Four page research paper on global perspectives of terrorism
Police Practice and Research, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 347–360
LOCAL PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM:
A VIEW FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT*
JOSEPH F. DONNERMEYER
Human and Community Resource Development, The Ohio State University, 2120 Fyffe Road, Room 203b, Columbus, OH 43210-1067, USA
This article examines the views of the law enforcement community concerning critical issues related to local preparedness for possible terrorists’ incidents. Information is derived from a statewide conference held on domestic preparedness in Ohio. Representatives from law enforcement agencies located in all 88 counties of the state attended the conference, and determined a set of top-five priority issues in response to four discussion questions: (1) critical equipment needs; (2) critical training needs; (3) critical internal issues; and (4) critical external issues.
Keywords: Terrorism; Community; Horizontal–Vertical integration
Since September 11, media portrayals of the New York City Police Department have been quite prominent and very positive. The public has learned that the police are ‘first responders’ to the scene of tragedies and are frequently placed at great risk.
Beyond the media hype, however, is a different story. It is neither the glamorous tale of heroic rescue efforts nor the tragic depictions of officers who lose their lives in the line of duty. This story is more mundane. It is about local preparedness by the police in communities both large and small to respond to incidents of terrorism. It is about how the police define the probability of terrorism occurring in their community in rela- tion to the cost of preparation.
The purpose of this article is to examine preparedness issues from the point of view of the police. Information for this article comes from a series of group discussion sessions attended by police officers who examined various dimensions of local preparedness for terrorism. These sessions occurred at a state-wide conference held on that subject in Ohio in June, 2000. This conference also included concurrent sessions for other first
*Support for the statewide conference was provided by the Office of the Lieutenant Governor in coopera- tion with the Ohio Emergency Management Agency, the Ohio Highway Patrol, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, and The Ohio State University.
ISSN 1561-4263 print/ISSN 1477-271X online/02/040347-14 � 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1561426022000032105
responders (i.e., fire, emergency medical, health officials etc.) and community leaders concerned about issues related to terrorism (Office of the Lieutenant Governor, 2000).
Clearly, timing is important, and any conference focused on the issue of terrorism is chronologically defined in relation to September 11. Would police perceptions be different if the conference were held in October, 2001 rather than in June, 2000? Are the views of the police more valid today than before September 11, 2001? Perhaps, but, perhaps not. I argue that general issues related to local preparedness for terrorism should be discussed without the rush of recent events, and instead tempered by the everyday issues confronting the police in communities across the country.
COMMUNITY AND POLICING IN THE US
The context of policing in the United States can best be described as a complex system of overlapping jurisdictions and missions (Geller, 1985; Hickman and Reaves, 2001; Whisenand and Ferguson, 2002). Federal and State legislation empower local commu- nities to establish their own police agencies and services. These legislative bodies also define the parameters in which police powers are exercised in the US, specifically through laws that put limits on who can be a police officer; minimum requirements for basic or entry-level training, plus requirements for recertification and advanced training; certification of training programs and facilities; laws defining police powers of arrests; costly penalties for crimes committed against police officers; appropriate police practices in relation to citizens rights; and the internal management of police departments, including budgeting and conformance of personnel to agency policies and procedures, among a host of other managerial functions.
Within the parameters set by Federal and State governments, each local community is relatively autonomous in terms of how their police agencies are set up and run. There are nearly 17 000 local law enforcement agencies in the US, from as small as 1 officer (or sworn personnel) to as large as 39 000 plus officers (Hickman and Reaves, 2001). Size adds complexity to the way a police agency is administered and variety to the ways the agency relates to the community in terms of how sworn personnel respond to calls for service and how the police department develops collaborative arrangements with other public service agencies in the community (Weisheit et al., 1999; Palone et al., 2000).
Also influencing the complex fabric of policing in the US is the way in which police agencies are organized and integrated into the bureaucratic structure of local com- munity services. In some communities, the head of the police department has nearly complete autonomy to do whatever he/she likes. Other communities require much more accountability of the police agency, such as through periodic updates of police activities and crime statistics and routinized auditing of police budgets. Political arrangements of local communities vary as well. In some communities, the head of the police agency reports to a single person, such as a mayor or city manager. In other communities, accountability is directly to an elected assembly, such as a city council, county commissioners, or township trustees. Some communities add an extra layer to their bureaucratic structures by hiring a ‘safety director,’ to whom the head of the police agency (and other local first responder agencies) is directly accountable (Geller, 1985; Whisenand and Ferguson, 2002).
348 J.F. DONNERMEYER
Further complicating the patch-quilt arrangements of policing in the United States is the fact that local police agencies can overlap in their jurisdictions. For example, local units of government include both counties (or county equivalents) and incorporated places, such as cities, towns, and villages. Usually the status of city is reserved for incor- porated places with large populations, the status of town for populations smaller than cities, and the status of village for the smallest populations. State-level laws specify these statuses, and each of the 50 states will have a different arrangement for the relationship between population size and the status of an incorporated place. The unincorporated areas of counties in many states are subdivided into townships. All three – counties, townships, and incorporated places – can establish police agencies. Plus, in many localities, the jurisdictions of these police agencies can overlap. For example, there are over 3000 county-wide sheriffs departments (Hickman and Reaves, 2001). These police agencies can have jurisdiction over the whole county, including all townships and incorporated places located within the boundaries of the county. In some states, sheriffs departments are restricted to serving arrest warrants and subpoenas for people to appear in court, with a separate county-wide police depart- ment. In other states, sheriffs departments are full-service police agencies, matching the same breadth of mission and array of functions as police agencies of township and incorporated places.
There is another dimension to the complexity of policing in the United States. It is the presence of specialized police agencies authorized by the constitutions and by-laws of State governments. These agencies, who often have far-ranging jurisdictions and police powers, can include a state-wide police, or police devoted to servicing highways (i.e., highway patrol), public housing (i.e., metropolitan housing authority), parks and recreation areas (i.e., park police or park rangers), and public transit (i.e., metropolitan subway or transit system police).
The locality-specific nature of policing is complicated by one more dimension. It is the nature of community itself (Wilkinson, 1970; Sharp, 2001). By definition, com- munity has both a geographic referent and an organizational referent. Typically, community is defined as a place where members have common ties. As a place, most communities have boundaries, frequently defined by geography (i.e., rivers, mountains, valleys, etc.), political jurisdictions (i.e., counties, townships, incorporated places), or both. Communities vary by the amount of cohesion exhibited by the individuals and groups who reside and act within the boundaries. In other words, in some communities, there is strong identity with the community and strong ties among community mem- bers. In other communities, identity is weak among most members, ties are not very strong, and there is little social capital on which collective action can be built (Sharp, 2001). Commonly, it has been assumed that smaller communities represent the former type, and larger, more urban-like communities represent the latter. However, that is not always so. Some rural communities are not very cohesive, and many large, urban communities exhibit an amazing degree of cohesion among its members.
The community context is an important influence on the organizational behavior of the police. Not only do the heads of police agencies have to deal with administration of the agency itself, but must contend with the ever-shifting and often competing interests of different constituencies within the community (Geller, 1985; Palone et al., 2000). Beyond calls for service, police agencies and police response to crime are shaped at the local level by politicians, civic and volunteer groups, activists, local media, reli- gious groups, youth and youth-related groups, and a host of other individuals and
LOCAL PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM 349
organizations. A community’s relative intolerance of deviance, and the values and poli- tical attitudes of its citizens partly determine which laws are enforced aggressively and which laws are not.
Nearly all communities in the United States have politically defined boundaries. As such, they are authorized to provide various services and collect taxes. The police repre- sent one type of service considered basic or vital to the general welfare and safety of the populace. However, there are others who also are considered ‘first responders.’ In most communities, these other first responders would include fire-fighting and emergency medical services. Sometimes, fire departments provide emergency medical services, or, the latter may be a specialized group within the fire department.
Beyond first responders, there are other local groups who are involved in issues related to safety and security, including an agency responsible for responding to large emergencies, such as natural and man-made disasters. Most often referred to as an emergency management agency, local offices are integrated with the state office of emergency management through various administrative arrangements and procedures that seek to insure rapid response when situations arise. Also, at the local level, there are public health agencies of various sorts that are concerned with medical issues, including the early detection and treatment of disease.
One measure of a community’s cohesion is the extent to which these various agencies, including the police, cooperate with each other when emergency situations occur. For example, tornadoes are frequent in the Midwestern states and can cause massive devastation. Rapid and effective response requires coordination amongst all of these agencies. Even public health agencies become involved because natural disasters have the potential to contaminate water and food sources.
Community theorists define cohesion along two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Wilkinson, 1970; Garkovich, 1989; Sharp, 2001). Vertical integration refers to the strength of relationships between an individual or group at the local level and various individuals and groups beyond the immediate boundaries of the community. For example, a police agency’s vertically-integrated relationships would include memberships in professional police associations, relationships with statewide police organizations (such as the State Police), and relationships with various criminal justice agencies, such as the state Attorney General’s Office or a state forensics lab. Some of these vertically integrated relationships are mandated by Federal and State laws, while other are arrangements developed through contacts initiated by a local police agency with an outside agency in order to acquire additional resources and expertise.
Horizontal integration refers to the strength of relationships between individuals and groups within the immediate boundaries of the community. For example, there are various degrees of both cooperation and competition between a police agency and a fire department. On the one hand, both are first responders who have responsibility for incidents involving public safety. At the scene of a fire, fire department personnel are responsible for suppression of the blaze and the rescue of individuals from the burning structure. The police are responsible for securing the area so that fire department personnel can perform their duties without interruption and so that onlookers are not endangered. On the other hand, the respective heads of police and fire agencies must frequently compete with each other for funding from the same local elected officials, and vie for support from the same community-at-large and the various constituency groups within.
350 J.F. DONNERMEYER
In most communities of the US, volunteers (i.e., nonpaid personnel) help staff both police agencies and fire departments, creating situations in which the two groups must competitively recruit from the same pool of citizens (Whisenand and Ferguson, 2002). Among law enforcement, these volunteers frequently are called ‘police reserves’ who can be called to duty in emergency situations, or when large events are held, such as festivals or concerts, that require additional personnel. In many communities of the US, fire departments are staffed almost completely by volunteers. Even the fire chief may serve part-time and is a volunteer. Fire departments become more than merely agencies responsible for responding to calls for service, they become a focal point for various social activities (and the political center for local politics), such as a place for volunteers to congregate and gossip, and as a group raising money in order to purchase fire protection equipment.
Similar relationships exist between the police and other local agencies in the community who are responsible for issues of health and safety. It is into this complex network of overlapping jurisdictions and varying degrees of inter-agency collaboration and competition that the issue of preparedness for terrorism has now confronted every police agency in the United States.
THE STATE OF OHIO CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM
During the 1990s, a series of incidents raised grave concerns about the possibility that terrorism would become a growing reality in the US. These incidents included events occurring both inside and outside the country. Conflicts around the world made head- lines nearly everyday in the United States, from such places as far away as Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Israel and Palestine, the Basque region of Spain, and groups within countries formed after the break-up of Yugoslavia, among others. Plus, US citizens and property in other countries (i.e., embassies, ships and military installations) have been the frequent targets for attacks by terrorists. Within the US, there were many events as well, including incidents of terrorism by right-wing and anti- government groups, extremists groups promoting various environmental and animal rights issues, and groups opposed to the globalization of the economy, the practices and policies of international corporations, free-trade summits by world leaders etc. As well, race relations within US society have been and will continue to be a possible domestic source for terrorism. In the past, civil rights groups and leaders of predominately black churches have been the targets of violence.
In particular, one incident served to change the mind-set of many elected officials, especially at the State and Federal level. This was April 19, 1995 when Timothy McVeigh and accomplices bombed the Federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Over 160 people were killed. This incident had important symbolic value for these State and Federal leaders. First, it occurred in the Midwestern region of the US. A common assumption prior to that time was that terrorism only occurred in large cities on the East and West coasts of the country. Second, the perpetrator was a citizen of the US, and was a military veteran. But third, and most importantly, the ability of first responder agencies in the community (and surrounding communities) of Oklahoma City was put severely to the test. Their ability to coordinate rescue and investigatory efforts was vital to the recovery process of victims’ families and friends and the ability of police investigators to uncover clues and apprehend the terrorists.
LOCAL PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM 351
Yet, public opinion about terrorism continued to be weak after Oklahoma City insofar as most people believed that the likelihood of an incident occurring in their community was almost nil. Although public attention was jolted by the World Trade Center and Pentagon events of September 11, 2001, when citizens consider terrorism in reference to their own communities, they have maintained the belief that the chances are very small. To quote one US citizen from the medium-sized, Midwestern town of Waterloo (USA Today, 3/7/02): ‘You have to get to the airport early, and you have to take off your shoes....Besides that, what’s changed?’
METHODOLOGY
The Oklahoma City bombing set in motion the idea that terrorism could occur in the ‘Heartland’ or Midwestern states of the US. In Ohio, a statewide conference on ‘Domestic Preparedness’ was organized. The conference was cosponsored by the Office of the Lieutenant Governor and the Ohio Department of Public Safety, plus the Ohio Emergency Management Agency. A number of other state-level institutions also assisted with the conference, including The Ohio State University (OSU). The role of the OSU team (led by the author) was to record the proceedings, including observations and note-taking at each of the plenary and concurrent sessions (Office of the Lieutenant Governor, 2000).
Altogether, slightly more than 900 persons attended the 2-day conference, which was held on June 5–6, 2000. Ohio is subdivided into 88 counties, and representatives of various local agencies who are important to the ‘horizontal integration’ of the community were invited. These included locally-based representatives from: (1) police agencies; (2) fire-fighting agencies; (3) emergency medical services; (4) emergency management agencies; (5) public health officials; (6) the medical community, including local doctors, hospital personnel and the coroner; and (7) local elected officials.
The 88 counties in Ohio vary greatly in population size and composition. The most rural county in Ohio has fewer than 13 000 residents, while the largest includes 1.4 million people. Ohio is a state that includes three metropolitan areas of þ1 million (Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus), and 13 smaller metropolitan areas. As well, within its borders are many suburban communities, communities located on the fringe between urbanized areas and rural areas, a large number of small towns, and areas that are exclusively rural. The US Bureau of the Census (2002) indicates that 2.8 million of Ohio’s approximately 11 million residents live in small towns and unincorporated areas. Local stakeholders to the conference reflected the diversity of these community environments, which indicates that the law enforcement representa- tives and those of the other groups brought with them experiences reflective of the overlapping jurisdictions and missions of their own agencies and of issues related to both vertical and horizontal integration of their communities
A significant portion of the conference was devoted to break-out sessions in which each of these seven ‘stakeholder’ groups considered a set of four questions with refer- ence to the major theme or focus of the conference: ‘domestic preparedness.’ The four questions were: (1) What are the most critical equipment issues? (2) What are the most critical training issues? (3) What are the most critical internal issues? and (4) What are the most critical external issues?
352 J.F. DONNERMEYER
Since a member of each stakeholder group was invited from each of the 88 counties in the state, the size of the stakeholder groups was quite large. A team of 4 trained facilitators guided each of the concurrent sessions in which the police and the other 6 stakeholder groups independently discussed the 4 issues and developed their short lists of priorities. The facilitators introduced the topics and supervised the discussion. Facilitators recorded issues on flip chart paper. Anyone could enter an issue on the list. Then, participants were handed discussion sheets. On these sheets, they were asked to first write down up to ten critical issues in reference to the question under consideration. Through discussion and debate, guided by the facilitators, the list was reduced to five and a final vote was taken. Despite the best efforts of facilitators, however, some of the groups, depending on the question under consideration, did not conform to the principle of listing only 5 priorities. On occasion, as many as 7 and as few as 3 priorities were listed. The priorities were reported by the facilitation team leader at the general closing session of the conference.
In this article, the critical issues related to preparedness as prioritized by representa- tives from police agencies across the state of Ohio are presented. In addition, their priorities are compared to the other stakeholder groups.
RESULTS
(1) Critical Equipment Issues Table 1 includes a summary of the 5 priority issues of law enforcement on each of the 4 questions. Also included are issues identified by the other 6 stakeholder groups, but not by the police. At the bottom of the table is a list of the abbreviations for each group.
For law enforcement, the five critical equipment issues were: (1) communications equipment; (2) personal protection equipment (PPE); (3) detection equipment (HAZMAT); (4) funding for the first-time purchase of equipment; and (5) funding for the maintenance of equipment. Based on the notes of the observers in the law enfor- cement session, the police defined critical equipment issues in terms of improving their inventories, with most indicating that their agencies have little or none of the equipment necessary to respond adequately to an incident of terrorism or to protect police officers and others who must respond to such incidents. At the same time, the police represen- tatives at the conference recognized that equipment purchases for possible incidents of terrorism (either to assist with rescue, to gather evidence, or to detect bombs, dangerous chemicals and other weapons of mass destruction) requires special funding beyond discretionary monies already available for patrol cars, weapons, vests and other police paraphernalia.
All seven stakeholder groups were in agreement that communications equipment was one of the top-five critical equipment issues. In addition, 4 of the other 6 groups indicated that the purchase of PPE and HAZMAT equipment were top priorities. Working independently, the police and fire groups had nearly identical equipment priority lists. Of particular note is that both the police and the fire-fighter groups were the only stakeholder groups to list funding of equipment among their top-five critical equipment issues. Three priorities not identified by the police but listed by 2 or more of the other 6 groups included: (1) equipment necessary to establish a command center; (2) software containing reference material information about
LOCAL PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM 353
T A B L E
I P ri o ri ti es
o f la w
en fo
rc em
en t a n d
o th
er st a k eh
o ld
er g ro
u p s
C ri ti ca
l eq
u ip
m en
t n ee
d s
C ri ti ca
l tr
a in
in g
is su
es C
ri ti ca
l in
te rn
a l is su
es C
ri ti ca
l ex
te rn
a l is su
es
I. T
o p -f iv
e p ri o ri ti es
o f la
w en
fo rc
em en
t
C o m
m u n ic a ti o n s eq
u ip
m en
t (P
, F , E M
S , M
E D
, P H
O ,
E M
A , E O
)
C er
ti fi ca
ti o n
o f tr a in
in g
(P , F , E M
S , P H
O , E O )
In tr a -a
g en
cy p o li ci es
a n d
p ro
ce d u re
s fo
r re
sp o n se
to in
ci d en
ts (P
, F , P H
O , E O
)
O n -g
o in
g in
te ra
g en
cy co
o rd
in a ti o n
a n d
co m
m u n ic a ti o n
(P , F , E M
S ,
M E D
, P H
O , E O )
P er
so n a l p ro
te ct io
n eq
u ip
m en
t (P
P E )
(P , F , E M
S , P H
O , E O
) R es
o u rc
e g u id
e o f ce
rt if ie d
tr a in
er s a n d
tr a in
in g
si te s (P
, F )
P er
so n n el
re te
n ti o n
(P )
P o li ti ca
l su
p p o rt
(l o ca
l a n d
st a te
) (P
, F , P H
O , E O
)
D et ec
ti o n
eq u ip
m en
t (H
A Z M
A T )
(P , F , E M
S , P H
O , E O
) B a si c tr a in
in g
fo r fi rs
t re
sp o n d er
s o n
te rr
o ri sm
(P , E O )
T ra
in in
g in
h o w
to re
sp o n d
to cr
it ic a l in
ci d en
ts (P
, E M
S , E O )
F u n d in
g /l a ck
o f fu
n d s/ u n fu
n d ed
m a n d a te
s (P
, E M
S , E M
A )
F u n d in
g fo
r 1 st
ti m
e eq
u ip
m en
t p u rc
h a se
s (P
, F )
In ci d en
t co
m m
a n d
tr a in
in g
(P )
C o m
m a n d
st a ff
tr a in
in g
(P , E M
S )
M ed
ia re
la ti o n s (P
, P H
O , E O )
F u n d in
g fo
r eq
u ip
m en
t m
a in
te n a n ce
(P , F )
F u n d in
g o f ce
rt if ie d
tr a in
in g
si te
s (P
) T ra
in in
g in
u se
o f eq
u ip
m en
t (P
P E , H
A Z M
A T , et
c. )
(P , E M
S )
M u tu
a l a id
a g re
em en
ts (P
, M
E D
)
II . T
o p -f iv
e p ri o ri ti es
o f o th
er st
a k eh
o ld
er g ro
u p s
C o m
m a n d
ce n te r eq
u ip
m en
t (E
M A , E O
) C o n d u ct
o f m
o ck
d is a st er
ex er
ci se
s (E
M S , P H
O , E O )
F u n d in
g (F
, E M
S , E M
A , E O
) P u b li c a w a re
n es
s a n d
p u b li c
ed u ca
ti o n
(F , P H
O , E O
)
R ef
er en
ce m
a te ri a ls
so ft w a re
(P H
O , E M
A )
C er
ti fi ca
ti o n
o f in
st ru
ct o rs
(F , E M
S , E M
A )
A d eq
u a te
a n d
q u a li fi ed
st a ff
(E M
S , M
E D
, P H
O , E M
A )
In ci d en
t co
m m
a n d /c
h a in
o f
co m
m a n d
(E M
S , E M
A )
D ec
o n ta
m in
a ti o n
eq u ip
m en
t (F
, E M
S )
C o n ti n u o u s tr a in
in g
o n
p re
p a re
d n es
s fo
r te
rr o ri sm
(M E D
, E M
A )
C o m
m it m
en t o f
p er
so n n el
(F , M
E D
) In
te ra
g en
cy /c
ro ss
-a g en
cy tr a in
in g
(E M
S )
R es
p o n se
v eh
ic le s (E
M S )
T ra
in in
g fu
n d s fo
r lo
ca l
a g en
ci es
(F , M
E D
) S u p p o rt
fr o m
th e g en
er a l
p u b li c a n d
st a te
a g en
ci es
(M E D
, E M
A )
In te ll ig en
ce sh
a ri n g
(F )
E m
er g en
cy g en
er a to
rs (E
O )
M ed
ia /p
u b li c
in fo
rm a ti o n
(P H
O , E O )
A ss
es si n g
n ee
d s w it h in
th e a g en
cy (F
) E x te rn
a l co
m m
u n ic a ti o n
(f ro
m lo
ca l to
st a te
le v el ) (E
O )
354 J.F. DONNERMEYER
C ra
sh ca
rt (M
E D
) In
te r- a g en
cy ro
le s in
cr it ic a l in
ci d en
ts (P
H O
) C o n fl ic t w it h
o th
er d u ti es
in m
is si o n
o f a g en
cy (F
)
S ta
te g u id
el in
es fo
r tr a in
in g
a n d
eq u ip
m en
t (M
E D
)
O n -s it e p o rt a b le
co m
p u te
rs (P
H O
) I. D
. o f w ea
p o n s o f m
a ss
d es
tr u ct
io n
(P H
O )
F u n d in
g fo
r d ev
el o p m
en t
o f m
is si o n
in re
la ti o n
to te
rr o ri sm
(E M
A )
In fo
rm a ti o n
o n
n a ti o n a l st a n d a rd
s fo
r tr a in
in g
a n d
eq u ip
m en
t (E
M S )
H a rd
co p y
re fe re
n ce
m a te
ri a ls
(E M
A )
D ec
o n ta
m in
a ti o n
(E M
S )
D is tr ib
u ti o n
o f tr a in
in g
st a ff
(M E D
) C o m
m u n ic a ti o n s/ m
ed ia
tr a in
in g
(M E D
)
Id en
ti fi ca
ti o n
o f h ig
h p ri o ri ty
eq u ip
m en
t n ee
d s (M
E D
)
U si n g
co m
p u te
r so
ft w a re
(P H
O )
A d m
in is tr a ti v e m
a n a g em
en t
o f em
er g en
cy re
sp o n se
(M E D
) C o o rd
in a ti o n
o f h ea
lt h
ca re
p ro
fe ss io
n a l tr a in
in g
(M E D
)
A n ti d o te
s (F
) U
si n g
p er
so n a l p ro
te ct
io n
eq u ip
m en
t (E
M S )
S ta
n d a rd
iz ed
em er
g en
cy re
sp o n se
p la
n a cr
o ss
a ll
a g en
ci es
(P H
O )
In te
g ra
te p u b li c h ea
lt h
st a n d a rd
s in
to cr
it ic a l in
ci d en
t st a n d a rd
s (P
H O
)
U n if ie d
in te r- a g en
cy tr a in
in g
o n
is su
es re
la te
d to
te rr
o ri sm
(F )
C ri ti ca
l in
ci d en
t tr a in
in g
(P H
O )
F u n d in
g fo
r re
p la
ce m
en t
o f u se
d eq
u ip
m en
t (F
)
F in
d in
g w a y s to
ef fe
ct iv
el y
tr a in
b u sy
p eo
p le
(M E D
) S ec
u ri ty
fo r p u b li c
o ff ic ia ls
(E O
) F in
d in
g w a y s to
ef fe
ct iv
el y
tr a in
b u sy
p eo
p le
(M E D
)
A p p ro
p ri a te
tr a in
in g
fo r
p er
so n n el
fr o m
u ti li ty
co m
p a n ie s (E
O )
M ed
ia re
la ti o n s (E
O )
F ed
er a l a n d
st a te
a ss
is ta
n ce
fo r in
te rv
en ti o n
(E O
)
A p p ro
p ri a te
tr a in
in g
fo r
el ec
te d
o ff ic ia ls
(E O
) P ro
m o ti o n
o f em
er g en
cy m
a n a g em
en t a g en
ci es
(E M
A )
A ss
es si n g
tr a in
in g
n ee
d s
a n d
p ri o ri ti es
(E M
A )
U n fo
re se
ea b le
ci rc
u m
st a n ce
s (E
O )
E v a lu
a ti n g
tr a in
er s a n d
tr a in
in g
p ro
g ra
m s (E
M A )
A b b re
v ia ti o n s:
P : P o li ce
; F : F ir e;
E M
S : E m
er g en
cy M
ed ic a l S er
v ic es
; M
E D
: M
ed ic a l C o m
m u n it y
(d o ct o rs
a n d
h o sp
it a l a d m
in is tr a to
rs );
P H
O : P u b li c H
ea lt h
O ff ic ia ls ; E M
A : L o ca
l E m
er g en
cy M
a n a g em
en t A g en
cy W
o rk
er s;
E O : L o ca
l E le ct ed
O ff ic ia ls .
LOCAL PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM 355
weapons of mass destruction and other pertinent information in response to critical incidents; and (3) decontamination equipment.
It was possible that if there was no agreement among the seven stakeholder groups, the list of critical equipment issues in Table 1 would include about 35 different items. In fact, there were only 34 critical equipment issues identified (although the fire-fighter group listed 2 extra, the medical community group identified only 3 and the local EMA stakeholders identified only 4). However, the list was less than half that size, indicating only 15 discrete equipment issues. In other words, for every equip- ment issue identified, there was 2.4 votes, that is, an average of 2.4 stakeholders groups identified each issue as a high priority. This indicates a moderate amount of agreement among each of the 7 local stakeholder groups. In addition, the top-five priorities listed by representatives from local law enforcement were also listed 16 out of the remaining 29 times by the other 6 groups, indicating that the priority issues of the police were largely the same priorities of the other stakeholder groups.
(2) Critical Training Issues In contrast to the results in Table 1, perceptions of critical training issues among the 7 stakeholder groups was much more divergent. There were 21 different priorities listed out of 33 possible, or 1.57 votes per priority training issue identified. The discrepancy from 35 possible priorities was due to the fact that only 3 priorities were listed by the medical community, 4 by EMA represen- tatives, and 6 by elected officials.
The law enforcement stakeholder group was very much concerned about the issue of certification. Three out of their top-five priority issues expressed this concern, including certification of training about how to respond to terrorist incidents, a resource guide of certified trainers and training sites, and funding of sites where certified training can be conducted. These priorities reflected the environment in which police training on many other issues is conducted. Observer notes from this session indicated that the participants were concerned that the funding for terrorism training will create a number of ‘overnight experts’ who do not meet standards. The police representatives also recognized that training budgets for police agencies, large and small, were already stretched to the limit, and that if the police are expected to increase their preparedness for possible incidents of terrorism, then State and Federal governments must be pre- pared to provide the monies necessary to fund the training sites.
The police response to this question was quite logical given the context of policing in the US. Federal and State laws define the standards for police training and retraining and who (trainers and training sites) is eligible to conduct this training. It was perfectly logical for the police stakeholder group to consider critical training issues about terrorism in the same terms as their other training.
In addition to issues related to certification, the police identified two other training needs. The first was basic training for first responders (the police plus fire and EMS). Observer notes indicated that a number of the police participants had knowledge of the police experience from Oklahoma City, where a coordinated effort with other first responders was considered relatively effective. Therefore, they expressed the need that basic training was necessary for all three groups, not merely the police. Likewise, the other critical issue identified as a top-five priority by the police stake- holder group was incident command training. Again, those who expressed the need for this kind of training frequently referred to the experience of Oklahoma City, where the chain of command had been predetermined through mutual aid agreements of the police department and other first responding groups.
356 J.F. DONNERMEYER
Police priorities did not always agree with the other 6 stakeholder groups. Issues identified by 2 or more of these other groups included: (1) the conduct of mock disaster exercises; (2) certification of trainers; (3) continuous training on preparedness for ter- rorism; (4) training funds for local agencies; and (5) media relations/public information training.
(3) Critical Internal Issues Thirty-four priorities were identified by the 7 stakeholder groups in regard to the question of critical internal issues. Public health officials listed only 4 priorities. Altogether, 18 different issues were identified, or 1.9 votes per issue. Among the top-five priority issues of the law enforcement stakeholder group, three related to training, including training on how the police should respond to critical incidents, command staff training, and training in the use of equipment (PPE, HAZMAT, etc.). These three issues reflected priorities previously expressed in response to questions about critical issues relative to both equipment and training.
There were two other internal issues in the top-five priority list identified by the police. The first was the concern among a number of the participants in the police stake- holder group for the need to establish agency policy and guidelines about how to respond to incidents of terrorism. This priority reflects the culture of police agencies in the US insofar as standardization of procedures is a prominent concern. One of the primary duties of the CEO of a police agency is to review and reformulate the procedures ‘manual’ of the police agency. These procedures reflect not only various Federal and State guidelines that define the mission of policing, but also agreements between management and unionized officers, and procedures established in order to avoid lawsuits through inappropriate actions or the negligent behavior of sworn personnel. Concern about policies and procedures was also the most frequently mentioned issue, making the top-five priority list for 4 out of the 7 stakeholder groups.
Also considered important by the law enforcement representatives was the issue of personnel retention. They were the only group to rank this issue as a top priority. Observer notes indicated that the concern centered on the high turnover rate among patrol officers due to transfer from one agency to another, resignations, and retire- ments. Every personnel change requires learning anew policies and regulations, given the relative autonomy of each agency to develop its own set of rules.
Three of the top-five priorities of the law enforcement stakeholder group overlapped with the EMS stakeholder group, namely training on how to respond to critical incidents, command staff training, and training in the use of equipment. Elected officials also listed critical incident training among their top-five internal issues.
There were 2 issues rated high by at least 4 stakeholder groups that did not make the top-five priority list of law enforcement. These were ‘funding’ and ‘adequate and qualified staff.’ Funding was a high priority internal issue for fire-fighters, EMS person- nel, local EMA personnel, and local elected officials. Adequate and qualified staff was a priority for EMS personnel, local representatives of the medical community, public health officials, and local EMA personnel. Both reflect the belief of representatives of these agencies that they are under funded and understaffed in general, hence, their capacity to be responsive to any kind of incident involving multiple victims would be difficult.
(4) Critical External Issues The final question asked to the police and the other 6 stakeholder groups was to consider critical external issues. Two of the top priority issues of the police involved their relationship with other agencies in the community (i.e., horizontal integration). These were on-going interagency coordination and
LOCAL PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM 357
communication and mutual aid agreements. With both priority issues, the law enforce- ment group realized that inter-agency coordination and communication in their com- munity was rarely very good, although they qualified their statements by noting that most first responding agencies were able to cooperate sufficiently to respond to incidents, when necessary. However, a terrorist incident would be at an entirely differ- ent level, something never experienced before by anyone in the community, and would require a new, heightened level of coordination. For this reason, mutual aid agreements become extremely important, and several of the law enforcement representatives saw a parallel between the critical internal issue of intra-agency policies and procedures and the external issue of mutual aid agreements that spell out policies and procedures between agencies.
Two other top-five police priority issues included dimensions of both vertical and horizontal integration. These were political support (local and state) and media relations. The discussion centered mostly on local political support for the financial cost of preparedness and the fact that local elected officials ‘take their cue’ (to quote one of the participants) directly from voters. However, the discussion also included the importance of political support from state leaders so that local political leaders feel the pressure to be equally supportive. Plus, state political support is necessary in order for proper levels of funding to come about (also a top-five priority issue). Over-all, the police representatives were skeptical of the sustainability of political support for domestic preparedness, believing that it will wane because the public’s attention span, vis-à-vis the media’s attention span, is rather short. Obviously, this dis- cussion occurred before the events of September 11, but as the USA Today quote cited earlier aptly demonstrated, public attention to terrorism has already begun to decline.
In regard to media relations, observers’ notes indicated that the discussion by the police included both local and national media, with the police representatives realizing that any local incident of terrorism would bring media from around the country and the world to their community. They recognized that mutual aid agreements have to include which first responder or other community agency (or coordination thereof) will be responsible for clearing information for public release. They also discussed the problems of keeping the media away from the scene where evidence must be collected without restricting the rights of a free press. Finally, another part of the discussion of the media centered on media bias toward the police and the accuracy of media reports of other incidents involving the police. In essence, part of the reason that the police consider media relations a high priority external issue is prior skepticism and animosity toward the press.
There were 20 different priority issues listed by all 7-stakeholder groups. Altogether, there were 36 votes on critical external issues, with every group identifying 5 priorities except the medical community, which listed 6 priorities. There were 1.8 votes by stake- holder groups per issue.
All but one of the other 6 stakeholder groups (namely, local EMA representatives) agreed with the police that on-going inter-agency coordination and communication was a priority issue. Three others agreed with the police that political support was critical. In addition, two other stakeholder groups lined up with the police on the importance of funding and media relations. Two external issues considered important by 2 or more of the other 6 stakeholder groups included: (1) public awareness and public education relative to terrorism and to local preparedness; and (2) establishment of chain of command in response to critical incidents.
358 J.F. DONNERMEYER
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The purpose of this article was to examine issues related to domestic preparedness from the point of view of the police, based on a statewide conference held in Ohio in June, 2000. Information was derived from a formal process, guided by facilitators, of developing priority issues in response to four questions about preparedness, and from the notes of observers to the discussion sessions. Comparisons of police priorities of the critical issues was made with 6 other stakeholder groups who consisted of local representatives from throughout the state. These included fire-fighters, EMS personnel, the medical community, public health officials, local EMA personnel and elected officials. In large part, the other 6 stakeholder groups agreed with the assessment of domestic preparedness as formulated by the police. Despite this, it was often the case that top-five priorities among all 7-stakeholder groups varied due to the unique perspectives and special interests of each.
When examining the various priority issues raised specifically by the police to the 4 questions, three patterns emerge. First, the police indicated a high priority for equip- ment necessary to respond effectively to terrorism and for equipment that would protect them while at the scene of the incidents. Recognizing that current police budgets are not sufficient to purchase and maintain this equipment, they also identified funding as a high priority for both initial purchases and for maintenance of the equipment so that it can be used when the time comes. However, without local and state political support, they felt that such funding is not likely to occur.
Second, the police identified certified training as a high priority. This included training in the use of equipment and in the chain of command within the police agency and between other agencies when incidents occur. Training must meet minimum standards as specified by a certification process that includes both trainers and training sites, and these must be listed in a resource guide so that local police agencies can access the right kinds of training, trainers, and training sites. Like equipment, training includes a maintenance dimension because of personnel turnover in the police ranks. Of course, as with equipment purchase and maintenance, current police budgets are insufficient to fund training for domestic preparedness. Local and state political support becomes essential.
Third, policies and procedures must be established proactively so that the police agency and its personnel know what to do should an incident of terrorism occur. Likewise, inter-agency coordination and communication during a time of crisis requires prior development of mutual aid agreements, especially among first responder agencies within the same community.
The nature of policing at the local, community level is clearly evident in police perceptions of critical issues that need to be addressed in order to prepare for incidents of terrorism. The officers felt that assistance from the outside (vertical integration) must come in the form of funding, political support, and an infrastructure of certified training sites and trainers. Further, the officers recognized that their relationship to other service groups in the community, including other first responders, was critical to an effective response (horizontal integration).
Policing in America is conditioned by the locality-specific nature of the US federated system of governance (Federal, State and local) and by a culture that values local community autonomy. In turn, these broad social structural and cultural parameters condition the response of the police (and the other stakeholder groups) to an issue
LOCAL PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM 359
like domestic preparedness. For example, none of the notes of observers recorded a comment by an officer indicating that domestic preparedness for terrorism should be under the sole jurisdiction of a statewide agency. Yet, nearly every participant, at one time or another, believed that outside assistance (funding, certification standards, and political support) was essential for preparedness within their communities. Likewise, when they considered coordination and communication issues with other first responders, the issue was always discussed as a local, community level issues, and not as a State or Federal level issue.
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