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Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory Author(s): Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke Source: Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 224-237 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695870 Accessed: 26-10-2017 14:40 UTC

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Social Psychology Quarterly 2000, Vol. 63, No. 3,224-237

Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory*

JAN E. STETS

PETER J. BURKE

Washington State University

In social psychology, we need to establish a general theory of the self which can attend to both macro and micro processes, and which avoids the redundancies of separate the- ories on different aspects of the self For this purpose, we present core components of identity theory and social identity theory and argue that although differences exist between the two theories, they are more differences in emphasis than in kind, and that linking the two theories can establish a more fully integrated view of the self The core components we examine include the different bases of identity (category/group or role) in each of the theories, identity salience and the activation of identities as discussed in the theories, and the cognitive and motivational processes that emerge from identities based on category/group and on role. By examining the self through the lens of both identity theory and social identity theory, we see how, in combination, they can move us toward a general theory of the self

In contrast to Hogg and his colleagues

(Hogg, Terry, and White 1995), we see sub- stantial similarities and overlap between social identity theory and identity theory. We think that this overlap ultimately will cause these theories to be linked in fundamental ways, though we do not think that time has come. To show how such a merger is possible, we outline some important similarities

between the theories; at the same time we note the differences in language, orientation, and coverage of the two theories as they cur- rently exist.'

We believe that three areas are central to linking the two theories. First are the differ-

ent bases of identity in the two theories: cate- gories or groups for social identity theory, and roles for identity theory. A related issue is the place of person identities. The second area is the activation of identities and the concept of salience as used in each of the the-

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 meetings of the American Sociological Association, held in San Francisco. We wish to thank members of the Social Psychology Graduate Training Seminar in the Department of Sociology at Washington State University for their helpful com- ments on an earlier version of this paper. Direct all correspondence to Jan E. Stets, Department of Sociology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4020; e-mail stets@wsu.edu.

1 We recognize that this goal is a moving target because both theories are under active development.

ories. The third area involves the core processes that arise once an identity is acti- vated. In this regard we discuss the cognitive processes of depersonalization (in social identity theory) and self-verification (in iden- tity theory) as well as the motivational processes of self-esteem (in social identity theory) and self-efficacy (in identity theory).

For those less familiar with social identi-

ty theory and identity theory, we begin with a brief review of the concept of identity as used in both theories. Then we review the theories on the points identified above, with a focus on identifying the ways in which each might reinforce and complement the other. To out- line identity in the two theories, we first dis- cuss how each theory conceptualizes the self.

THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY

In social identity theory and identity the-

ory, the self is reflexive in that it can take itself as an object and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications. This process is called self-categorization in social identity theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987); in identity the- ory it is called identification (McCall and Simmons 1978). Through the process of self- categorization or identification, an identity is formed.

224

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IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 225

In social identity theory, a social identity

is a person's knowledge that he or she

belongs to a social category or group (Hogg and Abrams 1988). A social group is a set of individuals who hold a common social identi-

fication or view themselves as members of

the same social category. Through a social

comparison process, persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self and

are labeled the in-group; persons who differ

from the self are categorized as the out-

group. In early work, social identity included

the emotional, evaluative, and other psycho-

logical correlates of in-group classification

(Turner et al. 1987:20). Later researchers often separated the self-categorization com-

ponent from the self-esteem (evaluative) and commitment (psychological) components in order to empirically investigate the relation-

ships among them (Ellemers and Van Knippenberg 1997).

The two important processes involved in

social identity formation, namely self-catego-

rization and social comparison, produce dif-

ferent consequences (Hogg and Abrams 1988). The consequence of self-categoriza- tion is an accentuation of the perceived simi-

larities between the self and other in-group

members, and an accentuation of the per-

ceived differences between the self and out-

group members. This accentuation occurs for

all the attitudes, beliefs and values, affective

reactions, behavioral norms, styles of speech,

and other properties that are believed to be

correlated with the relevant intergroup cate-

gorization. The consequence of the social comparison process is the selective applica- tion of the acceiituation effect, primarily to those dimensions that will result in self-

enhancing outcomes for the self. Specifically, one' s self-esteem is enhanced by evaluating the in-group and the out-group on dimen- sions that lead the in-group to be judged pos-

itively and the out-group to be judged negatively.

As Hogg and Abrams (1988) make clear, the social categories in which individuals place themselves are parts of a structured society and exist only in relation to other contrasting categories (for example, black vs. white); each has more or less power, prestige, status, and so

on. Further, these authors point out that the

social categories precede individuals; individ-

uals are born into an already structured soci-

ety. Once in society, people derive their identi-

ty or sense of self largely from the social

categories to which they belong. Each person,

however, over the course of his or her person-

al history, is a member of a unique combina-

tion of social categories; therefore the set of social identities making up that person's self-

concept is unique.

In identity theory, self-categorization is

equally relevant to the formation of one's

identity, in which categorization depends

upon a named and classified world (Stryker 1980). Among the class terms learned within a

culture are symbols that are used to designate

positions-the relatively stable, morphologi-

cal components of social structure that are

termed roles. Thus, like social identity theory,

identity theory deals principally with the com-

ponents of a structured society. Persons acting

in the context of social structure name one

another and themselves in the sense of recog-

nizing one another as occupants of positions

(roles). This naming invokes meanings in the

form of expectations with regard to others'

and one's own behaviors (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 1980).

In identity theory, the core of an identity

is the categorization of the self as an occu-

pant of a role, and the incorporation, into the

self, of the meanings and expectations associ- ated with that role and its performance

(Burke and Tully 1977; Thoits 1986). These expectations and meanings form a set of stan- dards that guide behavior (Burke 1991; Burke and Reitzes 1981). In addition, as McCall and Simmons (1978) make clear, the naming within identity theory includes all the

things (including self and other) that take on meaning in relation to our plans and activi-

ties. More recently, identity theorists have drawn on this meaningful relationship between persons and things to incorporate the concept of resources (things that sustain persons and interactions) as a central compo- nent in identity processes (Freese and Burke 1994). Much of the meaningful activity within a role that is governed by an identity revolves around the control of resources (Burke 1997); this feature as much as anything, defines social structure.

In general, one's identities are composed of the self-views that emerge from the reflex-

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226 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

ive activity of self-categorization or identifica-

tion in terms of membership in particular

groups or roles. Thus, although the basis of

self-classification is different in the two theo-

ries (group/category versus role), theorists in

both traditions recognize that individuals view

themselves in terms of meanings imparted by

a structured society (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 1980; Turner et al. 1987). The

bases of identity constitute the first area relat-

ed to linking these two theories.

THE BASES OF IDENTITY

Much of social identity theory deals with

intergroup relations-that is, how people

come to see themselves as members of one group/category (the in-group) in comparison

with another (the out-group), and the conse- quences of this categorization, such as ethno-

centrism (Turner et al. 1987). Here, however,

we address the view of social identity on what

occurs when one becomes an in-group mem-

ber; and later we compare this with the view

of identity theory on what occurs when one

takes on a role.

Having a particular social identity means

being at one with a certain group, being like

others in the group, and seeing things from the

group's perspective.2 In contrast, having a par-

ticular role identity means acting to fulfill the

expectations of the role, coordinating and negotiating interaction with role partners, and

manipulating the environment to control the

resources for which the role has responsibility. Herein lies an important distinction between

group- and role-based identities: the basis of

social identity is in the uniformity of percep-

tion and action among group members, while

the basis of role identity resides in the differ-

ences in perceptions and actions that accom-

pany a role as it relates to counterroles. In group-based identities, the uniformity

of perception reveals itself in several ways (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994). These may be categorized along cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral lines. Social stereotyping is primary among

the cognitive outcomes: researchers have found that stereotyped perceptions of in-

2 Rather than continuing to use the awkward group/category designation, we will generally use the term group.

group members and out-group members are

enhanced and are made more homogeneous

by identification with the in-group (Haslam,

Oakes, McGarty, Turner, Reynolds, and

Eggins 1996). Similarly, others have found strong evidence that group identification

influences the view of the self as prototypical

in the group (Hogg and Hardie 1992). Still others have found that in-group homogene-

ity is especially strong when no motivational

forces exist to distinguish the self from others

within the group (Brewer 1993; Simon,

Pantaleo, and Mummendey 1995).3 Along attitudinal lines, people uniformly

make positive evaluations of a group, when

they become group members. For example,

social identity researchers have found that

individuals who identify with the group feel a

strong attraction to the group as a whole, inde- pendent of individual attachments within the group (Hogg and Hardie 1992). Similarly, oth-

ers have found that in-group identification leads to greater commitment to the group and

to less desire to leave the group, even when the group's status is relatively low (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997).

Finally, people behave in concert within a

group with which they identify. Even in a

low-status minority group, for example, indi-

viduals who use the group label to describe

themselves are more likely than not to partic-

ipate in the group's culture, to distinguish

themselves from the out-group, and to show

attraction to the group in their behavior

(Ethier and Deaux 1994; Ullah 1987). Similarly, groupthink or extreme concur- rence in decision-making groups is much more likely under conditions of high social

identification (Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, and Leve 1992). In addition, social identifica- tion is one of the prime bases for participa- tion in social movements (Simon, Loewy, Stuermer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 1998).

In general, we find uniformity of percep-

tion and action among persons when they take on a group-based identity. This point contrasts somewhat with the consequences

3 Perhaps because of the strong focus on homo- geneity, a social identity theory of intragroup differ- entiation and structure has not yet been developed

(Hains, Hogg, and Duck 1997).

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IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 227

of taking on a role identity. Role identity the-

orists have focused on the match between

the individual meanings of occupying a par-

ticular role and the behaviors that a person

enacts in that role while interacting with -

others (Burke 1980; Burke and Reitzes

1981). This match includes the negotiation of meanings for situations and identities, and

how they fit together to provide a situated

context for interaction. By taking on a role

identity, persons adopt self-meanings and

expectations to accompany the role as it

relates to other roles in the group, and then

act to represent and preserve these meanings

and expectations (Thoits and Virshup 1997). The meanings and expectations vary across persons in the set of roles activated in a

situation.

Early in the development of role identi-

ty theory, McCall and Simmons (1978) dis- cussed the importance of negotiation in

working out the differential performances, relationships, and interconnections of roles

within a group or interaction context. If each role is to function, it must be able to rely on the reciprocity and exchange relation with

other roles. Individuals do not view them- selves as similar to the others with whom

they interact, but as different, with their own

interests, duties, and resources. Each role is

related to, but set apart from, counterroles;

often the interests compete, so that proper role performance can be achieved only

through negotiation.

Evidence of negotiated roles is revealed

in identity research. For example, research

on leadership role identity found that when

individuals could not negotiate differential

leadership performances in a group that ver-

ified their identity, they became less satisfied

with their role and less inclined to remain in

the group (Riley and Burke 1995). Other research found that the different gender

roles in marriage result in different (albeit negotiated) behaviors for men and for women (husbands and wives) (Stets and Burke 1996).4 In later work, Burke and Stets

(1999) showed that when different but inter- related role behaviors and meanings are

4Taking the role of the other seems to move indi- viduals toward the other's identity (Burke and Cast 1997).

negotiated so that role identities are verified,

a strong attachment to the group develops.

Still other research has shown the disruptive

effects that can occur in the family when

fathers begin to take on some of the role

behaviors that traditionally are performed

by mothers (Ellestad and Stets 1998). In group-based identities, only the

actor's perceptions and actions are directly

involved; in role-based identities, other indi-

viduals in the group who occupy counter-

roles are directly involved in the role

performance (Burke 1980; Burke and

Reitzes 1981). In group-based identities, the actor need not interact with group members.

Indeed, the minimal group experiments in social identity theory precluded any interac-

tion (Turner et al. 1987). When most of the actors in a category hold the same percep-

tions, those perceptions are mutually rein- forced, and group formation is the result

(Turner et al. 1987). Acting in unison, howev- er, is the behavioral consequence for individ-

ual members, because they all have the same perceptions.

In role-based identities, some form of interaction and negotiation is usually involved as one performs a role (McCall and Simmons 1978). Relations are reciprocal rather than parallel. Different perspectives

are involved among the persons in the group

as they negotiate and perform their respec-

tive roles, creating micro social structures within the group (Riley and Burke 1995; Stets 1997; Stets and Burke 1996). Thus a role-based identity expresses not the unifor-

mity of perceptions and behaviors that

accompanies a group-based identity, but interconnected uniqueness. The emphasis is not on the similarity with others in the same

role, but on the individuality and interrelat- edness with others in counterroles in the

group or interaction context. By maintaining

the meanings, expectations, and resources associated with a role, role identities main- tain the complex interrelatedness of social structures.

When researchers focus on the different

ways in which people are linked to groups, through social identities and through role identities, they conceptualize groups differ- ently. Social identity theorists regard the group as a collective of similar persons all of

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228 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

whom identify with each other, see them- selves and each other in similar ways, and hold similar views, all in contrast to members of outgroups. Identity theorists regard the group as a set of interrelated individuals, each of whom performs unique but integrat- ed activities, sees things from his or her own perspective, and negotiates the terms of interaction.

The group and the role bases of identity correspond to the organic and mechanical forms of societal integration analyzed by Durkheim ([1893] 1984), which formed the basis of much discussion and theory in soci- ology. People are tied organically to their groups through social identities; they are tied mechanically through their role identities within groups. A full understanding of soci- ety must incorporate both the organic/group and the mechanical/role form because each is only one aspect of society that links to individual identities in separate but related ways.

To illustrate, let us consider the identi- ties of teacher and student. First, teacher and student are roles that are defined with- in the group/organization of a school. Meanings and expectations are tied to each of these roles, regarding performance and the relationships between these roles. At the same time, teacher and student are social categories or groups that constitute (more strongly in some situations than in others) in-groups and out-groups. Here the focus is more on membership than on per- formance, and intergroup issues are promi- nent. Not all roles, however, are tied intimately to gr6ups. For example, the roles of husband and wife within the family are accompanied by meanings and expecta- tions, but the social categories of husband and wife only occasionally constitute an in-group/out-group pair.

Whether one is a teacher or wife, she is at once in a role and in a social category. In focusing on the role, we consider the group (school or family) and the relationships among the different roles within that group; these are intragroup relations. In focusing on the categorical aspect, we look at the group of teachers, for example, in terms of what they have in common in relation to other groups such as students or busi-

nesspersons;5 these are intergroup relations. We point out that one always and simultane- ously occupies a role and belongs to a group, so that role identities and social identities are always and simultaneously relevant to, and influential on, perceptions, affect, and behav- ior.6 For this reason we cannot easily separate role from group, either analytically or empir- ically (Deaux 1992b; Thoits and Virshup 1997). Although it is important to examine how a person categorizes herself or himself as a member of a group, it is also important to observe the role that the person enacts while a member of the group. For example, group belongingness may be a function not only of self-categorization (Hogg and Abrams 1988) but also of assuming a high-status role iin the group.

Not only can we not easily disentangle group identities from role identities; we also cannot easily separate the group and role identity from the person identity. Both social identity theorists and identity theorists have discussed the person identity, but they have largely failed to examine how it might be incorporated into their theories. To establish a general theory of the self, we must under- stand how group, role, and person identities are interrelated.

In social identity theory, the person (or "personal") identity is the lowest level of self-categorization (Brewer 1991; Hogg and Abrams 1988). It is the categorization of the self as a unique entity, distinct from other individuals. The individual acts in terms of his or her own goals and desires rather than as a member of a group or category. The level of identity that is activated (the personal or the social) depends on factors in the situa- tion, such as social comparison or normative fit, which make a group identity operative and override the personal identity.

Deaux (1992a) attempts to link the per- sonal identity to the social identity. She argues that some features of social identities

5Whether one makes the comparison with students or businesspersons depends on the context. This rais- es the issue of salience, which we address later.

6 As we shall see, however, when we focus on one aspect or the other (role or group), certain features become relevant for understanding cognition, emo- tions, and behavior; these features have been empha- sized by one theory or the other, but seldom by both.

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IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 229

are consensually based and will be expressed

along normative lines, whereas other aspects

may be based on personal feelings and values

and will be expressed along those lines. Thus,

idiosyncratic characteristics (one's personal

identities) are added to normative character-

istics of social identities. Although Deaux

indicates that particular personal identities

may be linked to specific social identities, cre-

ating unique ways of expressing membership

in particular groups, she also suggests that

some personal identities may represent a

general view of the self and therefore may

pervade all the membership groups to which

one belongs.

Identity theorists conceptualize the per-

son identity in a manner similar to social identity theorists. The person identity is the

set of meanings that are tied to and sustain

the self as an individual; these self-meanings

operate across various roles and situations in

the same way as Deaux believes that some

person identities pervade all the member-

ship groups to which one belongs (Stets 1995; Stets and Burke 1996). Stets (1995)

attempts to link person identities to role

identities by arguing that the two may be

related through a common system of mean-

ing: the meanings of role identities may over-

lap with the meanings of person identities.

For example, a masculine gender (role) iden- tity is linked to the mastery (person) identity ("I am a competent person") through the shared meaning of control. Therefore, when

one person acts to control another, this

action is peformed in the service of both a

role and a person identity. Stets observes that

when the meaniings and expectations associ- ated with role identities conflict with the

meanings of person identities, individuals may act without regard to the role identities

so as to maintain person identities. Thus,

"while role identities need to be maintained, person identities also need to be maintained. An individual cannot simply be guided by

role identities and have person identities

unaffected by them. Overall, people need to

balance the demands of role identities with

the demands of person identities" (Stets 1995:143).

Person identities penetrate role and

group identities in the same way as role iden-

tities infiltrate group identities. If we can

integrate these different identity bases and

show how they operate simultaneously in a

situation, we can address the degree to which

individuals are constrained by structural

expectations (tied to group and role identi-

ties) or have some choice in their enactment

(through person identities). Further, we can

examine how individuals resolve the distress

that occurs when the meanings tied to differ-

ent identities (group, role, or person) inter-

fere with or contradict one another. Finally,

we can investigate the degree to which some

identities are more malleable than others: for

example, people may be more likely to adjust

their person identities to adapt to situations

than to modify more structurally constrained

role or group identities. We also can ex-plore

the direction of influence of the different

identities. For example, person identities may

influence role and group identities when they

are first taken on. Once a role or group iden-

tity becomes established, however, person

identities may have little impact.

THE ACTIVATION OF IDENTITIES

AND IDENTITY SALIENCE

The second area related to linking identi-

ty theory with social identity pertains to the

activation of identities and the concept of

salience as used in each theory. How and

when do identities become activated in a sit-

uation? Social identity theorists originally

used the term salience to indicate the activa-

tion of an identity in a situation. A salient

social identity was "one which is functioning

psychologically to increase the influence of

one' s membership in that group on percep-

tion and behavior" (Oakes 1987:118). In identity theory, salience has been understood

as the probability that an identity will be acti-

vated in a situation (Stryker 1980). When both definitions are considered in probability terms, it appears that social identity theory

uses only the probabilities of 0 and 1, while identity theory uses the full range of proba-

bilities. We discuss each in turn.

In social identity theory, although a

salient identity is an activated identity, schol- ars have been concerned with understanding what makes a particular social categorization of the self (or other) relevant in a situation. As Oakes (1987) points out, salience is not

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230 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

about attention-grabbing properties of social stimuli, but about the psychological signifi- cance of a group membership. Early work on salience focused on the separateness and the clarity of the categories. This emphasis later was translated into a question about the dis- tinctiveness of social categories. For example, minority status (McGuire, McGuire, Child, and Fujioka 1978) or relative numbers (Abrams, Thomas, and Hogg 1990) might make a category distinctive. In either form, however, this conception of what influences the salience of a social category did not take into account any of the realities of the social context. Those realities were general percep- tual biases; they were not functionally related to the situation nor to the individual's behav- ior, goals, and motives.

Borrowing from Bruner (1957), Oakes (1987) discusses the notion that salience is a product of accessibility and fit. Accessibility is the readiness of a given category to become activated in the person. It is a func- tion of the person's current tasks and goals, and of the likelihood that certain objects or events will occur in the situation. As an exam- ple, Oakes states that the "taxi" category is accessible if one is in a hurry to get some- where (goal) and if a taxi stand is nearby (sit- uational object).7 Fit is the congruence between the stored category specifications and perceptions of the situation. Fit has both comparative and normative aspects. A social category has comparative fit when an individ- ual perceives within-group differences to be less than between-group differences (the meta-contrast principle) (Turner et al. 1987). A social category has normative fit when an individual perceives that the content of the category is defined along stereotypical, nor- mative lines as held in the culture.

It is assumed that social groups are real for individuals who identify with these groups to accomplish particular personal and social goals. Oakes's extension thus makes salience more than a cognitive-perceptual feature; it is also tied to the social requirements of the situ- ation, and results from an interaction between individual and situational characteristics. The activation of an identity in a situation allows

7The source of an individual's goals and purposes has generally not been considered.

individuals to accomplish their personal and/or social goals. It seems ironic, however, that despite the focus on the activation of a group identity, the source of such activation is left to individual and situational variability and apparently does not depend on social structural characteristics.

In identity theory, scholars have been concerned more about understanding the effect of persons' positions in the social struc- ture on the likelihood that those persons will activate one identity rather than another, and less about the impact of the particular situa- tion on that process. In connection with this concern, the idea of commitment to an iden- tity was introduced into identity theory. Commitment has two aspects (Stryker,and Serpe 1982, 1994). The first is quantitative- the number of persons to whom one is tied through an identity. The more persons one is tied to by holding an identity (i.e., the greater the embeddedness of the identity in the social structure), the more likely it is that the identity will be activated in a situation. In brief, the stronger the commitment, the greater the salience. The second component of commitment is qualitative-the relative strength or depth of the ties to others. Stronger ties to others through an identity lead to a more salient identity. When salience is made to focus on its probabilistic nature, it becomes a characteristic of the identity, not of the situation.

Employing this view, identity theorists distinguish between the probability that an identity will be activated (salience) and that an identity actually will be played out in a sit- uation (activation). In contrast, social identi- ty theorists have tended to merge the concepts of activation and salience, and to equate them. By separating activation from salience, identity theorists can investigate factors such as context (for example, the exis- tence of an appropriate role partner), which activate an identity in the situation, separate- ly from factors such as commitment, which influence the probability that an identity will be played out across situations.

In another way as well, social identity theorists and identity theorists have differed in their views of salience. In identity theory, salience has often been discussed in a relative way: two or more different identities have

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IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 231

been examined in light of the different social

structural positions held by an individual and

the possible impact of each on that person's

performance (Thoits 1983, 1986, 1992). This

notion, known as a salience hierarchy,

addresses which role a person will enact in a

situation when more than one role may be

appropriate (Stryker 1968).

Stryker also goes beyond the immediate

situation by hypothesizing that people will

seek out opportunities to enact a highly

salient identity. Thus it is not a matter of an

identity being activated by a situation, but

rather of a person invoking an identity in a

situation and thereby creating a new situa-

tion. For example, Stryker and Serpe (1987)

found that first-year college students tended

to decorate their rooms in the same fashion

as they had done at home, thus reminding

themselves and others of their identity. This

agentive character of an identity has always

been prominent in identity theory (McCall

and Simmons 1978; Tsushima and Burke

1999). The identities at the top of the salience hierarchy are more likely to be activated

independent of situational cues. When acti-

vated, they act on the situation to accomplish

self-verification; in the process they create a new situation.

In social identity theory, identities also

are considered in a relative way because dif-

ferent identities are organized in a hierarchy

of inclusiveness. Three levels are generically involved: a superordinate level such as

"human," an intermediate level such as

"American," and a subordinate level such as

"southerner." The levels are floating and

contextual, and depend on the salience of the

different classifications (Turner et al. 1987). At the lowest level, for example, an individ-

ual may see herself as a member of a sorori-

ty executive board, in contrast to other

members of the sorority. At the next higher level she may see herself as a sorority mem-

ber, in contrast to other sororities in the uni-

versity. At a still higher level she may see

herself as at the "University of X," in con-

trast to students from another university in a

particular community or state. Different identities become active as the situation

changes and as relevant stimuli for self-cate-

gorization change.

In social identity theory, salience per-

tains to the situational activation of an iden-

tity at a particular level. A particular identity

becomes activated/salient as a function of

the interaction between the characteristics of

the perceiver (accessibility) and of the situa- tion (fit). There has been little or no discus- sion about identities' creating or modifying

situations so as to guide behavior.

Although these two theories have viewed

salience in different ways, the different ways are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they may

complement each other. Identity theory

focuses on social structural arrangements and

the link between persons; social identity theo-

ry focuses on characteristics of situations in

which the identity may be activated; both.the- ories acknowledge the importance of the indi-

vidual's goals and purposes. Thus an

understanding of the conditions for the prob- ability of and the actual activation of an iden- tity can be found. Both theories agree that an

identity has no effect without activation. To

examine the likelihood that an identity will be activated across many situations, researchers must consider factors such as the fit of the

identity to the situation (the stimuli present in the situation that fit the characteristics of the identity), which has been emphasized in social identity theory, as well as the individ- ual's structural embeddedness or commit-

ment, as emphasized by identity theory.

COGNITIVE AND MOTIVATIONAL

PROCESSES

The third area related to merging identi-

ty theory with social identity theory involves core processes identified in each of the theo- ries. The central cognitive process in social

identity theory is depersonalization, or seeing

the self as an embodiment of the in-group prototype (a cognitive representation of the social category containing the meanings and norms that the person associates with the

social category; Hogg et al. 1995) rather than as a unique individual (Turner et al. 1987).8 Activation of a social identity is sufficient to result in depersonalization. In this process, the person perceives normative aspects of

8 Depersonalization also denotes seeing the other as an embodiment of the out-group prototype.

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232 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

group membership in the prototype and then

acts in accordance with those norms (Reicher 1987, 1996; Terry and Hogg 1996). Depersonalization is the basic process under-

lying group phenomena such as social stereo-

typing, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, cooperation and altruism, emotional conta- gion, and collective action (Turner et al. 1987).

Similar to depersonalization in social

identity theory, a central cognitive process in identity theory is self-verification, or seeing the self in terms of the role as embodied in the identity standard (the cognitive represen- tation of a role containing the meanings and norms that the person associates with the

role; Burke 1991; McCall and Simmons

1978). When an identity is activated, self-ver- ification occurs. In this process, the person

behaves so as to maintain consistency with the identity standard (Burke 1991; Swann 1983). Self-verification underlies behavioral processes such as roletaking, rolemaking, and

group formation as the person acts to portray the identity (Burke and Cast 1997; Burke and Stets 1999; Turner 1962).

The processes of depersonalization and

self-verification show us that membership in any social group or role includes two impor- tant aspects: one's identification with a cate-

gory (emphasized more strongly in the depersonalization process), and the behav- iors that we associate with the category (underscored more strongly in self-verifica- tion). Both identification with a social cate- gory and role behavior refer to and reaffirm social structural arrangements. People know the structural categories and relationships, and act in accordance with that knowledge. When we identity with the social categories that structure society, and when we behave

according to the expectations tied to our identification, we are acting in the context of, referring to, and reaffirming social structure

(Thoits and Virshup 1997). In this way, a com- bination of the two theories would recognize that the self both exists within society, and is influenced by society, because socially defined shared meanings are incorporated into one's prototype or identity standard. In addition, it would recognize that the self influences society, because individual agents act by changing social arrangements to bring

the self into line with the abstract proto-

type/identity standard (Freese and Burke 1994; Hogg, et al. 1995; Stryker 1980).

In regard to the motivational underpin-

nings of an identity, social identity theory

holds that when a group identity is activated,

people behave so as to enhance the evalua-

tion of the in-group relative to the out-group

and thereby to enhance their own self-evalu- ation as group members (Turner et al. 1987). This process is the maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem. The self-esteem

motive initially was thought to be the basis of

in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism as well as of hostility toward the out-group.

Although this idea was central to the initial formulation and development of social iden- tity theory (Abrams 1992), it has received mixed empirical support and thus has been downplayed in more recent work (Abrams 1992; Abrams and Hogg 1990).9

As a substitute for the self-esteem

motive, other motives have been suggested, including a collective self-esteem motive (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990), a self-knowl- edge motive, a self-consistency motive, a self- efficacy motive, (Abrams and Hogg 1990), an uncertainty reduction motive (Hogg and Mullin 1999), and a self-regulation motive (Abrams 1992, 1994). Any of these motives can be brought into play when the identity is activated and depersonalization occurs. With

respect to the self-regulation motive, for

example, Abrams argues that when a social identity is salient (activated) and attended to, responses are deliberate and self-regulated. Group members act to match their behavior

to the standards relevant to the social identi-

ty, so as to confirm and enhance their social

identification with the group. All of these suggestions are new; as Hogg and Abrams (1988) suggest, more research is needed to examine the efficacy of each in the context of

social identity theory.

In earlier formulations of identity theory, motivation was tied to commitment and

salience. The greater the commitment to an identity and the greater the salience of the

identity, the more effort would be put into enacting the identity (Stryker 1980; Stryker

9 Below we suggest an alternative formulation of the sources of self-esteem in social identification.

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IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 233

and Serpe 1982). Self-esteem was implicated

as a motivator: insofar as an individual had a salient role identity, the evaluation of his or

her performance would influence feelings of

self-esteem (Stryker 1980). If the role was evaluated positively, the person's self-esteem

would be higher (Hoelter 1986); if the person performed well in the role, he or she would

feel good, given the appraisals by others and

their approval (Franks and Marolla 1976). Self-efficacy also was implicated as a motiva-

tor, however: a person who performed well in

a role gained a sense of control over the envi- ronment (Franks and Marolla 1976; Gecas

and Schwalbe 1983). These ideas are con-

firmed in recent research in identity theory,

showing that self-esteem and self-efficacy are

increased by the self-verification which

occurs through performing a role well

(Burke and Stets 1999). Recent extensions of identity theory

have added consideration of the internal

dynamics of identity processes and have included motivational elements of self-con-

sistency and self-regulation (Burke 1991; Burke and Stets 1999; Stets 1997). Similar to the mechanisms underlying perceptual con-

trol theory (Powers 1973), affect control the- ory (Heise 1979), self-verification theory (Swann 1983), and self-discrepancy theory (Higgins 1989) is the idea that people act to keep perceptions of themselves in the situa-

tion consistent with their identity standard.

They take actions to modify the situation so that perceptions of the self are consistent

with the standard in spite of situational dis-

turbances caused by others, prior actions of

the self, or other situational influences

(Burke and Stets 1999). As long as the identity is activated, the

process described above is constant and

ongoing, linking the individual to the situa-

tion, and it has been viewed as part of the

self-verification process (Burke and Stets 1999; Swann 1983). Two different manifesta- tions of self-verification exist. First, when dis-

turbances change the situation such that individuals perceive situated self-meanings

and expectations of themselves as different from their identity standard, they act to coun-

teract the disturbance. Second, when no dis- turbances occur, individuals act consistently with the meanings held in their standards.

We argue that identities referring to groups or roles are motivated by self-esteem,

self-efficacy, self-consistency, and self-regula-

tion. Indeed, recent research in social identity

theory and in identity theory appears to be

moving in common directions: both are con-

sidering multiple motives that lead one to act

in keeping with that which most clearly rep-

resents the group or role. In considering mul-

tiple sources of motivation, we may find, for

example, that the self-esteem motive is tied

more closely to identification or membership

in groups, while self-efficacy is associated

more closely with the behavioral enactment

of identities. Individuals may categorize

themselves in particular ways (in a group or a role) not only to fulfill the need to feel valu-

able and worthy (the self-esteem motive) but also to feel competent and effective (the self- efficacy motive) (Cast, Stets, and Burke 1999; Stets 1997).

The increase in self-worth that accompa-

nies a group-based identity, however, may

come not simply from the act of identifying

with the group, but from the group's accep-

tance of the individual as a member (Ellison 1993). This point may partially explain the mixed support for self-esteem effects in

social identity theory (Abrams 1992; Abrams and Hogg 1990). A social identity based on membership in an abstract category may not

yield the support and acceptance provided by a social identity based on membership in an actual group of interacting persons. The strongest confirmation that one is a group member may come from acceptance by oth-

ers in the group. Further, enhancement of

one's self-worth through group membership

may involve acting so as to promote accep- tance through appropriate behavioral enact- ments; such behavior has implications for

fulfilling the need to feel competent.

CONCLUSIONS

We began with an assertion that identity theory and social identity theory possess similarities that make the linking of the two theories worth consideration. Such a merger

would prevent redundancies in separate the- ories and would be a basis for establishing a

general theory of the self. To this end we have considered three areas of central concern: the

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234 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

different bases of identity (group, role, per- son), the different foci in examining activa- tion and salience of an identity, and the cognitive and motivational underpinnings of the two theories.

In spite of their differences in origins as well as in language, orientation, and cover- age, the two theories have much in common. In most instances, the differences are a mat- ter of emphasis rather than kind. For the most part, the differences originated in a view of the group as the basis for identity (who one is) held by social identity theory and in a view of the role as a basis for identi- ty (what one does) held by identity theory (Thoits and Virshup 1997). We suggest that being and doing are both central features of one's identity. A complete theory of the self would consider both the role and the group bases of identity as well as identities based in the person that provide stability across groups, roles, and situations.

We think that a merger of identity theory with social identity theory will yield a stronger social psychology that can attend to macro-, meso-, and micro-level social processes. Such a theory would address agency and reflection, doing and being, behaviors and perceptions as central aspects of the self. It also would provide a stronger integration of the concepts of the group, the role, and the person. At the macro-level, for example, we might want to examine whether participation in social movements increases as one identifies with the group, is committed to the role identities within the group in com- parison with other identities one claims, and sees the group as corresponding closely to the important dimensions along which one defines oneself. In other words, participation may be highest when individuals are linked at all three levels of abstraction (the group, the role, and the person).

At the mesolevel, we might want to study inter- and intragroup relations. The different roles that one assumes in a group may increase or reduce identification with the group, depending on (for example) power and status. In addition, the roles defined as more important to the group may influence hostility toward out-group members more strongly than do roles defined as less impor- tant to the group.

At the microlevel, an analysis of the group, the role, and the person may help us to understand more clearly such motivational processes as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and authenticity. It is possible that people largely feel good about themselves when they associ- ate with particular groups, typically feel con- fident about themselves when enacting particular roles, and generally feel that they are "real" or authentic when their person identities are verified.

Yet, although the group, role, and person

identities provide different sources of mean- ing, it is also likely that these different identi- ties overlap. Sometimes they may reinforce who one is; at other times they may constrain the self. The conditions under which each occurs are important topics for future research.

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Jan E. Stets is Associate Professor of Sociology at Washington State University. She is currently

using recent developments in identity theory to study people's emotional reactions to (in)justice in a series of lab experiments (NSF SES-9904215). Recent publications include "Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification" (with Peter A Burke) in Social Psychology Quarterly and "Does the Self Conform to the Views of Others?" (with Alicia D. Cast and Peter J. Burke) in Social Psychology Quarterly.

Peter J. Burke is Professor and Research Scientist at Washington State University and Chair of

the ASA Social Psychology Section. His current work extends identity theory into areas of emo- tion, group relations, and social learning. Recent publications include "Where Forward-looking and Backward-looking Models Meet" (with L. Gray) in Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, "Levels, Agency, and Control in the Parent Identity" (with T Tsushima) in Social Psychology Quarterly, 1999, and "Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification (with J. Stets) in Social Psychology Quarterly, 1999.

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