POL101-2

Journal of Contemporary China, 2017 Vol. 26, no. 105, 325–336 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245505

An Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power

Sangkuk Lee

Center for Security and Strategy, Korea institute for Defense analysis, Seoul, South Korea

ABSTRACT Xi Jinping swiftly centralized political power shortly after the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress in 2012, opposing what was predicted when he was elected general secretary. This action also compromises China’s long-term efforts to avert an over-concentration of power among a few elites. This study deals with Xi’s strong ascent to power, defined as the result of institutional change in China’s political power game from the perspective of new institutionalism. The author identifies triggers of institutional change, ideas and norms introduced for changing informal institutions, and the actual transformation of formal institutions, arguing that Xi took advantage of social demand for reform coordination as well as some top elites’ serious political misbehavior to commence institutional change for the centralization of political power. To do so, Xi introduced new reform ideas – systemic thinking and top-down design, originating from complex systems theory – in the name of coordinating and comprehensively deepening reform. Xi eventually succeeded in justifying the centralization of power and the establishment of central organizations to deepen reforms comprehensively and coordinate internal and external security. As a result, Xi seized power while practically nullifying the principle of division of work.

Introduction

One of the major characteristics of China’s elite politics during the era of ‘‘Reform and Opening up’’ is that the power of China’s political elites came to be shaped more by political institutions than any other factor, such as personal networks. This phenomenon has been perpetuated and intensified by the efforts of top political leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, in the reform era. That is, China’s top leaders pushed for institutionalizing political elites’ power games by establishing political norms and regulations for the selection, promotion, resignation, and responsibility of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres.1 As the political game has been institutionalized through the reform leadership’s efforts, the power of China’s political elites has become determined by their official position and responsibility, authorized by formal institutions, under the condition of a deficiency of personal charisma and prestige similar to that which empowered previous revolutionary leaders including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.2

Particularly with Deng Xiaoping’s strong drive, as shown in his 1980s speech, ‘On the reform of the party and state leadership system’,3 China’s top leaders initiated vigorous institutional reforms to ensure

1for details, see Wang yang, The Building of Institutions for the Party’s Cadres in the New Era [新时期党的干部制度建设] (Beijing: CCp history publishing house, 2006), pp. 89–176.

2David Shambaugh, ‘the dynamics of elites politics during the Jiang era,’ The China Journal 45 (2001), p. 109; Shiping Zheng, ‘the new era in Chinese politics,’ Issues and Studies 41(1), (2005), pp. 195–196.

3Deng Xiaoping, ‘on the reform of the party and state leadership system’ [‘党和国家领导制度的改革’], Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2 (Beijing: Central party literature press, 1994), pp. 320–342.

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that power could not be overly centralized and concentrated in the hands of a few individuals who act arbitrarily. Specifically, China’s reform leadership reinstated the system of combining ‘collective leader- ship’ (集体领导) and ‘division of work with individual responsibility’ (个人分工负责), e.g. for party, admin- istrative, legal, and military affairs. Since then, China’s power politics has been significantly influenced by the rule of collective decision-making by consensus, with a division of policy responsibility among the individual members of the CCP’s Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Indeed, the ‘collective leadership system’ and ‘division of work’ have been incorporated in the Party’s authoritative public documents, including successive party constitutions, political work reports issued at the Party’s National Congresses, and speeches by top leaders throughout the reform era.4

This political institutionalization of decentralized power in Chinese politics has accordingly affected the estimation of power of China’s new political leadership, elected in the 18th Party National Congress. Specifically, some forecasts for Xi Jinping, the Party’s new General Secretary, was that his power would be significantly more fragile because of the collective leadership system and division of work as well as his weak personal network with other power elites. Further, there were even predictions that Xi would be the weakest leader since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.5

However, Xi’s political power, evident within a few years of his inaugural speech as the Party’s General Secretary, is profoundly different from the aforementioned expectations. Many expert commentaries on Chinese politics evaluate that Xi Jinping not only consolidated his political power swiftly but also exerted his influence over more varied policy areas than any previous general secretary in the reform era, even to the point of Xi’s power surpassing ‘‘the paramount leader,’’ Mao Zedong. These new assess- ments of Xi’s power are mainly based on analyses of his heading newly introduced as well as existing organizations for the transformation of modes of exercise of political power. It is estimated that after making institutional rearrangements for policy decision-making at the central party level, Xi Jinping could exert significant influence on an almost full range of policy areas: not only the extant duties of General Secretary – foreign policy, national security, and military affairs, but also domestic security, the economy, society, and legal affairs, which were assigned to other PBSC members in the past.6 Thus Xi’s wielding of immense power over broad policy areas significantly surpasses previous leaders’ intentions and efforts to avert an over-concentration of power and to ensure a decentralization of power during the 30-year period of the reform era. In this sense, Xi Jinping’s centralization of power can be depicted as an unusual phenomenon in Chinese reform-era politics.

With this premise, this study will address what factors have contributed to Xi Jinping’s seizure of power beyond the initial forecasts. In so doing, it will utilize institutional change theory from new institutionalism. This is because, as previously discussed, Xi’s grip on power depended considerably on the rearrangement of institutions for policy decision-making at the central level, or transformations in modes of Chinese top elites’ exercise of power.

4alice miller, ‘the 18th Central Committee leadership with comrade Xi Jinping as general secretary,’ China Leadership Monitor 48, (2015), p. 1.

5for some predictions for Xi’s weak power, see William a Callahan, ‘Who is Xi Jinping, and where will he lead China?,’ CETRI Website, 8 november 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cetri.be/Who-is-Xi-Jinping-and-where-will?lang=fr; Jiang Xueqin, ‘West should prepare for confusing new Chinese leader,’ CNN, 7 november 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://globalpub- licsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/07/west-should-prepare-for-confusing-new-chinese-leader/; alice miller, ‘prospects for solidarity in the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China Leadership Monitor (april 2012); fang yuan, ‘Xi to be ‘weak’ president,’ RFA, 12 november 2012 available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/xi-jinping-11122012110129.html; akio yaita, Xi Jinping: The Weakest Leader in Communist China [習近平：共產中國最弱勢的領袖] (taipei: Common Wealth magazine, 2012); robert lawrence Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think, 2nd ed.(Singapore: Wiley & Sons, 2011), p. xiv.

6See Gao yi, ‘analysis: how Xi Jinping can get to be like Deng Xiaoping?’ [‘分析：怎样的习近平才能是邓小平？’], BBC (18 august 2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/08/140818_deng_xi_comparison_poli- tics; Chris Buckleynov, ‘Xi Jinping’s rapid rise in China presents challenges to the u.S.,’ The New York Times (11 november 2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/president-xi-jinping-makes-it-his-mission-to-em- power-china.html; Jeff mason and Steve holland, ‘obama says China’s Xi has consolidated power quickly, worrying neighbors,’ Reuters (4 December, 2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-usa-china-obama-iduSK- Cn0Jh21420141204; Willy lam, ‘Xi Jinping: a 21st-century mao?,’ Prospect Magazine, 21 may 2015, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/xi-jinping-a-21st-century-mao

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According to new institutionalism, institutions are comprised of two basic dimensions. The formal pillars consist of constitutions, laws, directives, regulations, and other rules that constrain, regularize, and force agents’ behavior. The non-formal pillars establish principles, such as values and norms that prescribe the goals of agents’ behavior and the appropriate ways to pursue them. The non-formal pillars also include culturally shaped and taken-for-granted assumptions through which a certain reality is perceived, understood, and given meaning by agents.7 From the perspective of new institutionalism, institutions are endowed with properties of self-enforcement and perpetuation by relevant agents. This is because many types of institutions are produced through bargaining and political conflict between individuals and organizations for their own benefit,8 or because agents’ taken-for-grantedness makes extant institutions self-enforcing.9

Thus, institutional change and rearrangement is frequently triggered by an exogenous shock, the occurrence of a crisis, or an existing institution’s failure.10 Under the condition of a certain trigger’s action, some stakeholders such as policy-decision makers and political elites turn to legitimizing and justify- ing the necessity of institutional change. Sometimes social brokers, such as expert advisers and think tanks, engage in the process of institutional change by introducing ideas and programs for institutional redesign. Policy decision-makers as stakeholders make efforts for institutional transformation by inter- acting with these social brokers.11 The characteristic of institutional change, whether it is fundamental or partial, depends significantly on political context – for example, the existence of high veto players who can mobilize institutional or other means of blocking change, and the stratagems of institutional challengers to overcome the resistance of the veto players.12

With these theoretical guides for institutional change, this study endeavors to illuminate the institu- tional rearrangement of China’s policy decision-making to explain the phenomenon of Xi’s centralization of power after the 18th Party Congress. The study focuses on the triggers of institutional change, ideas, and norms introduced to justify changing institutions, and the transformation of formal institutions. To achieve this analytical goal, in the next section this study tries to identify what made what factors caused China’s political elites to form a consensus on resolving the failure of the decentralized power system and the necessity of centralizing political power. The third section deals with what ideas and norms have been mobilized to justify or legitimize institutional change by Xi Jinping as an institutional challenger. These analytic works proceed by identifying the major social brokers who support and spread the discourse of institutional change. The transformation and its effect on formal institution are analyzed in the fourth section. These issues are addressed with a focus on Xi’s stratagems for complying with the party constitution regulating a ‘collective leadership system’ and ‘division of work’ as well as minimizing other top elites’ (potential) opposition and resistance. The final section summarizes the new findings in the previous sections and discusses the implications of this analytic result on China’s politics.

Chinese Political Elites’ Reaching Consensus on Remedying the Decentralized Power System

The negative effects of decentralized power on China’s political environment were already present from the Hu Jintao era of the mid-2000s, while the requirement of coordinating internal and external

7W. richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4th ed., (thousand oaks: SaGe publications, 2013), pp. 55–85.

8Douglass C. north, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1990), p. 36; avner Greif and Christopher Kingston, ‘institutions: rules or equilibria?,’ in norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero, eds., Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting (Berlin: Springer, 2011), p. 14.

9James mahoney and Kathleen thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (new york: Cambridge university press, 2010), p. 10.

10marc Schneiberg, ‘Combining new institutionalisms: explaining institutional change in american property insurance,’ Sociological Forum, 20(1), (2005), pp. 93–137.

11John l. Campbell, Institutional and Globalization (princeton and oxford: princeton university press, 2004), pp. 102–103. 12Wolfgang Streeck, and Kathleen thelen, ‘introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies,’ in Wolfgang Streeck and

Kathleen thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (oxford: oxford university press, 2005), pp. 1–39; James mahoney and Kathleen thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, pp. 14–37.

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securities was proposed persistently in the reform era.13 That is, some of China’s officials and adminis- trative experts raised concerns that the leadership system of ‘collective leadership’ and ‘division of work’ caused China’s poor governance and administrative performance, including ministry selfishness, inef- fectiveness of policy decision-making, irresponsibility of officials, and procrastination of reform.14 Thus, they proposed establishing a new organization for reform coordination at the central party or central government level. Furthermore, they asserted that this organization should precede Chinese reforms in the social and economic sectors by coordinating individual ministries’ and local government interests.15

The demands of installing a coordinating organization to deepen reform smoothly were voiced loudly before and after the 18th CCP National Congress of 2012 by some of China’s high-ranking officials and administrative experts from leading internal and external think tanks. They accentuated that ministerial and regional self-centeredness should have been overcome by introducing a new central government organization in order to further deepen China’s reform.16 Specially, a research report titled ‘‘China 2030’’, jointly published in February 2012 by the Development Research Center of the State Council, Finance Ministry, and World Bank, emphasized that ‘‘a high-powered reform commission needs to be established by – and with the full support of – the highest level of government,’’ while pointing out a variety of obstacles, like Chinese officialdom’s vested interests, to advancing reform.17

While these voices for solving the problems of the decentralized power system were rising, a series of unexpected political events gave Chinese politics a shock shortly before the 18th Party Congress in 2012. That is, the Party’s Chongqing Secretariat, Bo Xilai was removed from the Party as well as the Politburo in September 2012. Bo was considered an effective candidate for membership of the PBSC at the 18th Congress in 2012, since, as a member of the Politburo, he was armed with the Chongqing devel- opment model, the ‘‘Singing Red Song’’ campaign, and a strong personal network among princelings.18 However, Bo was dismissed from the Party on a charge of abuse of power, graft, serious party disciplinary violation, and attempting to establish a politically independent ‘‘kingdom’’ in Chongqing.19 In addition, the chief of the Party’s General Office, Ling Jihua was reported to have committed a variety of abuses of power and corruption in March 2012. He was considered very close to General Secretary Hu Jintao.

13See David m. lampton, ‘Xi Jinping and the national Security Commission: policy coordination and political power,’ Journal of Contemporary China 24(95), (2015), pp. 4–9; fan Chuangui, ‘the profound and figurative meaning of proposing overall national security outlook’ [‘‘总体国家安全观’提出之背后深意’], Legal Daily (21 april 2014), p. 4.

14alice l. miller, ‘prospects for solidarity in the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China Leadership Monitor 37, (2012), pp. 9–11; David m. lampton, Following the Leaders: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Berkeley, los angeles, and london: university of California press, 2014), p. 68.

15for details, huang Xiaohua, ‘Chi fulin member: establishing central reform coordination organization’ [‘迟福林委员：建立中央 改革协调机构’], Hainan Daily (13 march 2008), p. 2; Kuang Xianming ‘the goals and missions of the eleventh five-year reform: the overview of meeting for reform situation’ [‘十一五’改革:目标与任务 – 改革形势分析会综述’], Review of Economic Research,76(2005), pp. 17–22; Gao Shangquan, ‘Some opinions on report of government work (draft for comments)’ [‘对《政 府工作报告（征求意见稿）》的几点意见’], Reformdata.org (february 2005), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www. reformdata.org/index.do?m=wap&a=show&catid=301&typeid=&id=5141; Gao Shangquan, ‘accelerating reforms in key areas: pushing for China’s economic transformation’ [‘加快重点领域改革 推进中国经济转型’], China Reform, 12 (2010), pp. 42–43.

16for examples, see Geng Kuanmou, ‘Chu fulin: a top-down design transmits three signals, a reform organization at central level should be established’ [‘迟福林：顶层设计释放三个信号 应建中央层面改革协调机构’], People’s Daily Online, 12 march 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/148980/17355259.html; an (unknown) editorialist, ‘Coordination mechanism for improving system reform’ [‘完善体制改革的统筹协调机制’], South China Daily (19 february 2013), p. 2; 陈佳 贵主编, Report On China's Economic System Reform 2012 to Build a Mature Socialist Market Economy [中国经济体制改革报 告 2012: 建设成熟的社会主义市场经济体制] (Beijing: economy management publishing house, 2012); ren Zhongyuan, et al., ‘unveiling: comprehensive interpretation for reform roadmap’ [‘揭幕：改革路线图全解读’], New Century, 44 (2013), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cb.com.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=26&id=1023059&all; Wang Zhangjiang, ‘a series of conversations on scientific development: do not make top-down design deformed’ [‘科学发展系列谈：莫让’顶层 设计’走形’], China Youth Daily, 2 July 2012, p. 2.

17the World Bank & Development research Center of the State Council, the people’s republic of China, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society (Washington: the World Bank, 2012), pp. 66–67.

18Xiansheng tian, ‘When Chongqing challenges Beijing: the Bo Xilai case,’ in Xiaobing li and Xiansheng tian, eds., Evolution of Power: China's Struggle, Survival, and Success (lanham: lexington Books, 2014), pp. 323–350.

19Wang yuanyuan, ed., ‘Bo Xilai expelled from CpC, public office,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 28 September 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/28/c_131880079.htm; Cheng li, ‘the Bo Xilai crisis: a curse or a blessing for China?,’ Brookings, 18 april 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/ interviews/2012/04/18-china-boxilai-li

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Moreover, a member of the 17th PBSC, Zhou Yongkang was accused of unreasonable power extension by utilizing the authority of the Central Political and Legal Affair Committee (CPLAC) authority, e.g. by controlling China’s courts and the procuratorates.20 After their news releases, Ling Jihua was relegated to head of the United Front Work Department from chief of the Party’s General Office, one of the Party’s most powerful organizations, in July 2012. Additionally, according to the Party’s official newspaper, The People’s Daily,21 the Party’s investigation over the Zhou Yongkang case commenced with the launch of an investigation into charges of the corruption of Tao Yunchun as early as March 2012. Tao was the head of the China National Petroleum Corporation and considered one of Zhou Yongkang’s associates.22

Meanwhile, a CCP official theory periodical, ‘Seeking Truth’ (Qiu Shi, 求是) presented a drawback of China’s decentralized power system by citing a Chinese political scientist in August 2012. Remarkably, this journal directly criticized the system of combining ‘collective leadership’ and ‘division of work with individual policy responsibility’ among the individual members of PBSC. With pointing out the impact of the Bo Xilai scandal on China’s politics, the journal argued that the decentralized power system had led to the ineffectiveness of government system, the corruption of government officials, their political irresponsibility, and damage to national interest.23

With the civilian voices for reform coordination as well as the unexpected political scandals, the 18th Party Congress suggested that the Party would push for centralizing political power. This fact was in evidence in Hu Jintao’s work report for the 18th Party Congress of November 2012, written after extensive discussion and consultation within and among Chinese political elites.24 Specifically, the work report for the 18th Party Congress placed greater emphasis on enforcing party discipline and upholding centralized leadership than any other report in the reform era. Remarkably, the work report excluded the concepts of collective leadership and division of work that had been stressed in successive party reports from the 15th Congress of 1997 to the 17th Congress of 2007.25 Moreover, the report underlined that ‘the Party ‘should improve the mechanism for coordinating structural reforms and conduct major reforms in a holistic way according to the overall plan’’26 in the section on ‘‘deepening reform of the administrative system’’. These statements regarding the centralization of power represent an historical first in the Party’s work reports.27 In addition, the work report emphasized that ‘the Party ‘should improve the national security strategy and its work mechanism,’’ while pointing out the importance of political security, economic security, social security, ecological security, and military security.28 This suggests that the consensus of the Chinese political elites over institutional rearrangement was formed in order to precede reform effectively and to enforce national security capabilities.

20Sun Chun, ‘ling Jinhua’s entering the pBSC is hopeless, making efforts to enter the politburo,’ [‘令計劃入常無望 努力入局’], China’s Secret Report, 1 (october 2012), pp. 14–20; Zhou yongkun, ‘the history and evolution of the political and legal affair Commission’ [‘政法委的历史与演变’], Spring and Autumn Annals, 9 (September 2012), pp. 7–14.

21‘a whole record for the investigation into the Zhou yongkang case for two years’ [‘周永康案查办两年全纪录’], People’s Daily Online, 30 July 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0730/c1001-25370099.html

22after the 18th party Congress, the party’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping publically criticized Bo Xiali, Zhou yongkang, and ling Jihua for violating the party’s political discipline (政治纪律) and political rules (政治规矩) thus putting the party in much greater peril by pointing out that they built ‘‘an independent kingdom’’ (独立王国) for their personal interests at their jurisdiction. See Zhong Zuyi, ‘resolutely safeguard the authority of the party Central Committee’ [‘坚决维护党中央权威’], Seeking Truth, 18 (September 2015).

23Zheng yongnian, ‘the 18th CCp national Congress and China’s reform issues’ [‘十八大与中国的改革问题’], 2 august 2012, Seeking Truth Website, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/tslj/201208/t20120824_177566.htm

24for the process of drafting the report of the 18th party Congress, Xu Jingyue, Wu Jing, and Zhao Chao, ‘a political declaration and a program of action for winning new victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics: recording the birth of the report for the 18th party congress’ [‘夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利的政治宣言和行动纲领: 党的十八大报告诞生记’], People’s Daily (21 november 2012), p. 1.

25for the work reports of the successive party congresses since the foundation of the party, see the Archives of the CCP National Congresses [中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库], accessed 18 September 2016, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/ index.html

26‘hu Jintao’s report at 18th party Congress,’ The Xinhua News Agency, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_6.htm

27Du Qiang, ‘Wang yukai, a professor of China's national School of administration: the establishment of independent organization for considering system reform’ [‘国家行政学院教授汪玉凯：设独立机构协调体制改革’], Yunnan Information Daily, 10 november 2012, p. a09.

28‘hu Jintao's report at 18th party Congress’.

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Xi Jinping’s Infusing ‘Systemic Thinking’ and ‘Top-down Design’ for ‘Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’

Under this socio-political context, in order to centralize political power and to eventually exert his influence over widespread policy areas, Xi Jinping, the Party’s General Secretary, actively publicized his new approach and reform methodologies, including ‘systemic thinking’ and ‘top-down design’ as will be discussed. Xi’s methodology for China’s deepening reform is based on a complex systems theory, especially the open complex giant system (OCGS).29

The OCGS theory considers a social system as a type of OCGS, ‘where the quantity of subsystems is extremely large, the subsystems have a hierarchical structure and complex interrelations within them; finally their energy, material and information exchange are open to the outside, self-adaptive and evolutionary’.30 Furthermore, this systems theory regards society as an organic whole constructed by interconnections, interactions, and mutual effects between economic institutions, socio-political insti- tutions, and ideological and cultural systems.31 Systems theorists perceive that the traditional reduc- tionism of the exact sciences cannot provide an effective methodology to solve social OCGS problems effectively.32 Thus, the proponents of OCGS propose employing the methodology of meta-synthesis ( 综合集成法) and establishing the Department of Integrative System Design (总体设计部, DISD) to be responsible for the comprehensive analysis, design, and planning in considering an entire complex system rather than its specific subsystem.33

Indeed, this kind of complex systems engineering, based on the OCGS theory, was applied to some of China’s major policy decisions or large-scale project performances in various areas including military, economy, education, and transportation for a time.34 In addition, the Party has already asked its cadres to learn systems theory. For example, the systems theory titled ‘systematic thought and creative capa- bility’ (系统思想与创新能力), is one of the major subjects for Party cadres in the Central Party School.35 Moreover, some of China’s top leaders presented their interests about systems theory. Specifically, Xi Jinping accepted systems theory comparatively earlier, as reflected in his book, the New Sayings from Zhejiang (之江新语) of 2007, which contains his endorsement of ‘strategic thinking’ as well as a ‘four-in- One’ (四位一体) development planning by an integrated approach for economy, politics, culture, and society.36 Former top leaders such as Hu Jintao set a high value on this OCGS theory earlier as well.37

Finally, China’s 17th Party leadership decided to apply the core concepts of complex systems engi- neering and the DISD in proceeding with China’s economic reform. Concretely, ‘Proposals on the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development’ (关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十 二五年规划的建议) adopted at the fifth plenary session of the 17th Party Central Committee in 2010 promoted strengthening ‘top-down design’ (顶层设计) and an ‘overall plan’ 总体规划) to deepen eco- nomic reform.38 According to the People’s Daily Online, the concept of top-down design, originating

29See Qian Xuesen, yu Jingyuan, and Dai ruwei, ‘a new discipline of science: the study of open complex giant system and its meth- odology’ [‘一个科学新领域: 开放的复杂巨系统及其方法论’], Chinese Journal of Nature, 13(1), (1990), pp. 3–10.

30Jifa Gu, Xijin tang, ‘Some developments in the studies of meta-synthesis system approach,’ Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, 12(2), (2003), p. 172.

31Xu Guozhi eds., Systems Science [系统科学] (Shanghai: Shanghai Scientific and educational press, 2000), pp. 307–308. 32Qian Xuesen, yu Jingyuan, and Dai ruwei, ‘a new discipline of science: the study of open complex giant system and its methodology,’

p. 9; Jifa Gu, Xijin tang, ‘Some developments in the studies of meta-synthesis system approach,’ p. 172. 33Sun Dongchuan eds., Introduction to Systems Engineering [系统工程引论], 3rd ed. (Beijing: tsinghua university press, 2014); Dai

ruwei, li yaodong, and li Qiudan, Social Intelligence and Meta-synthetic System [社会智能与综合集成系统] (Beijing: posts & telecommunications press, 2012), pp. 79–83.

34Sun Dongchuan ed., Introduction to Systems Engineering, pp. 376–424. 35Zheng na, ‘the decryption of the Central party School’ [‘解密’中央党校’], The People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 2 July 2010, p. 4. 36for the evidences of systems theory’s impact on Xi Jiping, see ‘World vision and strategic thinking should be established’ [‘要有 世界眼光和战略思维’] and ‘the dialectical unity of four-in-one’ [‘四位一体’的辩证统一’], in Xi Jinping, New Sayings from Zhejiang[之江新语] (hangzhou: Zhejiang people’s publishing house, 2007), pp. 20, 201.

37Sun Dongchuan, eds., Introduction to Systems Engineering, preface, and p. 64. 38tang yi eds. Unabridged Dictionary for China’s Society Construction [中国社会建设大辞典] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science

press, 2013), p. 65; Zeng Jun, ‘utilizing top-down design to deepen reform’ [‘用’顶层设计’来深化改革’], Study Times, 13 June 2011, accessed 18 September 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/14885422.html

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from systems theory, indicates the government’s strategic management in political terms. The kernel of top-down design is setting strategic goals on whole (整体性), comprehensive (全面性), long-term (长远性), and overall (全局性) ways. Notably, the top-down design cannot do without an architect, like Deng Xiaoping, who is officially recognized as ‘the chief architect of China’s economic reforms and socialist modernization’.39 As this article from the People’s Daily suggests, the concept of top-down design intrinsically takes a positive view of the emergence of a powerful leader.

After being elected as the helmsman of the CCP in November 2012, Xi Jinping assertively prioritized applying his new approaches and methods, developed from systems theory, to deal with a whole slate of reforms beyond just economic reform. According to the Party Central Document Research Bureau, the first and best examples of Xi’s reform approach and methodology were his remarks during a tour in Guangdong province in December 2012. During this tour, Xi Jinping warned that China had entered a period of overcoming major difficulties, a deep-water zone (深水区) in its drive to break through barriers to reform presented by ideological differences and vested interests. Xi targeted reform and opening up as crucial movements for deciding China’s fate today and for determining whether the country will achieve its ‘Two Centenary Goals’ (两个一百年目标) by 2021 and 2049, the years marking the centennial anniversaries of the founding of the CCP and the PRC, respectively, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Thus, Xi asked the Party and the people to adhere to the path of reform and opening up and to put greater focus on pursuing reform in a more systematic (系统性), whole (整体性) and coordinated way (协调性). Xi added that deepening reform and opening up requires firm confidence, consensus, top-down design (顶层设计), an overall plan (总体规划), and coordinated steps (协调推进), outlining comprehensively deepening reforms (全面深化改革) involving the organic combination of political, economic, social, cultural, and ecological reforms as a type of complex systems engineering.40

After this tour, Xi Jinping made efforts to garner support for his new approach to reform from China’s political elites from the larger society through a variety of channels, including his tour of the provinces, Central Party meetings, and talk meetings. To publicize this new reform methodology, Xi utilized, among others, the Central Conference on Economic Work of December 2012, the second col- lective study session of the Party’s Politburo of December 2012, the second plenary meeting of the 18th Party’s Central Committee of February 2013, Xi’s Hubei inspection tour of July 2013, and talks with non-partisan members convened by the Party Central Committee in September 2013. In these, Xi urged the organic synthesis of economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological reforms by top-down design and implementation of an overall plan to comprehensively deepen reforms.41

Meanwhile, Xi Jinping directly demanded that the Party cadres study and apply his reform methodol- ogy to their works. For example, the Party’s Central Organization Department (COD) under Xi’s leadership of the Party Construction Leading Group publicized various reform theories, including a methodology for strategic thinking and system thinking aimed at cadres in a book, The Lecture Hall of Cadres’ Courses (干部选学大讲堂), which was published in May 2012, shortly before the 18th Party Congress.42

Moreover, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) and the COD jointly demanded that the Leading Party Members’ Groups (党组) and Party Committees (党委). including government organ- izations, civic organizations, some crucial state enterprises, universities, and China’s military earnestly organize activities for the study of new reform methodologies using the book Ten Lectures on Marxist Philosophy (马克思主义哲学十讲). Both organizations pointed out that Party cadres’ capacities for

39Wang hejin, ‘Bite words and chew characters’ [‘咬文嚼字’发布 ‘2014年十大流行语’], People’s Daily Online, 15 December 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://culture.people.com.cn/n/2014/1215/c87423-26211903.html

40‘Xi Jinping vows no stop in reform, opening up,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 11 December 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/11/c_132034269.htm; CCp Central Document research Bureau ed., The Selection of Xi Jinping's Discourses on Comprehensively Deepening Reform [习近平关于全面深化改革论述摘编] (Beijing: Central party literature press, 2014), pp. 30-31.

41for details, see the CCp Central Document research Bureau ed., The Selection of Xi Jinping's Discourses on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, pp. 32–50.

42See the CoD Cadre education Bureau ed., The Lecture Hall of Cadres' Courses: the Selection of Courses for the Department- and Bureau-Level Cadres of Central or State Organs [干部选学大讲堂: 中央和国家机关司局级干部选学课程选编], Vol. 1 (Beijing: party Building reading publishing house, 2012), pp. 68–87, 112–136.

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strategic management, comprehensive policy decision-making, and controlling the overall situation would be enhanced by studying this book.43 The book contains ‘modern Marxist’ theories regarding systemic thinking (系统思维), strategic thinking (战略思维), creative thinking (创新思维), and contra- diction theory (矛盾论), which are based on the various remarks and speeches of Xi Jinping as well as the words of other prominent Marxist and Chinese leaders, including Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping.44

Meanwhile, some social brokers, such as Chi Fulin, director of the China Institute for Reform and Development, and Wang Zhangjiang, director of the Party Building Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School, proposed establishing a new central organization to coordinate reforms by taking the opportunity of the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) of March 2013.45 Specifically, Gao Shangquan, former vice chair of the National Development and Reform Commission and president of the China Economic System Reform Research Association, proposed setting up the Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms to take on the responsibility of top-down design and overall planning for the Party top leadership in April 2013. Gao asserted that this leading group should be headed by the Party’s General Secretary and elected that the Premier be its vice-head as well, while pointing out that comprehensively deepening reforms involve implementing the overall plan for reforms of the political system, cultural system, social system, and ecological system as well as economic system reform.46 Gao’s proposal to establish the central coordination organization received the attraction of the China’s top leaders. Specifically, Zhang Gaoli, Vice Premier expressed his gratitude to Gao’s concern and attachment to the party. Zhang asked the drafting group for the work report of the third plenary session of the 18th Party Central Committee to study Gao’s proposal in May 2013.47

These supports from society as well as the efforts of Xi Jinping himself eventually led to a consensus of China’s political elites not only to apply the top-down design and overall plan, but also to establish coordination organizations to do so at the central party level. Specifically, the third plenary session of the 18th Party Central Committee decided that the Party would establish the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CDR) and the National Security Commission in November 2013.48 When expounding this Central Party’s decision in explanatory notes, Xi Jinping stressed that ‘comprehensively deepening reform is a complicated systems engineering project, which requires more than one or several departments to carry out. Therefore, leadership at a higher level should be established for this purpose’.49

As for the establishment of a national security commission, in the aforementioned explanatory notes of November 2013, Xi emphasized that China’s security system would be improved by constructing a strong platform to coordinate security work in order to safeguard state sovereignty, national security, and development interests and to maintain political and social stability.50 In April 2014, remarkably, Xi Jinping introduced an overall national security outlook (总体国家安全观) as a normative foundation for

43’the Central propaganda Department and the Central organization Department release a notice demanding the organization of earnest study of Ten Lectures on Marxism Philosophy (Textbook for Party-Members and Cadres)’ [‘中宣部中组部通知要求: 认真组织学习《马克思主义哲学十讲(党员干部读本)》’], People’s Daily (26 December 2013), p. 4.

44according to China’s systems theorists, these types of thinking are deeply connected with systems theory. for details, see Ten Lectures on Marxism Philosophy (Textbook for Party-Members and Cadres [马克思主义哲学十讲(党员干部读本)] (Beijing: Study press & party Building reading materials publishers, 2012).

45Wang Quanbao, ‘the decryption of the leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening reforms’ [‘解密全面深化改革领导小 组’], People Digest, 2 (2014), pp. 18–19.

46Ibid; Gao Shangquan, ‘proposals on the topics of the third plenum of the 18th national Congress’ [‘关于十八届三中全会主题 的建议’], CIRD Brief, 947 (June 2013), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cird.cn/WeareCird/research/Briefing/201306/ t20130615_169353.htm

47Wang Quanbao, ‘the decryption of the leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening reforms,’ p. 18. 48‘Decision of the CCCpC on some major issues concerning comprehensively deepening the reform,’ China.org.cn, 17 January 2014,

accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494.htm 49‘explanatory notes for the ‘decision of the Central Committee of the Communist party of China on some major issues concerning

Comprehensively Deepening the reforms’, China.org.cn, 16 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org. cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31210122.htm

50Ibid.

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the function and authority of China’s new security organization and national security system. Concretely, Xi Jinping asserted that, ‘to implement the overall national security outlook, China must place impor- tance on both external and internal security. Domestically, China will pursue development, reform, and stability and foster a safe environment … Externally, the country will seek peace, cooperation, a win-win situation and a harmonious world’.51 This concept of overall national security outlook originated from systems theory in terms of its emphasis on not only the nation’s comprehensiveness of security (全面 性), wholeness (整体性), and systematicity (系统性).52 Moreover, the concept has been influenced by systemic security theory, which was developed by Chinese scholars,53 as seen from Xi Jinping’s prior- itizing the building of a national security system for covering the spheres of politics, territory, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear, and natural resources.54

The Fundamental Change of Power Structure by Partially Rearranging Formal Institutions

As discussed in the previous section, Xi Jinping significantly succeeded in making China’s political elites reach consensus on centralizing the powers of the party, the state, and the military by his reform meth- ods, such as top-down design and overall planning, from complex systems engineering. Nevertheless, obstacles remain to the formal institutionalization of centralizing power. For example, the revised Party Constitution of 2012 still stipulates that ‘the Party Committees at all levels function on the principle of combining collective leadership and division of work with individual responsibility. All major issues shall be decided upon by the Party Committees after discussion in accordance with the principles of collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual consultations and decision by meetings’ in article 10 of the chapter on the party organizational system.55 This tension between new norms and formal regulation regarding the centralization of power forced Xi Jinping to push for partially changing formal institutions in various ways.

First, Xi Jinping outwardly retained the ‘division of work’ system at the central level by keeping most extant positions for China’s top leaders while consolidating power by restructuring them slightly. Concretely, since the 18th Party National Congress, the number of the PBSC members has been curtailed from nine to seven and the head of the CPLAC has been excluded from the PBSC. Xi Jinping directly led the system of Political and Legal Affairs as well, while Meng Jianzhu, a member of the Politburo, was elected as Secretary of the CPLAC.56 As a result, Xi Jinping has been put in charge of both domestic and external security through this institutional restructuring, leading to Xi’s taking stronger power, as compared with former General Secretary Hu Jintao. In addition, some newly introduced coordination organizations functioned in earnest after the 18th Congress. Xi Jinping has become further empowered by heading these central organizations on China’s military reform and security, namely the Central

51See Zhu ningzhu, ‘national security matter of prime importance: president Xi,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 15 april 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264574.htm

52See liu yuejin, ‘the overall national security outlook in the great security era’ [‘大安全时代的总体国家安全观’], Beijing Daily, 19 may 2014, p. 17.

53for systemic security theory, see liu yuejin, ‘the systemic security outlook and its three layers’ [‘系统安全观及其三层次’], Journal of University of International Relations, 2 (June 2001), pp. 3–9; liu yuejin, ed., The Science of National Security [国家安全 学] (Beijing: China university of political Science and law press, 2004); Che li, ‘national security outlook in the new situation should be the comprehensive systemic security outlook’ [‘新形势下的国家安全观应是全方位的系统安全观’], The Journal of International Security Studies, 6 (november 2008), pp. 87–87.

54Zhu ningzhu, ‘national security matter of prime importance: president Xi’. 55‘Constitution of the Communist party of China,’ revised and adopted at the eighteenth national Congress of the Communist party

of China on november 14, 2012, China.org.cn, 16 november 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/chi- na/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm

56huang Shan, ‘the individual works of the seven pBSC members is clear: there is a difference with the earlier predictions from the outside world’ [‘七常委分工明确: 与早前外界预测有差别’]，International Business Times, 16 march 2013, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/23659/20130316/104910.htm

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Leading Group for Maritime Rights Work (中央海洋权益工作领导小组) from September 2012, the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization (中央网络安全和信息化领导小组) from February 2014, and the CMC’s Leading Group for National Defense and Military Reform (深化国 防和军队改革领导小组) from March 2014.57

Nevertheless, these institutional rearrangements did not directly affect the political power of other top elites. As shown in Table 1, the power structure of the 18th PBSC membership closely resembles that of the 17th PBSC only when considering the existing positions inherited from the Hu Jintao era and the aforementioned new positions. In other words, an individual member of the PBSC seems to have his own responsibilities within each policy area, such as foreign affairs, military, administration, legal affairs, political consultation, and party discipline in compliance with the principle of ‘division of work with individual responsibility’.58

However, the principle of division of labor has been significantly nullified by establishing two central coordination organizations: the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CDR) and the Central National Security Commission (CNSC). At first, with the decision of establishing the CDR Leading Group, Xi Jinping was elected as a leader of the CDR Leading Group in December 2013 by the Politburo. This leading group has been authorized to ‘design reform on an overall basis, arranging and coordinating reform, pushing forward reform as a whole, and supervising the implementation of reform plans’.59 The leading group covers general policy areas in the name of researching and deciding major guidelines, policies, and overall plans for systemic reforms in the economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological sectors as well as the party system.60 As such, in January 2014, the leading group established specialized sub-groups for reforms in six areas, such as economy and ecological civilization, democracy and law, cultural system, social system, party building system, and discipline inspection system.61

57See the source of table 1. 58outwardly, the principle of division of work seems to be complied with well within the politburo, similar to the pBSC. for the

division of work in the politburo including the pBSC members, see yan yirong, ‘China’s political system of division of six author- ities’ [‘中国的六权分工政治体制’], The Observer, 14 December 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.guancha.cn/ Zuoyilong/2014_12_14_303270_s.shtml

59‘president Xi to head leading group for overall reform,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 30 December 2013, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/30/c_133007127.htm

60Ibid. 61‘China's reform leading group holds first meeting,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 22 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://

news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm

Table 1. the power Structure of 18th pBSC by their official posts.

*official posts have been introduced before the 18th party national congress except for the posts in bold. Sources: for the data of the responsibility for the pBSC members, see Zou Chunxia, ‘the positions of the pBSC members in the

leading groups’ [‘政治局常委的小组职务’], Beijing youth Daily, 23 June 2014, p. a3; ‘What types of leading groups are the pB- SC’s seven members in charge of, respectively?’ [‘政治局七常委担任哪些领导小组的领导职务?’], the observer, 12 July 2013, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.guancha.cn/Dounong/2013_07_12_157600.shtml; Wang mei, ‘the center releases a signal to raise the stand of unification work many times this year’ [‘今年中央多次释放统战工作’升格’信号’], the Beijing news (31 July 2015), a06; alice miller, ‘the work system of the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China leadership monitor, 41 (Spring 2013): 1–13.

PBSC Member Official Positions Xi Jinping General Secretary, prC Chairman, Central military Commission(CmC) Chairman, foreign affairs Work Central

leading Group Director (lGD), taiwan Work lGD, finance & economy lGD, Central maritime rights Work lDG, Internet Security and Informatization LGD, CMC’s National Defense and Military Reform LGD, Comprehensively Deepening Reforms LGD, Central National Security Commission Chairman

li Keqiang premier, Central institutional organization Commission Chairman, national energy Commission Chairman, State Council’ Western China Development lGD

Zhang Dejiang national people’s Congress Chairman, hong Kong-macao lGD yu Zhengsheng political Consultative Conference Chairman, Xinjiang Work lGD, tibet Work lGD liu yunshan CCp Central Secretariat, Central party School president, ideology and propaganda lGD, party Building lGD,

Central party’s mass line educational practice lGD Wang Qishan Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline inspection Zhang Gaoli Vice premier

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Additionally, the CDR Leading group leads major reforms at the central level and addresses major issues with nationwide significance and long-term impact involving different regions and departments. It guides, pushes forward, and supervises the implementation of major reform policies.62 The leading group is more powerful than any other central leading group because not only do the Party’s provincial committees establish the provincial leading group for comprehensively deepening reform, but the party committees on all levels also perform the duty of pushing forward reform as a whole, and supervise the implementation of reform plans under the leadership of the CDR Leading Group.63

China’s new national security organization has weakened the principle of division of work as well. With the establishment of the CNSC in January 2014, Xi Jinping was elected as leader of this commis- sion. The commission answers to the Politburo and the PBSC, and is responsible for decision-making, deliberation, and coordination on national security work. It is in charge of ‘making overall plans and coordinating major issues and major work concerning national security’. The responsibilities of the commission include construction of the rule of law system concerning state security, research, resolving major issues of national security, setting principles and policies, as well as stipulating and implementing strategies.64

Moreover, these responsibilities of the security commission have legal bases because of the PRC’s National Security Law (NSL), which was passed on 1 July 2015 at the 15th meeting of the 12th NPC Standing Committee.65 Remarkably, the legal foundation of the NSL as well as the theoretical basis of the overall national security outlook, containing a holistic security concept, empowers the CNSC to cover general policy issues regarding internal and external, traditional and non-traditional, individual and collective security.66 Specifically, according to the NSL’s article 2, ‘national security refers to the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state’s power to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security’. Thus, the NSL covers the areas of politics, territorial issues, the military, the economy (including energy, finance, and food), culture, anti-terrorism, society, science, technology, outer space, cyberspace, information, ecology, nuclear power, and natural resources.

In its essence, the functions, heads, and authority of the CDR Leading Group and the CNSC illustrate why the system of division of work in Xi Jinping era cannot effectively perform its function of preventing the concentration of all power in the hands of a few top leaders. Moreover, Xi Jinping is armed with strong power because he can exert his influence over entire policy areas through these organizations while he holds the armed forces and information in an almost monopolistic way through other channels, such as the CMC, the system of Political and Legal Affairs, and the leading group for internet security.

Conclusion

The previous sections attempted to solve the enigma of Xi Jinping’s taking centralized power promptly by relying on institutional change theory. These efforts led not only to identifying Xi Jinping’s power consolidation as the phenomenon of institutional change regarding China’s policy-making and its political power game, but also to figuring out the power game changer, Xi Jinping’s stratagems for rearranging political norms and formal institutions to exert political power.

62‘president Xi to head leading group for overall reform’. 63See Wang Shu, ‘eight questions on the Central leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening reform’ [‘中央全面深化改革领 导小组八问’], The Beijing News, 14 november 2013, p. a06.

64‘Xi Jinping to lead national security commission,’ China Daily Online, 24 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/24/content_17257409.htm

65See articles 4 and 5 of the national Security law of the prC. 66for overall national security look, see liu Dan, ed., ‘Commentary: China to follow specific national security strategy,’ The Xinhua News

Agency, 16 april 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/16/c_133267984.htm

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To summarize these findings, Xi Jinping took advantage of social demand for reform coordination as well as the serious political misbehavior committed by some major players of China’s power politics before the 18th National Congress to commence institutional change for the centralization of polit- ical power. With rising social voices for solving ministry and individual selfishness as well as political scandals, Xi Jinping actively made efforts to weaken the logic of justifying decentralized power which had been cemented during the reform era by pointing out China’s reform as complex systems engi- neering. Rather, in order to deepen reforms comprehensively and to achieve the ‘Chinese dream,’ Xi has attempted to implement a new reform methodology, including top-down design, an overall plan, and a coordinated push forward, which stem from complex systems engineering and the principle of the Department of Overall Design.67

In spite of acquiring the support of political elites for (or, at least, without accruing noticeable resist- ance against) his reform methodology, Xi Jinping could not completely obey the principle of ‘division of work’ as stipulated in the current Party Constitution. Instead, Xi adopted a strategy of retaining most of the existing framework for the power structure and policy decision-making while incapacitating the work division system itself. That is, Xi established new organizations such as the CDR Leading Group and the CNSC. Through these two organizations as well as other leading groups under his leadership, he can exert his influence to cover the overall policy area in the party and the government – the leg- islative body, the judicature, the administration, and the military. Indeed, both of these organizations are superior to other leading groups and commissions that are headed by other top elites because of the support of the Party Committees at all levels or China’s law as well as their coverage.

Xi Jinping, as a new architect of China’s reform, therefore, can take responsibility for overall policy areas beyond the former General Secretary’s existing sphere of influence. In other words, Xi can have his direct political influence over party affairs (organization, ideology, and discipline), administrative affairs (economy, society, culture, ecology, health), legal affairs (legislation and jurisdiction), and military affairs. Thus, Xi’s way of exercising power is very different from that of former general secretaries in the reform era. The former general secretaries could not directly exercise such political influence over the policy areas of other PBSC members other than the specific policy area under his authority. They could have a circuitous effect on the policy area of other the PBSC members by personal exchanges and negotiations, and cooperation between their own organizations.68

In conclusion, Xi Jinping has seized strong power by reconfiguring reform norms and values, and partially rearranging formal institutions. In spite of its nominal survival, the principle of division of work has therefore been practically and significantly excluded in China’s power politics.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor Sangkuk Lee is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) in Seoul, South Korea. He was a visiting scholar at the Center for Chinese Studies, UC Berkeley. Before joining KIDA, he was a research professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. His current research interests include China’s politics, foreign policy, and national security. He can be reached at korpia@naver.com

67for a comparison between the Department of overall Design and top-down design, see Wei hong-sen, ‘the Department of overall Design and top-down design’ [‘总体设计部与顶层设计: 学习十八届三中全会的一点认识’], Journal of Systems Science, 22(4), (2014), pp. 4–9.

68for details on the way a certain pBSC member affected the policy areas of other pBSC members in the previous party sessions, see hu angang, China's Collective Leadership System [中国集体领导体制] (Beijing: Chinese people's university press, 2013), pp. 61–62.

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