Psychological and behavioral factors of homegrown terrorists

Endgames: Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism

MICHAEL ZEKULIN

Department of Political Science

University of Calgary

Calgary, Canada

This article examines how the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism has evolved over the past decade. It argues that there have been significant developments that impact how we conceptualize and study it and offers two suggestions moving forward. It argues that re-branding it Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism (IIHGT) better captures the nuances of this phenomenon and that sub-dividing it by “endgame,” the action the radicalized individual pursues creates the opportunity for a more robust analysis and provides a better way to compare incidents and identify traits that our current efforts overlook. Focusing on the action component may also provide a new way to investigate radicalization as the different endgames represent an escalation in violence, suggesting different degrees of radicalization might also be present.

This article examines our conceptions of homegrown terrorism (HGT) and asks whether it

accurately reflects the phenomenon first identified approximately ten years ago. It argues

there have been significant developments since that time and it is therefore incumbent on

scholars to re-visit these ideas. In an effort to further investigate, stimulate new discus-

sions and improve our understanding of HGT we must revisit issues identified by Sam

Mullins, who in 2007 highlighted theoretical challenges in defining this term. It also

addresses more recent assertions from individuals such as Thomas Hegghammer that the

term is “fuzzy” at best. 1

This article offers some preliminary thoughts on this challenge and suggests a theo-

retical reset, a reflection of how we have understood this phenomenon to date and how

we might improve or refine our knowledge today. It will do this from two general per-

spectives. The first targets HGT as “what it is,” how we understand it and its place more

broadly in the field of terrorism studies. The second focuses on how “we understand it”

and argues that a reset will enable a better analytic framework. It is important we avoid

stagnation and recognize that as terrorism evolves we must be open to shifting our focus

if it offers greater potential to capture and explain the phenomenon.

The first section investigates what we currently know about the term HGT. It exam-

ines the roots of the term, the rationale for its definition and conceptualization at that

time, and why it has become increasingly problematic. First, the majority of our

Received 6 April 2015; accepted 13 August 2015. Address correspondence to Michael Zekulin, Ph.D., Department of Political Science, Univer-

sity of Calgary, Social Sciences Tower Room 705, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada. E-mail: mzekulin@ucalgary.ca

46

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 39:46–66, 2015

Copyright � Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online

DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1084161

definitions overlap with our conceptions of domestic terrorism and can also include ele-

ments we associate with international terrorism as well. Recent events such as those taken

by Dylann Roof in Charleston, North Carolina and numbers recently released in a recent

Canadian Senate report remind us that domestic terrorism remains a reality that must be

clearly differentiated from HGT. 2 Second, the HGT phenomenon has increased signifi-

cantly suggesting it will remain a concern for the foreseeable future. We can also no lon-

ger deny that it is directly inspired by an Islamist ideology which has existed for a long

time and has been adopted by jihadist groups including Al Qaeda and Islamic State of

Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The West needs to accept that beneath the violence exists a larger

social movement that transcends these groups and will continue long after they have been

defeated. There will likely be others who assume the mantle moving forward suggesting

that this phenomenon is a generational one. Ensuring our definitions and conceptualiza-

tions are accurate allows us to meet the challenges it poses. The section closes by suggest-

ing that a more appropriate way to define and conceptualize HGT is to re-brand it

Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism (IIHGT).

In the second section, the article refines and operationalizes the phenomenon of

IIHGT. It briefly investigates how we have thus far studied HGT and argues that these

efforts, which focused on degrees of belonging/autonomy or on the geographical location

of an individual’s radicalization, are no longer adequate. IIHGT has evolved and it no lon-

ger simply describes radicalized Westerners attacking their own states but now manifests

itself in many different ways. To this end, the article introduces the concept of

“endgames,” arguing we can improve our efforts to analyze IIHGT by investigating what

action the radicalized individual takes pursuant to their newfound ideology. This

approach separates ideas of cognitive radicalization (the thought component) from behav-

ioral radicalization (the action component) while simultaneously integrating these com-

ponents in a novel way helping create a fuller picture of the phenomenon. In addition,

dividing homegrown terrorism into categories will more accurately capture the nuances

refining our knowledge and creating the conditions for a more manageable analysis. This

article hypothesizes that there are multiple possible “endgames” that might arise from an

individual’s radicalization. Investigating this observation offers a new approach to better

understand IIHGT and should apply to radicalization studies as well.

The third section ties together the previous two sections and introduces a new

approach based on the refined conceptualization from the first section and the discussion

from section two. IIHGT should no longer be viewed as a monolithic phenomenon but an

umbrella under which several different variants might exist. It will introduce this typol-

ogy and identify these categories as “support or facilitative” IIHGT, “foreign fighter”

IIHGT, and “domestic” IIHGT. This represents a stark departure from current methodo-

logical efforts. Our current efforts lump these categories together, skewing details or

observations which might emerge from compartmentalizing and studying them indepen-

dently. This section closes by addressing an issue which will no doubt emerge in the near

future: questions surrounding how we categorize or understand foreign fighters who

return home following involvement in conflicts abroad.

The fourth section introduces additional research applications that arise from this

new conceptualization of IIHGT. It argues that insights may emerge that we can apply to

better understand radicalization and the radicalization process. It asks whether these dif-

ferent types of IIHGT represent different degrees of radicalization. The shortcomings that

arise from our current efforts to understand radicalization is that they neglect to investi-

gate the outcome of that radicalization. Too much emphasis has been placed on cognitive

radicalization (the thought component) which downplays or neglects to account for the

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 47

behavioral radicalization (the action component). It might also allow us to investigate

whether there is any link between the different types and whether progression or regres-

sion can occur.

Defining Homegrown Terrorism

Crone and Harrow are generally credited with identifying the academic origins of the

term “homegrown” following the 2005 7/7 attack in London. This early definition contin-

ues to serve as the basis for many of our definitions today and focuses on two points. First,

it involves individuals plotting or perpetrating attacks who were born and raised in the

West or have a strong attachment to the West. Second, these individuals (or groups) are

acting on their own behalf and not taking orders from a group abroad. 3 These core ideas

are also found in more recent definitions. For example, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and

Laura Grossman describe “home-grown” individuals as those who “either spent a signifi-

cant portion of their formative years in the West, or their radicalization bears a significant

connection to the West.” 4 For Tomas Precht, homegrown terrorism is defined as “acts of

violence against targets primarily, but not always, in Western countries in which the terro-

rists themselves have been born or raised.” 5 From an American perspective, Jerome Bje-

lopera argues that “homegrown is a term that describes terrorist activity or plots

perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent res-

idents or visitors largely radicalized within the United States.” 6 Echoing Bjelopera, Peter

Nesser studies homegrown terrorism perpetrated by individuals “born and raised in

Europe.” 7

Governments and their agencies have also wrestled with how to best understand

homegrown terrorism. Over the past several years, the European Union has evolved its

understanding of this phenomenon. Examining annual terrorist reports indicates a shift in

their conceptualization. In 2009, reports focused on the general threat posed by Islamist

terrorism, which it defines as “terrorism perpetrated by individuals, groups, networks or

organizations which evoke a certain interpretation of Islam to justify their action.” 8 By

2011, reports identified a growing distinction between international Islamist terrorism

and terrorist groups, and “something else,” suggesting that the threat was “increasingly

likely to originate from self radicalized individuals who may not necessarily be linked to

al-Qaida senior leadership.” 9 In 2013, the annual report mentions the term “homegrown

terrorist groups” for the first time, but does not elaborate or provide a clear definition. 10

In Canada, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) uses the term

homegrown extremism, defined as “the indoctrination and radicalization of individuals

into the ideology espoused and propagated by al-Qaida.” 11

CSIS further acknowledges

that one of the main catalysts is “the adoption of significant grievances against Western

governments, their societies and way of life, as well as the conviction that the Muslim

world is under attack and needs defending through the use of violence.” 12

This is not a

definition of homegrown terrorism per se; it focuses less on actual outcomes and instead

places the emphasis on indoctrination by Al Qaeda. Similarly, Australia has yet to provide

a definition for homegrown terrorism, instead relying on its current definition of terrorism

and adding that it recognizes “a number of Australians are known to subscribe to violent

jihadist messages, and some are radicalized to a point of being willing to engage in vio-

lence to advance their political aims.” 13

The similarities found among these definitions concern individuals born and raised,

or who have been in Western states for an extended period of time and who are not acting

48 M. Zekulin

on behalf of a foreign group abroad. The focus also increasingly emphasizes the location

where these individuals were radicalized or adopted this Islamist ideology.

It is, however, important to acknowledge that as far back as 2007, Sam Mullins was

questioning the basis on which the majority of our current definitions would come to be

based. For him, homegrown Islamist terrorism as a term “seem[ed] to be largely taken for

granted as being self-evident without being specifically defined,” with usage focused on

“where perpetrators are from and whether they receive international organisational

support.” 14

His definition at that time focused on those who: were born and/or spent most

of their lives in the West; were radicalized within their Western home countries; have

trained and achieved attack-capability in their Western home countries; have planned/car-

ried out attacks in their Western home countries; and are lacking direct foreign (non-

Western) international support or control. 15

This was a fairly accurate representation for

that time period, considering the types of attacks and disrupted plots from this time such

as Madrid 2004, London 2005, and disrupted plots in Sydney and Melbourne 2005 and

Toronto 2006.

However, homegrown terrorism has changed and taken on additional observable

actions or endgames. To adapt Mullins’s original definition, one might say: individuals

born and raised or who have spent most of their lives in the West, radicalized in the West

(Mullins’s original contribution) but who now in addition to conducting attacks in their

states may go abroad to fight in jihadist hotspots or may also be acting in nonviolent sup-

port capacities in their Western home countries. Based on our current legal definitions,

providing material support to terrorism is akin to violent terrorist acts.

This article takes Mullins’s closing remarks to heart, which emphasizes that it may

not be prudent to think of this as a homogenous phenomenon, but instead a continuum

encompassing a whole spectrum of realities.

Islamist terrorism is a diverse and dynamic phenomenon. Researchers must

remain sensitive to change and development but also continuity in order to be

able to accurately capture and understand the progression of its various

manifestations. 16

Recently, homegrown terrorism has no longer been limited to individuals radicalized in

the West and plotting or attacking their own states. Instead, these radicalized individuals

are increasingly pursuing other courses of action. Some still choose to pursue plots or

attacks against their home state. However, others provide support, post materials and pro-

paganda, and travel abroad to jihadist hotspots to pursue terrorism against foreign targets

and join jihadist groups like ISIS. Accepting this reality creates a potential problem in

how we understand, define, and conceptualize homegrown terrorism.

As currently defined, homegrown terrorism straddles a fine line between our concep-

tions of domestic terrorism and international terrorism and in some cases, simultaneously

demonstrates characteristics of both depending on those aspects one chooses to empha-

size. We must not forget that until mid-2005 the United States reserved the term home-

grown terrorism for domestic organizations including antigovernment militias, White

supremacists, and eco-terrorists. The United States did this purposefully to distinguish

them from jihadist terrorist networks because the jihadist cause was always perceived to

be foreign. 17

Today, the term homegrown is more regularly being applied to individuals

inspired by the global jihadist narrative, but the term does not indicate that many individ-

uals radicalized in the West travel abroad for the action component. This prevents us

from constructing a stand-alone definition for homegrown terrorism based on Islamist

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 49

motivations. Homegrown is simply understood as radicalization of individuals in the

West but can also refer to what we understand as domestic terrorism. In a recent report

Jerome Bjelopera defined domestic terrorists in the United States as “people who commit

crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from US based extremist ideologies and

movements.” 18

This follows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s definition of

domestic terrorism: “Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based extremist

ideologies.” 19

Wilkinson suggests that domestic—or what he termed “internal”—terror-

ism was characterized as terrorist attacks occurring within one state or province, and that

this description was used to specifically differentiate it from international terrorism

because it had a domestic agenda, not an international one. 20

Conversely, terrorism is

considered to be international when: more than one country is involved in the attack,

including if the nationality of the perpetrator is different from the nationality of the vic-

tims; an attack is also international if the terrorists are outside their national boundaries,

or if terrorists of different nationalities act together. 21

The type of “homegrown” terrorism that has preoccupied Western states more

recently muddies this distinction. The plots and attacks against Western states are being

perpetrated by citizens or long-standing residents of those very same countries, but the

motivation for these attacks is international. The current wave of so-called homegrown

terrorism and radicalization is being driven by the global jihadist narrative and its motiva-

tions stem from an international Islamist ideology attributed generally to Al Qaeda’s

motivations and grievances articulated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 22

and continued

today by groups including AQAP and ISIS. Therefore this type of “homegrown” incident

implies that individuals of a country are carrying out attacks in that country with an inter-

national agenda. However, investigation also uncovers other examples that are designated

as “homegrown” terrorism, where individuals have been crossing borders, or assisting

foreign groups across borders.

When compared with current definitions, this description does not fit. This is because

the language involved in defining homegrown terrorism outlined in legislation such as

The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act 2007 also applies

to domestic terrorists:

the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a large group

or individual born, raised, or operating primarily within the United States . . . to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population

of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or

social objectives. 23

In essence, there is little offered here that allows a clear distinction to be made between

domestic terrorists, acting on behalf of a domestic ideology, and “domestic” individuals

acting on behalf of an international motivation such as the global jihadist narrative. Rick

Nelson and Ben Bodurian in their report examining homegrown extremism go another

step backward with their definition: “extremist violence perpetrated by US legal residents

and citizens,” 24 which seems to be the very definition of domestic terrorism.

Now compare these to the definition of a homegrown violent extremist offered by the

Department of Homeland Security:

a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the

United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to

engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing

50 M. Zekulin

support for terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted

by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by

a foreign terrorist organization. 25

This definition addresses some earlier concerns but downplays the truly unique aspect of

this current “homegrown” terrorism. Individuals are more often than not born and raised,

or have lived extensively, in the country that they attack. The citizenship aspect is an

important component of the phenomenon and the term “operated primarily” fails to

clearly identify and separate an individual’s radicalization from their planning, or from

the actual execution of an attack. This places it at odds with many definitions in the litera-

ture which offer as their primary feature the fact that the radicalization occurred in the

Western state in question. One advantage however is that the Department of Homeland

Security’s definition does highlight that the motivation is based on objectives promoted

by a foreign group.

The fact that none of these definitions clearly capture this phenomenon coupled with

the presence of multiple definitions creates confusion and ambiguity. Consider the fol-

lowing: In August 2010, Misbahuddin Ahmed, Hiva Alizadeh, and Khurram Sher, were

arrested and accused of planning a terrorist attack in Canada. During a search of an

Ottawa residence, police seized more than 50 electronic circuit boards that were to be

used to develop remote detonators as well as terrorist literature, videos and manuals and

plans, materials, and a list of potential targets. 26 The target list is alleged to have included

the Parliament buildings and Montreal subway system. Authorities were fairly certain

that Alizadeh was in contact with someone in Afghanistan but could not confirm whether

this contact was anything more than superficial (not directly tied to a specific terrorist

group). This included suspicions that the group was also attempting to provide support to

Afghani groups and assist their efforts to attack troops and targets overseas as well. 27

Based on this account the group meets the definition of homegrown but appears to have

simultaneously had both domestic intentions and international aspirations as well, making

it possible to categorize it as international terrorism. Similar incidents also add to the

confusion. 28

To alleviate this ambiguity, this article suggests re-branding homegrown terrorism by

adding “Islamist-inspired” thus creating the concept of IIHGT. Recognizing that the primary

driver behind this type of terrorism is the global jihadist narrative allows us to clearly differ-

entiate between homegrown extremists who are born and raised and act based on a domestic

motivation and those who are homegrown, used in the context of individuals born and raised

or long-time residents who act motivated by an international ideology. An investigation of

Islamist-inspired terrorist plots or attacks has yet to identify incidents where individuals tar-

geting Western governments were doing so in an effort to affect any significant domestic

changes or concessions. 29

This provides a solid first step clarifying what this phenomenon

represents. It conveys the homegrown aspect—individuals born and raised or longstanding

residents—but further communicates that the motivation is an Islamist-inspired one, not a

domestic one, nor one limited to any one specific Western state. It is therefore possible to

keep definitions of domestic terrorism and international terrorism narrow (as narrow as the

field itself can succeed), intact and compartmentalized by introducing this IIHGT category,

which allows us to account for the unique characteristics this terrorism demonstrates.

Moreover, as the phenomenon of IIHGT has evolved, the manner by which we ana-

lyze it must change as well. The next section addresses this point in greater detail and

argues that examining IIHGT by endgame offers some potentially interesting

opportunities.

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 51

Challenges Studying Homegrown Terrorism

Clarifying the definitional issue highlights a second challenge. We have not kept pace

with how the phenomenon has evolved and the developments that have occurred, specifi-

cally the fact that we now observe multiple endgames or actions radicalized individuals

might pursue. Our current approaches to studying IIHGT are narrow in that they empha-

size the location where the individuals involved were radicalized, and to a lesser degree

measures of “belonging” or “autonomy.” 30

Considering that the majority of definitions

center on the fact that IIHGT is perpetrated by individuals born and raised in the West or,

individuals who have spent considerable time or their formative years in the West, schol-

ars have focused their efforts on measuring this aspect. Crone and Harrow were among

the first to emphasize ideas of “belonging,” the degree to which an individual belongs or

is integrated into their society, and “autonomy,” the degree of connection an individual

might have to an actual foreign group. Based on these two criteria, a matrix could be cre-

ated and it would be possible to categorize individuals or groups as being closer to the

definition of homegrown terrorism. 31

As time has passed and IIHGT has continued to evolve, new methods must be inves-

tigated because ideas of belonging and autonomy are subjective and very difficult to mea-

sure, ensuring difficulties categorizing groups, individuals, or incidents based on these

criteria. What exactly is meant by the term “belonging?” Nira Yuval-Davis discusses

three separate levels on which belonging is constructed; the social location, the individu-

al’s identification and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings, and

the ethical and political value systems with which people judge their own and others’

belonging. 32 Which of these would be the most appropriate to use as the basis for measur-

ing belonging in the context of IIHGT? “Belonging” might also be different from state to

state, thus making larger comparisons and categorizations difficult. Bloemraad points out

that belonging has very different meanings in different states based on a state’s policies.

One perspective will exist in a multicultural state, where group rights are protected and

multiple identities are encouraged which might impede or impact belonging. A second

perspective will exist in a state that pursues a more assimilationist policy, one where indi-

vidual rights are important and one common identity is encouraged. 33

A further challenge in emphasizing belonging is whether we are referring to individu-

als who once belonged and then disassociated themselves from a society, or those who

never felt any sense of belonging to begin with. Richard Parent and James Ellis in a report

on radicalization suggest: “Homegrown terrorism covers both classic domestic terrorists

and a more nebulous set of individuals that are newly arrived, or from the first, second, or

even third generation of immigrants within a diaspora community.” 34

Again, if one

focuses on the “newly arrived” aspect, a term used broadly and poorly explained, this

might be more in line with radicalization having primarily occurred elsewhere, aligning it

with our understandings of international terrorism. By suggesting that IIGHT has been

attributed to individuals more recently arrived in Canada as well as second and third gen-

eration individuals they highlight a methodological challenge surrounding whether, or

how well, these groups were integrated to begin with. Supposedly, at one point they were

integrated but they “have become disenchanted with [Canadian] society” 35

Belonging

becomes subjective in terms of how long one must have lived in a state before they can

be said to identify and be a part of that society. This would be opposed to the idea that

there are those who immigrate to states but continue to retain strong linkages to family in

their countries of origin that “they still perceive their host country [Canada] as foreign.” 36

Michael Taarnby also recognized the challenges in categorizing different groups in a

52 M. Zekulin

society that might be susceptible to radicalization. He suggested that those who had

newly arrived in the West, those who were second-generation immigrants, and those who

converted to Islam would essentially all display different degrees of belonging or

attachment. 37

The idea of citizenship also appears quite prominently in definitions of IIHGT. Defi-

nitions of citizenship are generally understood as helping us understand the extent people

incorporate into a society. 38 Michael Genkin and Alexander Gutfraind suggest that IIHGT

represents terrorist acts which are committed by “groups whose membership is composed

entirely or predominantly of the native-born citizens of the country that is being

attacked.” 39

The most pressing problem with this approach is that again, absent clarifica-

tion, this is also representative of domestic terrorism. Second, like belonging, citizenship

can be viewed differently. In liberal theories of citizenship it is viewed as the reciprocal

relationship of rights and responsibilities between individuals and the state, or the social

contract. Conversely, republican theories of citizenship believe the political community

mediates between the individual citizen and the state, and loyalty to that political commu-

nity, the nation, and its preservation and promotion are the primary duties of the citizen. 40

Rogers Brubaker argues for a distinction between citizenship in a nation-state and

belonging to the nation-state. He argues that one can have formal state membership but

this can be different from the substantive membership or citizen status—access to, enjoy-

ment of the substantive rights of citizenship or about their substantive acceptance as full

members of a “society,” 41

being a member of the nation before a member of the state

(assimilation). This poses the question whether social integration is more important than

political or civic integration and how this might apply to our discussions here.

Belonging from an abstract perspective potentially creates problems. This, however,

does not preclude us from taking a different approach to incorporate belonging into an

analysis of IIHGT. Insofar as different “endgames” may also represent a greater commit-

ment to the ideology itself, belonging, or lack thereof, may help us understand why some

individuals choose one endgame over another. This will be examined further below and

examines how individuals see themselves compared to other members of their society: a

new twist on the “us versus them” dichotomy.

While belonging may still have something to contribute to this discussion, the same

cannot be said for autonomy. Autonomy according to Crone and Harrow was about

degrees of independence or connectedness of those perpetrating IIHGT and links to for-

eign terrorist groups abroad. 42

This creates measurement problems, which would also

require an in-depth analysis and discussion. What does connectedness imply? Is it corre-

sponding or communicating with a foreign group? To what extent: Is one time sufficient

or does it require multiple discussions? Over how long a time period would this corre-

spondence need to occur? Do specific topics need to be covered during these discussions?

Perhaps it refers specifically to individuals leaving a Western state and traveling to train-

ing camps abroad. This has been a point of contention as early as the first waves of what

would today be understood as IIHGT. Analysis of the 2004 Madrid attack, the 2005 Lon-

don 7/7 attack and disrupted plots in Sydney and Toronto reveals that there are conflicting

accounts and conclusions regarding whether individuals responsible for those incidents

were instructed, trained or provided with support from foreign groups, and to what

degree. 43

In fact, studies done on these earlier incidents have concluded that very rarely

did we see individuals who had been recruited, trained abroad and sent home specifically

to carry out an attack. 44

Lorenzo Vidino suggested that it was possible to observe links to

foreign groups based on whether members had any form of training. Analyzing case stud-

ies from this perspective revealed that groups existed along a continuum or spectrum: in

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 53

some cases, groups had obvious links and connections and in other cases it is clear that

groups were completely autonomous. However, twelve of twenty-one groups analyzed by

Vidino could not be placed in either category. 45

This measurement has become increasingly complicated as the War on Terror has

dramatically affected terrorist groups’ abilities to operate training camps and the likeli-

hood individuals from Western states can attend these camps and return home unde-

tected. 46

This sentiment has been echoed among jihadists who organize these training

camps. They refer to “reduced opportunities,” and the increased challenges and dangers

as the War on Terror began and the United States and its allies actively began locating

and destroying/disrupting these camps, 47

which previously operated unabated. Abu

Masab al-Suri has stated “it is no longer possible for countries to open safe havens or

camps for the Islamists and the jihadis.” The result has been smaller camps in more

remote places. 48

Whereas trips to terrorist camps seemingly lasted weeks if not months and multiple

techniques were taught, in more recent times, it is increasingly difficult to say with any

certainty what the quality or duration of these camps might be. Because of the strategy to

disrupt these camps individuals attending them might actually receive a rudimentary and

brief camp where they are unable to apply trial and error and might be forced to leave

abruptly if the camp is detected. Increased use of drones for surveillance (and their ability

to attack) has severely disrupted terrorist groups’ ability to openly train operatives over

an extended period of time. Whereas at one point practical training on bomb making

would be one month plus the potential for an additional graduate course, in many instan-

ces it has been reduced to as little as five days. 49

We must also think about how we will measure autonomy in the long run when Western

individuals fighting in conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq start returning home. Our earlier

discussion identified there are varying degrees of autonomy, from directly trained and

ordered, to trained and acting independently, to suggestive advice and financing. It becomes

increasingly problematic to view these returning individuals as purely autonomous in any

sense of the word because they would have been trained, directly or indirectly simply by

observation, coupled with their hands-on experience. The fact that they are immersed in that

environment subjects them to further radicalization, even if inadvertently, by those around

them. Should individuals return home and conduct terrorist attacks it will be nearly impossi-

ble to determine their degree of autonomy, whether they are acting on their own volition or

whether they were dispatched with “suggestions” or actual plots or plans. A suggestion on

how we might start to categorize these individuals will be introduced in the third section.

Instead of simply looking at where an individual was radicalized or relying on subjec-

tive efforts to determine degrees of belonging to the country where they are located, or

degrees of autonomy from foreign groups, a better approach would be to focus on the end-

game: what an individual who is radicalized in the West does with this newfound ideology.

This approach allows for the possibility that several different types of IIHGT can be identi-

fied. Refining the definition and creating separate subtypes of IIHGT based on endgame

may result in a much clearer and concise understanding of what it is, and has the potential

to provide newer and more robust approaches to analyzing and understanding it because it

will take into account not only the thought component but the transition to action as well.

Different Subtypes of IIHGT

In this context, “endgame” refers to the course of action or behavioral radicalization an

individual pursues once they have been radicalized and adopted aspects of the global

54 M. Zekulin

jihadist narrative. From here, three different types of IIHGT can be identified: “logistical/

support” IIHGT, “foreign fighter” IIGHT, and “domestic” IIHGT. These categories repre-

sent ideal types and they must also be viewed as a snapshot of the IIHGT phenomenon at

this current point in time. It is therefore entirely possible that these distinctions may

change, whereby some become obsolete and others may need to be created as it evolves

moving forward.

One additional thought emerges based on categorizing IIHGT in this manner. In

addition to creating categories that will provide some clarity on this ever-evolving phe-

nomenon, it potentially offers a new approach to understanding and studying issues

related to radicalization. Each one of these types of IIHGT arguably represents an escala-

tion in one’s dedication or commitment to the global jihadist narrative. Returning to ear-

lier work in terrorism studies such as Moghahham’s staircase model and more general

ideas about demonization and its role in facilitating moral disengagement, these discus-

sions fit within these parameters and perhaps offer some new insight into the link between

radicalization and IIHGT.

“Support” or “Logistical” IIHGT

This iteration applies to individuals in Western states who are radicalized and become

involved in a supportive role. The supportive role may take many forms but the key is

that it represents a nonviolent manifestation of their radicalization. For example, some

activities that would fit in this category include individuals who post or upload material

to the Internet, engage in discussions in online forums, serve a more traditional recruiting

role, and who raise or solicit resources to further the cause. This type of IIHGT has

become a greater concern of late as studies tracing jihadists’ use of social media have

revealed the existence of large numbers of what have been termed “disseminators.” These

are individuals, often located in the West, who collect large amounts of data, posts, photos

and tweets and flood social media. These individuals for the most part do not champion

any one group but actively seek to sow the seeds of distrust and confrontation between

the West and Islam in furtherance of the larger Islamist agenda. 50

These types of support

would be akin to “providing material support,” which has also been identified by other

authors as “actions unrelated to specific violent plots.” 51

One of the challenges in identi-

fying these individuals is that they are able to work and connect with others anonymously

and they often use methods to disguise their IP addresses or operate multiple sites and

accounts simultaneously.

Some examples illustrating this type of IIHGT include Canadians Said Namouth,

arrested in 2007 and Tahawwur Rana, arrested in 2009. Born in Morocco, but a perma-

nent Canadian resident since 2002, Namouth was accused of being involved with the

Global Islamic Media Front, a group linked to Al Qaeda. Namouth was responsible for

uploading and maintaining propaganda videos, and literature as well tools for recruit-

ment. 52

Rana arrived in Canada from Pakistan in 1997 and received Canadian citizenship

in 2001. He later moved to the United States but retained a residence in Ottawa. He was

arrested alongside U.S. citizen David Headley, also known as Daood Gialni, a childhood

acquaintance from Pakistan, and accused of providing material support to the Pakistani

terrorist group Lashkar-e-taiba. In 2013, Rana was found guilty of contributing resources

toward a plot to bomb Jyllands-Postens in Denmark in retaliation for their publishing car-

toons of the Prophet Muhammad and sentenced to 14 years in prison. 53

More recently

Canada has identified Othman Ayed Hamden. Located in Northern British Columbia, it is

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 55

alleged he was connecting with and counseling individuals to commit terrorist acts. 54 It is

still unknown the locations of those with whom he was speaking.

In 2004 Australian officials arrested Belal Khazaal. A dual Lebanese-Australian,

Khazaal obtained Australian citizenship in 1986. He was charged with inciting others to

commit jihad and publishing and posting a “do-it-yourself” terrorist manual. He had pre-

viously been convicted in 2003 by a court in Beirut in absentia for his role in helping

fund a bombing campaign in Lebanon. 55

Some prominent cases from the United States include Wesam El-Hanafi and Sabiran

Hasanoff’s efforts to provide material support to Al Qaeda in Yemen. Between 2007 and

their arrest in 2010 they provided “financial support, equipment and technical support

(computer related) to the group.” 56 Barry Bujol’s efforts to support AQAP led to his arrest

in 2010 and he was charged with transferring money and other objects such as pre-paid

phone cards. 57

In 2011 Hafiz, Izhar, and Irfan Khan were arrested and accused of provid-

ing support to the Pakistani Taliban. 58

Finally, Syaed Talha Ahsan from Britain was

arrested in 2006, and charged with operating Azzam Publications, a series of websites

that provided extensive material support to a variety of terrorist groups. He was extradited

to the United States in 2011 and recently sent back to the United Kingdom in 2014. 59

“Foreign Fighting” IIHGT

The number of individuals born and raised in Western democratic states who have chosen

to travel abroad and join foreign jihadist conflicts has been increasing at an alarming rate.

While this is not a new phenomenon (previous destinations included individuals traveling

to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab), the current trend is travel to Syria and Iraq. There

has been an increase in individuals from Western states now joining groups such as the

Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL]) and

Jabhat al-Nusra. In Canada, intelligence agencies estimate around 130 individuals 60

have

left to fight abroad. The United States offers no concrete numbers but concedes that

“dozens of their citizens” are fighting in places like Syria. 61

European countries are not

immune. Britain estimates 500 individuals have joined the ranks of ISIS, 62 and in a recent

interview, Peter Neumann suggests that this number is generally applicable to other Euro-

pean countries as well. His estimates suggest as many as 700 individuals from France,

400 individuals from Germany, 300 from Belgium, and approximately 50–100 individu-

als from each of the Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. 63

We are uncertain how up-to-date or accurate these estimates might be and that they may

in fact be lower than actual figures.

This category of individuals would represent a second type of IIHGT where individu-

als are radicalized in their home state and then choose to travel abroad to fight in foreign

jihadist-motivated conflicts. One point that might require further investigation is whether

additional subtypes might exist within this type of IIHGT. This would hinge on whether

individuals have traveled with the clear intention of committing terrorism or targeting

civilians purposefully and those who join groups that could conceivably be deemed as

insurgent groups. For example, there are dozens of armed groups operating in the Syrian

theater and in the early months of the conflict many groups such as the Free Syrian Army

were directly fighting and targeting Assad’s forces and supporters. Some such as Richard

Barrett have identified these groups as “rebel groups” which are notably different from

“extremist groups” including ISIS, who are less discriminating in their targets and whose

motivation transcends the boundaries of Syria and the future of that state or govern-

ment. 64

It is however also possible that this divide, especially more recently, is redundant

56 M. Zekulin

as the extremist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have come to dominate the land-

scape which would result in one conceptualization of this type of IIHGT. 65

In addition to those who travel to join extremist groups fighting abroad, there are also

numerous individuals who travel to directly participate in terror activities. In 2007, the

international media reported that five Australians had been detained in Lebanon and

accused of funneling weapons and plotting terrorist attacks. Two men, Omar El Hadba

and Irahim Sabouh were charged. 66 A third man Bassem al-Sayyed, a duel Lebanese-Aus-

tralian citizen, was acquitted of those charges but died several months later in a gun battle

with the Lebanese military. 67

Canadians Xristos Katsiroubas and Ali Medlej traveled to Algeria and in January

2013, were part of the Al-Mulathameen brigade, also known as “Those Who Sign with

Blood,” which attacked the Tigantouine Gas Plant in Amenas, Algeria. This group, an

offshoot of AQAP was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. There is every indication that these

two Canadians were fully a part of the militant group responsible for launching the terror-

ist attack. 68

Finally, the Somali community in Minnesota has seen an estimated twenty-

three young men travel to Somalia and join al-Shabaab. There are some reports that

Americans might have been involved in the 2013 Westgate Mall terrorist attack in

Nairobi. 69

One further point regarding foreign fighters needs to be investigated. When

examining foreign fighters, should we be making a distinction between Western indi-

viduals who might be former nationals of countries where conflict zones have

emerged? What if any role does cultural or familial or ancestral ties impact their

decision to become involved in a conflict? From this perspective, why would an

individual like Canadian Mohamed Ali Dirie, a Somali-Canadian convicted in 2009

as part of the disrupted Toronto 18 plot, travel to Syria in 2011 upon his release

from prison? Why would this individual not be more inclined to travel to Somalia

and join al-Shabaab? 70

Domestic Homegrown IIHGT

This final type of IIHGT would apply to individuals who have been radicalized in a West-

ern state and then choose to conduct a terrorist attack against their state. In the mid 2000s

there were several large-scale attacks and plots including the 2004 Madrid train attack,

the 2005 7/7 attack in London, the 2005 plots disrupted in Sydney and Melbourne, the

2006 plot disrupted in Toronto, and the 2009 plot, again disrupted by Australian agencies,

where five men plotted to attack the Holsworthy military base in Sydney. These individu-

als tried reaching out to al-Shabaab seeking religious sanction or fatwa for their attack. 71

Again, the defining characteristics of these attacks and plots were those involved were

born and raised or had lived extensively in the states they attacked.

More recent incidents include the October 2014 attacks in Canada conducted by Mar-

tin Couture-Rouleau and Michel Zehaf-Bibeau. Rouleau used his car to run down two

members of the Canadian Armed Forces, killing one. 72 Two days later in a separate attack

Bibeau shot an unarmed soldier at the Ottawa War Monument and then proceeded to try

and storm Canada’s Parliament building located nearby. 73

These more recent incidents

might also be an indicator of the potential for an increase in domestic IIHGT. As Western

engagement with ISIS began in the summer of 2014, ISIS began releasing videos encour-

aging those loyal to the group to start conducting attacks against Western targets includ-

ing the United States, Canada, and Europe. 74

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 57

Additional Thoughts

One methodological advantage of this approach would be its ability to provide an intro-

ductory framework to better refine our data. Our current efforts searching for commonali-

ties or trends among IIHGT incidents focus on a more abstract approach to data analysis

and case study investigation. It lumps them all together. Taking this same data and filter-

ing it through the different categories suggested in this article might refine our under-

standing to some degree. Perhaps examining cases of those who pursue support/logistical

IIHGT in isolation might reveal additional observations and offer additional research

questions or direction. Should analysis reveal that they tend to be older or wealthier or

practice certain types of employment, we might deduce that these factors influence their

decision to undertake this endgame as opposed to other types which obviously carry a

greater risk of injury, death, or even detention. Perhaps examining those who travel

abroad will also reveal some interesting observations which were lost among their inclu-

sion with other endgames. It might be revealed that these individuals are more likely to

have been converts to Islam, have a criminal past or were un- or underemployed, influ-

enced by their own ennui and dissatisfaction with their life’s direction. These represent

some examples which this type of categorization might tease out. “Lumping” together all

incidents of IIHGT, and all radicalized individuals regardless of their course of action,

has yet to identify any discernible trends or profile. This newer approach should help us

understand why radicalized individuals choose the course of action they do and help us

extrapolate from these indicators what type of action an individual who is radicalized is

more likely pursue. For example, if it were revealed that the majority of those categorized

in a support or logistical IIHGT category make for money than those who are in other cat-

egories, are increasingly married or have children, or are on average are older, it might

indicate that these impact an individual’s decision to take on a passive or nonviolent role.

It would allow us to expand our investigation in an effort to how or why these factors

might influence or limit their actions.

There is one final issue regarding the different typologies identified above: how to

categorize those involved in foreign fighter IIHGT who eventually return home. While

we recognize that many of the foreign fighters will be killed or have little intention to

return home the question remains: how would we characterize these individuals espe-

cially if they plot attacks? Would these individuals fit into the category of domestic

IIHGT, or if they chose to simply recruit or raise money are they re-slotted into support/

logistical IIHGT? The characterization of domestic IIHGT outlined above represents indi-

viduals who are radicalized in their home state and then plot or attack that state, with a

key point the fact that they never left that state at any time in connection to their attack.

Although it has not yet proven to be a significant problem to date, we are beginning to see

incidents suggesting it may become a possibility. The two most prominent examples

include the individual who attacked the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014 and a

shootout between police and returning foreign fighters in the Belgian town of Verviers in

January 2015. 75

Early estimates from Europe suggest that between 2012 and 2014 some-

where between 1,500–2,500 Sunni extremists left Europe and traveled to Syria. Estimates

today are that 300–400 have left Syria and returned to Europe. 76

Clearly, not everyone who returns from Syria and Iraq would necessarily represent a

threat. Some who have traveled abroad might actually choose to leave and return home

based on the realization that they made a mistake. Hypothetically however, the very con-

cept of re-branding homegrown terrorism and applying the Islamist-inspired moniker is

designed to recognize that it is motivated by a larger ideology and one that transcends

58 M. Zekulin

any one group. Those traveling from Western countries to Syria and Iraq are predomi-

nantly doing so of their own volition. They are not necessarily in contact with leadership

or recruiters from specific groups who assist them or facilitate their travel and assimila-

tion. While some have the advantage of guidance from those connected to these groups,

increasingly the stories involve Western individuals who become radicalized traveling to

Turkey and then attempting to identify or make contact with someone who can help them

across the border and provide them access to the group. 77

From this perspective the obvi-

ous prescription would be to argue that once an individual has joined a group, they are no

longer simply inspired by the ideology but become inspired and motivated by a group

itself. In part they serve an apprenticeship surrounded by members of that group and are

more likely to identify and adopt the specific nuances of that group, its goals and agenda

in essence becoming a representative or agent of that group. Based on this logic, such an

individual returning to their home country would arguably remain an agent of that group

and any action they take upon their return would be on behalf of that group in pursuit of

its specific goals and agenda. Any action, be it supportive such as recruiting or raising

money, would most likely be directed or funneled to the group that they are familiar with

and have established connections. The commission of an attack or assistance to others to

this end would more readily fit into our conceptualization of international terrorism. The

individual, directly (by order) or indirectly (as a member of that group), is acting as a

member of an international terrorist group and should be categorized as such.

Future Research Applications

Identifying different variants of IIHGT based on endgame provides the methodological

advantage of differentiating what radicalized individuals do with their newfound ideol-

ogy. Instead of viewing them through one lens, dividing radicalized individuals along the

lines suggested above may help reveal traits or commonalities among the specific types

that are not observed when they are lumped all together. There is another potential avenue

of inquiry which arises from categorizing IIHGT based on endgames worth investigating

further. If we look at these varying endgames from the perspective of well established

ideas in the terrorism literature such as demonization and the “us versus them” dichot-

omy, there is growing evidence that suggests this more robust analysis will be useful.

Examining the different endgames seemingly reveals different degrees of violence, espe-

cially toward one’s own state and society. Might this suggest differing degrees of radicali-

zation or commitment?

The majority of our previous efforts to understand radicalization and deconstruct the

radicalization process focus on the cognitive or thought component. These include well-

known models by individuals such as Randy Borum, Fathali Moghaddam, Silber and

Bhatt, and Tomas Precht. 78

But the endpoint of each of these models, their final stages, is

simply the identification that action might occur. 79 There is no discussion or investigation

beyond that point. This leaves the “action” component completely untouched and under-

researched.

According to Peter Neumann there needs to be a holistic understanding of both cog-

nitive and behavioral processes, of how ideas and actions are related. 80 This article argues

that including and investigating the endgames or action component might add to these

earlier efforts and that it might contribute to this under-studied aspect and help us under-

stand radicalization and the radicalization process in greater depth. Examining this second

part of the equation, the action, and specifically what individuals do with the newfound

radical ideology will help inform us about how far their radical ideas may have gone. It

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 59

suggests looking at their actions through the lens of several well-founded concepts from

the terrorism literature such as demonization, moral disengagement, and the “us” versus

“them” dichotomy that could reveal different degrees of radicalization.

The terrorism literature identifies demonization as an outcome, the end result of

which assists in allowing terrorism to occur. Because terrorism represents one of the most

extreme forms of violence we witness, in part because its goal is to instil fear in a wider

audience than the immediate victims, it ensures more often than not targeting civilians,

whether intentionally or accidentally. The act of perpetrating violence is one thing, but

killing people, especially people who are average citizens, requires an intense hatred and

disregard for life. People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they

have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. 81

Thus, the level of violence we

generally associate with terrorism requires a detachment from the ethical and moral prin-

ciples most people have, namely, that one should not kill. According to Bandura it is

much easier for people to undertake “political violence,” in which political figures are

personally targeted. However, it is much more difficult to “cold-bloodedly slaughter inno-

cent women and children.” This will require a more powerful form of what he terms

“moral disengagement.” 82

To this end, the different types of IIHGT identified in this arti-

cle demonstrate different levels of violence. Intuitively this suggests a possibility that

there exists differing degrees of a willingness to commit violence, and that these different

types of IIHGT involve differing degrees of radicalization.

The literature accepts the notion that there is a process of radicalization whereby

individuals intensify their extreme positions. Moghaddam spoke of a staircase concept of

demonization where “feelings of discontent are a platform for stepping initially onto the

path to terrorism.” 83

Moghaddam’s premise fits into this discussion because it is possible

that each of these different types of IIHGT might represent a similar escalation or pro-

gression. An individual who is sympathetic to an ideology and acts passively by support-

ing or propagating is not yet sufficiently radicalized to contemplate killing others. The

individual who decides to travel abroad and pursue jihadist/foreign fighter IIHGT has

attained a level whereby they are capable of fighting and killing others but this may not

yet be sufficient to target, attack, and kill others that they might have or still partially

identify with such as those in their country of origin. The ability to completely dissociate

oneself from society and attack and kill one’s fellow citizens would represent the highest

degree of radicalization on this spectrum. One of the most fundamental questions sur-

rounding domestic IIHGT is how individuals who are born and raised, or who have lived

extensively in Western democratic states, are able to so quickly turn against their own

states and societies. 84

Part of the answer may rest in a re-formulation of the “us versus

them” dichotomy.

Demonization represents the most extreme variation of the ingroup/outgroup

dynamic. A simple explanation of the ingroup/outgroup dynamic suggests that people

tend to identify with those they deem most similar to themselves. Spillman and Spillman

identify how this syndrome of viewing “others” as an enemy may take hold, 85

and in this

framework it applies to the first two types of IIHGT. Discussions regarding domestic

IIHGT however are an interesting new twist on this dynamic. In a case where an individ-

ual who is born and raised in a Western society becomes radicalized and is capable of

turning on their own population, it presents a scenario whereby these individuals simulta-

neously represent elements of both “us” and “them.” Tying this back to radicalization,

something akin to Moghaddam’s staircase where each type of IIHGT represents a higher

degree of radicalization resulting in an equal increase in the degree of violence, another

step or level to encompass domestic IIHGT should be investigated.

60 M. Zekulin

Conclusion

This article offers a new framework for analyzing and understanding incidents of what it

has now termed IIHGT. This phenomenon has grown and evolved over the past several

years and shows little signs of abating in the near future. The term IIHGT clearly conveys

exactly what this type of terrorism represents and clearly distinguishes it from other cate-

gories of terrorism avoiding confusion that arises from the abstract use of “homegrown”

that currently can be applied to a myriad of different possible scenarios. It has also out-

lined a different approach for refining our understanding of IIHGT, categorizing it by end-

game, thus including the action component as a potential focal point. Current efforts and

models focused on cognitive radicalization or the thought component have only taken us

so far; this new approach offers an additional path worth investigating. What is being sug-

gested here simply adds another step—current models plus a more detailed analysis and

examination of the action taken. The result of these efforts provides a potentially new and

interesting way to study IIHGT and additionally influence our analysis of radicalization.

In addition to providing a new way to analyze our current data on IIHGT, this

approach sheds light on what, if any, relationships might exist between the various endg-

ames. Does a trajectory exist where individuals progress through these different types of

actions? Will the individual posting propaganda today become the foreign fighter tomor-

row? Do individuals prevented from traveling abroad immediately become an increased

risk to pursue domestic IIHGT? Perhaps no progression exists, and individuals catego-

rized in one type of IIHGT may never shift or progress to another type. More data needs

to be collected because currently there are few explanations which might indicate how or

why individuals might move from one type to another. Australians Khaled Sharrouf and

Mohamed Elomar, arrested and jailed in 2005 for their role plotting a domestic IIHGT

attack are reportedly fighting with ISIS in Syria and Iraq. 86 In this case it appears as if cer-

tain individuals simply pursue which ever endgame they are able to pursue at any given

time and it may not necessarily be a purposeful or conscious choice.

The core characteristic of this phenomenon remains the fact that those perpetrating or

pursuing this type of terrorism are radicalized in Western states. Understanding how and

why individuals choose their endgame, the result of their radicalization, might be tied to

differing degrees of radicalization or commitment to the global jihadist narrative and

efforts to filter data through this lens might offer some interesting insights we have yet to

uncover.

Notes

1. Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107 (1) (2013), p. 13.

2. In the report, the chief of the Surete du Quebec Division of Investigations on Extremist Threats suggests that only 25 percent of the files on his desk refer to Islamist Extremists the larger number focus on right-wing extremists. Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Countering the Terrorist Threat in Canada: An Interim Report” (Canadian Senate: Ottawa, July 2015).

3. Manni Crone and Martin Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23(4) (2011), p. 522.

4. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the US and UK: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process (Washington, DC: FDD Center for Terror- ism Research, 2009), p. 11. Also see Brian Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 61

Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 1.

5. Tomas Precht, Home-Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007), p. 15.

6. Jerome Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat (Washing- ton, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), pp. 1, 10.

7. Petter Nesser, “How Did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2) (2008).

8. Europol, “TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,” European Police Office (2011), p. 9. By way of comparison, the definition has slightly changed and by the 2013 report the TE-SAT is using religious inspired terrorism and not Islamic terrorism as the category. See Euro- pol, “TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,” European Police Office (2013), p. 49.

9. Ibid., p. 20. 10. Europol, 2013, “TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,” European

Police Office, p. 16. 11. CSIS, Public Report 2010–2011 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2012), p. 13. 12. Ibid. 13. Australia Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), 2012, “ASIO Annual Report to Par-

liament 2011–12,” p. 3. Also see Australian Government, 2010, “Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia,” Commonwealth of Australia, p. 8.

14. Sam Mullins, “Homegrown Terrorism: Issues and Implications,” Perspectives on Terror- ism 1(3) (2007). Available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/12/ html (accessed 8 October 2012).

15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Lorenzo Vidino, The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland, Real Instituto

Elcano (2009). Available at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng (accessed 14 February 2012).

18. Jerome Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress (2013). Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf (accessed 29 July 2013), p. 1.

19. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Domestic Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era (2009). Avail- able at http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/september/domterror_09070 (accessed 30 July 2013).

20. Paul Wilkinson, “The Strategic Implications of Terrorism,” in M. Sondhi, ed., Terrorism and Political Violence: A Sourcebook (Delhi, India: Har-anand, 2000).

21. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle, “Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009), pp. 31–49. Also see Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2002–2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2006) whose definition of international terrorism stipulates that “International terrorist acts occur outside the US, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accom- plished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpe- trators operate or seek asylum.”

22. Osama bin Laden referred to the invasion of Afghanistan as an extension of “the Crusades” and directed many post Afghanistan invasion statements toward both the American people (6 October 2002) and their allies (12 November 2002), outlining plans to avenge what he perceived as hostile actions by the Western world against Muslims. “Just as you kill, so you shall be killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be more to come.” In his statements, bin Laden named certain countries that he considered to be allied with the United States. These included Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany, and Australia. Taken from Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 135–136, 173, 174.

23. US Congress, H.R. 1955: The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Preven- tion Act 2007 (2007). Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1955rfs/pdf/BILLS- 110hr1955rfs.pdf (accessed 7 May 2014).

24. Rick Nelson and Ben Bodurian, “A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing Homegrown Extremism in the United States” (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2010). Available at http://csis.org/files/ publication/100304_Nelson_GrowingTerroristThreat_Web.pdf (accessed 3 June 2013).

25. DHS and FBI Joint Intelligence Bulletin, Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small Unit Tactics (2001). Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/JIB_Use_of_S- mall_Arms_Examining_Lone_Shooters.pdf (accessed 3 July 2013).

62 M. Zekulin

26. Stewart Bell, “RCMP Dismantle Alleged Terror Cell in Ottawa” (25 August 2010). Avail- able at http://www.nationalpost.com/RCMPCdismantleCallegedCterroristCcell.html (accessed 3 June 2011). Also see CTVNews, “Terror Plot Reaches to Afghanistan, Middle East” (28 August 2010). Available at http://wwwottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20100828/terror-arrests- ottawa.html (accessed 3 June 2011) and CBCNews (27 August 2010) “Alleged Terrorism Plot Tar- geted Canada.” Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2010/08/26 (accessed 3 June 2011).

27. Ibid. 28. In December 2010, three men were arrested planning to attack the Jyllands-Poster newspa-

per in Copenhagen in what authorities described as a “Mumbai style attack.” The group, two Swed- ish citizens and a third longstanding resident, were radicalized in Sweden. Despite only traveling a very short distance to their target, this travel involved their crossing international borders. Thus, while it does meet the criteria to be defined as homegrown, the fact that they traveled from Sweden into Denmark, crossing state borders in order to conduct their attack, allows for an international label to fit as well. See Christina Anderson and David Goodman, “Terror Suspects Appear in Danish Court,” 30 December 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/world/europe/31den- mark.html (accessed 23 March 2012).

29. We have seen incidents where domestic considerations are mentioned, but they are clearly secondary to the larger motivation. Instead, the incidents are a direct result of more international or global efforts such as involvement in foreign wars or “occupations,” or perceived persecution of the larger Islamic community or umma as a whole. We have not observed calls for policy changes such as shifts to Sharia law or increased rights or protections for Muslims living in Western states.

30. Crone and Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” p. 522. 31. Ibid. 32. Nira Yuval-Davis, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging,” Patterns of Prejudice 40(3)

(2006), pp. 197–214. 33. Irene Bloemraad et al., “Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and

Challenges to the Nation-State,” The Annual Review of Sociology 34 (2008), pp. 154–155. 34. Richard Parent and James Ellis, Countering Radicalization of Diaspora Communities in

Canada (Vancouver: Metropolis British Columbia Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigra- tion and Diversity, 2011).

35. Reuters, “Over 200 Canada Terror Suspects Tracked” (12 May 2010). Available at http:// tvnz.co.nz/world-news/over-200-canada-terror-suspects-tracked-3538154 (accessed 6 May 2014).

36. Sami Aoun, “Muslim Communities: The Pitfalls of Decision-Making in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in David Carment and David Bercuson, eds., The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demogra- phy, and Domestic Politics (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008), p. 114.

37. Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives” (Danidh Ministry of Justice, 2005), pp. 32–33.

38. Bloemraad et al., “Citizenship and Immigration,” pp. 154–155. 39. Michael Genkin and Alexander Gutfraind, 2011, “How Do Terrorist Cells Self-Assemble?

Insights from an Agent-Based Model.” Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac t_id=1031521 (accessed 10 May 2014).

40. Yuval-Davis, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging,” pp. 205–206; also see Bloemraad et al., “Citizenship and Immigration.”

41. Rogers Brubaker, “Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History XLI (I) (2010), pp. 61–78.

42. Crone and Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West.” 43. Michael Zekulin, A Growing Disconnect: Can the Contemporary Terrorism Literature

Explain Domestic Homegrown Terrorism? PhD Dissertation (University of Calgary: Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 2012).

44. Crone and Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” p. 534. 45. Lorenzo Vidino, Radicalization, Linkage and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism

Europe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010). 46. Anne Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?,” Terrorism and Political Vio-

lence 20(2) (2008), pp. 215–233. 47. Brynjar Lia, “Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training,” Terrorism and Political Violence

20(4) (2008), p. 520.

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 63

48. Ibid. Lia cites the original source as Umar Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Global Islamic Resistance Call. Part I: The Roots, History, and Experiences Part II: The Call, Pro- gram and Method [in Arabic].

49. Aaron Zelin, “How We have Changed al-Qaida,” The Atlantic, 2010. Available at http:// www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/10/how-weve-changed-al-qaeda/64216/ (accessed 10 May 2014).

50. Joseph Carter, Shiraz Maher, and Peter Neumann, “#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks” (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2014); Jyette Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38(1) (2014), pp. 1–22.

51. Jerome Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat (Washing- ton, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), p. 29.

52. CBCNews, “Quebecer in Bomb Plot gets Life Sentence” (17 February 2010). Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2010/02/17 (accessed 14 March 2011). Also see Zoe McKnight, Factbox: Key Terror Cases in Canada (25 August 2010). Available at http:// www.nationalpost.com/related/topics/FactboxCterrorCcasesCCanada.ca (accessed 14 March 2011).

53. Stewart Bell, “Canadian Sentenced to 14 Years for Role in 2008 Mumbai Attack” (1 Janu- ary 2013). Available at http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/01/17/canadian-sentenced-to-14-years- for-role-in-2008-mumbai-attack/ (accessed 29 July 2013). Also see CBCNews, “Canadian Charged in Plot to Attack Danish Newspaper” (27 October 2009). Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/ world/story/2009/10/27/canadian-terror-arrest.html (accessed 30 July 2013).

54. The Canadian Press, 13 July 2015, “BC Terror Suspect Makes Court Appearance.” Avail- able at http://www.princegeorgecitizen.com/news/b-c-terror-suspect-makes-court-appearance-after- arrest-in-northern-town-1.1999069 (accessed 20 July 2015).

55. Regina versus Khazaal [2009]NSWSC 1015 (25 September 2009); Nicola McGarrity, “Testing Our Counter-Terrorism Laws: The Prosecution of Individuals for Terrorism Offences in Australia,” Criminal Law Journal 92 (2010), p. 105; Dan Harrison, “Court Rule Sends Khazaad Back to Jail” (11 August 2012). Available at http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/court-rul- ing-sends-khazaal-back-to-jail-20120810-2407i.html (accessed 5 August 2013); Sam Mullins, “Islamist Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the ‘Home-Grown’ Threat,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23(2) (2011), pp. 254–285.

56. FBI Bulletin, “Two Brooklyn Men Plead Guilty” (18 June 2012). Available at http://www. fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/two-brooklyn-men-plead-guilty-in-manhattan-federal-court- to-providing-material-support-to-al-qaeda (accessed 20 July 2014).

57. Associated Press, “Texas Man Gets 20 Years in Prison,” 24 May 2012. Available at http:// www.nbcnews.com/id/47557311/ns/us_news-security/t/texas-man-gets-years-prison-trying-give- al-qaida-drone-gps-documents/#.VBMfJhZrgSg (accessed 21 July 2014).

58. Gardiner Harris, “Florida Men accused of Aiding Pakistani Taliban,” New York Times (14 May 2011). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/15taliban.html?_r=0 (accessed 12 July 2014).

59. Edmund Mahoney, “Brit Tied to Terrorist Groups Sentenced to 12 Years” (16 July 2004). Available at http://articles.courant.com/2014-07-16/news/hc-terror-support-0717-20140716_1_babar- ahmad-terror-groups-azzam-network (accessed 4 September 2014). Also see Imperial Valley News, “ICE Removes Convicted Terrorism Supporter” (26 August 2014). Available at http://www. imperialvalleynews.com/index.php/news/latest-news/10718-ice-removes-convicted-terrorism-supporter- to-the-united-kingdom.html (accessed 2 September 2014).

60. Nadim Roberts, “Calgary Brothers Join Ranks of Canadians Fighting for ISIS,” CBC News (28 August 2014). Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/gregory-and-collin-gordon-calgary- brothers-join-ranks-of-canadians-fighting-for-isis-1.2749673 (accessed 2 September 2014).

61. Reuters, “US Foreign Fighters in Syria Pose very Serious Threat to US” (31 August 2014). Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/us-syria-crisis-usa-lawmakers-idUSKBN0 GV0KR20140831 (accessed 2 September 2014).

62. The Economist, “European Jihadists” (30 August 2014). Available at http://www.econo- mist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-iraq- it-aint-half-hot-here-mum (accessed 2 September 2014). This article provides an excellent chart estimating the number of foreign fighters from over 12 Western countries.

64 M. Zekulin

63. Independent IE, “12,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria Expert Says” (9 September 2014). Available at http://www.independent.ie/world-news/middle-east/12000-foreign-fighters-in-syria- expert-said-30572979.html (accessed 12 September 2014).

64. Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria” (The Soufan Group: New York, June 2014). Available at http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria (accessed 6 June 2015).

65. If one were interested in entertaining this type of distinction it would apply to individuals who travel abroad to join foreign conflicts that are not clearly, at least initially, focused on terrorism. Defining this sub-type is the most problematic due to the grey area recognized to exist when targets are predominantly military and a non-state group engages in a somewhat conventional manner dur- ing conflict. Despite this subjectivity, groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra currently operating in Iraq and Syria can be labeled terrorist groups for two reasons. The first reason is a political one: governments in Western states have identified and added these groups to their list of designated ter- rorist organizations. The second reason is that as these conflicts have expanded civilians are being increasingly targeted and the brutality of their tactics is indeed meant to send a larger message to others. CBC News, “ISIS Name Added to Canada’s List of Terrorist Entities” (24 September 2014). Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-name-added-to-canada-s-list-of-terrorist-entities- 1.2776607 (24 September 2014), ISIS was listed as Al Qaeda in Iraq and designated since 2012. The United States has had ISIS designated since 2004, also when it was previously known as Al Qaeda in Iraq.

66. Jamie Pandaram and Ed O’Loughlin, “Boxer among Australians Held” (27 June 2007). Available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/boxer-among-aussies-arrested-in-lebanon/2007/ 06/26/1182623909208.html?page=fullpage (accessed 8 August 2013).

67. Sarah Smiles, “Australian Islamist Killed in Lebanon” (26 June 2007). Available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/australian-islamist-killed-in-lebanon/2007/06/25/ 1182623823209.html (accessed 5 August 2013).

68. Katherine Blaze et al., “How Three London Teens Ended Up Dead or Jailed, Accused of Terrorism” (6 April 2013). Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/how- three-london-teens-ended-up-dead-or-jailed-accused-of-terrorism/article10825822/?page=all (accessed 31 July 2013). Also see Greg Weston, “Canadians in Algerian Gas Plant Attack Identi- fied” (2 April 2013). Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/04/01/f-algeria-cana dians-militants-hostages.html (accessed 31 July 2013).

69. Faith Karimi, “Kenya Mall Attack” (23 September 2013). Available at http://www.cnn. com/2013/09/22/world/africa/kenya-mall-attack/index (accessed 27 August 20014). Also see Jon Swaine, “Al-Shabaab’s American Recruitment Drive” (25 September 2013). Available at http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10335139/Al-Shabaabs-Ameri can-recruitment-drive-Betray-the-US-and-join-the-real-Disneyland-of-African-jihad.htm (30 August 2014).

70. Michelle Shephard, “Toronto 18: Ali Dirie, Convicted in Plot Dies in Syria” (25 Septem- ber 2013). Available at http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2013/09/25/toronto_18_ali_mohamed_dir ie_convicted_in_plot_dies_in_syria.html (14 September 2014).

71. Michael Zekulin, “Islamic-Inspired Homegrown Terrorism: What We Know and What it Means Moving Forward,” Occasional Research Paper #8 (Calgary: Calgary Center for Military and Strategic Studies, 2013).

72. CBC News, “Martin Couture-Rouleau, Hit-an-Run Driver Arrested by RCMP in July” (22 October 2014). Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/martin-couture-rouleau-hit- and-run-driver-arrested-by-rcmp-in-july-1.2807078 (accessed 2 November 2014).

73. CBS News, “Ottawa Gunman Spoke of Religion, Canadian Foreign Policy in Video” (27 October 2014). Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ottawa-gunman-spoke-of-religion- canadian-foreign-policy-in-video (accessed 2 November 2014).

74. Michael Georgy and Mariam Karouney, “ISIS is Now Directly Threatening to Attack Ameri- can and European Targets” (20 August 2014). Available at http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-now- openly-threatening-attacking-us-targets-2014-8 (12 September 2014); Josh Levs and Holly Yan, “Western Allies Reject ISIS Leader’s Threats against Their Civilians” (22 September 2014). Available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/world/meast/isis-threatens-west (23 September 2014).

75. Alistair Reed et al., “Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (un)Intended Consequences” (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague, April 2015), p. 5.

76. Ibid., p. 3.

Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism 65

77. Evan Kohlmann and Laith Alkhouri, “Profiles of Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 7(9) (2014), p. 3.

78. Michael King and Donald Taylor, “The Radicalization of HomeGrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Socio Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and Political Vio- lence 23(4) (2011); Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Con- ceptual Models and Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4(4) (2011).

79. For example, Randy Borum’s model includes four stages where the final stage is “you’re evil,” and the catalyst for action. Randy Borum, “Understanding the Terrorist Mindset,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 72(7) (2003), pp. 7–10. For Moghaddam there are five stages where the final stage is “the terrorist act.” Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60(2) (2005), pp. 161–169. For Silber and Bhatt there are four stages where the final stage is “jihadization.” Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York Police Department Intelligence Division, 2007). For Tomas Precht he identifies the final step as “the actual act of terrorism or planned plot.” See Tomas Precht, “Homegrown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe: From Conversion to Terrorism,” Danish Ministry of Defense (2007).

80. Peter Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” International Affairs 89(4) (2013), p. 885.

81. Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1990), pp. 161–191; Albert Bandura, “The Role of Selective Moral Engagement in Ter- rorism and Counterterrorism,” in F. Moghaddam and A. Marsella (eds.), Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2004), pp. 121–150.

82. Ibid., pp. 123–124. 83. Moghaddam identified several steps. During the first step, an individual’s attempts to alle-

viate adversity and improve his or her situation have been unsuccessful, leading to feelings of frus- tration and aggression that are displaced onto some perceived causal agent (enemy). As anger builds, the individual becomes more sympathetic toward justification for violence. Some sympa- thizers eventually join an extremist group that advocates or engages in the violence. At the final step, the individual overcomes the last barrier and commits a terrorist act. Moghaddam acknowl- edges that fewer and fewer people ascend to each successive level, which explains the limited num- ber of terrorists. Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60(2) (2005), pp. 161–169; Randy Borum, “Understanding Terrorist Psy- chology,” in Andrew Silke, ed., The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism (Forthcoming) (London: Routledge, 2010). Available at http://works.bepress.com/randy_borum/45 (accessed 12 April 2010).

84. Zekulin, “Islamic-Inspired Homegrown Terrorism.” 85. First, negative anticipation whereby all acts of the enemy, in the past, present, and future

become attributable to destructive intentions toward one’s own group. Second, putting the blame on the enemy, whereby the enemy is thought to be the source of any stress on a group. Third, identifica- tion with evil, whereby the values of the enemy represent the negation of one’s own value system and the enemy is intent on destroying the dominant value system as well. Fourth, zero-sum thinking whereby what is good for the enemy is bad for us and vice-versa. Fifth, stereotyping and de-individ- ualization, whereby anyone who belongs to the enemy group is therefore our enemy. And sixth, refusal to show empathy, whereby consideration for anyone in the enemy group is repressed due to perceived threat and feelings of opposition. Spillman and Spillman in D. Merskin, “Making Ene- mies in George W. Bush’s Post 9/11 Speeches,” A Journal of Social Justice 17 (2005), p. 374. Also see Randy Borum, The Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004) and L. Miller, “The Terrorist Mind,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Crimi- nology 50 (2006), pp. 121–138.

86. CBCNews, “Jihadist Khalef Sharrouf Tweets Photo of Son Holding Head,” 10 August 2014. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/jihadist-khaled-sharrouf-tweets-photo-of-son- holding-soldier-s-severed-head-1.2732838 (accessed 13 September 2014).

66 M. Zekulin

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