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Western Theory, Global World Western Bias in International Theory

S cholars o f in tern atio n al relations often operate u n d e r th e assu m p tio n th a t th e ir p ro je c t is to generate th e tru th , to com e to som e objective understanding o f w hat the international sphere is and how it works. M ost contemporary international relations theory, though, is tainted by a major source o f bias: it

is produced in western nations by western authors for western readers. International relations theory is skewed westward, which impairs its ability to explain and to produce social good.

M uch o f this western bias is due to the historical political and m ilitary dom inance o f the west; history is w ritten by the victors, and philosophy seems to be, too. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan argue in their 2010 book N o n -W e ste rn In te r­ national Relations Theory: Perspectives O n and Beyond Asia th at the vast m ajority o f schools o f th o u g h t in international relations are outgrow ths o f one w estern philosophical tradi­ tion or another: realism comes from the w ork o f Thucydides,

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in th eir research; this means th at western researchers use almost exclusively w estern subjects. T h e body o f knowl­ edge generated by studies in game theory and behavioral economics, then, is considered to reveal certain universal truths about hum an beings, whereas in reality it is highly culturally specific. In 1995, th en -U C L A graduate student in anthropology Jo e H en rich traveled to P eru to study the economic behavior o f indigenous peoples. H e n rich found th at th e subjects o f his research behaved very differently in game theoretic simulations than N o rth American subjects did. N o rth Americans are generally eager to propose and to reward fair distributionsof resources in games; Peruvian na­ tives, on the o th er hand, did n o t seem to care nearly as much about fairness. T h is is n o t to say th at some cultural, ethnic, o r regional groups played the game m ore or less rationally than others; no style o f play is necessarily b etter or worse. Instead, H e n rich ’s findings simply point to a diversity of

“T here is nothing inherently biased about applied game theory, but as it is practiced in modern academic circles, the field privi­

leges westerners over people of other backgrounds.”

H obbes, and Machiavelli; liberalism derives from K ant, Locke, Smith, and others; M arx and Engels were Germ an; and even those constructivist and postm odern accounts of in­ ternational relations th a t emphasize relativism and diversity draw m ostly on the ideas o f F rench authors such as Pierre Bordieu and M ichel Foucault. O f course, non-w esterners from Sun T z u to A m artya Sen have also m ade valuable contributions to political science and international relations theory, but on the whole, western voices have dom inated and continue to dom inate international relations discourse.

T h e problem does n o t seem likely to go away, either. T h e field o f in te rn a tio n a lre la tio n s is becom ing increas­ ingly grounded in economics and psychology. T h e growing use o f applied game theory to explain and predict phenomena in international affairs means th a t international relations theory has become entangled w ith the assumptions, ideo­ logical com m itm ents, and empirical findings of behavioral economics— a body o f knowledge th a t exhibits a western slant. T h e r e is n o th in g in h ere n tly biased ab o u t applied game theory, b u t as it is practiced in m odern academic circles, the field privileges westerners over people o f other backgrounds. Social psychologists use convenient subjects

values across cultures th a t translates into different goals and strategies. H e n rich replicated this study in various countries and cultures around the world, observing a wide range of behaviors across cultures. T h e se findings challenge th e com m on, western position that game theoretic study reveals fundamental features o f hum an nature. H is w ork points to one o f the sources o f bias in international relations theory: it is built on research in behavioral economics and psychol­ ogy th at com m only assumes th at people operate the same way regardless o f culture and th a t takes m ainly w esterners as the subjects o f its study. T h e concept of hum an nature th a t informs international re-lations theory is a western one, produced through studies o f western subjects but erroneously applied to people the world over. D espite these limitations, applied game th eo ry was widely employed in p rom inent publications to explain Vladim ir P u tin ’s actions and in ten ­ tions after the Russian invasion o f C rim ea last spring.

M oreover, international relations theory is largely the product o f western thinkers at western institutions. In 2 011, the C hristian Science M o n ito r ranked the top 2 5 graduate program s in in tern a tio n al relations worldwide; 19 were in the US, five were in the UK, and one was in Canada.

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N one were in non-western countries. T he Times Higher Education world university rankings for the social sciences in 2013-2014, meanwhile, list no non-western institutions until the National University of Singapore, which comes in tied for 29th. T he QS W orld University Rankings from 2013 for politics and international studies puts only seven non-western universities in the top 40. Granted, these are western rankings in western publications, and perhaps this is an example of western bias in journalism; but it is telling that non-western rankings of international affairs programs do n o t seem to exist. At the very least, western rankings of university programs reinforce western dominance over international relations theory.

T h e western nature of those academics responsible for international relations scholarship and teaching is notewor­ thy because of the influence of the identity of a researcher on the outcomes of research. This is the central argument of standpoint theory, a school of thought that holds that those individuals who are marginalized or oppressed gain

privileged access to knowledge and truth that is routinely excluded from the mainstream; for example, non-westerners subjected to centuries of western political and m ilitary domination likely have novel and insightful interpretations of international affairs to offer. Because it fails to take into account a wide variety of important perspectives, interna­ tional relations theory that is the product of western thought in western institutions cannot claim to be global theory or to be true in any meaningful sense.

T he danger of western bias is that it shuts out those alternative perspectives. Limiting the diversity of theory we consider in the field of international relations limits the truth we can generate and taints what knowledge we do produce.

This is especially problematic given the growing importance of knowledge as an economic phenomenon - as a good with value. Knowledge and information are increasingly sources of economic w orth and measures of economic success. Whereas Marx proposed a philosophy of historical material­ ism whereby material factors—such as productive capacity and technology—are the sources of power and the drivers of history, we are likely now living in a post-Marxist age of informationism, in which knowledge and its spread are the most important sources of power. Examples abound. A 2009 W orld Bank report found that a 10 percentage-point increase in high-speed Internet connections is accompanied by an increase in economic growth of 1.3 percentage-points. The US budget for intelligence work has risen every year since 2006 andnowsits at around US$80 billion per year. A recent N ew York Times opinion piece by Karl Taro Greenfeld highlighted the importance of information gleaned from so­ cial media in building social and cultural capital. If the search for truth drives contemporary history, and westerners domi­

nate the search for truth about international affairs, then much of the world has been unjustly prevented from participating in an important world-historic and power-generating process. W estern-skewed international relations scholarship excludes much of the world from touch­ ing the benefits of the pursuit of knowledge about the interna­ tional system, while at the same time generating an incomplete picture of world affairs.

This exclusion does not seem to the result of some intentional or malicious grand conspiracy. It would be incorrect to argue that individual westerners are at fault. Instead, this problem is the result of a sort of organic growth, an unintentional historical process. It is more correct to view west­ ern dominance of international relations theory as a disease that has in fe c te d academ ia— and

one that harms westerners as well as non-westerners. T he non-universality of international relations thought prevents western theorists from arriving at good understandings of the international system and from gaining access to the truth. T he ethnocentrism at play is implicit and harmful to all interested in the pursuit of truth, from any culture or region. Despite this lack of intentionality or fault, Robert Cox’s insight holds: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” International relations theory is by and for westerners, even if it is not intentionally so.

Now, perhaps something different is at work. Perhaps instead of a western bias, international relations theory

In September 2 0 13, a Facebook user logs into his account in Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone after the Chinese government decided to lift an internet ban on websites like Facebook, Tw itter, and the New York Times.

j30] H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W • Summer 2014 Photo Courtesy Reuters

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instead suffers from regional insularism. If this is the case, then it only seems to me that international relations thought is slanted toward the west because I am a westerner writing from a western institution in a western publication. Perhaps a Chinese writer would argue that international relations the­ ory exhibits a Chinese or an eastern bias. This possibility is real but slight; there is good reason to discard it. Acharya and Buzan’s book on western bias in international rela­ tions theory features contributions from prom inent professors at uni­ versities in India, Singapore, Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and China, and all of them agree with the basic premise that western thought dominates the field globally. Students at Bogazi^i University in Istanbul read very few non-western authors, and virtually no Turkish theorists, in their political science courses. Across the world, political scientists and international theorists are much m ore likely to recognize the name of Italian states­ man and theorist Niccolo Machiavelli than they are to recall the name of the earlier Indian scholar Kautilya. W estern theory seems to dominate not just in the west, but also globally.

T h e problem is m ore or less clear; the solution less so. There are two plausible remedies for western dominance of interna­ tional relations theory. T h e first would require the creation of a truly global, unified theory. Such a body of knowledge would seek to accurately, honestly, and objectively describe the workings of the international system without drawing unduly on any culturally specific tradition. Its task would be to detach scholarship about global affairs from any specific culture, region, or group of people—not at all an easy thing to accomplish. There is a legitimate case to be made, likely from standpoint theory, that such a holistic understanding of international affairs is impossible because all thought is wrapped up in the background of the thinker. In other words, cultural people cannot generate non-cultural thought. T he second possible way out of western bias, then, would involve pluralism about theories of global affairs. This approach to resolving bias would accept that theory is necessarily entangled in culture but would strive to make all kinds of theory from all kinds of theorists known and legitimate. Dif­ ferent culturally specific and culturally generated theories would exist and would be in many ways distinct from one another, but scholars in one tradition would acknowledge the existence and potential validity of other, culturally dif­ ferent international theories. Cross-pollination between theoretical traditions could of course occur, and would likely prove fruitful, but various culturally specific bodies of theory would exist side-by-side. This second solution appears to be much more plausible. In order to achieve pluralism in inter­

national relations theory, scholars must educate themselves and their students about a wide variety of different ideas from differently cultured authors. University professors who educate the next generation of international theorists must give roughly proportional syllabus space to Alexis de

Tocqueville and to Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani- or at the very least, if a professor chooses to assign only readings by western authors, he or she should title and advertize his or her course accordingly. Institutions of research and edu­ cation must shed their occidentalist leanings and embrace pluralism about this complex, diverse world in which we live.

International relations theory is ironically not a global body of knowledge; instead, it is regionally and culturally specific. W e work with a non-global theory of global affairs. W estern-biased international relations theory overlooks valuable perspectives that could enrich and enhance our un­ derstanding of how the world works. Moreover, that western skew incorrectly excludes potentially valuable perspectives and unfairly privileges some viewpoints, creating disparities in access to knowledge and its benefits. W e must strive to make international relations as a field more inclusive and more global—but how? Perhaps the answer lies in some global, unified theory of international relations, detached from culture and independent of any particular regional or ethnic group; more likely, though, the solution will involve pluralism about international relations theory. Researchers and students must acknowledge that western international relations theory does not represent the only option or the truth. W e must pave the way toward pluralism in order to craft diverse international theory for a diverse international world, i ■ I

D e s p i t e t h e s e e m i n g le v e l o f d i v e r s i t y in m a n y i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d g a t h ­ e r in g s , i t is s t ill a l m o s t im p o s s i b l e t o a v o id a w e s t e r n s k e w a n d w e s t e r n d o m i n a n c e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r y .

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