State Fragility
Third World QuarTerly, 2017 Vol. 38, No. 6, 1291–1309 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1257907
Measuring state fragility: a review of the theoretical groundings of existing approaches
Ines A. Ferreira
School of international development, university of east anglia (uea), Norwich, united Kingdom
ABSTRACT State fragility has become a resonant term in the development discourse over the past decade. In its early days it served as a catch-all phrase used by donor organisations to draw attention to the need to assist ‘fragile states’. In response to the call for a better understanding of how to deal with these countries, there was a surge in measures of fragility. However, it was not long before academics pointed to the murkiness and fuzziness of the term, and identified several caveats to most of the proposals for quantification. This paper reviews existing approaches to operationalise this concept, distinguishing between those that offer no ranking or only partial rankings of fragile states, and those providing ordinal lists of countries. The examination of their theoretical underpinnings lends support to the critical view that most existing approaches are undermined by a lack of solid theoretical foundations, which leads to confusion between causes, symptoms and outcomes of state fragility.
Introduction
Over a decade has passed since the term ‘fragile states’ was adopted in the development vocabulary. The literature is now extensive and reflects the concerns of policymakers and the donor community over security and development as well as the urgency from academics to provide answers to their questions.
A growing number of review studies have engaged with different aspects of the fragile states discourse. In the early 2000s there was a lack of consensus on how to define the term, and a tendency to use it interchangeably with other expressions, such as ‘weak performers’, ‘failing states’ or ‘failed states’. In the face of these disparate views, some authors have attempted to organise the lexicon by describing the evolution of the term, and by attempting to categorise existing definitions.1
This increasing popularity, but also confusion, in the use of the term has led to the emer- gence of several critical voices, motivated by the political aspects inherent to labelling a country as a ‘fragile state’. While some have focused on the concept itself,2 others have looked more broadly at the discourse on state fragility. Among the latter studies, a few authors have discussed the (lack of sound) theoretical groundings of related concepts, such as state
© 2016 Southseries inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com
KEYWORDS Fragile states fragility measurement index ranking
ARTICLE HISTORY received 23 May 2016 accepted 3 November 2016
CONTACT ines a. Ferreira i.afonso-roque-Ferreira@uea.ac.uk; http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6174-4810
1292 I. A. FERREIRA
failure.3 More recently, a growing number of studies have looked into the underlying agendas of donors and recipient countries, and, specifically, into the political aspects inherent to the concept of fragile states.4 Grimm, Lemay-Hebert and Nay distinguish between ‘problem solvers’, who focus on performance issues and provide policy recommendations, and ‘critical scholars’, who question the values and assumptions underlying the concept.5 Notwithstanding the existing scepticism, according to Brinkerhoff, the ‘wicked problems’ of state fragility and failure remain in good currency despite their weaknesses.6
In parallel to the concerns with how to deal with fragile states, there was an obvious need to identify the countries that fell under that category. This was met by a profusion of quantification efforts, which either adopted existing indices, such as the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), to obtain lists of fragile states, or developed alternative measures, expressly aimed at measuring state fragility (eg Fragile States Index, Index of State Fragility). Yet, similarly to the attempts to define the concept, agreement is yet to be reached on how to measure state fragility. Different frameworks and methodologies have resulted in diverse lists and rankings of fragile states. These measures, and especially the popular use of indices, have been the object of scrutiny by different authors. Touching upon issues of conceptualisation, methodological approaches, and related technical aspects (eg coding and aggregation procedures), studies by Fabra Mata and Ziaja, Wennmann, and Gutierrez Sanin have pointed out several limitations to the existing meas- ures.7 The latter provides a comprehensive assessment of measurement instruments, iden- tifying some problems emerging in different stages of index building, and highlighting the importance of a sound theoretical grounding for maintaining coherence in the con- struction of the measure.8
The aim of this paper is to contribute to existing reviews by focusing on the attempts to operationalise the concept of state fragility, departing from existing studies that concentrate exclusively on the definitions of fragile states. The goal is to build upon the aforementioned work focusing on the implications of a lack of definitional clarity, and to scrutinise the the- oretical roots of existing conceptualisations, in line with previous studies looking at the theory underlying the concept of state failure. It is argued that, with some exceptions, there is a failure to clearly discuss the theoretical underpinnings upon which they are based. Additionally, none of the reviewed approaches provides a clear distinction between symp- toms and causes of state fragility.9
The paper is structured as follows. The next section offers an outline of existing approaches for measuring state fragility, whereas the third section is concerned with scrutinising their theoretical groundings. The final section summarises the key conclusions and offers some suggestions for future analysis.
Overview of existing measures
As the term became more and more ingrained in the development discourse, there was a growing concern with identifying the countries deemed fragile states, which in turn required some form of quantitative assessment of fragility. In response to this need, a number of analytical tools emerged aimed at operationalizing the concept and measuring different dimensions of state fragility. The baseline is the identification of a set of indicators that capture these perceived dimensions. Frequently, though not exclusively, these indicators are then aggregated to obtain an index of fragile states. In some cases, this measure serves
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1293
as a basis to establish a threshold level below which countries will be classified as fragile states, and/or to form rankings of countries. In other cases, the analytical exercises result in the identification of different categories of fragile states.
The following paragraphs provide more detail about the existing tools to measure state fragility, differentiating between approaches that provide: (1) no rankings of countries or only partial rankings of countries within those groups; and (2) overall rankings of countries according to their degree of fragility.
No ranking or partial rankings of fragile states
I start by considering the first group of proposals, which focus on identifying different groups of fragile states, based on specific criteria. Table 1 includes a summary of their main characteristics.
Stewart and Brown provide lists of countries according to the number of classifications of ‘failure’ or ‘risk’ in each of the dimensions identified (authority, service delivery, and legit- imacy), but no ordering of the countries is attempted.10 More specifically, different indicators are used for each dimension, considering distinct thresholds for situations of failure and risk of failure. The same applies to Goldstone et al., who, apart from a distinction between failing and failed states, only discuss examples of countries that fit into each of the 10 (five for each category), non-comparable, stylised scenarios they identify.11 These stylised scenarios are derived using a methodology that comprises five sequential steps, and serve as a basis to identify adequate strategies for intervention.
In the case of the approaches providing partial rankings of countries, these refer only to the groups identified in the analysis. Call’s conceptualisation of fragility distinguishes between three ‘gaps’ – in authority, legitimacy, and capacity.12 The author provides a ranking of the top 20 countries with the worst performance in each of these dimensions, based on their score in the indicator considered for each of the gaps. This division is used to provide some guidance for response in countries corresponding to each category, and some exam- ples of countries experiencing one, two and all of the gaps are also included. Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum obtain clusters of countries according to similar criteria and provide country rankings for each group using their degree of ‘typicality’.13 These authors consider a set of indicators for each of the dimensions of fragility they identify (authority, capacity and legitimacy). A mixture model is used to obtain different clusters of countries according to different combinations of these three dimensions, and ‘typical’ countries are also identified. Still, in both cases it is not assumed that the obtained classification of fragile states is ordinal.
Proposals providing overall rankings of fragile states
I turn now to the proposals of overall rankings of countries derived from fragility indices, whose main characteristics are summarised in Table 2. I focus here on the most frequently used indices for the measurement of fragility and on those whose description specifically refers to this concept, namely: the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Fragility Index, the aforementioned CPIA, the Fragile States Index, the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, and the State Fragility Index. All the scores resulting from these proposals are continuous (except for the State Fragility Index), thus enabling a full ranking of countries.
1294 I. A. FERREIRA
Ta bl
e 1.
P ro
po sa
ls p
ro vi
di ng
n o
ra nk
in g
or p
ar tia
l r an
ki ng
s o f f
ra gi
le st
at es
.
Re fe
re nc
e Co
nc ep
t D
efi ni
tio n
an d
di m
en si
on s
Th eo
re tic
al ro
ot s
In di
ca to
rs a
nd m
et ho
do lo
gy Ca
te go
rie s
Ca ll1
Fa ile
d st
at es
Fr
ag ile
st at
es Th
e de
fin iti
on o
f f ra
gi lit
y is
b as
ed o
n ga
ps in
th re
e di
m en
si on
s: c
ap ac
ity ,
se cu
rit y,
a nd
le gi
tim ac
y.
Th e
ra tio
na le
fo r e
ac h
of th
e di
m en
si on
s i s e
xp la
in ed
, b ut
th er
e is
n o
di sc
us si
on o
f i ts
th eo
re tic
al
fo un
da tio
ns .
Ca pa
ci ty
is p
ro xi
ed b
y th
e im
m un
is at
io n
ra te
s, an
d se
cu rit
y by
r ic
e an
d Pa
tr ic
k’ s i
nd ex
o f
se cu
rit y,
a nd
th e
in di
ca to
r o f
le gi
tim ac
y is
a c
om bi
na tio
n of
th e
ra tin
gs o
f p ol
iti ca
l r ig
ht s i
n th
e Po
lit y
iV d
at a
se t w
ith c
iv il
lib er
tie s
ra nk
in gs
o f F
re ed
om h
ou se
in
20 06
.2 Th
e in
di ca
to rs
a re
n ot
ag
gr eg
at ed
.
Pr op
os es
a c
at eg
or is
at io
n ac
co rd
in g
to th
e pa
rt ic
ul ar
g ap
s th
ey c
on fr
on t.
Co un
tr ie
s a re
de
si gn
at ed
a s f
ol lo
w s:
‘w ea
k st
at es
’, w he
n ex
pe rie
nc in
g a
ca pa
ci ty
g ap
; ‘w ar
-t or
n st
at es
’ w
he n
ex pe
rie nc
in g
a se
cu rit
y ga
p; ‘r
ep re
ss iv
e au
to cr
ac ie
s’,
w he
n ex
pe rie
nc in
g a
le gi
tim ac
y ga
p. G
ol ds
to ne
e t
al .3
Fa ili
ng st
at es
Fa
ile d
st at
es ‘S
ta te
s t ha
t a re
“f ai
lin g,
” “ in
fa ilu
re ,” o
r “r
ec ov
er in
g fr
om fa
ilu re
,” m ay
b e
co ns
id er
ed a
s a ll
– in
v ar
yi ng
de
gr ee
s – fr
ag ile
st at
es ’ (
3) . T
he
ca pa
ci ty
o f t
he st
at e
ca n
be
as se
ss ed
a cc
or di
ng to
fo ur
di
m en
si on
s o f s
ta te
–s oc
ie ty
re
la tio
ns : p
ol iti
ca l,
ec on
om ic
, s oc
ia l,
an d
se cu
rit y.
T he
c om
bi na
tio n
of
lo ss
o f e
ffe ct
iv en
es s a
nd le
gi tim
ac y
in e
ac h
of th
es e
fo ur
d im
en si
on s
re su
lts in
st at
e fa
ilu re
.
St at
e fr
ag ili
ty a
nd fa
ilu re
a re
se en
in
re la
tio n
to st
ab ili
ty . T
he a
na ly
si s i
s bu
ilt u
po n
an in
st itu
tio na
lis t
pe rs
pe ct
iv e,
a cc
or di
ng to
w hi
ch ‘[
w ]
he n
st at
es a
re fa
ili ng
, f ai
le d,
o r
re co
ve rin
g, la
st in
g st
ab ili
sa tio
n de
pe nd
s o n
re bu
ild in
g in
st itu
tio ns
in
w ay
s t ha
t p ro
vi de
la st
in g
in ce
nt iv
es to
c oo
pe ra
tiv e
be ha
vi ou
r’ (6
). Ba
se d
on th
is
as su
m pt
io n,
th e
au th
or s b
ui ld
a n
in st
itu tio
na l m
od el
.
d efi
ni tio
n of
w ar
ni ng
si gn
s b as
ed
on th
re sh
ol ds
fo r e
ffe ct
iv en
es s
an d
le gi
tim ac
y in
e ac
h of
th e
fo ur
di
m en
si on
s. Pr
op os
es fi
ve
se qu
en tia
l s te
ps to
id en
tif y
st yl
is ed
sc en
ar io
s a nd
p ro
po se
tr
ea tm
en t s
tr at
eg ie
s.
Th e
tw o
ov er
al l c
at eg
or ie
s di
st in
gu is
h be
tw ee
n fa
ili ng
a nd
fa
ile d
st at
es , a
nd w
ith in
e ac
h of
th
es e
gr ou
ps fi
ve st
yl is
ed
sc en
ar io
s a re
id en
tifi ed
.
G ra
vi ng
ho lt,
Zi
aj a
an d
Kr ei
ba um
4
St at
e fr
ag ili
ty Fr
ag ili
ty is
c on
ce pt
ua lis
ed a
s t he
in
ve rs
e of
st at
eh oo
d, w
hi ch
in tu
rn
co m
pr is
es th
re e
di m
en si
on s:
au
th or
ity , c
ap ac
ity a
nd le
gi tim
ac y.
it is
a rg
ue d
th at
e ac
h of
th e
th re
e di
m en
si on
s h as
b ee
n th
e fo
cu s o
f a
ce rt
ai n
st ra
nd o
f p ol
iti ca
l t he
or y
an d
re pr
es en
ts a
p ar
tic ul
ar ty
pe o
f st
at e-
–s oc
ie ty
re la
tio n.
T he
c on
ce pt
of
a ut
ho rit
y is
b as
ed o
n a
co rp
or at
is t s
tr an
d of
p ol
iti ca
l th
eo ry
, s ta
te c
ap ac
ity d
ra w
s f ro
m
th e
id ea
o f t
he e
xi st
en ce
o f a
co
nt ra
ct ua
l r el
at io
ns hi
p be
tw ee
n st
at e
an d
so ci
et y,
a nd
le gi
tim ac
y is
de
riv ed
fr om
th e
co ns
tr uc
tiv is
t pe
rs pe
ct iv
e on
th e
st at
e.
Th e
in di
ca to
rs o
f a ut
ho rit
y ar
e:
m on
op ol
y of
v io
le nc
e, h
om ic
id es
an
d ba
tt le
d ea
th s.
Ca pa
ci ty
is
pr ox
ie d
by u
nd er
-5 m
or ta
lit y,
pr
im ar
y en
ro lm
en t,
ac ce
ss to
w
at er
, a nd
b as
ic a
dm in
is tr
at io
n.
Ph ys
ic al
in te
gr ity
ri gh
ts v
io la
tio ns
, pr
es s f
re ed
om v
io la
tio ns
, a nd
gr
an te
d as
yl um
s b y
co un
tr y
of
or ig
in a
re u
se d
as in
di ca
to rs
o f
le gi
tim ac
y. T
he a
gg re
ga tio
n of
th e
in di
ca to
rs is
m ad
e by
ta ki
ng th
e m
in im
um v
al ue
th at
a ny
o f t
he
in di
ca to
rs ta
ke s i
n a
gi ve
n co
un tr
y ye
ar . a
m ix
tu re
m od
el is
th en
u se
d to
id en
tif y
cl us
te rs
o f c
ou nt
rie s,
ba se
d on
th e
sa m
pl e’s
sh ap
e.
Ba se
d on
th e
th re
e di
m en
si on
s, si
x gr
ou ps
o f c
ou nt
rie s a
re
id en
tifi ed
, w ith
a se
ve nt
h gr
ou p
fo rm
ed b
y th
e gr
ou p
of
co un
tr ie
s n ot
in cl
ud ed
in th
e gr
ou pi
ng s b
ec au
se o
f t he
ir hi
gh
le ve
l o f u
nc er
ta in
ty . T
yp ic
al
co un
tr ie
s a re
id en
tifi ed
fo r e
ac h
gr ou
p.
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1295
o rd
er ed
a lp
ha be
tic al
ly a
cc or
di ng
to th
e re
fe re
nc e.
So ur
ce s:
1 C al
l, “ Be
yo nd
th e ‘
Fa ile
d St
at e.’
” 2 ri
ce a
nd P
at ric
k, “i
nd ex
o f S
ta te
W ea
kn es
s.” 3 G
ol ds
to ne
e t a
l., “S
tr at
eg y
Fr am
ew or
k.” 4 G
ra vi
ng ho
lt, Z
ia ja
a nd
K re
ib au
m , “
St at
e Fr
ag ili
ty ”;
an d
G ra
vi ng
ho lt,
Z ia
ja
an d
Kr ei
ba um
, “ d
is ag
gr eg
at in
g St
at e
Fr ag
ili ty
.” 5 St
ew ar
t a nd
B ro
w n,
“F ra
gi le
S ta
te s.”
St ew
ar t a
nd
Br ow
n5 Fr
ag ile
st at
es Co
ns id
er th
at fr
ag ile
st at
es a
re th
os e
th at
a re
fa ili
ng , o
r a t r
is k
of fa
ili ng
, w
ith re
sp ec
t t o
au th
or ity
, co
m pr
eh en
si ve
se rv
ic e
en tit
le m
en ts
or
le gi
tim ac
y.
N o
re fe
re nc
e is
m ad
e to
th e
th eo
ry o
f th
e st
at e
un de
rly in
g th
e id
en tifi
ca -
tio n
of th
es e
di m
en si
on s.
St at
e fa
ilu re
is p
ro xi
ed b
y et
hn ic
o r
ci vi
l w ar
. T he
a bs
ol ut
e se
rv ic
e en
tit le
m en
t i nd
ex c
om bi
ne s c
hi ld
m
or ta
lit y,
p ro
vi si
on o
f c le
an w
at er
an
d pr
im ar
y sc
ho ol
e nr
ol m
en t.
le gi
tim ac
y fa
ilu re
is p
ro xi
ed b
y th
e le
ve l o
f d em
oc ra
tic g
ov er
n- an
ce . i
n th
e la
st tw
o di
m en
si on
s, bo
th a
bs ol
ut e
an d
pr og
re ss
iv e
m ea
su re
s a re
c on
si de
re d.
T he
an
al ys
is is
b as
ed o
n th
e de
fin iti
on
of th
re sh
ol ds
fo r e
ac h
in di
ca to
r, w
hi ch
a re
th en
c om
bi ne
d.
Pr ov
id e
lis ts
o f c
ou nt
rie s f
or e
ac h
of th
e th
re e
di m
en si
on s,
di ffe
re nt
ia tin
g be
tw ee
n fa
ile d
st at
es a
nd c
ou nt
rie s a
t r is
k of
fa
ilu re
.
1296 I. A. FERREIRA
Ta bl
e 2.
S el
ec te
d lis
t o f f
ra gi
lit y
in di
ce s.
In st
itu tio
n In
de x
A im
a nd
d im
en si
on s
Th eo
re tic
al ro
ot s
In di
ca to
rs a
nd m
et ho
do lo
gy Ra
nk in
gs Ca
rle to
n u
ni ve
rs ity
1 Co
un tr
y in
di ca
to rs
fo r
Fo re
ig n
Po lic
y (C
iF P)
F ra
gi lit
y in
de x
it as
se ss
es st
at e
pe rf
or m
an ce
al
on g
th re
e di
m en
si on
s o f s
ta te
- ho
od –
a ut
ho rit
y, le
gi tim
ac y,
an
d ca
pa ci
ty (a
lC ).
Th e
co nc
ep t o
f a ut
ho rit
y dr
aw s o
n th
e W
eb er
ia n
de fin
iti on
o f t
he st
at e
an d
is
si m
ila r i
n so
m e
re sp
ec ts
to
M an
n’ s2
d efi
ni tio
n of
de
sp ot
ic p
ow er
. T he
co
nc ep
t o f l
eg iti
m ac
y is
ba
se d
on W
eb er
’s de
fin iti
on
of th
e st
at e
an d
on a
nu
m be
r o f a
ss um
pt io
ns
ab ou
t t he
c ha
ra ct
er is
tic s o
f a
le gi
tim at
e st
at e.
T he
de
fin iti
on o
f c ap
ac ity
is
si m
ila r t
o M
ig da
l’s 3 i
n its
fo
cu s o
n th
e st
at e-
so ci
et y
re la
tio n,
th ou
gh th
e au
th or
s f ol
lo w
th e
u ni
te d
N at
io ns
d ev
el op
m en
t Pr
og ra
m m
e (u
N d
P’ s)
br
oa de
r u nd
er st
an di
ng .
M or
e th
an 7
0 in
di ca
to rs
, m ea
su rin
g pe
rf or
m an
ce in
g ov
er na
nc e,
ec
on om
ic s,
se cu
rit y
an d
cr im
e,
hu m
an d
ev el
op m
en t,
de m
og ra
ph y,
an
d en
vi ro
nm en
t. Fi
rs t,
st ru
ct ur
al
in di
ca to
rs a
re g
ro up
ed a
nd a
co
m po
si te
in de
x fo
r c ou
nt ry
pe
rf or
m an
ce a
lo ng
th os
e si
x ca
te go
rie s i
s c on
st ru
ct ed
. T he
re su
lts
fo r e
ac h
co un
tr y
ar e
th en
a ve
ra ge
d in
e ac
h su
bj ec
t c lu
st er
(a lC
).
Th e
sc al
e is
1 –9
(l ow
fr ag
ili ty
to h
ig h
fr ag
ili ty
). Co
un tr
ie s h
av e
sc or
es fo
r t he
di
ffe re
nt c
om po
ne nt
s o f t
he a
lC
ap pr
oa ch
a nd
a n
ov er
al l s
co re
. o ve
ra ll
fr ag
ili ty
sc or
es a
bo ve
6 .5
a re
c on
si de
re d
se rio
us .
W or
ld B
an k4
Co un
tr y
Po lic
y an
d in
st itu
tio na
l as
se ss
m en
t (C
Pi a)
it re
pr es
en ts
th e
qu al
ity o
f a
co un
tr y’
s p re
se nt
p ol
ic y
an d
in st
itu tio
na l f
ra m
ew or
k, in
te
rm s o
f h ow
c on
du ci
ve it
is to
fo
st er
in g
po ve
rt y
re du
ct io
n,
su st
ai na
bl e
gr ow
th , a
nd th
e eff
ec tiv
e us
e of
d ev
el op
m en
t as
si st
an ce
. i t i
s b as
ed o
n fo
ur
di m
en si
on s:
e co
no m
ic
m an
ag em
en t,
st ru
ct ur
al
po lic
ie s,
po lic
ie s f
or so
ci al
in
cl us
io n/
eq ui
ty , a
nd p
ub lic
se
ct or
m an
ag em
en t a
nd
in st
itu tio
ns .
N o
de ta
ile d
re fe
re nc
e to
th e
un de
rly in
g fr
am ew
or k
is
m en
tio ne
d in
th e
m ai
n do
cu m
en ts
.
Si xt
ee n
cr ite
ria re
la te
d to
th e
fo ur
di
m en
si on
s. Fo
r e ac
h di
m en
si on
, co
un tr
ie s a
re ra
te d
on a
sc al
e of
1
(lo w
) t o
6 (h
ig h)
. T he
ra tin
g pr
oc es
s in
cl ud
es : (
1) a
b en
ch m
ar ki
ng p
ha se
, du
rin g
w hi
ch th
er e
is th
e ra
tin g
of a
sm
al l b
ut re
pr es
en ta
tiv e
sa m
pl e
of
co un
tr ie
s s el
ec te
d fr
om a
ll re
gi on
s;
an d
(2 ) a
se co
nd p
ha se
, d ur
in g
w hi
ch th
e re
m ai
ni ng
c ou
nt rie
s a re
ra
te d
us in
g th
e sc
or es
fr om
th e
be nc
hm ar
k co
un tr
ie s a
s g ui
de po
st s.
ea ch
o f t
he fo
ur c
lu st
er s w
ei gh
s 2 5%
of
th e
ov er
al l s
co re
.
Th e
sc al
e is
1 –6
(l ow
to h
ig h)
. F ra
gi le
st at
es
ar e
co un
tr ie
s w ith
a C
Pi a
sc or
e of
3 .2
o r
le ss
. ‘F ra
gi le
S itu
at io
ns ’ h
av e:
e ith
er (1
) a
ha rm
on is
ed a
ve ra
ge C
Pi a
co un
tr y
ra tin
g of
3 .2
o r l
es s,
or (2
) t he
p re
se nc
e of
a
u ni
te d
N at
io ns
(u N
) a nd
/o r r
eg io
na l
pe ac
e- ke
ep in
g or
p ea
ce -b
ui ld
in g
m is
si on
du
rin g
th e
pa st
th re
e ye
ar s.
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1297
o rd
er ed
a lp
ha be
tic al
ly b
y th
e in
de x
na m
e. So
ur ce
s: 1 C
ar m
en t e
t a l.,
“2 00
6 Co
un tr
y in
di ca
to rs
”; Ca
rm en
t, Pr
es t a
nd S
am y,
“F ra
gi le
S ta
te s
Fr am
ew or
k” ; C
ar m
en t a
nd S
am y,
“a ss
es si
ng S
ta te
F ra
gi lit
y” ; a
nd h
tt p:
// w
w w
4. ca
rle to
n. ca
/c ifp
/ff s.h
tm .
2 C ite
d in
C ar
m en
t, Pr
es t a
nd S
am y,
“F ra
gi le
S ta
te s F
ra m
ew or
k,” 8
6. 3 i
bi d.
, 8 4.
4 W or
ld B
an k,
“C Pi
a 20
11 C
rit er
ia ”;
W or
ld B
an k,
“h ar
m on
is ed
l is
t.” 5 F
un d
fo r P
ea ce
a nd
F or
ei gn
P ol
ic y,
“F ra
gi le
S ta
te s i
nd ex
d
at a.”
6 r ic
e an
d Pa
tr ic
k, “i
nd ex
o f S
ta te
W ea
kn es
s.” 7 M
ar sh
al l a
nd G
ol ds
to ne
, “ G
lo ba
l r ep
or t o
n Co
nfl ic
t” ; a
nd M
ar sh
al l a
nd C
ol e,
“G lo
ba l r
ep or
t.”
Fu nd
fo r
Pe ac
e; Fo
re ig
n Po
lic y
jo ur
na l5
Fr ag
ile st
at es
in
de x
(F Si
) Ba
se d
on th
e co
lle ct
io n
of d
at a
on
th e
ex is
tin g
so ci
al a
nd
ec on
om ic
, a nd
p ol
iti ca
l a nd
m
ili ta
ry , p
re ss
ur es
fa ce
d by
e ac
h co
un tr
y, it
a llo
w s t
he
id en
tifi ca
tio n
of th
e no
rm al
pr
es su
re s t
ha t a
ll st
at es
ex
pe rie
nc e,
a nd
th os
e pr
es su
re s
th at
a re
p us
hi ng
th e
st at
e to
w ar
ds th
e ed
ge o
f f ai
lu re
.
Th e
m os
t c om
m on
a tt
rib ut
es
of st
at e
fr ag
ili ty
in cl
ud e
‘th e
lo ss
o f p
hy si
ca l c
on tr
ol o
f i ts
te
rr ito
ry o
r a m
on op
ol y
on
th e
le gi
tim at
e us
e of
fo rc
e;
th e
er os
io n
of le
gi tim
at e
au th
or ity
to m
ak e
co lle
ct iv
e de
ci si
on s;
a n
in ab
ili ty
to
pr ov
id e
re as
on ab
le p
ub lic
se
rv ic
es ; t
he in
ab ili
ty to
in
te ra
ct w
ith o
th er
st at
es a
s a
fu ll
m em
be r o
f t he
in
te rn
at io
na l c
om m
un ity
’, bu
t n o
in fo
rm at
io n
is
in cl
ud ed
o n
th e
un de
rly in
g th
eo ry
o f s
ta te
.
Si x
so ci
al a
nd e
co no
m ic
in di
ca to
rs a
nd
si x
po lit
ic al
a nd
m ili
ta ry
in di
ca to
rs ,
an d
m or
e th
an 1
00 su
b- in
di ca
to rs
. Th
e Co
nfl ic
t a ss
es sm
en t S
of tw
ar e
To ol
a tt
rib ut
es a
sc or
e to
e ac
h in
di ca
to r m
ea su
rin g
th e
si gn
ifi ca
nc e
of th
e va
rio us
p re
ss ur
es to
th e
co un
tr y.
T he
o ve
ra ll
as se
ss m
en t
re su
lts fr
om a
tr ia
ng ul
at io
n of
th es
e re
su lts
, q ua
nt ita
tiv e
an al
ys is
a nd
a
qu al
ita tiv
e ex
am in
at io
n of
th e
m aj
or
ev en
ts in
th e
co un
tr ie
s.
Th e
sc al
e is
1 –1
20 (l
ow fr
ag ili
ty to
h ig
h fr
ag ili
ty ).
in th
e re
po rt
c ou
nt rie
s a re
ca
te go
ris ed
b y
sc or
e qu
ar til
es : a
le rt
(9
0– 12
0) , w
ar ni
ng (6
0– 90
), st
ab le
(3
0– 60
), an
d su
st ai
na bl
e (0
–3 0)
.
Br oo
ki ng
s in
st itu
tio n6
in de
x of
st at
e w
ea kn
es s i
n th
e de
ve lo
pi ng
w
or ld
(i SW
)
it en
ab le
s t he
id en
tifi ca
tio n
of
po te
nt ia
l p at
te rn
s o f s
ta te
w
ea kn
es s,
ei th
er w
ith in
ge
og ra
ph ic
al re
gi on
s o r a
cr os
s fu
nc tio
na l a
re as
b y
ca pt
ur in
g st
at e
pe rf
or m
an ce
a cr
os s i
ts
fo ur
b as
ke ts
o f r
es po
ns ib
ili ty
: ec
on om
ic , p
ol iti
ca l,
se cu
rit y
an d
w el
fa re
.
it is
a rg
ue d
th at
th e
de fin
iti on
of
w ea
k st
at es
c on
si de
rs
w ha
t a re
c om
m on
ly
pe rc
ei ve
d as
th e
co re
fu
nc tio
ns o
f s ta
te ho
od .
Tw en
ty in
di ca
to rs
, w ith
fi ve
in di
ca to
rs
fo r e
ac h
ba sk
et . W
ith in
e ac
h ba
sk et
, th
e in
di ca
to r s
co re
s a re
st an
da rd
is ed
an
d ag
gr eg
at ed
, c re
at in
g in
di vi
du al
in
di ca
to r a
nd b
as ke
t s co
re s r
an gi
ng
fr om
0 .0
(w or
st ) t
o 10
.0 (b
es t)
. T he
fo
ur b
as ke
t s co
re s a
re a
ve ra
ge d
to
ob ta
in a
n ov
er al
l s co
re fo
r s ta
te
w ea
kn es
s.
Th e
sc al
e is
0 –1
0 (w
or st
to b
es t)
. C ou
nt rie
s ar
e cl
as si
fie d
as : ‘f
ai le
d st
at es
’ ( th
re e
w ea
ke st
c ou
nt rie
s) ; ‘c
rit ic
al ly
w ea
k st
at es
’ (b
ot to
m ra
nk q
ui nt
ile );
‘w ea
k st
at es
’ (s
ec on
d ra
nk q
ui nt
ile );
an d
‘st at
es to
w
at ch
’ ( th
os e
w ith
a si
gn ifi
ca nt
ly lo
w
sc or
e in
a t l
ea st
o ne
d im
en si
on ).
G eo
rg e
M as
on
u ni
ve rs
ity 7
St at
e fr
ag ili
ty
in de
x (S
Fi )
it is
a m
ea su
re o
f s ta
te e
ffe ct
iv e-
ne ss
a nd
le gi
tim ac
y in
th e
ke y
di m
en si
on s o
f s ec
ur ity
, go
ve rn
an ce
, e co
no m
ic s a
nd
so ci
al d
ev el
op m
en t,
ba se
d on
th
e id
ea th
at th
e st
at e’s
a bi
lit y
to w
in th
e lo
ya lty
o f i
ts p
eo pl
e de
pe nd
ed o
n its
p er
fo rm
an ce
in
th es
e sp
he re
s.
Th is
ra tio
na le
o f t
hi s m
ea su
re
is re
la te
d to
th e
id ea
th at
, i n
or de
r t o
ac hi
ev e
m ax
im um
st
ab ili
ty , t
he st
at e
m us
t ex
hi bi
t b ot
h di
m en
si on
s. Th
e an
al ys
is o
f f ra
gi lit
y is
pa
rt o
f a g
lo ba
l r ep
or t t
ha t
m ak
es u
se o
f s ys
te m
s a na
ly -
si s t
o un
de rs
ta nd
th e
lin ks
be
tw ee
n go
ve rn
an ce
, co
nfl ic
t a nd
d ev
el op
m en
t, bu
t n o
fu rt
he r d
et ai
l i s
pr ov
id ed
in re
la tio
n to
th e
fr ag
ili ty
in de
x.
ei gh
t i nd
ic at
or s o
n eff
ec tiv
en es
s a nd
le
gi tim
ac y
ac ro
ss th
e fo
ur
di m
en si
on s.
ea ch
in di
ca to
r i s r
at ed
on
a 4
-p oi
nt fr
ag ili
ty sc
al e,
w ith
th e
ex ce
pt io
n of
th e
ec on
om ic
eff
ec tiv
en es
s i nd
ic at
or , w
hi ch
is
ra te
d on
a 5
-p oi
nt fr
ag ili
ty sc
al e.
Th
es e
sc or
es a
re th
en c
om bi
ne d
in to
a
sc or
e fo
r e ffe
ct iv
en es
s a nd
a no
th er
fo
r l eg
iti m
ac y.
T he
o ve
ra ll
in de
x re
su lts
fr om
th e
su m
o f t
he se
tw o
sc or
es .
Th e
sc al
e is
0 –2
5 (n
o fr
ag ili
ty to
e xt
re m
e fr
ag ili
ty ).
Th e
ov er
al l i
nd ex
is th
e ba
si s f
or
a ra
nk in
g of
c ou
nt rie
s a cc
or di
ng to
th ei
r sc
or e.
1298 I. A. FERREIRA
In most of them, rankings for each of the dimensions of fragility identified are also provided alongside the ranking of countries according to the overall score.
Due to their emphasis on elements of state performance as well as conflict indicators, other indices have also been considered as providing a measure of state fragility. These include the State Weakness Index, part of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index; the Global Peace Index; the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger; the Political Instability Index; and the indicators of Political Stability and Absence of Violence, part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators.14 I refer to Fabra Mata and Ziaja, Gutierrez et al. and Gutierrez Sanin for more extensive reviews.15
The CPIA is indisputably the most widely used as an indicator of fragility. Initiated in the mid-1970s, the CPIA ratings were developed and used for allocation purposes, namely of the resources from the International Development Association (IDA). It evolved since its inception, undergoing a number of changes and adjustments over time. Currently the CPIA aims to assess how favourable the policy and institutional framework of a country is to the promotion of poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of development assistance. For that purpose, it considers 16 criteria grouped into four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions. Given its emphasis on policies and institutions, it provides an indication of state performance.
According to many academics and development organisations, this makes the index suitable as a measure of state fragility. It has been used by several organisations to define the group of fragile states. The World Bank considered the score 3.2 a threshold below which countries would be classified, first, as Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), and from 2009 onward as ‘fragile states’. In 2011 the same institution adopted the designation of ‘fragile situations’ for countries with either a harmonised average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or the presence of a United Nations (UN) and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years.16 This index has also been used in some academic analyses of fragile and failing states. McGillivray, and Feeny and McGillivray, con- sider fragile states those countries belonging to the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA or those not rated in the current CPIA rating exercise.17 Chauvet and Collier, and Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler, adopt a cut-off level of 2.5 for the CPIA, defining failing states as those with a score below this threshold for at least four consecutive years.18 Bertocchi and Guerzoni consider two alternative definitions of fragility, both based on the CPIA.19 However, the rationale for using this particular threshold is not explicitly explained by either of these institutions and authors.
More recently, several indices have been built with the specific aim of measuring state fragility. The Fund for Peace institute has proposed a Fragile States Index (FSI), which is also published by the Foreign Policy journal.20 It is used to provide a ranking of countries, which are then categorised by score quartiles: alert (90–120), warning (60–90), stable (30–60), and sustainable (0–30). The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) uses it to build its list of fragile states, which results from the compilation of the list of countries based on the aforementioned harmonised average of the CPIA scores (from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank), and the countries of the FSI which are in the ‘alert’ and ‘warning’ categories.21 Alongside the CPIA, this is also one of the indices considered for the list of fragile states used by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID).22
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1299
The Brookings Institution built the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (ISW). It served as a basis to classify countries according to four categories: ‘failed states’ (three weakest countries), ‘critically weak states’ (those in the bottom rank quintile), ‘weak states’ (those in the second rank quintile), and ‘states to watch’ (states with a significantly low score in at least one of the four dimensions). However, the country rankings have only been pub- lished for the year 2008.
In line with their work on fragile states, the research centres at Carleton University and George Mason University also offer their own indices of fragility.23 Based on the conceptu- alisation of fragility developed by Carment, Prest and Samy, the CIFP Fragility Index provides an overall score of fragility, as well as disaggregated scores for authority, legitimacy and capacity.24 This is the measure adopted by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Researchers at George Mason University have built the State Fragility Index (SFI), rooted in Marshal and Goldstone’s matrix of fragility, which serves as a basis for a ranking of countries.25
Although less prominent in the debate on fragility, a few other indices are worth men- tioning. First, I briefly introduce two additional indices that were not included in the previous paragraphs due to lack of information. Even if not publicly available, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has its own ‘Alert List’ for Conflict and Instability, which ranks 160 countries in order of fragility, based on their internally built index.26 It is known that the underlying framework for this approach is provided by Goldstone et al., detailed above, and that the operationalisation of the concept is based upon the proposals in ARD, but no further details are provided.27 The second fragility index is the one underlying the proposal of the Crisis State Research Centre. In Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States, refer- ence is made to an aggregated index resulting from the variables included in their Monopoly of Violence, Administration and Territorial Reach (MAT) database.28 This database and the tools used in their quantitative analyses are described in detail elsewhere, but with no specific description of this fragility index or its application.29
Despite not frequently being referred to in discussions of fragility indices, the State Failure Problem Set, disclosed annually by the Political Instability Task Force (previously State Failure Task Force), offers a data set of internal wars and failures of governance which includes data since 1955 on four distinct types of state failure: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides.30 This measure differs from the ones described in the previous paragraphs in its narrower focus on state collapse and its concep- tually different approach to state failure. Two of the included variables, namely ‘failure of state authority’ and ‘collapse of democratic institutions’, are more directly linked to the described concepts. The first refers to situations in which central state institutions are weak- ened to the point that authority or political order can no longer be maintained in significant parts of the territory.31 The latter applies to situations in which autocratic political institutions, through the use or threat of force, weaken or replace democratic or quasi-democratic institutions.32
Finally, it is important to highlight the recent advances proposed in the OECD’s report States of Fragility: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions.33 The recognition of the need to consider multidimensional approaches to state fragility along with a concern with designing a strategy for post-2015 led to the suggestion of a new framework for identifying fragile states. This is based on the disaggregation of fragility into five dimensions. Each dimension is proxied by an index that results from the average of three normalised indicators and is designed to
1300 I. A. FERREIRA
measure goals drawn from Goal 16, which aims at promoting ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’.34 They include the following fragility ‘lenses’: peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice, effective and accountable institutions, economic foun- dations, and resilience.35
The focus on different dimensions of state fragility is common among existing proposals, though from varied perspectives. Whereas some focus on the outcomes of state fragility in different aspects, such as social, economic or political dimensions, others focus on the per- formance of countries across state functions, such as capacity or legitimacy. I argue that the latter should inform the operationalisation of the concept in order to avoid confusing causes and consequences of state fragility. In the next section I examine their theoretical roots in more detail.
Theoretical underpinnings of existing approaches
As pointed out by Bhuta, a key challenge of measuring state fragility is definitional.36 In fact, the fuzziness of the term and the broadness and vagueness of current definitions are fre- quently highlighted in critical appraisals. Given the complexity and multidimensionality of state fragility, the discourse is frequently disconnected from the theoretical roots of the concept, which has also led to the use of inappropriate tools to understand it.37
The construction of an index should be based on a sound working definition of the con- cept. According to Goertz, it implies the identification of the concept as employed in theo- retical propositions, as well as its constitutive dimensions, which will finally be measured by appropriate indicators.38 A clear and grounded theoretical framework is essential to inform the operationalisation of the concept. Not only does it identify the dimensions of state fragility, which will in turn determine the indicators to be used, but it also establishes the relationships between these dimensions, which will indicate the suitable aggregation pro- cedure to obtain the measurement tool.
Bearing in mind the complexity of the concept of state fragility, completing these steps can be particularly challenging. Existing proposals have been criticised for the lack of clarity in the explanation of their theoretical basis39 – namely, the underlying theory of the state – and for the fact that they overlook the distinction between symptoms, correlates and causes of fragility.40 To help assess the approaches described in the previous sections, and in light of the aforementioned framework, this section focuses on these two elements.
Apart from the CPIA, which was not specifically built as a measure of state fragility,41 existing proposals are based on a working definition of the concept. Common to these definitions is a focus on the performance of the state in what are perceived to be its core functions. However, there is some divergence in the identification of the key state functions, as well as the capabilities that the state needs to have in order to perform them. Current proposals can be divided broadly according to the latter element. One group of definitions focuses on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state as determinants of state strength (in opposition to fragility), whereas others adopt a three-dimensional approach, which, with some variation, draws upon the concepts of authority, legitimacy and capacity.42
The first group of definitions establishes the different functions associated with statehood, and views the performance of the state in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness. These two dimensions are used in the approach proposed by Goldstone et al., which is also used by USAID. According to these authors, the notion of fragile states encompasses, to different
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1301
degrees, states that are ‘failing’, ‘in failure’, or ‘recovering from failure’.43 States can fail in either of two senses: (1) ‘in the functional sense of losing the dominant role in enforcing law and order in their territories’; and (2) ‘in the normative sense of failing at those tasks that we think states should do: enforce justice and protect minorities, provide the conditions for economic growth, cope with natural and humanitarian disasters’.44 The authors develop a matrix intended to summarise the complexity of state capacity. This matrix is based on the assess- ment of four dimensions of state–society relations – political, economic, social, and security – in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. According to Goldstone et al., the provision of minimal public services is considered the bottom line of effectiveness.45 Although the con- ceptualisation of these two dimensions is explored in detail, the underlying theoretical basis is not always explicit.46
This approach is also followed by the Centre for Systemic Peace. The matrix of fragility that forms the basis for their State Fragility Index assesses the country’s performance in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy across the four dimensions mentioned above: security, political, economic and social. According to their definition, fragility is closely linked with the capacity of the state to ‘manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services’ and also with ‘its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive development’.47 In order to achieve maximum stability, the state must exhibit both effectiveness – ‘carry out the tasks expected of a competent government’ – and legit- imacy – ‘by being perceived as just and fair in the manner it carries out those tasks’.48 However, there is some lack of clarity in terms of the theory used to justify this view of the stable state.
Despite doing so less explicitly, Rice and Patrick draw upon related concepts.49 These authors use the designation ‘weak states’, but describe similar characteristics. It is argued that state weakness is measured according to the effectiveness in:
fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs for their population.50
These four elements are proxied by economic, political, security and social welfare indicators. According to Rice and Patrick, this definition is intended to capture the government respon- sibilities that are commonly considered as core state functions.51 However, the only allusion to a theoretical appraisal of these functions is a footnote referring to two previous volumes on the topic of state failure.52
The definitions in the second group provide a clearer description of the theoretical roots of the concepts used. With some variation, they focus on three dimensions associated with well-functioning states – authority, legitimacy and capacity – and the essential functions are derived from them.
Carment et al. propose a definition of state fragility based on the assumption that ‘it is the presence or absence of a functional government that distinguishes functional from fragile and failed states’.53 Fragility measures the extent to which the actual practices and capacities of the state for providing its basic functions differ from their ideal image, which is the one reified in both state theory and international law.54 The authors argue that there are three fundamental properties which reflect the functions of a state and its component parts: (1) authority, which refers to the ‘ability to enact binding legislation over its population’ and ‘to provide a stable and secure environment’; (2) legitimacy, which reflects ‘the ability
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of a state to command public loyalty to the governing regime, and to generate domestic support for that government’s legislation and policy’; and, finally, (3) capacity, which refers to ‘the power of a state to mobilise public resources towards productive ends’.55 The identi- fication of these elements is based on the determinants of state strength listed by Gurr, namely capacity, legitimacy, and the integrative role of the state.56 The theoretical grounding for each of these three properties is described in more detail, namely with reference to the Weberian definition of the state.
Call proposes a disaggregated approach to the problems posed by failed and fragile states based on the analysis of gaps in three similar dimensions.57 The author argues that there is: (1) a ‘legitimacy gap’ where the rules regulating the exercise of power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth are rejected by a significant group of the state’s political elites and society; (2) a ‘capacity gap’ where the institutions of a state lack the capability to deliver minimal public goods and services to the population; and, finally, (3) a ‘security gap’ where states do not provide minimal levels of security when confronted with organised armed groups.58
By the same token, Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum’s notion of state fragility is based on a vision of statehood as comprising three distinct, but interrelated, dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy.59 Although recognising the similarity to Carment et al.’s definition, their conceptualisation of these dimensions is closer to that of Call.60 Each of them is based on a particular type of state–society relation, namely: (1) authority refers to the control of violence by the state; (2) capacity concerns the provision of basic services to the citizens; and (3) legitimacy is linked with the acceptance, or refusal to accept, by the society of the state’s claim as the legitimate actor to set and enforce generally binding rules.61 Even if referring to Call’s work and describing the three dimensions,62 some have found their justi- fication for the choice of these dimensions as lacking in detail.63
Drawing upon a similar distinction between the dimensions of state fragility, Stewart and Brown define fragile states ‘as states that are failing, or at risk of failing with respect to author- ity, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy’.64 Although the core list of state func- tions remains similar to those in the previous approaches, there is a distinction in terms of the attributes of the state necessary to perform them. The authors consider comprehensive basic service provision instead of state capacity, as they argue that service failures may result from either lack of capacity or lack of will. In addition to that, Stewart and Brown introduce an additional element of distinction between actual failure and risk of failure.65 The criteria used to determine whether there is a failure in each of these dimensions are explained in more detail. The ‘authority’ of the state is related to the protection from violence, whereas ‘legitimacy’ is linked with elements such as the democratic character of the regime and the civil and political liberties. A comprehensive service provision includes health services, basic education, water and sanitation, basic transport and energy infrastructure, and reduction in income poverty. Still, unlike the aforementioned definitions, there is no explicit reference to the theoretical underpinnings of the proposed definition and the three dimensions it encompasses.
This overview indicates that, although there is a concern with clarifying the terms used in the definitions and with identifying relevant proxies, in most cases, there is no reference to the underlying theory of the state. Exceptions to this lack of clarity are Carment, Prest and Samy, Call, and Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, who dedicate more extensive sections to explaining the theoretical roots of the focus on authority, legitimacy and capacity.66 However,
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neither of these works allows for the distinction between symptoms and causes of state fragility, which, it is argued here, is essential for a better understanding of the complexity of this phenomenon.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to review current proposals to measure state fragility, focusing on the underlying definitions of the concept and their theoretical underpinnings. In so doing, some important caveats have been identified that can be overcome in future work. More specifically, most existing approaches are undermined by a lack of solid theoretical founda- tions, which leads to confusion between causes, symptoms and outcomes of state fragility. Additionally, the present review offers a useful tool for policymakers by providing a summary of existing measures and some clues for the search for improved instruments.
As highlighted above, some of the existing approaches are based on more thorough theoretical considerations, whereas the foundations of others are weaker and deserve more clarity. A few recent efforts have been made to provide theoretical models of state fragility. For instance, focusing on late-century Africa, and referring to state failure, Bates provides a model to determine the conditions for the prevalence of political order.67 It is argued that there is a state when there is an equilibrium resulting from the choices that characterise that political order, and the model derives the determinants of this equilibrium. Also, Besley and Persson put forward a framework for analysing fragile states by exploring the origins of state fragility, and, more specifically, how different factors contribute to different types of fragile states.68 Both proposals offer useful starting points to derive hypotheses regarding the main causes of state fragility, and to distinguish them from what are its dimensions, or pathologies, using Besley and Persson’s terminology.69
One prominent aspect of some of the current approaches is their focus on different dimen- sions of state fragility. However, considering the rankings of countries based on fragility indices, they do not take into account this multidimensional character of the concept when operationalising it (particularly when it comes to the choice of the aggregation procedure). Recent views in the academic world warn of the fact that, by using additive indices to rank countries according to a single aggregate measure, these proposals overlook the heteroge- neity among fragile states.70 The donor community moves in a similar direction, drawing attention to ‘the need for new approaches to assessing and monitoring fragility using metrics that do not reduce fragility measures to a single index but rather allow for tracking multiple (and potentially uncorrelated) dimensions’.71 However, with the exception of the recent sug- gestions by Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, and OECD, the call for departing from overall scores has yet to inform existing indices.72 This proves even more relevant when one con- siders that different types of fragility will require distinct forms of assistance. As expressed in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, there is an urgent need to improve the effectiveness of the assistance to fragile states.73 Thus, a better understanding of the differ- entiation between types of fragility is of crucial importance for policy decision-making.
Finally, a last remark is in order on the need to pursue better approaches to the measure- ment of state fragility. Despite the criticism it has been subject to, the term still holds sway over the development lexicon. Given its complexity and underlying political aspects, there is a need to ‘tame the wickedness of the state fragility/failure problem set’74 by adopting a term in common use while simultaneously examining the diversity of the phenomenon that
1304 I. A. FERREIRA
it assembles.75 This paper concurs with this view and hopes to inspire the pursuit of better answers and to motivate further research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was supported by the FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia under Grant SFRH/BD/100811/2014.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Arjan Verschoor and Edward Anderson for their helpful comments and advice provided. I also thank two anonymous referees for their insightful suggestions.
Notes on Contributor
Ines A. Ferreira is a PhD candidate at the University of East Anglia. Her research project examines the impact of development aid in fragile states. She holds an MSc in political economy of late development from the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK), and master’s and bachelor’s degrees in economics from the University of Coimbra (Portugal). Besides aid effectiveness, she is interested in the concept and measurement of state fragility.
Notes
1. eg Cammack et al., “Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda”; Engberg-Pederson, Anderson and Stepputat, “Fragile Situations”; and Bertoli and Ticci, “Fragile Guideline.”
2. Boege et al., “Building Peace”; and Nay, “Fragile and Failed States.” 3. Hameiri, “Failed States”; and Di John, “Concept, Causes and Consequences.” See also Milliken
and Krause, “State Failure”; Boas and Jennings, “Insecurity and Development”; Di John, “Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences”; and, more recently, Ayers, “Illusion of the Epoch”; and Hampel, “Dark(er) Side,” for critical analyses of the concept of state failure and the ideology behind it.
4. Cammack et al., “Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda”; Hout, “Between Development and Security”; Barakat and Larson, “Fragile States.”
5. Grimm, Lemay-Hebert and Nay, “Fragile States.” This is the introduction to a special issue on fragile states. See the full issue for more detailed accounts of how the concept is used by different development actors, from donor agencies to governments.
6. Brinkerhoff, “State Fragility.” 7. Fabra Mata and Ziaja, “User’s Guide”; Ziaja and Fabra Mata, “State Fragility Indices”; Wennmann,
“Grasping the Strengths of Fragile States”; and Gutierrez Sanin, “Evaluating State Performance.” 8. Gutierrez Sanin, “Evaluating State Performance.” 9. Similar arguments have been advanced before, for instance, in Besley and Persson, “Fragile
States”; and Lambach, Johais and Bayer, “Conceptualising State Collapse.” 10. Stewart and Brown, “Fragile States.” 11. Goldstone et al., “Strategy Framework.” 12. Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State.’”
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13. Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, “State Fragility.” 14. Fabra Mata and Ziaja, “User’s Guide.” The State Weakness Index was not considered given that
it is no longer provided as part of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which now only offers scores for the state of political and economic transformation as well as transformation management.
15. Fabra Mata and Ziaja, “User’s Guide”; Ziaja and Fabra Mata, “State Fragility Indices”; Gutierrez et al., “Measuring Poor State Performance”; and Gutierrez Sanin, “Evaluating State Performance.”
16. World Bank, “Harmonised List.” The term ‘harmonised’ refers to the averaging of the World Bank CPIA scores with those of the African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank.
17. McGillivray, “Aid Allocation”; and Feeny and McGillivray, “Aid Allocation to Fragile States.” 18. Chauvet and Collier, “What Are the Preconditions”; and Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler, “Paradise
Lost.” 19. Bertocchi and Guerzoni, “Fragile Definition”; and Bertocchi and Guerzoni, “Growth, History or
Institutions.” 20. Previous to 2014, this index was designated the Failed States Index. 21. See, for instance, OECD, “Fragile States 2013.” 22. DFID uses as a working definition of fragile states the following: ‘countries where the government
cannot or will not deliver core state functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’, and its list of fragile states draws on the CPIA, the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace, and the Uppsala Conflict Database. Independent Commission for Aid Impact, “Assessing the Impact,” 2.
23. Carment, Prest and Samy, “Fragile States Framework”; Marshal and Goldstone, “Global Report on Conflict.”
24. Carment, Prest and Samy, “Fragile States Framework.” 25. Marshal and Goldstone, “Global Report on Conflict.” 26. Bhuta, “Measuring Stateness,” 7. 27. Goldstone et al., “Strategy Framework”; ARD, “Measuring Fragility.” 28. Putzel and Di John, “Meeting the Challenges,” 18. 29. Gutierrez et al., “Measuring Poor State Performance.” 30. Marshall, Gurr and Harff, “PITF Codebook 2014.” 31. Ibid., 12. 32. Ibid., 13. 33. OECD, States of Fragility 2015. 34. Ibid., 19. 35. Ibid., 104. 36. Bhuta, “Measuring Stateness,” 7. 37. See Faust, Gravingholt and Ziaja, “Foreign Aid,” for a discussion of the cognitive challenge
associated with identifying the causes of state fragility and with finding suitable instruments to understand it.
38. Goertz, “Social Science Concepts,” 6–7. 39. Lambach, Johais and Bayer, “Conceptualising State Collapse.” 40. Besley and Persson, “Fragile States”; and Gutierrez Sanin, “Evaluating State Performance,” 21.
Besley and Persson also highlight that a conceptualisation based on a sound theory will enable the distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors. Besley and Persson, “Fragile States.”
41. For this reason, the analysis of this index is not included in this section. 42. This list of proposals does not make claims of completeness. The selection was made on the
basis of the aforementioned dimensions of state fragility, which appear to be the most common among existing frameworks. For other, more extensive, lists of dimensions, I refer to Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan’s framework based on 10 functions for the modern sovereign state. Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap.”
Additionally, Kaplan has proposed to categorise fragile states (or ‘political orders’, in the terminology of the author) around four types, based on their level of political fragmentation and government capacity. Kaplan, “Identifying Truly Fragile States.”
1306 I. A. FERREIRA
In a different account, but also using a multidimensional approach, the Crisis State Research Centre proposes a definition of fragility based on four attributes of the state, which constitute the basis for a fragility-to-resilience spectrum. Putzel and Di John, “Meeting the Challenges.”
43. Goldstone et al., “Strategy Framework.” 44. Ibid., 3. 45. Ibid. 46. Goldstone builds upon this approach and maps out different pathways of state failure.
Goldstone, “Pathways to State Failure.” 47. Marshall and Cole, “Global Report,” 51. 48. Marshall and Goldstone, “Global Report on Conflict,” 13–4. 49. Rice and Patrick, “Index of State Weakness.” 50. Ibid., 3. 51. Ibid., 8. 52. Patrick considers the same definition of state weakness and proposes a typology of seven
categories of countries, from ‘endemically weak states’ to ‘reform-minded governments’, based not only on their current situation, but also on their trajectory. Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security,” 651.
53. Carment et al., “2006 Country Indicators,” 5. 54. Carment, Prest and Samy, “Fragile States Framework,” 84. 55. Carment et al., “2006 Country Indicators,” 6–7. 56. Cited in Carment, Prest and Samy, “Fragile States Framework,” 83–4. 57. Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State.’” 58. Ibid., 306–8. 59. Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, “State Fragility”; and Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum,
“Disaggregating State Fragility.” 60. Carment et al., “2006 Country Indicators”; Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State.’” 61. Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, “Disaggregating State Fragility,” 1290–2. 62. Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State.’” 63. Lambach, Johais and Bayer, “Conceptualising State Collapse,” 1301. 64. Stewart and Brown, “Fragile States,” 3. 65. Ibid. 66. Carment, Prest and Samy, “Fragile States Framework”; Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’”; and
Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, “State Fragility.” 67. Bates, “Logic of State Failure.” 68. Besley and Persson, “Fragile States.” 69. Ibid. 70. Zulueta-Fulscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness.” 71. OECD, States of Fragility 2015, 45. 72. Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, “State Fragility”; Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum,
“Disaggregating State Fragility”; and OECD, States of Fragility 2015. 73. This agreement was signed in Busan in 2011 by the G7 and the group of 19 fragile and conflict-
affected countries, development partners, and international organisations. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “New Deal.”
74. Brinkerhoff, “State Fragility,” 337. 75. Gisselquist, “Varieties of Fragility,” 1272.
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- Abstract
- Introduction
- Overview of existing measures
- No ranking or partial rankings of fragile states
- Proposals providing overall rankings of fragile states
- Theoretical underpinnings of existing approaches
- Conclusion
- Disclosure statement
- Funding
- Acknowledgements
- Notes on Contributor
- Notes
- Bibliography