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Diplomacy & Statecraft, 26:571–590, 2015 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0959-2296 print/1557-301X online DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2015.1096658

ARTICLES

Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary

JOHN M. THOMPSON

There is a broad consensus about the ways in which public opinion and domestic politics influenced American foreign policy during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. Historians generally concur that the American public was ignorant about and uninterested in inter- national politics. They also agree that the president’s perception of public sentiment and his reading of the political landscape played essentially negative roles; that is, they were constraints at the point of implementation, rather than factors that shaped the substance of his policy, and were unquestionably a hindrance. Taking a fresh look at the origins of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine raises questions about this interpretation. Roosevelt believed that Americans were passionately opposed to the blockade of Venezuela by European Powers in late 1902 and early 1903 and viewed it as a threat to the Monroe Doctrine. This perception and Roosevelt’s 1904 presidential campaign therefore significantly affected the timing and content of the Roosevelt Corollary.

Although historians differ on the precise nature of the ways in which public opinion and domestic politics influenced foreign policy during Theodore Roosevelt’s [TR] presidency, there is a broad consensus about the fun- damentals.1 To begin, general agreement exists that most Americans and their elected representatives in Congress had relatively little interest in, or knowledge about, international politics. Certainly, many Americans had connexions, sometimes deep, to international cultural and economic devel- opments during this era, but a consensus endures that few Americans saw a political role for the country in world events.2 William Widenor, perhaps the most careful student of this question, concludes, “Isolationism and indiffer- ence to foreign policy were the greatest problem” that TR faced. Roosevelt,

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on the other hand, is generally seen as an astute statesman with both a keen understanding of the recent changes in international politics and an ambitious agenda. At the same time, he understood the limitations of pub- lic concern and adjusted his objectives accordingly. Some historians contend that such adjustments were relatively minor. Others see him forced to alter his diplomacy much more significantly. All agree, however, that the president’s perception of public sentiment and his reading of the political landscape played essentially negative roles; that is, they were constraints at the point of implementation, rather than factors that shaped the substance of pol- icy, and were unquestionably a hindrance. Hence, they supposedly affected the timing of Roosevelt’s decisions and whether or not he was forced to keep controversial decisions secret or, indeed, abandon some initiatives altogether.3

This interpretation reflects the continuing influence of realist critics of American foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, wrote that the conduct of foreign policy within the context of a democratic system of governance is difficult “because the conditions under which popular support can be obtained for a foreign policy are not nec- essarily identical with the conditions under which a foreign policy can be successfully pursued.” Whereas prudent statesmen think in terms of power and the national interest, the public remains shrouded in what Gabriel Almond called a “fog of apathy and ignorance which facilitates the mis- representation of the national interest.” This means that, in Morgenthau’s words, the “kind of thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy must at times be diametrically opposed to the kind of considerations by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved.”4

This view of the relationship between democratic governance and foreign policy re-enforced, to a considerable extent, a strain of thinking that had emerged in the wake of the First World War amongst some public intellectu- als, most notably Walter Lippmann. Disillusioned with progress on domestic and foreign policy challenges during the Progressive Era, Lippmann came to believe that the American public was largely ignorant and apathetic about such issues. Hence, he argued, “especially in the realm of foreign affairs . . . public opinion” should be “only a very partial, and almost always a merely negative guide to policy.”5

Of course, as the influence of realism has waned, and other approaches—notably cultural ones—have shaped the historiography, debates about foreign policy during Roosevelt’s era have become richer and more varied.6 The realist focus on power, though it still plays an important role, no longer monopolises the discussion. However, the notion of foreign policy conducted by an adroit and activist TR with as little deference as possible to an isolationist, indifferent public retains enormous interpretive sway. This view of the role of public opinion in Roosevelt’s conduct of for- eign policy receives support from some of his own comments. Gripes about

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petty, myopic members of Congress litter his correspondence. Another leit- motif is the need for “public opinion” to “be properly educated” about the new challenges and responsibilities facing the country. In addition, there is no denying that Roosevelt kept the extent of his involvement in mediating the Great Power political struggles in East Asia and Europe secret lest he engender protest at home.7

Yet it can be argued that to see the President’s own views and public opinion as essentially separate entities in this way is to misunderstand funda- mentally the nature of policy-making in the American system. As some recent scholarship demonstrates, presidents, like members of Congress, are elected officials operating in a competitive political environment and are therefore always bound to be concerned with the effects of their actions and utter- ances on their and their party’s public standing and appeal. The desire to enhance these two elements and diminish those of their opponents is likely to influence the objectives they seek to achieve, as well as how they attempt to achieve them.8

A closer look at the evidence suggests that this was certainly the case with TR. His correspondence, contemporary political reporting, and diplo- matic despatches from foreign embassies in Washington indicate that he was an intensely political creature. Whilst unarguably crucial factors in his decision-making, his desire to maintain public support for important deci- sions and use his conduct of the nation’s foreign policy to enhance his political standing and electoral prospects modified his strategic aims and views about the American role in the world. Despite his frequent complain- ing about the constraints imposed upon him by the nature of American politics, the president managed to achieve all of his principal objectives: building an isthmian canal, expanding the navy, establishing American hege- mony in the Caribbean region, and maintaining peaceful relations with the other Great Powers.

A re-examination of the evolution of the Roosevelt Corollary reveals the way that his perception of domestic as well as external realities shaped Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Revisiting this episode demonstrates that a remarkably complicated, and often contradictory, set of factors influenced him. He sought to reconcile America’s strategic interest in asserting and main- taining hegemony in the Caribbean Sea with avoiding a military conflict, even as other influential voices appeared to welcome such a fight. He struggled to balance a recognition that debt collection would need to take place in the region with demands from many corners that the United States avoid such an onerous responsibility. He worked to retain his status in the eyes of the public as a staunch defender of the national interest—an image that he had studiously cultivated—whilst not alienating influential ethnic groups in the process. And he strove to craft a policy that accomplished all of these goals whilst garnering the Republican Party’s nomination for the presidency and winning the election in 1904.

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This exegesis offers the first comprehensive analysis of the politics of the Roosevelt Corollary. It also serves as a case study in how domestic politics helps to shape presidential foreign policy decision-making. In the process, it recasts the prevailing interpretation that public opinion played only an obstructive role as TR sought to bring America to terms with its new status in world politics.9 Instead, the formulation of the Roosevelt Corollary was actually prompted in large part by Roosevelt’s perception of the attitudes of his countrymen. Furthermore, far from suffering politically from his initial misreading of the public’s view of the Monroe Doctrine, he parlayed his handling of the Venezuela Crisis into an electoral asset.

TR’s reading of public opinion played a key role in this story. However, without the benefit of modern opinion polling techniques, which did not emerge until the 1930s, Roosevelt and his contemporaries used other tools to evaluate the thinking of their fellow citizens. Chief amongst these was the press. As a progressive, Roosevelt viewed the tone of coverage, including editorials, as a proxy for—at a minimum, elite and attentive—public opinion. He followed a cross-section of publications from all regions of the country. Those published by key lobby and ethnic groups informed their thinking, as did partisan newspapers. Above all, the press in New York City shaped per- ceptions in the Roosevelt Administration.10 It also saw the press as a crucial tool for educating the public about foreign policy issues—and Roosevelt’s management of the press was masterly.11 In sum, newspapers and journals played a dual role: TR and his advisors viewed coverage of foreign policy as a useful measure of public opinion, even as they sought to shape that coverage to build and maintain public, and hence political, support for their agenda.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine served as a powerful symbol of American nationalism that politicians frequently used to score points against their opponents.12 Roosevelt demonstrated his under- standing of the politics of the Doctrine as early 1896, for instance, when he published two pieces about the first Venezuela Crisis in 1895-1896—an arti- cle in the Bachelor of Arts and a letter to the editor in the newspaper of his alma mater, The Harvard Crimson, released to the press. These documents were notable for several reasons. First, Roosevelt eschewed a long justifi- cation for the American position; he understood the strategic and historical importance of the Doctrine but left the job of elucidating it to his friend, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Instead, he focused on the state of American patriotism, which, he firmly believed, imbued most Americans but which was in danger of being undermined by members of the Eastern elite. These men, he argued, seemed embarrassed by declarations of love of country or feared the financial consequences of war with Britain. Hoping to prevent this viewpoint from spreading, he urged all educated men to sup- port vigorously the American position and to avoid the temptations of “milk and water cosmopolitanism”. The conspicuous absence of TR’s name or the

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phrase “Democratic Party” in these documents is also revealing, highlighting the fact that he recognised the popular appeal of the Democratic president’s, Grover Cleveland’s, hard line stance and was concerned that he and the Republican Party were in danger of surrendering the mantle of protectors of the country’s honour. Republicans had monopolised that particular asset since the end of the Civil War, and Roosevelt was not about to allow the Democrats to reclaim it, especially with a presidential election looming in 1896.13

This understanding of the Monroe Doctrine as both a cornerstone of America’s strategic position in the Western Hemisphere and a popular sym- bol that could be an asset for any ambitious politician remained a central component of TR’s worldview when he became president in 1901. In his first two annual messages to Congress, he called the Doctrine “the cardinal fea- ture” of American foreign policy. However, in 1902–1903, Britain, Germany, and Italy established a naval blockade against Venezuela to force its gov- ernment to address their protests about non-payment of its debts. Prior to the blockade, Roosevelt believed that the United States needed to strike a balance between preventing the European Powers from expanding their influence in Latin America and allowing them to help keep order. This belief was partly pragmatic—several European Great Powers had long maintained extensive trade and strategic interests in the region—and partly a product of the president’s reading of history. Along with many of his contempo- raries, TR generally believed that the most advanced, or “civilized”, countries should co-operate to maintain stability and promote progress amongst less- developed nations, many of which they viewed as being “wholly unfit for self-government”.14 As a result, Administration officials during the first year of Roosevelt’s presidency offered no objection to a series of European inter- ventions in the Caribbean that did not appear threatening to the Monroe Doctrine.15

To be sure, Roosevelt and his advisors followed closely European activ- ity in the Caribbean. However, they differentiated between those undertaken by friendly Powers and those that they considered a threat to American interests. British incursions, whilst hardly encouraged, engendered little gen- uine alarm—the first Venezuela crisis in 1895 notwithstanding. By this point Britain and the United States were in the midst of a “great rapprochement”, a process by which they began to move beyond their historical enmity and to recognise the cultural and strategic interests they had in common. Whilst this process was complicated by a number of factors, not least of which were sizeable numbers of Irish- and German-Americans who were often hostile to Britain, it was cautiously but steadily promoted by influential figures on both sides of the Atlantic, including Roosevelt.16

Germany occupied a different category altogether in the thinking of most American policy-makers. There was considerable concern that Berlin hoped to acquire territory in Latin America, a goal seen as a potential threat

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to America’s emerging strategic supremacy in the region, especially when it came to one of the Administration’s foremost priorities: constructing an American-controlled canal in the isthmus of Central America. As a result, American officials took steps to discourage German ambitions. In April 1901, for instance, in response to reports that Germany might have designs on the Venezuelan island of Margarita, Secretary of State John Hay instructed the chargé d’affaires in Berlin to warn that the United States would object to any such plans.17 American officials also took steps to prepare for any potential conflict. In late 1901, when Berlin informed Washington of plans to collect debts from Venezuela, and admitted that a temporary occupation might be necessary, the United States Navy, with Roosevelt’s blessing, arranged to hold a series of fleet manoeuvres in the region in late 1902 as a show of strength.

Suspicion of German motives was not limited to policy-makers; the broader public was wary as well. Perhaps the most vivid illustration was the controversy that emerged when Germany announced in mid-1902 that it would give the city of Washington, DC a statue of Frederick the Great. As a rudimentary bit of public diplomacy—many saw Frederick as a friend of the cause during the American Revolution—it should have been relatively uncontroversial. However, a series of editorials and a congressional resolu- tion that condemned the planned statue as a symbol of anti-republicanism rapidly over-shadowed the gesture. Normally, such rhetoric might have been dismissed as a bit of Jacksonian grandstanding and quickly forgot- ten. However, it assumed a more ominous tone amidst reports that Admiral H.C. Taylor, chief of the Bureau of Navigation, had predicted that the United States and Germany would go to war by 1907, when the German fleet would supposedly reach a sufficient level of strength. Such views were common in American naval circles, as was the notion that Germany resented the Monroe Doctrine and hoped to acquire territory in Latin America.18

TR shared many of these concerns. In particular, he believed that America’s failure to expand its navy quickly enough encouraged Berlin in its Latin American ambitions. Nevertheless, he considered maintaining peaceful relations with Berlin to be important.19 This attitude arose partly from a pru- dent desire to avoid conflict with an increasingly powerful nation. However, it also reflected considerations related to partisan politics. Recent scholarship has highlighted the significant role that immigration played in America’s rela- tions with the rest of the world during this period and how TR used foreign policy to appeal to ethnic voters.20

The president recognised that German-Americans were a key electoral demographic and particularly sensitive to the state of German-American rela- tions. The Illinois Staats-Zeitung observed the following year that TR had one eye upon “the large German vote” as he sought to maintain cordial ties with Berlin. With such considerations in mind, and in spite of criticism in the press and Congress, TR accepted the statue of Frederick. The German-born Richard Bartholdt, a Republican congressman from St. Louis, wrote in the

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New Yorker Handelszeitung, “President Roosevelt has earned the thanks of German-Americans in particular”.21

Prior to the blockade of Venezuela, TR had yet to decide how to rec- oncile these contradictory objectives and threat perceptions. He recognised that his current policy of asserting American hegemony in Latin America whilst at the same time allowing European interventions to help police it was problematic. However, he did not yet know how or when to begin revising it.22

Venezuela’s history of political instability, civil war, and chronic insol- vency meant that bondholders, foreign residents, and their respective governments had ample grounds for complaint. Berlin and London were par- ticularly unhappy, and the attitude of the country’s leader, Cipriano Castro, considered by many to be rude, dishonest, and corrupt, only exacerbated tensions. Germany’s plans to mount an intervention were an open secret and, by early 1902, Britain began to contemplate joint action. Negotiations ensued and, by late summer, an agreement to act in concert achieved. Italy later joined as a junior partner.23 When Berlin and London informed Washington of their plans, TR reacted much as he had to previous European interventions in the Caribbean. Whilst he did not encourage the blockade, neither did he ask them to reconsider. However, he warned that Washington expected the Powers to refrain from permanently occupying Venezuelan territory.24

Within days of imposing the blockade in early December 1902, the Europeans earned the suspicion of many Americans by undertaking a series of punitive actions that appeared excessive for a mission whose sole purpose was supposed to be the collection of debts. These included seizing the tiny Venezuelan navy and destroying a fort in the town of Puerto Cabello.25 This aroused strident criticism in the American press, in publications of all politi- cal persuasions, although Republican newspapers and journals tended to be more supportive of the President.26 Two themes were prominent. First, many editors argued that the blockade posed a threat to the Monroe Doctrine. “It is difficult to see how the United States government can maintain its neu- trality”, fumed the Democratic Constitution of Atlanta. The Democratic St. Louis Post-Dispatch, owned by newspaper magnate Joseph Pulitzer, won- dered whether it was not time to inform Berlin and London “that American patience, humanity, and policy may be tried too severely?”27

Second, the press framed the European expedition in a manner that was distinctly unfavourable to Germany. It generally portrayed Britain as a friend, and some saw its partnership with Berlin as the product of trick- ery or British naivety. The San Francisco Examiner, a fierce critic of TR owned by Pulitzer’s rival, William Randolph Hearst, insisted that Germany “resents” the Doctrine and wanted “colonies and coaling stations in South America”. In contrast, the Democratic Courier-Journal of Louisville opined that it would be “next to the impossible to draw England into a war with this

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country”.28 New York City newspapers were particularly prone to this narra- tive. The New York Herald offered an instructive example. A 15 December editorial expressed “not the slightest intention” of questioning Britain’s good faith, but called German Emperor Wilhelm II “the ‘wicked partner’ in this affair”. The Herald argued, “It is with the design of divorcing the Anglo- American ménage that the Emperor has cajoled the British government into acting with him”. The Herald also criticised the largest and most influen- tial German-American newspaper, the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung, which had partially defended Germany’s actions in the blockade. It implied that the Staats-Zeitung, and by extension German-Americans who failed to condemn the blockade, had divided loyalties.29

These insinuations provoked an immediate response. The Staats- Zeitung charged that the British press sought to prejudice Americans against Germany and “to arouse the belief . . . that Germany is following in Venezuela plans which could lead to conflict with the Union”. The Staats- Zeitung believed that this alleged campaign was having the desired effect, “not only to newspapers whose sensationalism is well known, but also in serious papers”. It cited the New-York Tribune, Evening Post, and Sun as the worst offenders.30

At first, Republicans in Congress were almost as critical of the blockade as Democrats. Shelby Cullom, the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that although the situation did not yet con- stitute a threat, if it were to escalate, Germany might “come in collision with the Monroe doctrine”. Other leading Republicans such as Lodge and Representative Robert Hitt, chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, reportedly agreed with Cullom. There was unease about the safety of the planned isthmian canal in Colombia, close as it was to Venezuela. Although this concern was present on both sides of the aisle, Democrats—doubtless spurred by partisanship—were more explicit in their criticism of the block- ade and quicker to question whether the Administration was doing enough to protect the Monroe Doctrine.31

Whilst it is difficult to pinpoint TR’s attitude at this juncture because he did not mention the blockade in his personal correspondence for most of December, it is evident from diplomatic correspondence and newspa- per reports that he wanted the blockade to be lifted as quickly as possible. Administration officials applied various types of pressure on the Europeans to achieve that goal. On the diplomatic front, Hay and the American chargé d’affaires in London, Henry White, urged Berlin and London to accept arbitration of the dispute. White informed Hay that he was expressing his “grave fears” to Prime Minister Arthur Balfour and the foreign secretary, Lord Lansdowne, that if the blockade continued, there was bound to be sooner or later an incident that would “estrange if not antagonize American public feeling”.32 The Administration also pressured Germany. Hay urged the chargé

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at the German embassy in Washington, Albert von Quadt, to seek a quick resolution to the blockade because the American public and Congress were “nervous and agitated”; von Quadt also learnt that Congress might well pass a resolution directing the president to ensure that the Monroe Doctrine would not be “injured”.33 On the naval front, the presence of a large American fleet in the region ensured that the United States would be prepared to outgun the European expedition if necessary.34 Probably to increase the pressure on the Europeans not to prolong the blockade, the press received the details of these preparations, as well as the presence of Admiral George Dewey, the hero of the Battle of Manila Bay during the Spanish–American War.35

Administration pressure on the European Powers reflected growing crit- icism of the blockade in newspaper editorials and Congress. Roosevelt and his advisors were concerned about perceptions of having failed to protect the Doctrine. Press reports and congressional debate indicated that Democrats were preparing to adopt this line of attack. The non-partisan Evening Star noted that, as the Doctrine was a topic “about which the average American is particularly sensitive, it would be easy to raise a storm of discussion which might seriously embarrass the executive branch of the government”.36

Sensitivity to the political consequences of public anger about the block- ade appeared in the Administration’s public statements. Those who contend that TR considered the Doctrine endangered by this point have overlooked the fact that whilst Washington applied pressure on Berlin and London to accept arbitration, Administration-inspired articles in the press continued to insist that the Monroe Doctrine was safe.37 These statements matched the Administration’s private evaluation of the situation. One newspaper reported, “The President . . . cannot see anything menacing to the Monroe doctrine in the situation at this time” and “does not expect any unfriendly act on the part of either of the countries that is now giving Venezuela trouble”.38

Roosevelt’s concern about the domestic reaction to the blockade reflected his understanding of the nature of American public opinion. Contrary to the prevailing view of public attitudes during this era—Americans were generally apathetic about foreign policy—TR believed that they were, at times, prone to become too passionate and agitate for aggressive and even imprudent action.39 As the blockade continued, believing that such an attitude was coalescing, he took several steps to counter it. He attempted to address the anxiety amongst members of Congress. Cullom, at first the most prominent Republican critic of the blockade, led this effort. In contrast to his early public statements, by 16 December Cullom began to echo the Administration’s public stance, which maintained that the blockade was not a danger to the Doctrine. On behalf of the president, Cullom and Hitt urged their congressional colleagues to show restraint in discussing the blockade so as not to exacerbate public concern and complicate Administration efforts to handle this delicate situation.40

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The Administration also sought to counter suggestions in the press that the Monroe Doctrine was under threat. Editorials appeared in pro-TR and Republican publications that echoed the Administration’s argument. The Commercial Advertiser, a Republican daily edited by one of Roosevelt’s clos- est friends in the newspaper industry, Joseph Bucklin Bishop, maintained that in their coverage of the blockade, newspapers had wasted a “great many unnecessary capital letters” speculating about the danger posed by the European expedition. “Americans should . . . not”, the newspaper con- tinued, “allow themselves to be misled by the irresponsible, uninstructed babble” found in “the columns of so many newspapers”.41 Administration officials also discouraged the more sensationalistic reports that claimed that Dewey’s fleet was poised to crush the Europeans.42

Suggestions exist that the frequent allusions to American public opinion on the part of Roosevelt, Hay, and White did not represent primarily expres- sions of concern about an emerging political problem for the Administration but, rather, were part of a co-ordinated strategy to force an end to the block- ade. American officials, goes the argument, used the sensitivity to public sentiment in Berlin and London as a further means of leverage in their effort to secure the raising of the blockade and furnish an excuse for each to retreat with some dignity.43 This interpretation, however, downplays the extent to which American public opinion’s reaction to the blockade was a threat to the president’s political standing at home as well as to amity with the European Powers. It is true that Roosevelt and his advisors saw Britain and Germany’s eagerness to retain American goodwill as one of several useful levers to fur- ther the case for arbitration of the dispute. Yet when TR told reporters and foreign diplomats that he was worried about the domestic American reaction to the blockade, he meant it. This attitude would have a profound impact upon his conception of the Monroe Doctrine.

Pressure from the Administration and anxiety about American public opinion quickly took effect, as did growing criticism in Britain about the blockade and German concerns over losing their blockade partner. Hence, on 18 December 1902, Berlin and London informed Washington of their willingness to arbitrate the dispute with Venezuela. However, they agreed to arbitrate in principle only and considered certain claims non-negotiable and exempt. Until agreeing on the terms for arbitration, the Europeans would not raise the blockade.44

Anger in the German-American community, reflected in editorials of the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung, did not abate following Berlin and London’s acceptance of an arbitrated settlement. Roosevelt had previously sensed the danger, but the full extent of the problem only became clear in mid-January 1903. Hugo Münsterberg, a German-American professor at Harvard—in con- tact with the German Foreign Office—advised the president that the growing discontent in his community was increasingly focusing on the Administration.

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German-Americans in “the East are going against you with growing inten- sity”, he warned. Bartholdt explained to his fellow Republican members of the House that tension in the German-American relationship was agonising for him and other German speakers; and he warned about the “jingoism” fuelling the current problems.45 TR also received complaints from sev- eral prominent German-Americans about the New York City Immigration Commissioner, William Williams.

In early February 1903, the Staats-Zeitung explicitly condemned the Administration’s policy for the first time. The American minister in Caracas, Herbert Bowen, had won the trust of Castro, and the Administration allowed Bowen to represent Venezuela in arbitration negotiations with London and Berlin; the only proviso was that he act as an individual and not a rep- resentative of the American government. Bowen’s tough negotiating tactics caused problems for the Administration vis-à-vis German-Americans, who came to see him as a thinly disguised conduit for an Administration hostile to Germany. The Staats-Zeitung excoriated Hay for “his pronounced pref- erence for England . . . his poorly concealed hate for Germany”, and for supplying “the alleged representative of Venezuela with the demands he should make”. The Staats-Zeitung also joined the chorus of critics of immi- gration procedures on Ellis Island. Finally, Emil von Schleinitz, editor of Germania, a Milwaukee newspaper, warned the president of “great indigna- tion” amongst German-Americans, who showed “a very decided inclination to” hold Republicans “responsible for the infamous and unprovoked attacks on Germany that they are compelled to read every day in the English press of this country”.46

TR made every effort to assuage the feelings of this key constituency. He held a reception at the White House for prominent German-Americans and urged the Immigration Commissioner, Williams, to “avoid any appearance of unnecessary harshness” in dealing with potential deportees and that “we must be sure that not only are we acting aright but that we are able to show to others that we are acting aright”. He asked Bishop to investigate the complaints about Williams. A few months later, he visited the Deutscher Club in Milwaukee and the Sängerfest Association in Baltimore and called for more “Gemütlichkeit” in “American social life”.47

Roosevelt’s response to von Schleinitz encapsulates the tension between his desire to retain the support of German-Americans and his growing con- viction that Germany posed a threat to the Monroe Doctrine. In an unsent first draft, he characterised the problem von Schlenitz referred to in his letter as “a subject of such weight” that he wanted to meet von Schleinitz “person- ally” to discuss it. At the same time, he wrote that, whilst he would “treat all foreign powers courteously”, he was also determined to “uphold the interests of the United States against any one of them”.48

The situation in Venezuela, quiet for a month, grabbed headlines in the second half of January 1903 when German ships shelled a Venezuelan

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fort twice in three days. Though no real progress occurred in negotia- tions between Bowen and the Europeans, the blockade had largely faded from public notice. The German bombardment quickly changed this situa- tion. The anti-German narrative re-surfaced in the press and Congress, with renewed fears about a threat to American interests. Berlin’s protestations that it did not order the bombardment had little effect. Several newspapers criticised the attack and asserted that Germany entertained designs on terri- tory in Venezuela or other parts of Latin America.49 Democratic newspapers again questioned TR’s approach to the blockade and his commitment to the Doctrine.50 In addition, senators and representatives from both parties expressed concern. Galvanised by complaints from their constituents, they were reportedly “besieging” Hay and his subordinates with demands for an explanation of German actions and confronting TR about the widespread unhappiness amongst the public.51 Talk of a naval confrontation circulated once more. The Washington Times reported that a “careful canvass” of sena- tors and representatives demonstrated that many were “ready to strike back at Germany at the moment the Administration considers action necessary”.52

Several dailies reported that the “attitude of Germany” was an important influence on the Senate Committee on Military Affairs’ deliberations on an army staff bill as it decided to increase the number of support personnel for coastal defences.53

At first, the Administration’s response to this renewed anger with Germany mirrored its actions in December. As late as 26 January, officials insisted that there was no reason for concern and that Bowen would succeed in concluding the arbitration negotiations. Administration officials informed the Republican Chicago Tribune, “There is as yet nothing to which the United States can fairly take exception in the conduct of the blockade”. Instead, the Administration’s main goal continued to be preventing public opinion from overheating. The Tribune reported that “President Roosevelt is chiefly anx- ious that nothing shall be done to inflame public opinion in this country against Germany”. As in December, TR and his advisors privately sought to persuade Berlin and London to end the blockade, using public criti- cism as one of their main arguments. The British and German embassies in Washington reported intense displeasure amongst the press and govern- ment circles with Germany and speculated that it might become difficult for TR to maintain his stance that the Monroe Doctrine was not threatened.54

Only at the end of January did TR conclude that the blockade posed a potential threat to the Doctrine, something seen in statements to the press, where Administration officials shifted their emphasis from dampening public anger about the blockade to warning the Europeans that American patience had evaporated. After a Cabinet meeting on 30 January, Administration offi- cials expressed support for Bowen’s latest proposal on behalf of Caracas and warned the Europeans not to take any further punitive measures regard- less of the progress in negotiations. Several newspapers carried virtually

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identical reports about the Administration’s new position: “the administra- tion is determined not to be unprepared for any situation that may arise”. The Administration provided details about naval preparations to the press, including a mobilisation of naval yards and stations. On 4 February, TR issued his first public warning to the Europeans. The Commercial Advertiser reported that a continued European insistence on preferential treatment for their claims would strengthen suspicion that they did indeed wish to “embar- rass this government in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine”. It also stated that concern for the situation in Venezuela played a role in the president’s strong support for the army staff bill.55

It was at this point that Roosevelt issued his much-debated warning to the Germans about the possibility of American naval intervention.56 When TR’s friend, Hermann Speck von Sternburg—a leading German diplomat who would become ambassador at Washington in July 1903—arrived in late January to oversee negotiations for Berlin, Hay and TR took turns scolding him about the dangerous level of anger amongst Congress, the press, and the public. Also informing his superiors that Dewey’s squadron had received “secret orders” to be at the ready, von Sternburg urged them to lift the block- ade as soon as possible. However, if officials in Berlin did take this message to be an ultimatum from TR, they ignored it. The blockade remained in place.57 On 5 February, TR asked the Department of the Navy for an analysis of the strategic situation in the Caribbean and for a comparison of German and American ship strength.58 Even as the president began to contemplate the worst, however, the crisis abated. The Balfour government, which had been urging Germany to moderate its behaviour since late January, was under enormous domestic pressure to end its involvement in the blockade. On 10 February, it broke with Berlin and signalled its willingness to reach an agreement.59 Four days later, unwilling to proceed further without Britain, Germany ended the standoff by making a minor concession. It consented to an arrangement whereby Venezuela would pay its reserved claims in sev- eral monthly instalments, rather than all at once.60 The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague would handle the rest of the dispute.

As he prepared for his election campaign in spring 1904, TR viewed his handling of the Venezuela blockade as a political asset, one that would burnish his credentials as chief defender of the national interest and bol- ster him at the polls in November. He made it the centrepiece of a major speech in Chicago, for instance, and in providing information for an upcom- ing stump speech by the former secretary of War—and soon to be secretary of State—Elihu Root, TR urged Root to emphasise the Administration’s “strik- ing enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and [the] acquiescence in [it] by great foreign powers”.61

At the same time, the episode convinced TR that his original concep- tion of the Monroe Doctrine needed revision. Two inter-related factors in particular prompted this decision. Whilst Roosevelt had long considered the

584 J. M. Thompson

Caribbean central to American security, the blockade had demonstrated the dangers that accompanied European, and especially German, activity in the region. The only way to prevent such crises in the future would be to assert American pre-dominance in the region more firmly.62 The president also revised his thinking in large part because of the politics of the Monroe Doctrine, something that historians have largely overlooked. In spite of his experience in this matter, he had been slow to recognise that for many Americans, the definition of the Doctrine had evolved and now prohib- ited any significant political or military interventions by Europeans in the Caribbean region. When combined with the public’s suspicion of Germany and the political problems that it caused for the Administration amongst German-Americans—which scholars have altogether neglected—this realisa- tion meant a new approach.63 He admitted as much during a conversation with von Sternburg in the wake of the blockade, when the German diplo- mat suggested some sort of joint European-American oversight of Venezuelan finances. Roosevelt replied that he doubted such an idea would “find support in public opinion”. He continued that the blockade had “very much changed my view as to the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine with relation to pub- lic opinion here”. His earlier belief that the temporary landing of European troops in Venezuela would engender no criticism from the American public had been “mistaken”.64

The trend of TR’s thinking was clear as early as March 1903, when he told von Sternburg, “A second attempt of foreign powers to collect their debts by force would simply not be tolerated here. I often think that a sort of protectorate over South and Central America is the only way out”. Events in the Caribbean over the next few years only re-enforced these ideas. Political instability and insolvency were common problems in the region. To make matters even more complicated, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling regarding the dispute between Venezuela and the Europeans in February 1904 gave preferential treatment to the claims of the blockading countries— as opposed to those Powers such as France and the United States that had not participated in the blockade. TR and his advisors believed that this decision would only encourage further debt-collecting expeditions in the Caribbean.65

Problems in the Dominican Republic forced Roosevelt to contemplate putting into practice his new conception of the Doctrine. In early February 1904, Dominican insurgents threatened American citizens and their prop- erty, prompting the United States Navy to intervene briefly. Americans with business interests in the Dominican Republic exerted strong pressure upon the White House to do something to stabilise the situation. Naval person- nel in the Caribbean urged the Administration to act. American ministers in Haiti and the Dominican Republic repeatedly warned Washington about the possibility of European intervention, with Germany mentioned most fre- quently. As he contemplated his response, TR informed his son that the

Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary 585

United States would likely need to “assume an attitude of protection and regulation” regarding some of its neighbours in the Caribbean.66

However, Roosevelt suspected that although Americans demanded a new policy that forbade European interventions in the Caribbean, they would be less enthusiastic about the suggestion that the United States assume a sweeping new role in policing instability in the region. Before acting, he would need to get a better sense of the political feasibility of his new policy; and whether he could implement it prior to his bid for the presidency in November 1904. Hence, he began to attempt to shape public opinion, even as he sought to evaluate it. First, in his Chicago speech, he used the same formulation of the Monroe Doctrine that American statesman had been using for decades. However, for the first time, he mentioned that “the growth and influence and power” of the United States should “redound . . . to the benefit of our sister republics whose strength is less”. He also linked his expanding conception of the Doctrine to two other priorities: construction of a canal in Panama and expansion of the navy. What was more, in a preview of the narrative he would soon use, he proffered the protectorate of Cuba as an example of the benign nature of expanding American power.67

Roosevelt elaborated on this theme in 1904. He began by launching a series of trial balloons in prominent journals. Then, Root read a letter from the president at a Chicago banquet celebrating the anniversary of Cuban independence. In this letter, TR announced what would later become the Roosevelt Corollary. In his view, the United States had the right to act in the region to prevent instability or insolvency amongst its neighbours. He also pre-empted anti-imperialist critics by disavowing any intent to annex territory and highlighting Cuba as a successful example of what future policy in the Caribbean would look like.68

Despite TR’s attempt to assuage their concerns, anti-imperialists and Democrats in Congress were unimpressed. They hammered the president on several counts. They attacked the proposal; many argued that it would constitute a disastrous change to a cornerstone of American foreign policy. It would be virtually impossible to police effectively Latin American states, in particular their financial affairs. Pulitzer’s The World, a prominent critic of the Administration, worried that “There are twenty Latin-American republics, and under this program we might be called to intervene in all of them at once”. In addition, many of his critics contended, Roosevelt’s proposal would invert the defensive nature of the Monroe Doctrine, making America the subjuga- tor, rather than protector, of Latin Americans and violating international law and morality in the process. The Sun, a conservative daily that frequently criticised the Administration, argued, “the United States Government has no more right or authority to read lectures of admonition and menace to the rulers or the people of those countries than they have to preach at our- selves”. The anti-imperialist Evening Post and World suggested that the new policy could even lead to war with European Powers.69

586 J. M. Thompson

Many of these critics also questioned TR’s judgment and motives. John Sharp Williams, leader of the House Democrats, called the Cuban dinner letter “the most absolutely reckless, unsafe, and . . . insane, utterance that has ever been attributed to a President of the United States”. Others charac- terised the proposal as a power grab and worried that TR was using this new policy as a cloak for imperialist expansion. The Evening Post compared the president to Louis XIV.70 Republicans in the press and Congress were con- spicuously silent and, judging from available measures of public opinion, the broader public was either indifferent or unenthusiastic.

In spite of this criticism, and the lack of enthusiasm from his party and possibly the public, TR remained convinced of the need for his new policy and contemptuous of his opponents. Indeed, he contemplated tak- ing action against Venezuela—which was once again drawing the attention of European creditors—and in early 1905 formulated plans, known as the Dillingham-Morales agreement, that would have put the United States in charge of Dominican debts and finances and, amongst other details, entailed a guarantee of Dominican sovereignty.71

However, all of this would have to wait. For much as he might disdain Democrats and anti-imperialists for their opposition, Roosevelt was reluc- tant to implement such a radically new policy, he confessed to Hay, “in the closing weeks of the campaign.” TR’s resounding victory in 1904 was not a foregone conclusion; he genuinely believed that he was vulnerable, both in the Republican primary contest until early 1904 and then the general elec- tion, and was particularly concerned about leaving himself open to attack.72

Hence, the manner in which TR introduced his new policy: an extension rather than a dramatic revision of the original Monroe Doctrine—and as the same policy followed toward Cuba writ large—designed to disarm, or at least pre-empt, anti-imperialist and Democratic criticism.73

The president struggled to implement his new policy in the Dominican Republic. Bi-partisan opposition in the Senate forced revisions, and even then, he could not secure ratification of the final treaty until 1907.74 However, opposition in Congress and public indifference to the state of affairs in the Dominican Republic did not prevent the implementation of the Roosevelt Corollary; they simply delayed it for a few years.75 Indeed, that he was able to revise the Monroe Doctrine, a cornerstone of American foreign policy— and did so in part based upon his reading of public opinion—indicates that TR was not nearly as hamstrung in his diplomacy as some historians have argued.

It suggests rethinking the understanding of the interaction between pub- lic opinion and foreign policy during Roosevelt’s era in two, inter-related respects. First, whilst the American public and their elected representa- tives in Congress remained relatively indifferent to some problems in world politics—for instance, the financial situation in the Dominican Republic after

Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary 587

1904—at other times they were fiercely opinionated and reasonably well- informed. The notion that America should prevent significant European interventions in the Caribbean region was one such case. Indeed, in late 1902 and early 1903, public and congressional sentiment appeared to have been more adamant on this point than was Roosevelt.

This leads to a second feature of the literature needing reconsideration: the part played by public and congressional opinion in Roosevelt’s foreign policy decision-making. Each did not merely serve as constraints; they could also affect the substance of decisions. As von Sternburg explained to his superiors in Berlin in the wake of the Venezuela blockade, if Berlin wanted to develop a better relationship with the Roosevelt Administration, it would have to work “constantly” to explain to the American public the “true” nature of German policy. Particularly important in this regard was the press, before which, he claimed, TR and all other officials had to “bow.”76 However, this was also a simplistic view of the relationship. The initial negative public reaction to his new policy did not deter Roosevelt; he merely adjusted his tactics and timing. Like all sophisticated policy-makers, he sought a course of action that met both the external and domestic requirements.

In short, an adept politician such as Roosevelt constantly evaluated the public mood and political landscape. Sometimes this process influenced his thinking in fundamental respects; at other times, it led him to modify poli- cies to make them more politically palatable; and on occasion, he felt that he had to act in secret. In nearly all cases, he sought to shape public and congressional opinion, not only by direct exhortation but also through skil- ful management of the press. Such methods were not just the product of governing in an era when Americans were still uncertain about their place in international politics. Rather, they also reflected the worldview of a career politician who understood that effective statecraft was not only a matter of directing his country’s relationship with the rest of the world; done correctly, it could also be an asset at the polls.

NOTES

1. I use “public opinion” in two related senses: my evaluation of public sentiment regarding a particular issue; and Roosevelt’s perception of the state of public opinion.

2. Kristin Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865–1920 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007).

3. W.C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA, 1980), 150–70; Howard Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, MD, 1956), 454–56; William Tilchin, Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft (New York, 1997), xi; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), 39–40; Frederick Marks, Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt (Lincoln, NE, 1979), 142; Raymond Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries (Claremont, CA, 1970), 1–3; John M. Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA., 1983), 75–76; John M. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1954), 62; Emily Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy (Durham, NC, 2003), 39; Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and

588 J. M. Thompson

Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago, IL, 1953), 75–85.

4. H.J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, 1967), 141–42; G.A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), 5.

5. W. Lippmann, “Democracy, Foreign Policy and the Split Personality of the Modern Statesman— Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 102 (July 1922), 192; Thomas Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York, 1948).

6. Serge Ricard, “The State of Theodore Roosevelt Studies,”— H-Diplo (24 October 2014): https:// networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/49929/h-diplo-state-field-essay-%E2%80%9C-state-theodore- roosevelt-studies%E2%80%9D.

7. TR to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 15 November 1903, in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt [Letters], Volume III (Cambridge, MA, 1951), 652; TR to William Hale, 3 December 1908, Ibid., VI, 1408.

8. Thomas Schwartz, “‘Henry, . . . Winning an Election Is Terribly Important’: Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History, 33/1 (2009), 177; Fredrik Logevall, “Politics and Foreign Relations,” Journal of American History, 95/4 (2009), 1074–78; Jussi Hanhimäki, “Global Visions and Parochial Politics: The Persistent Dilemma of the American Century,” Diplomatic History, 27/4(2003), 423–47.

9. It also sheds light on the role that public opinion and domestic politics played in shaping American imperialism prior to the First World War.

10. This article draws from a cross-section of newspaper and journal coverage that broadly mirrors that of TR.

11. John A. Thompson, Reformers and War: American Progressive Publicists and the First World War (Cambridge, 1987), 48–52; John M. Thompson, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Press” in Serge Ricard, ed., A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt (Malden, MA), 216–36; Doris Kearns Goodwin, The Bully Pulpit: Theodore Roosevelt and the Golden Age of Journalism (New York, 2013).

12. Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America (New York, 2011), 12–13, 202–11.

13. Henry Cabot Lodge, “England, Venezuela, and the Monroe Doctrine,” North American Review, 160/463 (1895), 651–58; New York Times (7 January 1896); Theodore Roosevelt, “The Monroe Doctrine,” March 1896, in Hermann Hagedorn, ed., The Works of Theodore Roosevelt [Works], Volume XIII (New York, 1926), 172.

14. “First Annual Message” and “Second Annual Message,” Works, XV, 116–17, 158; TR to Charles Eliot, 4 April 1904, Letters, IV, 769; David Burton, “Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist.” Review of Politics, 23/3(1961), 356–77; Frank Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism (Malden, MA, 2001), 209; Thomas Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race (Baton Rouge, LA, 1980), 141–42; Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine–American Wars (New Haven, 1998), 139; Matthew Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917 (New York, 2000).

15. Powell [American minister, Haiti] to Hay [secretary of State], 3, 6, 7, 9 September 1902, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902 [hereafter FRUS] (Washington, DC, on- going), 644–50; Nancy Mitchell, The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 76–79.

16. Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1896–1914 (New York, 1968).

17. Mitchell, Dreams, 9–63; Richard Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 (Princeton, NJ, 1973), 15–17; Seward Livermore, “Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902–1903,” American Historical Review, 51/3(1946), 452–71.

18. Washington Post (21 May and 6 August 1902); Sun (27 May 1902); New York Times (1 June 1902). Debates in Congress and the press can be followed in IA [Auswärtiges Amt, Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, Berlin] R 17333 between May and December 1902.

19. Serge Ricard, “The Roosevelt Corollary,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36/1(2006), 21–23; Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867–1907 (Gloucester, MA., 1966), 319–21; TR to Lodge, 19 June 1901, Letters III, 97–98.

20. Donna Gabaccia, Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective (Princeton, NJ, 2012), 122–58; John M. Thompson, “Constraint and Opportunity: Theodore Roosevelt, Transatlantic

Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary 589

Relations, and Domestic Politics,” in Hans Krabbendam and John M. Thompson, eds., America’s Transatlantic Turn: Theodore Roosevelt and the Discovery of Europe (New York, 2012), 56–61.

21. Illinois Staats-Zeitung (27 March 1903), New Yorker Handelszeitung (21 June 1902), IA R17334 and 17333.

22. TR to Hale, 17 December 1901, Letters III, 209. 23. Richard H. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt’s Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine,

and the Latin American Context (Baton Rouge, LA, 1990), 1–94. 24. FRUS 1901, 192–96; Lansdowne [British foreign secretary] to Herbert [British ambassador,

Washington] and reply, 11 and 13 November 1902, British and Foreign State Papers, Volume 95 (London, 1905), 1081–82, 1084.

25. Bowen [American minister, Caracas] to Hay, 13, 14 December 1902, FRUS 1903, 796–97; Evening Star (11 December 1902).

26. New-York Tribune (12, 16, 17 December 1902); Chicago Tribune (12, 16, 19 December 1902); Commercial Advertiser (11, 12, 15, 17 December 1902).

27. Constitution (17 December 1902); St. Louis Post-Dispatch (15 December 1902). 28. San Francisco Examiner (15 December 1902); Courier-Journal (12 December 1902). 29. New York Herald (15, 19, 21 December 1902); New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung (16–20 December

1902). 30. New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung (16, 17 December 1902). 31. Evening Star (13 December 1902); Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 2nd Session

(12 December 1902), 272. 32. Bowen to Hay, 11 December 1902, FRUS 1903, 791–92; White to Hay, 15 December 1902, RG

59 [State Department Archives, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD] M30, Reel 193.

33. von Quadt to the Foreign Office, 18 December 1902, in Johannes Lepsius et al., eds., Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914, Volume XVII [GP] (Berlin, 1922–1927), 269.

34. According to the New York American (5 December 1902), on the American side there were seven battleships, 19 torpedo and gunboats, and 560 guns in total, compared to one battleship, three torpedo and gunboats, and 318 total guns for the Europeans.

35. Evening Star (17, 18 December 1902); Paul Holbo, “Perilous Obscurity: Public Diplomacy and the Press in the Venezuelan Crisis, 1902–1903,” Historian, 32/3(1970), 428–48.

36. Evening Star (16 December 1902). 37. Beale, Roosevelt, 403–19; Edmund Morris, “A Matter of Extreme Urgency: Theodore Roosevelt,

Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902,” Naval War College Review, 55/2(2002), 73–85. 38. Evening Star (16 December 1902). 39. Widenor, Lodge, 150–51. 40. Evening Star (16 December 1902). 41. Commercial Advertiser (15, 17 December 1902); New-York Tribune (17 December 1902);

Outlook (20 December 1902). 42. New York American (13, 15–17 December 1902); Evening Star (16–18 December 1902). 43. Beale, Roosevelt, 403, 413–15, 419–20; Edward Parsons, “The German-American Crisis of

1902–1903,” Historian, 33/3(1970), 444. 44. Herbert to Lansdowne, 16 December 1902, in G.P. Gooch and Harold William Vazeille

Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, Volume II [BD] (London, 1926), 162; von Quadt and von Holleben to Foreign Office, 16, 18 December 1902, GP, XVII, 269, 264; FRUS 1903, 423–24, 455, 799.

45. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 385–6; Münsterberg to TR, 14 January 1903, Roosevelt Papers, Reel 32; Congressional Record, 20 January 1903, IA R17334.

46. New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 3, 4, and 7 February 1903; Von Schleinitz to TR, 6 February 1903 Roosevelt [Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Washington] Reel 32.

47. Holls [American diplomat] to Cortelyou, 15 January 1903 and to TR 2 February 1903, both Roosevelt Reel 32; Roosevelt to Williams, 23 January 1903, Letters III, 411; Williams to TR, 24 January 1903 and Bishop to TR, 26 January, 3 February 1903, both Roosevelt Reel 32; TR to Hay, 9 August 1903 Letters III, 405, 411, 549–50; TR, “Americans of German Origin,” 15 June 1903, Works, XVI, 36–38.

48. TR to von Schleinitz, 10 February 1903, Roosevelt Reels 330, 412. 49. Harper’s Weekly (31 January 1903); Constitution (16 January 1903); Boston Post (23 January

1903); Chicago Tribune (20 January, 4 February 1903); New York Tribune (23, 24, 25 January 1903).

590 J. M. Thompson

50. New York American (24 January 1903), San Francisco Examiner (24 January 1903); Times- Democrat (23, 24 January 1903).

51. Times-Democrat (23 January 1903); Chicago Tribune (26 January 1903). 52. Washington Times (24 January 1903). The American fleet still had a large presence in the region;

see Livermore, “Theodore Roosevelt,” 466–67. 53. New-York Tribune (31 January 1903); Evening Star (29, 30 January 1903); Commercial Advertiser

(29, 31 January 1903). 54. Chicago Tribune (26 January 1903); Evening Star (23 January 1903). White to Hay, 7 February

1903, White [Henry White Papers, Library of Congress, Washington] Reel 5; von Quadt to Foreign Office, 23 January 1903, GP XVII, 274; Herbert to Lansdowne, 26, 31 January 1903, Gooch, BD, II, 166, 168.

55. Evening Star (30 January 1903), New York Times (31 January 1903), Commercial Advertiser (31 January 1903); Commercial Advertiser (31 January and 4 February 1903).

56. For the debate on whether TR issued an ultimatum, see Serge Ricard, “The Anglo-German Intervention in Venezuela and Theodore Roosevelt’s Ultimatum to the Kaiser: Taking a Fresh Look at an Old Enigma,” in Serge Ricard and Hélène Christol, eds., Anglo-Saxonism in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1899–1919 (Aix-en-Provence, 1991), 65–77; Mitchell, Dreams, 87–89.

57. White to Hay, 24 January 1903, Hay memorandum, 25 January 1903, both Roosevelt Papers Reel 32; Hay to White, 9 February 1903, Hay [John Hay Papers, Library of Congress, Washington] Reel 4; von Sternburg to Foreign Office, 31 January, 3 February 1903, GP, XVII, 285–86.

58. Admiral Taylor to TR, 9 February 1903, Office of Naval Intelligence memorandum, 11 February 1903, both Roosevelt Papers Reel 32.

59. White to Hay, 7 February 1903, White Papers Reel 5; White to Hay, 10 February 1903, FRUS 1903, 475.

60. New York Times (10–14 February 1903); Evening Star (9–14 February 1903); White to Hay, 14 February 1903, Tower to Hay, 19 February 1903, FRUS 1903, 437, 475–76.

61. New-York Tribune (3 April 1903); TR to Root, 2 June 1903, Letters IV, 811; “Republican Party Platform of 1904,” 21 June 1904, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29631.

62. TR to Hay, 22 April 1903, Letters, III, 465; Ricard, “Roosevelt Corollary.” 63. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 321, 354, 390–91; Mitchell, Dreams, 104–07. 64. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 408; TR to Hay, 13 March 1903, Letters, III, 446; Herbert to

Lansdowne, 26 March 1903, FO [Foreign Office Archives, The National Archives, Kew] 5/2522. 65. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 408; idem., Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston,

MA, 1941), 237–38. 66. J. Fred Rippy, “The Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic”, Hispanic

American Historical Review, 17/4 (1937), 420–37; TR to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 10 February 1904, Letters, IV, 724.

67. New-York Tribune (3 April 1903). 68. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 421–23; TR to Root, 20 May 1904, Letters, IV, 801. 69. World (25–27, 29, 31 May 1904); Sun (24 May 1904); Evening Post (21, 31 May, 7 June 1904). 70. World (3 June 1904). 71. FRUS 1905, 298–312; Collin, Roosevelt’s Caribbean, 417–18. 72. TR to Hay, 2 September 1904, Letters, IV, 917. 73. Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 230–31. 74. William Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle between President and

Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore, MD, 1933), 212–28. 75. TR also concluded it would not be feasible to keep the Philippines in light of the lack of

public and Congressional support for defending the islands against Japan. See TR to Taft, 21 August 1907, Letters, V, 761–2.

76. Von Sternburg to von Bülow, 1 March 1903, IA R17334.

John (Jack) M. Thompson is Lecturer at the Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College Dublin. He is co-editor of the forthcoming book, Progressivism in America: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford University Press, 2016).

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