Abortion
O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E
Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the fetus
Joona Räsänen
Correspondence
Joona Räsänen.
Email: joona.rasanen@iki.fi
Abstract Many people believe that the abortion debate will end when at some point in the future it will be
possible for fetuses to develop outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, would
make possible to reconcile pro-life and pro-choice positions. That is because it is commonly
believed that there is no right to the death of the fetus if it can be detached alive and gestated in
an artificial womb. Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis defended this position, by arguing
against three common arguments for a right to the death of the fetus. I claim that their arguments
are mistaken. I argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus because gestating a fetus in an
artificial womb when genetic parents refuse it violates their rights not to become a biological parent,
their rights to genetic privacy and their property rights. The right to the death of the fetus, however,
is not a woman’s right but genetic parents’ collective right which only can be used together.
K E Y W O R D S
abortion, ectogenesis, genetic privacy, parenthood, property right, right not to become a parent
1 | INTRODUCTION
The most prominent advocates of abortion rights believe that there is a
right to terminate a pregnancy but not a right to the death of the fetus.
Peter Singer and Deane Wills phrase this in the following way: ‘Freedom to
choose what is to happen to one’s body is one thing; freedom to insist on
the death of a being that is capable of living outside one’s body is another.’1
Judith Jarvis Thomson2 believes this, and so do David Boonin3, Frances M.
Kamm4 and Mary Ann Warren.5 More recently Bertha Alvarez Manninen6
and Lindsey Porter7 have reached similar conclusions.
Whether there is a right to the death of the fetus, in addition to
the detachment, is not a question not explored in detail before. Michael
Hawking argued – using an interesting thought experiment, viable vio-
linist – that the Thomsonian defence of abortion gives the woman only
a right to detachment, not a right to end the life of the fetus once it
has reached the point of viability.8 Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy
Davis considered in this journal whether there is a right to the death of
the fetus when ectogenesis is available.9 They concluded that there is
no such right. Therefore, the possibility of ectogenesis should end the
abortion debate to all these people.10 That is because it would then be
possible to reconcile (alleged) fetal rights with women’s rights.
1Singer, P. & Wells, D. (1984). The reproduction revolution: New ways of
making babies (p. 135). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1,
47–66. 3Boonin, D. (2003). A defense of abortion (p. 257). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press. 4Kamm, F. M. (1992). Creation and abortion: A study in moral and legal
philosophy (p. 81). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 5Warren, M. A. (1982). Postscript on infanticide, February 26, 1982. In J.
Feinberg (Ed.), The Problem of Abortion (pp. 116–119). Wadsworth, Belmont CA; Warren, M. A. (2010). The moral difference between infanticide and
abortion: A response to Robert Card. Bioethics, 14, 352–359. 6Manninen, B. A. (2013). Yes, the baby should live: A pro-choice response
to Giubilini and Minerva. Journal of Medical Ethics, 39, 330–335. 7Porter, L. (2013). Abortion, infanticide and moral context. Journal of
Medical Ethics, 39, 350–352.
8Hawking, M. (2015). Viable violinist. Bioethics, 30, 312–316. 9Mathison, E. & Davis, J. (2017). Is there a right to the death of the foetus?
Bioethics, 31, 313–320. 10I use the term ectogenesis as it is commonly used in bioethical literature.
Ectogenesis refers the use of artificial or mechanical wombs. Ectogenesis
could be understood as an alternative to the whole gestation process where
the embryo is never inside a woman’s uterus. Here the focus is on a form of ectogenesis which is sometimes referred to as an ectogenesis abortion
or partial ectogenesis, where the fetus removed from the woman’s uterus alive will be gestated in an artificial womb. Although the technology is not
yet possible, the ethical issues of ectogenesis deserve careful philosophical
attention. For the sake of argument, I assume that a fetus (or technically a
blastocyst) would become a candidate for ectogenesis soon after it has
implanted in the womb.
Bioethics. 2017;31:697–702. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bioe VC 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd | 697
Received: 6 March 2017 | Revised: 10 July 2017 | Accepted: 13 August 2017 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12404
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I disagree. I argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus, but
that right is not a woman’s right. A right to the death of the fetus is a
right of the genetic parents and only together can they use this right. I
also consider what should be done when biological parents disagree
upon the fate of a fetus.11
Mathison and Davis considered three arguments why a woman
might have a right to the death of the fetus: 1) a right not to become a
biological parent 2) a right to one’s genetic privacy and 3) a right to
property. They argue that none of the arguments succeed. I believe
Mathison and Davis’ argumentation does not show that there is no
right to the death of the fetus. I consider their argumentation sequen-
tially and argue why there is a right to the death of the fetus. I claim –
contrary to Mathison and Davis – that because people have a right not
to become biological parents, a right to genetic privacy and a right to
their property and because ectogenesis without the consent of the
genetic parents of the fetus violates these rights, genetic parents have
a right to the death of the fetus.
I do not consider here whether the fetus itself has a moral standing
or whether it has a right to life, although I admit – and agree with
Mathison and Davis here – that to settle the issue fully, that is some-
thing which should be done.12 At the end of the article, I make some
remarks about the practical implications of my position and raise some
new questions to explore.
2 | THE RIGHT NOT TO BECOME A BIOLOGICAL PARENT
An argument given in support of the right to the death of the fetus is
the right not to become a biological parent. Mathison and Davis (here-
after referred to as M&D) call this the ‘biological parents’ rights’ argu-
ment. Here, I frame the argument in detail and defend it against their
criticism. M&D state that spelling this argument out in more detail –
and perhaps the most common way, they say – is to argue that a right
to the death of the fetus is necessary for preventing certain harms
from befalling the biological parents. So, on this view, an abortion con-
sists of both terminating a pregnancy and preventing parenthood.
The harms in question are parental obligations which are linked to the
concept of attributional parenthood. That is the social attitude in which
others treat a genetic parent as though she still has the same moral obliga-
tions to the child as a custodial parent, even when the legal system has
absolved her of such obligations.13 Catriona Mackenzie explains this by
stating: ‘abortion is not a matter of wanting to kill this particular being,
which is, after all, as yet indistinguishable from oneself. It is rather a matter
of not wanting there to be a future child, so intimately related to oneself,
for which one either has to take responsibility or give up to another.’14
The insight of attributional parenthood leads to the Right Not to
Become a Biological Parent Argument:15
1. Becoming a biological parent causes harm to the couple because
of parental obligations towards the child.
2. The couple has the interest to avoid the harm of parental
obligations.
3. Therefore, the couple has a right to the death of the fetus to avoid
the harm of parental obligations.
M&D understand parental obligations in a way that the parents would
still feel morally responsible for the child, which then could cause them
significant psychological harm. They claim that such harm may be self-
or socially imposed. For example, others might discriminate the parents
by displaying negative attitudes or behaviour towards them. To support
this interpretation of parental obligations, M&D cite a study where sev-
eral women reported that ectogenesis would leave them with the lin-
gering sense of obligation towards the child, even if no legal obligation
were maintained.16
M&D reject the above argument. They admit that parents have a
right not to be discriminated against on the basis of attributional
parenthood, but they reject the argument by parity of reasoning. Put
another way, they claim that if the right not to become a biological par-
ent argument is sound, it leads to conclusions that are difficult to
accept (or at least which people do not currently accept). They claim
that:
[I]t does not follow from the fact that this treatment
[discrimination on the basis of attributional parenthood]
is wrong that one therefore possesses a right to the
death of the foetus. Indeed, there are reasons to doubt
that any such further right exists. To see why, consider
cases that look very similar to the one in question. Sur-
rogate mothers, egg and sperm donors, and women or
couples who give their child up for adoption may all
experience the harms of attributional parenthood, as
well as other felt obligations more generally. If the right
against the harms of attributional parenthood entail fur-
ther rights to prevent or avoid such harms in the case
we have been considering, they should entail similar
rights in these cases as well. And yet, in these other
cases, we do not typically think that the existence of
such harms gives rise to any further rights to the biolog-
ical mother or father.17
M&D seem to believe that the alleged intuitions against the claim
that gamete donors and surrogate mothers have rights towards the
child are a sufficient reason to believe that there are no such rights,
11In this article, I use the terms genetic parent and biological parent as
synonyms. 12Mathison and Davis also do not consider whether a fetus has a right to
life. 13Cohen, I. G. (2008). The right not to be a genetic parent. Southern
California Law Review, 81, 1115–1196. 14Mackenzie, C. (1992). Abortion and embodiment. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 70, 136–155. p. 152. Emphasis original.
15The formulation of the argument is my own, although M&D argue against
a similar argument. 16Cannold, L. (1995). Women, ectogenesis, and ethical theory. Journal of
Applied Philosophy, 12, 55–64. 17Mathison & Davis, op. cit. note 9, p. 315.
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and thus surrogate motherhood, gamete donation and adoption are
problem free practices. However, they omit the work of numerous phi-
losophers who argue, for example, that gamete donors do have parental
obligations (and perhaps rights) towards the child produced from their
gametes. Indeed, several scholars argue that no parental responsibility
theory can explain why the accidental father, who procreates due to
birth-control failure, has parental obligations towards the child but a
sperm donor does not. This notion has been brought forth by Rivka
Weinberg,18 as well as J.L Nelson,19 David Benatar,20 Melissa
Moschella,21 Reuven Brandt22 and Andrew Botterell23 – just to men-
tion a few.
It is also argued that mothers and fathers remain obliged, life-long,
to their birth children even when the child is adopted out. Lindsey Por-
ter frames this in the following way: ‘makers – that is, “birth parents”
and other causers – do not and cannot cease to be obliged to their
birth children, even when adoption takes place.’24
If these authors are correct, there is reason to believe that the
genetic parents have a right to the death of the fetus so that they could
avoid the obligations and harm of attributed parenthood. Adoption
won’t resolve the issue because parental obligations cannot fully be
transferred or delegated to someone else; such obligations are non-
transferrable in nature.
These claims might be against someone’s intuitions, but the intu-
itions alone are not a sufficient reason to believe that genetic ties, or
the fact that the parents have caused their child to exist, do not matter
in the case of gamete donation, surrogate motherhood and – ectogene-
sis abortion. Appealing to alleged intuitions is a somewhat common
way to argue in applied ethics, but without a proper theory that
explains why those intuitions are justified, the parity of reasoning argu-
ment fails. If one wants to reject the right not to become a biological
parent argument, one should offer a parental responsibility theory that
exonerates genetic parents from their parental obligations altogether
or give another reason why the argument fails. M&D do neither.
Because there are no alternative ways to avoid the harms of parental
obligations than the death of the fetus, the right to the death of the
fetus argument stands.
Some pro-choice philosophers have argued that abortion rights
include a right to the death of the fetus. Christine Overall, who has
recently changed her views about the right to the death of the fetus,
now states:
[W]omen who seek pregnancy termination are usually
choosing that there be no being at all who is their
genetic offspring. They are choosing not only not to be
social mothers, but also not to be biological mothers. In
other words, they are claiming a right not to reproduce.
(. . .) When women obtain a termination of pregnancy,
they are (. . .) acting upon their legitimate reproductive
right not to become a biological parent.25
I believe Overall is right when she claims that there is a legitimate
right not to become a biological parent. But she misses an important
point: procreation is a collective act involving two people, therefore the
biological father also has a right not to become a biological parent. The
fetus is not her project, as Overall claims, it is their project. Ergo, when
it is possible to gestate the fetus outside the womb, the fate of the
fetus is not her decision, but their decision.
3 | THE RIGHT TO GENETIC PRIVACY
Another way to argue for the right to the death of the fetus is to
claim that gestating the fetus, even if outside the womb, violates some
other rights the genetic parents possess. I believe ectogenesis abortion
violates two kinds of rights, in addition to a right of not becoming a
biological parent: a right to genetic privacy and a right to property.
There is at least in some cases a right to genetic privacy. For exam-
ple, if a mad scientist finds a way to clone humans, steals my DNA and
creates a fetus that is genetically identical to me, which he then ges-
tates in an artificial womb, my right to genetic privacy is violated.
Therefore, in such a case, I have a right to the death of the fetus.
Similarly, if ectogenesis abortions become reality, some women
(and men) will have genetic children out there who carry their genetic
material without their consent. In this scenario, their right to genetic
privacy has been violated, and the only way to avoid this is if they have
a right to the death of the fetus. Call this the Right to Genetic Privacy
Argument:26
1. People have a right to genetic privacy.
2. Ectogenesis abortion violates the genetic privacy of the genetic
parents of the fetus.
3. Therefore, genetic parents have a right to the death of the fetus.
I believe the mad scientist example shows that the first premise is true.
People in general have a right to genetic privacy. But does ectogenesis
abortion violate parents’ genetic privacy and if so, do genetic parents
18Weinberg, R. (2008). The moral complexity of sperm donation. Bioethics,
22, 166–178. 19Nelson, J.L. (1991). Parental obligations and the ethics of surrogacy: A
causal perspective. Public Affairs Quarterly, 5, 49–61. 20Benatar, D. (1999). The unbearable lightness of bringing into being.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16, 173–180. 21Moschella, M. (2014). Rethinking the moral permissibility of gamete
donation. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 35, 421–440. 22Brandt, R. (2016). The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for
genetic offspring in gamete provision. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 33(4)
doi:10.1111/japp.12251 23Botterell, A. (2016). Why gametes are not like enriched uranium. Bioethics,
30, 741–750. 24Porter, L. (2012). Adoption is not abortion-lite. Journal of Applied Philoso-
phy, 29, 63–78.
25Overall, C. (2015). Rethinking abortion, ectogenesis, and fetal death.
Journal of Social Philosophy, 46, 126–140, p. 131. Emphasis original. 26Again, the formulation of the argument is my own, although M&D argue
against this argument.
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have a right to the death of the fetus? M&D are sceptical. They state
that even if there is a right to genetic privacy there will be considerable
limits to that right. M&D claim that at most, one has a right that her
entire genome not be released without her consent. But they don’t
argue why there is only a right that one’s entire genome not be released
– clearly more is needed than a mere declaration. M&D claim that
because the fetus’ genetic material comes only partly from the genetic
mother, the mother’s genetic privacy is not violated, in such a way that
she has a right to the death of the fetus. However, this line of reason-
ing explains only why the genetic mother has no right to the death of
the fetus. But the nature of this right has been misunderstood here.
A right to genetic privacy in the case of ectogenesis should not be
understood not as an individual but as a collective right. That is because
reproduction is not an individual but a collective action. Even though a
fetus shares 50% of its genetic material with each genetic parent
respectively, 100% of the fetus’ genetic material comes from its genetic
parents. Because having a genetic child in the world who carries the
genetic material of the parents without their consent is against their
right to genetic privacy, the genetic parents together have a right to
the death of the fetus. To use that right, however, they must be unani-
mous about it. Only if they both agree and want the death of the fetus
can they choose it to happen.
To conclude, a right to the death of the fetus is not an individual
right (as a right to terminate the pregnancy is), but a couple’s collective
right, therefore the right to genetic privacy argument stands. A right to
the death of the fetus is a right the genetic parents can only use
together.
4 | THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
There is yet another way to claim that the genetic parents have a right
to the death of the fetus: the genetic parents own the fetus, and
because of that, their property rights are violated if the fetus is
gestated in an artificial womb without their consent. Call this the Right
to Property Argument:27
1. The fetus is property of the genetic parents.
2. People can destroy their property.
3. Therefore, genetic parents can destroy their fetus.
Common intuition seems to support both premises and therefore the
Right to Property Argument. For example, it is commonly believed that
the couple owns their (early) fetus or their embryos.28 Consider a cou-
ple who uses IVF treatment (in vitro fertilization) to get pregnant. Sur-
plus cryopreserved embryos are their embryos and no-one can use
them against the couple’s consent. In fact, it is commonly believed that
a couple using IVF has a right to destroy surplus cryopreserved
embryos. M&D share this intuition (and so do I).
Many people have inconsistent intuitions, as they believe it is
impermissible to kill the early fetus but permissible to destroy frozen
embryos. In both cases, there is an embryo involved that has a poten-
tial to develop into a fetus and then into an infant. The location of the
embryo is morally irrelevant so whichever position one holds, consis-
tency demands that the cases are treated the same, M&D claim. M&D
reject the claim that it is permissible to destroy cryopreserved embryos
and I reject the claim that it is impermissible to kill the fetus.
However, there is a way to make a moral distinction between cry-
opreserved embryos and early fetuses located inside a woman’s body.
One might claim, as Dale Jacquette does, that there are two kinds of
potentialities in question: naturally probable potentiality and merely
logically possible potentiality, and that only the former potentiality is
morally relevant.29 In the case of naturally probable potentiality, such
as what a fetus in a fully functioning womb has, the fetus’s develop-
ment into an infant is something we expect to happen, as long as there
is no fatal accident or interference involved. On the other hand, in the
case of merely logical possible potentiality, such as what cryopreserved
embryos would have, without outside interference these embryos do
not develop into anything. Although this distinction does not seem to
have implications for the ectogenesis debate, because a fetus has the
same kind of potentiality whether it is inside an artificial or a natural
womb, it does enable M&D to retain their intuitions regarding the
destruction of cryopreserved embryos while maintaining their position
about the death of the fetus. That is because a fetus located in a womb
has naturally probable potential for development, while a cryopre-
served embryo only has logically possible potential for it.
It is also commonly believed that people have a right to destroy
their property. As M&D state: ‘If we buy a rare piece of art, and sup-
posing that art can possess intrinsic value, we, as the owners, still
have the right to destroy it.’30 So why would there be no right to
destroy the fetus or the embryos? M&D argue that because even if
one owns something, there are limitations to what one can do to it.
They claim:
[C]ulturally protected buildings or artefacts can be pri-
vately owned but have use limitations. Buying a historic
building means we can occupy it, but we are not
allowed to raze it. (. . .) These limitations [to destroy] are
justified by appealing to the intrinsic value of the prop-
erty, or minimally the instrumental value the property
possess for those other than the owner.31
But why do I have a right to destroy a rare piece of art, as M&D
claim, but no right to destroy a historic building? They don’t give
any justification to why it would be permissible for the owner to27Again, the formulation of the argument is my own, although M&D argue against similar argument. 28Although it is not a philosophical argument, it is worth mentioning that in
November 2016 a Missouri court has ruled that a divorced couple’s frozen embryos should be treated as marital property. Retrieved from http://www.
bionews.org.uk/page_729067.asp
29Jacquette, D. (2001). Two kinds of potentiality: A critique of McGinn on
the ethics of abortion. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18, 79–86. 30Mathison & Davis, op. cit. note 9, p. 318. 31Ibid: 318.
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destroy a rare piece of art but not a historic building – after all, they
both have intrinsic value and/or value to others. Perhaps M&D just
want to say that it is usually permissible to destroy one’s own prop-
erty but not always. So, is it permissible to destroy the fetus or the
embryos?
M&D think that because a fetus (and cryopreserved embryos)
shares only 50% of its genetic material with one individual, that individ-
ual cannot have a property right to it, and therefore has no right to
destroy it. But that is not a problem unless we want to claim that the
mother (or the father) alone has a right to the death of the fetus. That
is not the position I am arguing for. I claim that the fetus is collective
property of its genetic parents. When the genetic parents agree and
they both want the death of the fetus or the destruction of the
embryos, it is morally permissible for them to do so since they together
share 100% of the fetus’ or the embryos’ genetic material, and
gestating the fetus or the embryos against their consent violates their
rights.
Another reason why someone might reject the property right argu-
ment is that because many people are involved in the process of creat-
ing the embryos, it cannot be explained why only the parents own the
embryo. For example, M&D claim that in the process of in vitro fertil-
ization there are several people, most obviously, the doctor who
extracts the ova and performs the procedure – yet they do not have a
property right over the embryo. Therefore, we should reject this ver-
sion of the argument what M&D call the labour-mixing argument for
the property rights.
There are two responses I want to make here. First, as stated ear-
lier, many philosophers believe genetic ties are morally meaningful. If
they are right, that is a sufficient reason to believe that genetic parents
– and not the other parties – have a property right to the fetus and the
embryos. Because the doctor performing the IVF do not share genetic
material with them, he has no property right to the embryos – even
though he has taking a part of the process of creating the embryos.
Second, the objection against the labour-mixing argument for
property rights can be applied only to embryos created in the process
of IVF – not to a fetus created in normal sexual intercourse. When two
people have sex and it leads to fertilization, the two people are the
only ones bringing the fetus into existence by mixing their labour. So,
the labour-mixing argument for property rights explains why genetic
parents have property right to the fetus and why they do not have
property right to cryopreserved embryos.
Perhaps someone would object. For example, M&D argue that
because parents do not own their children, parents cannot own
their fetuses or embryos either. ‘If the justification for property is
that one has mixed one’s labour, then nothing about leaving the
womb explains why the baby is no longer the property of the
mother.’32 Obviously, children are not parents’ property. But that
has nothing to do with mixing labour. Children are not property
because children are persons: morally valuable individuals. Now,
whether a fetus is a person is a question outside the scope of this
article, although I admit that if an early fetus is a person, it might
change the outcome of the debate.33
5 | WHEN BIOLOGICAL PARENTS DISAGREE UPON THE FATE OF THE FETUS
I have argued that biological parents have a right to the death of the
fetus. But an obvious question then rises: what should be done to the
fetus when ectogenesis is available and the biological parents disagree
regarding the fate of their fetus. There are reasons to believe that the
fetus can be killed or let die only when both parents consent to it.
First, when a man and woman are having sex, they implicitly accept
the possible consequences of their activity. As Rivka Weinberg states: ‘If
we do things that put our gametes at risk of joining with others and grow-
ing into persons, we assume the costs (and rewards) of that risky activity.’34
Because for the conception to happen, there needs to be two persons per-
forming the action (intercourse), it is those two persons that together have
responsibilities for the consequences. A right to the death of the fetus,
therefore, and for the reasons mentioned earlier, is a collective right.
Second, when only one person wants to use a collective right, he
or she cannot use that right. When Bob wants to marry Jane, but Jane
does not want to marry Bob, Bob cannot use his right to marriage,
because a right to marriage is a collective right and therefore cannot be
used alone.35 Similarly, when Bob wants the fetus to die, but Jane
wants it to live, Bob cannot use his right to the death of the fetus
because this right is not an individual but a collective right.
Third, in cases where genetic parents disagree, I believe we should fol-
low what can be called the status quo approach. According to this approach,
change needs a stronger justification than keeping things as they are.36
32Mathison & Davis, op. cit. note 9, p. 319.
33I am of course familiar with the wide scope of literature concerning the
moral status of the fetus. The most important defences of fetal rights and
the moral status of the fetus include: Marquis, D. (1989). Why abortion is
immoral. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 183–202; Lee, P. (2004). The pro-life argument for substantial identity: A defense. Bioethics, 18, 249–263; Beck- with, F. (2007). Defending life: A moral and legal case against abortion choice.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; George, R. P. & Tollefsen, C.
(2008). Embryo: A defense of human life. New York, NY: Doubleday; Kaczor,
C. (2015). The ethics of abortion: Women’s rights, human life, and the question of justice (2nd edn.). New York, NY: Routledge. If these authors are correct
and killing a fetus is as wrong as killing any standard adult, then my argu-
ments might be refuted because a serious right to life could overweigh any
other rights the parents have. On the other hand, one might claim, if the
fetus has no value at all, so that killing the fetus is equivalent to, for exam-
ple, cutting one’s hair, then there would be no need to argue for the right of the death of the fetus. So, perhaps my argumentation would convince
those who believe the fetus does not have full moral status equivalent to a
standard adult human, but who believe that the fetus is not akin to one’s hair either. I think most people believe that a fetus has some but not a full
moral status, thus my argumentation should convince most people. 34Weinberg, R. (2015). The risk of a lifetime: How, when, and why procreation
may be permissible (p. 67). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 35For defence of a right to marriage as a collective right see Williams, R. (2011).
Same-sex marriage and equality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 14, 589–595. 36I cannot give a full defence of the status quo approach here but at least it
is intuitively compelling. Others have argued that humans prefer the status
quo approach so deeply that it is an irrational status quo bias. Bostrom, N.
& Ord, T. (2006). The reversal rest: Eliminating status quo bias in applied
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As long as there is no intervention to the pregnancy, the fetus will
naturally develop inside the woman’s womb. This means that there is
no change to the status quo and the fetus’ naturally probable potential
to develop into an infant would be actualized. Following the status quo
approach would mean that when one parent wants the death of the
fetus and the other does not, the fetus should not be killed or left to
die. Therefore, when, for example, a pregnant woman wants the fetus
to die, but the father wants it to live, the fetus should be detached and
implanted into an artificial womb where the fetus would continue its
development into an infant. Thus the status quo should be understood
from the point of view of the fetus: an already developing fetus would
continue its development in a womb – albeit an artificial one.
If the procedure of removing the fetus alive from the womb is
physically much more harmful to the woman than abortion, where the
result is the death of the fetus, she might have a right to choose the
latter. But at least when detaching the fetus alive is physically no more
harmful to the woman than abortion, she would be obligated to choose
ectogenesis abortion, the kind of abortion where the fetus detached
alive would be gestated in an artificial womb.
The status quo approach, together with a collective right to the
death of the fetus, would also mean that, for example, when an ex-wife
wants to gestate the cryopreserved embryos she and her ex-husband
have made, but the ex-husband refuses (as in Evans v UK), she cannot
gestate the embryos. But the ex-husband cannot have the embryos
destroyed either. This leads to what some might claim to be an odd con-
clusion: the embryos should be kept frozen indefinitely even though
they will never be used in any way. But until shown to be a totally unten-
able view, I am willing to accept that this is indeed what should be done.
What should be done when the biological father cannot be found
or the father is an anonymous sperm donor is beyond the scope of this
article. However, I am inclined to think that when the father is an anon-
ymous sperm donor he has already relinquished his demands regarding
the fate of the fetus. Therefore, the mother alone would have a right
to the death of the fetus.
6 | CONCLUSION
I have argued that genetic parents have a right to the death of the fetus.
That is because ectogenesis abortion without the consent of the genetic
parents violates their right not to become biological parents. It also viola-
tes their right to genetic privacy and their property rights. I have consid-
ered some recent objections against a right to the death of the fetus and
shown them to be flawed. I have claimed that Mathison and Davis omitted
important literature on how parental obligations are acquired and they
have not identified that a right to the death of the fetus is a collective –
rather than an individual – right. If my argumentation is correct, ectogene-
sis abortion will not solve the abortion debate since there will still be a
right to the death of the fetus. Therefore, we cannot reconcile pro-life and
pro-choice positions simply by gestating the fetus in an artificial womb.
I am not the first to argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus.
Stephen L. Ross37 has argued for it, as well as Catriona Mackenzie38 and
Christine Overall.39 However, my position differs from that of the aforemen-
tioned philosophers because I have claimed that the right to the death of the
fetus is not a genetic mother’s right but a couple’s collective right which they
can use only together. That right can also be used when the fetus is outside
a woman’s body – contrary to what Overall, for example, has argued. Of
course, nowadays a woman’s right to bodily autonomy outweighs other
arguments, but when ectogenesis becomes an option, this changes.
I have not argued that biological parents have a right to kill the fetus,
but that they have a right to the death of the fetus. Whether the fetus
should be left to die after the detachment but before putting it in an arti-
ficial womb, or whether it can be directly killed is for full discussion in
another paper. However, I am inclined to side with James Rachels that
there is no morally relevant difference between killing and letting die.40
My position has the value of equality because when ectogenesis
becomes possible, men and women can exercise equally their rights
not to become a genetic parent, their rights to genetic privacy and
property. Perhaps some feminists see this as a reason to object, but I
see it is a reason to value my position. As Tuija Takala suggests: ‘I sup-
pose the strong opposition to ectogenesis coming from many feminist
(sic) stems from the fact that it might increase the rights of males when
it comes to reproduction. But for anyone who is truly for equality this
should not be an unwelcome development.’41
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Milla Miettinen for discussions on the subject
and her useful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. I also
thank two anonymous referees for their insightful comments on an
earlier version of the paper.
ORCID
Joona Räsänen http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7383-6138
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
JOONA RÄSÄNEN holds a Master’s degree in Social and Moral Philosophy
from University of Helsinki and a Master’s degree in Geography from
University of Oulu. He has research interests in applied philosophy and
bioethics, and he has previously published in this journal.
How to cite this article: Räsänen J. Ectogenesis, abortion and a
right to the death of the fetus. Bioethics. 2017;31:697–702.
https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12404
ethics. Ethics, 116, 656–679. Yet others have argued that it is rational to keep things as they are. Nebel, J. M., 2015, Status quo bias, rationality, and
conservatism about value. Ethics, 125, 449–476.
37Ross, S.L. (1982). Abortion and the death of the fetus. Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 11, 232–245. 38Mackenzie, op. cit. note 14. 39Overall, op. cit. note 25. 40Rachels, J. (1975). Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of
Medicine, 292, 78–80. 41Takala, T. (2009). Human before sex? Ectogenesis as a way to equality. In
F. Simonstein (Ed.), Reprogen-ethics and the future of gender (pp. 187–195, p. 190.). Dordrecht: Springer.
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