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3 TO BECOME A KNOWLEDGE CREATOR

In Chapter 3 our comparison between the various methodological views, the analytical view, the systems view and the actors view, is deepened. This is done primarily by, under specific headings, stressing their similarities and differences. What it means, “to become a knowledge creator” will be explored further in this chapter, especially in the sense of personal development.

WHAT IS SCIENCE?

Every serious attempt to explain the world or to understand it includes the following five questions as points of departure (compare with our three examples in Chapter 2): 1. Which are the ultimate presumptions held by the creator of knowledge? 2. Which kinds of questions are asked and from which perspective? 3. Which kind of conceptual set is used to formulate these questions and point out the

perspective?

The answers to these first three questions are of decisive importance to the last two: 4. Which kinds of methods and methodics are used to explain or understand the world? 5. Which kinds of answers or solutions are given to the questions and how are the results

presented?

Answers to each of these five questions should have a solid philosophical foundation. From the answers to these five questions, it is possible to distinguish various ways of

creating knowledge, that is, the various approaches to gaining knowledge about the world. One of the ways of creating knowledge about the world can be called scientific. Sometimes

it seems like there are as many “expert opinions” about what science is as there are “experts”. Still, we maintain that there is a relative unity in terms of explaining or understanding the world the scientific way – compared with other ways of doing so. The scientific way is specific in three aspects, all of which are both necessary and interrelated. First, each attempt that claims to be scientific is based on an explicit relation between

ideas and empirical observation and on an attempt to be relevant to a reality. What is “empirical” and what is “reality”, however, is debated in the scientific community (see Box 3.1). Therefore, one problem that every scientist has is that of convincing colleagues that

Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-03 13:13:32.

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his/her results, descriptions, explanations or understanding are supported or can be confirmed by empirical reality.

Box 3.1

Empiricism and Reality

What “reality” is and what the experience of this “reality” is – in other words “empiricism” – is a question that has been debated by philosophers for millennia. In order to illustrate the issue, we provide a few examples of ideas of “reality” and “empiricism” among “ideologists” in the history of science and philosophy:

There are those (e.g. Durkheim) who claim that creators of knowledge researching reality should look for “objective facts”, as “unspoiled” by “biased” subjective impressions as possible. There are those (e.g. Russell) who ask that every statement of reality should follow a certain logical form; otherwise the statement cannot be called “scientific” or “true”. There are others (e.g. Schutz) who claim that social science cannot progress if it is not based on an understanding of how subjective (and thereby social) reality emerges. There are people (e.g. Weber) who throughout their scientific life aim at making subjective reality objectively understandable. There are people (e.g. Kant) who assert that we cannot reach objective reality per se. Because we, through human necessity, always “cultivate” this reality when it is experienced, it can only appear to us in this cultivated form. There are those (e.g. Husserl) who believe that there is also a reality that does not depend on our sensory experiences, that is, a so-called transcendental reality. This reality is more a basic result of human conditions in reality than accumulated experiences as life progresses. There has been a lively discussion in philosophy whether or not this experience of reality can be called “empirical”. Husserl chose to talk about this reality as eidetical, to separate it from empirical reality.

So, there are truly different opinions about what “reality” and “empiricism” are. The reader should keep this in mind in order to understand the breadth we want to impart to what we mean by “scientific”. What is contained in the concepts of “reality” and “empiricism” is a decisive issue between different scientific schools in general and between different methodological views in particular. (For references and further reading on the subjects, see the Appendix.)

Second, using a scientific methodology necessarily means a conscious application of reasonably clearly formulated rules. Opinions vary about how strict these rules or methods should be – which will be evident in this book. In other words, all scientists worthy of the name attempt to find an explicit way of showing others – particularly other members of the

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scientific community – how they arrived at their results. Third, using a scientific methodology means that the scientist acknowledges that every

member of society has a legitimate right to protection from public scrutiny or of his/her private life. In other words, there are limits to the research that can be done on the public. These characteristics of scientific activities are general enough to allow for a variety of

opinions. They are valid whether you are dedicated to explaining, interpreting and/or understanding or whether you base your research on a specific philosophical school or research tradition. The concepts of explaining and understanding will be brought up later.

BEING A SCIENTIST AND CREATING KNOWLEDGE

It is not necessary to be a scientist to be a creator of knowledge. There are many studies that are based on “an explicit relation between ideas and empirical observations” and on “a conscious application of reasonably clearly formulated rules”, and that acknowledge that “every member of society has a legitimate right to protection from public scrutiny of his/her private life”. Such works, without claiming to be scientific, change our state of knowledge just as surely as advanced works of science. A principal difference between knowledge created the scientific way compared with other

ways (say as a consultant or as any other kind of investigator) is that some kinds of studies do not present their methods and results for public and critical scrutiny by other creators of knowledge (e.g. for reasons of confidentiality). This “principle of publicity” is central to scientific works. From a methodological point of departure, however, there needs to be no major differences

between various ways of creating knowledge. From this particular point of departure, we treat them as equal in Methodology for Creating Business Knowledge.

“PRACTISED” AND “RECONSTRUCTED” LOGIC

The American theorist of science Kaplan (1918–1974) makes an important distinction between “practised logic” and “reconstructed logic”. Practised logic is the path that researchers/consultants/investigators follow de facto (this path can be rather meandering); reconstructed logic is their presentation of this path (often somewhat straightened out). Some communities may simply demand a certain type of presentation of how a study was conducted and its results. Even if there were no such requirements, the presenter might still want to make the text more “pedagogic”, that is, to reconstruct his/her logic (compare with the aesthetical aspect of the paradigm concept).

Box 3.2

To Become a Creator of Knowledge Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-03 13:13:32.

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As mentioned in the text, it is not necessary to become a scientist (junior or senior) to become a creator of knowledge (see also Boxes 1.2 and 1.3). To become a creator of knowledge the way we look at it means as a first step to acquire that basic methodological thinking which is presented in this book. It means also, as a second step, that this consciousness includes being creative, open, aware and self-reflecting. So these are the qualities that you are training yourself for if you want to become a creator of knowledge, for instance, as a student. This is, of course, easier said than done, but we can assure you that it is worth the effort of trying! And the value includes not just a possible professional career, but, in the highest degree, also personal development. To be able to “decode” different research results of their ultimate presumptions is, in fact, very much about personal freedom. The freedom to be able to have one’s own ideas about research and science. The freedom to be able to handle adaptation and usage of business theories and models in completely new contexts. Even if it may seem difficult to become a creator of knowledge in the meaning of this

book, there are a few simple rules of thumbs, which might be of value in the process. You will never become a creator of knowledge if you are not willing to:

1. embrace curiosity and imagination 2. ackowledge the insight that knowledge involves manifestations of ultimate

presumptions as well 3. seek training in the concrete handicraft to develop knowledge 4. present new knowledge to others and be accountable for it

When reading presentations of how other creators of knowledge have proceeded, remember that in reality there is always a difference between practised and reconstructed logic. We also want to mention that some of the allure of creating knowledge is being able to

participate in “Aha!-experiences”. This is the creative side of these activities. And real creativity can hardly be presented at all!

A FEW BASIC DICHOTOMIES TO KEEP IN MIND

Most of this chapter will contain a more detailed comparison of our three methodological views. Before we proceed, however, we need to clarify some fundamental dichotomies that can be seen in Figure 3.1. The analytical view has a sole ambition to explain reality, a reality that it looks at as fact-

filled with objective and subjective facts which are summative, that is, its parts can be considered in isolation from other parts. The systems view may have as an ambition either to explain or to understand. In both cases

it looks at reality as full of facts as well, but unlike the analytical view it looks at reality as systemic, that is, its parts cannot be seen in isolation from each other but as more or less

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structured as relative wholes, called systems.

Figure 3.1 The Boundary Between Explanatory and Understanding Knowledge

When the analytical view and the systems view are looking for explanations, they build models, mental constructions made by the creator of knowledge where he/she is subtracting (neglecting) irrelevant facts and circumstances from the fact-filled (see Box 3.3) reality (seen as either additive or systemic respectively). The systems view may also look for understanding. This is pursued as in the case of building models by its creators of knowledge, but here he/she is adding metaphors, structural images, narratives and the like but all along they are seen as representing it.

Box 3.3

Models and Facts

In everyday language it is common to associate the concept of “model” with “prototype”, “paragon”, or “example”, that is, with some kind of ideal situation. This may also be the case in the context of creating knowledge. It is more common here, however, that a model stands for a reproduction of a piece of existing reality rather than a desirable reality (i.e. a picture or a representation vs. a prototype of a paragon). A photo is not, according to the analytical view, a “model”, however, nor are novels,

poems, or works of art considered to be “models”. What is required in order for a picture to be called a model according to this view is that the picture in question is deliberately simplified in order to highlight some important relations or circumstances. So, a model – in the context of creating knowledge in the analytical view and in the

systems view – is a deliberately simplified picture or prototype (representation) of a piece of the fact-filled reality. In the continuation of the book we denote this so-called “fact-filled reality”, as factive reality. The statement that the two views in question have different opinions of how this reality is based and arranged makes no difference to their perspective on what a model is – in principle. The concept of model is given another meaning in the actors view, as models are part of

constituting reality, not representing it only. An additional concept in this view that is given Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-03 13:13:32.

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another meaning is fact/factual. The meaning of these two should be read as “factified”. Something socially constructed.

The actors view has as its ambition to understand reality, seen as socially constructed. Whenever the actors view comes up with models as metaphors, structural images, narratives and the like, however, they are seen as constituting reality (being a part of it), not only representing it (as stand-alone pictures). Also, when creators of knowledge in the actors view aims at understanding, they do it in

dialogues with the actors in the study area, not by the creator of knowledge on his/her own, which can happen in the case of the systems view. Understanding through the systems view could be called representative understanding.

Understanding through the actors view could be called constitutive understanding.

REALITY ASSUMPTIONS

The first methodological view we consider is the analytical, which is also the oldest of the three. The analytical view is common in business research and consulting today, and it is also well represented in various public investigations. A large number of books on methodology for creating business knowledge take only into consideration the analytical view, even if in the preface and in the use of terminology they sometimes attempt to give a more “comprehensive” impression. The analytical view has its origins in classic analytical philosophy and has therefore a

deeply rooted tradition in Western thinking. Its assumption about the quality of reality is that reality is factive and has a summative character, that is, the whole is the sum of its parts. This means that once a knowledge creator gets to know the different parts of the whole, the

parts can be added together to get the total picture (see Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 The Analytical View: The Whole is the Sum of its Parts

Knowledge created based on the analytical view is characterized as being independent of the observer. This means that knowledge advances by means of formal logic that is represented by specific judgements, which are supposed to be independent of the creator of knowledge’s individual subjective experience. These judgements consist of assumptions that

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can be verified or falsified (hypotheses). Historically, the systems view is next. It came into business in the 1950s, partly as a reaction

to the summative picture of reality in the analytical view. It is no exaggeration to say that systems thinking is the dominant point of departure in business (in theory as well as in practise) today. It is very common in business to attempt a rather holistic perspective on problems. Early writers on the systems view in business include von Bertalanffy, Buckley, Churchman

and Emery. The assumption behind the systems view is as in the case of the analytical view that reality

is factive, but the systems view holds, unlike the analytical view, that reality is arranged in such a way that the whole differs from the sum of its parts. This means that not only the parts but also their relations are essential, as the latter will lead to plus or minus effects (synergy) (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 The Systems View: Synergy

Knowledge developed through the systems view depends on systems. The behaviour of individuals, as parts of a system, follows systems principles, that is, individuals are explained in terms of systems characteristics. Consequently, the systems view explains parts through the characteristics of the whole (of which they are parts). If we say instead that the whole is understood by the characteristics of its parts, we

describe the third view, the actors view, the most recent of the three. It appeared, shaped clearly enough for us to be able to talk about and develop it as a specific view, at the end of the 1960s. The person probably most associated with an actors perspective in business at its beginning was the English organizational sociologist Silverman, who had adapted the more important contributions to his “action frame of reference” from men like Husserl, Schutz and Weber. The actors view is not interested in explanations; rather, it is interested in understanding

social wholes. This is accomplished through the pictures of reality – the finite provinces of meaning – held by individual actors. The actors view is directed at reproducing the meaning(s) that various actors associate with their acts and the surrounding context. Reality

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is therefore taken as a social construction that is intentionally created by processes at different levels of meaning structures. From this it follows that our common language is given a different meaning relative to these levels. Wholes and parts are ambiguous and are continuously reinterpreted. In the actors view, systemic characteristics are not relevant to understanding businesses and

organizations. Interest is instead directed toward the finite provinces of meaning held by leading actors in a particular social context. Organizations as such cannot act, only their individual members can. According to this concept, systems – as these are seen in the systems view – are not real. The actors view asserts that such systems exist only in the head of the systems view knowledge creator and are therefore not based on the way actors interpret themselves in relation to their own experienced and constructed totality of meaning structures (see Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4 The Actors View: Meaning Structures

Knowledge developed with the actors view is therefore dependent on actors, even though it follows certain phenomenological principles (see Chapter 6 and the Appendix) as to how social reality is constructed. A review of the reality assumptions made by the three methodological views is presented

below:

Analytical view

The whole, which is factive, is equal to the sum of its parts. As long as it contains facts, knowledge can be objective as well as subjective. Parts are explained by verified judgements.

Systems view

The whole, which is factive as well, does not equal the sum of its parts. Knowledge depends on systems. Parts are explained or understood by the characteristics of the whole.

Actors view

The whole is socially constructed and exists as meaning structures, which are socially constructed. Knowledge depends on individuals. The whole is understood via the actors’ finite provinces of meaning.

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Please be aware that the systems view is critical of the analytical view, and the actors view is critical of both the analytical view and the systems view and that this criticism is by no means a one-way affair (even if it may appear that way in the text above). The three views currently direct various kinds of criticism at each other, which has led not only to fruitful development within the views themselves but also to various attempts at combining the three different methodologies. We will return to this criticism and these attempts in Chapter 13. We present each of the three views on its own terms, and we need additional bases for this

comparison so the reader will be able to compare them better. Remember that these bases can never be completely consistent across the views: each view shapes its own base according to its own individual logic. This gives the views partly separate content and meaning (see Box 3.4).

Box 3.4

Picture of Reality and Finite Province of Meaning

The reader has probably noted that we use the concept of “picture of reality” in the analytical and the systems view and that we use the concept of “finite province of meaning” in the actors view. These concepts are, in a way, related. They both refer to means by which individuals orient themselves in this world. The difference between the two, a difference that the reader will learn to appreciate more in the course of this book, is that the “picture of reality” stands for an image of an external world; “finite provinces of meaning” is reality.

PREREQUISITES, EXPLANATIONS, UNDERSTANDING AND RESULTS

Based on the different assumptions about reality made by our three views, a number of subsequent theses have been developed that specify the prerequisites in order for each of the three views to function. These prerequisites in turn determine the form of explanations and understanding involved, and the results to aim for.

Consider the following: You want to expand your company. You have a well-established position in the part of the country where you started, and now you want to go further by opening a new branch office in region C, where you have never operated before. You want to be just as successful there as you are now at your original site. You set up certain objectives for market share, turnover, customer value, and profit – these are your desired results. In order to accomplish this, you decide to develop a model (a crib) or an interpretation on

your terms of the relations that you believe to exist among the various factors – pricing, product choice, employee motivation, customer preferences, competition and organization. You are looking for explanations in the first case and representative understanding in the second.

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If, however, you believe that results are inevitably connected with the individuals involved in your expansion project, the language and symbols they use or the interpretations they make, and the relation of it all to customers as individuals as well, you are seeking a constitutive understanding. Your explanations or your understandings are based on certain assumptions, such as, the size

of the new market you are looking at, the experience and background of your employees and customers, the financial power of your company, your desire to build up an organization at the new site that will be similar to the successful one you already have, and your belief in the will power and creative ability of those involved. These are your prerequisites.

The initial conditions just referred to determine to a large extent the forms of explanations, understandings and results. This example should be regarded only as an illustration of the relations among prerequisites, explanations, understandings and results: It is not intended to illustrate a specific methodological view, because each of our three views would present both objections and additions to the example.

The analytical view

Prerequisite: existing theory and a number of techniques given in advance that make rendering the verification or falsification of stated hypotheses possible when the techniques are used properly. Verified or falsified hypotheses clarify facts that are subsets of the factive reality. When these facts are added together, a more complete picture is obtained. This follows from the assumption of the summative character of its factive reality. Explanation: in the ideal case reproducing causal relations, which means seeking to

explain some effect by finding the prior or current cause. The view’s assumption about reality gives the following situation: the greater the number of proven causes (or proven effects), the stronger the explanation. The analytical view assumes that it is possible at all levels to argue “ceteris paribus”, that is, “other things being equal” or, “all other things remaining unchanged”. Result: cause–effect relations, logical models and representative cases. The result should

have a generalizable character in order to be a prerequisite of continuing research/consulting/investigation. The character of the result follows naturally from the factive and summative assumption of reality. The fact that reality is seen as factive and summative and independent of its observers leads knowledge creators who use the analytical view to express themselves in relation to their results with the words: “These explanations are good, but they can always be improved!” The conception of reality held within the analytical view also makes it important to keep in constant contact with what is called the research front. It is from this front that judgements are made whether progress in the process of a summative creation of knowledge has taken place.

The systems view

Prerequisite: existing systems theory, which, however, is not used in the same general way, as Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-03 13:13:32.

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are theories in the analytical view. This follows from the assumption that wholes in reality are always seen to differ from the sum of their parts. For this reason the systems view operates with analogies normally based on similarities in structure and form with other findings as a prerequisite of research/consulting/investigation. Explanation or understanding: reproducing finality relations, which leads to seeking to

explain or understand a particular result by finding a force with a structural pattern. Result: Starting from the assumption of synergistic effects in reality (e.g. 2 + 1 + 3 ≠ + 8),

the results yielded by the systems view will be structural models or representative interpretations delivered by the creator of knowledge. This in turn will lead to typical cases and certain general classification mechanisms for different kinds of cases (see Box 3.5).

Box 3.5

Causality and Finality

Relations between various phenomena and events can be seen in different ways. If a relation is seen as causal, it means that an event either must lead to another event by necessity (deterministically) or with a certain probability (stochastically). If the result is explained by the purpose behind the driving force, the relation is called a finality relation (sometimes called teleological). If we ask, for example, why a company has a budget, a causal explanation could be: “The budget was established by the founder of the firm and the bank requires a continuation.” A finality explanation could be: “Senior management feel the budget makes them better able to plan the company’s future.” Note that teleological explanations only are meaningful in the human world, that is, where

conscious actions can take place in order to achieve some purpose. For example, explaining, “Why do birds have wings?” by saying “They must to be able to fly” sounds frivolous. In order to separate finality relations in the systems view from causal relations in the

analytical view, we will talk in the systems view about producer–product relations instead of cause–effect relations.

The actors view

Prerequisite: various metatheories (more fundamental “theories of theories” that inevitably include the people using them) that give general starting points for the function of human consciousness and the social construction of reality, along with guidelines for different constitutive interpretive procedures and interactive actions in the study area. Furthermore, previous actors view research/consultations/investigations will result in certain “general” contributions as far as constitutional factors are concerned; constitutional factors are part of what is denoted as an ideal-typified language (see “Result” section below). These theories and contributions are associated with the knowledge creator’s development of understanding in

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interaction with the other actors. The assumption in the actors view that reality is socially constructed means that the

situational contributions (descriptive languages) from previous actors’ research/consulting/investigation can only be included as experiential material (for developing and maintaining skills in the area of knowledge creation), and can therefore never constitute starting points given in advance (see Box 3.6).

Box 3.6

Constitute

Constitute as a concept, stands for constructing social reality and/or making it visible. In this process it is possible to find “general” factors that make the construction of reality understandable. The quotation marks here indicate that this is not the same type of generality as is the case for the conception of a factive reality in the other two views. The generality as a social science phenomenon is also regarded by the actors view as socially constructed (a social invention, as it were); for which reason it can be questioned, changed, and transformed.

Understanding: describing dialectical relations, which means trying to understand relations among (constitutive) interpretations made by various actors in relation to different levels of meaning structures. The relations being sought are not relations in the sense used earlier, but rather how various constitutive interpretations and factors mutually and in constant transformation influence each other in a continuous developmental process in which reality is socially constructed (see Box 3.7).

Box 3.7

Dialectics

The word dialectics comes from the Greek word dialektos (through “discourse”). The dialectic procedure brings to light contradictions and other types of opposition. The origin of dialectics may be attributed to Socrates and Plato, with the Sophists in a supporting role. The role of the dialectic process, the interpretation of its nature and the understanding of its importance vary widely in the history of philosophy, depending on the position of the philosopher in question. For Plato, dialectics embodied the highest knowledge and formed the capstone of the

sciences. For Kant, dialectics became the term for man’s misguided effort to apply the principles governing phenomena to what we can never completely reach, that is, “things-in- themselves”. The German Kantian Fichte (1762–1814) was the first to present the process of dialectics as involving the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. He also regarded the

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process as one of posit, counterposit and synthesis. Hegel and Marx frequently used the dialectic process as a model for development. For us, dialectics stands for the logic of ambiguity. “Dialectic relations” mean that the

relations are ambiguous and change qualitatively in a continuous transformation. To describe dialectic relations means, for the actors view, to make this socially transforming and transcendental interaction visible and comprehensible.

The actors view also aims at pointing out “general” constitutional factors. The relations that are sought in this methodological view can be seen as having both an internal and an external character. The internal character is related to getting the actors to understand their own situation better – a kind of (internally) emancipative understanding. The external character can be seen as consisting of procreative understanding. To create, to transform, to vivify and to change hold unique and desirable positions in this view. Because reality is perceived as a human construction, why shouldn’t creators of knowledge actively participate, expressing responsibility for their actions? This is both the question and the answer that the actors view gives because of its own prerequisites (see above). Result: Depending on the type of understanding sought – the description of dialectic

relations with or without aiming for internal and/or external emancipation – the result of the actors view commonly consists of descriptive languages such as situational interpretive models; ideal-typified languages that concern typified cases and constitutional ideals; and emancipatory interactive action out in the study area (see Boxes 3.8 and Box 3.9; see Table 3.1 for a review of the foregoing discussion).

Box 3.8

Explain, Understand and Emancipate

Earlier, we made a distinction between “explaining” and “understanding”. In the latter case many creators of knowledge go further, looking for possibilities for “emancipation”. This can be internal, that is, it can “end” with the creator of knowledge making the actors aware of their locked-in frames of reference. It can also be external, with the creator of knowledge actively creating conditions for a genuinely new kind of thinking, transformation and change.

Box 3.9

Average, Typical and Typified

To create knowledge means almost by definition to make descriptions of more than one perhaps unique case. Such “more general descriptions” can be based on different assumptions and therefore acquire different characteristics. If we believe in a factive (but generally describable) reality that is independent of us as

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observers, we may calculate statistically average descriptions – for example, that “an average small exporting company in Country S has 4.3 employees per country being exported to, and that its general manager has an average education of 12.5 years” (the analytical view). With the same objective basis we might instead say, as an example, that “a typical (most

frequent, modal) small company in Country S can be described as a system with four employees per country being exported to, and its general manager is an educated economist of some sort” (the systems view). If we don’t believe in a factive reality we talk about another type (or ideal type). We say,

perhaps, that “a typified (ideal-typified) Country S small export company consists of a smaller group per country being exported to, which constitutes just the critical mass of actors necessary to develop the company in this country, where the leader as far as relevant areas are concerned is somewhat more educated than the others”. The purpose in this case is not to reproduce (statistically or in any other way) an external independent reality (which we in this case consider to be constantly moving), but deliberately to isolate certain relations to improve the understanding of what may happen in “Country S’s small export companies” (the potential as an intrinsic part of what is, or seems, factual) (the actors view).

A recapitulation

Table 3.1 provides a recapitulation of what has been said so far. As it is based on partly incompatible presumptions (it would be interpreted differently from the actors view point of departure compared with starting from the other views, for instance), it is better seen as a typified description (compare Box 3.9).

MORE ABOUT REALITY, EXPLAINING, UNDERSTANDING AND RESULTS

The analytical view

The goal in the analytical view is to explain the factive reality as exactly as possible. Explanations of this reality take, ideally, the form of causal relations. The terms cause and effect are then used. In all versions of the analytical view, reality is assumed to be built up by summative components.

Table 3.1 A Recapitulation

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According to the analytical view, a causal relation exists between two groups of factors, X (the causes, sometimes called independent variables) and Y (the effects, sometimes called dependent variables), if the following three requirements are met:

Requirement 1 There must be a relation between X and Y. Requirement 2 Y must not precede X in time (but X and Y can be contemporary).

Requirement 3 Relations other than X→Y are excluded, or at least do not give a better explanation (see Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5 The Black Sheep of the Cause-family

In order to achieve an acceptable explanation of a certain effect, a sufficient number of causes is required. The view leads to the ambition to find causes that are independent of each other (see Figure 3.6).

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Figure 3.6 Cause and Effect

Causal relations can be of two kinds: deterministic or stochastic. In deterministic causal relations, the causes give both necessary and sufficient conditions for an effect. In stochastic causal relations, on the other hand, the causes may be necessary, but they are not sufficient. In other words, there is a “chance” that the effect in question will not take place in the given situation even if the causes are present. This may be because the model constructed is not inclusive enough (there are other causes that are not included) or because it is not detailed enough. These conceptions mean, among other things, that if a cause is not included in a model, the

result will be a less good (but possibly still acceptable) picture of the phenomenon (see Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7 More Causes Make a Better Explanation in the Analytical View

Another basis for the analytical methodological view is that, when moving from one research/consulting/investigation situation to another that is similar, the former situation could be very useful. Similarity between the two situations β and Ω below may be such that it is possible to use the same model, even though the causes themselves might be different.

Situation β Y = 4 + A + 6B + 2C - 4D

Situation Ω Y = 4 + A + 5B - C - 4D

Consider the mathematical expressions in the above two situations as pedagogic examples only. Although it is common to do so, it is in no way necessary to work with mathematical symbols in the analytical view. Also, the expressions above do not have to be linear for the logic to be valid. A constant goal of the analytical view is to collect data about factive reality. This data

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collection is controlled by hypotheses, that is, by possible descriptions and explanations that are formulated at the beginning of the study. Such research/consulting/investigation results in a theory constructed of verified hypotheses

– descriptions and explanations of factive reality – that have not been proven false. As more and more of the hypotheses in a theory are verified, the theory is considered to be a better and better representation of factive reality. It gains a general character. Its use does not depend on any individual; it is at the disposal of anyone with the interest and competence to use it. The theory also becomes absolute in the sense that users do not have to go back to the situation in which the theory was developed in order to use it. The theory is therefore assumed to be true and not dependent on anyone’s idiocracy. We may call this knowledge independent of individual observers (see Table 3.2 for a recap of the analytical view).

Table 3.2 Analytical View

• Conception of reality:

A factive (objective and/or subjective) reality that can be described as consisting of summative components.

• Knowledge independent

Descriptions and explanations of reality are general and absolute. of individual observers:

• Explanations:

The analytical researcher/consultant/investigator seeks causal relations, that is, necessary and sufficient relations between cause and effect (deterministic relations) or necessary but not sufficient relations between cause and effect (stochastic relations).

• Result: The theory of reality becomes ever better, consisting of more and more verified hypotheses.

• Prerequisites for continuing:

When studying new problems the researcher/consultant/investigator can build on existing theory for the problem area in question. However, new results may falsify earlier results.

The systems view

The systems view also assumes the existence of a factive reality that researchers/consultants/investigators consider their primary field of interest. Creators of knowledge presume that this “systems” reality is constructed somewhat differently than the reality of the analytical view. Systems reality is assumed to consist of components that are often mutually dependent on each other – which means that they cannot be “summed up”. The structure of these components brings about synergistic effects. This means that not only the content of the individual components, but also the way they are put together, provides information. The whole is more (or is less) than the sum of its parts. What is required for reaching an acceptable explanation or understanding of a specific situation is to consider the

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more total picture. The systems researcher/consultant/investigator asserts that it is possible to discern such “wholes” or “more total pictures” in factive reality. In the systems view, it is not possible to remove any of the factors from a systems picture

without risking that the more total picture will be seriously affected. Note the difference in the two structures in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8 All Factors are Necessary in the Systems View

In Picture B, component K has been removed, which also removes all connections with K. Picture B differs so much from Picture A that it may no longer give a satisfactory image of the whole. This is easy to see if Component V is the one we want to explain or understand. It is not possible to add the separate components together (they are not independent of each other). We may well have to consider all five components in Picture A in order to reach an acceptable explanation or understanding of what we are looking for – hence the name “system”, or whole. Another important difference between the systems and the analytical views is that the

systems view denies the usefulness of looking for single-dimensional causal relations. In the systems view, the creator of knowledge looks instead for forces that influence the system as a whole (or results which the system as a whole will contain). Such a force might be that one constellation of components proves to be more or less functional in a specific situation than another constellation. Another possibility is that the force is a goal perceived by the system (or its members). A third possible force is the active behaviour (or ambitions) of individuals who are part of the system. There are further possibilities. These forces may (or may not) be part of what is normally called the systems structure. We will call these finality connections between forces and their results in the systems view

producer–product connections (see Figure 3.9) to differentiate them from the cause–effect relations in the analytical view. Working with producer–product (vs. cause–effect) connections means – among other things

– not having to satisfy Requirements 2 and 3 of the requirements for causal relations listed above (p. 61). Furthermore, the background and intervening variables may be exactly the kind of relations we are looking for to improve our picture of the real system and of the possible synergistic effects embedded in its relations.

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Figure 3.9 Producer–Product Connections

It is also possible for a producer to lead to alternative products (multifinality) and for alternative producers to lead to the same product (equifinality; see Figure 3.10). This is because there is always a time lag between producer and product, and an interaction between the system and its environment in the meantime. During this interim period, interaction with the environment or active interference by the members of the system may change the course of the system.

Figure 3.10 Multifinality and Equifinality

Note the difference between Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.6, which depicts the analytical view. In Figure 3.6 we referred to several simultaneously operating causes, whereas the systems view has alternative (mutually exclusive) producers or products. The systems view also leads to a different attitude toward using the experiences from one

study in another (similar) study. The results of a systems study (and therefore the prerequisites for another) do not result in an absolute theory (as understood in the analytical view), neither for the components of a model, nor for the way such components must be structured or behave. Systems creators of knowledge use the experience and the results from earlier studies only as mental inspiration for analogies or metaphors when they conduct studies of systems with similar orientation and content (see also Box 3.10).

Box 3.10

Analysis and Actor

There are many conceptual confusions in our subject area of business. Two of them should Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-03 13:13:32.

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be brought up here. An analysis can be made within all three of our methodological views. Also, it is possible to be an actor within the systems view. An analysis, according to the analytical view, consists of dissecting an object into its

parts, studying the separate parts, and then putting them back together again in the same relationship to each other. This dissection and recombination can take place either in imagination or in reality. An analysis in the systems view consists of explaining or understanding the relations of

an object’s parts to each other, to the totality, and to the environment (including the relations of this whole object as such to the environment) while keeping the object as a whole entity. Alternatively, we can say that a systems analysis always leads to a systems synthesis. An analysis as understood by the analytical view does not lead to some kind of total combination. The analysis concept is also sometimes used in the actors view in order to emphasize an

interest in looking at different parts and their ambiguous (dialectic) relations to each other. More common within the actors view, however, is the concept of diagnosis, to stress an interest in understanding (we will come back to the concept of diagnosis in Chapter 6). The concept of actor is sometimes used in the systems view. Then it is not a question of

causal relations (as in the analytical view) because individuals (especially if they are powerful) can “destroy” or change any such relation if they want to. Nor is it a question of any dialectic relations (as in the actors view) even if this term is sometimes used carelessly here. It is rather a question of finality relations (as in the systems view), that is, a behaviour (among separate individuals or in the system as a whole) aimed at achieving certain results. The fundamental difference between actors in the systems view and in the actors view is

that the former act within a factive framework. (Creators of knowledge mean here that subjective conceptions are facts as well.) Within the actors view, actors are regarded as free creators who nevertheless objectify various phenomena (i.e. treat them as if they were objective; we will return shortly to this concept). An emancipatory knowledge interest, however, aims at making visible to the actors that these phenomena are merely treated as objective without them having to be so. These definitional and conceptual displacements between the different views are

extensive. They are fully visible only when used against a background of the separate ultimate presumptions made by these same views.

An early version of systems theory, the so-called general systems theory (which will be treated in Chapter 5), claimed that the goal of the systems view should be to find different systems and to derive typical behavioural patterns for these types. In its early days, the systems view was also seen as a way to bridge the gaps among various disciplines in the technical, biological and social (including business) fields. In fact, some of the terminology of these “bridging” goals are still with us in Business today: for instance, survival, adaptation, dominance, niches, dynamics and feedback (terms that are taken from biology and technology). It is fair to say that the systems view still has some of its interdisciplinary ambitions, even if

they are much more limited. Many commentators claim, for instance, that Business is Arbnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (2008). Methodology for creating business knowledge. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from indwes on 2021-03-03 13:13:32.

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essentially a conglomerate of selected parts of, say, Sociology, Psychology, Ethics, Economics, and Economic History that, lacking a core of its own, is placed in a systems-oriented framework. Modern systems view is also more ambitious to gaining than was traditionally the case

(more of this in Chapter 5). Knowledge developed by the systems view does not become general in the same absolute

way as knowledge developed by the analytical view. Theoretical knowledge becomes related to one or several types of system or to specific systems phenomena, and we therefore speak of systems-dependent knowledge. Table 3.3 presents a recap of the systems view.

Table 3.3 Systems View

• Conception of reality:

A factive (objective or subjective) reality, consisting of wholes, the outstanding characteristic of which is synergy.

• Knowledge dependent on system:

The description of reality consists of pictures of systems or parts of such systems. These pictures, however, are normally not regarded as general but as valid only for specific systems classes.

• Explanation or understanding:

The researcher/consultant/investigator seeks finality relations (producer– product relations), i.e. relations among (systems) forces and their (positive or negative) results as explanations, or comes up with representative interpretations as understanding.

• Result: The theory of reality becomes an ever better explanation or understanding of the behaviour of different classes of systems. Even the classification itself is changing and improving.

• Prerequisites for continuing:

When studying new problems, the researcher/consultant/investigator is relatively free to draw analogies or come up with metaphors being inspired by the results of earlier (similar) studies. These analogies, however, must be adapted to the specific case, which could mean a rather unique (or at least contingent) picture of the new system.

The actors view

The actors view differs markedly from both the analytical and the systems views and their assumption of a factive reality, independent of its observers. The reality assumed by the actors view (or at least the reality of interest to the social sciences) exists only as a social construction, which means that it is not independent of us, its observers. Reality is thus regarded as consisting of a number of finite provinces of meaning that are shared by a larger or smaller number of people. These different provinces have separate sociocultural significances. The finite provinces of meaning can overlap to varying degrees. The overlapping parts constitute common parts of reality for an inclusive group of people, which

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may be an organization or an entire society. The parts that are held in common by the group, organization and/or society (see Figure 3.11) can be called an objectified reality, but this reality is not objective in the sense of the other two views.

Figure 3.11 Objectified Reality in the Actors View

This objectivity is created by people and can therefore be questioned and changed. Furthermore, these objectified parts of reality or their meaning influence, in turn, the people who created them. The relations between that which people create and how these creations in turn influence the creators are dialectical. We continuously reinterpret the sets of meaning that are in play in these relations, resulting in meaning that becomes ambiguous and relations that therefore becomes dialectic. One very fixed objectified meaning structure, shared by practically everyone, is that we

should not kill any fellow human being – but this objectified reality is reinterpreted if we enter a state of war. The concept “to kill” is then given a quite different meaning, one that even the clergy can justify. In war, we substitute the concept enemy for fellow human being, because this concept legitimizes killing, legally as well as ethically and morally. If we move down the hierarchy of meaning structures, we come eventually to the level of

subjective finite provinces of meaning. As an example, consider the two different meanings the concept “poor” will probably have for one and the same actor, first when applying for a bank loan (to be able to borrow money you must, as we know, have assets that enable you to pay it back with interest) and then when applying for social welfare (which will not be granted if you do have any direct assets). Similarly, we can think of other conflicting meanings a person might have, depending on the situation in which he or she is placed. An actor’s various meanings and interpretations acquire their structure from the finite

provinces of meaning by which actors orient themselves, and also from those that actors orient themselves toward, that is, other actors’ provinces. These finite provinces of meaning are further developed through these interpretations and significances. Reality (the provinces of meaning – the thesis) and the actors’ interpretations (the antithesis) stand in a mutual dialectic

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relation to each other – they are reformulated in a continuous process of change (synthesis). Over time, change becomes more evident at the subjective than at the objective level

(compare the interpretation of “to kill”, which in many countries has not been changed for hundreds of years). In this sense we can regard subjectivity and objectivity as endpoints on a scale. That is, the more objectively something is socially constructed, the fewer reinterpretations; and the more subjectively something is socially constructed, the more reinterpretations. So reality consists, as mentioned before, of different levels of meaning structures, and language will be given different meaning in relation to these levels. This means that in the actors view, social science, unlike natural science, studies phenomena

that consist of concepts – the actors’ conceptions of their experiences. Because phenomena are constituted by the actors’ experiences, which are constructed through their egological sphere, this finite province of meaning and egological sphere must be comprehended before any kind of understanding can be reached. Criminals do not perceive the law code as a guide (see Figure 3.12); in their finite province of meaning it is seen as a threat to their existence.

Figure 3.12 Different Meaning Structures

How criminals establish meaning and interpret this threat, along with their total life situation, makes it possible for us to understand why they repeatedly commit crimes in spite of knowing the legal consequences. Similarly, a purchasing manager who always buys too much of a particular product is none the less rational if this is seen in the light of the finite province of meaning (and egological sphere) that controls the interpretation. The behaviour of this manager will hardly be changed by pointing out that, once again, too much has been purchased. The purchasing manager might well be aware of this, but gives it a different interpretation than the environment does – in a way that relates to his or her finite province of meaning and egological sphere, which are, after all, what control the purchase. The same idea, but to a greater degree, is valid for people who have developed a

pathological pattern of action. No matter how hard a psychotherapist might try to explain to a patient that a particular problem might be due to a dysfunctional relationship between the patient and the patient’s mother, it doesn’t help. The patient, like the purchasing manager, may know this, but it does not help because the action is interpreted through the finite province of

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meaning (which is consistent with the person’s egological sphere) that led to the pathology in the first place. In the actors view, the therapist must try to make the patient aware of the finite province of meaning that led to the disturbance. This means that there are people who are unable to see certain things in spite of the fact that nothing is wrong with their eyes or their neurological functions. The problem is that their finite province of meaning neither allows nor makes it possible for them to see these things. When talking about information in everyday life (e.g. business, organizations, society), the

expression “in one ear and out the other” is all too often confirmed. According to the actors view, the problem is usually that the people who receive information do not have the finite provinces of meaning from which the information was developed and that would allow them to interpret the information in a way that is meaningful for them. Compare this ideal-typified description of an information problem with how politicians and people in senior positions often believe that this kind of problem can be solved by providing more information. Having a more insightful outlook on this situation would, according to the actors view, make it possible to save large sums of money in the transfer of information in both business and society. The above can be called the first basis for understanding in the actors view. According to

this view, the creator of knowledge must first understand the finite provinces of meaning by which different actors orient themselves before they can understand actions in the social world. If this first understanding is not reached, any subsequent understanding of why the actors act the way they do cannot be reached either. If this is related to what we said earlier about different actors’ finite provinces of meaning and these actors’ interpretations standing in a mutually dialectic relation (being developed in a constant interaction with other actors), we will have the second basis for understanding in the actors view – an understanding of these dialectic relations. When we understand how different finite provinces of meaning interact, develop and change through these relations, we can also understand why something changes in a sociocultural life-world the way it does, to use a phenomenological term (see Figure 3.13). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the understanding that is sought in the actors view may

have both an external and an internal character. The internal character has to do with getting actors to come to a better understanding of their situation – that is, how their finite provinces of meaning both control and are related to their interpretations and acts, and to the organizational and taken-for-granted social structures in which they exist. This emancipatory interest can, in turn, create circumstances for a genuinely new way of thinking, acting and of creating, which is the external character of understanding. So far, understanding is done by the actors themselves. The creator of knowledge (who is an

actor as well, of course) also reaches an understanding that is expressed. This explicit understanding (which is based on the understanding reached by the knowledge creator) in turn aims at bringing the actors to an understanding and/or creating circumstances for a new way of thinking and acting. This brings us to the form of the results in the actors view. The knowledge creator’s understanding is presented as results in the form of a general

language for the actual problems or phenomena. The different parts of understanding are related to each other and are connected to previous experiences and results, as well as to what we earlier referred to as metatheoretical starting points, whereby such general languages can be developed. We will henceforth talk about descriptive languages and ideal-typified

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languages – or simply language/language development – to represent the various interrelated models that depict the results of the actors view.

Figure 3.13 Finite Provinces of Meaning in Dialectic Relations

Language/language development, then, means that the everyday language used by actors is transformed or abstracted to a scientific language (lacking a better word, we call this language “scientific” although it is not restricted to scientists; any researcher/consultant/investigator can construct and/or use it) for creating knowledge, which, however, does not mean that the language as such becomes more abstract (in relation to concrete), but only that the descriptive elements of the language are separated and developed (more about this below and in Chapter 6). Knowledge developed by means of the actors view is dependent on individuals in the sense

that it refers to the ways in which different actors or groups of actors perceive, interpret and act in the reality they themselves have helped to create. Yet the results from the actors view must not be seen as giving an understanding relative only to specific individuals. The results,

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because of the assumption about reality in the actors view, also have a broader significance in that they contribute to a general understanding of different contexts of structural meaning and of the dialectic processes that create social reality. Furthermore, the results may include certain “general” contributions, such as typified cases and constitutional factors. Figure 3.14 on the next page demonstrates the actors view models mentioned earlier in Table 3.1. As descriptive languages, situational interpretive models focus on how different actors’

finite provinces of meaning lead to the same or to different interpretations and acts. Institutional models focus on how objectified provinces of meaning develop a life of their

own as taken-for-granted structures in relation to an individual actor’s interpretations. Process models focus on how interpretations and finite provinces of meaning are developed

in actor relations. Social change is understood based on how these finite provinces of meaning develop and change over time. Ideal-typified language is a more “general” contribution from actors’

research/consulting/investigation. The ideal types consist of an abstraction of the above said. The abstracting involves development of the language’s descriptive elements. This abstraction takes place, though it may sound strange, through a reduction, which means that the creator of knowledge gradually separates interpretations and acts from what is factual and actual, and concentrates on the functions of human consciousness as such. Ideal-typified languages have an important dialectic function because they also tend to point out that which is potential as an intrinsic part of what is factual (the antithesis of everyday language). Models of typified cases contain descriptions of different groups of actors from the

perspective of “typified actors with typified actors’ perceptions (finite provinces of meaning) acting as a type under typified circumstances”. Models of constitutional ideals describe the constitutional ideals of social reality. For creators of knowledge who choose the actors view as their starting point, it follows as a

natural consequence of the reality assumptions about a socially constructed reality that they, during their knowledge-creating work, are also active parts of this dialectic. Among the prerequisites of the actors view (see below) is an interactive development of understanding by the creators of knowledge as an indispensable part of the everyday dialectics in the research/consulting/investigation field. When we then look at the actors view results, we can see how this everyday dialectic

process of thesis–antithesis–synthesis accumulates different interpretations and is transformed into a higher, qualitative form through the language developed by the creator of knowledge. The descriptive and ideal-typified languages emerge as the antithesis of everyday language. The creator of knowledge’s emancipatory interactive action in the research/consulting/investigation field constitutes the synthesis – that is, the active process that creates new social reality together with the actors in the field. From a methodological point of departure, in other words, it is the active part, the creative process itself, not its result, that constitutes the synthesis. This dialectic methodology of the actors view might be illustrated as in Figure 3.15.

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Figure 3.14 A Summary of Actors View Models

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Figure 3.15 The Dialectic Methodology of the Actors View

Models 1 to 5 in Figure 3.14 and the emancipatory interactive action can, to a certain extent, be seen as a developmental hierarchy in which the most highly developed form is the fifth model together with interactive action. This does not mean that the results of the actors view must necessarily contain all five models and the interactive action element. How far the creator of knowledge goes is decided on a case-by-case basis and depends on the purpose of the study. How the language of the actors view is developed and what it might look like will be

presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 12. Circumstances for continued research/consulting/investigation, as mentioned earlier, consequently become a “general understanding of different situations of meaning structure and those dialectic processes creating social reality” (Models 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 3.14), and “general” contributions (Models 4 and 5 in Figure 3.14) and the experiences of the researcher’s/consultant’s/investigator’s emancipatory interactive action out in the study area. It is important to realize that this is related to the interactive development of understanding in future studies. Furthermore, creators of knowledge have different metatheories at their disposal (we will come back to those theories in Chapter 6). Table 3.4 offers a recap of the actors view.

Table 3.4 Actors View

• Conception of reality:

A socially constructed reality that consists of different levels of meaning structures. Human beings (the generating actors) and reality (what is generated) stand in a mutual dialectic relation to each other (we create reality at the same time as reality creates us).

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• Knowledge dependent on individuals, including the knowledge creator:

Reality is described by denoting conceptual meaning at various structural levels, which is based on how different actors (individuals) perceive, interpret, and act in reality (their egological sphere).

• Understanding

The researcher/consultant/investigator attempts to understand and describe dialectic relations, i.e. ambiguous relations that are continuously reinterpreted and given different meaning.

• Result:

Through the understanding sought for, our knowledge of those processes that socially construct reality will grow. The result is presented in various forms of descriptive language and ideal-typified language and by emancipatory interactive action out in the field.

• Prerequisites for continuing:

Use of the actors view is very much based on a personal and conscious development within the creator of knowledge himself/herself. The actors creators of knowledge will over time develop something we might call craftsmanship in creating knowledge (craft as creative activity and not as a repetition of routines). This will be of help in attacking new problems. Researchers/consultants/investigators also have metatheories at their disposal that provide essential starting points for a “general” understanding of the function of human consciousness and for the construction of social reality. Furthermore, these metatheories give guidelines for constitutive interpretive procedures to be applied by the creator of knowledge to him/herself and to others. The “general” contribution provided by previous research/consulting/investigation as constitutional factors also gives starting points a priori. Other “general” contributions, that is, typified cases, are only a guide for thinking in analogies. Experiences from emancipatory interactive actions out in the field raise the quality of “craftsmanship” resources as well, of course, in order to continue to create knowledge within the framework of the actors view.

This chapter has presented the basic conditions for the three methodological views, their similarities and differences, describing how the views are focusing relations in reality and how they differ. As the analytical view chooses to look at these relations as causal, the systems view talks about the relations in terms of finality and the actors view them as dialectical. Furthermore, the chapter has illustrated how the views lead to different results and conditions for further development of research. We have gone deeper into each of the three views under their own headings and illustrated them through a number of figures and sketches, which, also in the way they have been designed, try to convey some of the differences between the views. There are also several summarizing tables to simplify comparisons between them.

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POINTS OF REFLECTION

1. At the end of Chapter 2 you could follow how a number of questions evolved in front of an imaginative knowledge creation task in the study area of entrepreneurship. These questions can also be seen in this chapter. When looking at various answers given to these questions it is possible to separate … What?

2. In the chapter we can find words like explain and understand. Give a short description of these concepts as you see them “in everyday life”. Relate your opinion to how they are looked at from a scientific point of departure. Which differences and similarities can you see between everyday life opinion and the scientific one?

3. The methodological views represent different conceptions of reality. Give your version of them and clarify to yourself what the different views mean for working with creating knowledge.

4. In the chapter concepts like finality, dialectic and causal relations are mentioned. Describe the relations between a company and its customers in a finality way, dialectical and causal. Discover the differences!

5. What does it mean that something is general? 6. From what view did you start when you answered the question above about the

meaning of general? Can you summarize how the different views look at what this “general” issue is?

7. What are “Cause–effect relations, classifications and descriptive languages” examples of?

8. Sometimes there is a mention about background and/or intervening variables. Can you give an example to illustrate what these two concepts stand for?

9. Sometimes there is a mention of multifinality and/or equifinality. How would you argue with these concepts as a background if you were a research manager and were in a situation where you want to initiate a project to develop a new mobile phone? Justify your arguments.

10. What does your finite provinces of meaning look like? 11. In the chapter you can read about models in several different ways. Detail some of the

different definitions/conceptualizations that exist in the chapter. 12. Thesis–antithesis–synthesis are three important concepts, but in what methodological

view? And what do they stand for?