Emergency Support Function

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CHAPTER 4

RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION This chapter explains how people perceive the risks of environmental hazards and the actions they can take to protect themselves from those hazards. Addressing such perceptions is the most common way for emergency managers to change the behavior of those at risk from long-term threats or imminent impacts of disasters. This chapter describes the Protective Action Decision Model, which summarizes findings from studies of household response to disasters, and concludes with recommendations for risk communication during the continuing hazard phase, escalating crises, and emergency response.

Introduction

Risk can be defined broadly as a condition in which there is a possibility that persons or property

could experience adverse consequences. Some people, by virtue of their access to data or their specialized

expertise in interpreting those data, have more information than others about the risk of a particular

hazard and about ways in which that risk can be managed. These risk analysts have a responsibility to

convey their assessments to decisionmakers who must determine what action to take in response to the

risk that the analyst has characterized. These assessments typically define risk in terms of the likelihood

that an event of a given magnitude will occur at a given location within a given time period and describe

the expected consequences that the event will inflict on persons, property, and social functioning. The

decisionmakers to whom the analysts communicate this information can be either the population at risk or

emergency managers who are responsible for protecting the population at risk. In either case, the principal

reason for risk communication is to initiate and direct protective action.

Risk communication has become a common concept in recent decades—appearing in many

contexts (infectious diseases, food additives, natural hazards, routine effluents, and technological

accidents) and referring to many target groups (employees, households, minority groups, and legislators,

to name only a few). The principal concern of this chapter will be events that, because of their rapid onset

and the large amounts of energy or materials released, have the potential to cause significant numbers of

casualties and substantial amounts of property damage unless timely and effective action is taken.

Some of these extreme events originate in the natural environment and, thus, are known as

natural hazards. Events involving the release of substantial amounts of energy (e.g., earthquakes) can

cause immediate destruction of buildings and infrastructure, inflicting many casualties (deaths, injuries,

and illnesses) and much disruption to social, economic, and political activities. In some cases, these

effects are immediate, whereas in other cases they might take years to manifest themselves.

In addition to hazards originating in the natural environment, there are also hazards that are

transmitted through the natural environment. These include some, but not all, of what are commonly

referred to as technological hazards. Some technological hazards can have a very rapid onset and have the

potential for killing many people very quickly unless there is a prompt and effective emergency response.

Others involve the cumulative effect of routine air- or water-borne releases from technological facilities

or contamination of food and drugs. Many exposures to these hazards unfold over an extended period of

time and the adverse health effects even more delayed—frequently producing low incidence rates of

disease in the affected population. Regardless of the speed of onset or the persistence of the hazard, the

same principles of risk communication are likely to apply.

There is, however, a temporal distinction that is central to the organization of this chapter—the

amount of time between the detection of the hazard and the onset of exposure. A risk communication

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effort addressing the imminent threat of an extreme event is referred to as a warning; it is intended to

produce an appropriate emergency response. By contrast, a risk communication program addressing the

long-term potential for such events to occur is often known as a hazard awareness program; such efforts

are intended to produce long-term hazard adjustments. There are quite distinct research literatures on

natural and technological hazards that have produced similar conclusions about warnings but have

encountered an important difference in the case of hazard awareness programs. Natural hazards seem to

arouse substantially less concern than technological hazards, so risk communication programs about the

long-term threat of natural hazards generally have sought to increase public concern. By contrast, risk

communication programs about the long-term threat of technological hazards have more frequently

sought to decrease public concern. Research on technological risk perception has sought to explain why

some hazards elicit more concern than others, and it appears the difference is due, at least in part, to such

hazard characteristics as the voluntariness and controllability of hazard exposure and the degree of dread

about its consequences (Slovic, 1987).

Risk communication attempts to promote appropriate protective behavior by those to whom the

information is directed; such hazard adjustments to long-term threats include modifying the hazard,

modifying the hazard’s impact by preventing specific effects, moving to another location, changing the

land use to reduce hazard vulnerability, sharing the loss, or bearing the loss (Burton, et al., 1993).

Alternatively, one can think of such behavior changes as disaster responses to an imminent threat by such

actions as evacuating, sheltering in-place, expedient respiratory protection, or food interdiction (Drabek,

1986; Mileti, Drabek & Haas, 1975).

In general, this chapter will emphasize the communication of information to those who are

actually at risk of exposure to a hazard, but also will recognize the need for communicating to those who

think they are at risk of exposure to the hazard even if authorities do not share this belief. In the latter

case, messages are sometimes needed to convince people they do not need to take protective actions

because they will not be exposed to the hazard or because the actions being taken by authorities will be

sufficient to protect them. Alternatively, such messages might be designed to convince people that hazard

managers do not need to implement protective actions because the costs of responding outweigh the risk.

Moreover, authorities are occasionally knowledgeable enough about citizens’ concerns that a one-way

communication flow from them to citizens will produce results that are satisfactory to all concerned. In

practice, however, authorities frequently need feedback from citizens and should expect such feedback

whether or not they believe it is needed. For most environmental hazards, the risk communication process

should be based upon a hazard analysis that identifies risk areas—the geographical locations in which the

environmental extremes are expected to occur—and the mechanisms by which exposure can occur. The

risk communication process also should be guided by a vulnerability analysis identifying the populations

and property located in those risk areas. These analyses provide the basic data upon which messages can

be formulated that describe the vulnerability of different population segments and the protective

responses that are appropriate to reduce these risks.

It is important to recognize that one cannot focus exclusively on a risk analyst’s definition of the

situation to generate risk messages. Unfortunately, many well-intended attempts at risk communication

are based on the assumption that risk area populations fail to implement analysts’ protective action

recommendations because they are unaware of or misperceive the risk. Thus, analysts assume that

disseminating scientific information about the hazard agent will motivate people to adopt their protective

action recommendations. This assumption is correct in some cases, but it substantially oversimplifies the

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risk communication process because it ignores the roles of the information source, the channel by which

the information is transmitted, and the individual differences among message receivers. In addition, this

naive approach to risk communication also ignores the effects of impediments to information processing

such as competing demands for attention, the use of cognitive heuristics (simplified rules of thumb for

processing complex information), and conflicts of the new information with people’s existing beliefs

(Yates, 1990). Finally, such an approach neglects the social structural (community) and cultural

environments in which communication processes are immersed (Gudykunst, 1998).

Instead, risk communication should be a process in which stakeholders share information about

hazards affecting a community. The use of the term sharing is important because risk analysts and

emergency managers must understand how different segments of the population at risk think about a

hazard if they are to be effective in communicating with their audience. These population segments

include businesses and households that are vulnerable to a specific hazard, as well as community and

industry personnel who are responsible for managing a hazard in ways that reduce the risk to a level that

is acceptable to the community.

People’s attentiveness to risk communication varies across the four emergency management

functions—hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery.

Decades ago, Fritz (1968) observed most of the money and resources for emergency management are

expended in connection with response and recovery activities. This is consistent with the cycle, noted in

previous chapters, of significant citizen and government interest in disasters only during imminent threats

and in the immediate aftermath of disasters. However, public attention declines significantly as time

passes. Because considerable time is required to translate public concern into government budget

allocations and coherent programs, many mitigation and preparedness programs have simply failed to be

implemented (Birkland, 1997; Prater & Lindell, 2000).

The important differences between imminent threat associated with response and recovery and

the long-term threat associated with mitigation and preparedness—especially the significant differences in

the behavior risk communicators should expect from those at risk—suggests there should be

corresponding differences in the risk communication processes associated with these two different types

of situations. This dichotomy between imminent and long-term threats does not imply that two

completely different theories are needed to guide risk communication. In fact, most of the same

theoretical principles are relevant to both situations, so a single theoretical model can account for short-

term warning response and long-term hazard adjustment. Nonetheless, each of these situations requires

specific modifications of the overall model.

The Classical Persuasion Model

According to Lasswell (1948), all communication should be analyzed in terms of who (Source)

says what (Message), via what medium (Channel), to whom (Receiver), and directed at what kind of

change (Effect). This classical persuasion model, which is depicted in Figure 4-1, was further articulated

by Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) and has remained the predominant conceptual approach in the field

of communication, and especially research on persuasive communication (McGuire, 1969, 1985;

O’Keefe, 1990).

Research guided by this model has found sources are perceived primarily in terms of expertise

and trustworthiness, but also by other characteristics such as status, likeability, and attractiveness. Similar

to French and Raven’s (1959; Raven, 1964) definitions of expert and information power, a source’s

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expertise is defined by its information about a situation and knowledge about cause-and-effect

relationships in the environment. By contrast, trustworthiness refers to a source’s willingness and ability

to provide accurate information and take actions that protect the receiver without seeking hidden

advantage for him- or herself.

Figure 4-1. The Classical Persuasion Model.

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

Messages vary in their content—especially their information about a hazard, its impact

characteristics (e.g., magnitude, location, and time of impact), potential personal consequences (e.g.,

likelihood of casualties, property damage, and social disruption), alternative protective actions (e.g.,

evacuation, sheltering in-place), and the attributes of those protective actions (e.g., efficacy; safety; cost;

and requirements for time and effort, knowledge and skill, tools and equipment, and cooperation from

others). In addition, messages also vary in terms of their style (clarity, forcefulness, and speed of delivery,

use of figurative or humorous language), inclusions and omissions (whether or not to include one’s own

weak arguments, address opponents’ arguments, or to rely on implicit or explicit conclusions), ordering of

message content, and amount of message material (McGuire, 1985).

The information channels available for use by emergency managers include print media such as

newspapers, magazines, and brochures; electronic media such as television, radio, telephone, and the

Internet; and face-to-face interaction through personal conversations and public meetings. The

distinctions among these information channels are important because they differ in the ways they

accommodate the information processing activities of receivers. For example, orally presented

information is ephemeral and will be lost unless otherwise recorded, whereas written information

inherently provides a record that can be examined at a later time. Moreover, many types of risk

information can be presented in either verbal (words), numeric (numbers), or graphic (pictures) format.

Sometimes one mode of presentation is more effective for a particular type of information; for example,

charts generally are more effective than tables of numbers in conveying trends. However, there are

individual differences among receivers, so some presentation modes are more effective for some people

but not others. For example, some people can understand verbal descriptions much more readily than

graphs of data, whereas the reverse is true for others.

Receivers differ in many respects, but the most important of these are psychological

characteristics that have direct effects on the communication process. For example, receivers differ in

their perceptions of source credibility, access to communication channels, prior beliefs about hazards and

protective actions, ability to understand and remember message content, and access to resources needed to

implement protective action (Lindell & Perry, 2004). The effects of a message on a receiver include

attention, comprehension, acceptance, retention, and behavioral change. Indeed, researchers agree

message effects should be characterized in terms of multiple stages, but the boundaries among these

stages are not well defined, so differences exist among various researchers in their typologies (see

Source Message Channel Receiver

Feedback

Effect

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McGuire, 1985 vs. Mileti & Peek, 2001) and some theorists have varied in their definitions of these

stages over time (McGuire, 1969, 1985).

Finally, feedback is an important component of the communication model because some attempts

are unidirectional, whereas others are interactive. Unidirectional communications are appealing to many

risk communicators because they appear to be less time consuming and sometimes this actually is the

case. Frequently, however, interactive communication is needed for receivers to indicate they have not

comprehended the message that was sent or to explain that the message sent by the source did not satisfy

their information needs.

The classical persuasion model makes it clear that risk communication is an activity with

relatively clearly defined parameters regarding source, message, channel, and intended effect. In most

cases, the source is an authority, the message describes an environmental hazard, and the intended effect

is a change in receivers’ behavior. However, receiver characteristics have very important influences on

each of the stages in the communication process. For example, the effect of a given information source is

determined by receivers’ perceptions of that source and the effect of a given message is determined by

receivers’ willingness to attend to and ability to comprehend and retain the information. Moreover the

effect of a given channel is determined by receivers’ access to and preference for that channel and the

amount of feedback depends upon receivers’ willingness and ability to provide it. Unfortunately,

authorities often fail to recognize the importance of these factors and sometimes fail to design risk

communication programs in accordance with the principles of effective communication even when these

issues are recognized (Perry & Lindell, 1991).

Some scholars have criticized the classical persuasion model as providing an incomplete

representation of the risk communication process (Kasperson & Stallen, 1990). They contend the

feedback loop in the model implies a dyadic relationship that is limited to contact with the original

information source. However, extensive research shows people engage in information seeking activities

that are directed to other sources as well. More generally, risk communication should be represented by a

network in which multiple sources are linked to intermediate sources who receive information and relay it

to the ultimate receivers (Figure 4-2). The original sources could be linked to few or many intermediates

or could even be linked directly with some of the ultimate receivers. Similarly, the intermediates could be

linked to few or many of the ultimate receivers and the ultimate receivers could be linked to each other.

Another apparent limitation of the classical persuasion model is that receiver characteristics have

pervasive effects on the other components of the model. For example, receivers’ demographic

characteristics are correlated with access to sources and channels, as well as with message

comprehension. Thus, receiver characteristics are of critical importance in determining the success of risk

communication programs, but many of them are psychological in nature and, thus, not readily observed.

Nonetheless, receivers’ demographic characteristics—such as sex, age, education, income, race, and

ethnicity—are readily identifiable. Because some of these demographic characteristics are related to

relevant psychological characteristics, they can provide some indication as to how receivers will respond.

The Protective Action Decision Model

A review of theories on social influence, persuasion, behavioral decisionmaking, attitude-

behavior relationships, protective action, and innovation processes reveals a wide variety of perspectives

providing useful accounts of the ways in which risk communication can influence disaster response and

hazard adjustment (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Although these theories overlap to some extent with the

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findings of research on hazards and disasters, all of them provide valuable insights that can extend our

understanding of ways in which people respond to the threat of environmental hazards. The relevant

elements of these complementary approaches have been integrated with the findings of disaster research

to produce a model of the factors that influence individual’s adoption of protective actions against natural

and technological hazards and disasters. This integrated model is the Protective Action Decision Model

(PADM).

Figure 4-2. Communication Network Model.

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

According to Lindell and Perry (2004), the PADM is most directly based upon a long history of

research on disasters that has been summarized by many authors (Barton, 1969; Drabek, 1986; Fritz 1961;

Janis & Mann, 1977; Lindell & Perry, 1992; Mileti et al., 1975; Mileti & Peek, 2001; Mileti & Sorensen,

1987; Perry et al., 1981; Tierney, et al., 2001). This research has found sensory cues from the physical

environment (especially sights and sounds, see Gruntfest, Downing & White, 1978) or socially

transmitted information (e.g., disaster warnings) can each elicit a perception of threat that diverts the

recipient’s attention from normal activities. Depending upon the perceived characteristics of the threat,

those at risk will either resume normal activities, seek additional information, pursue problem focused

actions to protect persons and property, or engage in emotion focused actions to reduce their immediate

psychological distress. Which way an individual chooses to respond to the threat depends upon

evaluations of both the threat and the available protective actions.

The findings of previous disaster research can be combined with propositions drawn from the

theories listed earlier in this chapter to express the PADM in terms of a flow chart that provides a graphic

representation of the model (see Figure 4-3). The process of decisionmaking begins with environmental

cues or risk communication messages that initiate a series of predecisional processes. In turn, these

predecisional processes stimulate either a protective action decisionmaking process or an information

seeking process. To proceed through the successive stages of either process, the individual must arrive at

an affirmative answer to the questions posed. The dominant tendency is for environmental cues and risk

communication messages to prompt protective action decisionmaking, but information seeking occurs

when there is uncertainty about the answer to the critical question at a given stage in the protective action

decisionmaking process. Once the question is resolved, processing proceeds to the next stage in the

protective action decisionmaking process.

Ultimate receiver 2

Original source

Intermediate 1

Intermediate 2

Ultimate receiver 3

Ultimate receiver 6

Ultimate receiver 5

Ultimate receiver 1

Ultimate receiver 4

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Figure 4-3. Information Flow in the PADM.

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

The model attempts to characterize the way people “typically” make decisions about adopting

actions to protect against environmental hazards. The stages within the protective action decisionmaking

process are sequential, as are those within the information seeking process. However, few people follow

every step in the model in the exact sequence listed in Figure 4-3. For example, an extremely credible (or

powerful) source might obtain immediate and unquestioning compliance with a directive to evacuate an

area at risk—even if there were no explanation why evacuation was necessary or what alternative

protective actions were feasible (Gladwin, Gladwin & Peacock, 2002). Such an order would, of course, be

quite improbable in contemporary American society, but compliance with such an order would bypass all

of the intermediate stages in the PADM. Other situations can be imagined in which some, but not all,

decision stages would be bypassed. The important lesson is that—unless risk communicators have an

extreme amount of credibility or power to compel compliance—the more stages in the PADM they

neglect, the more ambiguity there is likely to be for message recipients. In turn, greater ambiguity is likely

to lower compliance and cause warning recipients to spend more time in seeking and processing

information rather than preparing for and implementing protective action. Indeed, ambiguity can initiate a

repetitive cycle of decision processing and information seeking that postpones the initiation of protective

action until it is too late to be completed before hazard onset.

Predecisional processes

Environmental cues

Social context

Information sources

Information channels

Message content

Receiver characteristics

Risk identification: “Is there a real threat I need to pay

attention to?”

Risk assessment: “Do I need to take protective action?”

Protective action search:

“What can be done to achieve

protection?”

Protective action assessment: “What is the best method of protection?”

Protective action implementation: “Does protection action need to be taken

now?”

Information needs assessment: “What information do I need?”

Communication action assessment: “Where and how can I obtain this

information?”

Communication action implementation: “Do I need the information now?”

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Predecisional Processes

Both environmental cues and risk communication from other persons prompt three predecisional

processes that are needed to bring information to conscious awareness. These are exposure to, attention

to, and interpretation of environmental cues or—alternatively—reception of, attention to, and

comprehension of socially transmitted information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Environmental cues and risk

communications are somewhat independent of each other, so one household might only observe

environmental cues, whereas another might receive only warnings. Still other households might have

access to both environmental cues and warnings. Regardless of whether information comes from

environmental cues or social warnings, all three pre-decisional processes are necessary. That is,

information from the physical environment will not lead to the initiation of appropriate protective actions

unless people are exposed to, heed, and accurately interpret the environmental cues. Similarly,

information from the social environment will not lead to the initiation of appropriate protective actions

unless people receive, heed, and comprehend the socially transmitted information.

These predecisional processes are critical because some of those at risk who are exposed to

environmental cues will heed this information, but others will not. Whether or not people heed the

available information is determined by their expectations, competing attention demands, and the

intrusiveness of the information. Specifically, expectations of threat are established when people have

advance information that leads them to believe the potential exists for a significant environmental impact.

For example, many people in tornado-prone areas know the months of the year in which there is a peak

level of activity. Consequently, they check weather forecasts frequently and attend to environmental cues

such as cloud formations. Competing demands are important because attention is limited, so absorption in

one task will tend to prevent the processing of information associated with other tasks. Continuing with

the example of tornadoes, people who are engaged in tasks that require intense concentration are less

likely to notice gathering storm clouds and might not notice a warning even if they have a radio turned on.

Of course, the perceptual intrusiveness of hazard information affects attention because it disrupts

cognitive processing of the primary task at hand. Those who did not notice the gathering storm clouds, or

even an approaching funnel cloud, are certain to notice the roar of the wind or will notice a warning if it is

preceded by a loud signal from a radio or a nearby siren. Finally, interpretation of environmental cues is

critical because this requires an understanding of the hazard. For example, some coastal residents have

lost their lives because they did not understand that a sudden recession of water is the trough phase of a

tsunami. The naïve reaction to receding water has frequently been to confuse it with a sudden low tide

and to take advantage of an unexpected opportunity to collect stranded fish. Of course, those who have

been properly trained recognize this as a sign of danger and immediately evacuate to high ground.

The predecisional processes for warnings are similar to those of environmental cues. First, people

must receive information from another person through a warning channel and attend to this information.

Accordingly, the characteristics of the warning channel itself can have a significant impact on people’s

reception and attention to warning message content. Once a warning has been received and heeded, some

people will comprehend the available information, whereas others will not (what Turner, Nigg & Heller-

Paz, 1986, call “hearing and understanding”). The comprehension of warning messages will depend upon

whether the message is conveyed in words they understand. Quite obviously, warnings disseminated in

English are unlikely to be understood by those who understand only Spanish. In addition, however,

comprehension also affected by more subtle factors. A warning source cannot achieve comprehension of

a warning message if it uses technical terms that have no meaning for those at risk. For example, phrases

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such as “hypocenter”, “Saffir-Simpson Category”, “oxidizer”, and “millirem” are specialized terms that

will not be understood by all who hear them. Specialized terms cause confusion and distract people from

processing the information in the rest of the message. If such terms must be used in warning messages,

they should be explained—ideally before any emergencies arise.

Decision Stages

Once the three predecisional processes have been successfully completed, cognitive processing

turns to the decision stages in the core of the model presented in Figure 4-3—risk identification, risk

assessment, protective action search, protective action assessment, and protective action implementation.

In addition, information seeking activities include information needs assessment, communication action

assessment, and communication action implementation. Each of the decision stages in the PADM is

discussed in detail below.

Risk identification. According to the PADM, people’s decisions about how to respond to a hazard

or disaster begin with risk identification, which can be interpreted as the initial step in what Lazarus and

Folkman (1984) call primary appraisal. As noted earlier, this process can be initiated by the detection of

environmental cues, but the most important sources of risk identification usually are warning messages

from authorities, the news media, and peers such as friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers.

Conversely, the first step emergency managers must take when promoting the adoption of hazard

adjustments is to disseminate their message widely to attract the attention of those at risk and inform them

of the potential for environmental extremes that could threaten their health, safety, and property.

In both disaster response and hazard adjustment, those at risk must answer the basic question of

risk identification, “Is there a real threat that I need to pay attention to?” (Anderson, 1969a; Janis &

Mann, 1977; Mileti, 1975; Perry, 1979a). The importance of the resulting threat belief is supported by

research showing individuals routinely try to maintain their definition of the environment as “normal” in

the face of evidence that it is not (Drabek, 1986). Researchers have found a positive relationship between

level of threat belief and disaster response across a wide range of disaster agents, including floods (Mileti,

1975; Perry, Lindell & Greene, 1981), volcanic eruptions (Perry & Greene, 1982; Perry & Hirose, 1991),

hazardous materials emergencies (Lindell & Perry, 1992), hurricanes (Baker, 1991), earthquakes

(Blanchard-Boehm, 1998), and nuclear power plant emergencies (Houts, Cleary & Hu, 1988; Perry,

1985).

Risk assessment. The next step, risk assessment, refers to the process of determining the likely

personal consequences that the disaster or hazard could cause (Otway, 1973; Perry, 1979a). Decades of

research have shown the perception of personal risk—the individual’s expectation of personal exposure to

death, injury, illness, or property damage—is a critical variable in explaining disaster response (Mileti &

Sorensen, 1987). This process of assessing personal relevance, which Mileti and Sorensen (1987) refer to

as the “personalization of risk”, has been recognized as an important factor by persuasion theorists as well

as disaster researchers (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In the risk assessment stage, a positive response to the

question, “Do I need to take protective action?” elicits protection motivation whether the risk involves a

disaster response or long-term hazard adjustment (Fritz & Marks, 1954; Perry, 1983). Some of the factors

associated with people’s personalization of risk include “the probability of the impending event occurring

[and] the severity, to the individual, of such a development” (Withey, 1962, p. 104; see also Neuwirth,

Dunwoody & Griffin, 2000 and Lindell & Perry, 2000 for reviews of relevant research).

The immediacy of a threat is also important because warning recipients must understand that the

message describes a threat whose likely consequences will occur in the very near future. Thus, immediacy

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is related to forewarning, which is the amount of time between the arrival of the warning (or personal

detection of environmental cues) and disaster onset. For emergency managers, the amount of forewarning

received from hazard detection agencies such as the National Weather Service and US Geological Survey

affects their choice of message content, the channels feasible for delivery, and the number of times the

warning can be repeated. For those at risk, the amount of forewarning received from emergency managers

affects their sense of urgency to act. Other factors being equal, the likelihood of immediate disaster

response increases as the amount of time until impact decreases. However, people tend to devote this

additional time to other activities such as information seeking and expedient property protection when

they believe there is more time before impact than the minimum necessary to implement protective

action. Information seeking can ultimately increase compliance with recommended protective actions but

does, inherently, delay it. Similarly, the amount of time risk area residents devote to expedient property

protection also delays their initiation of personal protective action. In both cases, the delay in protective

action might be dangerous because the time of disaster impact cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy.

For many of the events studied by disaster researchers, warnings were issued when impact was imminent,

thereby reducing the extent of these other activities. Ultimately, increasing the amount of forewarning

changes the risk communication from a disaster warning to a hazard awareness message (Perry, et al.,

1981; Nelson & Perry, 1991).

Previous research has addressed people’s beliefs about other temporal dimensions of hazard

impact, as well. The duration of impact, which refers to the length of time hazard impacts will persist, has

been addressed principally in connection with studies of technological risk perception (Slovic, Fischoff &

Lichtenstein, 1980; Lindell & Earle, 1983; Lindell & Barnes, 1986). For radiological and toxic chemical

hazards, it appears many people are concerned that long-term contamination could prevent them from

returning to their homes for a long period of time after a disaster (Lindell, 1994c).

In general, research has shown simple measures of risk perception are positively correlated with

disaster response (Drabek, 1999), but it also is important to qualify this finding with one further

consideration. Specifically, the hazards most frequently studied by disaster researchers are ones whose

principal physical impacts are property damage and traumatic injuries. In such cases, the exposure paths

from the hazard agent through the environment to those at risk are relatively simple and well understood

by the general public. Physical proximity to the hazard increases risk, so safety increases with distance

from the point of impact. Indeed, Kunreuther, et al. (1978) reported proximity, along with certainty and

severity, was an important threat characteristic influencing the purchase of hazard insurance. The

correlations between risk perception and behavioral responses to that object might not be so high in cases

where the exposure paths are more complex than those involved in simple proximity. For example, food

contamination and infectious diseases both involve complex exposure paths that might be difficult for

most people to understand. For example, some have found it difficult to understand why AIDS can be

transmitted by infected needles but not by mosquito bites because the two types of exposure seem to be

similar (both involve injection through the skin surface).

Similar issues must be considered in examining hazards that have different types of impacts. For

example, Perry and Montiel (1997) reported the magnitude of perceived risk was higher for threats

affecting life safety and property than for those affecting property alone. Another issue concerns the

definition and measurement of perceived risk. Some studies have used very global measures of risk,

whereas others have used more specific measures. Early studies of evacuation compliance that defined

risk in terms of three components—certainty, severity, and immediacy—of the threat have reported high

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positive correlations between risk perception and disaster response (Perry, et al., 1981). However, some

researchers have applied these characteristics to the occurrence of a disaster, whereas others have applied

them to personal hazard exposure, and still others have applied them to the consequences of that

exposure. In some cases, there are essentially no differences among disaster impact, personal hazard

exposure, and personal consequences. For example, people living close to a volcano might think the

occurrence of a major eruption is highly likely to occur within the next year, their chance of severe

exposure is high because they live so close to the volcano, and their chance of experiencing severe

adverse health consequences within that time interval is high because the effects of blast and ash will be

felt immediately. In other cases, the differences among disaster impact, personal hazard exposure, and

personal consequences could be profound. For example, people living in the vicinity of a toxic chemical

facility might think the occurrence of a major release to ground water is highly likely to occur within the

next year, but also believe their chance of severe exposure within that time interval is low because they

live upstream from the release point. Even if they thought the chances of personal exposure were high,

they might believe their chance of experiencing severe adverse health consequences within that time

interval is low because it would take many years to develop cancerous tumors.

The differences among disaster impact, personal exposure, and personal consequences are

important because a number of investigators have found many people have an unrealistic sense of

optimism about their ability to avoid danger—in extreme cases, this results in a sense of total

invulnerability. For example, data from Lindell and Prater (2000) indicate people’s perceptions that there

is a significant probability of an earthquake in their community do not necessarily imply that they believe

there is a high probability of being personally affected by that earthquake. Moreover, some studies have

indicated perceptions of severity also can be quite complex. Research on earthquake hazard has revealed

perceptions of severity to be multidimensional because people are concerned about death, injury, property

damage, and disruption to work and daily activities (see Lindell & Perry, 2000, for a review). Other

research on risk perceptions regarding radiological and toxic chemical hazards indicates people are also

concerned about delayed health effects such as cancers and genetic effects (Lindell, 1994; Lindell &

Barnes, 1986; Perry & Montiel, 1997).

Protective action search. If a threat is judged to be real and some unacceptable level of personal

risk exists, people turn to protective action search—which involves retrieving one or more feasible

protective actions from memory or obtaining information about them from others. The relevant question

in protective action search is “What can be done to achieve protection?” and its outcome is a decision set

that identifies possible protective actions. The results of some studies (e.g., Jackson, 1977) suggest risk

area residents’ first attempt to answer this question often involves a search for what can be done by

someone else to protect them against the hazard. When there is insufficient time to find someone else to

provide protection—as is usually the case during disasters—or when such a search is unsuccessful,

households must rely on their own resources to achieve protection. In many instances, an individual’s

own knowledge of the hazard will suggest what type of protection to seek (e.g., sheltering in the basement

following a tornado warning). People are especially likely to recall actions they have taken on previous

occasions if they have had personal experience with that hazard. Alternatively, they might consider

actions they have taken in the course of their experience with similar hazards—recognizing, for example,

the impact of a volcanic mudflow is similar to that of a flood and, thus, protective responses to flood are

likely to be effective for a mudflow as well.

Information about protective actions also can be received from a variety of external sources.

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Specifically, those in the risk area are likely to become aware of alternative protective actions by

observing the behavior of others. This occurs, for example, when neighbors are seen packing cars in

preparation for hurricane evacuation or employing contractors to reinforce their homes against earthquake

shaking. People also are likely to consider actions with which they have had vicarious experience by

reading or hearing about others’ actions in response to a hazard. Such vicarious experience is frequently

transmitted by the news media and relayed by peers—friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers.

Finally, people also are made aware of appropriate protective actions by means of disaster warnings and

hazard awareness programs that carry protective action recommendations from authorities. Specifically, a

well designed warning message will assist recipients in constructing a decision set by providing guidance

in the form of one or more protective action recommendations (Mileti & Sorensen, 1988). Nonetheless,

authorities should not assume warning recipients will implement the official protective action

recommendation even if only one protective action is mentioned in the warning message. People will

always be aware that continuing normal activities is an option and they might think of other alternatives

by recalling such actions from memory or observing the actions of others.

Protective action assessment. After people have established that at least one protective action is

available, they pass from the protective action search stage to protective action assessment. This involves

examining alternative actions, evaluating them in comparison to the consequences of continuing normal

activities, and determining which of them is the most suitable response to the situation. At this point, the

primary question is “What is the best method of protection?” and its outcome is an adaptive plan.

As noted earlier, choice is an inherent aspect of emergencies because those at risk generally have

at least two options—taking protective action or continuing normal activities. Comparing alternatives

with respect to their attributes leads, in turn, to a balancing or trade-off of these attributes with respect to

their relative importance to the decision maker. Under some conditions, those at risk can only take one

action and, therefore, must make a choice among the alternatives. Evacuation maximizes the protection of

personal safety, but abandons property to the action of the hazard agent or, as some evacuees have

erroneously feared, to looters (Perry, et al., 1981; Lindell & Perry, 1990). On the other hand, emergency

measures to protect property (e.g., sandbagging during floods) require the property owner to remain in a

hazardous location. This problem also exists in the context of long-term hazard adjustment but is

significantly reduced because households have time before disaster onset to carefully consider trade-offs

among alternative protective actions and to implement multiple actions. Even when there is only a

moderate amount of forewarning, households might be able to engage in a combination of actions. For

example, if a flood has been forecast to arrive within a few hours, people could perform emergency

floodproofing and elevate contents to higher floors to provide as much property protection as possible, yet

evacuate family members before the floodwater reaches a dangerous level.

When households assess the salient characteristics of alternative protective actions, they are likely

to consider a set of characteristics that have been identified by previous research on disaster response and

hazard adjustment. In reviews of disaster studies conducted since the 1940s, Fritz (1961), Sorensen and

White (1980), Sims and Bauman, (1983), Drabek (1986), and Tierney, et al. (2001) have noted that a

protective action is unlikely to be considered unless it is considered to be effective in reducing the

negative consequences associated with disaster impact. Thus, efficacy, which is measured by the degree

of reduction in vulnerability to the hazard, refers to success in protecting both persons and property

(Cross, 1980; Kunreuther, et al., 1978). In some cases, such as sandbagging during floods, property

protection is the specific objective of the protective action. In other cases, however, people consider the

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implications for property protection of actions whose principal goal is to protect persons. For example,

many researchers have found that those who fail to comply with an evacuation recommendation do so

because of concerns about protecting their property from looting.

Research also suggests people evaluate protective actions in terms of their safety—that is, the

risks that might be created by taking that protective action. For example, some research has reported that

those who have not complied with recommendations to evacuate did so because they were concerned

about the traffic accident risks involved. As a general rule, the traffic accident risks of evacuation appear

to be no greater than those of normal driving (Lindell & Perry, 1992). However, it is important to

recognize warning recipients’ behavior is determined by their beliefs about safety, not the historical

evidence about safety. Thus, it is important for local authorities who want to increase compliance with

evacuation recommendations to ensure people are aware that evacuation accident rates are low.

Alternative protective actions also can be assessed in terms of their perceived time requirements

for implementation, which are a function of the number and duration of the steps required to complete a

given action. Evacuation is typically time consuming, requiring unification of the family, preparation for

departure, selection of a safe destination and route of travel, and transit out of the risk area (Lindell &

Perry, 1987; Lindell, Prater, Perry & Wu, 2002). By contrast, time requirements for in-place protection

are small—requiring only that occupants shut off sources of outside air, such as doors, windows, chimney

dampers, and forced air circulation systems for heating and cooling (Lindell & Perry, 1992). A major

problem in large scale evacuations such as those for hurricanes is people’s underestimation of the amount

of time needed to reach their destinations. Kang, Lindell and Prater (2007) found coastal residents have

reasonably accurate expectations about the time requirements of familiar tasks under their control (e.g.,

packing bags and shuttering windows), but they substantially underestimate the amount of travel time

needed to clear the risk area. The problem seems to be that they plan to take familiar routes to familiar

destinations and assume it will take the usual amount of time to get there. Unfortunately, they fail to

account for the fact that an evacuation might have ten times as much traffic on that route as they normally

encounter, thus turning a two hour trip into a 20 hour trip.

The perceived implementation barriers affecting protective action decisions arise from resource

constraints precluding the selection of a preferred protective action, as well as obstacles that are expected

to arise between the decision to take a protective action and the achievement of protection. In the former

category, resource constraints include a lack of knowledge and skill, tools and equipment, or social

cooperation required to achieve protection (Lindell & Prater, 2002). In the case of evacuation, this may

include a lack of knowledge of a safe place to go and a safe route to travel. Related barriers include the

lack of access to a personal vehicle (e.g., those who are routinely transit dependent or families in which

one spouse has the only car during the workday) or lack of personal mobility due to physical handicaps.

These were clearly factors affecting the alarming death toll in Hurricane Katrina. In some instances, the

separation of family members will be considered to be an evacuation barrier. Until family members have

been reunited or separated family members can establish communication contact and agree upon a place

to meet, evacuation is unlikely to occur (Killian, 1952; Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Haas, Cochrane & Eddy,

1977). Of course, separation of family members is unlikely to be a significant problem during incidents,

such as hurricanes, that have ample forewarning.

Finally, a variety of researchers (Cross, 1980; Fritz, 1961; Kunreuther, et al., 1978; Sorensen &

White, 1980) have reported the perceived cost of actions to protect personal safety is a consideration in

protective actions decisions. Such costs include out-of-pocket expenses (gasoline, food, and lodging),

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opportunity costs (e.g., lost pay from workdays missed during evacuation), effort, personal sacrifice, and

aesthetic cost (e.g., the unattractive appearance of houses that are elevated out of the flood plain). The

high cost of protective action can lead people to delay its implementation until they are certain it is

necessary. For example, many households delay hurricane evacuation because they want to avoid

incurring evacuation expenses if possible. These averaged $262 per household during the Hurricane Lili

evacuation (Lindell, Prater, Lu, Arlikatti, Zhang & Kang, 2004).

A significant impediment to the assessment of protective actions arises when none of the

available alternatives dominates the others (i.e., is superior to the others on all of the evaluation

attributes). For example, Lindell and Perry (1992) reported evacuation was rated higher than sheltering in-

place and expedient respiratory protection in efficacy for protecting persons (a positive consequence).

However, evacuation also was judged to be higher in its resource requirements for time, effort, skill, cost,

and barriers to implementation (all negative consequences). This suggests people must sometimes make a

difficult choice between the higher effectiveness of evacuation and its higher resource demands against

the lower effectiveness of the alternative protective actions (sheltering in-place and expedient respiratory

protection) and their lower resource demands.

The importance of perceived attributes in the protective action assessment stage should alert risk

communicators to the potential for differences between the judgments of experts and the public,

especially in connection with protective actions that are not well known to those at risk. Sheltering in-

place can substantially reduce toxic gas exposure to safe levels (Wilson, 1987, 1989), but its effectiveness

does not seem to be recognized outside a relatively narrow circle of experts. Moreover, attempts to

evacuate immediately prior to tornado impact, which are contrary to scientific recommendations (Glass,

et al., 1980), are probably due to the recognition that sheltering in-place during the tornado does not

guarantee survival. This observation also holds true for many victims of fires in high-rise buildings who

have attempted unsuccessfully to evacuate when sheltering in their rooms would likely have saved their

lives.

The end result of protective action assessment is an adaptive plan, but people’s adaptive plans

vary widely in their specificity, with some being only vague goals (e.g., “We’ll stay with my sister’s

family”) and others begin extremely detailed. At minimum, a specific evacuation plan includes a

destination, a route of travel, and a means of transportation. More detailed plans include a procedure for

reuniting families if members are separated, advance contact to confirm the destination is available,

consideration of alternative routes if the primary route is unsafe or too crowded, and alternative methods

of transportation is the primary one is not available.

Research has documented a tendency for those who lack a ready adaptive plan to experience

more negative disaster outcomes (Quarantelli, 1960; Perry, 1979b; Drabek, 1986). A classic example in

the literature on floods lies in the Hamilton, Taylor, and Rice (1955, p. 120) interview with the recipient

of an evacuation warning that contained no information on safe evacuation routes or safe destinations:

“We couldn't decide where to go... So we grabbed our children and were just starting to move outside...if

it had just been ourselves, we might have taken out. But we didn't want to risk it with the children.”

Protective action implementation. The fifth step, protective action implementation, occurs when

all the previous questions about risk reduction have been answered satisfactorily. Specifically, those at

risk have determined action should be taken, at least one available option is likely to be effective in

achieving protection, and that option is logistically feasible. In general, the implementation of protective

actions consumes resources people would prefer to allocate to other activities, so those at risk frequently

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delay implementation until they have determined that the immediacy of the threat justifies the disruption

of normal activities. Thus, people often ask the question, “Does protective action need to be taken now?”

The answer to this question, whose outcome is the threat response, is crucial because people sometimes

postpone the implementation of protective action even when there is imminent danger. As noted earlier,

recipients of hurricane warnings have often been found to endanger their safety because too many of them

wait until the last minute to begin their evacuations. Unfortunately, they fail to recognize that adverse

weather conditions and a high volume of traffic can significantly reduce the average speed of evacuating

vehicles, thus running the risk that their evacuation will not be completed before the arrival of storm

conditions (Baker, 1979, 1990, 1993; Dow & Cutter, 1998, 2002; Prater, Wenger & Grady, 2000). The

problem of procrastination is even more severe in connection with long-term hazard adjustment than it is

in disasters with ample forewarning because hazard awareness programs cannot specify even an

approximate deadline by which action must be taken. For example, an earthquake prediction might

indicate a 75% chance of a damaging earthquake within the next 20 years.

Information needs assessment. At all stages of the protective action decision process, people who

are responding to the threat of disaster must act on the basis the available information, even if it is

insufficient for a confident appraisal of the threat or the available protective actions. However, when

people think time is available, they cope with the lack of information by implementing three additional

stages involving information search. The process of information search begins with an information needs

assessment arising from an individual’s judgment that the available information is insufficient to justify

proceeding further in the protective action decision process. The research literature indicates ambiguity at

any point in the protective action decision process will tend to initiate information seeking, especially

when the probability of disaster impact reaches a critical threshold. Thus, if any of the questions cannot

be answered with an unequivocal yes or no, people will ask “What information do I need to answer my

question?” so they can generate an identified information need. As is the case with a lack of information

about a threat, information seeking can also resolve a lack of information about appropriate protective

actions. In particular, additional information about alternative protective actions could make it clearer

which action would be most appropriate for that situation. Such information seeking is frequently needed

because, as noted earlier, those at risk are rarely aware of all of the alternatives available to them.

Communication action assessment. Identification of a need for information does not necessarily

suggest where the needed information can be obtained. Thus, the next question in the information seeking

process is “Where and how can I obtain this information?” Addressing this question leads to information

source selection and information channel selection, which constitute an information search plan. The

sources from which information is sought are likely to differ depending upon stage of the protective

action decision process that has generated the need for information. For example, uncertainty about risk

identification and risk assessment can stimulate questions directed to officials and, more likely, the news

media (see Lindell & Perry, 1992). The high level of reliance on the news media appears to be due to

people’s desire to confirm the information they initially received in a warning message from one source

by contacting a different source (Drabek, 1969). By contrast, uncertainties about protective action search,

protective action assessment, and—especially—about protective action implementation are likely to

prompt questions directed to peers.

The sources sought are likely to be affected by the available channels, which in many disasters

precludes the use of the telephone because circuits are so overloaded that it is impossible to obtain a dial

tone for hours or even days. Further, attempts to reach authorities sometimes prove futile because

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emergency response agencies are busy handling other calls. Thus, people are often forced to rely on the

mass media and peers even when they would prefer to contact authorities. This distinction between risk

area residents’ preferred channels of information receipt and their actual channels of information receipt

also can be seen in connection with long-term hazard adjustment. For example, Lindell and Perry (1992)

reported residents of communities downstream from the Mt. St. Helens volcano revealed some significant

disparities between their preferred and actual channels of information receipt in the years after the 1980

eruptions. However, there also were significant differences between the two communities of Toutle and

Lexington in both their preferred and actual channels of information receipt. Unfortunately, the available

research does not reveal any general principles of source and channel preference that can be assumed to

apply across a broad range of communities.

Communication action implementation. The final step in the information search process is

communication action implementation, which provides decision information by answering the question

“Do I need the information now?” If the answer to this question is positive, that is, they are threatened by

an imminent disaster, people will actively seek the needed information from the most appropriate source

through the most appropriate channel. Drabek’s (1969; Drabek & Stephenson, 1971) research indicates

people will go to great lengths, contacting many people over a period of minutes to hours, if the prospect

of an imminent disaster needs to be confirmed. However, information seeking will be less frequent and

less active if the location is specific but the time of impact is ambiguous. Perry, Lindell, and Greene

(1982) reported many residents of the area around Mt. St. Helens monitored the radio four or more times

a day after the initial ash and steam eruptions led authorities to believe increased activity might indicate

an increased probability of a larger eruption. By contrast, the absence of locational specificity and time

pressure inherent in a hazard awareness program provides little need for those at risk to obtain immediate

answers, so they are likely to forego active information seeking in favor of passive monitoring of the

situation. Unfortunately, the absence of a deadline for action means this passive monitoring is likely to

continue until an imminent threat arises (as in the case of hurricanes and floods) or until a disaster strikes

(as in the case of earthquakes).

Communication action implementation can have one of three outcomes. If the query elicits a

message that meets the information needs that initiated the search, then information seeking has been

successful and the decision maker can return to the point in the protective action decision process that

generated the information search. However, if the source is unavailable, the query produces no additional

information, or the query produces no useful information at all, then information seeking is unsuccessful.

The response to this situation is likely to depend upon an individual’s expectations for success in

obtaining the desired information from another source or through another channel. Optimism regarding

either of these is likely to motivate further information seeking. Pessimism regarding the success of

obtaining the needed information is likely to force the decision maker to attempt a protective action

decision on the basis of the information available.

In summary, The PADM provides a framework that identifies the critical stages of information

processing relevant to household adoption of protective actions and—for each stage—the activities

performed, the typical question asked, and the outcome (see Table 4-1). If an individual cannot determine

a satisfactory answer to the question posed at one of the decision stages, then progress toward

implementation of a protective action is likely to be delayed and possibly even terminated. If the process

terminates due to a negative answer about risk identification, then the decision maker is likely to return to

normal activities. If the process terminates due to a negative answer about risk assessment, then the

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decision maker is likely to monitor the situation. If the process terminates due to a negative answer about

the availability or acceptability of protective actions, then the decision maker is likely to enter a state of

either denial or panic (Janis & Mann, 1977). Which of these emotion-focused coping strategies is used

depends upon a person’s susceptibility to distraction, with the most distractible being inclined to denial

and the least distractible being inclined to intense fear. Nonetheless, extensive research reveals a very low

incidence of panic in disaster (Drabek, 1986).

Table 4-1. Warning Stages and Actions. Stage Activity Question Outcome

1 Risk identification Is there a real threat that I need to pay attention to?

Threat belief

2 Risk assessment Do I need to take protective action? Protection motivation

3 Protective action search What can be done to achieve protection? Decision set (alternative actions)

4 Protective action assessment and selection

What is the best method of protection? Adaptive plan

5 Protective action implementation

Does protective action need to be taken now?

Threat response

6 Information needs assessment What information do I need to answer my question?

Identified information need

7 Communication action assessment and selection

Where and how can I obtain this information?

Information search plan

8 Communication action implementation

Do I need the information now? Decision information

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

Risk Communication During the Continuing Hazard Phase

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are theoretical and practical reasons for

distinguishing between risk communication activities undertaken during the continuing hazard phase

(which are directed toward long-term hazard adjustment) and those taken during an escalating crisis or

emergency response (which are directed toward disaster response to avoid personal exposure or minimize

personal consequences). The continuing hazard phase involves a stable probability (usually low) that a

catastrophic incident will threaten public safety, property, and the environment. This phase is

characterized principally by hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness activities, although

preparedness for disaster recovery also should be undertaken at this time (Schwab, et al., 1997; Wu &

Lindell, 2004).

There are five basic functions that should be addressed in the continuing hazard phase. Table 4-2

identifies these as strategic analysis, operational analysis, resource mobilization, program development,

and program implementation. These five functions and the tasks associated with them are listed in the

table as if they form a simple linear sequence but, in fact, some tasks will be performed concurrently. In

addition, the process will frequently be iterative. For example, some resource mobilization tasks might

take place concurrently with the operational analysis, or tasks conducted during the operational analysis

phase might be suspended temporarily in order to return to the strategic analysis and refine it.

Strategic Analysis

Task 1: Conduct a community hazard/vulnerability analysis. As will be discussed in Chapter 6,

emergency managers need to understand the hazards to which their communities are exposed and the

geographic areas at risk. Knowing the characteristics of the most significant hazards makes it possible to

identify the most appropriate hazard adjustments. Identifying the geographic areas at greatest risk makes

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it possible to identify the most vulnerable population segments and types of businesses. In turn, this

knowledge about vulnerable population segments and types of businesses provides information about

how to target the risk communication program and also suggests which incentives and sanctions might be

best suited to increasing hazard adjustment adoption (see Lindell & Perry, 2004, for a further discussion

of the roles of risk communication, incentives, and sanctions).

Table 4-2. Tasks for the Continuing Hazard Phase.

Strategic analysis

Conduct a community hazard/vulnerability analysis

Analyze the community context

Identify the community’s prevailing perceptions of the hazards and hazard adjustments

Set appropriate goals for the risk communication program

Operational analysis

Identify and assess feasible hazard adjustments for the community and its households/businesses

Identify ways to provide incentives, sanctions, and technological innovations

Identify the available risk communication sources in the community

Identify the available risk communication channels in the community

Identify specific audience segments

Resource mobilization

Obtain the support of senior appointed and elected officials

Enlist the participation of other government agencies

Enlist the participation of nongovernmental (nonprofit) and private sector organizations

Work with the mass media

Work with neighborhood associations and service organizations

Program development for all phases

Staff, train, and exercise a crisis communications team

Establish procedures for maintaining an effective communication flow in an escalating crisis and in emergency response

Develop a comprehensive risk communication program

Plan to make use of informal communication networks

Establish procedures for obtaining feedback from the news media and the public

Program implementation for the continuing hazard phase

Build source credibility by increasing perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness

Use a variety of channels to disseminate hazard information

Describe community or facility hazard adjustments being planned or implemented

Describe feasible household hazard adjustments

Evaluate program effectiveness

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

Task 2: Analyze the community context. As noted in Chapter 3, the most comprehensive research

on the practice of local environmental hazard management is that undertaken by Drabek (1987, 1990),

whose careful analysis of the problem has identified many effective managerial strategies. In particular,

he has emphasized the need for emergency managers to continually study their communities’ ethnic

composition, communication channels, perceptions of authorities, levels of education, and income

distribution.

If environmental hazards are not high on the community’s priorities, as usually is the case (Rossi,

Wright, Webber-Burdin, Peitras & Diggins, 1982), emergency managers need to begin with small

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programs, demonstrate their effectiveness, and build constituencies for environmental hazard

management (Lindell, 1994b). In developing a risk communication program, emergency managers need

to realistically assess the resources the community can afford to allocate to this activity, but should not

limit their assessment to the resources of a single agency. Instead, they should explore the ways in which

a variety of different organizations (e.g., LEMA, police department, fire department, watershed

management authority, and public health department) might collaborate in developing a comprehensive

program. As noted in Chapter 3, the LEMC provides an excellent framework within which to achieve this

collaboration.

Task 3: Identify the community’s prevailing perceptions of hazards and hazard adjustments. Of

the many hazards that are prevalent in modern society, the ones that seem to produce the greatest conflict

are those having a potential for inflicting significant harm on bystanders such as the residents of areas

near technological facilities. The general public perceives the risks of nuclear power plants and chemical

facilities as being greater than those of other technologies and natural hazards (Lindell & Earle, 1983;

Slovic, 1987). In addition, they differ from technologists by considering what Hance, Chess, and

Sandman (1988) call “outrage” dimensions, including a risk’s (un)naturalness, (un)familiarity, (lack of)

understanding by science, (lack of) detectability, (un)trustworthiness of information sources, (lack of)

controllability by those exposed, (lack of) voluntariness in exposure, (un)fairness in the distribution of

risks and benefits, and dread. Thus, this line of research suggests residents of most communities are likely

to consider the risks of technological facilities to be greater than those of natural hazards, even if the

annual fatality rate is the same for the two types of hazards (Slovic, 1987).

As noted earlier, technological hazards generate a level of risk perception exceeding what experts

consider to be warranted, whereas natural hazards seem to elicit the opposite pattern. Emergency

managers can begin to address this problem by explaining the community hazard/vulnerability analysis

and their resulting assessments of risk area residents’ personal likelihood and consequences of disaster

impact. A major impediment to effective risk communication is the difficulty in explaining small

probabilities of occurrence and small numbers of expected casualties per year. This has led some experts

to propose risk comparisons that list the annual death rate (Morrall, 1986), loss of life expectancy (Cohen

& Lee, 1979), and the time to increase risk by one chance in a million (Crouch & Wilson, 1982).

Unfortunately, these solutions seem to produce more problems than they solve (Covello, 1991).

Specifically, such risk comparisons typically ignore the uncertainties in the estimates (which could differ

significantly from one hazard to another). Moreover, by comparing hazards only in terms of casualties,

these risk comparisons equate hazards having what many people consider to be very different types of

consequences. The problem is compounded when the experts presume that if people “have voluntarily

accepted” risks having higher fatality rates (often these are a lifestyle risks such as automobile driving),

they also “should accept” another risk having a lower fatality rate (often this is the risk of a technological

facility that someone is proposing to build and operate). Of course, this argument ignores the fact that the

facility risk will be added to the lifestyle risk, not substituted for it, and that the facility risk often is

estimated from analytical models whereas the lifestyle risk is computed actuarially from a very large

database. Even local residents who cannot articulate these distinctions explicitly often seem to be aware

of them implicitly and, thus, reject these arguments.

Task 4: Set appropriate goals for the risk communication program. As indicated earlier, hazard

awareness is an important first step in the process of hazard adjustment, so people need to be informed

about the hazards to which their community is exposed. This could include information about physical

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science, engineering, public health, social science, and planning perspectives on environmental hazards.

In addition, people need to be informed about the likelihood that events of different magnitudes will occur

at their locations. In the case of hurricanes, emergency managers should ensure residents of coastal

communities understand the basic atmospheric processes that cause hurricanes, the long-term

probabilities of their community being struck by hurricanes in Saffir-Simpson Categories 1-5 over the

next ten years, and the different types of threats caused by hurricanes (wind, tornadoes, storm surge, and

inland flooding). However, it also is necessary to ensure local residents personalize the risk of casualties

to themselves and their families, damage to their property, and disruption to daily activities such as work,

school, and shopping. To help people personalize the risk, local emergency managers should provide

detailed maps showing areas at risk from wind, storm surge, and inland flooding, as well as the

vulnerability of different types of structures in the community to these threats. For example, hurricane

vulnerability can be assessed by defining the areas that would be affected by hurricanes in Saffir-Simpson

Categories 1-5 and displaying these risk areas on large-scale maps. Such maps should indicate streets,

rivers, political boundaries, and other local landmarks that will help people to identify the risk areas in

which their homes and workplaces are located. These maps could be supplemented by drawings of

different types of structures (e.g., mobile homes, typical single family residences, and typical multifamily

structures) showing the level of damage expected for each hurricane category. Such information needs to

be developed and pretested thoroughly because recent studies have shown only one- to two-thirds of

coastal residents can accurately identify their hurricane risk areas, even when shown a risk area map

(Arlikatti et al., 2006; Zhang, Prater & Lindell, 2004).

In addition, emergency managers must foster people’s sense of personal responsibility for self-

protection to achieve high levels of household hazard adjustment adoption. Thus, it is important to remind

local residents of the limits to what local government and industry can do in mitigating environmental

hazards. Moreover, as the PADM indicates, risk communication programs should ensure people are aware

of the available hazard adjustments and have accurate beliefs about the efficacy and resource

requirements of these hazard adjustments. Indeed, there is theoretical and empirical support for the

proposition that the probability of hazard adjustment adoption is higher if messages address attitudes

toward the hazard adjustments themselves as well as addressing the hazard (Lindell & Whitney, 2000).

That is, emergency managers should provide information about the personal consequences of hazard

impact to arouse protection motivation but also identify feasible protective actions, describe the

effectiveness of those actions, and help people to meet the resource requirements needed for

implementation.

Finally, the risk communication program should be structured as a progressive, long-term process

but emergency managers should recognize that even the most scientifically sound and effectively

implemented risk communication programs will not produce very high levels of household adoptions of

hazard adjustments. A long-term perspective will not demonstrate immediate results, but it can put

environmental hazards on the political agenda, which can reinforce the results achieved at the household

level (Birkland, 1997; Prater & Lindell, 2000).

Operational Analysis

Task 1: Identify and assess feasible hazard adjustments for the community and its

households/businesses. The purpose of this task is to address the problem that many people who know

about their exposure to environmental hazards often don’t know what to do to reduce their vulnerability

(Lindell & Perry, 2000). To identify feasible hazard adjustments, local emergency managers could access

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resources such as the American Red Cross web site at www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared,

where they can find information about recommended household adjustments for a wide range of hazards.

These can be evaluated in terms of resource requirements such as financial cost, time and effort,

knowledge and skill, tools and equipment, and required cooperation with others.

Task 2: Identify ways to provide incentives, sanctions, and technological innovations. Some

hazard adjustments require a significant amount of household resources for implementation, so the level

of adoption could be increased by supplementing risk communication with sanctions, incentives, or

technological innovations. As noted in Chapter 1, sanctions are appealing because they avoid the obvious

costs associated with incentives and have been shown to be effective in situations such as the use of seat

belts in automobiles (Escobedo, Chorba & Remmington, 1992). However, sanctions are less useful than

they might seem because they require constant monitoring for enforcement, even in the workplace

(Lindell, 1994a). By contrast, the financial cost of a hazard adjustment can be reduced by providing

incentives such as grants, loans at subsidized interest rates, or tax credits. An alternative incentive is for

emergency managers to reduce resource requirements such as knowledge and skill by providing specific

plans or checklists for hazard adjustment implementation. For example, providing plans for homeowners

to bolt their houses to their foundations makes this hazard adjustment feasible for do-it-yourselfers with

only a modest level of construction experience, but adding a community tool bank also makes this hazard

adjustment feasible for those who lack the tools and equipment that are needed.

Task 3: Identify the available risk communication sources in the community. As noted earlier,

sources can be categorized as authorities (local, state, and federal government agencies, facility operators,

and scientists), news media, (especially newspapers, television, and radio) and peers (friends, relatives,

neighbors, and coworkers). These sources are judged in terms of their credibility, which primarily

comprises perceived expertise and trustworthiness, but these credibility perceptions are likely to vary

depending upon whether a source is speaking about hazards or hazard adjustments. Within the latter

category, sources are likely to be differentiated with respect to their credibility regarding disaster

responses and long-term hazard adjustments and, within each of these categories, with respect to hazard

adjustment efficacy and hazard adjustment resource requirements (Lindell, 1994c).

The best risk information sources will be credible because of their expertise regarding multiple

hazards and their trustworthiness to multiple community groups. Previous hazard research has

documented that official sources are generally the most credible, and message recipients infer credibility

from the source's credentials (e.g., job title and educational degrees), acceptance by other sources of

known credibility, or previous history of job performance (Perry & Lindell, 1990b). Lindell and Perry

(1992) found the degree of expertise attributed to different sources varies from one hazard to another and

there is evidence that perceptions of source characteristics vary by gender, ethnicity, and other

demographic characteristics (Nigg, 1982; Perry, 1987; Perry & Nelson, 1991).

Source credibility has special implications among ethnic minorities, but most research on

ethnicity has focused on Mexican Americans, African Americans, and Whites. The results of these studies

indicate authorities (particularly firefighters and police) tend to be regarded as credible by the majority of

all three ethnic groups, except under special circumstances (Lindell & Perry, 1992). African Americans

and Whites tended to be more skeptical of the mass media than Mexican Americans. In general, Mexican

Americans are more likely than African Americans or Whites to consider peers (friends, relatives,

neighbors, or coworkers) to be the most credible sources. There is evidence, however, that the results vary

by community, which appears to reflect historical differences in relationships between ethnic groups and

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authorities in these specific communities.

The practical implication of these differences in source credibility is that each emergency

manager must identify the patterns of credibility attribution in his or her own community. There is no

substitute for knowing which minority groups live and work in the community, if they are geographically

concentrated (and where), and how they view alternative sources of information about environmental

hazards and hazard adjustments. Such information can be gained from census data, informants, and

personal observation. Census data can be used to identify those census tracts having a greater than

average percentage of ethnic minorities. These data can be supplemented by informants, who can describe

the nature of credibility attributions among the ethnic groups located in those areas. It is particularly

important to identify opinion leaders, who are individuals that are recognized as especially credible by

particular ethnic groups, that might be recruited to participate as additional sources of risk information. In

this regard, they play the role of social influentials, as was discussed in Chapter 2, and intermediate

information sources, as represented in Figure 4-2. Finally, the best information comes from emergency

managers’ active outreach programs employed over a long period of time—for example, speaking at

meetings of neighborhood associations and civic organizations, and involving a diverse group of citizens

in advisory committees. Not only does such community involvement provide emergency managers with

information about citizens’ credibility attributions, but it also enhances authorities’ visibility, fosters

dialogue, and facilitates citizens’ access to accurate risk information.

Task 4: Identify the available risk communication channels in the community. The primary risk

communication channels available in most communities are electronic media such as radio and television

(and, increasingly, Web sites) and print media such as local newspapers and magazines. Other print media

that have been used in hazard awareness programs include brochures, posters, newsletters, telephone book

inserts, comic/coloring books, reports and scientific journal articles. Additional communication channels

include informal face-to-face conversations (drop-in hours at local libraries and information booths at

local events and shopping malls) and formal meetings with or without audiovisual presentations such as

computer simulations, slide shows and films (Hance, et al., 1988; Mileti, Fitzpatrick & Farhar, 1990).

Even though emergency managers have access to all of these channels in principle, access to some of

them is limited in practice because their costs exceed agency budgets. To gain access to low-cost

opportunities for publicity, emergency managers must establish contacts with local media personnel. In

addition, collaboration with private sector organizations can sometimes yield financial contributions that

can be used to pay for low cost items such as brochures and posters.

Task 5: Identify specific audience segments. Emergency managers face a significant dilemma

when designing their hazard awareness programs. On the one hand, most risk communication programs

have assumed a very homogeneous “public” and have done little to tailor information materials to

different groups. One obvious reason for this strategy is that it is easier and cheaper to provide a generic

program; another reason is that existing research can barely provide a basis for what to say to the

“typical” person, let alone guidance on how to tailor messages to specific demographic groups. On the

other hand, individuals with different demographic characteristics are likely to have different interests and

concerns, distinct motives for undertaking hazard adjustments, and varying media preferences, so

different approaches must be used.

A variety of sources have emphasized the importance of tailoring information to the

characteristics of each audience segment (Expert Review Committee, 1987; Hance, et al., 1988; Nelson &

Perry, 1991; Olson, Lagono & Scott, 1990). Accordingly, the design of these audience segmentation

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strategies should be based upon local assessments of receiver characteristics, which we have defined

broadly in terms of geographic (e.g., recency and frequency of hazard experience, and proximity to the

impact area) and demographic (e.g., age, sex, education, income, and ethnicity) attributes. Emergency

managers should assess each audience segment’s channel access and channel preference to identify the

types of media (e.g., radio) and, more specifically, the channels used (e.g., specific radio stations). Next,

emergency managers need to ensure recipients heed and comprehend the messages, which can be

facilitated by determining each population segment’s and business sector’s perceptions of different

information sources to assess their credibility.

Message comprehension can be improved if emergency managers determine whether there are

any audience segments for whom there are language barriers. These are less likely to arise among more

acculturated ethnic groups (except perhaps among Native Americans) or among ethnic groups whose

socioeconomic status is similar to that of the majority population. However, language tends to be a very

important issue for recent immigrants and for minority groups who either have resisted acculturation

(which is most likely when there is a high level of ethnic identity) or who have experienced sufficient

prejudice and discrimination to preclude acculturation. Thus, information about environmental hazards

and hazard adjustments often needs to be presented in multilingual format, preferably across multiple

channels. In jurisdictions with small minority populations, the number of channels will be quite limited—

perhaps not including mass media at all—but the emergency managers who know their communities

should be able to identify some (even informal) mechanisms of native language communication.

Moreover, emergency managers should assess the information needs of each population segment

to determine what message content should be transmitted to them. Specific questions include whether

local residents have adequate information about the hazards to which they are vulnerable, appropriate

hazard adjustments, and the efficacy and resource requirements of those hazard adjustments. Finally,

emergency managers need to identify any audience segments that lack a sense of personal responsibility

or self-efficacy for adopting hazard adjustments. Any groups that are low on these characteristics should

be targeted for special attention during the implementation of the risk communication program.

Resource Mobilization

Task 1: Obtain the support of senior appointed and elected officials. The research literature from

a wide range of settings indicates successful implementation of a new program in any type of organization

needs the support of higher level management (Lindell, 1994b). In the public sector, obtaining the support

of senior appointed and elected officials is an important step toward obtaining the participation of other

government agencies, as well. Organizational support can be increased when middle managers recognize

they must effectively “sell” the issues that they believe should have a high priority. This means

emergency managers must successfully identify community hazard vulnerability as an important issue

and propose hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, and recovery preparedness as effective

solutions.

Task 2: Enlist the participation of other government agencies. No matter how supportive senior

appointed and elected officials would like to be, they are almost certain to have few additional resources

to allocate to environmental hazard management, let alone to environmental risk communication.

Consequently, emergency managers should adopt an interorganizational approach, the first stage of which

is to be certain each agency is aware of the risk communication programs being planned and implemented

by other governmental (city, county, state and federal) agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and

hazardous technological facilities. The second stage of this interorganizational approach is to develop a

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coalition that pools the resources of multiple agencies within local government (Drabek, 1990; Gillespie,

et al., 1993; Lindell, et al., 1996a). To elicit the active support of other government agencies, emergency

managers should identify ways in which collaboration can achieve the goals of both organizations. For

example, emergency managers could work with the police to ensure that Block Watch (also known as

Neighborhood Watch) groups are provided with information about environmental hazards.

Task 3: Enlist the participation of nongovernmental and private sector organizations.

Nongovernmental organizations such as the American Red Cross and religious organizations such as the

Salvation Army are active in household emergency preparedness and, especially, disaster recovery. Some

of these organizations routinely work with needy families and can identify the geographic areas in which

there is a high concentration of population segments that are most likely to be vulnerable to disaster

impact. These organizations can also help to identify methods of assisting households to prepare for

emergencies, reduce the vulnerability of the structures in which they live, or to find safer places to which

they can move.

In addition, there are many disaster-relevant infrastructure organizations such as water,

wastewater, fuel, and electric power utilities that can play a significant role in promoting the adoption of

hazard adjustments. Most of these respond to more routine emergencies such as severe thunderstorms and

winter storms, so they are aware of the demands that disasters can place on a community. In addition,

these organizations routinely send bills to all of the residents of their service areas, a situation which

provides emergency managers with an opportunity to disseminate notices about sources and channels for

obtaining further information about hazards and hazard adjustments.

Task 4. Work with the mass media. Collectively, the mass media comprise a variety of channels

that routinely reach a large number of community residents. Consequently, a knowledge of media goals

and operations, as well as familiarity with specific news media personnel, can set the stage for

relationships in which information about environmental hazards adjustment can be disseminated. At the

same time, the visibility and credibility of local environmental hazard management agencies can be

enhanced. In particular, contact with reporters and editors can allow emergency managers access to

channels with which citizens are familiar and routinely use for information. Cultivation of a cooperative

relationship with the mass media through these mechanisms serves to diversify channels for the

dissemination of risk information, as well as to increase the visibility of the environmental hazard

management function in the community. Finally, reporters are often aware of their specialized audiences

and tend to target them directly. This aspect of media coverage creates opportunities for emergency

managers to target messages to specific audience segments defined by gender, age, ethnicity (and

language groups), and socioeconomic status.

It is important for emergency managers to recognize that, even though they consider

environmental hazards to be a topic of vital concern for the community, reporters and editors will not

automatically consider this information to be “newsworthy” during the continuing hazard phase. In order

to increase the priority of this topic for the news media, many federal agencies such as the National

Weather Service urge government officials to “declare” weeks for hazards such as tornadoes and

hurricanes. Local emergency managers can take advantage of the publicity generated by these agencies to

contact their local media. In addition, emergency managers can collaborate with the news media by

working with them to develop the background materials reporters will need in an escalating crisis,

emergency response, or disaster recovery. Thus, emergency managers need to anticipate what types of

information reporters are likely to seek during these events and to prepare fact sheets and other

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“boilerplate” that can be used no matter what specific conditions occur during an emergency.

Task 5: Work with neighborhood associations and civic organizations. Most communities have

many neighborhood associations and civic organizations whose members participate when they perceive

social and environmental problems in their community that they expect the organization to be successful

in mitigating (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Florin & Wandersman, 1984). Such studies have found

group members’ sense of individual and collective self-efficacy is enhanced when these organizations are

empowered by successfully influencing actions taken by the community (Prestby, et al., 1990). As noted

in Chapter 3, emergency managers can help the leaders of these groups to increase members’

organizational commitment by increasing leader initiating structure (explaining what tasks to perform and

how to perform them), leader consideration (recognizing the needs and limitations of each person), and

perceived reward opportunities, and by reducing role conflict (differing expectations regarding members’

duties). In addition, emergency managers can work with these organizations by providing them with

opportunities to learn about environmental hazards and feasible adjustments to those hazards. Time is

frequently available for this purpose during organizational meetings because most of these organizations

meet regularly, but are not always able to fill their meeting agendas.

Program Development

Task 1. Staff and train a crisis communication team. One important principle of risk

communication is to establish a crisis communication team as part of a broader emergency preparedness

program (Churchill, 1997; Fink, 1986). The crisis communication team forms a critical link between

technical experts and the population at risk, so it must be able to communicate effectively with both

groups. In addition, the crisis communication team should be represented by a spokesperson who is

technically competent to explain the situation clearly. As noted earlier, spokespersons will be perceived as

credible if they have relevant credentials (e.g., job title and educational degrees), are accepted by other

sources of known credibility, or have a demonstrated history of job performance that has enhanced their

credibility (Lindell & Perry, 1992; Perry & Lindell, 1990). It also will be helpful if they receive training

from public relations experts (Hance, et al., 1988).

As is the case with any other emergency response organization, the crisis communication team

should have written operating procedures to guide its activation and initial contacts with the news media.

The crisis communication team’s procedures should include documentation of all emergency response

related activities, especially an event log recording the information that was available and the criteria that

were used to guide critical decisions such as those involving protective actions for the public. The crisis

communication team should also prepare to monitor information being disseminated by the news media

and should designate a rumor control center that will be staffed by operators who are frequently updated

on the status of the incident and the response to it.

The crisis communication team should recognize that reporters are taught to describe events in

terms of stories that are framed by five questions—who, what, when, where, and why (Churchill, 1997).

Specifically, they will want to know what happened and what were the specific causes of the event. Other

questions include who was (or will be) affected—including casualties, property damage, and economic

disruption—and what authorities have done (and will do) to respond to the situation. It frequently is

difficult to answer one or more of these questions because information is lacking. In such cases, it is

important for the spokesperson to avoid speculation (and especially premature blame), but rather to admit

he or she does not know the answer and will find out as soon as possible. This should not be interpreted

as a license to plead ignorance even when you are reasonably confident about your assessment of the

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situation. It is important to strike a balance between avoiding speculation and withholding information.

When providing information to the news media, it is important to remember few reporters have

scientific backgrounds, so technical details might not only be unnecessary but potentially confusing and

thus counterproductive. To distinguish material that is informative from that which is useless or confusing

requires advance preparation—especially advance contact with local reporters. This will not solve all

problems; major crises such as the 911 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina draw reporters from around

the country and even around the world. Reporters from national or international newspapers and

television networks will not cover stories in exactly the same way as local reporters, but most of the

important information needs will be common to all categories of reporters.

Despite their limited knowledge about scientific and technological processes, reporters should be

treated with respect because they have a difficult job to do. Specifically, they must translate complex

scientific concepts in terms that can be understood by any reasonably intelligent and literate citizen. Thus,

emergency managers who prepare briefing materials that facilitate this process will have a far better

chance of getting their message to the public than those who continue to speak in technical jargon

(McCallum & Anderson, 1991). Just as officials should translate warnings from English to minority

languages in order to ensure the warning messages are transmitted correctly, agency officials also should

translate their assessment of a situation from technical jargon to ordinary English to ensure this message

is also transmitted correctly. It is important to provide reporters with the best available information when

they face a deadline, even if that information is less reliable or current than one might prefer.

Finally, the crisis communication plan and procedures should be evaluated using drills that test

the crisis communication team alone and also by means of full scale exercises that test the integration of

the crisis communication function into the overall emergency response organization. Each drill or

exercise should be followed by a critique that evaluates the adequacy of the crisis communication plan

and procedures, as well as the staffing, training, and materials used.

Task 2: Establish procedures for maintaining an effective communication flow during an

escalating crisis or emergency response. All organizations participating in the risk communication

program should establish procedures for coordinating the information they disseminate during crises and

emergencies. It is especially important to routinize the flow of information among these organizations to

ensure each organization receives all the information it needs as promptly as possible. The types of

information needed in an escalating crisis will depend upon the circumstances, but recommendations

regarding the content of incident notifications can be found in guidance for chemical (National Response

Team, 1987) and nuclear (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1980) facilities, and are summarized in

Table 4-3. It is advisable that this table be adopted as a template because it is based upon long experience

with escalating crises and disaster responses. It is essential that facility operators and local emergency

managers discuss their information capabilities and needs and agree in advance what information will be

exchanged when the need arises.

Task 3: Develop a comprehensive risk communication program. As noted earlier, McGuire’s

(1985) system for analyzing message content can be defined in terms of the amount of material, speed of

presentation, number of arguments, repetition, style, clarity, ordering, forcefulness, and extremity of the

position advocated. Some of these characteristics can be measured objectively; for example, the amount

of material can be measured in terms of the number of words, the speed of presentation can be measured

in words per minute, and the number of arguments can be counted. Other characteristics are more

ambiguous—repetition can be measured either in terms of the number of verbatim duplications of the

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message or the number of times an idea or argument is presented. Finally, characteristics such as the

clarity and extremity of the arguments must be measured subjectively. As one might expect, there often

are significant individual differences in receivers’ perceptions of the subjective message characteristics as

well as in their reactions to all of these message characteristics.

Table 4-3. Essential incident data. Date and time of report

Name, affiliation, and telephone number of information source

Location, type and current status of the incident

• Derailment, containment failure, fire, explosion, liquid spill, gaseous release

• Hazardous material name, physical properties (gas, liquid, solid), environmental cues (sights, sounds, smells), and potential health effects

• Hazardous material release duration and quantity released

• Casualties and damage already incurred

Incident prognosis

• Potential for fire or explosion at site

• Potential for fire or explosion affecting residential, commercial, or industrial areas

• Hazardous material quantity available for release and expected release duration

• Locations and populations requiring protective action

• Types of protective actions recommended: evacuation, sheltering in-place, expedient respiratory protection, interdiction of food/water

Weather conditions (current and forecast wind speed and direction)

Chronology of important events in the development of the incident

Current status of response

• Facility/shipper/carrier actions: assessment, preventive, corrective, population protective actions

• Local/state/federal agency actions: assessment, preventive, corrective, population protective actions

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

At a somewhat broader level, Mileti and his colleagues (Mileti, et al., 1992; Mileti & Peek, 2000;

Mileti & Sorensen, 1987) have defined warning message content in terms of information about the

information source, the nature of the hazard, the impact location and time, guidance about recommended

protective action, and frequency of repetition. Messages can be further characterized in terms of stylistic

characteristics, which include message specificity (the level of information detail), consistency

(compatibility of information within and between messages), and certainty (the stated or implied

probability of an event’s occurrence, as well as sources’ apparent confidence in what they are saying).

The stylistic characteristics also include clarity (simplicity of the words used in the message), accuracy

(the degree to which a source’s statements are proven to be correct over time), sufficiency (adequacy of

the amount of information provided—neither too much nor too little), and channel (electronic, print, face-

to-face).

In evaluating the suitability of message content, the primary concern is that it should take into

account the protective action decision process that determines the adoption of household hazard

adjustments. Although adjustment adoption intentions and actual adoption depend upon many additional

variables, the four key message content factors are personal risk, personal responsibility for action (when

this is necessary during the continuing hazard phase), guidance for protective action (including

information about an action’s efficacy and resource requirements), and sources of further information.

These factors should become important themes during risk communication and should be addressed in

designing messages that are most likely to have an impact.

There are several implications of the PADM for the construction of risk communication

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messages. First, information about hazards and hazard adjustments should be presented in a form that

attracts attention and is easily understood and retained but, even then, it will require periodic repetition

over time.

Second, risk communication programs should address risk perception but should not over-

emphasize it. Risk perception should be addressed because probabilities are difficult for most people to

understand. In particular, the statement that “there is a 1% probability of a damaging earthquake within

the next year” might have little impact on people’s behavior, but cumulating probabilities over time by

making the mathematically equivalent statement that there is a 20% chance of an earthquake in the next

twenty years does seem to make more of a difference in risk perception (Kunreuther, 2001). However,

even communication programs that succeed in increasing the accuracy of people’s risk perceptions are of

no consequence if risk area residents fail to act on these risk perceptions by adopting effective hazard

adjustments. In the case of warnings, it is especially important to describe what the risk is, where it is

going to happen, when it is going to happen, and what the effects will be (Mileti, 1993). Beyond this,

however, detailed explanations of risk assessment processes and hazard agent dynamics might be

unnecessary or even counterproductive if such information displaces a discussion of the other three

issues—personal responsibility for action, guidance for protective action (including information about a

hazard adjustment’s efficacy and resource requirements), and sources of further information (Mileti,

1993).

Explicitly addressing personal responsibility for action is important because research suggests

repeated officials statements regarding the need for households struck by earthquakes to be self sufficient

for 72 hours have increased citizens’ sense of personal responsibility for self protection (Lindell & Perry,

2004). Thus, a frank acknowledgement of the limits to governmental assistance might be useful in other

contexts as well. Moreover, self sufficiency is likely to increase when emergency managers describe the

ways in which households can protect themselves, together with specific descriptions of the resource

requirements to implement these hazard adjustments. In addition, emergency managers should work with

NGOs in their communities to ensure households with low incomes and other disadvantages are able, as

well as willing, to take personal responsibility for self protection.

As noted earlier in this chapter, guidance for protective action during an emergency response

often requires nothing more than stating what is the recommended protective action and when to

implement it (e.g., evacuate now). In other cases, such as the continuing hazard phase, guidance would

include information about a hazard adjustment’s efficacy and resource requirements (e.g., bolting water

heaters to the foundation).

Finally, sources for further information should be addressed because message recipients vary in

so many ways that they might need individualized information. This might include information about

their personal risk (for those who are on the edge of the risk area), alternative protective actions (e.g.,

sheltering in-place rather than evacuation for those whose health status is too fragile to be moved safely),

or sources of assistance (e.g., for those who have no personal vehicle and have not been able to leave with

friends, relatives, neighbors, or coworkers).

In addressing the four critical risk communication issues, emergency managers should pay

attention to message style factors such as achieving clarity by choosing simple, nontechnical language.

The essential information is simple and can be communicated quickly by the broadcast media or in a

small space by the print media. For additional detail or elaboration, people can be referred to another

specific channel or source. Messages should be short enough to avoid losing receivers’ attention because

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of seemingly irrelevant details that induce boredom. Conversely, long messages presenting many details

have the potential for overloading receivers with so much information they are unable to determine what

is centrally important and what is peripheral. That is, the provision of too much information is probably as

dysfunctional as the provision of insufficient information. Nonetheless, emergency managers should

recognize what is “too long” will vary from one community to another and even from one situation to

another. In regard to the latter, people’s attention spans for emergency management information will be

relatively short during the continuing hazard phase, but can be expected to increase significantly during

an emerging crisis or emergency response. In the latter case, lengthy messages should be repeated

frequently to ensure that people can obtain the information they need if they fail to attend to it or

comprehend it the first time they receive it.

In all multiethnic communities, the production of brochures or other official written information

should be multilingual. It is important to note, as Lindell and Perry (1992) indicate, that translations

should be professionally executed to avoid complications arising from dialect variations within the same

language group. Furthermore, when providing hazard information to non-English outlets, it is appropriate

to provide it in both English and the target language to minimize information distortion that might be

introduced if employees of a radio or television station, newspaper, or magazine provide a “freelance”

translation of the English version.

Task 4: Plan to make effective use of informal communication networks. It is important for

emergency managers to recognize peer communication takes place during all phases—the continuing

hazard phase, the escalating crisis phase, and the emergency response phase. They should plan to use

these informal networks to increase the level of hazard adjustment adoption in their communities and to

alert peers to dangerous situations. However, even the best intended friends, relatives, neighbors and

coworkers might misunderstand a message in the first place or inadvertently distort it through selective

recall. One strategy for reducing distortion is to disseminate information through a range of official

sources and channels, creating what Mileti (1993, p. 148) calls a “supplemental barrage of information”.

The idea is to provide many opportunities for citizens to hear official messages via several channels in the

expectation that people will retain the common elements of these messages.

Task 5: Establish procedures for obtaining feedback from the news media and the public. As

Figure 4-1 indicates, feedback is a critical part of any communication process because it provides

receivers with an opportunity to confirm they have comprehended the message, to reconcile

inconsistencies within or between messages, or to obtain information that is not available in the messages

they have received. Feedback is an inherent part of some communication channels such as informal face-

to-face discussions. It is somewhat more limited in public hearings where public comment might be

limited to a few minutes at the end of a meeting (indeed, avoiding feedback is often a major objective of

such “hearings”) and, in any event, individual speakers are typically limited to 3-5 minutes apiece. This

need for feedback is precisely the reason why many scholars recommend informal channels of

communication (e.g., Committee on Risk Perception and Communication, 1989; Covello, 1987; Hance, et

al, 1988). Thus, if community or agency procedures require public hearings, these should be

supplemented by less formal procedures such as advisory panels and meetings with neighborhood

associations and civic organizations.

During emerging crises, there often is pressure to disseminate information more rapidly via

electronic and print media, so opportunities for monitoring the degree of message distortion are somewhat

limited. One effective strategy for performing this function is to monitor the news media by obtaining

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copies of local newspapers, listening to radio, and viewing television broadcasts. In addition, emergency

managers can obtain feedback from citizens via rumor control centers with a telephone number or a Web

site that has been publicized in advance.

Program Implementation During the Continuing Hazard Phase

Task 1: Build source credibility by increasing perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness. As

noted previously, disaster researchers have found those who think they are at risk from environmental

hazards seek information from the news media (print and broadcast) and peers (friends, relatives,

neighbors, and coworkers), as well as from authorities (federal, state and local government). In order to

ensure local authorities are considered to be the most credible source, they must take steps during the

continuing hazard phase to enhance perceptions of their expertise and trustworthiness. Accordingly, the

members of the crisis communication team should ensure its procedures are coordinated with all relevant

agencies’ emergency operations plans. This coordination can be verified by using joint training, drills,

and full-scale exercises to produce joint messages, messages that reference each other or, at least,

messages that are consistent with each other.

It also is important for personnel from each agency to develop a demonstrated history of effective

job performance that enhances their credibility. In part, this experience can be gained during minor

incidents such as severe storms and minor floods that cause localized damage and disruption of normal

activities. However, credibility can also be enhanced by effective performance in public hearings or in

meetings with advisory committees, neighborhood associations, and civic organizations. Of course,

expertise is only one component of credibility; trustworthiness is also essential. According to Renn and

Levine (1991), trust develops when messages are perceived to be accurate, objective, and complete. This

can be expected when a source is fair, unbiased, complete, and accurate (Meyer, 1988; Trumbo &

McComas, 2003). Similarly, Maeda and Miyahara (2003) contend that a trustworthy source is competent,

open and honest, caring and concerned, and sympathetic. Accordingly, emergency managers are advised

to earn a community’s trust by being competent, caring, honorable, and considering outrage factors when

working with the public (Covello, McCallum & Pavlova, 1988; Hance, et al., 1988). It also is important to

promote meaningful public involvement by involving the community in the continuing hazard phase (or

early in the decision process of a new facility), avoiding secret meetings, and explaining the agency’s

procedures (especially what constraints on public participation are imposed by law and agency policy).

Emergency managers also should provide accurate information that is responsive to people’s requests. In

this regard, it is important to recognize the difference between the information people think they need and

the information experts think is needed. Emergency managers must learn to respond to both sets of

information needs.

Task 2: Use a variety of channels to disseminate hazard information. Information channels differ

significantly with respect to the types of information most suited to them, so messages tend to be

“channel-bound”. Radio, face-to-face conversations, and oral presentations are limited to verbal

information, whereas television, print media, computer simulations, slide shows, and films can convey

numeric and graphic information as well as verbal information. The fact that messages disseminated

through different media inherently have different characteristics implies different channels could be

selected to contribute to different stages of information processing. For example, radio or television

“spots” might have their greatest impact in establishing initial hazard awareness (i.e., attracting attention

to the problem) and maintaining its intrusiveness by means of frequent thought and discussion. By

contrast, printed materials are most effective in providing the detailed information needed to establish a

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perception of threat and identifying suitable hazard adjustments. This function follows from their ability

to be retained and re-read to enhance comprehension and memory for important information such as

definitions and checklists.

Still other channels include public meetings and interactive (listener or viewer call-in) broadcast

programs, which provide opportunities for two-way communication that are effective for answering

unresolved questions but have the disadvantage that communication is oral and thus less readily retained.

The advantage of such interactive channels is that their use is likely to enhance the receiver's

personalization of the message, but large public meetings are especially likely to elicit theatrical

demonstrations of outrage rather than sincere questions. Thus, when agency policies or particular

circumstances require large public meetings, Hance, et al. (1988) advocate considering the use of neutral

moderators such as the League of Women Voters, structuring agendas so that public comment can be

made before the end of the meeting (by which time most people have left), and breaking the meeting up

into smaller working groups with specific topics to address.

In addition to the channel boundedness of certain types of information (verbal, numeric, and

graphic), environmental hazard mangers should recognize channel access is unevenly distributed in

communities and can be compounded by variations in ethnicity and income. Typically, variation in

resources and personal skills do not eliminate channel access altogether, but instead concentrate it on a

narrower range of channels. Moreover, individual preferences also restrict the access each channel

provides to different community groups, so cross-channel linkages might be required. If enough channels

are used, emergency managers are likely to reach all members of a community that has even the most

varied pattern of channel preferences.

Task 3: Describe community or facility hazard adjustments being planned or implemented. In

many communities, there are emergency management actions being planned or implemented by local

government agencies or, in the case of some technological hazards, by hazardous facility operators. Local

residents should be informed of any hazard mitigation actions being taken to reduce the probability of an

incident so they will understand that their risk is being reduced. Of course, it is unlikely all of them will

believe these measures will be wholly effective in protecting them and, indeed, emergency managers

should acknowledge there is no mitigation action that can guarantee complete safety. That is, land use and

building construction practices can reduce, but not eliminate, the threat of natural hazards. The same can

be said about the use of land use practices and engineered safety features in connection with technological

hazards. In addition, emergency managers should describe any emergency preparedness actions being

taken to facilitate an active response to an incident and any recovery preparedness actions to support a

rapid restoration of the community to normal patterns of social and economic functioning after an

incident occurs.

Task 4: Describe feasible household hazard adjustments. Even when hazard mitigation actions

have been implemented to reduce the likelihood of incidents ranging from floods to accidental chemical

releases, some local residents will not be satisfied that these actions will provide an adequate level of

safety. In such cases, emergency managers should inform risk area residents of hazard adjustments they

could take to protect themselves. For example, households can mitigate flood risk by adopting a variety of

floodproofing measures (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1986), prepare for airborne releases

of toxic chemicals by reducing air infiltration in their homes (Lindell & Perry, 1992), or drink bottled or

boiled water in the event of groundwater contamination of local wells.

In some cases, the most cost-effective (and, sometimes, the only available) hazard adjustments

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are those taken by households. For example, earthquakes cannot be prevented (as engineered safety

features can prevent chemical releases) or controlled (as levees can control floods). Consequently, the

most effective methods for reducing earthquake casualties and damage is by household hazard

adjustments, such as bolting heavy items with a high center of gravity (e.g., refrigerators, water heaters)

to the walls. In such cases, emergency managers should promote the adoption of the most feasible hazard

adjustments by beginning with the ones that are most effective, most generally useful, and lowest in

resource requirements.

Task 5: Evaluate program effectiveness. It is important to evaluate the effectiveness of any risk

communication program by measuring the degree to which it has achieved its objectives (Stallen, 1991).

An evaluation of program effectiveness is the logical complement to the goal setting activity undertaken

in the strategic analysis. Thus, emergency managers should determine how to measure the goals they have

set, how to collect the data needed, and how to decide if the data indicate the goals have been achieved.

This comparison process can then serve as the basis for determining whether changes need to be made in

the risk communication program.

As this chapter has indicated many times, a primary goal of environmental risk communication

should be to promote household adoption of hazard adjustments. Thus, the first step in the program

evaluation will usually be to identify the hazard adjustments whose adoption the program is seeking to

increase. The remaining steps will depend upon the resources available.

Risk Communication During an Escalating Crisis or Emergency Response

There is an important difference between a state of chronic hazard and an escalating crisis, but the

time at which the transition takes place is rarely well defined. It helps to consider the definition of an

escalating crisis—a situation in which there is a significantly increased probability of an incident

occurring that will threaten the public’s health, safety, or property. Unfortunately, the problem is that the

probability of occurrence is at least partially subjective. Thus, the determination of whether a crisis exists

will also be subjective. As a practical matter, a crisis exists if authorities (including technological facility

operators), or the news media, or a significant proportion of those in the community believe that there is

an increased risk. Asserting that a crisis exists if any of these groups defines the situation as such follows

from the basic principle that “perception is reality”. If the news media or local residents believe there is a

crisis, then there is a crisis unless authorities can convince them otherwise. This might make it seem as if

any abnormal situation will inevitably become an escalating crisis, but such is not necessarily the case.

The crucial point is that authorities must be prepared to explain specifically why a situation is or is not a

crisis.

Classify the Situation

Authorities can exert some control over other people’s definition of a situation by establishing

specific criteria in advance of an incident that systematically define elevated conditions of threat. For

example, the National Weather Service has established an emergency classification system that consists

of watches and warnings, whereas the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1980) classifies an incident

as an Unusual Event, an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency. The number of

categories in the emergency classification system should correspond to meaningful differences in the

levels of response by local authorities (and facility personnel, in the case of technological facilities), but

the number of categories is less important than that the fact that the emergency classification system has

been established in advance, is defined as objectively as possible, and is agreed to by all responding

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organizations (Lindell & Perry, 1992). By establishing a set of objective indicators of environmental or

plant conditions that are linked to specific response actions, authorities commit themselves in advance to

take those actions under those conditions—a situation indicating decisions are being made on the basis of

rational scientific considerations rather than the exigencies of the moment.

Program Implementation During an Escalating Crisis or Emergency Response

Once authorities have determined that environmental conditions have exceeded the criteria listed

in the emergency classification system, they need to implement the predetermined response actions. Many

of these actions will include further emergency assessment, property protection, population protection,

and incident management. One of the most important incident management actions is risk

communication, and this will consist of six tasks:

• Activate the crisis communication team promptly,

• Determine the appropriate time to release sensitive information ,

• Select the communication channels appropriate to the situation,

• Maintain source credibility with the news media and the public,

• Provide timely and accurate information to the news media and the public, and

• Evaluate performance through post-incident critiques.

Task 1: Activate the crisis communication team promptly. When the criteria in the emergency

classification system have been exceeded, the crisis communication team should activate promptly and

prepare to disseminate information even if it does not need to release that information immediately.

Members of the team should contact all appropriate authorities and open all necessary communication

links to ensure all sources of information and expertise are brought to bear on the situation. It is essential

that all organizations be aware of the information being disseminated by other organizations so they can

identify any disagreement and prepare appropriate explanations before they are contacted by the news

media to explain the discrepancies.

Emergency managers should review the information in press kits and any background materials

they have prepared for briefing the news media in press conferences or community groups in public

hearings. They should also contact personnel in their agencies who are peripherally related to the crisis

(e.g., plant workers and clerical support staff) to brief them about the situation. Such personnel might

otherwise have only incomplete or outdated information to provide about the situation if they are queried

by the news media and peers.

During the initial stages of an escalating crisis or emergency response, emergency managers

should take care to review their communication objectives (Churchill, 1997). These objectives should

become the criteria according to which all later press releases, press conferences, and public meetings are

evaluated. In most environmental emergencies, the principal objectives will be to promote appropriate

protective action by those whom the authorities believe to be in the most immediate danger and also to

promote active monitoring of the situation by those who might later be determined to be at risk. The

objectives should not be to prevent panic, which disaster researchers have found to be extremely rare

(Drabek, 1986; Lindell & Perry, 1992). Nor should authorities ridicule what they consider to be

unnecessary protective action by those who think they are at risk, as long as such actions do not impede

the protection of those whom the authorities believe are at risk. It is especially important for authorities to

avoid attempting to promote one protective action by criticizing another. For example, some misguided

attempts have been made to promote sheltering in-place by asserting that people are exposing themselves

to major traffic accident risks if they evacuate. Not only is this incorrect (the accident risks in evacuation

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appear to be no greater than those of normal driving; Lindell & Perry, 1992), but it is likely to lead those

at risk to believe that there is nothing they can do to protect themselves.

Task 2: Determine the appropriate time to release sensitive information. When emergency

managers, but not others, can detect the subtle environmental cues that indicate the onset of an

emergency, they must determine when to alert others of the danger. Thus, the crisis communication team

needs to be guided by procedures that define when information is to be released, but there are no

universal rules for determining when to release information because even experts disagree (Kasperson,

1987). On the one hand, early releases of information often are characterized by a significant degree of

uncertainty, so there is a possibility that crisis conditions might never materialize or will be less severe

than initially expected. Consequently, authorities frequently withhold information in order to avoid

unnecessary disruption. The disadvantage of delaying the release of information is that this can be

misinterpreted as a cover-up if the data are leaked (Hance, et al., 1988) and there are many ways in which

such leaks can occur. It also is important to respond appropriately to reporters’ questions when they

become aware that something important is happening. Statements of “no comment” are almost certain to

be interpreted as meaning that authorities have important information that is being withheld.

By contrast, early release of information tends to enhance the credibility of the information

source and to increase a source’s control over the agenda. In particular, being the first to break bad news

provides an opportunity to put the information into an appropriate context. In addition, controlling the

timing of a press release can have a significant impact on the amount of attention it receives. A press

release distributed on a slow news day might receive substantially more coverage in the news media than

the same information released on a busy day or late on a Friday afternoon preceding a three day weekend.

Task 3: Select the communication channels that are appropriate to the situation. One of the most

significant differences between a continuing hazard and an escalating crisis is that the latter is

“newsworthy”, so emergency managers will generally have little difficulty in obtaining the news media

coverage they sought, usually unsuccessfully, during the continuing hazard phase. As always, news media

coverage needs to be monitored to ensure reporters are accurately disseminating the information released

by emergency managers, yet this procedure alone cannot ensure those at risk are receiving, heeding, and

comprehending the information they need. Thus, emergency managers need to promote dialogue through

two-way communication, preferably in small groups rather than massive public hearings. This will help

them to understand public risk perceptions and explain risks more effectively (Hance, et al., 1988).

Even though an escalating crisis or an emergency response will prompt the news media to seek

information, emergency managers should not rely only on reporters’ requests for interviews to determine

when and what information to disseminate. Instead, they should initiate communication with reporters

through press releases and press conferences. Typically, press releases afford the most control over the

agenda, whereas interviews provide the least control.

Task 4: Maintain source credibility with the news media and the public. During an escalating

crisis or emergency response, emergency managers should obtain timely and accurate data from within

their own and other agencies and make their recommended actions consistent with the analyses. If the

available data are incomplete, they should be honest about what is and is not known. A candid confession

of ignorance might be uncomfortable at the time, but it is less dangerous to one’s credibility than making

up an answer that is later found out to be incorrect.

A related principle is that emergency managers should recognize the news media have many

sources of information in addition to authorities. Consequently, it is important to respond to reporters

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when they need information for an imminent deadline because they will obtain the best information they

can from whatever sources are available at the time that they need to file their stories (Churchill, 1997).

Accordingly, it is often better to explain that data have been or are being collected, describe how they are

being or will be analyzed, and indicate the date on which the results of the analyses will be released.

Hance, et al. (1988) note that agencies should present some management options when the data reveal

environmental problems, but practitioners differ in their beliefs about the balance between analyzing these

options thoroughly and presenting tentative options that provide a starting point for input from the

community.

Trust is a major issue because there tends to be so little of it to begin with and what there is can

be lost so easily. As Kasperson (1987) noted, trust in institutions has been decreasing for some time and

television anchors tend to be among the few people other than independent scientists that are generally

trusted. Television anchors are trusted because they are familiar, authoritative, and have developed a track

record of accuracy over time. Frequently, those who must communicate information about environmental

risks are stereotyped as representatives of their organizations and, unless the stereotype is positive at the

outset, it can be difficult to build trust during a crisis. This is the reason why it is so important for

emergency managers to forestall public stereotypes about their agencies, and thus themselves, by working

with community groups on multiple environmental issues before crises arise and publicizing the

accomplishments of their agencies in handling these problems.

Task 4: Provide timely and accurate information about the hazard to the news media and the

public. News releases should be no longer than two pages with simple short sentences in plain English

(Churchill, 1997). They should contain a dateline (date and location of release), the organizational source

(including point of contact) for the information, a summary lead that provides a one sentence abstract of

the press release, the text of the press release, and a brief description of any attachments. These should be

supplemented by fact sheets that contain basic background information appropriate to any incident. There

should be attachments including information such as a biographical summary about the spokesperson and

other pertinent details about the hazard and official responses.

In deciding how to present risk information, it is important to assess the audience’s level of

technical sophistication so the presentation can avoid being too technical for people to understand, yet not

so simplistic the audience is insulted. In general, it is important to presume the average member of the

audience is intelligent but uninformed about environmental risks. Thus, emergency managers should

avoid acronyms and use ordinary English words rather than technical jargon to explain basic concepts.

They also should anticipate the possibility of confrontational tactics by the news media or some members

of the public. If confronted with differing interpretations from other experts, emergency managers should

be prepared to calmly reiterate their own scientific qualifications, repeat the rationale for their own

position on the dispute, and explain what they believe are the weaknesses in alternative positions.

Emergency managers should be prepared to describe the process by which risks were assessed

(including ways in which cautious estimates were used in different steps of the analysis), and what the

risks are (in terms of quantities released, ambient concentrations, individual exposures via different

pathways, probabilities of adverse effects, and expected levels of impact over different time periods).

They also should be prepared to acknowledge uncertainties in hazard data and even be ready to

acknowledge they don’t know the answer to a question when this is the case. However, they also should

be prepared to state what will be done to obtain an answer to the question and when the answer will be

forthcoming.

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Task 5: Evaluate performance through post-incident critiques. To improve their performance,

organizations must learn from their experience. Thus, each incident in which emergency managers must

disseminate risk information to the news media or the public should be followed by a thorough critique of

performance (Lindell & Perry, 1992; National Response Team, 1987). All members of the crisis

communication team should review the goals of the risk communication program, the event logs kept

during the incident, and other available documentation to identify deficiencies in organizational

performance. Experience in drills, exercises, and incidents has demonstrated the importance of focusing

on the performance of the organization rather than the performance of individuals because this enhances a

spirit of cooperation. Thus, each participant should be encouraged to follow up on any deficiencies by

identifying the ways in which these can be corrected by improvements in plans, procedures, training,

facilities, equipment, or materials and supplies.

Case Study: Risk Perception and Warning of the Mt. St. Helens Eruption

In late March, 1980, Mt. St. Helens began a series of ash and steam eruptions that culminated six

weeks later in a blast that ejected one cubic mile of material from the top of the mountain. Prior to the

March eruptions, most residents of nearby communities were aware that Mt. St. Helens was a volcano and

could name a specific threat that could affect their safety (Perry & Greene, 1983). The majority of those

within about 20 miles of the volcano expressed concern about ashfall, whereas most of those in

communities 30-40 miles away were concerned about mudflows and floods. The severity and immediacy

of the volcano threat led people to search for information frequently—most of them sought information

four times a day or more. The unfamiliarity of the threat led them to rely on the news media more than

peers. Reliance on authorities was very high in communities closest to the volcano, but very low farther

away. Similarly, residents of areas closest to the volcano thought they were more likely to evacuate and

had made more preparations to evacuate.

On the day of the May 18 eruption, most of those living close to the volcano (Toutle/Silverlake)

were warned by authorities (48%) but almost as many were warned by peers (41%) and few were warned

by the news media (11%). By contrast, most of those living farther away the volcano (Woodland) were

warned by peers (59%) and equal proportions of the remainder were warned by authorities (21%) and the

news media (20%). The initial response also differed by community. Toutle/Silverlake residents were

most likely to prepare to evacuate (40%), but many took family oriented action (18%), sought to confirm

the warning (19%), or continued normal routines (18%). Woodland residents were most likely to take

family oriented action (41%), while others sought to confirm the warning (21%) or continued normal

routines (29%) rather than prepare to evacuate (7%). Most residents of both communities sought warning

confirmation, but those in Toutle/Silverlake were less likely to use the mass media (33% vs. 59% in

Woodland) and more likely to contact peers and local authorities.