Edge/Fog computing

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A Survey on Internet of Things (IoT)-Architecture and Applications

Abstract—Wireless Ad hoc networks are being increasingly used recently because of their flexibility and ease of establishment and usage. Ad hoc networks are infrastructure-less and can be formed dynamically without requiring the presence of a fixed infrastructure and it supports communication among various types of mobile devices. The very characteristics of ad hoc networks that makes it suitable for a variety of applications also poses lot of challenges such as incompatibility with the routing protocols of wired networks, performance issues in the usage of transport protocols such as route failures. In this paper, a survey of the various routing protocols that are available and the way in which they differ will be presented. Also, the dynamic nature of the wireless ad hoc networks makes it susceptible to a wide range of security issues. This paper also provides an overview of these security issues, the list of available solutions to prevent them and the various challenges associated with implementing them in a wireless ad hoc network.

INTRODUCTION

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ireless networks are increasingly being used nowadays. They also support the communication among various devices of heterogenous types. The establishment of an infrastructure in places where there are little, or no resources is challenging and also in situations where a network is just required temporarily, the setting up of a wired network such as a base station seems extravagant and unnecessary. In these situations, a MANET can be used instead of setting up a wired communication network. A wireless ad hoc network or mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes that do not depend on a fixed infrastructure and can form a temporary network by dynamically organizing themselves in an arbitrary way. In ad hoc network, multi-hop routing occurs, that is, there are no fixed default routers, every node in the networks acts as a router when required. Therefore, a node in a mobile ad hoc network can communicate with all the other nodes directly. Their adjustability makes them suitable for a lot of applications where the setting up of a conventional infrastructure might take too much time and cost or might compromise the security of the data being sent. Examples of such situations are military and emergency communications and communications in an area far away from any base stations. Since the nodes in the ad hoc network are mobile and the link between the nodes change periodically due to their dynamic nature, the routing protocols that are being used for wired communication networks might not be suitable for MANETS. Therefore, new routing protocols have been proposed for the ad hoc networks that overcome the various difficulties and take into account, the dynamic nature of the network. In addition to the routing protocols, MANET also require the design of improved transport protocols as the existing ones such as TCP cause various problems such as route failure and high error rates, etc.

CHALLENGES IN MANET

The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) which is used to avoid and control the congestion is of huge importance in any network. But TCP presents many problems when used in ad hoc networks due to its node mobility and interference which does not exist in wired networks [1]. This causes problems across the physical, network, transport and the MAC layer such as increase in bit error rates and route failures because most of the assumptions that TCP makes does not apply to MANET.

The nodes in a MANET share a wireless medium to communicate with each other. The access to a shared medium should always be maintained or controlled by some protocol, which in most of the cases is done by the Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol. The MAC protocol designed for an ad hoc network has to address various constraints such as energy limitations of the nodes, mobility, channel capacity, etc. One of the important purpose of the MAC protocol is to detect and avoid collision in the shared medium. In wired networks, this is done by employing mechanisms such as ALOHA, slotted ALOHA and Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) and Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (MACA) [2]. The MAC protocols that are to be used in ad hoc networks should also address the collision problem.

In addition to all these, the ad hoc networks also inherit all the difficulties which already exist in conventional wireless networks such as, the lack of clear boundaries outside of which communication cannot take place; the wireless channel is susceptible to unwanted signals which can lead to the addition of noise in the data; the wireless medium is less reliable than the wired medium; they might be vulnerable to hidden terminal problem and exposed terminal problem.

MANETs are autonomous which means that they do not rely on a centralized infrastructure. This presents many difficulties in network management. In ad hoc network, multi-hop routing occurs, that is, there are no fixed default routers, every node in the networks acts as a router when required [3].

Since MANET is composed of nodes that move arbitrarily, the structure of the network changes dynamically which causes the route between a source and destination change accordingly.

The nodes in an ad hoc network need not necessarily be of the same type, that is, it supports communication among heterogenous devices. Different devices have different transmission and reception abilities and also the underlying software and hardware used in each type of device may vary. Because of the mobile nature of the devices, there is a significant limit on the power available. A routing protocol designed for an ad hoc network has to take into consideration, all the mentioned constraints and must provide suitable accommodations for it.

Any node can join or leave a mobile ad hoc network at any given time. While this might be convenient for forming a network dynamically it also causes security issues. All this has to be taken into consideration when implementing the security mechanisms. A detailed list of the possible security mechanisms will also be discussed in the later sections of the paper.

ROUTING PROTOCOLS

The design of routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks poses various challenges due to the mobility of the nodes which causes the route to be different sometimes, the status of the link between the nodes, etc. So in order to keep up with such a dynamic network, the routing protocols have to be dynamic as well. The routing protocols can be classified based on many factors. They can be classified into topology based routing protocols and position based routing protocols. The topology based routing protocols depend on the characteristic information of the link to determine the route from the source to destination whereas position based routing protocols make use of the geographical information to find the route. Since topology based routing relies on the link information, the nodes have to maintain a routing table to keep track of the link status whereas there is no such requirement in position based routing.

Fig. 1: Classification of routing protocols in MANET

The classification that is described in this paper is based on when the route is calculated. Based on this, the routing protocols are categorized into proactive routing protocols, reactive routing protocols and hybrid routing protocols. These are described further in the following sections.

PROACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Proactive routing protocols require each node in the network to maintain a routing table that store information such as next hop, hop count, sequence number, etc. Since the route information is readily available, there is minimum latency before transmitting a packet. The routing information is shared periodically even if the neighboring nodes don’t explicitly request for it. Since the network is changing dynamically in a MANET, the changes have to be propagated throughout the network to ensure the consistency of the information being maintained. This is usually done by broadcasting update messages. There are a number of proactive routing protocols in existence but the ones that will be discussed in this paper are DSDV, OLSR, WSR and CGSR.

1. DESTINATION SEQUENCED DISTANCE VECTOR PROTOCOL

Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) protocol [4] is a table-driven protocol based on the Bellman Ford algorithm and makes use of the Routing Information Protocol (RIP). When the topology of the network changes, the node which identifies the change, broadcasts it to its neighbors. The sequence number assigned by the destination, helps in distinguishing the active routes from the old or inactive routes thus preventing loops.

Fig. 2: Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) protocol

The update message being transmitted contains the sequence number, the destination, hop count to reach the destination and the next hop. A sequence number is also appended by the transmitter and it is incremented it is being transmitted, so that the most recent information can be used. The update messages can either be a full dump or of incremental type. In a full dump, the entire routing table is forwarded as the update message whereas in an incremental message, only the changes between the previous full dump transmitted and the current state is broadcast as the update message. If the network is a little stable without any frequent changes in topology, then incremental updates are used to reduce the control traffic but when the network is changing frequently, the size of the incremental updates increases in which case a full dump is forwarded instead. DSDV maintains only one path for each source-destination pair which is usually the best path and it also helps in avoiding loops.

Fig. 2 shows how a node in a simple network maintains routing information at a given instance in DSDV protocol.

2. OPTIMIZED LINK STATE ROUTING PROTOCOL

The Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol [5, 6] is an improved version of the link state routing protocol. Similar to the DSDV, the nodes maintain routing information by sharing information with each other but to reduce the traffic instead of transmitting information to all the nodes in the network, few nodes are selected which retransmit the update information they receive. This is done by employing multipoint relays (MPR). A node in the network selects a set of nodes from its neighboring nodes. These nodes are known as MPR selectors. The MPR selectors of a node is the least set of neighboring nodes through which all of the origin node’s two hop neighbors can be reached. The smaller the MPR selector, the more optimized the protocol. Hello messages are sent to select the MPR selector nodes as they do not remain constant due to the nodes’ mobility. The message being transmitted by an MPR selector node is assumed to be the update information. This protocol works well when the network is large, because otherwise in a small network almost all the nodes will be in the MPR selector list which reduces the optimality of the protocol.

Fig. 3: Difference between flooding and using MPR. (Cited from ”http://kb9mwr.blogspot.com/2010/02/developing-wireless-networking-using.html” )

The above figure shows the difference between flooding and using MPR.

3. WIRELESS ROUTING PROTOCOL

In the Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP), the nodes maintain more than one table, that is, they maintain tables for route, distance, Message Retransmission List (MRL) and the link-cost [7]. The distance table stores the information about the distance to the destination through each of its neighbors whereas the routing table stores the previous hop and the next hop along with the hop count for all the destinations. The MRL table contains the sequence number and stores and keeps track of the information related to update messages and their retransmission. The link-cost table stores the cost associated with each link and keeps track of the time-outs.

Nodes exchange their routing tables with other nodes in the network. The nodes listed in the MRL table have to acknowledge the update messages, once the acknowledgement is received, the MRL table is updated accordingly. The routing table is exchanged when the network changes and if the network is stable for a period of time, the nodes are required to send hello messages to make sure that the connection is still active. When a node receives an update message, it updates it’s routing table to reflect the changes communicated to it. In addition to maintaining consistency in its own records, a node also checks its neighboring nodes to ensure that the data they possess are consistent as well. Wireless routing protocol also avoids the count to infinity problem by maintaining the information about the nodes’ predecessor and successor.

4. CLUSTERHEAD GATEWAY SWITCH ROUTING PROTOCOL

The Clusterhead Gateway Switch Routing Protocol (CGSR) is based on DSDV protocol [8]. The nodes in the network are grouped into clusters and a node in each cluster is selected as the cluster head. A node is said to be a gateway node if it can be reached by two or more cluster heads. Since the nodes are mobile in a MANET, the cluster heads have to be re-elected sometimes. In a dynamic network, the cluster head re-elections might be too frequent which will decrease the efficiency of the protocol. Therefore, the Least Cluster Change (LCC) mechanism is used. According to the LCC algorithm, there is a need for cluster head election only when the network changes so much that two cluster heads fall into the same cluster or when a node travels out of range of all the clusters.

When a node wants to transmit a packet to a destination, it first forwards it to its cluster head. The cluster head then forwards the packet to the corresponding gateway which connects this cluster head to the one which lies along the path to reach the destination. The same process happens until the packet reaches the cluster head of the cluster to which the destination node belongs to. The cluster head then transmits the packet to the destination node.

Fig. 4: An illustration of CGSR where a source node in cluster A is transmitting a packet to a destination in cluster B. (The gray nodes are the cluster heads and the black nodes are the gateway nodes.)

REACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Contrary to proactive routing protocols, reactive or on demand routing protocols determine the route only on demand, that is, they don’t calculate the route between the source and a destination until it is needed. While proactive routing protocols have less transmission latency, they consume huge portions of the network bandwidth to keep the routing information up to date. So the advantages and disadvantages of both the categories nullify each other. Although in real time, proactive routing protocol might be preferred for the transmission of packets. Some of the examples of reactive routing protocols are AODV, DSR, TORA, etc.

1. AD HOC ON DEMAND DISTANCE VECTOR ROUTING PROTOCOL

Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector (DSDV) protocol [9] is based on the Bellman Ford algorithm. When a source wants to transmit a packet, and does not have a route to the destination it sends a Route Request (RREQ) message to its neighboring nodes which forward it to their neighbors. This propagates until it reaches the destination node or a node with a valid route to the destination. To avoid the broadcasting of information about stale routes, sequence number is used. The source adds the sequence number of the destination, that it possesses, in the RREQ. So, an intermediate node has to respond only if the route that it possesses has a sequence number of equal or higher value. As the RREQ message is propagated through the network, the intermediate nodes keep track of the sender of the packet so that once the node with a valid route is found, the Route Reply (RREP) can be transmitted back to the sender. If a node strays out of a particular route (link rupture), a node that identifies it relays that information to the predecessor node until it reaches the sender. A link rupture is identified by periodically sending out hello messages. Similar to DSDV, there is no loop in AODV too due to the use of sequence numbers.

2. DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING PROTOCOL

Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol [10] is similar to AODV. In DSR, each node maintains a route cache which stores the source routes. When a node in the MANET wants to transmit a packet to a destination, it first checks for the route in its route cache, if a valid route is found then that route is used for transmitting the packet otherwise a route request is originated. There are two phases: route discovery and route maintenance. The route discovery process is similar to the one in AODV, the route request consists of the source and destination address and an identification number. When a node receives the packet, it processes it only if it hasn’t seen the packet yet or if it’s address is not present in the route records. If the node has an active route to the destination, then it includes that route in the reply message. Otherwise it adds its address to the route records. If the destination node receives the request, it checks its route cache to see if it has a route to the source, if it does it uses that route. Otherwise if it’s a symmetrical link, then the same route followed by the request message can be used in reverse. If its not symmetrical then it has to generate a new route discovery message.

HYBRID ROUTING PROTOCOLS

As the name implies, hybrid routing protocols make use of both proactive and reactive approach depending upon the condition. They were introduced with the idea to overcome the disadvantages in both the routing protocols, that is, to reduce the overhead during route information discovery in proactive routing and to reduce the transmission latency in reactive routing. ZRP and ZHLS are two examples of hybrid routing protocols.

1. ZONE ROUTING PROTOCOL

Zone routing protocol (ZRP) makes use of both the reactive and proactive routing protocols [11]. The network is divided into zones based on various factors such as speed, signal strength, etc. A node can be in one or more zones. Zones can be of different size. Zone radius is measured using hop count. Each node stores the route information to all the nodes in its zone. It uses three different mechanisms: Intra Zone Routing Protocol (IARP), Inter Zone Routing Protocol (IERP), Bordercast Resolution Protocol (BRP). If the destination node lies in the same zone as the source node, then IARP is used which makes use of proactive routing protocols to transmit the packet from the source to the destination. If the destination node lies outside the zone, then IERP is used which makes use of reactive routing protocols for the packet transmission. IERP depends on BRP for finding the route to the destination. BRP makes the border nodes to find the routes to the destination outside the zone. The disadvantage of this protocol is that there are lot of overlapping of the zones. But it is advantageous considering how it reduces the latency and the routing overhead.

2. ZONE BASED HIERARCHICAL LINK STATE ROUTING PROTOCOL

In Zone based Hierarchical Link State (ZHLS) routing protocol, similar to ZRP, the network is divided into zones. But in this protocol, the division is done in such a way that the zones don’t overlap. Two types of topologies are defined in ZHLS: node level and zone level. Node level topology describes how the nodes in a zone are connected. Zone level topology describes how the zones are connected. Two zones are said to be connected if there is a physical link connecting a node in one zone to a node in the other zone. Two types of Link State Packets (LSP) are used: node LSP and zone LSP. Node LSP contains the information about the adjacent nodes, and zone LSP contains information about the zones. Node LSPs are communicated only to the nodes within a particular zone whereas zone LSPs are propagated through the entire network. A packet being transmitted contains both the zone id and node id. Zone id helps in identifying the correct zone and once it reaches the right zone, the route to the destination node is determined using the node id. Unlike other hierarchical routing protocols, there is no election of cluster heads in ZHLS.

SECURITY ISSUES AND ATTACKS IN MANET

SECURITY ISSUES

Ad hoc networks have different characteristics than the conventional networks and it makes them vulnerable (discussed in section II) as they lead to security issues. Some of the characteristics of MANET that pose inconvenience are the dynamic topology, mobility of the nodes, lack of a centralized management system, bandwidth constraints and resource limitation. These make the traditional security protocols hard to be implemented in MANET.

ii. Key management: Key management is an essential aspect that is used to provide security in the network. For promoting trust among the nodes, authentication has to be enforced and if public key cryptography is going to be used, there must be an efficient and secure key management technique which is distributive in nature.

iii. Access control: Since a MANET is infrastructure-less and dynamic in nature, any node can join or leave the network at a given instance. While this has a lot of advantages because of its flexibility, it also leaves the network open to a lot of security issues where a potentially harmful node can join the network and attack the traffic and the other nodes in the network.

SECURITY ATTACKS

Since the usual security protocols cannot be implemented in a MANET, it leaves the network wide open to a range of attacks [12]. One of the most common attacks is against routing. There are two approaches to routing attacks. In the first type, the attack is targeted towards the routing information that is being transmitted. The attacker can modify the information resulting in erroneous path determination. In the other type, the attacks are directed towards the packets that are being routed in the network.

Some of the most commonly used attacks are discussed in this section.

i. Passive attack: Passive attacks are attacks that do not corrupt the data being transmitted. The goal of a passive attack is to attain the information being transmitted without interrupting the communication. While it might seem less harmful than other attacks, it is still an attack since it violates the confidentiality of the message being sent. In some cases, it might contain information which if leaked might lead to further breach in security. For example, an active attack on a message containing sensitive information such as passwords.

ii. Active attack: In an active attack, the attacker aims to disrupt the communication by modifying the message being transmitted, introduce misleading route information and decrease the network performance to affect the communication. Active attacks are of two types: internal attack and external attack. External attacks are attacks which are caused by the nodes that do not belong to the network. Internal attacks are carried out by nodes which are part of the network or once belonged to the network.

iii. Denial of service attack: The purpose of this attack is to disrupt the node by making it unavailable. Sometimes this might disrupt the functionality of the entire network. This is usually done by overloading the node with service request messages and finally exhausting the node causing it to fail.

iv. Eavesdropping attack: Eavesdropping is a passive attack, where neither the node in the network nor the packet being transmitted is interrupted. But the attacker reads the message being transmitted.

v. Impersonation attack: In this type of attack, the attacker impersonates a node in the network. This occurs when the authentication mechanism is not strong. An impersonation attack, if undetected, can be harmful as the attacker can monitor the traffic, send false packets and gain access to confidential data.

vi. Sequence number modification: In this attack, the sequence number in the route request packet being transmitted is modified. This is mostly used against AODV. Since the sequence number is modified, the route being returned to the sender might not be the correct route, it might be a stale route.

vii. Source route modification attack: In this attack, the attacker modifies the source address which causes the traffic to be diverted towards the destination that it chooses.

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Fig. 5: Denial of service attack by source route modification

In the above example, the route from S to D is given as S, A, B, D in the routing information. But the malicious node M modifies the information sent to A by removing B from the route. Now when A routes the packet, it can’t find a way to reach D, in which case, the service is denied to the node D.

viii. Wormhole attack: In this attack, there is more than one malicious node in the network. The two nodes are in different locations in the network. The packets received by the first node are transmitted to the other node thereby creating a tunnel or ‘worm hole’. This disrupts the regular flow of the routing protocol.

ix. Black hole attack: In the black hole attack, a malicious node which is in the network, advertises it’s hop count to reach the destination as zero. Since most of the routing protocols choose the node which has the least hop count as the next hop, all the packets are forwarded to the attacker. This leads to denial of service as well as the leaking of the messages to the attacker.

x. Replay attack: This is a combination of both passive and active attacks. The first phase involves passive attack, where the attacker captures the information being transmitted. In the second phase, the captured message is replayed again. In some cases, the nodes receiving the replay message may believe that this is a genuine node and forward the packets to the malicious node.

SECURITY SCHEMES

A security mechanism implemented in a network has to ensure that the following characteristics are preserved.

i. Availability: This means that the information or service should always be available to the user when requested without any error. This might be incorporated by ensuring a backup is available so that denial of service attack is prevented.

ii. Confidentiality: This means that the information should be kept private. Only authorized nodes or users should be able to access the information or service.

iii. Authentication: The security mechanism should make sure a peer node can ensure the identity of its peer node by enforcing some authentication mechanism. This helps keeping out impersonators from accessing confidential information.

iv. Non-repudiation: The sender and the receiver should not be able to disavow that they did not send or receive the message.

v. Anonymity: The messages being sent and the information about the sender and the receiver should be kept confidential. They should not be revealed to other nodes or users.

vi. Integrity: This means that all the data should be maintained consistently. The data should not be corrupt or out dated.

Some of the security schemes [13] that are in use are discussed in this section.

SECURE EFFICIENT AD HOC DISTANCE VECTOR ROUTING

Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector (SEAD) [14] routing protocol is an enhanced version of AODV. There was a security issue in AODV that allowed an intruder to modify the routing information of a node such as sequence number and hop count metrics. SEAD prevents this from happening by including a cryptographic hash to be stored along with the other routing information such as destination address, hop count, next hop and sequence number. This prevents the modification of the sequence number and metric so that an intruder node with lesser sequence number or hop count can advertise itself as the next hop in the route.

SECURITY MECHANISM FOR SOURCE ROUTING

In source routing protocols such as DSR, an attacker can modify the source route such that an existing node in the network can be removed from the route which causes the failure of message delivery to a destination. This can be prevented by incorporating a per-hop authenticator mechanism that detects any intrusion immediately.

SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL

Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) is a security enhancement that can be incorporated in any on demand routing protocols. Instead of making use of a cryptographic validation along the intermediate nodes in the path, it first establishes a Security Association (SA) between the sender and the destination. This is usually done by having a shared key between the sender and the receiver. It then either uses an additional field in the packet being used in the underlying algorithm or computes the keyed hash of the request fields and compares it with the MAC, which guarantees the authentication of the sender and the receiver. It then compares the reply route with the reverse of the request route, if it matches the source calculates the MAC using the header, key shared between the sender and the receiver and the reply route.

SECURITY MECHANISM AGAINST WORMHOLE ATTACK

This mechanism is attack specific and made for defense against the wormhole attack. This method proposes the incorporation of leashes to the packets. The leashes can be either geographical leashes or temporal leashes. A geographical leash raises an alert when the geographical distance is exceeded by the packet, so this ensures that the receiver is within a certain range from the sender. Temporal leashes have a time limit threshold, the expiration of which means that the packet is being transmitted for a long period of time which usually occurs when a wormhole is present. The geographical and temporal leashes can help in detecting a wormhole attack.

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Fig. 6: Illustration of wormhole attack

INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM

As the name implies, intrusion detection systems (IDS) [15] are used to detect the intrusion in a network. This is usually done by monitoring the network for malicious nodes or activities. These activities can be reported after detection. There are different types of intrusion detection systems based on what the network is monitored for to detect an intrusion. The most commonly used intrusion detection types are signature based, anomaly based, and specification based.

1. ANOMALY BASED IDS

In signature based intrusion detection system, the network is monitored, and the regular or normal conditions are defined. If any activity other than the ones in the definition take place in the network, then the node responsible for that activity is identified as a malicious node or intruder.

2. SPECIFICATION BASED IDS

In specification based intrusion detection system, the system defines what the correct or normal behavior of a mechanism or protocol is. If any operation or activity other than the ones defined by the system takes place, an intrusion detection alarm is raised.

3. SIGNATURE BASED IDS

In signature based intrusion detection system, the patterns and behavior of known and common attacks are maintained. In other words, signatures of the regular attacks are maintained. Whenever any irregular or abnormal activity occurs, its characteristics are compared with the signatures maintained for likeliness. If it matches, then intrusion is detected. This works well when the attacker makes use of the common and well-known attacks.

FUTURE WORK

The Intrusion detection systems are an efficient security enforcing mechanism which when used in the right way can be effective. A possible modification might be the design of an intrusion detection system that is based on location which involves detecting intrusion based on the location information of the node. This requires the node to forward its geographical information or location along with the other information when forwarding the packets. This can be done by the use of GPS or other positioning systems. They are already being used in position based routing protocols.

An authenticated node communicating initially has to communicate its location along with the message. Then the location identifier of the subsequent messages from the node with the same IP address has to be checked with the location that was sent by it initially taking into account the mobile node’s movement characteristics.

Its working is largely similar to the working of location based routing protocols. If a node’s location information changes erratically or inconsistently with the date being maintained, then intrusion can be detected based on that. It is an IDS that is similar to anomaly based IDS that might prevent the network against impersonation attacks such as IP spoofing.

While intrusion detection systems are useful in detecting intrusions, there should be some kind of mechanism incorporated to handle the intrusion will really improve the efficiency of using intrusion detection systems.

CONCLUSION

This paper studies the routing and security in wireless ad hoc networks. The main objective of this paper was to provide an overview of the routing protocols in MANET and the various security issues and attacks in ad hoc and a list of possible solutions to avoid overcome these issues. First, the characteristics of MANET that present a challenge for designing routing protocols and security mechanisms are described briefly. Then the description of how routing is performed is given along with the advantages and disadvantages associated with each protocol. The above described sections will then provide solid grounds for discussing the security issues that persist in MANET. A list of well known attacks and few solutions that are in existence were presented.

REFERENCDES

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MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS

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