Week 4 Assignmt.

Human Systems Management 29 (2010) 205–215 DOI 10.3233/HSM-2010-0716 IOS Press

205

The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

Suzanna Long Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering, Missouri University of Science and Technology, 600 W 14th Street, 215 EMGT Building, Rolla, MO, USA Tel.: +1 573 341 7621; E-mail: longsuz@mst.edu

Abstract. The introduction of change is frequently met with resistance, especially if that change involves a re-engineering of basic work processes and the introduction of high technologies. This study examines the introduction of a complex software system to standard work processes within an organization staffed by a largely non-technical, professional workforce. A case study approach will be used to highlight high technology-driven change management and decision-making at the planning and early implementation stages.

Keywords: High technology, technology-driven change management, sociotechnical system design, strategic planning

Suzanna Long is an Assistant Professor with the Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering, Missouri University of Science and Technology. Prior to joining Missouri S&T she was an Assistant Professor in the Departments of Management and Marketing, Missouri Southern State University and Coordinator of the transportation-logistics program. She holds a PhD and an M.S. in engineer- ing management, B.S. in physics and a B.A. in history from the University of Missouri-Rolla (UMR) and an M.A. in

history from the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Her research interests include strategic supply chain management, transportation management systems, and sustainable change initiatives.

1. Introduction

The introduction of change is frequently met with resistance, especially if that change involves a re-engineering of basic work processes and the intro- duction of high technologies. High technology is defined as new technology requiring transformational levels of learning and adaptation of organizational culture [11, 12]. This study examines the introduc-

tion of a complex software system to standard work processes within an organization staffed by a largely non-technical, professional workforce. Existing litera- ture explores the nature of change management from the perspective of issues of organizational leadership and communication. This study examines the bene- fits of using an integrated approach in the face of transformational change. It will consider the change event as a system and explore the impact of non- technical stakeholder acceptance on high technology initiatives.

High technology-driven change initiatives are often difficult to implement and have an approximately 75% failure rate [2, 4, 10]. Lack of success is often linked to failures in understanding the change environment and level of learning required for the high technology, accounting for human factors in the implementation or acceptance of the new technology, and failure to adjust the organizational structure or culture to truly manage the change process [12].

This paper explores the impact of non-technical stakeholder acceptance on high technology sociotech- nical system design and implementation. A case study approach is used. The case will illustrate technology-

0167-2533/10/$27.50 © 2010 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved

206 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

driven change management and decision-making at the planning and early implementation stages for a high technology initiative at a historically non-technical national organization. Narrative interviews with key stakeholders are used to capture opinions and attitudes associated with emergent high technology and changes in work patterns. Lessons learned offer insight that may prove useful to managers and organizations faced with managing high technology-driven change in organiza- tions with significant percentages of stakeholders with non-technical backgrounds.

2. Literature review

Change management requires careful planning and communication for effective implementation. On some levels an acceptance of risk may provide an advan- tage to the organization. The organization may actually increase its flexibility if it is willing to incorporate “lessons learned” as part of the change management process. Most stakeholders do not have high levels of technical expertise. Sociotechnical systems design- ers frequently ignore the social learning elements of change and fail to consider the level of stakeholder learning associated with complete comfort with the technology.

The level of learning required for successful imple- mentation of technology can serve as a change management guide. This important theme is the focus of several articles by Zeleny [11, 12]. High technology-driven change management and transfor- mational change calls for corresponding changes in organizational learning and culture. Effective use of technology must be considered as part of a series of social, interactive relationships termed a technol- ogy support net (TSN). The TSN enables the use of the technology correctly through the creation of interwoven physical, informational, and socioeconomic relationships. High technology disruptions in the TSN lead to change resistance. Individual perceptions of what the technology means may be determined by how the systemic rearrangement impacts their daily schedules or power base. Business processes cannot remain fragmented or isolated from the change pro- cess. The TSN must be transformed to embrace new patterns of work, organizational structures, and cross- functionality for technology initiatives to fully succeed [11, 12].

McCarter et al. promotes the need for training and organizational education for any genuine change

in organizational culture. Integration of supply chain systems is impossible without establishing appropri- ate cultural pathways to “manage people”. Integration is improved by accommodating existing culture and including these structures as part of the change process. New cross-functional skill sets are essential for creating managers capable of leading this type of change [9].

Kontoghiorghes and Hansen examine organizational dynamics that facilitate change. Sociotechnical sys- tems that are open and interactive are considered the most effective. Both the social and technical subsys- tems are essential to managing the change process. Modeling change behaviors based only on the technical aspects results in re-engineering without the produc- tion of competitive advantage. Redesign of work should be included. “Change ready” cultures are built on the visions of the organization’s leadership and the respon- siveness of the employees and other stakeholders. The nature of the change involved can offer insight as well. Developmental change is a “fine tuning” of existing structures and states. Transitional change involves the controlled introduction of new processes and technol- ogy. Transformational change is the emergence of an unknown from an old state; this frequently requires a “leap of faith” and occurs when dramatic change is needed within the organization. An awareness of the type of change envisioned offers the leadership team guidance in decision-making and implementation strategies [6].

Holti discusses change involving information and communication technology. Known as ICTs, these new technologies are often perceived as the “cure-all” for the modern industrial organization. Implementation of technological-driven change is far from a direct path and that the possibility of organizational loss is very real with improper implementation. “Team working” is discussed as a means of building cooperative structures for change management. Organizational restructuring frequently revolves around one of three distinct ratio- nales: business, which focuses on products produced and mechanisms for reducing cost while improving quality; manufacturing systems or technology, which suggests strategies for achieving flexibility with tech- nical resources, and motivational, which addresses harnessing employee competencies and motivation. The motivational rationale presents the greatest oppor- tunities for managing change as the human element is the most difficult to plan over the course of the business cycle. Human behavior is shaped by myriad influences, some conscious and some unconscious. These influ- ences often become clear only after a change initiative

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 207

has been tried and failed. Change should be managed at the strategic level in order to maximize success. Interim reviews and the revisiting of priorities should be scheduled as part of the strategic choices made by organizations [5].

The dynamic changes resulting from the implemen- tation of new technology can impact organizational culture. Resistance to change may result from sev- eral factors. Long-standing organizational traditions and work processes have the benefit of familiarity. Even if they are no longer effective, the work pro- cesses are familiar and there is a level of resistance due to the move outside of organizational norms and comfort zones. Resistance may also result from fear of disruption caused by the introduction of the new technology and its impact on organizational structure and staffing patterns as stated by Allen. Allen asserts that organizational communication is a key to man- aging change. Leadership teams should determine the nature and timing of this communication and the level of employee participative decision making. Leader- ship teams should consider implementing an integrated communications strategy. This strategy should accom- plish five objectives: the creation of awareness, the maintenance of that awareness throughout the process, a tangible demonstration of leadership commitment, solicitation of employee support, and the education of stakeholders [1].

Establishing trust is an essential characteristic for leading successful change initiatives according to Lines et al. The freedom to speak out honestly during change initiatives is determined by existing trust relationships between managers and non-managers. In part this is dependent on the managers’ willingness to empower employees. Risk-taking is evidenced by the level of freedom given to employees to make decisions and the amount of “psychological safety” given to alle- viate employee concerns of failure or personal harm to their jobs. Suspicious watchfulness is not useful in establishing this level of trust and does not encour- age good judgment and appropriate action. Further, it is difficult to establish the necessary depth of trust needed for serious levels of change in a stable environ- ment. Patterns of routine do not facilitate the need for trust in the same way. In cases where trust levels are low, change management processes should first under- take trust-building exercises prior to introducing any other types of change. This increases the argument that actively involving stakeholders in meaningful ways is essential in creating scenarios where positive change is possible [7].

3. Case study methodology: Narrative interviews

This case study investigates contemporary events within real-life contexts. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provide compre- hensive information management services to federal agencies and its constituent contractors. This impres- sive task includes the identification and preservation of records of many different origins and media types, including the myriad forms of electronic information [8]. NARA is headquartered in the Washington, D.C. area and has branches throughout the country.

The Electronic Records Archives (ERA) initiative is intended to expand NARA’s abilities to preserve and grant access to new forms of electronic information. This project builds on NARA’s thirty years of experi- ence in dealing with simple electronic records. NARA’s attempt to facilitate transformational change as it adopts a new project-oriented organizational structure illus- trates that contexts are not always easily distinguishable from phenomena. NARA has attempted to update its managerial focus by bringing in talent from outside of the agency and overlaying project structures onto exist- ing functional hierarchies. However, the context of a change in leadership and reporting structures is not nec- essarily representative of any level of transformational change. Evaluating the success of change initiatives within the Electronic Records Archives (ERA) project is best explored from the richness of method possible through the case study.

For this case study, a series of twenty four in-depth narrative interviews were conducted with constituent stakeholders to determine the effectiveness in project planning at the social interfaces of the sociotechnical system. Interviews were conducted during the plan- ning phase of the project just after the awarding of the design contract. This allowed an assessment of thresh- old acceptance and understanding of the project goals by the major stakeholders. A qualitative approach was used for the following reasons:

1. ERA is an emergent process using emergent high technologies. The perceptions of the stakeholders are most easily captured in an interactive format. This format allows the history of the project to be included in the project analysis.

2. Narrative interviews allow the greatest possible flexibility of questioning and create a venue for allowing the interview to be refined as information is presented by stakeholders.

208 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

3. Interviewer background in information logistics and electronic records management created a nat- ural rapport with the stakeholders and provided a mechanism for reducing bias.

As attitudes frequently differ between headquar- ters and field operations, NARA respondents included staff from both elements. Internal stakeholders included members of the ERA leadership team, top and mid-level managers from within NARA, and non-managers from affected program units. External stakeholders included users from federal, state, and research communities. A summary table of respondent characteristics is pre- sented in Table 1.

3.1. Narrative interview protocol

Stakeholders were identified as essential constituen- cies of the ERA virtual management system. These constituencies included members of the leadership team, internal staff, and external stakeholders, such

as agency records managers, historians, and other end users. Such groups provide the basis for generating the inputs and outputs of the virtual supply chain associ- ated with ERA. Sample interview questions include the following:

General, Demographic Information

• Describe your current position? How long have you worked in this area?

• How long have you worked at NARA? • What is your background? Organizational Culture

• Describe NARA’s current organizational structure. • How often is the organization chart revised? • How open is NARA staff to change? Are the

changes effective? Why or why not?

Sociotechnical Systems Design

• What is ERA? Why is it unique? • What is your role with the project?

Table 1

Summary of respondent characteristics

NARA/ HQ/ YRS of Manager/ Stakeholder set Back-ground Responsibility

Non-NARA Field service Non-Manager

R1 NARA HQ 14 Manager ERA Leadership Tech Tech

R2 Non-NARA HQ 6 Non-Manager External Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R3 NARA HQ 15 Non-Manager ERA Team Non-Tech Tech

R4 NARA HQ 30 Manager ERA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R5 NARA HQ 20 Manager External NARA Tech Tech

R6 NARA HQ 25 Manager NARA Leadership Tech Tech

R7 NARA HQ 19 Manager External NARA Non-Tech Tech

R8 NARA HQ 19 Manager External NARA Non-Tech Tech

R9 NARA HQ 20 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R10 NARA HQ 16 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R11 NARA HQ 29 Manager ERA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R12 NARA HQ 20 Non-Manager ERA Team Non-Tech Non-Tech

R13 NARA HQ 22 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R14 NARA Field 38 Manager External NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R15 NARA HQ 10 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R16 NARA Field 30 Manager External NARA Tech Non-Tech

R17 Non-NARA Field 20 Manager External Leadership Tech Tech

R18 Non-NARA Field 20 Manager External Non-NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R19 NARA HQ 20 Manager ERA Leadership Non-Tech Both

R20 NARA HQ 20 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R21 NARA HQ 8 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R22 Non-NARA Field 16 Manager External Non-NARA Non-Tech Both

R23 NARA HQ 20 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Both

R24 NARA HQ 15 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Both

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 209

• Are you satisfied with ERA’s state of development? • What impact will ERA have on your daily work-

load? • What new technologies will be introduced? • Is there value in developing an integrated system

for this project? • Would the project be better served if components

were addressed one at a time? • Did the creation of a systems engineering group

assist in the development of ERA?

High Technology Risk Assessment

• What risks are associated with the project? • How were stakeholders identified? • What training will/should be provided to stake-

holders? • How were ideas communicated? • What input did stakeholders have? • What is the feedback process? • How are changes implemented due to feedback?

Interviews with stakeholders were conducted face to face whenever possible. When schedules and dis- tance did not permit, telecommunications strategies were used employing email and telephone as the basic modes of communication. Interviews were sched- uled with respondents in advance and a summary of research objectives and a copy of the informed consent form provided during this initial contact. Stakehold- ers were given the opportunity to ask questions about the research, its methodology, and any other aspect of the project prior to the actual interview. Copies of the signed consent form were provided to respon- dents at the completion of the interview and permission for follow-up conversations to clarify and confirm responses obtained. Respondents were selected to rep- resent major stakeholder groups from the gamut of ERA constituencies.

Respondent participation levels were maximized by confining interviews to 60 minute intervals, with per- mission for follow-up requested. Respondents were offered the option of completing the interview with the door open or closed and were notified in advance that the interviews would be recorded using a digital voice recorder. In addition, hand-written notes were taken during the interviews to emphasize critical points and provide direction during the coding process. Transcripts were created from the interviews and accuracy verified by an independent reviewer trained in transcription.

4. Analysis methodology and limitations

This study used the standard issue-based, general- ized approach for analysis of the narrative interviews. Rather than presenting accounts of individuals, com- mon themes and attitudes were described to maximize the learning potential from all respondents. Logical connections were identified between respondents as they relate to particular areas surrounding the ERA project. A generalized reporting scheme was used to add layers of confidentiality necessary to preserve the anonymity of interviewees.

Responses were coded using broad categories of issues that examine levels of expertise, collabora- tion and leadership, communications patterns, and organizational culture. In addition, coding categories covering project management, technology risk assess- ment, and risk mitigation seemed vital for exploring issues stemming from responses to questions concern- ing organizational culture.

This study does not address change management in all environments and may not be generalizable outside of high technology-driven change management. Findings may accurately reflect the partnering and change processes within this particular organization and project, but may not be indicative of processes in other situations.

Relationships among stakeholders may be indica- tive of issues resulting from organizational patterns other than those associated with change management. Because many of these groups and individuals have long-established histories, findings may be linked to personalities rather than issues. Examples of shared goals may not illustrate shared values for implemen- tation strategies or may be linked to questions of gain and authority levels rather than the benefits of the new technology.

The relatively small sample size further decreases the ability to draw broad conclusions. Despite the sweeping implications for the project, direct stakeholder sets are limited at this point. Although validity and reliability constructs have been addressed in the study, statistical inferences that can be drawn from the results are lim- ited. The value of the study rests more with identifying planning horizons and threshold acceptance measures than with the size of the sample.

This study includes methodological weaknesses inherent in qualitative studies. The study design is impacted by researcher biases regardless of attempts to minimize that bias. One such bias results from a pos- sible perception by the interviewees of the researcher’s

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“insider” status. The researcher has almost fifteen years of experience in electronic records management includ- ing almost four years with NARA. Examples of positive benefits include the level of contacts within NARA and other members of the federal information commu- nity. These contacts provided access to the principle stakeholders of the Electronic Records Archives (ERA) and were used to open additional doors. One strong advantage was the existence of levels of trust with the leadership team of ERA, as well as key external stake- holders. The mutual respect facilitated open dialog. However, there is no question that this impact may have had negative components as well.

In the same way that those who are resistant to change may choose to ignore it in the hopes that it will go away, some interviewees may have found it easiest to “tell her what she wants to hear” so that the interview would end or may have mistrusted the motivations for the study depending on their relationship with the orga- nization. Perception of an “insider” researcher as a mole to uncover hidden pockets of resistance was a danger to the study. This problem was reduced because the goals of the researcher were strictly based in the com- pletion of research and did not include any authority to make changes to the project or its funding levels. This was fully explained to all interview subjects in advance of the conversations. In addition, those who may have hoped to use past connections to paint a rosy picture of the project, may have tried to steer the interviews toward or away from certain individu- als. Cross-checking interviews lists with a variety of independent sources minimized this possibility.

Respondents comments used in the study were repre- sentative of the attitudes and opinions of the perceptions of the interviewees. This was independently verified through the use of multiple coders to minimize the impact of researcher judgments and opinions on the study.

Moreover, assumptions about what “insider status” means in terms of terminology and current knowledge base may negatively impact accurate communications flow and interpretation. Rather than taking comments at face value, interpretation and assumptions may be added that place a biased or incorrect assessment of respondent remarks. Additional study on current archival theory and practice, along with asking respon- dents to define terms lessened this possibility.

4.1. Stakeholder perspectives

The ERA project is ambitious and is considered by some external stakeholders to be the first practical appli-

cation of new technology to existing archival theory and practice. All stakeholders agree that the change is necessary and all agree that this change can only be accomplished with considerable planning and commu- nication.

This is consistent with the change methodology sug- gested by the literature. Organizational planning should include attempts to accurately assess the attitudes and concerns of all stakeholder groups. NARA and the ERA team have attempted to accomplish this important task through a series of “town-hall” meetings and forums with internal and external stakeholders. Their success has been limited. Many stakeholders complain of a level of forced participation and state emphatically that their voices are either not heard or are silenced with the label of “trouble-maker” if they raise objections.

This echoes a pitfall presented by Clegg and Walsh [2]. The ERA team has excellent intentions but are “pushing” change rather than “pulling” stakeholders into the process. Stakeholders are not truly assuming ownership of the change process. The partiality sug- gested in the literature is clearly evident as stakeholders hope for the best but expect the worst.

Woodward and Hendry [10] stress that this begins with top levels of management. Stakeholder comments reveal a perceived negative bias from the agency lead- ership team and suggest that these top managers view themselves as “outside” the project rather than a critical, integrated component of the change process.

Support at the highest managerial levels is essential for project success. Even perceptions of negativity or ambivalence on the part of top managers can shift the balance in terms of goal acceptance by non-managerial stakeholders. This perception clearly exists at NARA. Stakeholders commonly suggest that top management is publicly supportive, but ambivalent or even com- pletely antipathetic to the ERA project behind closed doors. Representative respondent comments are pre- sented in Table 2.

This reflects an ingrained rigidity based on long-term association with the agency. Organizational judgment is frequently reactive rather than proactive in cases where past criticisms make “recovery from past mistakes” the order of the day. NARA has been frequently criticized for its policy concerning electronic records and there is a real feeling of a “last chance” effort on the part of the agency with respect to the ERA project and the attempt to deal with electronic records. Respon- dent comments suggest that escalating commitment and high funding levels have added a level of desperation and encouraged the blame-centered culture discussed in the literature. This leads to the problems discussed

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 211

Table 2

Lack of top management support

Respondent Response

R2 A feeling that efforts are wasted and repeated over and over reduces credibility Tug of war between different administrative units

NARA believes they are collaborative but instead of collaboration, more frequently achieve consensus w/o foundational support

Long-standing grudges among managers: I won’t work with you because I don’t like you

R3 Lack of shared vision between ERA team and Top Mgmt in terms of goals for facilities and systems development

Top management does everything they can to undermine the ERA team in private forums, not publicly however

R4 Internal NARA environment is not conducive to collaboration

Turf wars between Project Management Office (PMO) and NARA leadership has added to the challenge of ERA

R8 Disagreement over priorities and funding levels inside NARA

R10 Ambiguity of roles and commitment across collaborative groups

R11 Lack of consistency with top management; based in lack of common needs and objectives across program lines

R12 Fighting opinions of top management over whether project is important; still have to do it!

Top management in particular is entrenched and unhelpful; playing own little turf games

R15 NARA and ERA team did not speak with one voice

Leadership did not send consistent message

above of poor decision channels and the labeling of dissenters as troublemakers.

Most stakeholders are cautiously optimistic but do not feel that they have a full understanding of the pro- cess or how the project will evolve. There is some concern that top management has conveyed enthusi- asm, but not necessarily tangible support. Moreover, the positioning of ERA is telling in terms of NARA’s understanding of dedicated project teams. The project management literature suggests that projects of strate- gic importance should be placed outside of regular functional units. Their authority and autonomy levels should increase with relative importance. NARA has identified ERA as strategically important yet it is posi- tioned within a functional unit. Authority and autonomy levels exist in a confusing blend of traditional functional structures overlaid with aspects of dedicated project teams. Samples of representative respondent comments are presented in Table 3.

In essence, NARA has tried to maintain its past reporting structures and relationships at the expense of needed new risk-taking management structures it has tried to adopt. Few non-technical stakeholders outside of the leadership team have any awareness of systems engineering or project management principles. Even when awareness is present, the implementation has fallen short of proper project management procedures.

Stakeholders clearly understand the importance of the project and ERA project leaders possess the infor- mation required for determining project direction. Other members of the leadership team are best consid- ered as internal member stakeholders when considering the technical requirements of the project.

The project has a lengthy planning horizon due to the technical requirements of the project and the federal contracting process. This allows adequate time for pre- planning, group identification, and work processes.

Differences in technical knowledge and expertise are clearly present in the risk identification process. The nature of the technology is a cause for great con- cern among those with engineering backgrounds, but is rarely addressed by those with non-technical back- grounds. Most express their fear that the new system will fail and that NARA will not be given a second chance, but don’t understand how to prevent this or what technologies will be introduced.

Stakeholders seem to share project goals for ERA but not necessarily the full vision presented by the ERA leadership team. The leadership team consists of ERA project members and key management personnel within the agency. The belief that enough information is not being presented to stakeholders may be rooted in a lack of understanding of the project interfaces by external managers with limited technical expertise. However, it may also reflect a lack of expertise on the part of the subordinate stakeholders.

Stakeholders with technical experience suggest that a new, hybrid archivist is needed. The lack of relevant experience and common vocabulary has increasingly become a source of frustration. When asked for process maps and system requirements, long lists of individual requirements are returned rather than clear definitions of process and information flows. These stakehold- ers recommend the creation of a new specialty within archives education with training in computer science or computer engineering. Many archivists also hold

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Table 3

Comments showing TSN disconnect for ERA

Respondent Response

R1 Relatively little influx of fresh experience in new managerial styles

R2 Highest levels of non-appointee leadership need to be more involved and committed to project

Tug of war between different administrative units

NARA believes they are collaborative but instead of collaboration, more frequently achieve consensus w/o foundational support

No collaboration between levels of interface with ERA team and NARA as a whole

R3 Lack of shared vision between ERA team and Top Mgmt in terms of goals for facilities and systems development

PMO and ERA team do not speak with one voice; ERA staff spread out all over the building

NARA doesn’t take advantage of knowledge across functional units

ERA program management will go away; absorbed into NARA as a whole

Top management does everything they can to undermine the ERA team in private forums, not publicly however

R4 Highly entrenched, stove-piped bureaucracy with little change in attitudes

Organization is not fully behind ERA despite its vitality and necessity

Internal NARA environment is not conducive to collaboration

Turf wars between PMO and NARA leadership has added to the challenge of ERA

Mismatch in cultures between NARA (dated business processes) and Contractor (modern business processes)

No cross-organizational planning; friction between corporate and project change officers

R5 ERA PMO does not contain all of the admin units and supports necessary

R9 ERA PMO doesn’t understand that their role is much greater than building the tool; tend to isolate themselves

CM roles not properly defined at either PMO or NARA level

R10 Oversight groups formed w/in NARA to try to integrate ERA PMO with agency goals and objectives

Change Management needs to be at agency level, not within PMO

R12 Why is PMO physically split? It wasn’t originally but now, some groups seem delegated to the cheap seats

ERA’s physical space illustrates top managements lack of commitment; PMO director should be more assertive in gaining

visibility

Fighting opinions of top management over whether project is important; still have to do it!

Top management in particular is entrenched and unhelpful; playing own little turf games

R11 Lack of consistency with top management; based in lack of common needs and objectives across program lines

R12 Don’t speak with one voice

R15 NARA and ERA team did not speak with one voice

an MLS (master of library science) and have some experience with managing information contained in databases. However, knowledge of how to manipulate databases is not adequate training for establishing an equal dialog with technologists. It is hard to ask the right questions or understand the answers if you don’t have common experiences, terminology, and reference bases. These opinions are echoed by those with non- technical backgrounds as well.

Stakeholders agree that ERA is a welcome change in the area of electronic records management and believe that NARA has taken a proactive stance to correct any real or perceived deficiencies in their electronic records policies. Approval notwithstanding, all stake- holder groups express concerns about potential risk and NARA’s ability to manage these risks. As one ERA team member stated, there are “risks all over the place”.

The man-machine interface is of prime concern among these risks. The lack of a common vocabu- lary between records managers and technical specialists leads many to speculate that the system design will be flawed as a result. Moreover, the importance given to ERA by NARA may not reflect the opinion of agency stakeholders or agency officials outside of records man- agement. Put simply, those making the decisions for ERA may not have the ability to enforce decisions or have access to the appropriate stakeholders to secure information needed for high quality decisions in the cor- rect use of the proposed high technology. Mismatches in the TSN are presented in Table 4.

In addition to concerns over the man-machine inter- face of the ERA system, stakeholder risk identification includes the belief that archivists and information pro- fessionals use the same vocabulary in different ways.

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 213

Table 4

Sample comments on expertise deficiencies for the TSN

Respondent Response

R1 Lack of new types of skill sets needed for dealing with technology

R3 Need new skill sets to accomplish tasks of the future

R5 Problems of ER are rooted in the hard sciences: physics, chemistry, computer science; current staff lack skill sets to understand

and cope with mandate of preserving and granting access

Relies on research created externally w/o an understanding of how it works

ER staff base judgments on media stability, etc on what they’ve heard w/o having any genuine understanding of fact

R6 Naïve culture in terms of technology users from IT application; limited experience with major IT systems

R8 No inside expertise in how to actually build the system; had to contract

R14 Little relevant expertise exists in the field. No budget provided for off-setting this deficiency

R17 NARA lacks the breadth of training for high-level technology projects

Need to create new, hybrid staff: archival engineers capable of understanding both technology/historian skill sets

R18 Feel unskilled and uncomfortable with the technological elements of the project

Need new, technically competent archivists

R19 Need new technologies and skill sets to accomplish the task of dealing with ER

R22 Need new skill sets to manage the challenges of modern ER

Moreover, there is concern that the training may be inadequate or that the supporting information technol- ogy professionals may not find the project “interesting enough” to devote the required time to creating system interfaces at the agency level.

Records management may be of critical importance for NARA, but for another agency, it is a legal neces- sity rather than a primary goal. Decisions on technical systems are not made to accommodate records manage- ment functions but to accomplish the work assigned in the real task environment of the agency. The amount of time spent on records management will be fluid, as will the level of participation. It is not important from the standpoint of the agency’s mission; therefore, solu- tions are explored in terms of “good enough”, instead of what is optimal. Known as satisficing, this approach merely adds to the complexities of records management for the ERA team [4]. Moreover, this reflects problems identified in the literature by Dasher [3] and others. Common sense heuristics are inadequate when proper understanding of the systems engineering principles involved does not exist. Concerns exist as well over the level of training. This training should be adaptable to the needs of the users at differing points in the ERA virtual management system.

The feedback process has received mixed results. The ERA team understands the necessity of open forums, discussion groups, and other methods of communi- cating project goals. The willingness or interest of stakeholders in providing key feedback is uncertain. Despite monthly meetings and published updates, infor-

mation flows do not adequately cement virtual teams into cohesive units.

Virtual teams have not been formed to bridge orga- nizational lines. Task leaders exist, but social leaders have not emerged to build the required levels of trust and commitment for risk mitigation. Stakeholders do not have a common sense of how to accomplish the tasks ahead or how to manage the interests of the var- ious groups most efficiently. This is contrary to the “best practices” presented in the literature [11, 12] for organizations implementing high technology change initiatives.

5. Conclusions

People are far more resistant to change when it involves loss of control over long-standing work pat- terns or exposing weakness resulting from a lack of understanding of the proposed change. ERA incorpo- rates exactly this type of change making understanding the interfaces of this sociotechnical system critical. ERA is not confined to one organizational culture. It crosses organizational culture lines of every federal agency. There are commonalities involved but differ- ences as well. These should be understood by the systems designers and system users alike.

NARA hopes that ERA will be an adaptive system capable of adjusting to this dynamic environment. ERA has grown from a series of technological advances over the past thirty years. Rather than a systemic applica-

214 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

tion of these technologies to records management, each agency has adapted its own choice of advances from the numerous sets of solutions. The problems driving ERA for NARA are a creation of ambiguity in enforce- ment and interpretation that reflects the level of time and importance placed on the task environment of records management. This limited rationality reflects organiza- tional constraints within the federal government.

NARA’s authority rests on offering a format for transfer of permanent electronic records, not on their creation. Agencies postpone questions of how to achieve this transfer until later in the performance cycle. These choices are contrary to best practices indicated for virtual management systems. Rather than a com- mon series of goals and strategies, solutions emerge from a set of often previously abandoned choices rather than deriving from a well-constructed plan. Moreover, there are no “outs” for unhappy partners, no way to end relationships. Change management in high technology- driven processes adds an added level of complexity because of the technology involved and the difficulties of determining stakeholder readiness for adoption and understanding.

There is tremendous potential for communications disconnect between systems designers and archival or agency users. The breakdown in information flow between stakeholders should be addressed. Study results indicate that additional training will reduce this disconnect whether it is top-down or down-up direction- ally. This training should be undertaken immediately to reduce project risks identified in the change man- agement plan. This should prove especially beneficial in addressing the problems of communication between stakeholders with distinct differences in knowledge of technology or engineering practices.

Despite the necessity of the change, the form of ERA is still somewhat vague. The risks are many and require due diligence to plot their severity against project suc- cess. The fragility of the high technology used is a key source of risk for most engineers, but rarely is considered as important by those with non-technical backgrounds. It is unclear whether groups are being used at optimal levels for participative decision mak- ing. Stakeholder unrest and dissatisfaction are indicated based on study findings. However, change management has been built into the project and an understanding exists of its importance. Modeling the system to pro- vide access and understanding of the interface points will uncover the areas with the greatest chances for fail- ure. This commitment to conscientious management of change will improve chances of overall project success.

The decision making challenge rests with engag- ing the stakeholders in a meaningful way to achieve project goals. Training will help non-technical stake- holders find a comfort level with terminology and the system itself. The diversity of the stakeholders can be used as part of the systems model to manage risk. The disparate perceptions of system will offer a stronger risk assessment than would be possible from a team of stakeholders with the same background. Team-building exercises can help develop trust and team identity issues that will guarantee thoughtful, truthful responses to learning scenarios and potential system problems. Even the conflict that is inevitable can be harnessed to more properly model man-machine interface points.

The management of high technology-driven change initiatives is an area of critical importance in today’s global environment. Work processes and partnering are increasingly electronic or virtual in nature. Understand- ing “best practices” in the face of these changes is vital in the strategic planning and implementation of the modern organization. The significant failure rate of high technology-driven change suggests that organizations continue to struggle with these issues [2, 10].

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the key stakeholders from the ERA project who generously gave of their time and expertise in completing the narrative interviews for this research. She also expresses sincere appreciation to Milan Zeleny, Editor, Human Systems Management, for his insight in the final development of this paper.

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