reading review of disaster management and government

Ethnicity, politics and inequality: post- tsunami humanitarian aid delivery in Ampara District, Sri Lanka

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva Professor, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka

The provision of humanitarian aid at times of disaster in multi-ethnic community settings may lead to conflict, tension and even the widening of the distance between various ethnic groups. That aid agencies distribute humanitarian aid directly to affected communities, to speed up recovery, may often lead to chaos and the intensification of ethnic sentiments. The new distribution mech- anisms introduced for the delivery of tsunami aid in Ampara District, Sri Lanka, did not recognise local networks and the culture of the ethnically mixed community setting. This paper analyses post-tsunami aid distribution in Ampara and shows how such an extemporised effort in an ethnically cognisant context increased ethnic division, inequality and disorder, while marginalis- ing the poor segments of the affected population. It recommends the inclusion of local networks in aid dissemination as a measure for improving ethnic neutrality and social harmony in disaster-hit multi-ethnic communities.

Keywords: Ampara District, Asian tsunami, ethnicity, humanitarian aid, Sri Lanka

Introduction The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 is viewed overall as a tragedy that did not recognise ‘culturally derived discriminations and social distinctions’ (Fritz, 1961, p. 685). Due to the enormity of the catastrophe, various groups—rich and poor, Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the forces of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL)—were suffering the ramifications in the immediate aftermath. In Ampara District on the east coast of Sri Lanka, however, the picture is somewhat different. The theory that the effects of disasters are indiscriminate proved misplaced here, since the people most affected largely comprised those on the lower rungs of the social ladder and in certain ethnically identifiable communities. Disasters are seen as ‘products’ of the economic, political and social environment and of the natural events that cause them. Poor people are most likely to be the victims of disasters in developing countries in particular (Blaikie et al., 1994; Peacock and Girard, 1997). Such social groups often consist of ethnic minorities and excluded communities. Ethnicity is thus an important index of increased vulnerability to disasters in devel­ oping countries (Aptekar and Boore, 1990; Enarson, 1998; Peacock and Girard, 1997; Bates and Peacock, 1993; Peacock and Ragsdale, 1997).

doi:10.1111/j.0361­3666.2008.01073.x

Disasters, 2009, 33(2): 253−273. © 2009 The Author(s). Journal compilation © Overseas Development Institute, 2009. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva254

In ethnically mixed communities, the distribution of economic and political power has implications for coping with disaster­based vulnerabilities (Fothergill, Maestas and Darlington, 1999). Disaster vulnerability among racial and ethnic minority com­ munities has reportedly increased in the recent past (Anderson, 1996; Peacock and Girard, 1997). Significant differences in risk perception among different ethnic groups vis­à­vis disaster events have been reported (Ives and Furseth, 1983); and different consequences of hazards for ethnic minorities have been highlighted (Hutton, 1976; Bates et al., 1963). In terms of fatalities and other effects of the tsunami, the poor Muslim commu­ nities in the coastal areas of Ampara suffered particularly badly. Rates of mortality, morbidity and damage to property were extremely high among the politically less powerful Muslims in the coastal areas of Ampara compared to those of the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Locations most seriously affected on the east coast were those inhabited by the Muslims. Lower middle­class families in the affected ethnic minority commu­ nities were less likely to attract subsidies and assistance, a fact observed elsewhere as well (Aptekar and Boore, 1990). The unequal impact of the tsunami may have been precipitated by the fact that the Muslims lived along the coast, and the majority of them were involved in the fishing industry. The congested housing settlements of the Muslims may have been a factor in the higher levels of mortality and morbidity, as well as physical damage. That ethnic minorities on the east coast live in segregation, in ribbon­like discrete communities, and that, for historical reasons, Muslims in particular reside in less prestigious, low­lying places, hemmed in between the lagoon and the sea, might have heightened their vulnerability to the 2004 tsunami. In the process of recovery, cultural boundaries have been reinvented and culture­ based discrimination has resumed. During this process, some people and community groups sought advantages while others were deprived of benefits and opportunities for recovery. Despite the indiscriminate effects of disasters, it is generally recognised that disaster risk and vulnerability are not equally distributed, particularly in the recovery stage. Thus, the recovery process is seen as sensitive to ethnicity and social stratifications, especially those that emerge post disaster (Couch and Kroll­Smith, 1985; Fordham, 1999; Morrow, 1997). This paper argues that ethnicity has become the organising principle in the post­ tsunami humanitarian aid distribution process in Ampara. Ethno­political relation­ ships that existed in the pre­tsunami era in the District, particularly between Muslims and Tamils, were further ethnicised and intensified in the process. The disadvan­ taged and vulnerable communities affected by the tsunami along the coast of Ampara, largely comprising poor Muslim fisher folk, were deprived of the benefits of humani­ tarian aid. Creating highly centralised, elite­run mechanisms for the distribution of humanitarian aid in such multi­ethnic settings led to a widening of the ethnic divide, increasing inequalities and chaos, and thereby making the poor and the marginal­ ised communities even poorer and more marginalised. As a prelude to the analysis, the paper first contextualises tsunami­affected areas in their socio­economic setting in Ampara District.

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 255

Ampara District in the Eastern Province Ampara District in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, where the research was con­ ducted between March and June 2006, covers an area of 4,431 square kilometres and has a population of 635,332. Muslims (41.59 per cent), Sinhalese (39.33 per cent) and Tamils (18.76 per cent) constitute the major communities in the District. Of the 20 District Secretariat (DS) divisions in Ampara, the tsunami affected 10 along the coastal belt. Muslims predominantly inhabit most of these. The main livelihood in these divisions is fisheries, while paddy production is the main activity of the District as a whole. Muslims and Tamils live in juxtaposed, but discrete communities, spread along the coastal belt from south to north. Although the two communities maintain eco­ nomic exchange and trade links, mutual trust between Muslims and Tamils has been eroded since the 1980s due to a heightening of political activities. As in Muslim villages in Trincomalee (Korf, 2004), the Muslim fisher folk here are caught up in the power struggle between the GoSL forces and the LTTE, which has diminished their ability to fish in the deep seas. Despite cultural and lingual similarities, includ­ ing matrilocality and practising of the kudi system of inheritance and naming (Yalman, 1967; McGilvray, 1982), the Muslims and Tamils of Ampara view themselves as separate ethnic groups, different from one another. Cultic worship of Kannaki and Mari Amman makes the Eastern Tamils unique. They also view themselves as distinct from the Tamils and Muslims living in the rest of Sri Lanka. The March 2004 break­ away of Colonel Karuna or Karuna Amman, the leader of the eastern faction of the LTTE, further reflects the ethnic distinctiveness and identity of the Eastern Tamils. In the past, the Eastern Province was regarded as under the control of the Jaffna Tamils, who often held important positions in administration and local govern­ ment. Over the past two decades, Muslim political leaders in particular have pushed for a stronger Muslim identity and have been instrumental in setting up ethnically segregated governance and welfare structures in Ampara. A situation has gradually evolved in which both Tamils and Muslims in the Eastern Districts are seeking greater political and administrative independence. The Sinhalese communities, located in the interior and in the southern tip of the District, are not in direct confrontation with any of the other ethnic groups in the tsunami­affected areas of Ampara District. GoSL forces and the LTTE operate within their own territories, which were demarcated more or less in the years after the ceasefire agreement of 2002, with minimal trespass on either side at the time of the author’s fieldwork (March–June 2006).1

Ongoing power politics in the country influence the political set­up of the District. The pre­tsunami situation was that the Tamils (predominantly the LTTE) and the Muslims had political problems associated with land­related matters. Both Muslim and Tamil traders were subject to harassment and taxation by militant groups, includ­ ing the LTTE. Riots involving Muslims and Tamils have occurred since the 1990s (Goodhand and Lewer, 1999). Muslim villagers in the Northern Districts were expelled by the LTTE at the beginning of its struggle for a Tamil homeland or Eelam

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva256

Map 1 Grama Niladhari (GN) Divisions in Ampara District affected by the 2004 tsunami

Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka.

(in the 1990s), and this affected mutual trust and relations between these two ethnic communities in the Eastern Province. Competition for political power and economic resources, including land, between Tamils and Muslims in Ampara shows the deep mistrust between them, although they were neighbours who lived in adjacent com­ munities and engaged in trade and economic activities at the time of the tsunami. It is into this ethnically sensitive context that the tsunami entered on 26 December 2004.

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 257

Tsunami recovery politics and actors The territorial demarcations and political barriers that existed before the tsunami between the GoSL forces and the LTTE, and between the Tamils and the Muslims, were relaxed in the immediate wake of the tsunami, when both the GoSL forces and the LTTE commenced relief and welfare work for the people. In this environ­ ment, civil society organisations were at ease in providing for tsunami recovery through existing local networks (Frerks and Klem, 2005). The new development in the Eastern Districts, particularly in Ampara, was seen as a precursor to a renewed peace process. These local non­governmental organisation (NGO) and civil society initiatives (Rodriguez et al., 2006) were viewed as a sign of good things to come after the tsunami. It was in this context that the GoSL introduced an institutional arrangement for tsunami recovery and the reconstruction of the affected communities: the Post­ Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P­TOMS). P­TOMS was the regula­ tory outcome of the Joint Mechanism on Tsunami Aid Distribution, signed between the GoSL and high­level LTTE politicians on 24 June 2005. P­TOMS, as proposed, was to operate within a limited area of two kilometres from the coastline, in the six Districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee (Asian Tribune, 2005). Under this structure, there was no place for the civil society organisations that had played a key role in the early tsunami recovery process (von Braunmühl et al., 2006). Following the signing of the agreement, there were major demonstrations organ­ ised by predominantly Sinhala political parties—the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)—and by the Muslim political parties (Pirani and Kadirgamar, 2006). The protest leaders questioned the legitimacy of P­TOMS and its control over resources. The JVP left the GoSL coalition as a result. The massive opposition culminated in a hunger strike or fast­unto­death by Dr Omalpe Sobhita, a prominent member of the Buddhist clergy and a member of the JHU, which was called off only after then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga pledged to discuss the agreement with Buddhist prelates before it was put into effect. The four Maha Nayaka Theros2 of the Amarapura, Asgiriya, Malwatte and Ramanya chap­ ters gathered to issue a Sangha Agna (command) and to summon a mass gathering to object to the signing of the Joint Mechanism between the GoSL and the LTTE (Lankanewspapers.com, 2005). The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka ruled out certain clauses of the accord, and this proved to be the final nail in the coffin of P­TOMS. The LTTE later reneged on the P­TOMS agreement, saying that it would ‘refuse to work under any authority under the Sri Lankan government . . .’ (Asian Tribune, 2005). The LTTE’s rejection of a coordinated approach to tsunami recovery may have been induced by the notion that economic prosperity in the region would hamper its struggle for Eelam. The impact of the failed P­TOMS agreement reverberates to the present day in tsunami­affected Ampara District. The political manoeuvring surrounding this accord reinforced the importance of ethno­geopolitical identities and the internationalisation

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva258

of the tsunami recovery process (Pirani and Kadirgamar, 2006; Goodhand and Klem, 2005). The new aid delivery process created afterwards involved various GoSL depart­ ments, the Government Agent of the District, the GoSL forces, especially the Special Task Force (STF), and the LTTE, including the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO). The various civil society organisations that were engaged in the recovery pro­ cess at the beginning were not included as key agents in the aid delivery process. It is unfortunate that the macro players, who took part in P­TOMS and later in tsunami aid delivery, did not pay attention to those civil society actors and did nothing to utilise participatory experience of recovery and reconstruction efforts in Ampara District. The attempt by the GoSL to establish P­TOMS is viewed here as the product of a misreading of the emerging cooperation among divergent civil society groups and local political organisations following the materialisation of a burgeoning partner­ ship between the GoSL and the LTTE. Not only did the direct intervention of the GoSL, international NGOs and macro political parties impede the opportunity to create local participatory methodologies for post­tsunami reconstruction, but also the efforts that developed at the community level were nipped in the bud by the fail­ ure to support them. Sixty­four international NGOs in Ampara that were distributing tsunami aid formed the Ampara District Livelihood Coordination Committee (or the Consortium for Livelihood Coordination as it is popularly known) in 2006 under the leadership of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and similar lead agencies. This Consortium was set up to counteract the GoSL’s inability to develop a coor­ dinated humanitarian aid structure in the District. Here, too, local NGOs and community­based organisations were regarded as unimportant, and they did not participate in the meetings. As one local NGO activist3 noted, ‘they operate in English and conduct their meetings in Ampara town far away from the coastal areas. We are not important for them . . . we do not take part in this group’. Local NGOs have found it difficult to make their programmes effective as their clientele is now communally driven and preoccupied with various forms of assistance provided by the international NGOs. Ultimately, macro actors, such as the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (RRR Ministry), and the departments within it, P­TOMS, the LTTE, and the international NGOs, replaced the bodies that took an active interest in the early tsunami recovery process. Due to their failure to include local networks, the aid agencies from outside did not have a ground­level mechanism for aid distribution. The affected people lived in their natural groups of kith and kin in camps, and this was misread as ethnic segregation and concentration. Aid distribution was organised by the international NGOs and other aid agencies according to those ethnically segregated camps and villages, and this became the new organising principle for delivering aid. The aid agencies were identified with the ethnicity of the camp inmates. As a result, partici­ pation and cooperation on the part of affected communities developed an ethnic strand, and grew into renewed competition among ethnic groups for tsunami aid.

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 259

The ethnocentric political ideology of the new participating agencies, particularly the GoSL forces, the LTTE, TRO and some international NGOs, provided the leader­ ship for this competition.

The study’s focus and methodology This paper examines how new developments in the humanitarian aid distribution process have led to a widening of the ethnic divide and increased inequality in Ampara District, with fisheries and housing serving as particular examples. In doing so, the study focuses on how tsunami aid has reached the affected populations, and assesses whether the aid distribution programmes were able to provide for margin­ alised people, including the poor, vulnerable and backward communities. These aspects are appraised in the context of the multi­directional, complex relationship system that developed around tsunami aid distribution in Ampara. The data for this exploratory study were collected through interviews, observa­ tions, focus group discussions and case studies. Thirty­five interviews were held between March and June 2006 with tsunami­affected people, beneficiaries of tsu­ nami aid, the agencies supplying aid, key informants in the communities, political leaders, and members of the armed forces. The District Livelihood Coordination Committee of Ampara4 was a useful source. In addition, fisheries cooperative socie­ ties offered valuable information. The armed forces in Ampara furnished additional information on incidents reported by the interviewees. However, the author was un­ able to verify any of the contents of this paper with the LTTE and the TRO. Initially, the aid agencies were pinpointed through a list produced by the Humani­ tarian Information Centre, Ampara (HIC, 2005) and the Consortium for Humani tarian Agencies–Ampara (CHA­Ampara), which was later verified by talking to officials from international NGOs, UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Ampara. Secondary information obtained through aid agencies and the media was helpful in comprehending the context. The triangulations employed in the study helped to establish the authenticity, validity and reproducibility of the data.

Post-tsunami ethnic polarisation in Ampara During the post­tsunami reconstruction process, ethnic polarities resurfaced and intensified among the Muslim and Tamil communities of Ampara, partly due to the failure of P­TOMS, poor recognition of local networks, and the exclusion of local communities from the decision­making and implementation dimensions of the aid delivery system. An upsurge in violence and the augmentation of ethnic segregation in Ampara were the results. Tsunami aid delivery thus became a political process in which the GoSL, the LTTE, Muslim political leaders, and international NGOs played the main role. The Muslim community in Ampara felt dejected because it was not

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva260

granted adequate power and representation in the proposed structure. What is more, it criticised the GoSL for giving ‘undue’ power to the LTTE in the Joint Mechanism, despite the fact that the Muslims were the largest affected community in the East. Muslim leaders expressed their dismay and anger over not being made a signatory to the proposed P­TOMS (Rhodes, 2005). Disagreements over the proposed institutional set­up for joint post­tsunami recon­ struction among the GoSL, the LTTE, and the Muslim community permeated down to the local activities and politics of the District. Such variance was interpreted as reflecting ethnic differences and discrimination at the local level. The distribution of relief and the creation of camps occurred along ethnic lines, reinforcing ethno­ geographic boundaries. Many incidents of ethnic rivalry were reported afterwards, including separate hartals5 staged by Muslims and Tamils, highlighting the promi­ nent position of ethnic politics in post­tsunami aid distribution. These had a negative effect on the aid delivery system and heightened mistrust between the communities. A series of violent events occurred two months after the tsunami, including:

• the killing of three Muslim men and the destruction of Tamil barbershops in Marathamunai;

• the killing of five Muslims during the Drawpadi Amman Kovil festival and their interment in Tamil burial grounds as an insult to the Muslims; and

• the killing of a number of Tamils returning from the festival in retaliation.

President Kumaratunga came under pressure and was forced to appoint a com­ mission in February 2005 to investigate the murders. The organisation of welfare camps on ethnic lines provided the basis for various aid agencies to select communities on ethnic grounds. The people, Muslims and Tamils alike, described the aid agencies that supplied assistance as ethnically biased, and viewed these interventions as partial, undemocratic, wasteful, and not needs­ oriented. Such procedures have enhanced ethnic resentment and division between the Muslims and Tamils, and have given an ethno­political colouring to tsunami aid distribution. Eventually, there were more and more instances of aid agencies work­ ing for and among their own communities in the District, resulting in further distancing between the communities. Muslim politicians have extensively utilised the fact that Muslims were discriminated against for their own political gain, further aggravating ethnic consciousness. One respondent said that, ‘Muslim Congress poli­ ticians headed by the minister . . . promised houses when they win the election and wanted us to vote for them in the election’.6

Ethnic distancing and segregation became apparent in the ethnic concentration of aid packaging especially that organised by the Muslims in Colombo and outside, which was a reaction to the failure of GoSL organisations and international NGOs to meet the needs of the Muslim communities. Jamathe-e-Islami and the Muslim Relief Foundation helped the Muslims in the area after the tsunami. The Colombo Mamen Society (Mamen Sangam) supported the Muslim Baithul Tsunami (Tsunami

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 261

Fund) in Marathamunai. The Government of the United Arab Emirates pledged to build a new town, comprising 800 houses and modern amenities, for tsunami­affected people in Kalmunai. Similarly, the Government of Turkey pledged funds for hous­ ing programmes in tsunami­affected Muslim areas. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has helped the Peace Secretariat for the Muslims (PSM).7 The PSM established regional centres in predominantly Muslim areas and assisted poor Muslim people in the communities with redressing their grievances, with support from USAID (USAID, 2008). Many economic interactions between Muslims and Tamils used to take place in relation to land, but now it has become a politically sensitive resource, generating competition between the two ethnic groups. The competition is so intense that the LTTE has forbidden Muslims from building houses on land located in Muslim areas. Land­related ethnic distancing has been a factor behind the marginalisation of communities such as the fisher folk. They have been deprived of the right to their own land because of the GoSL’s policy that prohibits any form of construction within 65 metres of the sea, and the LTTE’s claim to all land suitable for construc­ tion in Eastern Province. Ethnic orientation and distancing in tsunami aid distribution worsened over time, because the participating agencies in the aid delivery system took decisions and worked spontaneously, without being subject to any central coordination. Owing to this lack of coordination (Stirrat, 2006), the agencies were driven by emotional attachments to their ethnic communities rather than by the needs of the affected people. As stated by the interviewees, the TRO started diverting aid, transported in trucks, to the North and the Tamil areas and distributing it only to Tamils in refugee camps. The presence of the TRO in the GoSL­controlled areas was a result of the Joint Mechanism, which introduced national politics to the local scenario of Ampara District. The intervention by the GoSL army and the STF in aid delivery was the result, leading to fights between the LTTE and GoSL forces over the distri­ bution of aid. The TRO was allowed to maintain its offices in the camps because of the Joint Mechanism and the need to coordinate relief work. Poor coordination and deviations from a commonly agreed agenda between the TRO and STF finally led to the elimination of the TRO from the refugee camps in Ampara. The STF inter­ vened and eventually assumed sole authority for the distribution of humanitarian aid in the refugee camps. Instead of facilitating the aid distribution process, the pres­ ence of the TRO generated fear and discontent, particularly among Tamil refugees, as occurrences of child recruitment increased during the post­tsunami recovery pro­ cess (Kautzky, 2005; Becker, 2005; Hindustan Times, 2005). An incident reported at the time of the fieldwork for this paper, which exacerbated tension between the Muslims and the LTTE, was the decree issued by the LTTE on 16 April 2006 in which it stated that all females should refrain from any form of employment in the NGO sector (TW News, 2006). This order was issued after a case of abortion, alleged adult filmmaking by an unspecified NGO, involving female employees, and the selling of such Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs) in the area.8 The

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva262

LTTE viewed these events as detrimental to the culture of the Tamils (TW News, 2006). This had an effect on Muslims in Ampara because a large number of female Muslims, who had had to abandon their jobs because of the tsunami, were working in the NGO sector that sprung up in the aftermath of the disaster. Muslims, as well as ordinary Tamils, criticised the LTTE for prohibiting females from working with NGOs, as they have lost income. There was a spate of killings and abductions of people from all communities in the post­tsunami environment, which also affected tsunami relief management at the local level in the District. The killing of the Director of the Vocational Training Centre (Ministry of Agriculture Marketing Development), Mr T. Kailanathan, a Tamil, on 4 April 2005, and the fatal shooting of the Divisional Secretary of Thirukkovil, Mr T. Thavaraja, another Tamil, on 15 April 2005, in Vinayagapura, Thirukkovil, were seen as protests against Tamils working with tsunami aid delivery programmes (GoSL, 2006; UTHR (J), 2005). The power struggle between the GoSL and the LTTE over the post­tsunami resource (aid is seen as a resource) distribution system in the east has terrified the affected people, who could not effectively participate in the aid distribution pro cess. The instigation of the LTTE ban on the provision of land to Muslims for house construction was a Machiavellian move to undermine the aid delivery process of the GoSL and the local and international NGO sectors. The ethnic distance between Muslims and Tamils in Eastern Province was further widened as a result. According to a Tamil trader from Kalmunai:

although Marathamunai is a predominantly Muslim area, the Tamils used to come there before the Kovil ceremony, to a land belonging to the Kovil, to collect poovarasu [Thespesia populnea] trees for the ceremony. This time when they came to collect the trees, there was tension and fights between the local Muslims and the Tamil visitors because of the current situation.9

The Muslims questioned the political power of the Tamils in the Eastern Province in the wake of the tsunami, due to the revived tension between the two communities. A Muslim politician from Eastern Province pointed out that:

the LTTE is interested in the land in the Northeast and is asking for more Pradeshiya Sabha10 Council areas for them. The Tamils are only 19 per cent of the total population in the Eastern Province, but have four Pradeshiya Sabha, namely Thirukkovil, Alayadi- wembu, Karative and Navadanveli. They are asking for a fifth one, which includes Pothuvil and Komari. The Government also gave them a separate Pradeshiya Sabha in Valachchena bordering Polonnaruwa. Out of the 13 Pradeshiya Sabha in the North East, the Muslims have only seven’.11

Thus, the tsunami provided a stage for the Muslims and Tamils (the LTTE) to im­ peril further their already endangered ethnic relationship. It also enabled the GoSL to demonstrate its power and control over the resources that emerged after the event.

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 263

These developments undermined the democratic process of aid distribution, caus­ ing delays, neglect and the exclusion of communities that were in need of aid at a time when such assistance was in urgent demand. The next sections examine these issues in relation to the provision of housing and fisheries aid to communities in Ampara District.

Housing programmes for tsunami-affected people in Ampara Tsunami­affected families in Muslim settlements along the coast are deprived of land for housing for two reasons:

• First, the GoSL has declared that land within 65 metres of the sea is unsafe for living due to possible seismic effects, and people are thus prohibited from engag­ ing in any construction in that beach area. This land strip is the traditional living area of the Muslims, particularly the fisher folk. Those families that lived along the narrow beach strip have not been offered alternative land or adequate com­ pensation to buy land outside of the 65­metre zone.

• Second, the LTTE has prohibited Muslims from building houses on land purchased for them by outside agencies, on the pretext that it belongs to the Tamils.

These two aspects are analysed below. The GoSL established several institutions as a response strategy for post­tsunami recovery after the failure of P­TOMS. The Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR) and the Tsunami Housing Recon­ struction Unit (THRU) were the lead agencies created through processes involving private and public sector participation. In November 2005, following the election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) was set up. This became an authority with executive powers following parliamen­ tary ratification of the RADA Act in 2006. RADA’s mandate is to accelerate recon­ struction and development activities in the affected areas, functionally replacing all the tsunami organisations, as well as a significant part of the former RRR Ministry. According to RADA, the total number of houses built so far (as of May 2006) in Ampara is 629, while total housing units pledged is 6,169. At the time of the research (March to June 2006), none of the housing projects completed is in a pre­ dominantly Muslim area. Payment of compensation for damaged houses was not based on a consistent scheme. As a result, some families received large sums, while others did not get any money. In some instances, those who collected compensation were not the affected families. The Auditor General, Mr S.C. Mayadunne, noted that:

Payment of an excessive amount even for minor damages due to the payments being made without assessing the cost of restoring the houses to normal condition. (For example, Rs.

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva264

100,000 had been paid for minor damages of Rs. 10,000) … Payments made without identifying the value of the damaged houses, thus resulting in heavy expenditure by the Government. (For example, a sum of Rs. 250,000 had been paid for the total destruction of a temporary house valued at Rs. 10,000) (Mayadunne, 2005, p. 8).

That compensation was not paid according to an acceptable scheme led to agitation among the affected people, and provided an opportunity for political manipulation. The LTTE and the TRO requested direct provision of aid for reconstruction work in LTTE­controlled areas. The poor response of the GoSL to this demand was inter­ preted as indifference on its part towards ethnic minorities in Ampara. Meanwhile, the GoSL provided direct support for tsunami­affected communities in southern Sri Lanka, where the majority were Sinhalese, strengthening this allegation. Land scarcity in tsunami­affected Ampara and disputes over landownership in the area were the main reasons for not completing the housing programmes. The LTTE contended that the land identified for building houses by the GoSL, or purchased by civil society organisations for constructing such houses, belongs to the Tamils, an ideol­ ogy based on ‘a myth of their own, a Tamil hereditary Homeland—paarampariyamaana taayakam’ (Peebles, 1990, p. 41). Consequently, housing programmes could not be implemented. The land question in the Eastern Province has a history that dates back to 1951, when the Gal Oya Colonisation scheme was established. According to the minor­ ity version of this history, the colonists were selected overwhelmingly from among the Sinhalese rather than the Muslims and Tamils, who were a majority in Ampara at that time, and, as a result, the ethnic balance of Ampara District was disrupted (Hasbullah, Balasundarampillai and Silva, 2005). Conversely, B.H. Farmer reported in 1957 that Tamils, especially Jaffna Tamils, were ‘chary’ and did not have a ‘tradi­ tion of migration’, which was the apparent reason for less Tamil representation among the colonists of Gal Oya. According to Farmer, up to 31 December 1953, between five and 16 per cent of the colonists were chosen from the Districts of Batticaloa, Jaffna and Trincomalee, which were predominantly Tamil (Farmer, 1957, Table 20, p. 209). Contradictory evidence (with a political colouring following the recent rise of ethnicity in this discourse) reports that 100,000 acres of agricultural land in the East have been ‘illegally transferred from Muslims to the Tamils’ since the 1990s (Hasbullah, Balasundarampillai and Silva, 2005). The Tamils, however, believe that the land in the Eastern Province is part and parcel of the Tamil Homeland. This new political ideology of landownership that has emerged in the present­day ethno­ political context of the Eastern Province has intensified land (re)claiming in Ampara by Muslims and Tamils. According to Tamil discourse, the increase in the value of land in Ampara over the past two decades has led to rich Muslims purchasing land belonging to poor Tamils, resulting in ethnic homogenisation in the coastal areas of the District in favour of the Muslims. ‘Violence against Tamils was also used in some areas to push out the numerically small Tamil service caste communities’ (Hasbullah, Balasundarampillai

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 265

and Silva, 2005, p. 37). In a situation with an ideological history of land disputes, find­ ing new land for the construction of houses for Muslim communities affected by the tsunami poses a challenge. In the face of this challenge, Muslims in Ampara sought assistance from Muslim politicians and organisations that willingly came forward to assist them. The efforts made by these politicians and civil society organisations to erect houses for tsunami­ affected Muslim families were forcibly curtailed by the LTTE. Consequently, a pro­ posed housing programme for Muslims in Kinnayady Kiramam in Kaththankudi was abandoned in 2005. Development of the four acres of land bought by the Memon Sangam in Colombo for tsunami victims of Makbooliya in Marathamunai was pro hibited in 2005. Similar occurrences have been reported in Marathamunai Medduvedday. Mrs Ferial Ashraff,12 Minister of Housing and Common Amenities wanted to build houses in Marathamunai, Periyaneelavanai DS division (Addaippallam), the Pandirippu Muslim area, and in Oluvil–Palamunai, but the LTTE proscribed all such initiatives. The Islamabad housing scheme in Kalmunai Muslim DS division, and the construc­ tion of houses by Muslim individuals in Karaithivu, were banned and threats issued by the LTTE and a Tamil military organisation called Ellai Padai (Boundary Forces). Because the GoSL and the intervening agencies were unable to resolve the hous­ ing problem, the affected communities became disillusioned with and lost confidence in the GoSL departments, aid agencies and international NGOs. Much effort and many resources were wasted in finding land and designing housing programmes that have not materialised. Some funds pledged by outside agencies were not forth­ coming, to the detriment of poor families. Attempts to provide housing for the tsunami­affected people in Ampara District show how powerless they are in the face of LTTE threats and the power politics of the participating agencies. With regard to housing and land issues, the people of Ampara have resorted to two mechanisms to address their problems. First, in certain cases, they have come to a compromise with the LTTE: once a housing project is complete, a percentage of it is to be allocated to the Tamil community under the aegis of the LTTE. In the Islamabad housing programme, for example, this tactic proved successful, and at the time of the research (March–June 2006), it was half­complete. Similarly, a hous­ ing scheme in Ninthavur reached a similar compromise with the LTTE. According to Mr Mohamed Mansoor, the President of the Centre for East Lanka Social Service:

22 of the 100 houses once completed would be handed over to the Tamil community. This figure has been identified as rational because 80 per cent of the land in that area is owned by the Muslims and 20 per cent by the Tamils.13

At the time of this author’s fieldwork, approximately 30 houses had been completed on this site. The second mechanism adopted by the people is to build houses in the location where they used to live before the tsunami, even though construction is prohibited in the area, as it is within 65 metres of the sea. Muslims in Marathamunai, knowing that they would not be receiving any land for housing, have sought funds from organisations

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva266

such as the Eastern Human Economic Development to erect houses where they resided before the tsunami. The people affected have also tried to persuade their leaders to approach the TRO and the LTTE to pay back the money that Muslim people and organisations have borrowed to purchase land. The four­acre plot that the Memon Society bought for the construction of houses was thus sold to a Tamil organisation for Rs. 1,000,000 (approximately USD 10,000). The national political forces operating in Ampara have deprived the poor fisher folk of their right to land and to build houses in their own villages. These commu­ nities have resorted to various non­violent strategies, involving both acceptance of the status quo without questioning it and fighting for their rights. The passivity among the poor affected families is a result of them not having representation in the civil society organisations in the area. These bodies are run by elites, which do not wish to contest GoSL rule of a 65­metre buffer zone, or LTTE land claims. The tsunami not only washed away the houses and took the land of the poor communi­ ties that lived by the sea, but also it has made them even poorer, more marginalised and more ethnically segregated.

Fisheries and aid distribution Fishing is the primary occupation of those hit by the tsunami in Ampara District. The estimated number of households affected by the tsunami in Ampara is 20,000, of which 80–90 per cent was engaged in jobs associated with fishing, the majority being Muslim. Aid for reconstruction work in the Eastern Province largely concen­ trated on the fisheries sector. Up to February 2006, the total sum pledged for the redevelopment of the fisheries sector in Sri Lanka was USD 99,701,128. The amount committed as of that date was USD 62,871,817 (63 per cent of the total pledged) (Amarasinghe, 2005). The money has been spent on distributing new fishing ves­ sels and fishing equipment, including nets and engines, the repair of damaged craft and gear, and the provision, inter alia, of new harbour facilities and cool rooms. The supply of vessels was, however, limited to 3.5­ton boats, outboard motor engines, small plastic boats, traditional vallam (karaval thony) canoes used for beach seine fish­ ing (madal or karaval), and traditional outrigger canoes employed in deep­sea fishing. Multi­day trawlers were not provided to the fishermen as they would have involved longer stays at sea and fishing in international waters, which the armed forces con­ sidered to be security threats. FAO data show that the provision of fishing craft and equipment exceeds the amount required in the Province, and the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR) and the Department of Fisheries (DFAR) fear that over­fishing will result in the depletion of fish stocks in the offshore area. MFAR noted in particular that the provision of small fishing craft has exceeded the number lost in the tsunami.14 Yet, despite the quantities of issued craft and gear exceeding what was lost, a ma­ jority of needy fishermen were not supplied with fishing equipment. Apparently, 54 per cent of those who received such assistance were not fishermen.15 Islamic Relief,

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 267

an international NGO, said that it had witnessed poor selection of beneficiaries in the field, and that in one instance, it had found more than 30 boats in the backyard of one house. In addition, MFAR pointed out that:

there is a large number of new boats lying on beaches which are inactive due to a lack of engines and or gear or due to the fact that they are owned by those who had not been involved in fishing previously. Fishermen complained that fishery inputs were distrib- uted unequally. It was found that boats, engines and fishing gear are being sold by the recipients . . . and that boats are still being provided by NGOs without coordinating with MFAR and DFAR.16

Deacon Brother Huxley Siriwadene, the Director of Digamadulla YMCA, New Town, Ampara, was appointed to investigate malpractice in post­tsunami fisheries aid distribution in Ampara District. Mr Siriwadene emphasised that many of those affected were reluctant to report cases for fear of reprisal. According to Mr Udeni Janasiri, a member of the Fishermen’s Cooperative of Panama, membership of this society increased from 300 before the tsunami to nearly 415 after the event because of the need to register to qualify for aid, indicating that newly registered persons were not genuine or traditional fishermen. Mr Janasiri highlighted that:

The new membership in the cooperative is political henchmen. They are not genuine, practising fishermen. They have registered purely to obtain boats and nets. They sell them afterwards.17

Several fishermen explained that they did not register with a fisheries cooperative before the tsunami because there was no need to do so then. Registration became an important criterion for qualifying for fishing aid after the tsunami, and therefore, they had to pay (or bribe) fisheries inspectors to register with such societies It has been revealed, furthermore, that the fishing craft distributed were not built to appropriate standards:

The survey found that 18.9 per cent of the new boats provided to tsunami-affected fishers are non-seaworthy. This would amount to 2,493 out of the 13,190 delivered and approxi- mately 1,150 boats out of the 6,067 with genuine beneficiaries are non-seaworthy.18

Moreover, it was found that 17–18 per cent of outboard engines were repaired unsatisfactorily. Around 60 per cent of the fishing vessels that were replaced were not supplied with nets and other equipment. The actual practising fishermen who were deprived of aid have resorted to various measures as adaptive strategies. Some have given up fishing and are now involved in other activities, such as petty trade, while some use the sub­standard boats pro­ vided to them for sand mining. The fishermen who had to pay a large sum as an initial payment for the fishing boats have mortgaged them to absentee entrepreneurs

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva268

(Mudalalis), because they could not pay the interest on loans, and they could not settle the balance. They work as wage­earning fishermen in such boats. Most of the fishermen who did not receive boats and gear work on a daily basis in boats obtained by the absentee owners. In Marathamunai, the traditional beach seine fishermen, who find it difficult to engage in their previous occupation due to the accumulation of debris in the shallow seas, and who do not have access to boats, now work as wage labourers for absentee owners in Mullaitivu and similar areas. In Komari 1 and Komari 2, some 700 fisher families are involved in lagoon and sea fishing. The Fishermen’s Cooperative Society in Komari had only 86 members before the tsunami; this has increased to 300, as fishermen were required to obtain membership to qualify for assistance. The intervention of the TRO in post­tsunami aid distribution resulted in the provision of one item per fisherman—a plastic boat, an outboard engine, or nets—a method devised to counteract the emerging system of absentee ownership and to establish a more egalitarian and participatory basis to fishing, envisaging three fishermen getting together to form a fishing crew. The fishermen, however, find it hard to form durable crews, and hence this arrangement has become futile. In addition, the Komari fishermen have found that the boats are not seaworthy. The affected fishermen in Komari are now increasingly subject to exploitation by the absentee owners, who, by various means, have obtained boats and fishing equipment in the post­tsunami environment. The excess boats and fish­ ing gear distributed to people are being purchased by the Mudalalis, who employ genuine fishermen, without fishing equipment, to work in their boats. Those who have paid money to register with the fisheries cooperatives have opted to sell their boats to the Mudalalis and to work in the same boats as labourers—a mechanism employed to avoid detection of illegal transactions. Most of the Muslim fishermen who lost boats and fishing equipment in Marathamunai are of the view that it is difficult to gain access to fisheries aid. But, as revealed in the interviews, the Tamils in Kalmunai, although most of them were not traditional fishermen, were given boats and nets due to the intervention of the TRO and the LTTE. Muslim fishermen say that the Tamil officers in Batticaloa discriminate against them: the money that came with food stamps was all given to the Tamils in Batticaloa, whereas in Marathamunai and other Muslim areas, recipients collected only Rs. 500 or so.19 The Fisheries Office in Kalmunai views this as preferential treat­ ment of Tamils. The larger picture of post­tsunami aid distribution among fisheries is indicative of poor coordination, monitoring and supervision on the part of those involved in the action, and reveals that no effort was made to involve the affected communities in the process. The result has been an extraordinarily costly waste of resources and an unequal distribution that favoured entrepreneurs (non­fishermen). If MFAR had had the capacity to coordinate the aid distribution process together with the affected people, it could have reduced wastage to a minimum. That MFAR officials in Kalmunai did not represent the ethnic groups that were fishermen at large in the District also had implications for the participation of people, especially those in Muslim communities.

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 269

In areas where fisheries cooperatives were actively involved in post­tsunami distribu­ tion, such as Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, malpractices and wastage were not reported to this extent.20 The post­tsunami fisheries aid distribution programme is a classic example of fail­ ures occurring due to direct intervention by humanitarian aid agencies that did not make use of existing development networks, such as those of local NGOs, and MFAR to utilise effectively the participation of affected fishermen in the District.

Conclusion As the hardest­hit region, Ampara District should have achieved a high level of political empowerment towards strengthening and mobilising the affected communities to allow them to gain better access to aid, to exercise their rights and to reconstruct their livelihoods. The bargaining position of such a population should have allowed it to attain extremely high levels of success in such a catastrophic situation. What actually happened in Ampara during the post­tsunami reconstruction phase is con­ trary to what one might have expected. Most notably:

• Instead of the empowerment of disadvantaged people in the District, this large group, made up of several communities, has been further fragmented and margin­ alised within the construct of the ‘tsunami­affected’.

• A lack of participatory methodologies to promote the empowerment of the poor and ethnic minorities was evident. Consultations with civil society organisations could have encouraged inclusiveness in programmes, policy formulation and aid distribution efforts. If this had been the case, it would have formed the basis and common ground for poverty reduction and implementing effective ways of pro­ moting livelihood opportunities for the poor, marginalised communities in the District.

• Ethnic divisions and hierarchies have re-emerged, further fragmenting and re- segregating those affected in terms of ethnicity, class, and residence or location. In general, the fishing communities have become more powerless, marginalised and dejected after the post­tsunami reconstruction programmes.

• Ethnicity has become the organising principle for restructuring the post-tsunami power structure of the District. The selection of communities on ethnic grounds for the provision of aid, housing and equipment has contributed to further ethnic segregation. Muslims and Tamils have become much more conscious of their ethnic identity after the tsunami.

• Because of political manoeuvring, politically powerful groups within the ethnic communities harnessed the advantages of the aid programme. Vulnerable groups, comprising artisans, fishermen, labourers and isolated communities, have not re­ ceived their fair share of tsunami aid.

• The introduction of P-TOMS, which forcibly brought its agents into the area from outside, not only neglected the initiatives of the civil society organisations in the

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva270

District, but also curtailed their efforts. If these initiatives had been recognised and made the foundation of an alliance forged to address tsunami­related problems, pov­ erty and destitution, efforts would have been much more successful and inclusive.

• The tsunami humanitarian aid process failed to make use of public institutions in the District for the purpose of aid distribution and thereby missed the opportunity to promote accountability and transparency of public institutions.

The agencies engaged in tsunami aid distribution in the District split up the society instead of making it inclusive, denied power to the poor and the backward classes instead of empowering them, and employed external forces to distribute aid instead of utilising existing social capital in the region for such purposes. Tsunami aid dis­ tribution in Ampara District is thus an example of an unsuccessful effort on the part of external agencies, including the GoSL, as they failed to achieve inclusiveness and social cohesion through humanitarian aid, instead promoting division and inequality in the affected communities. Through an examination of tsunami aid in Ampara District, Sri Lanka, this paper has demonstrated that local social structures and networks should not be ignored in humanitarian aid distribution, particularly when many ethnic and social groups are involved. The traditional approach to relief aid or humanitarian aid emphasises direct delivery at high speed to the affected communities by the providing agencies, ignor­ ing the secondary effects of their actions, through novel organisational structures, ignoring existing local development networks. Such an aid delivery system ‘often becomes intertwined with the forces that drive the conflicts that prompted the aid in the first place’ (Anderson, 1996, p. 344). This is not only going to fail in contexts such as that of Ampara, but also it allows interest groups to use such programmes to their own advantage, while further jeopardising the destiny of the people affected.

Acknowledgements I wish to thank Mr S. Majeed and Mr Weerasingham Sudesahan, the two research assistants who carried out interviews and interpretation work on my behalf during the period of fieldwork. In addition, I wish to thank Mr Z.M. Jaufer and the many informants who provided valuable insights and assisted me in successfully organising my fieldwork in a time of political turbulence. UNDP Colombo and the Depart­ ment for Research Cooperation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency project provided the necessary support for my fieldwork. My special thanks are due to Ms Radhika Hettiarachchi and her colleagues at UNDP Colombo, three anonymous reviewers, and Arjun Guneratne, Katharine S. Bjork and Prasannajit de Silva for providing valuable suggestions on an earlier draft.

Correspondence M.W. Amarasiri de Silva, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya 20400, Sri Lanka. E­mail: adesilva@pdn.ac.lk or mwadesilva@gmail.com.

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 271

Endnotes 1 At the time of writing ( July 2007), GoSL forces have reclaimed the land that was under LTTE con­

trol in the Eastern Province. 2 The Buddhist clergy in Sri Lanka comprises four sectors or chapters (Nikaya). The chief priest of

the chapter (or the Maha Nayaka) is appointed for life from among the most senior and qualified priests of the chapter on the unanimous approval of the clergy of the respective chapter.

3 A female activist working at the Muslim Women Research and Action Foundation who preferred to remain anonymous.

4 The District Livelihood Coordination Committee of Ampara was set up by the international NGO community in Ampara to coordinate the humanitarian assistance provided to tsunami­hit com­ munities in the District. UNDP Ampara is its lead agency.

5 Hartal is a term used for strike action, which originated during the Indian independence movement. It is mass protest often involving a total shutdown of shops, schools, offices and public utilities vol­ untarily or forcefully by political parties or armed groups. During hartals, banners and protest flags, usually black flags, are hoisted across the streets and transportation is blocked. The hartals witnessed by this author in Ampara did not last more than a day.

6 Mr Mohammed Kaleel, an affected fishermen living in Sainthamarathu, Kalmunai. 7 The Peace Secretariat for Muslims was formed in December 2004 when the two main Muslim

political parties, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the National Unity Alliance (NUA), signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding.

8 A special security meeting of CHA­Ampara was held in April 2006 to discuss the adult filmmaking issue. The document released by CHA­Ampara does not mention the specific NGO involved in the incident. See http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka/catalogue/Files/Coordination/Meeting %20Minutes/MM108_emergency%20security%20meeting.pdf.

9 Interview with Mr Mohamed Razak of Kalmunai Town, May 2005. 10 Pradeshiya Sabha is the lowest local government body of elected representatives at the village level. 11 Interview with Mr Mohamed Hasan Cegu Isadean, an Eastern Province politician, May 2006. 12 The Minister is the widow of the late Minister of Ports and Rehabilitation, Mr Muhammed Hussain

Mohammed Ashraff. Mr Ashraff held a Cabinet post in the Government of President Kumaratunga. He is believed to have been behind Muslim political developments in the East, especially in Ampara.

13 Interview with Mr Mohamed Mansoor, the President of the Centre for East Lanka Social Service, June 2006.

14 Minutes of the Fisheries and Agricultural Sector Coordination Committee meeting on 28 Febru­ ary 2006.

15 Minutes of the Fisheries and Agricultural Sector Coordination Committee meeting on 28 Febru­ ary 2006.

16 Minutes of the Fisheries and Agricultural Sector Coordination Committee meeting on 28 Febru­ ary 2006.

17 Interview with Mr Udeni Janasiri, a member of the Fishermen’s Cooperative of Panama, June 2006. 18 Minutes of the Fisheries and Agricultural Sector Coordination Committee meeting on 28 Febru­

ary 2006. 19 Interview with Mr Shaul Razik, a fisherman in Kalmunai Kudi, March 2006. 20 Minutes of the Fisheries and Agricultural Sector Coordination Committee meeting on 28 Febru­

ary 2006.

References Amarasinghe, O. (2005) ‘An assessment of the post­tsunami recovery process in the fisheries sector

of Sri Lanka’. ICSF Post-tsunami Rehab Workshop Proceedings. December. International Collective

M.W. Amarasiri de Silva272

in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF), Chennai. pp. 65–100. http://www.icsf.net/icsf2006/jspFiles/ tsunami/rehabilitation/english/rehabProceedings.jsp.

Anderson, M.B. (1996) ‘Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention’. In C. Crocker, F. Hampson and P. Aall (eds.) Managing Global Chaos. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC. pp. 343–354.

Anderson, W.A. (1996) The Underserved in Natural Disaster Reduction. Unpublished paper. Hazard Mit­ igation Section, National Science Foundation, Washington, DC.

Aptekar, L. and J.A. Boore (1990) ‘The emotional effects of disaster on children: A review of the literature’. International Journal of Mental Health. 19(2). pp. 77–90.

Asian Tribune (2005) ‘LTTE blasts peace, the Norwegians, the international community and the SL Government once again’. 19 May. p. 1.

Bates, F., C.W. Fogleman, B. Parenton, R. Pittman and G. Tracy (1963) The Social and Psychological Consequences of a Natural Disaster. NRC Disaster Study. No. 18. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.

Bates, F.L. and W.G. Peacock (1993) Living Conditions, Disasters, and Development: An Approach to Cross- Cultural Comparisons. University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA.

Becker, J. (2005) ‘Sri Lanka: Child Tsunami Victims Recruited by Tamil Tigers’. Human Rights Watch, New York, NY. 14 January. http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/14/slanka10016.htm.

Blaikie, P., T. Cannon, I. Davis and B. Wisner (1994) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters. Routledge, New York, NY.

Couch, S.R. and J.S. Kroll­Smith (1985) ‘The chronic technical disaster: Toward a social scientific perspective’. Social Science Quarterly. 66(3). pp. 564–575.

Enarson, E. (1998) ‘Through Women’s Eyes: A Gendered Research Agenda for Disaster Social Science’. Disasters. 22(2). pp. 157–173.

Farmer, B.H. (1957) Pioneer Peasant Colonisation in Ceylon: A Study in Asian Agrarian Problems. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.

Fordham, M. (1999) ‘The intersection of gender and social class in disaster: Balancing resilience and vulnerability’. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. 17(1). pp. 15–38.

Fothergill, A., E.G.M. Maestas and J.D. Darlington (1999) ‘Race, Ethnicity and Disaster in the United States: A Review of the Literature’. Disasters. 23(2). pp. 156–173.

Frerks, G. and B. Klem (2005) Tsunami response in Sri Lanka: Report on a field visit 6–20 Feb 2005. Wageningen University and Clingendael Institute, The Hague.

Fritz, C.E. (1961) ‘Disasters’. In R.K. Merton and R.A. Nisbet (eds.) Contemporary Social Problems. Harcourt, New York, NY. pp. 651–694.

Goodhand, J. and N. Lewer (1999) ‘Sri Lanka: NGOs and Peace­building in Complex Political Emergencies’. Third World Quarterly. 20(1). pp. 69–87.

Goodhand, J. and B. Klem (with D. Fonseka, S.I. Keethaponcalan and S. Sardesai) (2005) Aid, Conflict, and Peace building in Sri Lanka 2000–2005. Asia Foundation, Colombo.

Hasbullah, S.H., P. Balasundarampillai and K. Silva (2005) Addressing Root Causes of the Conflict: Land Problems in North-East Sri Lanka. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Foundation for Co­Existence (FCE), Colombo.

HIC (Humanitarian Information Centre) (2005) Contacts Directory. Version 3.3. HIC, Colombo. The Hindustan Times (2005) ‘Rights Body Sought to End Sri Lanka Killings’. 9 April. Ives, S.M. and O.J. Furseth (1983) ‘Immediate Response to Headwater Flooding in Charlotte, North

Carolina’. Environment and Bahavior. 15(4). pp. 512–525. Kautzky, K. (2005) ‘Sri Lanka: LTTE Must Halt Recruitment of Child Soldiers’. Refugee International.

21 March. pp. 1–2. Korf, B. (2004) ‘War, Livelihoods and Vulnerability in Sri Lanka’. Development and Change. 35(2).

pp. 275–295.

Ethnicity, politics and inequality 273

Lankanewspapers.com (2005) ‘Maha Nayakas under pressure to issue Command’. 27 June. http://www. lankanewspapers.com/news/2005/6/2408.html.

Mayadunne, S.C. (2005) Interim Report of the Auditor General on the Rehabilitation of the losses and Damages caused to Sri Lanka by the Tsunami Disaster on 26 December 2004. 30 June. Auditor General’s Depart­ ment, Colombo. pp. 1–12.

McGilvray, D. (1982) ‘Mukkuvar Vannimai: Tamil Caste and Matriclan Ideology in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka’. In D.B. McGilvray (ed.) Caste Ideology and Interaction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. pp. 34–97.

Morrow, B.H. (1997) ‘Stretching the Bonds: The Families of Andrew’. In W.G. Peacock, B.H. Marrow and H. Gladwin (eds.) Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of Disasters. Routledge, New York, NY. pp. 141–170.

Peacock, W.P. and C. Girard (1997) ‘Ethnicity and Racial Inequalities in Hurricane Damage and Insurance Settlements’. In W.G. Peacock, B.H. Marrow and H. Gladwin (eds.) Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of Disasters. Routledge, New York, NY. pp. 171–189.

Peacock, W.P. and A.K. Ragsdale (1997) ‘Social Systems, Ecological Networks and Disasters: Towards a Socio­Political Ecology of Disasters’. In W.G. Peacock, B.H. Marrow and H. Gladwin (eds.) Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of Disasters. Routledge, New York, NY. pp. 20–34.

Peebles, P. (1990) ‘Colonisation and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka’. Journal of Asian Studies. 49(1). pp. 30–55.

Pirani, C. and A. Kadirgamar (2006) ‘Internationalisation of Sri Lanka’s Peace Process and Governance: A Review of Strategic Conflict Assessments’. Economic and Political Weekly. 6 May. pp. 1789–1795.

Rhodes, A. (2005) ‘Sri Lanka: Tsunami aid agreement faces mountain of opposition’. Asia Media. Media news daily. UCLA Asia Institute. 7 July.

Rodriguez, H., T. Wachtendorf, J. Kendra and J. Trainor (2006) ‘A Snapshot of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: Social Impacts and Consequences’. Disaster Prevention and Management. 15(1). pp. 163–177.

Stirrat, J. (2006) ‘Competitive humanitarianism relief and the tsunami in Sri Lanka’. Anthropology Today. 22(5) (October). pp. 11–16.

Hutton, J.R. (1976) ‘The differential distribution of death in disaster: a test of theoretical propositions’. Mass Emergencies. 1(4). pp. 261–266.

TW News (2006) ‘Tamil Week news­features: Between Three Devils and the Deep Blue Sea’. 4 May. http://tamilweek.com/news­features/archives/312.

USAID (United States Agency for International Development) (2008) ‘Building and Strengthening Civic Foundations for Sustainable Peace’. Programs: Democracy and Governance. http://srilanka. usaid.gov/programme_dg_description.php?prog_id=3.

UTHR ( J) (University Teachers for Human Rights ( Jaffna)) (2005) Information Bulletin. 38. 21 July. von Braunmühl, C., R. Bolz, L. Jayatilake, K. Noble and S. Saroor (2006) Tsunami: A study on disaster

response in Sri Lanka. Bread for the World. Heinrich Böll Foundation and Medico International, Berlin. http://www.medico­international.de/material/downloads/mi_tsunami­report_2006_it.pdf.

Yalman, N. (1967) Under the Bo Tree: Studies in Caste, Kinship, and Marriage in the Interior of Ceylon. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.