Discussion

"Ethics and Ethical Reasoning"

"ermissible, etc.)”? One answer to this question is that such assertions can do nothing to solve the deep conflicts of value that we find in our world. We know that people disagree about abortion, gay marriage, animal rights, and other issues. If we are to make progress toward understanding each other, if we are to make progress toward establish-ing some consensus about these topics, then we have to understand why we think certain things are right and other things are wrong. We need to make arguments and give reasons in order to work out our own conclusions about these issues and in order to explain our conclusions to others with whom we disagree.It is also not sufficient to appeal to custom or authority in deriving our conclusions about moral issues. While it may be appropriate for children to simply obey their parents’ decisions, adults should strive for more than conformity and obedience to authority. Sometimes our parents and grandparents are wrong—or they disagree among themselves. Sometimes the law is wrong—or the laws conflict. And sometimes religious authorities are wrong—or the authorities do not agree. To appeal to authority on moral issues, we would first have to decide which authority is to be trusted and believed. Which reli-gion provides the best set of moral rules? Which set of laws in which country is to be followed? Even within the United States, there is currently a conflict of laws with regard to some of these issues: some states have legalized medical marijuana and gay marriage, and others have not. The world’s religions also disagree about a number of issues: for example, the status of women, the permissibility of abortion, and the question of whether war is justifiable. Many of these disagreements are internal to religions, with members of the same religion or denomination disagreeing among themselves. To begin resolv-ing the problem of laws that conflict and religions that disagree, we need critical philosophical inquiry into basic ethical questions. In the next chapter, we discuss the world’s diverse religious traditions and ask whether there is a set of common ethical ideas that is shared by these traditions. In this chapter, we clarify what ethics is and how ethical reasoning should proceed"

"What iS EthicS?On the first day of an ethics class, we often ask stu-dents to write one-paragraph answers to the ques-tion, “What is ethics?”How would you answer? Over the years, there have been significant differences of opinion among our students on this issue. Some have argued that ethics is a highly personal thing, a matter of private opinion. Others claim that our values come from family upbringing. Other students think that ethics is a set of social principles, the codes of one’s soci-ety or particular groups within it, such as medical or legal organizations. Some write that many people get their ethical beliefs from their religion.One general conclusion can be drawn from these students’ comments: We tend to think of ethics as the set of values or principles held by individuals or groups. I have my ethics and you have yours, and groups have sets of values with which they tend to identify. We can think of ethics as the study of the vari-ous sets of values that people have. This could be done historically and comparatively, for example, or with a psychological interest in determining how people form their values and when they tend to act on them. We can also think of ethics as a critical enterprise. We would then ask whether any particular set of values or beliefs is better than any other. We would compare and evaluate the sets of values and beliefs, giving reasons for our evaluations. We would ask questions such as, “Are there good reasons for preferring one set of ethics over another?” As we will pursue it in this text, ethics is this latter type of study. We will examine various ethical views and types of reasoning from a critical or evaluative standpoint. This examination will also help us come to a better understanding of our own values and the values of others.Ethics is a branch of philosophy. It is also called moral philosophy. In general, philosophy is a dis-cipline or study in which we ask—and attempt to answer—basic questions about key areas or subject matters of human life and about pervasive and sig-nificant aspects of experience. Some philosophers, such as Plato and Kant, have tried to do this system-atically by interrelating their philosophical views in many areas. According to Alfred North Whitehead, “Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.”1 Other people believe that philosophers today must work at problems piecemeal, focusing on one particular issue at a time. For instance, some might analyze the meaning of the phrase “to know,” while others might work on the morality of lying. Some philosophers are optimistic about our ability to address these problems, while others are more skep-tical because they think that the way we analyze the issues and the conclusions we draw will always be influenced by our background, culture, and habitual ways of thinking. Most agree, however, that these problems are worth wondering about and caring about.We can ask philosophical questions about many subjects. In aesthetics, or the philosophy of art, for example, philosophers do not merely interpret a certain novel or painting. Rather, philosophers concerned with aesthetics ask basic or foundational questions about art and objects of beauty: What kinds of things do or should count as art (rocks arranged in a certain way, for example)? What makes something an object of aesthetic interest its emotional expressiveness, its peculiar formal nature, or its ability to show us certain truths that cannot be described? In the philosophy of science, philoso-phers ask not about the structure or composition of some chemical or biological material, but about such matters as whether scientific knowledge gives us a picture of reality as it is, whether progress exists in science, and whether it is meaningful to talk about the scientific method. Philosophers of law seek to understand the nature of law itself, the source of its authority, the nature of legal interpretation, and the basis of legal responsibility. In the philosophy of knowledge, called epistemology, we try to answer questions about what we can know of ourselves and our world, and what it means to know something rather than just to believe it. In each area, philoso-phers ask basic questions about the particular sub-ject matter. This is also true of moral philosophy"

"One objective of ethics is to help us decide what is good or bad, better or worse, either in some gen-eral way or with regard to particular ethical issues. This is generally called normative ethics. Norma-tive ethics defends a thesis about what is good, right, or just. Normative ethics can be distinguished from metaethics. Metaethical inquiry asks questions about the nature of ethics, including the meaning of ethical terms and judgments. Questions about the relation between philosophical ethics and religion—as we discuss in Chapter 2—are metaethical. Theoreti-cal questions about ethical relativism—as discussed in Chapter 3—also belong most properly to metaeth-ics. The other chapters in Part I are more properly designated as ethical theory. These chapters present concrete normative theories; they make claims about what is good or evil, just or unjust.From the mid-1930s until recently, metaeth-ics predominated in English-speaking universities. In doing metaethics, we often analyze the mean-ing of ethical language. Instead of asking whether the death penalty is morally justified, we would ask what we meant in calling something “morally justified” or “good” or “right.” We analyze ethical language, ethical terms, and ethical statements to determine what they mean. In doing this, we func-tion at a level removed from that implied by our definition. It is for this reason that we call this other type of ethics metaethics—meta meaning “beyond.” Some of the discussions in this chapter are metaethi-cal discussions—for example, the analysis of various senses of “good.” As you will see, much can be learned from such discussions.Ethical and othEr typESof Evaluation“That’s great!” “Now, this is what I call a delicious meal!” “That play was wonderful!” All these state-ments express approval of something. They do not tell us much about the meal or the play, but they do imply that the speaker thought they were good. These are evaluative statements. Ethical statements or judgments are also evaluative. They tell us what the speaker believes is good or bad. They do not simply describe the object of the judgment—for example, as an action that occurred at a certain time or that affected people in a certain way. They go fur-ther and express a positive or negative regard for it. However, factual matters are often relevant to our moral evaluations. For example, factual judgments about whether capital punishment has a deterrent effect might be quite relevant to our moral judg-ments about it. So also would we want to know the facts about whether violence can ever bring about peace; this would help us judge the morality of war and terrorism. Because ethical judgments often rely on such empirical or experientially based informa-tion, ethics is often indebted to other disciplines such as sociology, psychology, and history. Thus, we can distinguish between empirical or descriptive claims, which state factual beliefs, and evaluative judgments, which state whether such facts are good or bad, just or unjust, right or wrong. Evaluative judgments are also called normative judgments. Moral judgments are evaluative because they “place a value,” negative or positive, on some action or practice, such as capital punishment.❯Descriptive (empirical) judgment: Capital punish-ment acts (or does not act) as a deterrent.❯Normative (moral) judgment: Capital punishment is justifiable (or unjustifiable).We also evaluate people, saying that a person is good or evil, just or unjust. Because these evalua-tions also rely on beliefs in general about what is good or right—in other words, on norms or standards of good and bad or right and wrong—they are also normative. For example, the judgment that people ought to give their informed consent to participate as research subjects may rely on beliefs about the value of human autonomy. In this case, autonomy func-tions as a norm by which we judge the practice of using people as subjects of research. Thus, ethics of this sort is normative, both because it is evaluative and not simply descriptive, and because it grounds its judgments in certain norms or values.“That is a good knife” is an evaluative or norma-tive statement. However, it does not mean that the knife is morally good. In making ethical judgments, we use terms such as good, bad, right, wrong, oblig-atory, and permissible. We talk about what we ought or ought not to do. These are evaluative terms. But"

"not all evaluations are moral in nature. We speak of a good knife without attributing moral goodness to it. In so describing the knife, we are probably referring to its practical usefulness for cutting or for impress-ing others. People tell us that we ought to pay this amount in taxes or stop at that corner before crossing because that is what the law requires. We read that two styles ought not to be worn or placed together because such a combination is distasteful. Here someone is making an aesthetic judgment. Religious leaders tell members of their communities what they ought to do because it is required by their religious beliefs. We may say that in some countries people ought to bow before the elders or use eating utensils in a certain way. This is a matter of custom. These various normative or evaluative judgments appeal to practical, legal, aesthetic, religious, or customary norms for their justification.How do other types of normative judgments differ from moral judgments? Some philosophers believe that it is a characteristic of moral “oughts” in particular that they override other “oughts,” such as aesthetic ones. In other words, if we must choose between what is aesthetically pleasing and what is morally right, then we ought to do what is morally right. In this way, morality may also take prece-dence over the law and custom. The doctrine of civil disobedience relies on this belief, because it holds that we may disobey certain laws for moral reasons. Although moral evaluations are different from other normative evaluations, this is not to say that there is no relation between them. In fact, moral reasons often form the basis for certain laws. But law—at least in the United States—results from a variety of political compromises. We don’t tend to look to the law for moral guidance. And we are reluctant to think that we can “legislate morality” as the saying goes. Of course, there is still an open debate about whether the law should enforce moral ideas in the context of issues such as gay marriage or abortion.There may be moral reasons supporting legal arrangements—considerations of basic justice, for example. Furthermore, the fit or harmony between forms and colors that ground some aesthetic judg-ments may be similar to the rightness or moral fit between certain actions and certain situations or beings. Moreover, in some ethical systems, actions are judged morally by their practical usefulness for producing valued ends. For now, however, note that ethics is not the only area in which we make norma-tive judgments. Whether the artistic worth of an art object ought to be in any way judged by its moral value or influence is another interesting question.Sociobiology and thEnaturaliStic fallacyThe distinction between descriptive and normative claims is a central issue for thinking about ethics. Philosophers have long been aware that we tend to confuse these issues in our ordinary thinking about things. Many people are inclined to say that if some-thing is natural to us, then we ought to do it. For example, one might argue that since eating meat is natural for us, we ought to eat meat. But vegetar-ians will disagree. Another example is used by the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, who noticed that incest appears to be quite natural—animals do it all the time. But human beings con-demn incest. It is thus not true that what is natural is always good. But people often make the mistake of confusing facts of nature and value judgments. Most of the time, we are not attentive to the shift from facts to values, the shift from is to ought. Hume pointed out the problem of deriving an ough"

"6paRt ONE❯❯EtHICaL tHEORYfrom an is; philosophers after Hume named the rule against simplistically deriving an ought from an isHume’s law. From this perspective, it is not logical, for example, to base our ideas about how we ought to behave from a factual account of how we actu-ally do behave. This logical mistake was called the naturalistic fallacy by G.E. Moore, an influential philosopher of the early twentieth century. Moore maintained that moral terms such as good are names for non-empirical properties that cannot be reduced to some other natural thing. Moore claimed that to attempt to define good in terms of some mundane or natural thing such as pleasure is to commit a ver-sion of this fallacy. The problem is that we can ask whether pleasures are actually good. Just because we desire pleasure does not mean that it is good to desire pleasure. As Moore suggested, there is always an open question about whether what is natural is also good.Now not everyone agrees that naturalism in eth-ics is fallacious. There are a variety of naturalistic approaches to thinking about ethics. One traditional approach to ethics is called natural law ethics (which we discuss in detail in a subsequent chapter). Natu-ral law ethics focuses on human nature and derives ethical precepts from an account of what is natural for humans. Natural law ethicists may argue, for example, that human body parts have natural func-tions and that by understanding these natural func-tions, we can figure out certain moral ideas about sexuality or reproduction. Opponents might argue that this commits the naturalistic fallacy, since there is no obvious moral content to be seen in the struc-ture and function of our body parts.A more recent version of naturalism in ethics focuses on evolutionary biology and cognitive sci-ence. From this perspective, to understand morality, we need to understand the basic functions of our species, including the evolutionary reasons behind moral behavior. We also need to understand how our brains function in order to explain how pleasure works, why some people are psychopathic, and why we struggle to balance egoistic and altruistic moti-vations. One version of this naturalism is known as sociobiology—an idea that was introduced by the biologist E.O. Wilson.2 “If the brain evolved by natural selection, even the capacities to select par-ticular esthetic judgments and religious beliefs must have arisen by the same mechanistic process,” Wil-son explained.3 The basic idea of sociobiology is that human behaviors result from the pressures of natu-ral selection. A useful tool for understanding human behavior is to understand the adaptive advantage of certain behaviors. We can study this by comparing human behaviors with the behavior of other social animals—from insects to chimpanzees.Sociobiology attempts to understand altruism, for example, in terms of evolutionary processes. From this perspective, altruistic concern develops through natural selection because altruistic ani-mals will help each other survive. Biologist Richard Dawkins explains a related idea in terms of “the self-ish gene.” Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic and other behaviors to spread themselves. Thus, when we cooperate within groups that share a genetic endowment, we help to preserve the group and help to disseminate our shared genetic char-acteristics, often in competition with rival genetic groups.4In discussing sociobiology and interpreting bio-logical evidence, we must be careful, however, not to anthropomorphize.5 The problem is that when we look at the natural world, we often interpret it in anthropomorphic terms, seeing in animals and even in genes themselves the motivations and interests that human beings have. In other words, we must be careful that our value judgments do not cloud or confuse our description of the facts.While the naturalistic approach of sociobiology is provocative and insightful, we might still worry that it commits the naturalistic fallacy. Just because altruistic behavior is natural and useful in the evo-lutionary struggle for survival does not mean that it is good, just, or right. To see this, let us return to Hume’s example of incest. Incest might be useful as a method for disseminating our genetic material—so long as the negative problems associated with inbreeding are minimized. We do inbreed animals in this way in order to select for desirable traits. But it is still appropriate to ask whether incest is mor-ally permissible for human beings—the question of ought might not be settled by what is"

"Ethical tErmSYou might have wondered what the difference is between calling something “right” and calling it “good.” Consider the ethical meaning for these terms. Right and wrong usually apply to actions, as in “You did the right thing,” or “That is the wrong thing to do.” These terms prescribe things for us to do or not to do. On the other hand, when we say that something is morally good, we are not explic-itly recommending doing it. However, we do recom-mend that it be positively regarded. Thus, we say things such as “Peace is good, and distress is bad.” It is also interesting that with “right” and “wrong” there seems to be no in-between; it is either one or the other. However, with “good” and “bad” there is room for degrees, and some things are thought to be better or worse than others.We also use other ethical terms when we engage in moral evaluation and judgment. For example, we sometimes say that something “ought” or “ought not” to be done. There is the sense here of urgency. Thus, of these things we may talk in terms of an obligation to do or not do something. It is some-thing about which there is morally no choice. We can refrain from doing what we ought to do, but the obligation is still there. On the other hand, there are certain actions that we think are permissible but that we are not obligated to do. Thus, one may think that there is no obligation to help someone in trouble, though it is “morally permissible” (i.e., not wrong) to do so and even “praiseworthy” to do so in some cases. Somewhat more specific ethical terms include just and unjust and virtuous and vicious.To a certain extent, which set of terms we use depends on the particular overall ethical viewpoint or theory we adopt. This will become clearer as we discuss and analyze the various ethical theories in this first part of the text.EthicS and rEaSonSWhen we evaluate an action as right or wrong or some condition as good or bad, we appeal to cer-tain norms or reasons. Suppose, for example, I say that affirmative action is unjustified. I should give reasons for this conclusion; it will not be accept-able for me to respond that this is just the way I feel. If I have some intuitive negative response to preferential treatment forms of affirmative action, then I will be expected to delve deeper to determine whether there are reasons for this attitude. Perhaps I have experienced the bad results of such programs. Or I may believe that giving preference in hiring or school admissions on the basis of race or sex is unfair. In either case, I also will be expected to push the matter further and explain why it is unfair or even what constitutes fairness and unfairness.To be required to give reasons to justify one’s moral conclusions is essential to the moral enterprise and to doing ethics. However, this does not mean that making ethical judgments is and must be purely rational. We might be tempted to think that good moral judgments require us to be objective and not let our feelings, or emotions, enter into our decision- making. Yet this assumes that feelings always get in the way of making good judgments. Sometimes this is surely true, as when we are overcome by anger, jealousy, or fear and cannot think clearly. Biases and prejudice may stem from such strong feelings. We think prejudice is wrong because it prevents us from judging rightly. But emotions can often aid good decision-making. We may, for example, simply feel the injustice of a certain situation or the wrong-ness of someone’s suffering. Furthermore, our caring about some issue or person may, in fact, direct us to more carefully examine the ethical issues involved. However, some explanation of why we hold a cer-tain moral position is still required. Simply to say “X is just wrong,” without explanation, or to merely express strong feelings or convictions about “X” is not sufficient.intuitioniSm, EmotiviSm, SubjEctiviSm, objEctiviSmPhilosophers differ on how they know what is good. They also differ on the question of whether our moral judgments refer to something objective to us or are simple reports of subjective opinions and dispositions.To say that something is good is often thought to be different from saying that something is yellow or heavy. The latter two qualities are empirical, known by our senses. However, good or goodness is held"

"to be a non-empirical property, said by some to be knowable through intuition. A position known as intuitionism claims that our ideas about ethics rest upon some sort of intuitive knowledge of ethi-cal truths. This view is associated with G.E. Moore, whom we discussed above.6 Another philosopher, W.D. Ross, thinks that we have a variety of “crystal-clear intuitions” about basic values. These intuitions are clear and distinct beliefs about ethics, which Ross explains using an analogy with mathemat-ics: just as we see or intuit the self-evident truth of “2 + 2 = 4,” we also see or intuit the truth of ethi-cal truths such as that we have a duty to keep our promises. As Ross explains,Both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that we can know about the nature of numbers and the nature of duty ... we do not read off our knowledge of particular branches of duty from a single ideal of the good life, but build up our ideal of the good life from intuitions into the particular branches of duty.7A very important question is whether our intu-itions point toward some objective moral facts in the world or whether they are reports of something sub-jective. A significant problem for intuitionism is that people’s moral intuitions seem to differ. Unlike the crystal-clear intuitions of mathematics—which are shared by all of us—the intuitions of ethics are not apparently shared by all of us.Another view, sometimes called emotivism, maintains that when we say something is good, we are showing our approval of it and recommending it to others rather than describing it. This view is asso-ciated with the work of twentieth-century philoso-phers such as A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson. But it has deeper roots in a theory of the moral sentiments, such as we find in eighteenth-century philosophers Adam Smith and David Hume. Hume maintains, for example, that reason is “the slave of the passions,” by which he means that the ends or goals we pursue are determined by our emotions, passions, and sen-timents. Adam Smith maintains that human beings are motivated by the experience of pity, compassion, and sympathy for other human beings. For Smith, ethics develops out of natural sympathy toward one another, experienced by social beings like ourselves.Emotivism offers an explanation of moral knowl-edge that is subjective, with moral judgments rest-ing upon subjective experience. One version of emotivism makes ethical judgments akin to expres-sions of approval or disapproval. In this view, to say “murder is wrong” is to express something like “murder—yuck!” Similarly, to say “courageous self-sacrifice is good” is to express something like “self-sacrifice—yeah!” One contemporary author, Leon Kass, whom we study in a later chapter, argues that there is wisdom in our experiences of disgust and repugnance—that our emotional reactions to things reveal deep moral insight. Kass focuses especially on the “yuck factor” that many feel about advanced biotechnologies such as cloning.One worry, however, is that our emotions and feelings of sympathy or disgust are variable and rel-ative. Not only do our own emotional responses vary depending upon our moods but these responses vary among and between individuals. We will discuss relativism in more detail later, but the problem is that these emotional responses are relative to culture and even to the subjective dispositions of individu-als. Indeed, our own feelings change over time and are not reliable or sufficient gauges of what is going on in the external world. The worry here is that our emotions merely express our internal or subjective responses to things and that they do not connect us to some objective and stable source of value.Other moral theories aim for more objective sources for morality. From this standpoint, there must be objective reasons that ground our subjec-tive and emotional responses to things. Instead of saying that the things we desire are good, an objectivist about ethics will argue that we ought to desire things that are good—with an emphasis on the goodness of the thing-in-itself apart from our subjective responses. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato was an objectivist in this sense. Objectivists hold that values have an objective reality—that they are objects available for knowledge—as opposed to subjectivists, who claim that value judgments are merely the expression of subjective opinion. Plato argues that there is some concept or idea called “the Good” and that we can compare our subjective moral opinions about morality with this objective standard."

"hose who want to ground morality in God are objectivists, as are those who defend some form of natural law ethics, which focuses on essential or objective features of bodies and their functions. Interestingly, the approach of sociobiology tends not to be objectivist in this sense. Although the sociobi-ologist bases her study of morality on objective facts in the world, the sociobiologist does not think that moral judgments represent moral facts. Instead, as Michael Ruse puts it,Objective ethics, in the sense of something written on tablets of stone (or engraven on God’s heart) external to us, has to go. The only reasonable thing that we, as sociobiologists, can say is that morality is something biology makes us believe in, so that we will further our evolutionary ends.8One of the issues introduced in Ruse’s rejection of objectivity in ethics is the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goods. Instrumental goods are things that are useful as instruments or tools—we use them and value them as a means toward some other end. Intrinsic goods are things that have value in themselves or for their own sake. For example, we might say that life is an intrinsic good—it is just fundamentally valuable. But food is an instrumental good because it is a means or tool that is used to support life. From Ruse’s perspective, morality itself is merely an instrumental good that is used by evolution for other purposes. Morality is, from this perspective, simply a tool that helps the human species to survive. According to Hume’s law, there is no higher value that can be derived from the factual description of how morality is developed by evolutionary forces. The selfish gene hypothesis of Richard Dawkins understands individual human beings instrumentally, as carriers of genetic infor-mation: “We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to serve the selfish molecules known as genes.”9 This conception of human beings runs counter to our usual moral view, which holds that human beings have intrinsic or inherent value. The idea that some things have intrinsic value is an idea that is common to a variety of approaches that claim that ethics is objective. The intrinsic value of a thing is supposed to be an objective fact about that thing, which has no relation to our subjective response to that thing. Claims about intrinsic value show up in arguments about human rights and about the environment. Do human beings or eco-systems or species have intrinsic value, or is the value of these things contained within our subjec-tive responses and in their instrumental uses? This question shows us that the metaethical theories are connected to important practical issues.Ethical rEaSoning and argumEntSIt is important to know how to reason well in think-ing or speaking about ethical matters. This is helpful not only in trying to determine what to think about controversial ethical matters but also in arguing for something you believe is right and in critically eval-uating positions held by others.the Structure of Ethical reasoning and argumentTo be able to reason well in ethics you need to understand something about ethical arguments and argumentation, not in the sense of understanding why people get into arguments but rather in the sense of what constitutes a good argument. We can do this by looking at an argument’s basic structure. This is the structure not only of ethical arguments about what is good or right but also of arguments about what is the case or what is true.Suppose you are standing on the shore and a per-son in the water calls out for help. Should you try to rescue that person? You may or may not be able to swim. You may or may not be sure you could rescue the person. In this case, however, there is no time for reasoning, as you would have to act promptly. On the other hand, if this were an imaginary case, you would have to think through the reasons for and against trying to rescue the person. You might conclude that if you could actually rescue the person you ought to try to do it. Your reasoning might go as follows:"

"Or you might conclude that you could not save this person, and your reasoning might go like this:Every human life is valuable.Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life should be attempted.In this case, there is no chance of saving this life because I cannot swim.Thus, I am not obligated to try to save him (although, if others are around who can help, I might be obli-gated to try to get them to help).Some structure like this is implicit in any ethi-cal argument, although some are longer and more complex chains than the simple form given here. One can recognize the reasons in an argument by their introduction through key words such as since, because, and given that. The conclusion often con-tains terms such as thus and therefore. The reasons supporting the conclusion are called premises. In a sound argument, the premises are true and the con-clusion follows from them. In the case above, then, we want to know whether you can save this person and also whether his life is valuable. We also need to know whether the conclusion actually follows from the premises. In the case of the examples given above, it does. If you say you ought to do what will save a life and you can do it, then you ought to do it. However, there may be other principles that would need to be brought into the argument, such as whether and why one is always obligated to save someone else’s life when one can.To know under what conditions a conclusion actually follows from the premises, we would need to analyze arguments in much greater detail than we can do here. Suffice it to say, however, that the connection is a logical connection—in other words, it must make rational sense. You can improve your ability to reason well in ethics first by being able to pick out the reasons and the conclusion in an argu-ment. Only then can you subject them to critical examination in ways we suggest below.Evaluating and making good argumentsEthical reasoning can be done well or done poorly. Ethical arguments can be constructed well or con-structed poorly. A good argument is a sound argu-ment. It has a valid form in which the conclusion actually follows from the premises, and the prem-ises or reasons given for the conclusion are true. An argument is poorly constructed when it is fal-lacious or when the reasons on which it is based are not true or are uncertain. This latter matter is of particular significance with ethical argumentation because an ethical argument always involves some claim about values—for example, that saving a life is good. These value-based claims must be estab-lished through some theory of values. The rest of Part I of this book examines different theories that help establish basic values.Ethical arguments also involve conceptual and factual matters. Conceptual matters are those that relate to the meaning of terms or concepts. For example, in a case of lying, we would want to know what lying actually is. Must it be verbal? Must one have an intent to deceive? What is deceit itself? Other conceptual issues central to ethical arguments may involve questions such as, “What constitutes a ’person’?” (in arguments over abortion, for exam-ple) and “What is ’cruel and unusual punishment’?” (in death penalty arguments, for example). Some-times, differences of opinion about an ethical issue are a matter of differences not in values but in the meaning of the terms used.Ethical arguments often also rely on factual claims. In our example, we might want to know whether it was actually true that you could save the drowning person. In arguments about the death pen-alty, we may want to know whether such punish-ment is a deterrent. In such a case, we need to know what scientific studies have found and whether the studies themselves were well grounded. To have adequate factual grounding, we will want to seek out a range of reliable sources of information and be open-minded. Each chapter in Part II of this book begins with or includes factual material that may be relevant to ethical decisions on the particular issue being treated.It is important to be clear about the distinction between facts and values. It is especially helpful when dealing with moral conflict and disagreement. We need to ask whether we disagree about the val-ues involved, about the concepts and terms we are employing, or about the facts connected to the case."

"Chapter 1❮❮Ethics and Ethical Reasoning11Those who analyze good reasoning have catego-rized various ways in which reasoning can go wrong or be fallacious. One of the most familiar examples of this is called the ad hominem fallacy. In this fal-lacy, people say something like, “That can’t be right because just look who is saying it.” They look at the source of the opinion rather than the reasons given for it. Another fallacy is called begging the question or circular argument. Such reasoning draws on the argument’s conclusion to support its premises, as in “Lying in this case is wrong because lying is always wrong.” You can find out more about these and other fallacies from almost any textbook in logic or critical thinking.You also can improve your understanding of ethical arguments by making note of a particu-lar type of reasoning that is often used in ethics: arguments from analogy. In this type of argu-ment, one compares familiar examples with the issue being disputed. If the two cases are similar in relevant ways, then whatever one concludes about the first familiar case one should also conclude about the disputed case. Thus, in a famous use of analogy by Judith Jarvis Thomson, one is asked whether it would be ethically acceptable to “unplug” a famous violinist who had been attached to you and your kidneys to save his life. She argues that if you say, as she thinks you should, that you are justified in unplugging the violinist and letting him die, then a pregnant woman is also justified in doing the same with regard to her fetus. The reader is prompted to critically examine such an argument by asking whether or not the two cases were similar in relevant ways—that is, whether the analogy fits.Finally, we should note that giving reasons to justify a conclusion is also not the same as giving an explanation for why one believes something. One might explain that she does not support euthana-sia because that was the way she was brought up or that she is opposed to the death penalty because she cannot stand to see someone die. To justify such beliefs, one would need rather to give rea-sons that show not why one does, in fact, believe something but why one should believe it. Nor are rationalizations justifying reasons. They are usually reasons given after the fact that are not one’s true reasons. Rationalizations are usually excuses, used to explain away bad behavior. These false reasons are given to make us look better to others or our-selves. To argue well about ethical matters, we need to examine and give reasons that support the con-clusions we draw.Ethical thEoryGood reasoning in ethics usually involves either implicit or explicit reference to an ethical theory. An ethical theory is a systematic exposition of a par-ticular view about what is the nature and basis of good or right. The theory provides reasons or norms for judging acts to be right or wrong and attempts to give a justification for these norms. It provides ethi-cal principles or guidelines that embody certain val-ues. These can be used to decide in particular cases what action should be chosen and carried out. We can diagram the relationship between ethical theo-ries and moral decision-making as follows.Ethical JudgmentEthical TheoryEthical PrincipleWe can think of the diagram as a ladder. In prac-tice, we can start at the ladder’s top or bottom. At the top, at the level of theory, we can start by clarifying for ourselves what we think are basic ethical values. We then move downward to the level of principles generated from the theory. The next step is to apply these principles to concrete cases. We can also start at the bottom of the ladder, facing a particular ethi-cal choice or dilemma. We can work our way back up the ladder, thinking through the principles and theories that implicitly guide our concrete decisions. Ultimately and ideally, we come to a basic justifica-tion, or the elements of what would be an ethical"

"theory. If we look at the actual practice of thinking people as they develop their ethical views over time, the movement is probably in both directions. We use concrete cases to reform our basic ethical views, and we use the basic ethical views to throw light on con-crete cases.An example of this movement in both directions would be if we start with the belief that pleasure is the ultimate value and then find that applying this value in practice leads us to do things that are contrary to common moral sense or that are repug-nant to us and others. We may then be forced to look again and possibly alter our views about the moral significance of pleasure. Or we may change our views about the rightness or wrongness of some particular act or practice on the basis of our theoreti-cal reflections. Obviously, this sketch of moral rea-soning is quite simplified. Moreover, feminists and others have criticized this model of ethical reason-ing, partly because it shows ethics to be governed by general principles that are supposedly applicable to all ethical situations. Does this form of reasoning give due consideration to the particularities of indi-vidual, concrete cases? Can we really make a general judgment about the value of truthfulness or courage that will help us know what to do in particular cases in which these issues play a role?typES of Ethical thEoryIn Part I of this text, we consider the following types of moral theory: egoism and contractarianism, util-itarianism, deontological ethics, natural law, virtue ethics, and feminist ethics. These theories represent different approaches to doing ethics. Some differ in terms of what they say we should look at in mak-ing moral judgments about actions or practices. For example, does it matter morally that I tried to do the right thing or that I had a good motive? Surely it must make some moral difference, we think. But suppose that in acting with good motives I vio-late someone’s rights. Does this make the action a bad action? We would probably be inclined to say yes. Suppose, however, that in violating someone’s rights I am able to bring about a great good. Does this justify the violation of rights? Some theories judge actions in terms of their motive, some in terms of the character or nature of the act itself, and oth-ers in terms of the consequences of the actions or practices.MotiveActConsequencesWe often appeal to one of these types of reason. Take a situation in which I lie to a person, Jim. We can make the following judgments about this action. Note the different types of reasons given for the judgments.That was good because you intended to make Jim happy by telling him a white lie—or it was bad because you meant to deceive him and do him harm. (Motive)That was good because it is good to make people happy—or it was bad because it is always wrong to tell a lie. (Act)That was good because it helped Jim develop his self-esteem—or it was bad because it caused Jim to believe things about himself that were not true. (Consequences)Although we generally think that a person’s motive is relevant to the overall moral judgment about his or her action, we tend to think that it reflects primar-ily on our moral evaluation of the person. We also have good reasons to think that the results of actions matter morally. Those theories that base moral judg-ments on consequences are called consequentialistor sometimes teleological moral theories (from the Greek root telos, meaning “goal” or “end”). Those theories that hold that actions can be right or wrong regardless of their consequences are called non-consequentialist or deontological theories (from the Greek root deon, meaning “duty”).One moral theory we will examine is utilitari-anism. It provides us with an example of a conse-quentialist moral theory in which we judge whether an action is better than alternatives by its actual or expected results or consequences; actions are then judged in terms of the promotion of human hap-piness. Kant’s moral theory, which we will also examine, provides us with an example of a non-consequentialist theory, according to which acts are"

"judged right or wrong independently of their conse-quences; in particular, acts are judged by whether they conform to requirements of rationality and human dignity. The other ethical theories that we will examine stress human nature as the source of what is right and wrong. Some elements of these theories are deontological and some teleological. So, also, some teleological theories are consequentialist in that they advise us to produce some good. But if the good is an ideal, such as virtue or self-realization, then such theories differ from consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism.10 As anyone who has tried to put some order to the many ethical theories knows, no theory completely and easily fits one classification, even those given here. Feminist theories of care pro-vide yet another way of determining what one ought to do (see Chapter 9). In Part II of this text, we will examine several concrete ethical issues. As we do so, we will note how various ethical theories analyze the problems from different perspectives and sometimes reach different conclusions about what is morally right or wrong, better or worse.can EthicS bEtaught?It would be interesting to know just why some col-lege and university programs require their students to take a course in ethics. Does this requirement stem from a belief that a course in ethics or moral philosophy can actually make people good?On the question of whether ethics can be taught, students have given a variety of answers. “If it can’t be taught, then why are we taking this class?” one wondered. “Look at the behavior of certain corporate executives who have been found guilty of criminal conduct. They surely haven’t learned proper ethical values,” another responded. Still others disagreed. Although certain ideals or types of knowledge can be taught, ethical behavior cannot because it is a matter of individual choice, they said.The ancient Greek philosopher Plato thought that ethics could be taught. He argues that “All evil is ignorance.” In other words, the only reason we do what is wrong is because we do not know or believe it is wrong. If we come to believe that something is right, however, it should then follow that we will necessarily do it. Now, we are free to disagree with Plato by appealing to our own experience. If I know that I should not have that second piece of pie, does this mean that I will not eat it? Ever? Plato might attempt to convince us that he is right by examining or clarifying what he means by the phrase “to know.” If we were really convinced with our whole heart and mind that something is wrong, then we might be highly likely (if not determined) not to do it. However, whether ethics courses should attempt to convince students of such things is surely debatable.Another aspect of the problem of teaching ethics concerns the problem of motivation. If one knows something to be the right thing to do, does there still remain the question of why we should do it? One way to teach ethics to youngsters, at least, and in the sense of motivating them, may be to show them that it is in their own best interest to do the right thing.With regard to teaching or taking a course in eth-ics, most, if not all, moral philosophers think that ethics, or a course on ethics, should do several other things. It should help students understand the nature of an ethical problem and help them think critically about ethical matters by providing certain concep-tual tools and skills. It should enable them to form and critically analyze ethical arguments. It is up to the individual, however, to use these skills to rea-son about ethical matters. A study of ethics should also lead students to respect opposing views because it requires them to analyze carefully the arguments that support views contrary to their own. It also pro-vides opportunities to consider the reasonableness of at least some viewpoints that they may not have considered.In this opening chapter, we have questioned the value of ethics and learned something about what ethics is and how it is different from other disciplines. We have considered a few metaethical issues. We have provided a description of ethical reasoning and arguments and have examined briefly the nature of ethical theories and principles and the role they play in ethical reasoning. We will examine these theories more carefully in the chapters to come, and we will see how they might help us analyze and come to conclusions about particular ethical issues"