Grammar Mistakes Check

Table of Contents

1.0 Executive Summary

2.0 Key Facts

2.1 The Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC

2.2 An Important External Factor – the United States

3.0 What is at Stake?

4.0 The Important Characteristic of the Conflict Situation

4.1 The Constraints of History

4.2 The Boundedness of International Mediation

4.3 The “Mess” of Various Aspects of Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC

5.0 The Reasons Why Prevention Action is Merited

6.0 Future Scenarios

6.1 Lower Feasibility - Standing with the ROC

6.2 Medium Feasibility - Exiting the “Game” or Keeping Silent

6.3 Higher Feasibility - Standing with the PRC

7.0 Conclusion

References

1.0 Executive Summary

In my 2017, the 23rd annual meeting of North American Taiwan Studies Association (NATSA) was held at Stanford University. The experts and scholars, who focused on researching the relevant issues about Asian-Pacific region, such as Kharis Templeman, Erin Baggott Carter, Thomas Fingar, and Lanhee J. Chen, analyzed the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations between People’s Republic of China (PRC-China) and Republic of China (ROC-Taiwan) on this meeting.[footnoteRef:1] During the process of discussing the potential conflict between PRC and ROC, the United States was highlighted as the most important mediator that could influence the trends of the conflict between PRC and ROC, and that was able to provide it with windows of opportunity. This early warning policy memo will examine the three scenarios with different degrees of feasibilities by regarding the United States government as the most suitable mediator. The key facts of Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC will be demonstrated, and the important characteristic of the conflict situation will also be analyzed. Based on them, this memo will discuss the points that are at stake, and the reasons why prevention action is merited for Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC. After analyzing the pros and cons of three future scenarios, the last one, which the United States government stands with the PRC and supports “One-China” policy, reveals the relatively higher feasibility. [1: Williams, Jack F. China Review International 10, (2017): 382-85. ]

2.0 Key Facts

2.1 The Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC

Since the second Chinese Civil War happened in 1937, the issues about the relations between PRC and POC, which were also called as Cross-Strait relations (Haixia Liangan Guanxi), have become seriously sensitive topics in both of the two political entities that were geographically separated by the Taiwan Strait in the west Pacific Ocean. In 1949, the second Chinese Civil War led to the political status that the mainland of China being governed by the PRC, instead, Taiwan pertains to the ROC, which means the divisive situation of these two regimes has been going on for almost 68 years.[footnoteRef:2] [2: Brands, Henry W. "Testing massive retaliation: credibility and crisis management in the Taiwan Strait." International Security 12, no. 4 (1988): 124-151.]

From a geographical perspective, Taiwan and China are separated by the Taiwan Strait. The military conflict, military maneuver, and arms race between these two regimes may lead to the potential crisis of a comprehensive war. From the historical perspective, there have been three Taiwan Strait Crises happening since 1954, but they were just regarded as regional military actions, or unimplemented plans rather than a real armed conflict. Among these three crises, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis (The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis) caused the serious casualties on both sides: the total number of fatalities on the PRC’s side was 678; and there were 439 deaths and 1,870 wounded on the ROC’s side. Moreover, in 1995, the military maneuver of the PRC caused the third crisis.[footnoteRef:3] However, the war did not break out, and it did not lead to any fatality directly. [3: Liu, Wenling, Gert Spaargaren, Nico Heerink, Arthur PJ Mol, and Can Wang. "Energy consumption practices of rural households in north China: Basic characteristics and potential for low carbon development." Energy Policy 55 (2013): 128-138.]

The core incompatibility in Cross-Strait relations is the qualitative asymmetries about the political statues and identities of PRC and ROC. In the 1970s, PRC, that was led by CCP, became the only legal representative of China in the United Nations by replacing KMT, and ROC lost the representation of China. Afterwards, PRC did not allow ROC to use “China” as its national identity to attend the international system unless ROC accepted “One-China” policy and the unification would be achieved. These facts were reflected by the contents of United Nations GA Resolution 2758, which was passed in order to respond to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1668 that required any change in the representation of PRC in the United Nations.[footnoteRef:4] After that, most of countries in the international system started accepting and supporting “One China” policy, which compressed the diplomatic space of ROC, and ROC’s external relations with other countries such as Honduras and Guatemala. In Taiwan, KMT supports One-China policy with respective interpretations, while DPP emphasizes “One Country on Each Side”, which means that PRC and ROC are two different countries, as opposed to two separate political entitles within the same country of “China”. Therefore, the political status and the identity of a country is closely related to the ruling party. [4: Chen, Lung-chu, and W. M. Reisman. "Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title." The Yale Law Journal 81, no. 4 (1972): 599-671. doi:10.2307/795213.]

Over the years, both the PRC and the ROC have tried their best to modify the Cross-Strait relations and to keep their benefits by utilizing different kinds of strategies and tactics such as using some strategies with forces and weapons, negotiating, and drawing supports from other countries. Generally, PRC has been relatively promoting the unification of PRC and ROC, and ROC has been standing on a relatively passive position and trying to achieve the independence. A very typical instance is the three Taiwan Strait Crises, especially the second crisis and the third one. During this long process, 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis (The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis) is regarded as a sign that can demonstrate the outburst of the previous conflict in the Cross-Strait relations. In this war, the islands of Kinmen and the nearby Matsu Islands along the east coast of the PRC were shelled by PRC. In order to emancipate Taiwan from the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang - KMT), PRC launched the war, which is the only direct military contest between PRC and ROC until now, with land force, sea force, and Air Force. And it caused more than 3000 fatalities.[footnoteRef:5] [5: JIAN, CHEN. "BEIJING AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958." In Mao's China and the Cold War, 163-204. University of North Carolina Press, 2001. ]

As for some negotiations, the most representative one is 1992 Consensus. In fact, 1992 Consensus is not a particular meeting; instead, it is a political term that refers to the outcomes of a meeting that was organized in Hong Kong in 1992 between some semis-official representatives of PRC and ROC. The main idea of 1992 Consensus is closely related to “One-China” policy and another political statement, “One-China with respective interpretations”. Although the government of PRC thinks highly of the importance of 1992 Consensus, it has not been accepted by the government of the ROC, and even DPP denied the exist of 1992 Consensus.[footnoteRef:6] [6: Chen, Dean P. "The Strategic Implications of Ma Ying-jeou's "One ROC, Two Areas" Policy on Cross-Strait Relations." American Journal of Chinese Studies 20, no. 1 (2013): 23-41. ]

Based on the circulation of personnel freedom, nowadays, the economic activities, trades, and other cooperation between PRC and ROC have been very close. On November 07, 2015, the former president of ROC, Ma Ying-jeou, and Xi Jinping met each other in Singapore, and had a friendly conversation about the development of Cross-Strait relations. However, since the reign of Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, and the PRC has added much pressure to ROC because PRC government worried about the Cross-Strait policy of DPP government so much.[footnoteRef:7] In this way, the communications between PRC and ROC were weakened. [7: Harrison, Mark. "A YEAR OF LOOKING BACKWARDS." In Control, edited by Golley Jane, Jaivin Linda, and Tomba Luigi, 259-68. Australia: ANU Press, 2017. ]

(Link: http://thechinadesk.blogspot.com/2007/07/roc-vs-prc.html)[footnoteRef:8] [8: The China Desk. The PRC vs. The ROC. http://thechinadesk.blogspot.com/2007/07/roc-vs-prc.html. (Accessed July 24, 2007).]

(Link:https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis#/media/File%3ATaiwan_Strait.png)[footnoteRef:9] [9: Global Security.org. Taiwan Strait. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis#/media/File%3ATaiwan_Strait.png. (Accessed March 23, 1996). ]

2.2 An Important External Factor – the United States

Besides PRC and ROC, there are also some external actors that involved in the tension of the Cross-Strait relations, and the most important one is the United States, which is seen as the international actor that can play the leverage in the current situations.

At the end of 2016, before Donald Trump became the president of the United States, he tried to use One-China policy as a bargaining chip to promote the negotiations about foreign trade with PRC. Moreover, he also tried to use ROC as a “pawn” to access the negotiating advantages of some issues such as DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) nuclear issue, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in order to ask China to make some concessions. On February 09, 2017, President Trump and President Xi had a further conversation on phone. In that conversation, President Trump stated that the United States will constitute strengthening the relations with China and following the long-standing One-China policy.[footnoteRef:10] [10: O’HANLON, MICHAEL E., and JAMES STEINBERG. "A Crossroads in U.S.-China Relations." In A Glass Half Full?: Rebalance, Reassurance, and Resolve in the U.S.-China Strategic Relationship, 1-10. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017.]

On the other hand, the United States also can be regarded as the key connector in Cross-Strait relations. Under the tense situation of Cross-Strait relations, the communications and cooperation between PRC and ROC have been receded on some aspects. In this case, the United States becomes the hinge that promote the “indirect communications” between PRC and ROC. ROC government tried to achieve the relative independence by getting the supports from the United States, one of the Great Powers that is able to competitive for PRC on the international stage. For PRC, Sino-America relations cannot be easily broken as well, therefore, PRC government will not allow ROC to make any negative effects on Sino-America relations, and does not let the conflict between PRC and ROC influence the relations between PRC and the United States. In a sense, PRC and ROC can understand some conditions of each other, combing some information, and expressing attitudes toward some specific issues by keeping in touch with the US.

3.0 What is at Stake?

The above-mentions contents demonstrate that although currently there is not any ongoing armed conflict happening between the PRC and the ROC, the tension of Cross-Strait relations may lead to the potential conflicts between China and Taiwan. There are several points of the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations are at stake.

First, the historical backgrounds of Cross-Strait relations show that both the two sides have repeatedly tried to use weapons and violence to deal with the incompatibility of Cross-Strait relations, and that the military exercises have taken place for many times since 1937. Any military exercises or battles might evolve into serious wars between the PRC and the ROC.

Second, the direct negotiations between the political representatives of those two regimes, such as 1992 Consensus, did not make any obvious success. In this case, the interventions of other mediators (countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, etc.) may be necessary to promote the further communications between the PRC and the ROC, and ensure the commitments that they reached in the consensus can be achieved effectively. Also, complicated factors have turned the Cross-Strait relations between PRC and ROC into a stalemate, because the conflict dynamics of these relations implicate the benefits of countries in Asia-Pacific area, even the whole world rather than just influence the conditions of China and Taiwan.

Third, with the development of globalization, the amount of the cross-regional communications between China and Taiwan have been increasing. However, the communications between China and Taiwan were implemented by mainly focusing on economic respect such as international trades and the cultural aspect such as the exchange activities for youths. In fact, with the obstacle of the incompatibility of Cross-Strait relations, the PRC and the ROC are still trying to avoid developing many political cooperation.

On some aspects, these points that are at stake can be regarded as the “blasting fuse” of the outburst of the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations. In other words, dealing with these points are the significant steps of the process of implementing early warning or other prevention actions.

4.0 The Important Characteristic of the Conflict Situation and the Main Challenges

4.1 The Constraints of History

The tension of Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC is not a new issue that has happened recently, instead, it is defined as a historical issue. In this case, the difficulties of preventing and solving the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations have been improved because of three reasons.

First, the governments of the two sides would like to stay in the “negative shadow” of the historical backgrounds of Cross-Strait relations rather than look forward or predict the positive effects that will appear if the tension of Cross-Strait relations can be mitigated. In the modern society, the DPP still concentrated on emphasizing the negative effects that were caused by Taiwan Strait Crises, and utilized them as example to support their ideas about denying “One-China” policy.

Second, some of the historical attempts that were made by people in order to modify Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC, such as 1992 Consensus and Wang-Koo summit, have their shortcomings. The failures of those historical attempts have made the people on both sides lose the confidence of dealing with the relevant issues. On some aspects, 1992 Consensus was not even a particular or official meeting between PRC and ROC. Although the government of PRC thinks highly of the importance of 1992 consensus, some of the contents of this meeting have not been accepted by the government ROC, and even the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)[footnoteRef:11] in Taiwan would like to deny the relevant meanings and uses of the consensus.[footnoteRef:12] In this case, the “One China” policy has not been implemented successfully. And this was the major causes of the failure of the consensus. As for the Wang-Koo summit, it refers to another attempt at a cross-strait meeting whose purpose is to continue pursuing the meanings of 1992 consensus. The first meeting took place in 1993 between the chairman of ARATS, Wang Daohan, and the chairman of Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), Koo Chen-fu. The summit also contained some follow up meetings up to 1998. Based on the fact that the Cross-Strait relations were not improved obviously, they tried to organize the third meeting in 1999, however, they did not make success because Lee Teng-hui, the President of Taiwan and Chairman of Kuomintang (KMT) from 1988 to 2000, published an article called Cross-Strait Tension: Special State to State, which made the Cross-Strait relations became very tense.[footnoteRef:13] Despite the communication efforts between the two groups, there was a lengthy gap between the two meetings that prolonged the peace process. Both groups should hold meetings in a sequential manner within a specific timeframe that will lead to a negotiated settlement. [11: The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP): a liberal political party in Republic of China, and the dominant party in the Pan-Green Coalition. ] [12: Shiquan, Xu. "The 1992 Consensus: A review and assessment of consultations between the association for relations across the Taiwan Strait and the straits exchange foundation." American Foreign Policy Interests 23, no. 3 (2001): 121-140.] [13: Lijun, Sheng. China and Taiwan: Cross-strait relations under Chen Sui-bian. Vol. 3. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. 5-10. ]

Third, most of the older generation, who immigrated to Taiwan during the Second Chinese Civil War, would like to support “One-China” policy, because they preferred to regard China as their real home country and their “root”. On the contrary, most of the younger generational, who grow up in Taiwan, their thoughts were not influenced by Chinese history a lot. They satisfied with the current social situations of Taiwan, and they were not eager to achieve the unification of the mainland of China and Taiwan.

4.2 The Boundedness of International Mediation

When the regional mediation is not able to deal with the local issues in some particular areas well, the local governments normally would like to improve the regional mediation to the global level. As for Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC, on the surface, global mediation seems to be the best tool to deal with the potential conflicts of these relations, because the tension of Cross-Strait has been influenced by external factors for a long time. In addition, the conflict situations of the Cross-Strait relations are also related to some external factors, because some countries, such as the members of ASEAN, have many economic and cultural cooperation with both the PRC and the ROC. Some Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can be seen as the ligament in Cross-Strait relations. ROC needs the international trade with some Southeast Asian countries to support Taiwan’s economy. In this way, although those Southeast Asian countries support One-China policy, ROC still does not want to arouse any clash with them. Although those Southeast Asian countries may not be able to improve the Cross-Strait relations, they maintained the stabilizing of the Cross-Strait relations indirectly. On the other hand, it can indirectly reveal that some Southeast Asian countries seem to be playing the relatively embarrassing roles in Cross-Strait relations, furthermore, their embarrassing roles make them not be able to being the powerful mediators to solve the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations.

In a sense, utilizing international mediation to solve the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations possible but not likely, because the amount of the suitable mediators is limited. Although the governments of the PRC and the ROC might also try to prevent the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations by applying for the international mediations and utilizing systematic prevention, the main incompatibility of Cross-Strait relations should not be ignored: PRC did not allow ROC to use “China” as its national identity to attend the international system unless ROC accepted “One-China” policy and the unification would be achieved. Therefore, if the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations happen someday, the PRC and the ROC will not be able to ask helps from the Peacekeeping of United Nations (UN), because the ROC has not been able to become a member of UN. In this case, the most suitable mediators are some powerful countries, such as the United States, which can intervene the Cross-Strait relations as an individual role. The memo will focus on analyzing the role of the United States instead of discussing all of the suitable mediators.

4.3 The “Mess” of Various Aspects of Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC

Before promoting the conflict prevention, one of the significant steps that needs to be done is identifying the conflict situations. A complicated conflict that is related to the various aspects of the main actors, such as economic respect, political aspect, and military filed, will provide mediators with more challenges. Related to Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC, the PRC tried to intervene the issues about what kinds of political identities that were used by the ROC to join international organizations and international meetings. However, the PRC did not try to prevent other kinds of communications between the ROC and the whole international system. For instance, in 2003, the PRC denies the political identity of the ROC, and prevented the ROC to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a country. On the other hand, the PRC supported some Taiwanese representatives to join the conference about how to treat severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), which was organized by WTO.[footnoteRef:14] Obviously, it is hard for mediators to find the point of entry to deal with the potential conflicts in Cross-Strat relations, because the potential conflicts are related to various aspects, and the identities of those potential conflicts are too fickle. [14: Cho, Hui-Wan. "China-Taiwan Tug of War in the WTO." Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (2005): 736-55. doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.5.736.]

5.0 The Reasons Why Prevention Action is Merited

“In the 21st century, to achieve the complete reunification of the People’s Republic of China is the common aspiration of all Chinese people”.[footnoteRef:15] This is one of the statements of Xi Jinpin, the current General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People’s Republic of China, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. At the first meeting between political leaders of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Xi-Ma Meeting on 07 November 2015 in Singapore, Xi obviously expresses the firm attitude of PRC’s government towards dealing with the conflicts between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.[footnoteRef:16] [15: Chai, Winberg. "Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou's Historic 2015 Meeting in Singapore: An Interpretation." Asian Affairs: An American Review 42, no. 4 (2015): 195-202.] [16: Ma: Ma Ying-jeou, a Taiwanese politician who served as the President of the Republic of China from 2008 to 2016.]

At present, Cross-Strait relations are related to not only the interests of both sides of Taiwan Strait, but also the situations of Asia-Pacific region, and even the world’s strategic layout of power and global security. Both China and Taiwan have been playing important roles in some global issues, such as the territorial disputes in South China Sea. The consciousness about independence in ROC and the consciousness of unification in PRC are still colliding. For the United States, the precondition that they could use Taiwan as a “pawn” to develop Sina-US relations is the stability of Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC. Therefore, the purposes of stabilizing Cross-Strait relations is not only to protect the peaceful atmospheres of the PRC and ROC, but also to avoids the outbreaks of some international conflicts.

6.0 Future Scenarios

Since the United States is regarded as the one of the important mediators that can be helpful to deal with the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC, the United States government will be seen as the main audience of this memo. In this case, the three scenarios that would be demonstrated in this memo are also related to the initiatives of the United State government.

6.1 Lower Feasibility - Standing on One Side

Based on one of the second characteristic of the conflict situation that was analyzed in this article, it seems that the United States have not tried to clarify its position in Cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, the United States did not want to break its peaceful relations with Taiwan. On the other hand, the United States would like to regard the rise of China’s power as a kind of threat to the leading role of the United States on the international stage. Facing the new “competitor”, the United States prefer to improve the Sino-U.S. relations rather than promote any confrontations openly. Although the political actions of the United States cannot be defined as keeping a neutral attitude towards Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC, the certain thing is that the United States tried to confound its position in these complicated relations. In this way, once the United States clarifies its position, and stand with one of the two sides of Cross-Strait relations, there will be hugely meaningful changes happening on the current conflict situations of Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and ROC. However, standing with different sides will lead to totally different results.

If the United States decides to stand with the ROC, and supports the independence of the ROC, it will arouse the dissatisfaction of the PRC, and even it may cause the breakdown of the Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC. Therefore, the feasibility of this scenario is relatively lower than the other two scenarios.

In addition, relating to the current situation that the United States tried to cooperate with the PRC to deal with its conflicts with North Korea, in this way, the United States will not be willing to lose one of its important “partners”. Back to a point that has been mentioned in this memo, the rise of China’s power was seen as a kind of threat to the leading role of the United States in the global system. Currently, the PRC is implementing “One Belt One Road” initiative, a development strategy that is proposed by Xi, which focuses on developing the connectivity and cooperation between Eurasian countries, primarily the PRC, the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the oceangoing Maritime Silk Road (MSR).[footnoteRef:17] If the PRC makes success by developing this initiative, its position on the international stage will be improved a lot. Based on the rationality that the United States would not like to make negative effects on its external relations with a country that is developing with a positive trend, the United States government will not promote this scenario, which stands with the ROC, easily. [17: Murphy, David. "ONE BELT ONE ROAD: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS." In Pollution, edited by Davies Gloria, Goldkorn Jeremy, and Tomba Luigi, 245-52. Australia: ANU Press, 2016.]

6.2 Medium Feasibility - Exiting the “Game” or Keeping Silent

Although there are some potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations, they have not been developed to be ongoing armed conflicts. As the most important mediator, the United States could continue confounding its position in these complicated relations and keeping silent in order to repress the outburst of those conflicts. Even the United States can exit the “game” between the PRC and the ROC so that it can avoid facing those conflicts. However, this scenario is not perfect as well, and it has the medium feasibility in these three scenarios.

First, on the surface, without the obvious intervention of the United States, Cross-Strait relations still can keep the original status. However, it is still risky, because those potential conflicts, which look like the “time bombs”, have not been solved.

Second, the United States have realized the importance of stabilizing its relations with both the PRC and the ROC, because they can help the United States achieve some particular goals. In other words, the United States will not lose the interests to the PRC and the ROC, or give up its external relations with them.

6.3 Higher Feasibility – Standing with the PRC

Standing with the PRC does not mean that the United States and the PRC would isolate the ROC or make it exist as a separated status. Instead, even the United State supports “One-China” policy, which may be contrary to the original will of the ROC, the ROC will still try to keep a relatively friendly relation with the United States.

First, from the perspective of the ROC, it needs the supports from the United States on different aspects such as arm sales, technology supports, etc. Also, if the United States decides to stand with the PRC, the ROC will not be able to confront with them because its abilities are not strong enough. Therefore, if the United States stands with the PRC, Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC will not be broken.

Second, after standing with the PRC and clarifying its position in Cross-Strait relations, the United States could design the relevant policies or rules to deal with the core incompatibility of Cross-Strait relations. For example, the United States can lead the PRC to support the ROC to develop the cultural and economic communications with other countries or international organizations. However, when the communications and cooperation between the ROC and other countries, the ROC will be asked to approve “One-China” policy. Obviously, compared to the other two scenarios, the feasibility of this scenario is relatively higher, because this scenario can help the United States, the PRC, and the ROC achieve the main goal that dealing with the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations effectively. Also, this scenario takes care of the benefits of all the United States, the PRC, and the ROC well, and it can be used to keep a balance in Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC.

7.0 Conclusion

Although modifying Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC may be a long-term process, the early warning and suitable prevention toward the potential conflicts in these complicated relations should promoted as soon as possible. During the process of promoting the prevention action, a suitable scenario should have the functions of stabilizing the Cross-Strait relations, providing the mediators such as the United States, with opportunities to play important roles, and containing the relatively high feasibility. In this case, the scenario that the United States stands with the PRC and supports “One-China” policy can be considered as the window of opportunity towards the tension of Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC. Although the scenario that were demonstrated in this paper still have some weaknesses, the feasibility of them is relatively higher than formerly historical trails. In fact, the reunification of PRC and ROC is not only the common goal of some people in PRC and ROC, but also the inevitable trend of the positive developments of Cross-Strait relations. As for the internal factors, although there are some powers such, as some people in DPP, in Taiwan would like to be isolated from China, there are also some people in KMT would like to support “One China” policy. In order to keep a relatively peaceful atmosphere in the Cross-Strait relations, PRC would not like to advocate wars, instead, the PRC government always keep a optimistic and friendly attitude towards the issues about the Cross-Strait relations. However, objectively, without the supports from other countries, especially the United States, the military power of ROC cannot compete with PRC. As for the external environment, Taiwan still cannot be identified as a state on the international stage or join the United Nations successfully under the intervention of China. Obviously, achieving the unification will be helpful for both PRC and ROC to improve their positions in the international arena.

References

Brands, Henry W. "Testing massive retaliation: credibility and crisis management in the Taiwan

Strait." International Security 12, no. 4 (1988): 124-151.

Chai, Winberg. "Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou's Historic 2015 Meeting in Singapore: An

Interpretation." Asian Affairs: An American Review 42, no. 4 (2015): 195-202.

Chen, Dean P. "The Strategic Implications of Ma Ying-jeou's "One ROC, Two Areas" Policy on

Cross-Strait Relations." American Journal of Chinese Studies 20, no. 1 (2013): 23-41.

Chen, Lung-chu, and W. M. Reisman. "Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title." The

Yale Law Journal 81, no. 4 (1972): 599-671. doi:10.2307/795213.

Cho, Hui-Wan. "China-Taiwan Tug of War in the WTO." Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (2005): 736-55.

doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.5.736.

Global Security.org. Taiwan Strait.