Scenario Mutability and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame
Former Student
Florida International University
Abstract Comment by Ryan Winter: The Abstract is a new element to Paper IV, so take some time to compose this paragraph. It should cover both studies and provide information about the study in general and your findings Comment by Ryan Winter: The word Abstract is centered and in bold
Need for Cognition (NFC) and scenario mutability can play a role in the way we interpret outcomes of events. The current studies analyzed culpability assessed when a situation varied in mutability (in study one and two) and when the NFC of each subject was assessed (study two). In both studies, undergraduate participants read a scenario in which an undesirable outcome could have been avoided (changeable) or was unavoidable (unchangeable). In both studies, the participants generated as many “If Only” statements as they could and rated how much blame the actor in the scenario deserved for the undesirable outcome. For both studies, participants assessed more blame in the changeable condition, but neither scenario nor NFC impacted counterfactual statement generation. These results suggest that the mutability of a scenario is important, but that counterfactual statements may explain how participants assess that mutability. Comment by Ryan Winter: The whole abstract is flush left (no indenting) but the right side is jagged Comment by Ryan Winter: In this course, try to keep the abstract to 150 words (this one is 140).
Keywords: need for cognition, counterfactual thinking, “If Only” statements, changeable condition, unchangeable condition Comment by Ryan Winter: The keywords are not included in the word count
Counterfactual Thinking and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame Comment by Ryan Winter: Same title as the title page. Make it identical! Comment by Ryan Winter: This Study One literature review section is nearly identical the study one literature review in Paper III. See my comments there.
As free-willed beings, humans are often the victims of their own decisions. Imagine accidentally running over a stray cat because you decided to look away from the road at the exact moment the cat decided to cross the street. Following the accident, most people would be plagued with thoughts of how alternative circumstances or decisions could have prevented such an unfortunate situation. Every time an individual forms a ‘what if’ scenario in which he or she mentally alters the course of events occurred, they are participating in a process that is known as counterfactual thinking (Ruiselová et al., 2007). This process allows individuals to consider the multiple factors at play in a situation (i.e mutability), and to decide what specific condition was responsible for the ultimate outcome of the event (Williams et al., 1996). The primary focus of our study is to analyze the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome. That is, if it is easy to “undo” an event that ends in a tragic outcome, will participants find an actor who fails to engage in that easy behavior more at fault?
The development of counterfactual thoughts relies on the variability of the situation as well as the knowledge that different actions could have resulted in alternate outcomes (Alquist, et al., 2015). According to Alquist et al., situations that are believed to be highly changeable generate more counterfactual thoughts than events that seem unavoidable. However, ruminating on every conceivable alternative of a situation would take an unlimited amount of time and resources. Instead of allotting so much time and energy on a cognitive task, people tend to narrow down the different scenarios that come to mind according to the degree of controllability of the factors involved (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). For example, the deliberate decisions individuals make that ultimately lead to a certain outcome is considered to be a controllable event, whereas uncontrollable events are unavoidable circumstances, such as traffic jams or natural disasters (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). When mentally forming a scenario different than the one occurred, individuals tend to change controllable rather than uncontrollable events. Therefore, events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction generally receive the brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.
In a similar light, a study performed by McCloy and Byrne (2000), discovered that inappropriate events are more often changed through the process of counterfactual thinking than appropriate ones, especially when the outcome of these events was negative. Inappropriate events include the decisions individuals make that are considered to be ‘socially wrong’, whereas appropriate events are ‘socially acceptable’ actions. Due to these results, we can conclude that what McCloy and Byrne consider to be “inappropriate controllable” events, will likely be regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation.
Another contributing factor to perceived culpability is the extent of knowledge of the actors involved in an event, as well as the intent of their actions (Gilbert et al., 2015). For example, in the aforementioned scenario, had the driver known that looking away from the road would have caused her to run over the stray cat, the driver would have been more likely to be perceived guilty, even though the actions and the outcome of the situation remained the same. This rationalization is the product of a bottom-up method of thinking in which individuals are able to generate more counterfactual thoughts due to the actor’s knowledge of the outcome (Gilbert et al., 2015). As these authors have noted, the increased development of counterfactual thoughts will in turn attribute more responsibility to the actor, which will ultimately increase perceived blame. But this is not the full picture when it comes to focusing on the role of counterfactual thoughts in altering participant responses.
Study One
In pursuance of counterfactual thinking and its relationship to perceived blame, we have devised a study that analyzed the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome. We provided participants with one of three scenarios, each of which depicted a variation of the same situation where alternate events lead to different conclusions. In the changeable condition, an actor engaged in a behavior that led to an undesirable outcome (death) that could have been avoided had he acted differently. In the unchangeable condition, the same actor engaged in a behavior that once again led to an undesirable outcome, but here the outcome could not have been avoided if he acted differently. In the neutral condition, the actor engaged in an alternative behavior, but the outcome was still undesirable. We predicted that participants would place more blame on the actor in the changeable condition where the actor could have avoided the undesirable outcome had he behaved differently than in both the unchangeable and neutral conditions, where the actor’s behavior could not be altered. This is because we expected changeable participants to generate more counterfactuals (more statements about how the actor could have behaved) in the changeable condition.
Methods
Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: This study one methods section is nearly identical the study one methods section in Paper II. See my comments there.
You can add in the phrase “Methods Study One” though, if you like (not required)
Participants
One hundred and twenty six students from Florida International University were randomly selected to participate in our study. Of these 126 participants, 37% (n = 47) were male and 63% (n = 79) were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 58 with an average of 22.32 years (SD = 6.30). Our sample population consisted of 68.3% Hispanic Americans (n = 86), 8.7% African Americans (n = 11), 19% Caucasians (n = 24), 1.6% Asians (n = 2), and 2.4% who did not specify their ethnicity (n = 3). See Table 1.
Materials and Procedure
In accordance with the standardized guidelines for informed consent, prospective participants were notified of the potential risks and benefits of participating in the study before being introduced to the research material. If the student verbally agreed to participate, he or she was given one of three different documents, each of which consisted of four parts or sections. In part one of the study, the participant read a short scenario concerning a paraplegic couple, Tina and Eugene, who requested a taxi for a night out with friends. Each of the three documents depicted the same initial situation with alternate conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) that ultimately led to different outcomes of events.
In the changeable condition, the taxi driver arrived to pick up the couple, only to promptly decline their fare upon seeing that they were both paraplegic. Without enough time to call for another taxi, Tina and Eugene decided to take Tina’s car, which was handicap equipped. In order to reach their destination, they had to cross a bridge that had been weakened the night before due to a severe storm. The damaged bridge collapsed mere minutes before the couple reached it. Unable to see the missing portion of the bridge in the night, Tina and Eugene drove off the road, into the river below, and drowned. The taxi driver, who had left 15 minutes earlier, managed to make it safely across, before the collapse. In the unchangeable condition, the situation remained mostly the same with the exception that the taxi driver arrived at the bridge after it had collapsed and plummeted into the water as well. He managed to make it out of the car and swim to safety, but Tina and Eugene drowned. In the neutral condition, the taxi arrived to pick up the couple but promptly refused their fare as soon as he realized that they were both paraplegic. In this condition, the taxi driver did eventually agree to take Tina and Eugene to their destination downtown, albeit after much argument. Due to the recently collapsed bridge, the taxi driver drove his passengers and himself off the road and into the river below. He barely managed to make it out of the car before drowning. Tina and Eugene’s outcome remained the same.
After reading one of the scenarios described above, the participant continued on to the remainder of the study, which was composed of a series of open, partially open, and close-ended questions.
In part two, the student participating in the study was asked to procure as many ‘If Only’ statements as possible, meaning that they had to list all the factors they could think of that could have possibly changed the outcome of the event.
In part three, the participant was presented with a series of questions about their thoughts regarding the specific situation they read about. After reading each question, the participant was asked to record his or her response in a scale of one to nine. These questions included how avoidable they thought the accident was (1 = not at all avoidable, 9 = very avoidable), the causal role of the taxi driver in the couple’s death (1 = not at all causal, 9 = the most important cause), their thoughts on how much control the taxi driver had (1 = no control, 9 = complete control), the negligence of the taxi driver (1 = not at all negligent, 9 = completely negligent), how much money for damages the taxi driver was responsible for (1 = no money, 9 = as much as possible), the foreseeability of the couple’s death (1 = not at all foreseeable, 9 = completely foreseeable), and how much blame the taxi driver deserved for the event (1 = no blame at all, 9 = total blame). Remaining questions focused on a series of statements about the taxi drive, all rated on scales ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 9 (Strongly Agree). These statements included, “The taxi driver was reckless”, “the taxi driver was patient”, “The taxi driver was careful”, and “The taxi driver was hasty”. The last question of part three was a yes or no question that asked the participant whether the taxi driver agreed to drive the couple or not. This final question served as an attention check, which informed us if the participant was attentive to the study and allowed us to exclude potentially misrepresentative responses from our data.
Part four asked for the participant’s demographic information, including gender, age, ethnicity, their first language, and whether they were a student at Florida International University. Concluding the study, the participant was debriefed on his or her contribution to the study as well as our insights on counterfactual thinking and our main hypothesis.
Although we had several dependent variables, our primary focus involved the perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver, the number of ‘If Only’ statements the participants could create, and the manipulation check regarding whether the driver agreed to take the couple. As such, these are the only three dependent variables that we analyzed.
Results
Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: This study one results section is nearly identical the study one results section in Paper II. See my comments there.
Using survey condition (changeable vs. unchangeable vs. neutral) as our independent variable and whether participants recalled whether the taxi driver picked up the paraplegic couple as the dependent variable, we ran a manipulation check in which we saw a significant effect, X2(2) = 93.95, p < .001. Participants in the changeable and unchangeable conditions correctly said the taxi did not pick up the couple (95.2% and 90.5%, respectively) while few participants in the neutral condition said the driver picked up the couple (4.8%). Phi showed a large effect. This indicates that participants did pay attention to whether the taxi driver picked up the couple. See Table 2.
For our main analysis, our first One-Way ANOVA test revealed significant differences among our independent variable, the scenario conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) and our dependent variable, perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver, F(2, 122) = 3.55, p = .032. A subsequent Tukey post hoc test supported our hypothesis by demonstrating that participants were more likely to blame the taxi driver in the changeable condition (M = 4.51, SD = 2.06) than in the unchangeable condition (M = 3.38, SD = 2.14).. However, there were no significant difference for perceived blame between the neutral condition (M = 4.36, SD = 2.11) and either the changeable or unchangeable conditions. These results indicate that in situations where the outcome is perceived as mutable (changeable), individuals are more likely to assign blame to the actor who could have acted differently (unchangeable). See Table 3.
We were also interested in the number of ‘If Only’ statements generated for each condition. We ran a One-Way ANOVA test using the different conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) as our independent variable, and the number of counterfactuals produced as our dependent variable. The results revealed that the relationship between condition and number of ‘If Only’ statements produced was not significant, F(2, 123) = 1.79, p = .171. Our initial prediction that participants would develop more counterfactuals in the changeable condition was not supported since the number of counterfactuals generated in the changeable condition (M = 5.41, SD = 2.21), the unchangeable condition (M = 4.57, SD = 2.04), and the neutral condition (M = 4.88, SD = 1.85) did not differ. Since the p-value for the ANOVA test was not significant, there was no need to run post hoc tests. See Table 4.
Finally, we ran an independent samples t-Test with the changeable and unchangeable conditions only and “How avoidable was the accident” as the dependent variable, which was significant, t(82) = 2.71, p < .01. Participants thought the accident was more avoidable in the changeable condition (M = 5.31, SD = 1.77) than in the unchangeable condition (M = 4.21, SD = 1.85). See Table 5.
Discussion Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: This study one discussion section is nearly identical the study one discussion section in Paper II. See my comments there.
We predicted that participants would place more blame on an actor whose behavior led to an undesirable outcome (death) when that actor could have acted differently primarily because these participants would generate more “If Only” counterfactual statements that would lead them to see the outcome could have been avoided. Conversely, we predicted that participants who read about an undesirable outcome that could not have been avoided would assign less blame to the actor and would think of fewer counterfactual “If Only” statements. Results partially supported these predictions, as we did find more blame for in the changeable condition compared to both the unchangeable and neutral conditions. However, the number of counterfactual statements that participants generated did not differ among our three conditions. It could be that participants were unfamiliar with the counterfactual task, which requires some deep thinking, though on a more unconscious level they could have seen the changeable condition as evidencing more elements of blame. This begs the question: what if participants were forced to think deeper? This is the focus of our second study.
Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: This study two literature review section is nearly identical the study two literature review section in Paper III. See my comments there.
Although most of the general population engages in counterfactual thinking, the number of counterfactual thoughts created varies between people. This is because the development of numerous counterfactual thoughts is determined by the overall mutability of a situation as well as the distinct differences between individuals (Alquist et al., 2015). For example, people who have an inclination for structuring situations in meaningful, integrated ways, or more aptly put, have a high need for cognition, are more prone to elaborate on presented information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Therefore, these individuals might be more likely to participate in the generation of counterfactual thoughts than individuals who typically avoid effortful cognitive activity, or have a low need for cognition (Sargent, 2004). Despite the fact that several studies have researched scenario mutability and need for cognition, no prior findings have examined the influence these two variables have on the assignment of blame. The primary focus of our second study, therefore, is to analyze the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct Need for Cognition of each subject.
On a related note, an experiment conducted by Wevodau et al. (2014) found a substantial positive association between NFC and the allocation of blame. The researchers found that that highly motivated individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive processing tend to assign more culpability than cognitively reserved individuals.
In pursuance of scenario changeability and NFC, study two analyzed the extent of culpability placed on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct need for cognition of each subject. Fortunately, we measured whether participants were high or low in NFC in study one, so in study two we looked at whether being high or low in NFC impacted the way participants perceived the guilt of the cab driver. Note that we dropped the neutral condition since it provided results nearly identical to the unchangeable condition.
We have one additional analysis for Study Two, though this includes two main effects and one interaction for the dependent variable “level of blame”. Here, we predicted a main effect for condition such that those in the changeable condition should find more blame than those in the unchangeable condition. This follows from study one, where participants blamed the taxi driver more when his cab made it safely across the bridge than when he passed safely. We also predicted a NFC main effect for blame wherein those high in NFC would find more blame than those low in NFC. That is, thinking deeply about the accident might elevate blameworthiness assessments compared to thinking shallowly. More important, we predicted an interaction of condition and NFC on blame such that participants find the taxi driver more blameworthy in the high NFC and changeable condition compared to all other conditions. Low NFC and unchangeable participants should produce the lowest levels of blame.
Methods Study Two
Participants
One hundred and sixty subjects, 90% (n = 144) university students, were recruited to participate in study two. Of these 160 participants, 33% (n = 52) were male and 67% (n = 108) were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 64 with an average of 22.38 years (SD = 5.14). Our sample population consisted of 76% Hispanic Americans (n = 122), 9% African Americans (n = 15), 9% Caucasians (n = 14), 3% Asian American (n = 5), and 3% Others (n = 4). See Table 6.
Materials and Procedure
In this follow-up analysis, all study material are identical to that in study one. That is, the Study Two participants are the same participants used in study one, and thus they had already read the story involving the taxi and thee paraplegic couple (though in Study Two we included only the changeable and unchangeable conditions, dropping the neutral condition (as it did not differ from the unchangeable condition in Study One). The most important difference in Study Two was our focus on a previously unanalyzed Need for Cognition independent variable. That is, in study one we ascertained whether participants were high versus low in NFC by asking them whether they enjoyed thinking deeply when making decisions or if they preferred going with their gut reactions. We labeled the formed High NFC and the latter Low NFC. Nothing else differed from Study One.
Although we collected several different dependent variables during Study One, the one we are most interested in pursuing in Study Two is whether participants blame the taxi driver on a scale ranging from 1 (no blame at all) to 9 (total blame). We will assess blame across the four conditions of our 2 X 2 factorial design: High NFC and changeable, High NFC and unchangeable, Low NFC and changeable, and Low NFC and unchangeable.
Results
Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: This study two results section is nearly identical the study two results section in Paper III. See my comments there.
To test our first dependent variable, we ran a 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA with NFC (high vs. low) and scenario condition (changeable vs. unchangeable) as our independent variables and the perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver as our dependent variable. Results demonstrated no significant main effect for NFC on perceived blame, F(1, 152) = 1.69, p = .196. This means that there was no meaningful differences in the assignment of culpability between the high-NFC (M = 3.72, SD = 2.44) and low-NFC group (M = 4.12, SD = 2.49). There was, however, a significant main effect for scenario condition, F(1, 152) = 3.98, p = .048. Participants in the changeable condition (M = 4.27, SD = 2.35) perceived the taxi driver to be more blameworthy for the couple’s death than participants in the unchangeable condition (M = 3.56, SD = 2.47). Unfortunately, there was no interaction of NFC and scenario, F(1, 152) = 0.00, p = .985, meaning that perceived culpability did not significantly differ among high NFC changeable participants (M = 4.04, SD = 2.28), high NFC unchangeable participants (M = 3.27, SD = 2.44), low NFC changeable participants (M = 4.56, SD = 2.44), and low NFC unchangeable participants (M = 3.77, SD = 2.51). See Table 7.
Discussion Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: This study two discussion section is nearly identical the study two discussion section in Paper III. See my comments there.
Although study two posited that Need for Cognition would impact participants and their assessment of blame, results did not fully support this contention. With regard to blame, Need for Cognition did not result in main effects. That is, despite predictions to the contrary, those high in NFC did not blame the taxi driver any more than those low in NFC. Nor did NCF interact with scenario, despite our prediction that those high NFC would find the most blame when given the changeable scenario compared to unchangeable scenario. However, scenario did show a significant main effect such that participants found more blame for the taxi driver in the changeable condition than the unchangeable condition.
General Discussion Comment by Ryan Winter: This is a new section in Paper IV that you have not done before. It wraps up the paper, talking about both study one and study two at the same time. Compare and contrast the papers, and then tie your results back to prior research in this area (you can refer to other papers, especially those you cited in your two literature reviews)
Across both studies, the data collected demonstrates a significant effect of scenario condition on the assignment of blame only. In both studies one and two, participants presented with the changeable condition, where the taxi driver remained unaffected by the bridge collapse, perceived the driver to be more blameworthy than those presented with the unchangeable condition, where the driver also fell into the water along with the couple. This result is reinforced by McCloy and Byrne’s (2000) proposition that “inappropriate controllable” events will likely be regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation. We saw this across mediums as well, as study one used a face-to-face survey while study two used online materials. The fact that both studies showed an effect for scenario argues for the robust nature of the changeable manipulation and increases our study reliability. Furthermore, Alquist et al. (2015) also suggests that events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction tend to increase counterfactual thinking and, ultimately, receive the brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.
Taking these findings into consideration, it would be reasonable to assume that participants assigned to the changeable condition should also generate more counterfactual thoughts than participants in the unchangeable condition. However, our hypothesis was not supported since the results demonstrated that there was no significant difference in the number of “If Only” thoughts produced between the changeable, neutral, and unchangeable groups in study one and the changeable and unchangeable groups in study two. A possible reason for this result may be that many of the “If Only” thoughts proposed were based on uncontrollable factors such as the collapse of the bridge and the couple’s handicap status. This counters previous findings, which propose that situations that are believed to be highly changeable generate more counterfactual thoughts than events that seem unavoidable (Alquist et al. 2015). The contradictory results might be due to differences in methodologies or the influence of different independent variables. Comment by Ryan Winter: You can summarize your findings a bit as this student did, but make sure you use plain English. I don’t need to see statistics in this section.
In regards to our NFC variable in study two, our hypothesis was not supported since we found no difference in the number of counterfactual thoughts created between high-NFC and low-NFC groups. This finding is especially surprising considering the characteristics of individuals with a high-NFC, which include engaging in effortful cognitive tasks (Strobel et al., 2015) and generating more alternative solutions to problems compared to low-NFC individuals (Curseu 2006). However, differences in the number of “If Only” thoughts created was too insignificant to suggest a meaningful effect between the two groups. This result might explain why, contrary to our initial hypothesis, we also found no differences in the assignment of blame between the high-NFC and the low-NFC group. We predicted that participants in the high-NFC group would place more blame on the taxi driver than participants in the low-NFC group because individuals with a high-NFC were previously found to produce more counterfactual thoughts, which in turn, leads to more allocation of blame. However, since we found that participants in both groups generally produced the same number of “If Only” thoughts, it stands to reason that there would be no significant difference in the amount of blame assigned to the taxi driver. Furthermore, prior studies have found evidence to suggest that individuals with a high-NFC tend to blame societal influences instead of the perpetrator, and typically avoid punishing the criminal responsible (Sargent, 2004). Therefore, our findings contribute to the previously established notion that high-NFC and low-NFC individuals do not differ in the assignment of blame, despite their notable differences. Additionally, we found no overall interaction of NFC and scenario condition, for either dependent variable (number of counterfactual thoughts created and assignment of blame).
Certain limitations in the present study, such as a narrow pool of participants, might have implicated the results. Future studies should procure a larger and more diverse sample population in order to expand our applications to the general public. Our approach to NFC may also be improved by actually measuring the NFC (either high or low) of each individual, instead of just manipulating it. Additionally, the scenario presented might have been too difficult to relate to for most participants, which might have limited the number of counterfactual thoughts generated. Future applications of this study design might benefit from adapting a more engaging scenario and analyzing whether participants generated more counterfactual thoughts if they at some point have found themselves in a similar situation. Comment by Ryan Winter: All studies have limitations, including those from our class. Make sure to note them. I also recommend mentioning future studies that can and should be pursued to get a better idea of how your variables would work in other situations.
As free-willed beings, we can often become the victims of our own decisions. Making a wrong choice might lead us to become immersed in futile thoughts of what could have been; which is why having an in-depth understanding of the way we think and grasp situations has the potential to lead us towards a stable and more prudent method of decision-making. Analyzing our NFC and the influence of scenario mutability is an important step forward in understanding. Our findings have suggested that certain factors of an event could potentially alter the way we regard a situation, and ultimately play a role in who or what we deem culpable. We have also determined that the differences between individuals with a high-NFC and a low-NFC are less significant than previously established. Regardless of whether NFC or scenario mutability has a momentous impact on our counterfactual thinking or assignment of blame, they undoubtedly have an impact on the way we interpret situations and, ultimately, the decisions we make.
References Comment by Ryan Winter: This final references section is nearly identical the references section in Paper III. See my comments there.
Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., Baumeister, R. F., Daly, M., & Stillman, T. F. (2015). The making of might-have-beens: Effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(2), 268-283. doi:
10.1177/0146167214563673
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 42(1), 116-131. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13
Curseu, P. L. (2006). Need for cognition and rationality in decision-making. Studia
Psychologica, 48(2), 141-156.
Gilbert, E. A., Tenney, E. R., Holland, C. R., & Spellman, B. A. (2015). Counterfactuals, control, and causation: Why knowledgeable people get blamed more. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(5), 643-658. doi: 10.1177/0146167215572137
McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about controllable events. Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 1071-1078. doi: 10.3758/BF03209355
Sargent, M. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts support for punitive responses to crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(11), 1485-1493. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264481
Strobel, A., Fleischhauer, M., Enge, S., & Strobel A. (2015). Explicit and implicit need for cognition and bottom-up/top-down attention allocation. Journal of Research in Personality, 55, 10-13. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2014.11.002
Wevodau, A. L., Cramer, R. J., Clark, John W., I.,II, & Kehn, A. (2014). The role of emotion and cognition in juror perceptions of victim impact statements. Social Justice Research, 27(1), 45-66. doi: 10.1007/s11211-014-0203-9
Table 1
Demographics – Study One
Table 2
Crosstabs and Chi Square – Study One
Table 3
ANOVA Blame – Study One
Table 4
ANOVA Number of Counterfactuals – Study One
Table 5
t-Test “Was the accident avoidable?” – Study One
Table 6
Demographics – Study Two
Table 7
ANOVA Perceived Blameworthiness – Study Two