Substantive Journal
In this era of persistent conflict, withthe focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, a unit’s command climate is vital to our nation’s long- term success at all levels of war—tac- tical, operational and strategic.
Command climate is the culture of a unit. It is the way a unit “conducts business.” The leader of the organiza- tion is solely responsible for the orga- nization’s command climate. Com- manders at all levels establish this climate by what they say and what they do. Character-based leadership is the bedrock requirement for a suc- cessful command climate.
Commanders send clear messages to their units by the way they do simple things and the things they check (an arms room inventory, a material readi- ness report, appropriate use of rules of engagement and escalation of force, timely and accurate reporting of check- points, and so on). For example, com- manders (leaders) who give cursory at- tention to the importance of accurate (ethical) reporting, training to standard, discipline under fire and treatment of noncombatants set a command climate that is prone to failure (or worse).
What follows is a response from a former brigade commander in Afghan- istan to the question, “How much does/can command climate prevent ethical lapses (atrocities) from occur- ring?”
Command climate has everything to do with it, but I would define it broadly to include discipline, leader- ship, training and understanding of the environment as well as values: courage, respect … there is no excuse for atrocities or indiscriminate kil- ling—it’s criminal behavior, and we are not criminals. We’ve lost 41 killed and 330-plus wounded without any lapses in discipline and are winning this COIN campaign.
We investigate every civilian death [according to Army regulation] 15-6 and do the right thing, be it solatia, express remorse or apologize if we were wrong for any innocent civilians killed; we obviously do not apologize for enemy killed, and we always em- phasize how the enemy endangers the civilians by fighting among them. The unwillingness or decision not to do this is staggering. How can we ex- pect to keep the population with us if we do not live American values and respect indigenous cultural values?
We were sent here to win the COIN, the center of gravity of which is the people. To do that, we live and model our American values and re-
Command Climate By Lt. Col. Joseph Doty and Maj. Joe Gelineau
22 ARMY n July 2008
The leadership the battalion commander and command sergeant majory exhibit, the caring they display and the command climate they set may very well determine whether a soldier reenlists or a leader stays in the Army. Similarly, their discipline and leadership standards are responsible for the behavior of their soldiers, units and leaders out of battle, whether in theater or at home. LTG (Ret) James Dubic, ARMY Magazine, July 2008
Lt. Col. Hal Moore and CSM Basil Plumley, Vietnam 1956
US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY Sergeants Major Course (SMC)
L300: Leadership Applied Lesson Plan for L302
Leadership and Ethics in War Reading B
Command Climate
24 ARMY n July 2008
spect Afghan values; in all we do, we seek to do no harm to the people and always do the right thing. If you do that, you retain the moral high ground, without which we lose.
Historically, there are examples ofquestionable command climates resulting in behaviors that are not in tune with our professional military ethic or a result of character-based leadership. An AR 15-6 investigation report, released by the Department of the Army in 2000, concluded that the command climate in Company A, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, serving on a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, resulted in a West Point lieu- tenant (torture) and a staff sergeant (rape and murder) being involved in criminal conduct. The unit’s battalion commander, also a West Point gradu- ate, believed that his unit was only do- ing what the situation required. Some of this “required” behavior included grabbing ethnic Albanian women’s breasts, drinking alcohol in violation of Army rules and roughing up ethnic Albanians. A unit’s motto is a reflec- tion of its command climate and a window into the way the unit con- ducts its business—the company’s motto was “shoot ’em in the face.”
In 2003 and 2004 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 4th Infantry Divi- sion’s Lt. Col. Allen West (firing a weapon adjacent to an Iraqi detainee’s head) and Lt. Col. Nate Sassaman (his subordinates throwing Iraqi detainees into the Tigris River) were involved in questionable ethical behavior, which resulted in both being released from the Army. There can be no doubt their units’ command climates factored into what they did and why they did it.
Soldiers in units are going to do ex- actly what their leaders allow and ex- emplify. The most egregious case is the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. Appropriate questions to reflect on in this case are: Can part of the blame be placed on the fact that the lo- cals were all “gooks”? Had the enemy been so dehumanized that this (and other) atrocities had to occur? What was the command climate in this unit?
How does a leader establish a com- mand climate? Most importantly, a command climate is set by what the leader says and does. Leaders must set the example. Period. Soldiers watch their leaders and follow the examples they set. Equally important, the leader must set the standard and enforce the standard. Walking by or ignoring any violations of a unit’s command climate is setting a new command climate. Commanders can set a climate that fosters open and honest communica- tion—both up and down the chain of command. This type of leader is an ap- proachable leader who does not shoot the messenger and fosters a climate of trust in the organization. A comman- der who “cuts out the knees” of peo- ple who bring him bad news will fos- ter a climate in which the unit will hide bad news or lie about it.
Leaders also set a command climate by articulating what the core values of the unit are. Core values are those non- negotiable tenets that permeate the unit and guide everything the unit does or fails to do and the manner in which it does so. Core values are often articulated in a commander’s philoso- phy. For core values to be most effec- tive, they should be limited to three to five. Why only three to five? Because when a unit focuses on too much, it ends up focusing on nothing. Clarity and simplicity are paramount when es- tablishing a command climate. For ex- ample, the following definition of dis- cipline could be a catchy yet effective battalion phrase that articulates a com- mand climate: “Doing what should be done, when it should be done; doing it the best it can be done; and doing it that way every time.”
A unit’s core values, its command climate, should not be confused or re- placed with the seven Army Values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage), the Soldier’s Creed or the Warrior Ethos. These values, beliefs and creeds are vitally important and are the Army’s strategic themes and values. At the unit level, however, it is more effec- tive to use the KISS (“Keep It Simple, Stupid”) principle and emphasize those three to five themes that will be
voiced nonstop in the unit. Arguably, in conventional forces (not
special operations), command climate is set at the battalion level. Although brigade-and-above commanders will establish a command climate, it is at the battalion level where the most pro- found and effective influence occurs. Battalion-level commanders are the lowest level commanders centrally se- lected by the Department of the Army, and they most closely “touch” and in- fluence soldiers’ attitudes and behav- iors. Counterinsurgency operations, which are often decentralized at com- pany- and platoon-level operations, highlight the importance of battalion commanders establishing and enforc- ing—by their presence (“leadership by walking around”)—a moral/ethical command climate. Company comman- ders and platoon leaders are at the exe- cution level of the battalion comman- der’s command climate (as alluded to in the introductory quotation by Capt. Kearney).
Most importantly, if a battalion- level commander does not set and en- force a command climate, subclimates will be established by leaders in the unit. Subordinate leaders within the unit with referent and expert power (charisma) will establish subcultures that may or may not be what the unit commander desires.
Setting a moral/ethical command climate must be an intentional process by commanders and is a requirement to maintain the moral high ground in this era of persistent conflict. nn
LT. COL. JOSEPH DOTY teaches in the Department of Physical Education and the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy. He also serves as the deputy director in the Army’s Center of Excel- lence for the Professional Military Ethic. He previously commanded the 1st Bat- talion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS), V Corps Artillery, U.S. Army Europe. MAJ. JOE GELINEAU teaches in the Department of Physical Education at the U.S. Military Academy. He previ- ously served as team leader and assis- tant operation officer in the 10th Special Forces.