Conventional ideas of language and communication pose for a scientific understanding of verbal behavior

Chapter 2

It's Just Verbal Behavior

Sarah was ready for Friday night. It had been a tough week, but it seemed they all were. She was halfa~ay through a Masters program in applied behavior analysis, and the work sometzmes got the best of her. Tonight she was meeting some of the other students at their favorite hangout, and they had earned some beers.

Carrie and Matt were already into the first pitcher when she got there. Jenny soon showed up with her new boyfriend, Chad. They ordered a second and then a third pitcher. They had sworn not to talk shop, but that went out the window soon enough, as usual. Besides, their professors encouraged them to make what they were learning part oftheir everyday life. It seemed as ifthe program was their life, so it was hard to avoid talking about school. Carrie was talking about a discussion they had in class and said she hadn t made up her mind yet about the subject.

Matt sat upright, eyebrows arched. Using his best professorial manner, he asked, "What do you mean, 'made up your mind'? You think thats like making up

your bed?" Carrie saw the game and grimaced. "Alright, one point for the boy. " Sarah and Jenny cackled Chad, who was trying to fit in, frowned. "/ don t get

it. Whats wrong with saying that?" he demanded. The students glanced at each other, wondering if they should continue. Jenny

tried to rescue Chad hoping to avoid getting into a real discussion. "Theres no such thing as a mind " she said casually. "Its just the way we learn to talk growing up. "

This didn t help Chad at all. "How could we _not,~ave a mind?" he said. "Thats how we decide everything. Its what makes us ~zck .

T'h · b ht another pitcher. which should have been a sign to talk 1 j e waitress roug · · ' ,

· l B t 0arah couldn t he/n it. "How do you know theres such about someth mg e se. u D 1 • :r,, a thing? No one has ever seen one, she said

21

ABA PRACTITIONERS 22 • RADICAL BEHAVIORISM FOR if our brain light up when

different parts o y "What about when they show _how_ 1 ? .. Chad countered . " , I ·n asked to think ofcertam thmgs. . d' . 1

. ,, Carrie insisted. Thats notpeop ear~ to stlmu 1, "But that 'sjust your bram respon mg .

your mm · d. " . w to react to difj(fie,vent things? Something has ·1 "But how does your brazn know ho h Id be obvious.

" h d 'd , zifthat s ou h 'dto tell it what to do, C a saz. ' as l Chad seemed to ave some prz e Jenny knew this wasn r gozng to end welh. t oif her evening. Matt saw her

. . d b ut t e res on the line, and she was a bzt worrze a 0

concern and tried to help her out. . d . . t made up. ft sfine to talk about . ;/; . if . 1/ the mm IS ]US

"From a sczenty,c poznt o Vlei , . . t·he wa1J oiftrying to study whats 1· · but 1t gets m /

your mind in everyday conversa rons, . . !kin about behavior strictly in terms really going on. We 're supposed to pracllce ta g ·

ofwhat S really there." . nd took Matt S lead. Sarah jumped <"'r:1rah and Carrie saw what was happen mg a

i...l~, , I " in and said, "Food! I'm ready for some eats.

SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT VERBAL BEHAVIOR

Do You Agree ... ?

It may already be obvious to you that everything we say or think. or write is learned. After a11 no one is born knowing how to ta]k. If you accept this, are you ready to acknowl~dge that all verbal behavior comes from the same kind of envir?nmental experiences and is not fundamentally different from other forms of behavior? Do~s it follow that ,;ve should exp]ain verbal behavior in the same way that we explam other behavior?

The questions get more challenging. If you are sti11 with me, would you agree that the meaning of what we say-our verbal behavior-should be explained no differently than the meaning of other behavior? Would you go further and concede that verbal behavior does not have meaning in the everyday sense, that when we speak or write we are not communicating ideas, concepts, intentions, or beliefs? That dictionaries do not tell us the meaning of words? Are you okay with admit­ ting that your most strongly felt convictions are 'Just verbal behavior" and had you grown up in a different family in a different culture you would likely hold very different views?

The "':ay that behavior.analysts a~~wer these and other questions about that most chens_hed human quahty-the ab1!ity to learn an elaborate verbal repertoire­ are rooted 111 how we approach behavior as a scientific subiect m tt Ab h v- . 1 . . f b J a er. e a 10r ana yt1c view o ver al behavior took form as bast·c res 1 b t I

. . t earc 1 eganp o revea the details of how operant shapmg works As this li't B Sk' . . · era ure grew, . . mnerfocused this emergmg understanding of verbal behav · · b k 1 h

. . . . . tor m a oo - engt treatment(Skmner, 1957), which he viewed as his most important k 't h d 'b d wor . 1n 1 , e escn e a

I'

CHAPTER TWO: IT'S JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 23

conceptual framework for analyzing verbal behavior that was consistent with what was even then a well-established science of behavior. What was most impressive about his approach was that it was free of cultural preconceptions about the nature of our verbal repertoire. Over the years, a sizable research literature has accumu­ lated (see, for example, the journal The Analysis of Verbal Behavior), as well as extensive clinical applications consistent with this framework.

Verbal behavior is a fascinating feature of the human repertoire, but that is not why this chapter explores the topic. It is important for you to understand the nature of verbal behavior in order to ease your consideration of the remaining chapters. After all, this book is about how we talk about behavior, so understanding your own verbal repertoire is the key to appreciating how the way we talk can cause problems for a scientific, as well as a practical, approach to the subject matter of behavior. Absent this background, it will be difficult for you to grasp the arguments in upcoming chapters.

Verbal Behavior is Learned

The most fundamental fact about verbal behavior is that it is learned. Most people would probably agree with this statement, at least after some reflection. It is easy to concede the point if you observe babies and young children over a period of time. At less than six months of age, they show only some preverbal skills such as babbling and non-word utterances. Parents hear their first words when children are about 1 1 months old, but by the time they are three years old, their vocabu­ lary exceeds 800 words and they are well on the way to acquiring the other basic features of a useful verbal repertoire. By the time they are teenagers, their verbal abilities are impressively developed.

It should also be obvious that we learn to talk from the people around us who have already acquired this repertoire. Early on, a child's verbal community is com­ prised of parents, siblings, extended family, and others they interact with daily. Of course, a child's verbal community gets much larger as he or she grows up, spends time with friends and teachers, and encounters an expanded social world. A child who had no access to a verbal community would simply not learn to talk. This tragedy is borne out in those rare instances when a child has been reared under con­ ditions of extreme social deprivation. Depending on the extent and kind of contact they have had with others, they tend to have little verbal repertoire at all, regardless

of their age (Newton, 2002). Although few would deny that children can learn to talk only by being around

others who already do so, it is more challenging to admit that all the human behav­ ior we call language or communication-whether speaking, writing, or signing­ has been learned. It is difficult to understand how the complex verbal repertoire of an adult can be explained in terms of a simple reinforcement history. What we say and think and write seems so complicated, flexible, spontaneous, and creative that

,

JORJSM FOR ABA PRACTJ110NERS 24 • RADICAL BEHAV f differential reinforcement. What

ere must be more going on than just ylefars ~ession conversation, and all of the etry se -eXP•. ' . l I c.th tabout reasoning and argumen 'po_ .. ' ? J-IoW can we explatn sue 1 comp ex ,onns

other features of mature verbal ab1hties. of verbal behavior? . · inforcement histol)' at work here; our biol-

Well there is more than a simple re . it is hard to overstate the role of ' I t be sure However, .

ogy plays a necessary ro e, o · rt . e In making the leap from baste · erbal repe O tr ·

operant selection in creating a v b h .or it is important not to get trapped . . f t b h vior to verbal e av1 ' . . . . 'f h k .

principles o operan e ~ . develo ed verbal capab1ht1es as 1 t etas 1s by the challenge of explami~g _fully pt ught your dog to sit on command. no more difficult than explammg how yot~ ; has a long history into a brief expla­ Deconstructing any complex performa1_ice a off as superficial inadequate, and

. · · d can east 1y come · ' nat10n of how 1t was acqmre . b t b startino at the beginning, understand- unconvincing. The challenge 15 est me .. ~ d l' 11owing the emerging perfor- in how rudimentary features are acquue '_an . o . .g . . .c. rt' to give fatr weight to the natural contmgenc1es mance over tune-neve1 1orge mg of endless practice.

What is Verbal Behavior?

How should we differentiate verbal behavior from other behavior? Skinner (1957) defined verbal behavior as operant behavior that requires the presence of another person for its reinforcement. The person emitting the be~avior_ is the sp~aker, and t~e person reinforcing that behavior is the listener. He quahfied his defimt10n by reqmr­ ing that the listener must be responding in ways that have been learned bec~use th_ey reinforce the behavior of the speaker. Of course, such reinforcement contmgenc1es are typically intennittent, which means that the speaker's behavior is not reinforced on every occasion, and the nature of the reinforcer may not be obvious. Take notice that Skinner added no special qualifications suggesting that verbal behavior is fun· damentally different from other kinds of operant behavior.

Although verbal behavior is often vocal, it need not be. Jt can be written, of course, and gestures frequently fit the definition as well. Sign language is a fonnal set of gestures that requires specific training, but we often participate in informal speaker-listener exchanges involving gestures. For instance, you might be in a noisy bar with a friend who is talking with someone else nearby, and you catch her eye and point to the exit w!th raised eyebrows. If she nods and you both sepa­ rately make your way to the exit, your gesture, together with your friend's reaction, qualifies as a bit of verbal behavior.

~s ~erb~l behavior uniquely human? We certainly like to think so, but it helps to d1stmgmsh between operant behavior and fixed action patt Alarm calls in . . b . erns. vanous. species se~m to e 1tke verbal behavior in that the behavior of a "speaker" (the. ammal sounding an ala~) has an effect on the behavior of "listeners" (oth· ers m the herd). However, this type of behavior is usually a fixed action pattern,

~ -

CHAPTER TWO: n's msr VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 25

B0X2.1

What is Behavior Anyway?

This might seem an easy questi b . can lead to chapter-Jen th d" on,. ut simple answers often seem inadequate, which 2). Whatever its parti g I ts~uss1~ns ~see Johnston & Pennypacker, 2009, Chapter

'd bl d . cu ars, ehavtor ts a characteristic of living oroanisms and is unav01 a y roote m their b · 1 . . o10 0can be tricky at th . ogy. rawmg a hne between behavior and biology k' 'd e margms, but one trap that must be avoided is assuming that the ~ : P:ovi ~s a use~ul demarcation between the two. Although it is true that most

e avior of mter~st m daily life and to practitioners involves actions that are obvious to oth:rs,. behavtora] phenomena also include movements that are subtle brief or occur ms1de the skin. ' '

An important ~esu_It_ of behavior's biological foundation is that it occurs only at the .level of the md1v1dual organism. This fact suggests that we should measure beh~vtor separately for each individual in order to get a clear picture of what is hap­ pen mg. _It also suggests that the notion of group behavior can be confusing if it leads us to thmk that such measures refer to anythino other than the collected actions of

0

individuals (see Box 9.2). Perhaps the most obvious defining feature of behavior is that it involves move­

ment. Given the "hand-in-glove" relation between behavior and environment, this also means that behavior cannot occur without having effects on the environment, however small they might sometimes seem. The reciprocal character of the relation between behavior and environment is critical as it underlies the adaptive character of behavior. Behavior is not merely movement but actions that are directly affected by the organism's interactive interface with its environment and that result in changes that enhance the individual's effectiveness in diverse circumstances.

ABA practitioners use science and technology in describing these reciprocal behavior-environment relationships to design contingencies that lead to preferred behavioral outcomes. In doing so, they do not usually face difficult questions about the nature of behavior. Their interest typically lies in its most obvious features, and scrupu]ous avoidance of mentalism is otherwise sufficient to avoid the confusions suggested by everyday dialect. As upcoming chapters will show, however, the temp­ tations of mental ism are pervasive, and fully understanding the nature of behavior is

only possible when they can be identified and resisted.

which is a relatively invariant behavioral sequence that depends on specific sign stimuli and is largely genetically mediate~ (Catania, ~007), ~or :xample, the mat­ ing dances typically performed by male btrds of ~ert~m species m th: presence of a female bird of that species. Human verbal behavtor is operant behavior, however, and is gradually acquired through the mechani~m of reinforce~~nt contingencies and very 11 hie in the face of changing envtronmental cond1t1ons.

ma ea . k' d f b Do some non-human species also acquire tht~ m o operant ehavior in

the wild? Possibly, although the answer is not entirely clear. We often read that

ABA PRACTITIONERS 26 • RADICAL BEHAVIORISM FOR

B0X2.2 Vi rbal Behavior?

Communication, Language, or e b 1behavior might seem synonymous,

Although communication, language, and ver ~ the broadest of these references it is important to make some distinctions. P~r a~s mmunicated and therefore has

. . 1· that something ts co . d9 is communication, which imp 1es . 't that might be commumcate . mentalistic connotations (see Chapter 3). Wh;t ts

1 ti·on? How is a communication

d' ? Jn1orma · An idea? A message? An understan mg. f translation from one party to another? understood or decoded? Is there a process ho ot so much prompted by facts to

· f estions yet t ey are n · These might seem temp mg qu . ' h' t . 0

more than operant behavtor. be explained as implicit assumptions about w cl ts n The term is too vague to be scientifically useful. h fa tool used for com-

Language is al so a pretty broad term. It has t e sense o h. dl . " t . " t ·nt to As somet mg we suppose y

munication though there 1s no t 1mg O poi · d A II use we talk about langua~e as if it is acquired and thereafter possesse · s usua Y.

' · · ..... dd · hat people know and say as we11descr ibed 1t requires a mental system to a I ess w ' as a ment:11 lcxicon and a system of rules about the syntax and morphology ?f.sen- tences (Hart & Risley, 1999). These implications are fundamentally n:1ental~st1c as well. Once again, there are those awkward questions : What are the d1mens1ons of this tool? Where do we keep it? How do we use it? How does language get turned into speech?

In contrast, there is no pretense that verbal behavior is anything other than oper­ ant behavior. As such, it is a natural phenomenon with fully physical characteristics that can be directly measured and related to other physical events. This conceptu­ alization hardly makes it simple to explain the human verbal repertoire, but at least it makes it possible to use scientific methods to undertake the task. One advantage is that this approach allows us to see the fundamental similarities among different fom1s of verbal behavior, such as speaking, gesturing, writing, and so forth. It also encourages us to understand the interplay between speaker and listener in terms of environmental contingencies, thereby avoiding the temptation to invent mentalistic alternatives.' T?ese are some of the reasons why behavior analysts avoid references to commumcation and language in favor of a focus on verbal behavior.

researchers have discovered some form of cmnm · t· b h · · · . . u111ca 1ve e av1or m certain

species, but the mamstream media is not a cred 1·ht f · · · · E . . . . e source o scientific mforrna- tton. ven reports m sc1enttfic Journa]s requi .c: I . .

· 1b' re careiu exammation of methodsd han t eoret1ca ias. One reason for such ca t. . h . munication often runs afoul of many of th u ton is t at research on animal com­ book. e conceptual problems detailed in this

. _I: we bring our own verbal repertoire into th . . . s1b1hty that we might serve as a ve b e picture, however, there 1s a pos-

. r a1 commun'ty ~ . nia, 2007, Chapter 15). For example 'th b 1 or other species (see Cata-

1 taught to communicate with their trai·' as. een shown that chimpanzees can be

11ers usmg s · ign 1anguage. This ability to hold

b:

CHAPTER TWO: IT'S JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 27

a conversation of sorts involves both parties being able to exchange speaker and listener roles, that is, to be a verbal community. Some interactions with non-human animals that might otherwise appear to involve verbal behavior may not meet this requirement, however.

For example, if your dog brings you his leash and you often take him for a walk when he does so, is his behavior of bringing you the leash verbal behavior? Cer­ tainly his bringing you the leash is operant behavior that has been acquired from a history of your reinforcing this response by taking him for a walk, and you must be present for this behavior to produce reinforcement. Does this make your dog the speaker and you the listener? The problem with this perspective is that you and your dog are not a verbal community because you cannot switch speaker-listener roles. Yes, you may give commands that your dog ( occasionally) obeys, but that may be stretching the sense of a verbal community. More about our pets later.

How Do We Learn Our Verbal Repertoire?

At first, a baby's vocalizations are more properly described as vocal rather than verbal behavior. For the first month or so, this vocal behavior is in the form of crying, which does not vary much with different reasons for any discomfort. From about the fourth through the sixteenth week, the baby will make particular sounds, including cooing, laughing, and some vowel sounds. Crying begins to vary in tone depending on the circumstances. Babbling begins at about 20 weeks and involves the baby stringing together sequences of one-syllable, often repetitive sounds. An important advance develops from six to nine months as babbling turns into mak­ ing imitative sounds. The child will initially repeat his or her own sounds but then begins repeating sounds that adults or other children make. Eager parents will often identify a child's first words between 10 and 12 months, although these responses are usually just imitations of sounds the parents have made.

At this point, parents may say that their child is talking, but there is a long way to go before they have to tell the little tyke to be quiet. The interplay between the child and a gradually expanding verbal community over the next few years is complex and the subject of a large research literature. Not surprisingly, most investigators approach this subject matter from the conceptual perspective shared by the larger culture. As we will see, this framework is burdened by the conviction that verbal behavior can only be understood as part of a mental world in which it occupies a special place. In the absence of contrary and irrefutable evidence, behavior analysts approach verbal behavior as nothing more than operant behavior. As a physical rather than a mental phenomenon, its features can usually be directly measured and studied with experimental methods that long ago proved their effectiveness.

For example, some years ago, Betty Hart and Todd Risley (1995, 1999) undertook the daunting challenge of documenting and analyzing the utterances of children and those around them over an extended period. They recruited 42

ABA pRACTJTIONERS

28 • RADICAL BEHAVIORISM FOR • ed monthly, hour-long samples of child and audwtap hen the children were seven

~:;~~it~e:;i:;!:t r:::i!ed t~e child. r;:~:::e:e:s old, ]oggin~ 1,300 hours )d and continued until they w ·pts and documenting more thanhmont s o . a es of transcrt , .

of observations, codmg 30,000 P g 175,000 child utterances. called a social dance in which the v~rb~l

Hart and Risley revealed what they h d powerful effect on the ch1 Id s h·1d d others a a lk h h"Iinterchanges between a young c I an d th t about half of the ta t e c I -

· Th · d ta showe a · eventual verbal repertotre. etr a essed from utterances conta1n- d th t they progr ·

dren heard was spoken to th.em an a t talking as much as the parents. II

ing words to longer inter~ct_,~ns a?d even:ar:.n °ting and encouraging the child's Much of the parent's talk mit1al1y mvolve p ~ t b two years of age the child speech. The interchanges gradually changed

50 t ; iot surprisingly, the child's

was holding the floor more often than the paren s. . . h .c. . ·1 H rt d ·b I behavmr m t e 1am1 y. a antalkativeness was related to the amount Of ver a · . · th · t d

. · :. of the children 10 etr s u y Risley estimated that the total language e~~enence . re three ranged from 1 O million to more than 30 mil hon words by the tm~e they we · years old. While these are impressive numbers, imagine how big they are by the time a child reaches adolescence!

The Har1 and Risley study did not address the nature of the learning contingen­ cies children experienced moment by moment during these three years. In order to understand how a child learns the full variety of customary verbal skills, we need to know the details of eve1yday verbal interchanges. How do children lean1 to label and describe events and experiences? How do they develop the ability to describe private events such as a stomach ache to which others are not privy? How do they learn re lationa] concepts such as inside and outside or near and far? How do they learn syntax and grammar? Argument and reasoning?

The~e are challeng~ng questions, and we do not yet have an adequate scientific foun~at1on for answermg them fully. However, researchers have looked closely at the kmds of m?ment by mo~ent experiences that ever so gradually lead to a com- plex and seemingly unexpiamable verbal repertoire and h d d h .·

. · ave ocumente s apmg proc~sses w.e might expec~ to fi~d (see, for example, Moerk, 1983 1990 . The key 1s focusmg on the contmgencies between a ch .Id' . ' ) .

· 1 . 1 s utterances and surroundmgenv1ronmenta events without resorting to melt 1. t'1 a is 1c explanat · f hUnfortunately our cultural history h tons o w at we see.

' as not prepared u :D h · dialect includes endless mentalistic blind alle s s .0 r t 1s task. Our every~ay sense of what is otherwise plainly evid . t Y that discourage us frotn makmg

. ~. For mstance, in watching a child sa d .

the room, it is natural to say that the 1~Jd okggze when the fain ily pooch comes in d d . I . . c 11 nows wh t th e 111 t us seemmgly obvious asses . a at word means Embed- 0 f b I . sment is the t· . .

e iavior and that they have me · . no ion that words are useful units fi h · · anmg m that th urt er imp hes that verbal behavior is d · ffi · ey refer to objects or events This

only be explained in tenns of a non-ph i. erent :rom other behavior in that it can ys1cal lex1co D

n. 0 not feel badly if you fail

CHAPTER TWO: IT'S JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 29

to see anything wrong with this perspective, but it is filled to the brim with serious conceptual problems for a science of behavior.

It helps to appreciate that all behavior, even unexpected or novel behavior, comes from the accumulation of many )earning experiences over time, as the Hart and Risley study suggests. Verbal behavior, like other operant behavior, grows more complex and functional one instance at a time. No one knows how many millions of learning trials occur along the way to a typical adult verbal repertoire, but there are surely enough to provide the basis for explaining how it is acquired. Just because verbal behavior is comp1ex does not mean its explanation must be mysterious.

Most peop1e do not appreciate the contribution of a learning history because they do not understand the mechanisms and power of operant learning. This limi­ tation is exacerbated by the fact that we cannot see a history of behavior-environ­ mental interactions laid out before us in some recognizable form. What if we could observe a complete set of video clips of the interchanges between a child and fam­ ily members associated with learning to label dogs and cats? Aside from the fact that it would take forever and a day to watch them, would it then be obvious how this discrimination is acquired? How much longer would such a video have to be to show all of the episodes necessary to teach pronouns, proper syntax, reasoning, and all the other features of a mature verbal repertoire?

The point of emphasizing the role of operant shaping and the literally countless learning moments accumulated in gradually building an adult verbal repertoire is to help explain how its complexity can be understood in a non-mentalistic concep­ tual framework. This perspective should not be taken as minimizing the role of biological preparedness in learning to talk. Acquiring this repertoire requires not just responsiveness to the social contingencies of a verbal community but other features of brain development. However, the role of operant selection is no less a prerequisite, and it implies a particular conceptual approach to understanding and explaining our verbal performance. From this perspective, the adult verbal repertoire is acquired very gradually from one verbal interchange to another, and we must give this process a pre-eminent role when we try to explain verbal behav­ ior, not just in general but in individual instances. It is especially important that you take this approach in understanding your verbal behavior as you consider the issues in this book.

ORGANIZATION OF VERBAL BEHAVIOR

The Concept of Response Classes

Skinner (1957) eased the challenge of explaining where each bit of verbal behavior comes from and what it means by proposing that different utterances otherwise sharing the same kind of relations with the environment should be described as

RACTITIONERS 30 • RADICAL BEHAVIORISM FOR ABA p .

e bad realized some years earlier that one belonging to the same response class. H cognize the natural structure under-

. b h . r was to re of the keys to understandmg e avio . , sponses (Skinner, 1935). Although lying the limitless variety of an or~anismh ~ re from occasion to occasion are what differences in the way we do a particular t mg ost important.

. . . h · ·1 't'es that are m we tend to notice, 1t ts t e s1m1 an 1 . th behavior of opening a door vary

For example, the responses involved tnD'f'C.erences in the physical features of fi · t to another 1 ie

a goo d b1t .

rom one ms ance · d four actions, and their varying.1 individual doors and how they work, t~e eta1 :~ses are exactly alike. There are outcomes mean that no two door opening resp . . d h

. . d d d' the charactenst1cs of the door an t e out- differences m what we o epen . mg on . . 11 t d so forth and our come that will be reinforcing. We may push, twist, pu , um, an , .

· · h h c. t a shoulder or even our backs1deactions may mvolve one hand or t e ot er, a 100 , , , 'th · d f e.cc.ort Regardless of these differences, all responses a11 w1 varymg egrees o 11, • • • •

that open the door produce a reinforcing state of a~alfs, as long as tt IS open a sufficient amount in each instance. The shared relatton between these responses and both the antecedent features of the door and the consequences of opening it define the different responses as belonging to the same class. All of the included responses are what we describe as the behavior of opening doors.

This concept of individual responses falling into paiiicular classes is important because they represent the organizing effects of natural contingencies. The fact that different actions produce the same reinforcing outcome in similar situations, thereby falling into the same class, allows us to make sense of what would other­ wise appear as endless and confusing variety, both within and across individuals. Those responses that share the same kind of relations with the environment are functionally the same, even though they may sometimes look somewhat different. They serve the same function in an organism's repertoire and are therefore called functional response classes.

Understanding how re~po~se classes work is also important because it helps us understand operant behavior m terms of the contingencies that c t l d th _ c. · p . . on ro an ere1 · 1ore exp am 1t. racttttoners depend on the concept of res 1 h h . . ponse c asses w en t ey are called on to develop an mtervent1on to ameliorate a pr bl t' b h · o . . · . o ema 1c e avtor. ne of their first tasks ts to determme the characteristics f th b ·

· d · o e target ehav1or What actions un er what ctrcumstances lead to the sam k' d f · · ·

·d l? N I d · · e In o outcome for the Ind1- v1 ua . ot on y oes this mformation help th d fi design measurement procedures 't h 1 ~m e ne the target behavior and1, e ps explam the O f · and suggests environmental changes th t ccurrence o the behavior

a may resolve th bl response classes is no less relevant whe th . ~ pro em. The focus on skill. The task then is to figure out the nh e asstgnment mvolves teaching a new

c aracterist · f h · the responses and the surrounding env· tcs o t e Intended class (both

. . 1ronmental e t ) h . natural contmgenc1es in the target sett. ven s t at will be supported by

.d . mg.Cons1 er this scenario. Clint a BCBA . I. · . ' , 1s asked to fi d woman 1vmg 1n a group home for intell . gure out why a middle-age

ectually d1sabl d . d' .d .e In IVI ua]s sometimes

CHAPTER TWO: IT'S JUST VERBAL BEHA VJOR • 3 J

gets upset and to develop an intervention that will resolve the problem. From talk­ ing with caregivers and observing the woman's behavior, Clint learns that under certain conditions she throws objects, kicks things, strikes out at staff and her housemates, and curses. She seems to act this way when she is asked to do things she apparently does not want to do, such as participate in scheduled activities. When she gets upset, staff clear the area, stop making their requests, and leave her alone for a while. Clint also notices that she curses when she is not being disruptive in other ways and that staff mostly ignore this. With this information, he reasons that throwing, kicking, and hitting may function as a single response class but that cursing might not be part of this class. Clint's suspicion is that throwing, kicking, and hitting tend to produce the same consequences in terms of the staff's reactions (possibly serving as negative reinforcers) but that cursing does not usually produce these consequences. He then goes about developing a definition of the response class for staff to use in counting occurrences. He also takes his hypothesis about the variables that might be prompting or maintaining the behavior into account in considering intervention procedures.

Verbal Response Classes

The reason for discussing the concept of response classes is that it is especially useful in understanding verbal behavior. Skinner ( 1957) identified a number of verbal response classes that have withstood decades of experimental and clinical scrutiny. These classes bring valuable structure and clarity to any discussion of ver­ bal behavior, but it is important to appreciate that they are justified by research evi­ dence, not merely conceptual preference or convenience. These response classes represent different kinds of operant contingencies and help explain how our verbal abilities are learned. They should therefore be used in explaining any particular instances of verbal behavior.

Let us briefly consider a couple of verbal response classes that are extensively involved in our daily talk, as well as a common focus of training efforts by ABA practitioners who work with children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders. We often say things in which there is a characteristic relation between the form of the response and the reinforcers received from listeners. This kind of verbal response is called a mand, which is sometimes described as a response that specifies its own reinforcer. More loosely, we often mand for things or circumstances we want ( or, more properly, under certain conditions of deprivation or aversive stimulation), whether it is an object or a change in someone's behavior. "Water!" is more likely to be followed by receipt of water than other events, just as "Stop!" is likely to get someone to cease what they are doing at the moment. There are a number of varia­ tions of simple mands, and they are clearly an important facet of our verbal skills. Children learn to mand early on, and when the skill is absent, as with some individu­ als with intellectual disabilities, it is one of the first communication skills to teach.

PRACTITIONERS 32 • RADICAL BEHAVIORISM FOR ABA . . . •

'fled relation with a pnor stimulus,. h · no spec1 Unlike mands, for which t ere IS b ertain object or event or a property

c. · oked Ya c15tacts are operants whose 1orm ev . c r mands are closely related to the 0the remforcers i• 'dWhof an object or event. ereas t' obiects or events vary wt ely but

h · c. ers for tac mg ~ .form of the response, t e remiorc b' t or event tacted. The early steps m are narrowly related to features of the ? ~e~ teaching children to simply label

1r0developing this type of verbal operant ve unity is to assure consistency in things or events. The role of the verba cohmt~ tacted This can be challenging

d b tw the tact and w a IS •the correspon ence e. een h sical differences among dogs, for for young leame~s. Thmk about all of the p. yentif all kinds of dogs as dogs, as example, yet a ch1Id must learn to accurately 1d Y

well as differentiate between dogs and cats. . dd. · I k" d f · · f b I b } ·or reqmres a 1t10na m s o ver-A comprehensive analysis o ver a e 1av1 ·

· · • J d toclitic operants as well as otherbal operants, 111clud111g echoic, textua , an a~ . . . . , variants. However, you might notice what is m1ssmg m this _11.st of terms are some structural elements of Ianouaoe with which we are all famthar-words and sen-

0 0 ..b h tences. Their shortcoming for a behavioral analysis is that they are not e av1or- al1y functional units. The same word (response topography) can serve different functions depending on the circumstances. The utterance "stop," for examp]e, has different effects on a listener in sentences such as "Please stop doing that!" versus "When can I stop?" The same limitation applies to sentences, which can be struc­ turally the same but functionally different. For example, the sentences "I went to a movie yesterday" and "I went to a concert yesterday" have the same structure, but the one word that differs between them may result in different effects on the behav­ ior of a listener. We recognize the value of focusing on behavioral functions in analyzing behavior when we acknowledge that other kinds of behavior must also be understood in terms of its function rather than its form. For instance we view the behavior of running differently in different contexts, such as runnin~ in a race versus running from the police.

Reconsidering Conventional Concepts

The idea of verbal response classes acquired thro . h J • • • the beginnino of learning how t ug earnmg experiences ts only

o . o approac 11 verbal behavio fi . 'fi spective, free of cultural preconceptions M . r rom a sc1ent1 c per- the way we have been taught to vi · any conventional concepts underlying

1ew anguage must b 'd example, our verbal repertoires offer man re . . e rec.ons1 ered as well. For structure. These regular patterns are c J lgulan~ies, such as their grammatical

II linguists view these rules as existing .a ~d ~es, as m the rules of grammar. Many a role in generating verbal behavior msi et e mind of the speaker and give them

Behavior analysts, however v1·e·w th ' ese reg J • • patterns of responding. In fact m t b h . u anties as no more than learned

. . ' os e av1or exh 'b· or orgamzation. Although most p 1 its some degree of patterning

eop 1 e do not ft . o en notice these patterns, they

CHAPTER TWO: n's JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 33

are not difficult to identify when we study behavior closely. The basic research literature on operant behavior is a description of such regularities (see Catani~ 2007), many of which have attained the status of empirical generalizations or even scientific laws. When grammatical or other kinds of rules are viewed as merely descriptions of behavioral regularities, there is no temptation to argue that they are entities that must have a mental existence. The rules of grammar are not in our head. They are just summaries of the observations of grammarians, which they tact in their verbal behavior.

Another common conviction underlying how we have learned to think about language is the view that words and sentences have meaning and that conversations communicate or transfer this meaning from speaker to listener. The assumption that words and sentences have meaning is based on the idea that we "use" them to refer to things and events. The word car is said to "refer to" a large wheeled conveyance that we can drive from one place to another. As a reference, the word is therefore taken as a symbol of the thing itself. Of course, there are many differences from one car to another, so car represents not just an object but a category or concept. These representations are said to be in a lexicon or collection of objects or events­ a kind of personal dictionary. The idea is that speakers and listeners communicate by looking up representations in their lexicon and relating them to symbols in order to understand what is being said. But where is this lexicon and where do these processes take place? Lacking physical dimensions, the required assumption is that the lexicon and its consultation are mental phenomena. As always, this is a serious constraint because it places the explanation of our verbal abilities beyond the reach of natural science.

Criticism of reference theories of language begs what might appear to be a fair question: How do behavior analysts handle the notion that our talking and writing seem to have meaning to listeners? First, understand that this notion is inherently mentalistic. The idea that words mean something goes beyond the observable fact of an utterance and its effects on a listener and invents a mental entity for which there is no evidence. Behavior analysts avoid this problem by recognizing that the mean­ ing of words and sentences lies in their impact on the listener's behavior, which in tum affects the speaker's behavior. In other words, behavior analysts approach the meaning of verbal behavior no differently than they do the meaning of any other behavior-as a matter of the environmental function of the behavior.

How do we deal with the meaning of any behavior? What does a driving response mean? An eating response? Put this way, the idea of meaning seems, well, meaningless. We do not consider non-verbal operant responses as having meaning in the sense that we conventionally attribute to verbal responses. Pressed to come up with the meaning of other behaviors, we tun1 to their function. The meaning of a response or pattern of responses lies in the effects on the environment. Take the example of running mentioned earlier. Absent context or function, running is just a physical event or action. In context, however, running in a race differs from

NERS 34 • RADICAL BEHAVIORJSM FOR ABA PRACTITIO

· fr h . b se the surrounding environmental events-anteced- runmng om t e po1ice ecau . . .to see that the act10n serves different functions

llow Usen s an d consequences-a· t h · t R · alongst'de others along a prearranged route leads to a m eac ms ance. . unnmg . . finishing time and congratulations from friends an~ family, if not an ~ward, and has a different function than running that leads to bemg tackled by a police officer,

handcuffed, and taken to jail. . In applying this approach to the meaning. of our verbal behavior, we look_ to

the circumstances under which we emit a particular verbal response. The mean mg of an utterance, whether a word, phrase, or sentence, can be found not by look­ ing it up in a dictionary, which only offers more words, but by discovering what set the occasion for emitting the utterance and what effect it had on the listener. Skinner made this argument in a seminal paper titled, "The operational analysis of psychological terms" (Skinner, 1945). He explained that we can only understand the meaning of psychological terms and constructs by examining the conditions under which we "use" ( emit) them. (See Box 9.4. for discussion of Skinner's view of operationism.) What we mean when we "refer to" anxiety, for example, lies in the stimuli that prompted the emission of that utterance and the effects of the utterance on the behavior of a listener. If we say that our friend seems anxious, and others respond with sympathy or helpful reactions, the meaning of the utterance is no more or less than those environmental events. After all, the spoken word anx­ ious is just a sound we make. If we had grown up in a different country and were speaking a different language, we would emit a different sound, but it would have the same "meaning" or relation with surrounding environmental events, including

the behavior at issue. Here, then, is the approach to understanding the "meaning" of a word, phrase,

or sentence. Ask yourself what environmental events occasioned and followed the utterance. The answer will not usually be simple, but it will be revealing. If we comment to a friend that Jules seems happy today, what we mean by happy can be discovered using this analytical approach. Upon reflection, we might realize that we noticed she was being more talkative than usual, smiling to others frequently, and making jokes. It is our reinforcement history associated with emitting this or similar responses ("Jules seems happy today") in the past that leads us to emit it again now. Our friend, in contact with these same stimuli mioht have a similar ~istory _and agr~e w!th our assessment, thereby reinforcing ;ur v:rbal response and mcreasmg the hkehhood that we will emit it again under similar conditions in the future. If our friend disagreed, it might have the effect of making us Jess likely to emit this ~erb~l response ( describing Jules or even others as happy) in the presence of such st1muh. In other words, what we mean when we sa J I · h y lies in . b h. b y u es 1s . app . 1 . mg an re1111orcmgthe re at1on etween t 1s ver al response and its prompt' d · .c. • condi-

t1ons. If enough ~eop1e m our verbal community share a similar history in their role ~s speakers an~ listeners regarding the verbal response ha then this is all there 1s to the "mean mg" of the word. rppy,

CHAPTER TWO: n's JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 35

GIVEN THAT VERBAL BEHAVIOR IS LEARNED ...

Just Verbal Behavior?

Perhaps it i~ not too difficult to concede that everything we say is learned. After all, pe~suas1ve argument aside, the scientific evidence for this position is over­ "":helmmg .. We have seen, however, that accepting this proposition leads to some d1sconcertmg coro11aries. The idea that we do not "use" words and sentences to "refer to" things and events and that they therefore do not have "meaning" in the colloquial sense takes some getting used to. And yet, understanding why we must view verbal behavior as fundamentally the same as other operant behavior is the key to understanding your own verbal repertoire.

In pursuing this interest, the focus of this chapter is somewhat narrow. Although it briefly introduces some of the conceptual issues underlying the behavior analytic approach to verbal behavior, it does not go on to address the more substantive and technical features of this perspective. Instead, the chapter's primary objective is helping you come to grips with the arguments in the remaining chapters. By virtue of your long history in the verbal community of our culture, it would be natural for you to read, think about, and discuss the issues in upcoming chapters without appreciating the impact of your own verbal history. Not only has this history fully determined your reactions to the issues, it has given you a certain view of verbal behavior in general, including your own. It is that conventional account ofyour own verbal behavior you must put aside in order to understand and reconsider the long­ standing views you bring to this discussion. In order to ease your transition from a colloquial to a scientific point of view, it is necessary that you appreciate what it means to admit that what you are accustomed to saying about these issues is ''just" verbal behavior.

Of course scientific talk about these issues is also ''just" verbal behavior. Our ' talkino thinking and writing is not fundamentally different from other forms of

o, ' operant behavior, and we must therefore approach verbal behavior within this con- straint. This does not mean what we say is unimportant, however. Just because our verbiage does not have meaning in the conventional sense should certainly not imply that what we say is trivial in terms of its consequences. How we talk about the conceptual issues addressed in this book is important because our verbal behavior has effects that are often important.

To consider this point further, remember that any behavior we emit is a physical event that changes the environment. Sometimes these effects involve only m01nen­ tary environmental outcomes. For example, when we nod to someone in greeting as we walk by and they respond in kind, ~his result of o~r actio? is brief a~d leaves no physical trace. Once the interchange ts over, there 1s_ no evidence of either our behavior or how it changed the environment. Other thmgs we do produce more enduring environmental effects. If we tum off the lights when leaving a room, the

AVIOR1SM FOR ABA PRACTITIONERS

36 • RADICAL BEH again. Sometimes these more- . turns them on . h

room remains dark until someone · · The effects of cleaning t e car I t 11 that 1ong. ·

than-momentary effects do not as a ems to last long enough once you h·t trip never se .windshield at a gas stop w 1 eon a h envi·ronmental changes are quite

times t ese are back on the road. However, some . h effects of which might last at least a durable, as when we paint a lawn chair, t e ·

few seasons. b h ior? When we say something, the What about the effects of our verbal e av d fsound although ifwe write

. d' ith the spee o ' immediate physical effects isapp~ar w nd for a long time. But what about something, the written product might be ar~u thers or our own behavior? As their effects on behavior, whether the behavior of O h fi . ti · d

· h ence of ot ers requen y m ucesenvironmental events, what we say 111 t e pres d d th d changes in their behavior, as when we ask someo~e to close the .00~ an ey 0

so. Indeed it is these changes in the behavior of listeners that mamt~m our verbal • ' . • cc. •. th ame way? Does tt make sensebehavior. Can our verbal _behavior a11ect us m e s . ·?

to consider ourselves as listeners for our own verbal behavior· . In a word, yes. When we make a grocery list, for instance, what we have writ­

ten serves as a prompt for what to buy when we are in the store. Just as we often comply with rules given by others, we may also state them "to ourselv~s" as a way of helping to control our own behavior. So, if you are trying to lose weight and tell yourself ( either silently or out loud) at a restaurant that you must not order dessert, this instruction may increase the likelihood that you decline when the waiter offers to bring the dessert menu. Sometimes we say things to ourselves that increase the likelihood of solving a problem, such as when we have lost our keys and systemati­ cally review where they might be or where we last saw them. We also say things to others that have the effect of controlling our behavior, as when we publicly announce our intentions to go to the gym, which may arrange social consequences for going or failing to go. We may argue a certain point in class in a way that leads us to take a position we might not have previously held, just as our argument may change the views of classmates.

There are endless examples of how our verbal behavior may influence our behavior as. listeners, a~though it is important to acknowledge that there may often be mo~e gomg on t?anJust verbal behavior (see Box 2.2). Even simple instances of behavior are ?ften mfluenc7d by multiple factors, and there is nothing simple about verbal behavior. But there 1s no question that what we say can affect what we do.

What is a Conviction?

You will better understand the impact of your coll · 1 b · . . . oqma ver a1 repertoire as you consider the conceptual issues discussed in the c 11 • h

l . 10 owmg c apters. The way we learned to ta k about behavior from our family c. • d . , 1rten s, teachers and the larger verbal comm umty-whether we are talking to oth ' . . t

f h h. . ers or to ourselves-is 1mportan

L because o ow t 1s kmd of talking affects oth b h · · ·

er e av1or. The present task 1s to

CHAPTER TWO: IT'S JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 37

BOX2.3

What Else Might Be Going On?

Skinner emphasized the mutt· I d t · f b h · · . . . . Ip e e ennmants o e av10r, especially verbal behav- ior, ma discus~1on of complexity in the analysis of behavior (1953). Our behavior as s~eakers an? listeners results from more than just simple reinforcement contingen­ cies. He pomted out, for example, that humor often depends on multiple sources of sn:en~,th. Puns are a good example. There was a sign at the drug rehab center that said, Keep off the grass." The humor, such as it is, comes from multiple sources of control over the response Hgrass."

. Skinner also noted that sustained verbal behavior is always multiply determined. His example is that it is impossible for us to call out random numbers because we have a history in which certain sequences of numbers have been reinforced in dif­ ferent contexts. Learning to count by multiples, recite multiplication tables, and give telephone numbers means that each number we say alters the probabilities of the next number we call, thus preventing us from offering truly random sequences.

There are also practical uses of the multiple sources of control over our verbal behavior. As Chapter 6 explains, for example, when we try to persuade someone to agree with us, we often emit propositions in a particular sequence that are more likely to be accepted in order to increase the likelihood that our conclusion will also be accepted. These examples of ways in which our verbal behavior is multiply

determined highlight its complexity and the challenge for researchers.

appreciate how your colloquial repertoire can get in the way of your learning the new dialect introduced in this book.

For example, as you read upcoming chapters, you will certainly find that you have been holding convictions about how behavior works and can be explained that are contrary to the arguments presented here. As you examine your exist­ ing views, appreciating that everything you have to say has been learned from your verbal community, consider what it means to "have a conviction." When we describe someone as having a conviction, we are labeling or tacting some aspects of their behavior. Although the word conviction is a noun, it is not a physical thing that can be picked up, turned over, or directly measured. This limitation should not encouraoe us to assume that it is a mental "thing" either. The word "conviction" is just an u~erance and we have been taught to emit it under certain stimulus condi- tions. (See Chap~er 7 for further discussio? of con:ic!ions and beliefs.) .

Keep in mind that describing someone s beh~v1or 1s funda~entally no different than describing their other features, such as thetr clothes or hair. _We learn to label behavior while we are learning to label other aspects of the envJronment, and we . learn to label our own behavior in the same way. Just as our parents teach us to say "dog" when we see a dog, they teach us to say "crying" when a sibling is crying

PRACTITIONERS . DICAL BEHAVIORJSM FOR ABA plicated than this, especially

3 8 • RA ore com . . I · . adually gets m . hapters will exp am morehen we are. Of course, it gr . and upcommg c

or w Own behavior, . with reference to our . mething we are tactmg

· cess · about so ' about this learmng pro . has a conviction dover time. If we report

When we say ~at some~~ele examples of it observe description is probably their behavior, typically_ mu p t meat for instanc:, our f her behavior. She

· d d not like to ea ' instances o that a fr1en o~s I bservation but on numerous t hen offered criticizes oth-1ba:;~:t:h:~ :h: ~~e: :ot eat meat, refuses to:::~~: d:es not like ;o eat mea~, we :s who eat meat, and so forth. When we sa~nder the control ofthese obs~rvattons, are emitting what is called an exten~ed :;~er behavior with respect to eatm~ meat. in effect summarizing our observatto~s when we say that we hold a certam co~-

This is the same thing we are dom~ t ften our verbal behavior. Here Is · behavior mos O · • • h fviction. We are tactmg our own d' t ''have" a conviction m t e sense o

the part that may be hard to grasp: We o .n~ b 1ief is not a thing in either a . R b r a conv1ct1on or ePossessing somethmg. emem e ' " rt" ·1·ts status When we make state-

d we do not repo · .Physical or mental sense, an · "I. b . e tllat " or "I hold the view . d th t " or e1tev ...

ments such as "I ~m convm~e a ... e have reviously said in other ways on that..." we are typically ~aymg what V: that .~ have a history of making these other occasions. We are, m eff:ct, ;aym~,, or "I am likely to say these kinds of kinds of statements about sue an sue . " . . o o more than tacting things" or "I often emit this kind of behavior. We are dom::, n

some of our behavior. . . . 'b d · So when you find yourself wanting to argue with pos~t1ons desert e m

upco~ing chapters in order to defend a point of v.ie"';, with wh'.ch you are alre~d~ comfortable, remember that "it's just verbal behavior. Everythmg you are argumt, for, the point you feel so strongly about, the position you want to preserv~-these are all "just verbal behaviors" that you learned from your verbal community along the way. Although you may want to focus on the "content" of your argument, you should first examine the sources of control over what you are saying. Are you saying things that come from your colloquial verbal history? Are they consistent with established scientific findings about how operant behavior works? Is your position based on and consistent with directly observable facts? Does it involve unsupported or unprovable assumptions, especially assumptions that depend on the existence of a mental universe?

Ifresearchers based their questions on your viewpoint, where would their meth­ ods .and fin~ings lea~? ~ould such studies be a wasted effort or would they result in discoveries that w1!11mprove our understanding ofbehavior? The ultimate crite­ rion for evaluating a philosophy of science, after all, is how well it serves scientific discovery. The vie;"'s described in this book cannot be legitimately defended by reference to authority. Just because they largely originat d ·th B F Sk" r may

"d h e WI . . tnnebe reason to cons1 er t em carefully, but it is not a s ffi · t hri·ne . u c1en reason to ensthem as true or beyond improvement. If talking a cert · b b h · h lps

am way a out e av10r e

CHAPTER TWO: n's JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 39 researchers ask better questio d I d . . ns an ea s to results that improve our ability to control and predict behavior, that perspective might be deemed useful. Even then, such status may be temporary B th· ·t · b . . · Y 1s en enon, etter arguments may emerge, and the history of behavior analysis reveals examples of h d ( B 2 4) Yi · ht · h sue a vances see ox . .

. ou mtg raise ~ _e same question about the implications of your existing views for ABA practit10ners If th d t d h · · · . . · . ey a op e t e conv1ct10ns about behav10r you grew up with, woul~ they ?e more or less effective in providing services than if they adopted t~e pomt of view described in this book? How would these two dif­ ferent perspe~tives a~ect their selection and assessment of target behaviors and the natu:e of mterv~nt1ons designed to change them? True, ABA practitioners must always 11~ter:ace with .t~e general public, who require plain English for effective commumcat1on. Physicians, lawyers, engineers, and other professionals face the

B0X2.4

Speaking of Antecedent Events

An example of the importance to both our science and professional practice of how we talk about behavior involves a proposal offered by Jack Michael (1982) about how we talk about antecedent events. He realized that the traditional assignment of discriminative stimulus functions betrayed a failure to appreciate a distinct motiva­ tional role for many antecedent events. By reintroducing the concept of establishing operations ( originally defined by Keller and Schoenfeld, 1950), he called attention to a broad array of motivational stimulus functions that exceeded the definitional limits of discriminative stimuli. In doing so, he advanced our understanding of behavior and the ways in which it is tied to environmental events.

Michael reminded us that the effectiveness of reinforcers depends on some degree of deprivation or satiation and that there is a similar relation involving aver­ sive stimuli. He proposed that we view establishing or motivating operations as events, operations, or stimulus conditions that share two functions. One is to alter the effectiveness of other events as reinforcers or punishers. The other is to alter the frequency of behavior associated with these reinforcing or punishing events. This latter effect is especially noticeable, though it can be confused with a similar effect of discriminative stimuli. The distinction, he pointed out, is that discrimina­ tive stimuli concern the differential availability of a reinforcer for a certain behavior, whereas motivating operations concern the differential reinforcing efficacy of acer-

tain environmental event (Michael, 2007). The technical vocabulary of science should always be at the mercy of its utility.

By this standard, Michael's proposal has alread~ proven its worth. Both r~s~arc~ers and practitioners enthusiastically adopted not JUSt a set of tenns, but their 1mphca­ tions. For instance, a review by McGill ( 1999) reveals how the concept of estab]i~h­ ing/ t' t· erations has influenced the assessment, treatment, and prevention

mo iva mg op 1 d' bl d . d' 'd 1 of problem behavior, especially in developmental y 1sa e m 1v1 ua s.

40 • RADICAL BERAVIORISM FOR ABA PRACTITIONERS

BOX2.5

The Translation Trap

· · f t 1 1· d y terms such as convictions or beliefs into the The exercise o rans a mg every a . . . · 1d. l f th · f behavi·or has a certain appeal. It seems reassuring techmca 1a ec1 o . . e science o .

to find what appear to be thoughtful substitutions for conventional terms that now appear to be prohibited. To some extent, such translations are a necess~ry part of explaining why behavior analysts insist on avoiding vernacular .reference~ m ~avor_of what is obviously a more laborious alternative. These transl~tton e~e~ctse~ 1den~1fy an everyday term concerning some aspect of behavior, exp lam why it 1s mts!eadmg, describe what is really going on with behavior instead, and offer an alternative term or expression that avoids the original problem. The desired result is that the reader will appreciate how colloquial terms and expressions misdirect our interests in under­ standing human nature and be motivated to focus on behavior and its environmental context instead. Upcoming chapters will offer many examples of these translations, just as Skinner often found it necessary to do ( e.g., Skinner, 1953, 1974).

This practice contains a trap or two, however. As argued in the Preface, for example, the act of translating assumes that a term or expression in one language has a matching term or expression in another that serves the same function for speakers and listeners. For example, "dog" in English and "chien" in French mean exactly the same thing. This is certainly not the case with everyday terms and expressions that appear to describe or explain behavior, however. Vernacular references often require relatively long-winded interpretation in the language of behavioral science precisely because there is no simple one-for-one substitution of terms that works. Other sci­ ences face this same challenge of translating everyday references into technically correct dialect. Everyday terms are generally superficial, conversationally efficient, and do not require special training, which is the basis for their appeal. Scientific langua~e requires considerable preparation and gives more weight to precision than convenience.

A more troublesome implication of this exercise is the implicit assumption that the availability of a term in one dialect warrants a matching term in the other dialect. That is, it is tempting to believe that the existence of a vernacular term means that its referent is real, or at least important, and that it therefore deserves a translation. This posi:ion is especially problematic for mentalistic terms, many of which serve as nouns m our grammar and therefore seem to be "things" that should not be dis­ missed without a proper substitution in a scientific dialect. Routinely attempting to translate such terms may encourage this conviction and imply that a l te alter-

. · 'fi · . comp e native sc1ent1 c 1ex1con 1s required.

Because of the limitations of mental ism however such a 1 · · ·th . pos . . . . · , , ex1con 1s net er - s1ble nor would 1t b~ s_attsfymg. A complete set of matching English and French words may n:ake a d1c~1onary, but a dictionary that translated mentalistic tenns into proper behavioral termmology would not serve as thee: d t· e: · t'fi h1· . 1oun a 10n 1or a sc1en 1 c p - losophy. As Chapter 3 will show, understanding the " · " f d rdsmeamng o every ay wo

CHAPTER TWO: IT'S JUST VERBAL BEHAVIOR • 41

in a behavioral framework· t f · · . IS no a matter o substitutmo one definition for another.

The real challenge IS to u d t d h O

• . . n ers an ow we must talk about behav10r so that ver- nacular phrasmg Is no longer t t' b · · · · . . emp mg ecause our dialect 1s fully cons1stent with the underlymg science.

same chal1.enge, but_ they also maintain a specialized technical dialect that is part ?f the basis for their effectiveness. Such a technical dialect may be even more important for ABA practitioners, given that it is the very foundation for how they look at behavior.

Is Something l\1issing?

Well, all of this ce11ainly changes things, does it not? We have grown up thinking that we possess things called convictions or beliefs, that they are non-physically held somewhere inside us, and that we express or report on them. Furthermore, when we talk about someone's convictions or beliefs in common parlance, the con­ notation is often that they are especially important and fervently held. The point of view described in this chapter leaves all of this behind. Are you now feeling as if something is being taken away from you? That something is missing in all of this? If so, it is a common reaction at first. Other scientific advances such as the discovery that the earth is round, that it rotates around the sun, or that diseases may be caused by germs produced similar reactions. Sometimes even otherwise well-educated people have great difficulty coming to grips with sound scientific findings, such as the theory of evolution. It should not be surprising that it has proven difficult to sell the discoveries of well-established behavioral analysis sci-

ence as well. Of course, we cannot Jose what we never had. The only thing being lost here

is our ignorance. Once past this apparent loss, you may become excited about learning a way of talking about be~avior, inclu~ing you~ own behavi?r, that is consistent with what science is teachmg us. Consider that mstead of losmg some­ thing you are discovering a way of looking at behavior that reveals relations and complexity you did not see before: You are learning how to look past th: implica­ tions of a misleading co11oquial dtale~t and ~ee a powerful ~nd ~ompel~mg world of possibilities based on scientific discoveries. What rem.ams 1s learnmg a new dialect that allows you to talk about those aspects of behav10r that are really there. That will come with the rest of this book. .