COURSE MATERIAL REVIEW 2
~H-M Functionalism Ernst B. Haas
Ernst B. Haas was Robson Professor of Government Emeritus at the University of California-Berkeley.
The Semantics of Functionalism
Functionalists, in the specific sense of the term, are interested in identifying those aspects of human needs and desires that exist and clamor for attention outside the realm of the political. They believe in the possibility of specifying technical and "non~ controversial'' aspects of governmental conduct, and of weaving an ever~spreading web of international institutional relationships on the basis of meeting such needs. They would concentrate on commonly experienced needs initially, expecting the circle of the non~controversial to expand at the expense of the political, as practical cooperation became coter- minous with the totality of interstate relations. At that point a true world community will have arisen.
The philosophical reasoning underlying this program does not at the moment concern us. What matters is the notion of function: it is, according to the explicit intent of the Functionalist writers, equivalent in meaning to "organizational task." The function of the Food and Agriculture Organization is to increase agricultural productivity and the world food supply; the function of the Universal Postal Union is to speed the world's mail; the function of the International Labor Organization is to raise and equalize the living standards of workers throughout the world. Apparently, there are no half-hidden relationships to systems and models, no intended or unintended con- sequences: function means task. Functionalism, then, becomes both an analytical tool for criticizing the deplorable present and an ideological prescription for ushering in a better future. The question next arises: Is it possible to reformulate the sociologist's notion of functionaism, to strip it of its ambiguities, so that a
punfied version can then be applied to the study of international institutions?
Certain awkward questions had best be faced at the outset. Does not the Functionalist notion of function also carry the connotation of cognitively perceived need on the part of the actor, leading to the creation of an organizational task designed to meet the need? If so, cannot the implementation of the task carry with it consequences not planned or intended by the actor, which may then somehow transform both the organi- zation and the actor's initial perceptions? The task may be carried out to fulfill the initial need, but once imple- mented, it may create an entirely new situation, setting up novel relationships affecting the total context in which action takes place. In that event, has the notion of function not been linked again, however involuni tarily, to a system of some kind?
This complication may be illustrated by two state- ments from the leading contemporary Functionalist writer, David Mitrany: "The truth is that by its very nature the constitutional approach [to world peace and uniry] emphasizes the individual index of power; the functional approach emphasizes the common index of need." 1 And again: "[The functional approach] ... should help shift the emphasis from political issues which divide to those social issues in which the interest of the peoples 1s plainly akin and collective; to shift the emphasis from power to prob- lem and purpose." 2 Now "function" acquires the meanings of need and purpose, in addition to task. "Task" could be considered merely to imply the legal mandate imposed on an organization, or the program that exists in the minds of its officers and executives. But "need" is a more general notion, a concept with vague societal implications, and hence a concept that
Beyond the Na/Um-State, Chapter 1, Stanford Unive.rsity Press, 1964, pp. 3-25.
246
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relates the organization to its environment. If ''pur, pose" refers merely to the task as explicitly conceived by the executive of the organization, we have noter, minological or operational problem; but if it is thought to relate to the more general notion of need, the problem of operationalization does arise. Do we look for the impulse generating organizational action in the organization itself or in the environmental forces? As soon as some structured relationship between organization and environment is postulated, as soon as ''task" ceases to be some simple practical objective in the mind of a manager, we are faced with the notion of system.
Whether we wish it or not, such an orientation involves us in political theory, the theory of analyzing and prescribing for the international society. This prescriptive intent is central to Functionalist theory: the Functionalists claim to possess a theoretical appa~ ratus capable of analyzing existing society and of pin- pointing the causes of its undesirable aspectsi they claim, further, to know the way in which a norma~ tively superior state of affairs can be created. Such, however, is not my theoretical intent. To quote Nadel, I am interested in functional theory as "a body of propositions (still interconnected) which serve to map out the problem area and thus prepare the ground for its empirical investigation by appropriate methods. More precisely, the propositions serve to classify phenomena, to analyze them into relevant units or indicate their interconnections, and to define 'rules of procedure' and 'schemes of interpreta~ tion.' 'Theory' here equals conceptual scheme or logical framework. 3 Thus armed, let us leave the semantic aspect and address ourselves to the recon~ ciliation of Functionalism and functionalism.
International Functionalism as Reformist Ideology
Functionalism has no single prophet, no scriptures, and no dogma. As an ideology seeking to reform the form and substance of international life it has had a variety of spokesmen since the 1870's. But far from constituting a coherent body of militants, these people are united only by a vague and shifting
Haas Functionalism 247
syndrome of common attitudes and propositions: in fact, it is of the essence of Functionali.sm to avoid rigidity and dogma. Those qualifying to be called Functionalist have been considered to include Paul S. Reinsch, Leonard Woolf, G. D. H. Cole, H. R. G. Greaves, Pitman Potter, Edgar Saveney, and a host of lesser-known writers preparing blueprints for the brave new world that was to arise at the end of World War II. The chief exponent of Functionalism, how- ever, is undoubtedly David Mitrany; yet it should be borne in mind that no one work of his contains the Functionalist gospel, but that the component parts are to be found scattered in books, articles, and speeches. Nor do all Functionalists agree on all points or maintain consistency in their emphases over a gen~ eration of writing. Aspects of the Functionalist argu~ ment singled out by me as crucial have not necessarily been so treated by all Functionalist writers. Yet when I was convinced that a proposition was imphcit in the Functionalist case, even though not necessarily given prominence by an author, I have felt free to incorpo- rate it in the mainstream of the argument.
My summary will be as eclectic as the Functionalist approach, though not inaccurate, I trust. It will take up, in turn, the Functionalists' view of the human condition, their criticism of the nation~state in relation to individual fulfillment and international conflict, their theory of change, and their program of reform.
Guild Socialism and Pluralism furnished the criteria for diagnosing the human condition. Man is by nature good, rational, and devoted to the common weal; when society is organized so as to bring out man's tendency to mobilize his energies for the general welfare, the forces of peace and harmony rule. This happy state of affairs is approximated whenever a maximum of authority is exercised by technicians and administrators dedicated to the common weal, working in close conjunction with the voluntary professional groups that form part of any modern industrial society. But, cautions Mitrany, "In all societies there are both harmonies and disharmonies. It is largely within our choice which we pick out and further .... We must begin anew, therefore, with a clear sense that the nations
248 Chapter ID International Integration
can be bound together into a world community only if we link them up by what unites, not by what divides. '14
Disharmonies and conflict prevail in a society in which authority is exercised by politicians rather than technicians, by parliaments rather than voluntary groups. Power, instead of the common good, then determines policy, and irrational behavior follows. Like Saint-Simon and Lenin, the Functionalist would hold that the human condition will improve only when "the government of men" is replaced by "the administration of things"; but whereas the Liberal will assume merely a quantitative distinction between politics and administration and recognize their mutual dependencies, the Functionalist will insist on a rigorous qualitative difference. Politics is identified with the pursuit of power and with residual infantile behavior traits, and technical management with a mature mind and a healthy society. 5 Preaching the administration and construction of the common good is itself part of the therapy for a disharmonious soci- ety. This is all the more urgent because technological and industrial progress makes the attainment of the general welfare an immediately realizable goal. A healthy society would control the forces of progress for the benefit of mankind; a power-oriented society would let the opportunity escape. When men's loyal- ties are penned up within the territorial confines of the exclusivist nation-state, there is little hope of working for the general welfare. However, these loy- alties, once freed from the shackles of national inse- curity and allowed to identify with humanity at large, will achieve the true common good.
This diagnosis brings into focus the distorting role of the modern state with respect to the possibil- ities of human fulfillment. Here again the Guild Socialist heritage of the Functionalist approach is manifest. Pre-industrial and pre-national primary occupational groups were the true focuses for human happiness because they afforded a sense of participa- tion in the solution of practical problems. The rise of the territorially bounded, omnicompetent national state changed all that. Group spontaneity was lost, the tendency of man to identify with his occupational colleague elsewhere was choked off,
the search for national security became the focus of life in the state. Even the administration of general welfare measures, such as social security legislation, took place within the depersonalized context of the state structure. The unnatural state took the place of natural society, a fact that was merely codified by the rules of nineteenth-century international law. According to Mitrany, "Our social activities are cut off arbitrarily at the limit of the state and, if at all, are allowed to be linked to the same activities across the border only by means of uncertain and cramping political ligatures. "6
Lack of fulfillment, of course, is closely linked to the element of human and group creativity. For the Functionalist a cooperative national effort aiming only at the negative goal of security is uncreative. So is the minimal program of assuring law and order. True creativity must be tied to the positive goals identified with the modem service state, "an instru- ment of life and not merely an order. "7 The definition of new rights flowing from an expanding welfare concept is a creative task still possible to the state, provided it once again makes available to voluntary groups channels of creative participation. Hence the recurrence of the terms "work" and "working" in the Functionalist vocabulary. Creative work aims at a general good that normally tends to be obscured by centralization, power-drives, and uncreative preoccu- pation with force and national military security.
As long as the state remains unreformed with respect to human fulfillment internally, its interna~ tional role will hardly be more reassuring. While the Functionalist is interested in peace, of course, he stresses the elements of creativity and work, of replacing the negatively political in international affairs with the positively functional:
The task that is facing us is how to build up the reality of a common interest in peace .... Not a peace that would keep the nations quietly apart, but a peace that would bring them actively together; not the old static and strategi.c view of peace, but a social view of it . ... We must put our faith not in a protected but in a working peace; it would indeed be nothing more nor less than the idea and aspiration of social security taken in its widest range.
This passage rains the ess the negative rive successo security, of 1 ences of pa1 tional attem It is so mud reintroducti tional group functioning cared to well agreement, t cal implicat peace-makin and foremos joint manag ment, comr dards, and p, not only of• but of remo· national ins1
But at ti sharply distil the "one wo1 on social am future interr nition that . are more rec domestic ha commonasi: unite them· same would conflict hea than an ind are merely t solutions th1 institutions exacerbated
Internat ing the w, experts, tee association than powe agreement
This passage from Mitrany bears rereading: it con- tains the essence of the Functionalist diagnosis of the negative existing order and the germ for its posi- tive successor. The peace of statesmen, of collective security, of disarmament negotiations, of confer- ences of parliamentarians, of sweeping constitu- tional attempts at federation, all this is uncreative. It is so much power instead of creative work. The reintroduction of man, united in natural occupa- tional groupings that ignore territorial boundaries, functioning through voluntary associations dedi- cated to welfare measures on which there is general agreement, this is the creative solution. The practi- cal implication, naturally enough, is that working peace-making efforts should address themselves first and foremost to economic and social reform: to the joint management of scarce resources, unemploy- ment, commodity price fluctuations, labor stan- dards, and public health. This would have the result not only of correcting the faults of existing society, but of removing economic causes of war and inter- national insecuirty.
But at this point Functionalist thought must be sharply distinguished from simple internationalism of the "one world" variety. The Functionalists' emphasis on social and economic primacy in the elements of a future international order is combined with a recog- nition that group loyalty and national attachments are more real than vague international good will. If domestic harmony can be mobilized by engaging the common aspirations of men with respect to tasks that unite them-welfare rather than order-then the same would be true internationally. By tackling global conflict head-on, a direct political approach rather than an indirect welfare one, existing nationalisms are merely triggered into explosive action; in seeking solutions through political international gestures and institutions, man's remoteness from modern life is exacerbated.
International conflict is best tamed by entrust- ing the work of increasing human welfare to experts, technical specialists, and their professional associations. Beirig interested in tasks rather than power, they can be expected to achieve agreement where statesmen will fail. They will be
Haas Functionalism 249
unconcerned with "rightful" authorities and jurisdictions; rightful ends, proper functions to be performed, are their concern. Further, conflict is simply side stepped if the territorial principle of representation is abandoned. Tasks will be entrusted to agencies possessing functional jurisdic- tion, i.e. concerning themselves with a specific welfare task; they will be staffed by specialists free from territorial referents. A supreme political authority would be as impossible as it is unneces- sary. An ever-widening mesh of task-oriented welfare agencies would come to pre-empt the work now done by some governments, leading eventually to the creation of a universal welfare orientation. Since men in many nations already share certain welfare aims, this process could be set in motion without involving political sources of friction, thus sidestepping the still blazing national loyalties. "National problems would then appear, and would be treated, as what they are, the local segments of general problems. "8
Naturally, existing international organizations devoted to welfare measures could be used for this purpose. If they also feature the principle of func- tional representation, they become ideal candidates in the indirect approach to community-building. It is for this reason that the International Labour Organization is of particular importance in Functionalist thought. 9 And so, among nations as well as within each, conflict resolution and negative problems of law and order might eventually become no more than an aspect of politics, falling "to a subordinate place in the scheme of international things, while we would tum to what are the real tasks of our common society-the conquest of poverty and of disease and of ignorance." 10
The reform of the state and of interstate rela- tions in the direction of human welfare can bring with it a new type of world only if the Functionalist is able to indicate how the new world will supersede the old: if he has an explicit or implicit theory of change. To this problem we must now turn-not an easy subject for investigation, since.on this vital theoretical (rather than ideological) issue the Functionalist theses are somewhat vague.
250 Chapter 10 International Integration
Put in the starkest and most abstract terms, the theory of change seems to be a purely systemic one. If the nations take full advantage of what, initially, are merely converging technical interests, eventually these interests will become fused. "In the end," wrote one early Functionalist, "the nations would find themselves federated, after a fashion, by the very force of things, " 11 This choice of words suggests an automatic process of change once the initial carving out of converging task contexts has taken place. Further, there is a dialectical quality to the automaticity. Since the Functionalist admits that national loyalties are too powerful to be over~ come merely by appealing to the symbols of One World, he also stresses that world government cannot come into existence until the sentiment of world community has come to flourish. Such a feel- ing, however, can evolve only gradually on the basis of joint tasks of equal interest to all. Thus, the thesis of national exclusiveness can be outflanked by the antithesis of creative work dedicated to welfare, yielding the eventual synthesis of world community. To cap off this conception it must be stressed that the Functionalist not only assumes an automatic and dialectical process of change, but puts his faith into action rather than advance planning of neces~ sary steps, action as creative endeavor and as an index of the degree to which the dialectic "force of things" has gotten the better of the status quo: "Promissory Covenants and Charters may remain a headstone to unfulfilled good intentions, but the functional way is action itself, and therefore an inescapable test of where we stand and how far we are willmg to go in building up a new international sociery."12
In other contexts, however, a more human notion of change emerges in the Functionalist literature, resulting in a doctrine of attitudinal reorientation on the basis of "learning." A necessary presupposition is the distinction between "technical" and "political"
modes of thought. Change can be introduced by maximizing the responsibility of the expert and the manager: he is committed to performing his task for the benefit of all; conversely, he is indifferent to representing specific (power~infused?) interests. Functional agencies, suggests Mitrany, might be based on "equality in nonrepresentation."* The differentia~ tion seems to be the Rousseauan one between the General Will and the Will of All: the manager stands for the General Will, whereas the politician repre- sents merely the Will of All, i.e. the interests of his constituents, which are by definition selfish and therefore not necessarily geared to transforming the system. The General Will is strengthened by isolating an ever larger slice (Mitrany often refers to "layers of action and of peace") of technical matters, which will be administered so as to extend the range of the technical still further.
Yet the problem remains: Do people "learn" to think in non~national terms merely because of a pattern of technical cooperation? This is indeed the central issue in the Functionalist theory of change. At first, it seems to be only the experts and managers who learn. They become habituated to consulting with their opposite n~mbers from other nations about technical problems, and eventually they come to see all problems from the perspective of mankind as a whole. Thus the answer to maximiz~ ing the learning process lies in extending the range of participation in practical problem~solving. In the end, others besides experts, managers, and civil servants will participate and undergo the same process, particularly by way of greatly increased work and responsibiliry on the part of international voluntary groups. Leaming becomes a species of group therapy. 13
The practical Functionalist program is implied in its theoretical position. Instead of attacking nation~ alism and sovereignty frontally, the Functionalist aims at solving these problems by simply ignoring
*As quoted in Engle, p. 85. In private correspondence with me (1963 ), Mitrany seems to disassociate himself from this formulation. He now grants that central guidance would have to be given by a government, a provision that would obviate an ultimate clash between the political and the technical principles of action. He denies any affinity with the syndicalist strains of thought apparent in my summary of Functtonalism.
them and rel, process for e defeating, th, institutions c service, admit by technical e participation job. The resul sentiment, fol thing Mitran~ ments." The n develop natun came to be fc agencies rathe 1 international professional an building blod We cannot in Functional pr reliance predo expectation of made up prima and the assum1 certain dynamh tution-buildine are at work-cc functionalist the
Functionali: Two Case S
In principle, an) of international material for it Functionalist id{ ideology to whi, many of these ca basis. Here our attempting a crit the growth of "l specific cases, see of experts and dir between power aspirations. A sui:
them and relying on systemic forces and a learning process for eventually transcending, rather than defeating, the old order. An increasing number of institutions of global scope dedicated to social service, administered for the benefit of all, manned by technical experts, and supported by the voluntary participation of non-political groups would do the job. The result would be first a world community of sentiment, followed by a world government, some- thing Mitrany once called "federalism by install- ments." The necessary loyalties of sentiment would develop naturally as people's expectations gradually came to be focused on these new social welfare agencies rather than on the present nations. Existing international bodies consisting of like-minded professional and occupational groups provide logical building blocks for the new structure of society. We cannot improve on Engle's summary of the Functional program: "These three features-a reliance predominantly upon functional units, an expectation of an eventual system of government made up primarily of interlocking functional units, and the assumption that in functional cooperation certain dynamic behavioral mechanisms of an 'insti- tution-building' and a 'consensus-building' nature are at work-constitute, then, the ideal rype of the functionalist theory at the international level." 14
Functionalist Ideology And History: Two Case Studies
In principle, any of the myriad "technical" activities of international organizations provide the case study material for investigating the validity of the Functionalist ideology. For the reformulation of this ideology to which we proceed in the next chapter, many of these cases did in fact furnish the historical basis. Here our purpose is more modest. Withou·t attempting a critique of the ideology we shall review the growth of "functional" preoccupations in two specific cases, seeking to highlight, first the rival roles of experts and diplomats, and, second, the distinction between power-infused and welfare-dominated aspirations. A superficial view of these cases may well
Haas Functionalism 251
suggest that the Functional perspective is remarkably accurate, and the ideology firmly grounded in historical experience; a second view, however, shows that extensive reformulation is needed.
Our first case deals with the growth of interna- tional measures for the control of contagious diseases, beginning with the pioneering health conferences of the nineteenth centuty and ending with establish- ment of the World Health Organization. What were the chief issues? All European governments seemed agreed that the Moslem pilgrim traffic was responsible for the recurrent plague and cholera epidemics that threatened the world but here agreement ended. The medical profession was divided into two major schools of thought: those who held that these diseases were spread by contagion, and those who felt that they orig- inated in unsanitary atmospheric, housing, sewerage, and food conditions. The profession was further divided in its evaluation of the effectiveness of quar- antine, with the environmentalists generally arguing that the isolation of patients and infected vessels was of no avail. Finally, there was dispute on where cholera in particular, originated. Most medical people were convinced that it was in Bengal, but British physicians tended to deny this. Let us note two salient features: the experts were sharply divided on the tech- nical issues involved, and the respective technical positions that they embraced corresponded srrikingly with the political positions espoused by their govern- ments. All the major maritime nations, notably Britain, defended the environmentalist position, ridiculed quarantine, and continually stressed the hardships that international quarantine regulations would impose on commerce and shipping! Britain refused to initiate quarantine measure to isolate Mecca-bound pilgrims in the Egyptian facilities over which she assumed control after 1881.15 Tutkey denied that environmental condition in territories under her sway contributed to disease conditions. Persia denied the efficacy of quarantines. The British medical profession even opposed the creation of an expert commission to study the diffusion of epidemics.
Between 1850 and 1903 no less than nine inter- national conferences were convened to arrive at common measures to deal with these diseases. They
252 Chapter 10 International Integration
were attended by national delegations composed either entirely of medical men or of, medical men assisted by lay delegates. Although the lay delegates made constant efforts to persuade the medical men to compromise the rival views of contagionists and environmentalists, progress was very slow. Some headway was made after several severe outbreaks of cholera and plague during the half-century, but until the 1890's the conventions for quarantines, ship inspections, bills of health, and expert studies were so poorly ratified and implemented by the partici- pating states that even so "non-controversial" a field as public health showed all the marks of major polit- ical conflict. Apparently it was the severe epidemics of 1893 and 1897 that eventually brought ;uccess. By joining the two rival medical views, the major maritime powers were able to come to terms: they agreed to reinstitute quarantines, disinfect ships, impose standardized inspection of vessels, and notify all other governments when cases of plague were discovered. Turkey and Persia, despite their objec- tion to these measures as infringing the rights of Moslems, were compelled to ratify. The edifice was completed in 1907 with the creation of the International Office of Public Health, which was entrusted with the task of conducting scientific studies, carrying out epidemiological intelligence, and suggesting to member states new control devices as the older ones proved inadequate. However, the jurisdiction of the Office was limited to the five major contagious diseases.
The record is far from "proving" whether extended contacts among medical experts were the factor that caused eventual success. It certainly took a long time for the pure welfare component of the health activities to be recognized. But it seems clear that the interest of all in common action and rules was directly influenced by the dangers posed by given epidemics. Once the breakthrough had been scored, so to speak, international health efforts were not only sustained but intensified. The League of Nations created a new health organization staffed entirely by uninstructed experts, which carried out the same activities as the International Office for diseases not covered by the Office, as well as
initiating the first international technical assistance operations by training national public health officials and encouraging them to keep in touch with each other. From then on the deliberate, expert-dominated standardization of national public health regulations proceeded quite smoothly. Goodman, for one, attributes this new measure of agreement to constantly growing medical knowl- edge. As inoculations and uniformly administered health certificates took the place of cruder inspec- tions and quarantines, the commercial and political sting was taken out of the ''function." But does this demonstrate the growing non-controversiality of health? Since the original issue was, in effect, side stepped, no clear answer can be given. Still, it should be noted that as the epidemics grew more perilous, objections to international regulations previously drafted or recommended at the many conferences died down in a sense, then, the opin- ions of experts were implemented as a common sense of danger and need gripped governments and the medical profession alike.
It seems incontestable, however, that since the advent of the World Health Organization in 1948, the consolidation of power in the expert has been as complete as the separation of welfare from politics. And the scope of WHO operations has expanded accordingly. Even though medical supplies are not distributed, they are supplied for demonstration purposes. Instead of merely conducting epidemio- logical intelligence, WHO seeks to eradicate dis- eases. Far from merely standardizing public health procedures, WHO assumes responsibility for inocu- lations in emergencies. Further, "action to meet emergencies is giving place to programmes, planned in advance, for a period of years; projects to bring about a particular advance are giving place to educa- tional work from which general advance may come; and emergency action to control communicable diseases is giving place to investigation of their fundamental causes, and to work for the eradication of some." 16 WHO possesses some legislative power in the very area in which the conferences of the nineteenth century could find so little agreement. The major initial decisions of the Organization were
made by officials, sel their natio activities ri~ desire to lin ally appoint public heal, Organizatior ing the com local profess so strict a ffi( ical" involve
Or could of responsibi tions, the r. clearly to th, Mitrany prec and maximiz the expense argued that t who rule WI- of power anc despite their refrained fror the general p, have done so from the fie!, the World M, social securit relate heal th cally infused rural sanitatic been less sue, tion control r by threats of Ireland, and Perhaps WHC ism that resis boundary of pc
Our secon tion of scien producing a between exper of science and all mankind ar
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made by well-known national public health, officials, selected for their competence and not for their national allegiance. 17 And in subsequent activities rigorous professionalism ruled, a consistent desire to limit participation to qualified (if nation- ally appointed) physicians, nurses, therapists, and public health administrators. The program of the Organization was consciously geared to strengthen- ing the competence and autonomy of national and local professional bodies, which were conceived in so strict a medical context that no thought of "polit- ical" involvement could occur to anyone.
Or could it' Compared with the pre-1945 scope of responsibilities of international health organiza- tions, the program and powers of WHO point clearly to that inevitable expansion of function that Mitrany predicts on the basis of minimizing power and maximizing welfare. 18 But did power shrink at the expense of advancing welfare' It could well be argued that the very professionalism of the experts who rule WHO defeats further inroads on the realm of power and politics. True, American physicians, despite their fixation on free enterprise 1 have so far refrained from attacking WHO and have joined in the general professional support of its work. But they have done so because WHO undertook to stay away from the field of "socialized medicine/ 1 thus giving the World Medical Association a target m the ILO's social security program instead. WH0
1 s efforts to
relate health development programs to such pohti· cally infused (but welfare-dominated) activities as rural sanitation and control of water resources have been less successful. And suggestions that popula- tion control relates to world health have been met by threats of withdrawal on the part of Belgium, Ireland, and several Latin American countries. Perhaps WHO's very success is due to a professional- ism that resists the temptation to push back the boundary of power and politics.
Our second case study concerns the participa- tion of scientists in the negotiations aimed at producing a nuclear test ban. Here, the issue between expert and diplomat, between the demands of science and technology on behalf of the welfare of all mankind and selfish national interest, was drawn
Haas Functionalism 253
much more sharply than in the case of health. One school of American scientists, as early as the Baruch Plan, took the clearly Functional position that if everyone 1s common interest was the prevention of nuclear war, then all reasonable men would arrive at identical conclusions on the purely "technicaln matter of how to disarm. The "logic of the facts" would dictate the right political formula. Further, they believed that this orientation implied no more and no less than the application of the scientific method to politics, thus "rationalizing)) policies since they hoped to apply their mode of analysis in the matter of disarmament to politics in general. Science would push back the boundary of power. Controversy would cease because every political measure would be a logical consequence of first principles accepted by all.
The failure of the Soviet Union to accept the Baruch Plan persuaded some of these scientists that if their vision of peace could not be realized by means of a physicists' theocracy, then the only alter- native was unrelenting nuclear rearmament by the United States, leading to eventual victory over the Soviet Union as the irrational political obstacle. Other members of the scientific community, however, felt that if only disarmament negotiations were left to scientists, who would concentrate on the technical merits of the issue, rather than to power-blinded diplomats, then the millennium, if not actually at hand, could at least be reached by stages. Crucial in this calculus were two further Functional assumptions: such negotiations would have to rest on direct contacts with Soviet scien- tists, who would be expected to be similarly moti- vated, and some dramatic "first step" would have to be taken to demonstrate to the world the feasibility of progress toward disarmamenr. 19
Considerable support for this viewpoint existed within the American government in 1958, although the President's advisers on disarmament disagreed among themselves-as did the scientists, despite their expertise. This support eventually took the form of American participation in the Geneva Conference of Experts, which was called to explore the possibility of policing a test ban agreement.
254 Chapter 10 International Integration
The American delegation was composed entirely of scientists with no previous experience in diplomacy. Apparently they were neither briefed nor instructed by the political arms of the government, with the exception of the basic mandate to seek agreement with the Soviets on "a number of systems with vary- ing characteristics, capabilities, and limitations which would then be presented for consideration to their respective governments. n20 The Functional expectation is best summarized in the words of Eugene Rabinowitch:
The success of the Geneva conference of scientists .. has confirmed the belief of scientists that once an international problem has been formulated in sdentifi~ cally significant terms, scientists from all countries, despite their different political or ideological back~ grounds, will be able to find a common language and arrive at an agreed solution .... This new approach to the fundamental problems of the arms race and world security, using the criterion of what is technically the most feasible approach to a common aim, instead of what will satisfy the national interests, may be a more radical innovation than the political leadership· of the major nations is now willing to contemplate, despite the disastrous experience of traditional diplomacy in the last ten years. 21
Not only were these hopes unfulfilled, but subse- quent events proved that the reasoning behind them was fallacious. For one thing, the Soviet delegation was not composed exclusively of scientists, but was headed by a seasoned atomic diplomat, Semyon Tsarapkin. For another, it at all times enjoyed the help and participation of professional legal and diplomatic advisers. Finally, its instructions were different from those of the American delegation, and, what is more, were firmly linked to pre~existing Soviet policy in the field of disarmament. 22 The fact was that the Soviet scientists were instructed to obtain agreement on a single detection system with a minimum of detection stations. Consequently, on the purely "technical" issues of the capability of specific pieces of detection equipment and the detectability of various types of blasts, the Soviet experts consistently took very different positions from their American and British counterparts: what
was hard to detect for the West seemed pleasantly simple for the Soviets, who could therefore advocate reducing to a minimum control posts, samples of radiation obtained by airplane flights, and on-site inspections. In other words, the Soviet delegation made no effort to separate the political from the technical, the role of the expert from that of the diplomat, and argued a wholly political position.
The Western delegations eventually interpreted their instructions to permit them to compromise with the Soviet Union, but compromise in such a way that the essence of the Soviet position emerged as the final recommendation. There is no reason to doubt the acquiescence of the two Western govern~ ments in this step. But the point is that the purity of the experts' dedication to the technical issue was violated in such a fashion as to put in question the very possibility of separating the two approaches in the first place. The American experts, in their eagerness to bring home results, so phrased the final recommendations as to safeguard their "technical" accuracy at the expense of specificity in terms of the extent, type, and enforceability of controls. James Fiske, the head of the American delegation, recog· nized this himself:
The technical content of arms control negotiations is likely to be very high but experience in the nuclear test and surprise attack negotiations has shown that technical and political arguments cannot be separated completely or for long. For example, in the nuclear test business the questions of "threshold" and probability of detection and identification have both technical and political matters deeply intermixed; if the technical people talk of a 1 kt, 5 kt or 20 kt "threshold" there are important political overtones; whether they talk of 10% probability or 50% or 90% is largely a political matter--0r is it technical? ... I think the Soviets recognized this interplay from the beginning. 23
If we had analyzed the conference held in 1851 for the control of pilgrims infected with cholera in as stringent terms as those just applied to the Geneva Conference of Experts, we would probably have reached a conclusion similar to this one of Fiske's: that dispassionate decisions by experts are
l not possible. · undeniable fu formerly nati inevitable th tinue? Or is it that it must e undermined 1 health official
It would immediate c control is lim certain aspect Nor can it be are less likely officials, now ested in profi must be this: to explain th powers incert: is crucial? Ci The equivoc suggests that insight into t theoretical (a of Functional
TheTheor Of Functic
All this is bas man will seek his physical ~ when necessa from the Uti service rathe Advantage is ing in comm unites men, implies a the Utilitarians'. t and inevitabl there is an at scarcity bege1 tional confh
not possible. Yet the field of world health shows an undeniable functional expansion at the expense of formerly national and political competences. Is it inevitable that the nuclear statement must con· tinue? Or is it implicit in the Functionalist ideology that it must eventually yield to the same forces that undermined the rigid positions of national public health officials?
It would be false to answer that health is of immediate concern to everyone, whereas arms control is limited to arousing ideological emotion; certain aspects of health suffer from this defect, too. Nor can it be argued that political or selfish motives are less likely to be present: at one time even British officials, now so welfare•minded, were more inter~ ested in profits than health. The question, rather, must be this: Is the Functionalist ideology adequate to explain the undeniable growth of international powers incertain fields? Is it the role of experts that is crucial? Can power be separated from welfare? The equivocal nature of our two case studies suggests that it cannot. Or can it? To gain some insight into these matters we must now turn to a theoretical (as opposed to ideological) examination of Functionalism.
The Theoretical Components Of Functionalism
All this is based essentially on a utilitarian calculus: man will seek his rational advantage in maximizing his physical welfare by cooperating with other men when necessary. The Functionalists, however, differ from the Utilitarians by stressing the necessity of service rather than the benefits of competition. Advantage is maximized by pooling efforts, by join- ing in common creative tasks, by stressing what unites men, groups, and nations. This, in tum, implies a theory of conflict at variance with the Utilitarians'. Social conflict is not considered natural and inevitable by the Functionalists if and when there is an abundance of economic resources; only scarcity begets conflict. If intergroup and interna~ tional conflict prevails even in the presence of
Haas Functionalism 255
material abundance, the reason must be found in some "devil" who perversely sidetracks man from the natural. H. G. Wells discovered this devil to inhabit the diplomatic services and the foreign offices of the Powers; Mitrany, more circumspectly, found it in the frustrations and anxieties of modem man compelled to live in the uncreative nation~state, which condi~ tions him to confuse genuine national differences with nationalistic prejudices and the fears they produce. 24 Service rather than social conflict, then, is the natural condition of man.
Like the modern group therapist, the Functionalist rejects the notion that group conflict is inevitable. Conflicts can be creatively tran~ scended without self~conscious sacrifice. Politics need not be envisaged as the crude clash of interests, each rationally conceived and defended, but may yield to problem-solving. Interests need not be "reconciled" if they can be "integrated" at a higher level of perception by engaging the actor in a "work~ ing" effort. This conception opens up possibilities of international integration that are nowhere spelled out in detail by the Functionalists. But it is vital to note that the future structure of international rela- tions would be qualitatively different from the old, precisely because a new moral component-integra- tion rather than conflict-would be its central pillar. To this theme we will return later.
The Functionalist's critique of other theories of international order consists of disputing the validity of a series of propositions fundamental to the so-called Realist school of thought. He hopes to arrive at a totally different conception of world order simply by challenging these assumptions, and since his critique hinges on separating notions held to be one by Realists, I shall approach it as a series of "separability" propositions.
We find four propositions. (1) The Functionalist separates power from welfare. Both are thought of as representing types of human and state aims; great insistence is placed upon the distinction, and a great many programmatic points follow from it.
(2) The Functionalist further separates various governmental tasks into discrete elements, even if only temporarily. But he insists on completely
256 Chapter 10 International Integration
separating military-defense (power-oriented) task from economic-abundance (welfare-oriented) tasks, in addition to isolating various kinds of welfare tasks. However, through the learning process he predicates, the Functionalist eventually gathers these tasks together again into one, at which point all governmental activities are coterminous with the achievement of welfare. An important corollary of the separation of functional spheres is the notion of transferability of lessons. Integrative lessons learned in one functional context will latet be applied by the actor in new contexts until the dichotomy between functional contexts is overcome. Unlimited learning and transferability are appar- ently assumed.
(3) A still finer separation occurs in the crucial distinction between the political and the technical, the work of the politician and that of the expert. Again a series of practical consequences follow from this distinction, leading to the conquest, at the hand of the welfare-oriented expert, of the political by the economic. Closely related is the distinction between the wholesome work of the voluntary group and the suspect activities of the government. This brings up the question of whether an expert can contribute to international integration by serving a government rather than a private group, a point on which Functionalist writing is silent.
( 4) A final, but equally crucial, separation occurs between the loyalties imputed to the political ac·tor. Functionalists, along with many social scientists, hold that any one person can entertain a variety of loyalties to a number of focuses, whether hierarchi- cally arranged or not; but unlike many others, they also assume that loyalties are created by functions, and that the transfer of functions can produce shifts in loyalty. A plurality of loyalties in any one nation is produced by the variety of functions carried out by various focuses for the person in question. The Functionalist, on the basis of this separation, hopes to transfer loyalties to international focuses carrying out functions. In doing so he seems to deny any existing hierarchical supremacy of nationalism, even though in other contexts he seems to deplore this supremacy.
Functionalists, as I emphasized before, do not think in explicitly functional-systemic terms. Existing needs give rise to appropriate tasks which by virtue of the theoretical propositions outlined, are expected to give rise to a new and more wholesome international configuration of relationships. The end product of the process is a world federation emerging from an indefinite number of task-oriented agencies that overline the sovereign state and detach man's loyalty from it. The redirection of loyalties is crucial here because it is expected to yield a community of sentiments and loyalties which, in turn, is conceived as a psychological prerequisite for political federa- tion. Functionalists, then, work with a terminal concept of immanent community much as Marxists use the notion of the classless society. What are the properties of the community concept?
Mitrany defines political community as the sum of the functions carried out by its members. At other times he speaks of it as the commitment to the common good of the members) the common good being the realization of welfare for all. 25 This formulation leaves in doubt whether the "members are individuals, voluntary groups, or functional agencies, and begs the question of the nature of the functions involved, for Mitrany surely cannot mean all the functions, including waging war, that at present are within the scope of political commu- nities. Finally, the notion of the common good cannot be readily accepted unless one also grants as valid the nature of the learning process and the transferability concept advanced by Functionalists. Otherwise the common good can be no more than the sum of individual group wills. Despite the emotional language used, however, the essentially mechanistic nature of the community stands revealed. It is immanent in man's present condi- tion because of the universality of needs and tasks; the fulfillment of these needs leads naturally to its emergence.
Have we not, in effect, now squared the circle? Is not an immanent community a system in disguise? Are not needs and tasks "functions)) in term of their contribution to the development of the system? The fact that the Functionalists have not faced this
l appareff should converg restated theory c
A Criti
We can Functior they me1 take for! sovereigi the chan tine epid made bi whom is Yer thei Functior denying ttons to s ment. En a study of Claude b: ized agen analysis i Reconstr i ment run:
Power commitm the confo made lar, Specific f from gen< must be n be expect tion that t in one fur readily tn functiona motion in to develc between t the politi hold beca,
I
apparent theoretical convergence does not mean we should be equally negligent. Suggestive as the convergence may bei it cannot be explored and restated until we have examined Functionalist theory critically.
A Critique Of Functionalism
We can easily summarize the critic.ism leveled at Functionalism by writers in the Realist tradition: they merely assert the primacy of the political and take for granted the presumed hard outer shell of the sovereign nation~state. Further, they minimize the chances of penetrating or softening the elephan· tine epidermls. 26 More to the point is the criticism made by Claude, Sewell, and Engle, none of whom is a priori committed to the Realist approach. Yet they reject the theoretical assumptions of Functionalism in no uncertain terms simply by denying the adequacy of the separability proposi· tions to sum up the potentialities of human develop~ ment. Engle arrives at this conclusion on the basis of a study of the European Coal and Steel Community; Claude bases himself on the activities of the special- ized agencies of the United Nations; and Sewell's analysis is centered on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Their indict~ ment runs as follows.
Power and welfare are far from separable. Indeed, commitment to welfare activities arises only within the confines of purely political decisions, which are made largely on the basis of power considerations. Specific functional contexts cannot be separated from general concerns. Overall economic decisions must be made before any one functional sector can be expected to show the kind of integrative evolu~ tion that the Functionalist describes. Lessons learned in one functional context cannot be expected to be readily transferred to new contexts; success in one functional sphere does not set up a corresponding motion in other spheres: on the contrary, it may fail to develop and be forgotten. The distinction between the political and the technical, between the politician and the expert, simply does not hold because issues were made technical by a prior
Haas Functionalism l.'Jt
political decision. Hence voluntary groups are most unlikely to have the salutary effect on international relations that the Functionalist predicts. Most important, both Claude and Engle deny that loyal- ties develop from the satisfaction of needs 1 can be separated and rearranged so as to ignore the nation. "There is room for doubt that functionalists have found the key which infallibly opens the doors that keep human loyalties piled up in sovereign ware, houses, thereby permitting those loyalties to spill out into the receptacles of internationalism." 27
Certainly Functionalism provides no infallible key. But I submit that even if the separability propo- sitions1 which are the heart of Functionalist theory, are not accepted in full, there remains considerable hope that they may be revised and refined so as to get us beyond the blind alley of Realist analysis. Anyone who uses the distinction between kratos and ethos as an analytical device will raise the same objections to Functionalist theory as the Realists do. Even the Functionalists, since they accept the dichotomy as fundamental in their distinction between power and welfare, are in a weak position. Conceding the "reality" of both orientations in international life, they must themselves put up with an unsatisfactory Manichean struggle, and hope for the best. The genuine Realist can then come back and agree to the epic struggle, and confidently predict the victory of kratos. Or, better, he can argue, as does Kenneth W. Thompson, that "men seem obstinately to reject the view that state behavior at some point is not a fit subject for moral judgment. One sign that this principle is accepted as relevant is the apl)arent compulsion of political actors to justify their needs in moral terms. Hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays· to virtue.,, 28 Thompson goes on to point out that expediency and morality move dialectically in international politics, so that a position taken by a government purely for reasons of expediency but extolling some moral principle may come to bind that government in some future situation merely because, by repetition, the principle has been accepted by other governments in the meantime. "On some points at least the practical and moral march hand in hand. ni 9
258 Chapter 10 lnternationa I Integration
The paradox is now complete: by granting the existence of a power orientation, the Functionalist approaches the Realist; by modifying the absolute victory of power, some Realists join hands with the Functionalists. Those, like Claude and Engle, who deny the first separability proposition are then forced to a subordination of Functionalism to
Realism without really investigating the empiri scope of the remaining notions of separation. , , the bulk of Functionalist theory goes unexamined.c
lt is precisely the merit of Functionalism that'it broke away from the cliches of Realist political: theory. lts fault lies in not having broken radically:
enough.
NOTES _________________ _
I. David Mittany, lnternanonn.l Affairs, XXIV (1948), 356.
2. Ibid., p. 359.
3. Nadel, Theory of Social StructuTe, p. 1 (italics in original).
4. Mitaty, International Affairs, XXIV (1948), 359.
5. Mitrany's application of this reasoning is exemplified in International Congress on Mental Health, Proceedings (London, 1948), Vol. IV, esp. p. 75.
6. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), p. 42, as cited by Engle, p. 49.
7. Engle, p. 89. Again, I am here heavily indebted to Engle's trenchant distinctions and analysis.
8. Mitrany, A Working Peace System, pA2.
9. Ibid., p. 41. This point is also strongly brought out by Engle, pp. 72-73.
10. Engle, p. 28.
11. Edgar Saveney, as quoted in Engle, p. 8.
12. Mitrany, A Working Peace System, p. 55.
13. The metaphor is not farfetched at all. See Mitrany's exposition in his address to the International Congress of Mental Health and the ideas of some earlier Functionalist writers, as summarized by Engle, pp. 148--49.
14. Engle, p. 58. 15. My treatment is based on Neville M. Goodman, lntemationa[ Health Organizations and Their
Work (New Yotk-Philade]phia: Blakiston, 1952). In 1885 the British government refused to institute quarantine in Suez, saying that such action "would probably have the result of making the Bristish commerce return to the Cape route, to the great detriment of the Suez Canal" (ibid., p. 61). When, in 1892, a general agreement was worked out for a quarantine at Suez for pilgrims only, the British government tried to get an exemption from the rule for
British ships!
16. WHO, The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization (Geneva, 1958), pp. 170-71.
17. Ibid., pp. 47 and 54. 18. Witness the much-heralded Article 1 of the WHO Constitution: "The objective of the World
Health Organization ... shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of
Haas Functionalism 259
health." My information concerning the obstacles encountered by WHO was obtained from interviews in Geneva and Washington.
19. My treatment relies essentially on the excellent study by Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). See especially Chapter 2 for the reasoning summarized above.
20. lbw.., p. 203 (italics in origmal).
21. "Nuclear Bomb Tests," BuU.etin of the Atomic Scientists, XIV (1958), 287; quoted in ibid., pp. 215-16. Albert Wohlstetter, in "Scientists, Seers and Strategy," Foreign Affairs (April 1963), adduces convincing logic and evidence concerning the false antithesis posed by Rabinowitch, even though the target of his demonstration 1s Sir Charles Snow.
22. For these and the following details, see Gilpin, Chapter 7.
23. As quoted in ibid., pp. 220-21. Nothing that has happened since changes this conclusion. The Test Ban Agreement of 1963, since it excludes underground explosions, simply sidesteps the "technical" detection issue on which the scientists could not reach agreement.
24. The reference to the "devil theory" and to H. G. Wells may be found in the excellent critique of Functionalism of lnis L. Claude, Jr., on which my treatment relies heavily. See his Swords into Plowshares (2d ed., New York: Random House, 1959), p. 379. For Mitrany's formulation, see Int. Cong. of Mental Health, Proceedmgs, IV, 82-83.
25. See Int. Cong. of Mental Health, Proceedings, and the discussion in Engle, pp. 11-12.
26. Thus, Hans J. Morgenthau, after agreeing with Mitrany's explanation of how national political communities come about and concurring further that the same sequence of events could apply internationally, nevertheless holds that "the contributions international functional agencies make to the well-being of members of all nations fade into the background. What stands before the eyes of all are the immense political conflicts that divide the great nations .... This is not primarily a matter of false emphasis born of ignorance. It is rather the recognition of the undeniable fact that, from a functional point of view, what the national government does or does not do is much more important for the satisfaction of individual wants than what an international functional agency does or does not do." Politics Among Nations (3d ed., New York Knopf, 1960), p. 528.
27. Claude, Swonls into Plowshares, p. 387.
28. PoUtical Realism and the Crisis of World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 172.
29. !bid.