451(a).
In concluding that Connecticut's long-arm statute did not apply, the court reasoned that Deiter had not used a Connecticut computer or computer network but had simply sent email “from one computer in Canada to another computer in Canada”; that is, from her MacDermid computer at her home to her personal computer at her home.
While it is true that Deiter physically interacted only with computers in Canada, we do not believe that this fact defeats long-arm jurisdiction. The record before the district court indicated that, “[i]n order to use [her] MacDermid e-mail account and to obtain said confidential data files, Ms. Deiter accessed computer servers located in MacDermid's offices in Waterbury, Connecticut.” A computer server meets the Connecticut long-arm statute's definition of computer because it is
an electronic device that, pursuant to human instruction, can automatically perform computer operations with computer data and can communicate the results to another computer or to a person [or is a] connected or directly related device that enables the computer to store, retrieve or communicate computer data to or from a person, another computer or another device.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53–451(a)(1).
Because we are constrained to accept as true MacDermid's uncontroverted assertions that Deiter used the Connecticut servers and because the servers are computers under the long-arm statute, we conclude that Deiter used a computer in Connecticut and that the Connecticut district court had long-arm jurisdiction under § 52–59b(a)(5).
It is not material that Deiter was outside of Connecticut when she accessed the Waterbury servers. The statute requires only that the computer or network, not the user, be located in Connecticut. See § 52–59b(a)(5). The statute reaches persons outside the state who remotely access computers within the state, and we read § 52–59b(a)(5) to apply to torts committed by persons not in Connecticut based on conduct not covered by §§ 52–59b(a)(1), (2), or (3). . . .
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.
BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
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