Business and Economics Growth Related Questions

Long-term Economic Performance in Thailand Author(s): Peter Warr Source: ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 1, Bridging the ASEAN Developmental Divide: Challenges and Prospects (April 2007), pp. 138-163 Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45275814 Accessed: 27-01-2021 04:11 UTC

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ASEAN Economie Bulletin Vol. 24, No. 1 (2007), pp. 138-63

DOI: 10.1355/ae24-lh

ISSN 0217-4472 print / ISSN 1793-2831 electronic

Long-term Economic Performance in Thailand

Peter Warr

Thailand's long-term economic growth has been remarkable. This progress has been reflected in the very significant improvement in indicators of well-being, such as life expectancy ; infant

and maternal mortality ; and literacy. Poverty incidence has declined dramatically, but economic inequality has increased. The performance of the education system is chronically weak. Environmental problems and institutional failures in resource management are ongoing. Reform is needed in several areas, including political and corporate governance, trade policy, regulation of industry and the education and health systems. This article attempts to clarify these issues and to suggest the most important areas for reform.

Keywords: Thailand, economic growth, poverty reduction, inequality, productivity growth.

I. Introduction: Thailand and Its Neighbours in Long-Term Perspective

The economies of Southeast Asia are diverse. Efforts to achieve closer economic integration among them are desirable, but these efforts must be based on an understanding of the economic circumstances of each of the economies concerned. The present article attempts to draw out the important features of the Thai economy which must be taken into account in this exercise.

There is a further, and possibly deeper, reason for studying individual country experiences in depth. The countries of Southeast Asia have employed quite different development strategies. How have these strategies worked out, and what lessons might others draw from this experience? A

good example is the comparison between Thailand and neighbouring country Burma/Myanmar. The two have similar natural resource endowments,

and half a century ago these two countries were similarly impoverished. But the development strategies employed since then and their subsequent economic outcomes could not be more different. The countries of Southeast Asia provide several natural experiments of this kind. To extract

their lessons, the individual country experiences must first be examined closely.

II. Long-Term Economic Growth

In 1945 Thailand was one of the world's poorest countries. Its economy had been stagnant for at

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least a century (Sompop 1989), and it had suffered significant war damage. Most economic observers of the time rated its prospects poorly (Ingram 1971). By the mid-1990s, half a century later, these negative assessments had been reversed. Thailand was widely considered a champion of sustained development, having achieved a combination of rapid growth, macroeconomic stability and steadily declining poverty incidence, extending over several decades. The twin currency and banking crises of 1997-99 interrupted this process, eroding some of the gains that had earlier

been made, but subsequent recovery has partially restored Thailand's long-term growth path.

This growth performance is summarized in Figure 1, showing the level of real GDP per capita in each year (vertical bars) and its growth rate

(solid line) for the period 1951 to 2006. The figure identifies four periods of Thailand's recent economic history: I - pre-boom (until 1986); II - boom (1987 to 1996); DI - crisis (1997 to 1999); and IV - recovery (2000 to 2006). Over the period 1968-86, the average annual growth rate of Thailand's real GNP was 6.7 per cent (almost 5 per cent per person), compared with an average of 2.4 per cent for low and middle-income countries (World Bank 1998). Then, over the decade 1987-96 the Thai economy boomed. It was the fastest growing in the world. As we shall see below, this boom was driven primarily by very high levels of investment, both domestic and foreign, in physical capital.

Even more remarkable than the rate of growth over this long period was the stability of the

FIGURE 1

Thailand: Real GDP Per Capita and Growth of Real GDP Per Capita, 1951-2006

Source: Author's calculations, using data from National Economic and Social Development Board.

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growth. Not a single year of negative growth of real output per head of population was experienced over the four decades from 1958 to 1996, a unique achievement among oil-importing developing countries. Thailand's performance was often described as an example others might emulate. Its principal economic institutions, including its central bank, the Bank of Thailand, were often cited as examples of competent and stable management.

The crisis of 1997-98 shattered these assess-

ments. Domestically, the economy was in disarray:

output and investment were contracting; poverty incidence was rising; the exchange rate had collapsed, following the decision to float the currency in July 1997; the government had been compelled to accept a humiliating IMF bailout package; the financial system was largely bankrupt; and confidence in the country's economic institutions, including the Bank of Thailand, was damaged. Internationally, Thailand was now characterized as the initiator of a "contagion effect" in Asian financial markets, undermining economic and political stability and bringing economic hardship to millions of people.

The economic damage done by the crisis of 1997-99, and the hardship that resulted were both substantial. The crisis eroded some of the gains from the economic growth that had been achieved during the long period of economic expansion, but it did not erase them. At the low point of the crisis

in 1998 the level of GDP per capita was almost 14

per cent lower than it had been only two years earlier, in 1996. Nevertheless, because of the sustained growth that had preceded the crisis, this

reduced level of 1998 was still higher than it had been only five years earlier, in 1993, and was seven times its level in 1951.

Since the crisis, Thailand's economic recovery has been moderate. The rate of growth of real GDP, at 5 per cent, has been somewhat below its long-term trend rate of well over 6 per cent (see Table 1), and it was not until 2003 that the level of

real GDP per capita had recovered to its pre-crisis level of 1996. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined dramatically since 1998 and private domestic investment has remained sluggish. In 2006 the level of real economic output per person was 19 per cent above its 1996 pre-crisis level and almost 10 times its level 55 years earlier, in 1951. The average annual rate of growth of real GDP per person over this entire period of five and a half decades was 4.2 per cent.

Figures 2 and 3 place the last two decades in a comparative East Asian perspective. Data on real GDP are presented for eight East Asian economies, including Thailand. The point made by these comparisons is the very large difference between the periods before and after 1996. The pre-crisis period of 1986 to 1996 is covered in Figure 2, with each country's 1986 level of real GDP indexed to 100. The crisis and post-crisis periods of 1996 to 2006 are shown in Figure 3, with 1996 real GDP this time indexed to 100.

TABLE 1

Thailand: Growth of GDP and Its Sectoral Components, 1968-2006 (Per cent per annum)

Pre-boom Boom Crisis Recovery Whole period 1968-86 1987-96 1997-99 2000-2006 1968-2006

Total GDP 6.7 9.5 -2.5 5.0 6.4 Agriculture 4.5 2.6 0.1 2.7 3.3Industry 8.5 12.8 -1.7 6.2 8.4Services 6.8 9 -3.6 4.3 6.1 Sources: Bank of Thailand, data for 1968 to 1986; National Economic and Social

Development Board, data from 1987.

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FIGURE 2

Real GDP in East Asia, 1986-96

Source: Asian Development Bank, Development Indicators, various issues.

Figure 2 shows that Thailand's boom was the laigest of the countries shown, but only marginally

so. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan were not far behind.

Figure 3 shows that in 1998 serious contractions occurred in Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia, but that, relative to 1996, Thailand's initial contraction

was the most severe. Along with Indonesia, its contraction has also been the most long-lasting. Thailand's contraction was initially larger than Indonesia's, but Indonesia did not experience a recovery as large as Thailand's in 1999. It is commonly said that Indonesia's economic crisis was more severe than Thailand's, but these data reveal a somewhat different story. Using the pre- crisis year of 1996 as a base, their time paths of real GDP, relative to that 1996 base, were remarkably similar. The main difference is that since 2002 Indonesia's recovery has been marginally slower.

III. Sources of Aggregate Growth

Where did Thailand's economic growth come from? Explaining long-term growth involves dis- tinguishing between the growth of the factors of production employed and the growth in their productivity. We now discuss a growth accounting exercise for Thailand, covering the years 1980 to 2002. The present section presents this analysis at an aggregate, economy-wide level, and the following section disaggregates the analysis by major sector.

The assumption being made in this kind of analysis is that during the period covered output was primarily supply-constrained, meaning that aggregate demand was not the binding constraint on output. This assumption seems reasonable for the period prior to the Asian crisis of 1997-99, but

the crisis and recovery periods from 1997 onwards

were characterized by a deficiency of aggregate

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FIGURE 3

Real GDP in East Asia, 1996-2005

Source: Asian Development Bank, Development Indicators , various issues.

demand. A growth accounting framework, which focuses on the determinants of aggregate supply, is

therefore of limited relevance for such periods. The data relating to that period are included here mainly for completeness.

Data on labour inputs are adjusted for changes in the quality of the workforce by disaggregating the workforce by the educational characteristics of

workers and weighting these components of the workforce using time series wage data for the educational categories concerned. Data on land inputs are similarly adjusted for the changing quality of land inputs by disaggregating by irrigated and non-irrigated land and then reaggregating these components using data on land prices. In Table 2, the resulting estimates of factor growth rates are contained in the first column. The second column provides average factor cost shares over time, compiled from factor

price data. These factor cost shares impose the

assumption of constant returns to scale. The factor

cost shares used in the calculations vary over time.

The summary data shown in the table are the averages of these shares.

The third column on factor contributions to

growth weighs the growth rates of factors by their

cost shares, producing an estimate of the degree to

which the growth of output (6.01 per cent) is attributable to growth of each component. These data are then used to calculate total factor productivity growth (IFF) as a residual. The final column shows the estimated percentage contribution of each component to the overall growth rate.

The outstanding point is the rapid growth of the

physical capital stock. The capital stock grew more rapidly than output in both the pre-boom and

boom periods. This growth of the capital stock accounted for 71 per cent of the growth of output

over the period 1980-2002. Growth of the size of

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TABLE 2

Thailand: Aggregate Growth Accounting, 1980 to 2002

Annual Average Contribution Per cent growth rate cost share to total growth contribution to (% per year) (%) (% per year) total growth

Output 6.01 n.a. n.a. 100All factors 5.41 100 5.41 90.0Raw labour 2.19 40.2 0.88 14.7 Human capital 2.49 11.2 0.28 4.6Physical capital 9.05 46.9 4.24 70.6Agricultural land 1.12 1.8 0.02 3.3

Aggregate TFP growth n.a. n.a. 0.60 10.0 Note: n.a. means not applicable. Source: Author's calculations, using data from National Economic and Social Development Board. Further detail on these calculations is provided in the text and in Warr (2005a).

the labour force contributed about 15 per cent of the growth of output, but improvements in the quality of the labour force made only a modest contribution, explaining less than 5 per cent of overall growth. Indeed, the performance of Thailand's educational sector has been among the weakest in East Asia. Secondary school participation rates were low and did not improve greatly during the pre-boom and boom periods (Sirilaksana 1993). Similarly, since the 1960s the expansion of the cultivated land area has been small. Growth of the stock of land was not the

source either. TFP growth was only moderately important, accounting for 10 per cent of output growth.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the explanation for Thailand's impressive growth lies primarily with growth of the physical capital stock. Both domestic and foreign investment grew rapidly, but

the growth rate of foreign investment was larger,

from about 1987 (Warr 1993). Foreign investment plays an important role in introducing new technology and in development of export markets.

Nevertheless, the quantitative importance of foreign investment in Thailand's capital stock accumulation is easily exaggerated. Figure 4

makes this point by decomposing Thailand's total annual level of investment into three components:

domestic private, public, and FDI. It does this for each of four years, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005. Of these three components, domestic private investment is by far the largest and FDI by far the smallest. In 2005 their percentage contributions to the overall level of investment

were: private domestic - 69.5, public - 26.8, and FDI - 3.7. Private investment by Thais themselves was the dominant contributor to overall capital accumulation.

How was the investment financed? Did the

funds come from domestic savings or from borrowing from abroad? Table 3 presents an accounting of this issue based on the identities that: (i) total investment = household savings + government savings + foreign savings; and (ii) foreign savings = long term capital inflow + short term capital inflow - change in international reserves of the central bank. By far the most important source of finance was the private savings of Thais themselves.

Contrary to the common perception that Thailand's boom (1987-96) was financed largely by foreign capital, this source, consisting of

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FIGURE 4

Thailand: Composition of Net Annual Investment, 1975-2005

Source: Author's calculations using data from National Economic and Social Development Board.

private FDI plus foreign government investment (overseas development assistance, or ODA), accounted for an average of only 5 per cent of total

investment. During the pre-boom period, FDI accounted for about 61 per cent of this inflow of long-term foreign capital, and ODA accounted for the other 39 per cent. During the boom period, these

proportions were 73 and 27 per cent, respectively. Short-term capital inflows, consisting of borrowing

from abroad plus portfolio inflows plus domestic bank accounts held by foreigners were a more important source, accounting for 23 per cent of total

investment. During the boom, government dis- saving (budget deficits) reduced the funds available

for investment by 1 1 per cent, and increases in the international reserves of the Bank of Thailand

reduced it by a further 9 per cent.

It is instructive to compare the boom period (1987-96) with the pre-boom period (1973-86).

The major difference between these periods was in the proportion of total investment that was financed by short-term capital inflows. This proportion increased from 2 per cent before the boom to 23 per cent during the boom. The inflow financed investment, but it also sowed the seeds of the crisis of 1997-99. The accumulated stock of

mobile foreign-owned capital grew to levels far exceeding the stock of the Bank of Thailand's foreign exchange reserves. If the owners of these funds chose to withdraw them from Thailand, the Bank of Thailand would be unable to defend its

fixed exchange rate. Unfortunately, this is what happened in July 1997 (see Warr 1999 and 2005a).

In summary, growth of the physical capital stock was the most important contributor to Thailand's aggregate growth, accounting for 71 per cent of all growth over the period 1980-2002 (Table 2). Most of this investment was financed

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from Thai domestic private savings. The notion that Thailand's accumulation of physical capital was financed by FDI and/or foreign aid is a myth. Total foreign capital inflows, FDI plus ODA accounted for only about 5 per cent of total investment. ODA was less than one-third of this

foreign capital inflow. That is, the quantity of ODA explains only 1.5 per cent of total investment over this period, and thus under 1 per cent of total growth.

Before leaving the subject of Thailand's aggregate economic performance, one further topic requires discussion. Why has Thailand's recovery been so slow? As noted above, the crisis

was a contraction in aggregate demand, rather than

a contraction in productive capacity. Labour and capital were underutilized because there was insufficient demand for Thai output. Where did this contraction in demand come from? Table 4

addresses this point. The upper section of the table

shows contributions to the composition of expenditure on GDP in Thailand during the pre- crisis boom (1987-96), the crisis (1997-99) and the post-crisis recovery period (2000-2005). During the crisis the share of investment in GDP collapsed by 13 percentage points. Investor confidence was severely damaged by the events surrounding the crisis, and during the post-crisis

TABLE 4

Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia: Contributions to Expenditure on GDP, 1987-2005 (Per cent of GDP)

Country/Period Consumption Investment Government Net exports Total

Thailand

Pre-crisis(1987-96) 54.8 38.9 9.9 -5.0 100 Crisis

(1997-99) 54.9 25.7 10.9 9.9 100 Post-crisis

(2000-2005) 56.9 24.8 11.2 4.9 100 Indonesia Pre-crisis(1987-96) 55.0 27.8 9.1 0.4 100 Crisis(1997-99) 76.1 29.1 8.5 7.5 100 Post-crisis

(2000-2005) 60.6 20.8 8.7 6.2 100 Malaysia Pre-crisis

(1987-96) 48.8 37.2 12.8 1.2 100 Crisis

(1997-99) 42.8 30.5 10.5 16.2 100 Post-crisis

(2000-2005) 43.6 23.0 12.9 20.6 100 Source: Author's calculations, using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators. Negative

entries for net exports mean that gross imports exceed gross exports.

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recovery period this share did not recover sufficiently to restore Thailand's long-term rate of

growth.

Why has this occurred? High interest rates are not the answer. Figure 5 shows that although Thailand's interest rates increased during the crisis, they have been at historically low levels since the year 2000. A clue is provided by Figure 6, which shows the relationship between the stock exchange index for Thailand (SET) and the level of private investment. Investment follows the SET,

but with a lag. The stock exchange index may be viewed as an indicator of investor confidence.

Investors have lost confidence in the capacity of the Thai economy to generate a satisfactory return on their investments.

This problem is not unique to Thailand. Table 4 shows similar calculations for two other crisis-

affected economies, Indonesia and Malaysia. The

pattern is very similar. Finally, Figure 7 shows annual data on the share of investment in GDP in five crisis-affected East Asian economies: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea. Although the contraction -of private investment in Thailand is at least as large as any other (Malaysia is similar), the figure shows that the problem of sluggish recovery of investment is

shared by several East Asian economies. It would not seem appropriate to look for country-specific causes. The decline of investor confidence is regionwide.

IV. Sectoral Economic Performance and

Productivity Growth

How do the major sectors of the Thai economy compare in terms of productivity growth? Table 1,

above, summarizes the sectoral composition of

FIGURE 5

Thailand: Real and Nominal Interest Rates, 1994-2006

Note: The real rate is the nominal rate minus the annual rate of CPI inflation. Source: Bank of Thailand.

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FIGURE 6

Thailand: Private Investment and the Stock Exchange Price Index

Note: Units on the left axis are the level SET index (Stock Exchange of Thailand). Units on the right axis are millions

of baht (1988 prices). Sources: National Economic and Social Development Board and Stock Exchange of Thailand.

Thailand's growth performance since 1968. The growth of industry, especially export-oriented manufacturing has far outstripped agriculture, implying that agriculture's share of GDP has declined significantly. This point is confirmed by Figure 8, which shows the rapidly changing composition of output in Thailand.

Observations of this kind are typical for rapidly

growing economies. As aggregate output per person expands, agriculture tends to contract as a share of total output, while the share of industry expands. But a common misinterpretation of this phenomenon is that the agricultural sector is "stagnant" while industry is "dynamic". The misinterpretation lies in mistaking the fact that the

level of factor productivity in agriculture tends to

be lower than in industry (and in services) with

differences in the rate of growth of productivity.

The data for Thailand indicate that although the level of factor productivity is indeed lower in agriculture, the growth of productivity has been much more rapid there than in other sectors. The key point is that Thai agriculture has been expanding its output, albeit more slowly than the rest of the economy, with declining shares of the nation's resources.

The evidence for this conclusion is summarized in Table 5. This table summarizes a set of calculations for agriculture, industry and services, which mirror the aggregate analysis reported in Table 2 above. The data used in this analysis again cover the years 1980 to 2002 and include: • employment of labour by educational category

by sector;

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FIGURE 7

Investment Shares of GDP in East Asia, 1993-2005

Source: Author's calculations, using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators .

• physical capital used by each sector; • use of land in agriculture, adjusted by the extent

of irrigation coverage; and • cost shares for each of the above factors of

production by sector. For convenience, the first column of Table 5

repeats the findings at the aggregate level, discussed above. The sectoral findings may be summarized as follows. First, although output (value added) grew more slowly in agriculture (2.64 per cent) than in either industry (8.09 per cent) or services (5.53 per cent), it was the only major sector to record positive TFP growth. This TFP growth in agriculture contributed one- twentieth of the overall growth of GDP. In agriculture, the growth of output of 2.64 per cent per year was achieved by factor input growth of 0.47 per and TFP growth of 2.17 per cent. TFP

growth therefore accounted for 82 per cent of the

growth of value-added in agriculture.

Second, the analysis decomposes the aggregate productivity growth component just described into

one component due to growth in productivity in individual sectors, each weighted by its share of GDP, and a second component due to the reallocation of resources among sectors of differing TFP. This distinction was apparently first

identified by Jorgenson (1988) in the context of U.S. productivity growth. This analysis indicates that the level of factor productivity in agriculture

remained significantly lower than elsewhere in the

economy, despite its higher TFP growth over this period. The movement of factors of production out

of agriculture thus further contributed to economic

growth by raising the productivity of these factors.

Indeed, this reallocation effect contributed 24 per

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FIGURE 8

Thailand: Sectoral Shares of GDP, 1965-2005

(In percentages)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators , various issues.

cent of the growth of aggregate output that actually occurred. It was almost five times as important for overall growth as the growth in the

productivity of the factors that remained within agriculture.

The results of the analysis reveal that agriculture's contribution to economic growth in Thailand included impressive rates of TFP growth. But its main contribution occurred through releasing resources which could be used more productively elsewhere, while still maintaining output, rather than through expansion of agricultural output. It is seriously wrong to characterize Thai agriculture as "stagnant", based merely on the fact that output growth is slower in

agriculture than in other sectors. If agriculture had

really been stagnant economic growth would have been substantially lower because it would not have

been possible to raise productivity significantly within agriculture or to release resources massively while still maintaining moderate growth

of agricultural output.

Table 6 summarizes the results of this analysis by showing in the first column, the contributions to overall growth of aggregate factor growth (90 per cent of total growth) and aggregate measures TFP (10 per cent). It then decomposes this aggregate TFP growth into its sectoral components

and the part that is due to the reallocation of resources from low productivity sectors (mainly agriculture) to higher productivity sectors (mainly

industry). Although agriculture generated positive TFP growth, in other sectors TFP growth was negative. Indeed, when each of these other sectors'

contributions to aggregate TFP growth are added, the total is slightly negative. Of the 10 per cent of

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TABLE 5

Thailand: Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sectors, 1980-2002

Aggregate Agriculture Industry Services

Average growth rates (per cent per annum)Output 6.01 2.64 8.09 5.53Raw labour 2.19 1.50 5.25 3.47 Human capital 2.49 9.43 11.35 6.90Physical capital 9.05 8.50 13.84 18.47Agricultural land 1.12 1.12 0 0 Average cost shares (per cent )Raw labour 40.2 59.0 30.4 31.0Human capital 11.2 3.9 12.0 9.2Physical capital 46.9 13.0 57.6 59.8Agricultural land 1.8 24.1 0 0 Decomposition of output growth (per cent per annum)Output growth 6.01 2.64 8.09 5.53Factor growth 5.41 0.47 9.20 7.04TFP growth 0.60 2.17 -1.11 -1.51 Decomposition of aggregate TFP growth (per cent per annum) Aggregate sectoral TFPG -0.85Reallocation effect 1.45 Source: Author's calculations, using data from National Economic and Social Development Board. Further detail on these calculations is provided in Warr (2005a).

TABLE 6

Thailand: Percentage Contributions to Aggregate Growth, 1980-2002

(In percentages)

Whole Pre-crisis period period

1980-2002 1980-96

Aggregate factor growth 90.0 80.3 Aggregate TFP growth 10.0 19.7 Agriculture TFP growth 5.0 2.9 Industry TFP growth -7.1 -1.1 Services TFP growth -12.0 0.7 Reallocation effect 24.1 17.3Total 100 100

Source: Author's calculations, using data from National Economic and Social Development Board. Further detail on these calculations is provided in Warr (2005a).

aggregate GDP growth which can be attributed to aggregate TFP growth, all of this amount is accounted for by the reallocation of resources among sectors. Finally, the second column of Table 6 shows that these qualitative conclusions are not reversed if the analysis is confined only to

the resource-constrained, pre-crisis period.

V. Poverty Incidence and Inequality

Is economic growth really so important? Do the poor actually benefit from it, or only the rich? Within Thailand, as elsewhere, there is considerable debate about these matters. Before

turning to the relationship between poverty incidence and economic growth in Thailand, some characteristics of poverty in Thailand will be reviewed. Despite much dispute about measure- ment and conceptual issues, all major studies of

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TABLE 7

Thailand: Poverty Incidence and Gini coefficient, 1988 to 2004 (Headcount measure, per cent of total population)

Poverty incidence Inequality (headcount measure, per cent of population) (Gini coefficient)

Aggregate Rural Urban Aggregate 1988 44.9 52.9 25.2 0.4821990 38.2 45.2 21.4 0.5201992 32.5 40.3 14.1 0.5411994 25.0 30.7 11.7 0.5221996 17.0 21.3 7.3 0.5181998 18.8 23.7 7.5 0.5152000 21.3 27.0 8.7 0.5252002 15.5 19.7 6.7 0.5012004 11.3 14.3 4.9 0.499 Note: Higher values of the Gini coefficient indicate greater inequality. Source: National Economic and Social Development Board website: http://poverty.nesdb.go.th/poverty_new/doc/NESDB/wanchat_2004 1 22004 1 907.ppt

poverty incidence and inequality in Thailand agree on some basic points: • Poverty is concentrated in rural areas, especially

in the northeastern and northern regions of the

country.

• Absolute poverty has declined dramatically over the last four decades, but inequality has increased.

• The long-term decline in poverty incidence was not confined to the capital, Bangkok, or its immediate environs, or to urban areas in general, but occurred in rural areas as well. Since 1988, the largest absolute decline in poverty incidence occurred in the poorest region

of the country, the northeast.

• Large families are more likely to be poor than smaller families.

• Farming families operating small areas of land are more likely to be poor than those operating larger areas.

• Households headed by persons with low levels of education are more likely to be poor than others.

The following discussion draws upon the official poverty estimates produced by the Thai

government's National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) which, like all other available poverty estimates, are based upon the household incomes collected in the National

Statistical Office's Socio-economic Survey (SES) household survey data. Despite their imperfections, these are the only data available covering a long time period. These survey data have been collected since 1962. The early data were based on small samples, but their reliability has improved steadily, and since 1988 the raw data have been available in electronic form. Table 7 summarizes the available official data for the four decades from 1988 to 2004.

VI Declining Poverty Incidence, Rising Inequality

Table 7 focuses on the familiar headcount measure

of poverty incidence: the percentage of a particular population whose household incomes per person fall below the poverty line. The table confirms that most of Thailand's poor people reside in rural areas. Until recently, the SES data were classified according to residential location in

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the categories municipal areas, sanitary districts, and villages. These correspond to inner urban (historical urban boundaries), outer urban (newly established urban areas), and rural areas, respectively. Poverty incidence is highest in the rural areas, followed by outer urban, and lowest in the inner urban areas. When these data are recalculated in terms of the share of each of these

residential areas in the total number of poor people

and then the share of the total population, as in the

last two rows of the table, respectively, a striking point emerges. In 2004, rural areas accounted for 93 per cent of the total number of poor people but

only 64 per cent of the total population. The final column of Table 7 shows the Gini

coefficient of inequality. This index takes values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating greater inequality. The index rose significantly over the three decades for which data are available. Combined with the reduction in absolute poverty which also occurred, this means that the real incomes of the poor increased with economic growth, but the incomes of the rich increased even faster.

Over the eight years from 1988 to 1996, measured poverty incidence declined by an enormous 21.4 per cent of the population, an average rate of decline in poverty incidence of 2.7 percentage points per year. That is, each year, on average 2.7 per cent of the population moved from

incomes below the poverty line to incomes above it. Over the ensuing two years ending in 1998 poverty incidence increased by 1.5 per cent of the population. Alternatively, over the eight years ending in 1996 the absolute number of persons in poverty declined by 11.1 million (from 17.9 million to 6.8 million); over the following two years the number increased by 1 million (from 6.8

to 7.9 million). Thus, according to the official data, measured in terms of absolute numbers of

people in poverty, the crisis reversed 9 per cent of

the poverty reduction that had occurred during the

eight-year period of economic boom immediately preceding the crisis.

From Figure 9, it is apparent that the northeast

region dominates poverty incidence in Thailand. This one region accounted for 51 per cent of

Thailand's poor people in 2004, but only 34 per cent of the total population. Every other region's share of the total number of poor is smaller than its share of the total population. Poverty is an especially important issue for rural people, particularly in the northeast.

More dramatic than any of these data, however,

are recently released data on the relationship between poverty incidence and education. According to the NESDB's data, of the total number of poor people in 2002, 94.7 per cent had received primary or less education. A further 2.8 per

cent had lower secondary education, 1.7 per cent upper secondary, 0.48 per cent had vocational qualifications, and 0.31 per cent had graduated from

universities. Thailand's poor are overwhelmingly uneducated, rural, and living in large families. But they are not necessarily landless.

V.2. Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth

What caused the long-term decline in poverty incidence? It is obvious that over the long term, sustained economic growth is a necessary condition for large-scale poverty alleviation. No amount of redistribution could turn a poor country

into a rich one. Long-term improvements in education have undoubtedly been important, but despite the limitations of the underlying SES data,

a reasonably clear statistical picture also emerges on the short-term relationship between poverty reductions and the rate of economic growth. The data are summarized in Figure 10, which plots the relationship between changes in poverty incidence, calculated from Table 7 above, and the

real rate of growth of GDP over the corresponding

period.

Although the number of data points is small, the

implications seem clear. Periods of more rapid economic growth were associated with more rapid reductions in the level of absolute poverty incidence. Moderately rapid growth from 1962 to 1981 coincided with steadily declining poverty incidence. Reduced growth in Thailand caused by the world recession in the early to mid-1980s coincided with worsening poverty incidence in the years 1981 to 1986. Then, Thailand's economic

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FIGURE 9

Thailand: Poverty Incidence by Region, 2004

Source: Author's calculations, using data from National Economic and Social Development Board.

boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with dramatically reduced poverty incidence. Finally, the contraction following the crisis of 1997-98 led to increased poverty incidence. The recovery since the crisis has been associated with significant poverty reductions.

On the other hand, no such simple short-term relationship can be found between the change in inequality over time and the rate of growth. The rate of growth does not seem to be a significant determinant of short-term changes in the level of inequality. Other social factors are undoubtedly playing a role, but research on this issue remains inconclusive.

VI. Non-economic Social Change: Population, Health and Education

The economic transformation that Thailand has

experienced was achieved with environmental and other costs. Pollution of air and water sources has

been well documented, and expansion of the cultivated agricultural land area has been partly at the expense of deforestation, with negative effects on land erosion and the siltation of rivers and

dams. Economic change has coincided with massive social change as well. Thai and foreign commentators agree that not all of this social change was necessarily beneficial. For example, the decline of village institutions and traditional values are widely lamented. Narcotics trafficking, including both illegal export of drugs such as marijuana and heroin and domestic use of drugs such as meta-amphetamines has had a corrupting influence. Other social evils such as trafficking in women and child prostitution reportedly persist. In

addition, rising wages in Thailand have attracted illegal migrants from neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, with occasional social conflict resulting. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to assemble solid evidence on the extent of these problems.

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FIGURE 10

Thailand: Poverty Incidence and Economic Growth

Source: Author's calculations using poverty data as in Table 1.4 and GDP data from National Economic and Social Development Board.

Despite these genuine problems, evidence can be advanced for substantial social progress accompanying Thailand's economic growth. The discussion will focus on five components of social change: population growth; infant and maternal mortality; literacy; access to clean drinking water; and HIV/AIDS infection levels.

VI. 1 Population Growth

In the 1960s, Thailand's population growth rate was

around 3.5 per cent per annum. Population growth at these rates puts enormous strain on a country's education and health systems. A programme of family planning was instituted in the 1960s, and these efforts have been an outstanding success. Four decades later, population growth was well under 0.8 per cent per annum and still falling (Figure 11). Thailand's population will reach its peak around the year 2025. The nation's capacity to

provide improved education and health services for

its youth is greatly enhanced by these demo-graphic

changes. But declining population growth rates brings adjustment problems as well. Rural depopulation is an inevitable consequence of de- clining overall growth rates and rural to urban migration. Thailand's population is rapidly urbanizing,

and this requires adjustment to the provision of government services and infrastructure facilities.

V7.2 Infant and Maternal Mortality

Improvement in the quality of life has been accompanied by startling improvements in standard health indicators. Important examples are shown in Figures 12 and 13. In 1960 infant mortality rates were around 50 deaths per 1,000 births at the national level. In 2002, the corresponding morality rate was 6.5 (Figure 12). This dramatic decline occurred in all major regions of the Kingdom. In 1960 no region had an infant mortality rate below 40 per 1,000

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FIGURE 11

Thailand: Population Growth Rate, 1960-2003 (Per cent per year)

Source: National Statistical Office, Bangkok.

FIGURE 12

Thailand: Infant Mortality, 1960-2002 (Deaths per 1,000)

Source: Public Health, Division of Vital Statistics, Ministry of Public Health, various issues.

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FIGURE 13

Thailand: Maternal Mortality, 1960-2002 (Deaths per 1,000 births)

Source: Public Health Statistics , Division of Vital Statistics, Ministry of Public Health, various issues.

births; by 2002 no region was above 7.5 deaths per 1,000 births.

Maternal mortality rates have declined even more rapidly. The data are summarized in Figure 13. In 1960 the average rate of maternal mortality was 4.2 deaths per 1,000 live births, at the national level. By 2002 this same national rate was 0.15 deaths per 1,000 live births. These achievements in public health were widespread throughout the Kingdom. In 2002 no major region had a maternal mortality rate above 0.3 deaths per 1,000 live births.

Thailand's economic progress has contributed to demonstrably improved health conditions for the Thai population.

VI. 3 Literacy

Data on literacy rates are available from the National Census, conducted by the National Statistical Office every ten years, beginning in 1960. These data are summarized in Figure 14. In 1960, literacy at the national level was 71 per cent.

For males it was 80 per cent and for females 61 per cent. In 2000 the corresponding rates were 95 per cent at the national level: 97 per cent for males

and 94 per cent for females. Clearly, the overall level of basic literacy has improved significantly and the gap between male and female rates of literacy, which often characterizes poor countries,

has declined. Figure 15 shows that at a regional level these same trends are evident throughout the

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FIGURE 14

Thailand: Literacy Rates among Males and Females, 1 96Q-2000

Source: National Statistical Office, Bangkok, National Census, various issues.

FIGURE 15

Thailand: Literacy by Region, 1960-2000

Source: National Statistical Office, Bangkok, National Census, various issues.

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country. For example, in the northeast, the country's poorest region, literacy rates at the aggregate level increased over the corresponding four decades from 75 per cent to 92 per cent. For males, the increase was from 83 to 94 per cent, and for females from 68 to 91 per cent.

VIA Access to Clean Drinking Water

Because water-borne diseases are a major health problem in all poor countries, improved access to clean drinking water is a necessary condition for improved public health. Since 1981 data on this aspect of public health has been available from the Socio-economic Surveys conducted periodically by the National Statistical Office. These data are summarized in Figures 16 and 17. Increasingly, Thai people have enjoyed access to privately provided piped water, the proportion of the population with such access increasing from 16 per cent in 1981 to 23 per cent in 2000. Two-thirds

of the Thai population still reside in rural areas

and access to clean water remains a problem throughout rural Thailand.

One aspect of the data provided in Figure 17 is especially notable. The proportion of the population of Greater Bangkok with access to piped water actually declined from 1981 to 2000. The reason is that the population increase in Greater Bangkok has been concentrated in outer, peri-urban areas. The population of inner Bangkok has actually declined. These outer areas of Bangkok have received migrant populations from rural areas and provision of basic public services to these peri-urban areas remains poor. Only half of the population of Greater Bangkok has access to piped water.

VL5 HIV/AIDS

The Thai public health system was slow to recognize the dangers of the worldwide HIV/ AIDS epidemic. Throughout most of the 1980s the problem was denied. Concerted efforts began in

FIGURE 16

Thailand: Access to Piped Water, 1981-2000

Source: National Statistical Office, Report of the Household Socio-Economic Survey , Whole Kingdom (various issues).

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FIGURE 17

Thailand: Access to Piped Water by Region, 1981-2000

Source: National Statistical Office, Report of the Household Socio-Economic Survey ; Whole Kingdom (various issues).

the late 1980s with campaigns encouraging condom use. Thai non-government organizations (NGOs) were on the forefront of these efforts. The

efforts paid off. Today, Thailand is considered a success story in the global fight against HTV/ AIDS. Figure 18 shows a significant reduction in the number of new HIV infections reported, beginning in 1996. From Figure 19, this reduced infection rate resulted in a reduction in both the

total number of Thai people suffering from AIDS and the number of AIDS-related deaths, beginning in 1999. Thailand has demonstrated to the world that concerted action to reduce HIV infection rates

can reduce the social costs of the HTV/AIDS problem. Regrettably, it cannot eliminate these costs.

VII. Thailand and the ASEAN Development Divide

Thailand is a highly unequal economy, both within and between the major economic regions of the

country. Moreover, the inequality within Thailand has increased over recent decades. This fact has contributed to some of Thailand's most intractable

regional problems. For example, the continuing conflict in the southern Muslim provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala has at least a partial foundation in the pronounced and growing impoverishment of these provinces (Warr 2005b), compared with adjacent southern provinces. These three Muslim provinces are markedly dis- advantaged relative to the southern region as a whole. This conflict has in turn produced cross- border disagreements which have raised tensions with Malaysia.

Inequality between Thailand and its northern neighbours has been a source of international tension as well. The affluence of Thailand compared with Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia has led to inflows of low-skilled workers from those

countries, especially agricultural workers. In normal times, these inflows have been overlooked.

This has been especially true during periods of

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FIGURE 18

Thailand: New HIV Infections Reported, 1984 to 2003

Source: Center of Epidemiological Information, Bureau of Epidemiology, Ministry of Public Health.

FIGURE 19

Thailand: Total AIDS Infections and Deaths Reported, 1984-2003

Source: Center of Epidemiological Information, Bureau of Epidemiology, Ministry of Public Health.

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rapid growth in Thailand, when rising wages have led to shortages of rural labour. At such times, Thailand's immigration authorities have been willing to overlook the illegal status of economic migrants. But crackdowns occur from time to time, and temporary migrants are often treated badly, exacerbating resentment in their home countries towards Thailand.

In short, inequalities within Thailand itself and inequality between Thailand and its poorer, northerly neighbours have been an impediment to the ASEAN integration process. Unfortunately, ASEAN as an institution has been able to make

only minor contributions towards resolving these problems. But this is not to say that an enhanced contribution of this kind cannot occur in the

future. By promoting continued economic integration between Thailand and its neighbours, ASEAN could improve the prospects for achieving its stated goal of an Economic Community by 2015.

But is this goal truly feasible? Establishing an Economic Community implies three things. First, erecting a common protective trade policy barrier around the ASEAN countries, thereby discriminating preferentially in favour of intra- ASEAN trade relative to trade with outsiders. This

corresponds to the textbook case of a customs union. Second, it also implies establishing full mobility of capital and labour within the group. This is the definition of a common market. Third,

an economic community (economic union) implies establishment of a common currency and therefore the surrender of independent exchange rate and monetary policies.

There seems little prospect of even the first of these three conditions being implemented. More than half of all intra-ASEAN trade currently involves Singapore, which has virtually no pro- tective trade policy barriers. Unless Singapore was willing to abandon its very high degree of eco-nomic openness, which has been the foundation of its prosperity, a common tariff barrier would mean Singapore's trade regime - no protection at all. While this might well be desirable, it is hardly likely that Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, not to mention the new

ASEAN members - Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar - would agree. Moreover, such an agreement would undermine all of the bilateral and multilateral preferential trading agreements involving the ASEAN countries which are currently in place or under consideration. The prospect of an ASEAN Economic Community being established within the foreseeable future therefore seems remote.

VIII. Conclusions: Thailand's Economic Prospects

The experience of Thailand over the past half- century confirms the importance of sustained economic growth, at least in poor countries, for the achievement of basic social objectives of poverty reduction, improved education, and public health. Life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality and literacy have all improved dramatically. Absolute poverty incidence has declined markedly, but inequality has increased. Thailand's recovery from the crisis of 1997-99 is now complete, despite unexpected setbacks including rural drought, Asian influenza, SARS, political violence in the south, the tsunami of 26 December 2004, and political turmoil in 2006.

The government of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001- 2006) did much to restore economic confidence but did little to reform or strengthen Thailand's key institutions, particularly those mandated by the 1997 Constitution to provide checks and balances on the operation of the central government. Many observers claim that it did the opposite, by undermining these institutions. Key issues of reform remain to be addressed adequately. The country's archaic education system must be the most important of these areas

needing reform, and the promotion of improved competition within the domestic economy is probably the second. The continuing problem of high and rising levels of inequality within Thailand remains to be addressed at a policy level and its underlying causes are not properly understood.

Thailand's continuing macroeconomic problem is the restoration of investor confidence, severely

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damaged by the crisis and its aftermath. Private investment has declined as a share of GDP, and

getting it back to levels consistent with the maintenance of high rates of growth has proven to

be surprisingly difficult. This applies to both foreign and domestic investment, but because domestic investment is so much larger, encouraging it is the most crucial issue. Political turmoil has not helped, including both the military

coup of September 2006 and the continued security problems arising from insurrection in the Muslim south. Restoration of the rates of investment of the boom decade from 1987 to 1996

would not be a sensible target, but the current level of private investment needs to be increased. As the discussion in this paper has shown, Thailand shares this problem with several other crisis-affected ASEAN countries.

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Peter Warr is the John Crawford Professor of Agricultural Economics and founding Director of the Poverty Research Centre in the Division of Economics, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, at the Australian National University.

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