Critical Reflection

Individual Critical Reflection - France

The already concerning situation of fragile states worldwide has been further escalated due

to the multifaceted issues brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. With just under one

hundred and twenty five million confirmed cases and two and a half million deaths globally

(World Health Organization, 2021), it is estimated that one-third of these cases and fatalities

are located in highly vulnerable countries faced with refugee and humanitarian crises

(Security Council, 2020). Fragile states have lacked resources and support during the

pandemic, generating potential long-term social, economic and political consequences.

Countries in such positions have witnessed an increase in poverty, hunger, human rights

violations, risking a decline of institutional order in newly established democratic

governments. Furthermore, vaccination programs and campaigns have been disrupted,

‘putting more than 80 million children under the age of one at risk of vaccine-preventable

diseases’ (Security Council, 2020). With this, the Security Council (SC) has, since March

2020, been working to address the concerns surrounding maintaining peace and security in

fragile states during such unprecedented times. This paper will critically analyse the

conflicting position points and negotiation tactics of the delegation of the United States,

Vietnam and India during the simulation and will further evaluate the virtual experience of the

debate as a whole.

As a representative of the delegation of France, our aim was to push delegates to commit to

the upkeep of newly-formed democracies in this time of global health crisis by calling for

further humanitarian aid support and monetary contributions towards the Global

Humanitarian Response Plan. Our position focused on the fragile status of African states

during this time, most specifically the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Republic of

Mali, countries which share intrinsic economic, political and historical ties with France.

France’s diplomatic posture throughout the debate, and further emphasised in our position

paper, was that of a comprehensive collaborative approach of international partnership

which prioritised the facilitation of peacekeeping operations by enabling them to fully

implement their mandates, despite the challenges incurred by the pandemic. Ultimately,

France’s main goal was to preserve democracy by finding a resolution that would protect

decades worth of political and economic development investment in fragile states, now at

risk of deterioration due to the pandemic.

While France greatly welcomed the grand majority of position papers presented by the

participating members of the SC, where most declared their underlying support to deal with

the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic as a matter of urgency, the debate

itself steered in a completely different direction. In a proposal put forward by the delegation

of India, the council surprisingly voted to focus the discussions solely on conflict resolution.

While France was also committed to finding a resolution related to the cessation of hostilities

and conflict, we found this topic to be not only incredibly broad for a moderated caucus but it

also conflicted with the majority of position papers and our debate expectations.

Furthermore, resolution 2532, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and

armed conflicts during this moment, passed unanimously by the SC in July 2020 (United

Nations Security Council, 2020), making our discussion on conflict resolution redundant.

Although France attempted to exercise its veto power to negate the passing of this motion,

this was unfortunately overseen by the chair and the motion passed with a simple majority.

The delegation of France believed that the SC would have benefited from taking a

consequentialist approach and focusing on finding a resolution to the immediate, unresolved

matters related to the challenges on fragile states before attempting to resolve their

pre-pandemic conflicts. For example, the protection of aid workers and medical personnel in

fragile states, which France strongly advocated for, will impede the discontinuation of efforts

on poverty eradication, education, healthcare and development.

Although France and the US are well-known diplomatic partners, our approaches during this

debate were extensively different. The US holds significant relevance and power within the

decision-making body and processes of the SC. However, on this occasion, the American

position paper was incompatible with the real-life postures of US foreign policy on priorities

and measures to support peace and security in fragile states. While the new Biden-Harris

administration is currently negotiating cuts for their defence spending, which was increased

by 19% during the Trump administration (Stone, 2020), the delegation of the US took a

unilateral approach and proposed an increase of defence budgets and spending by the

member states of the SC, which would be used to support military interventions. While this

may have been an accurate posture for the US delegation to hold in a 2001 post-9/11

themed SC simulation, it did not align with the new administration’s foreign policy strategy

and with the aims of the debate overall. Furthermore, for unexplained reasons, the

delegation of the US focused their position paper solely on their bilateral relationship with the

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. For a simulation of an institution that highly promotes

multilateral diplomatic practice, this decision was rather disappointing. It limited debating

capacities with the US and disrupted the group’s negotiation dynamics as a whole. Having

known the American position before the submission of the position papers, our delegation

would have pushed for a Franco-American political and economic collaboration of aid and

peacekeeping in Afghanistan. Furthermore, France, together with the other P5 member

states could have pushed the US to steer its focus of the debate toward COVID related

emergencies in fragile states.

When evaluating the theoretical basis of negotiation for some of the most involved actors of

the discussion, while the delegation of India took the lead in attempting to find a possible

zone of agreement between the SC (Merino, 2017), France and other P5 member states

rejected their proposal for states to decrease their defence budget and spending by 7.5%.

India’s integrative bargaining tactic (Weingart et al, 1987) failed to estimate the almost

obvious constraints posed by the power and influence of the P5 and their unwillingness to

allow their national policies and spending to be a matter of negotiation for the SC. On the

other hand, France was poised as a competitive negotiator committed to using its bargaining

power (O’Neill, 2018) to guarantee the inclusion of its interest in the final resolution.

‘Competitive negotiators attempt to conceal the true extent of their authority to make

compromises (...) they seek to persuade rather than discuss’ (Lowenthal, 1982).

Furthermore, while the simulation called for a systematic collaborative and multilateral

approach for a topic that raises transnational concerns, the delegations of the US and

Vietnam focused their attention on issues concerning their own national security, foreign

policies and relations. As previously mentioned, while the US focused its position solely on

solidifying its relationship with Afghanistan, Vietnam disregarded the committee topic as a

whole and proposed another, no less concerning, discussion on China’s assertive and

expansionist behaviour in the East Sea region. However, this matter was already tabled for

debate in the ASEAN 2020 summit where its leaders recalled and reiterated the UN’s

Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) to find a resolution for this dispute based on

‘sovereignty rights and entitlements’ (The Guardian, 2020). While the UK and France both

believe that China is a ‘clear and present threat to the stability of the region and the

international community’ (Meizels, 2019), this specific discussion did not fit with the purpose

of the debate.

Model United Nations (MUN) simulations are a key tool for learning IR theory and ‘doing

politics’ (Haack, 2008; 395; Asal, 2005). It presents the importance of group work and

cooperation, serving as a site of ‘collective legitimization’ where state representatives come

together to seek ‘multilateral endorsement of their positions’ (Claude Jr, 1986). As Professor

R. P. Barston (1997) explained, diplomacy is ‘an attempt to explore and reconcile conflicting

positions in order to reach an acceptable outcome’ (p.84) . All and all, the experience of

running this simulation online mimicked the real-life adaptations of global governance in this

period of isolation and social distancing. Such conditions have established a growing

demand for digital competence as a vital skill for future diplomats. Diplomacy, as we have

seen, is a site subject to constant change (Barston, 1997: 4). However, ‘traditional

diplomacy is unlikely to be abandoned’ (Purwasito and Kartinawati, 2020). As much as the

virtual simulations attempt to come close to the experiences of in-person debates, it differs

greatly due to the fact that we are unable to detect, absorb and incorporate other important

factors of negotiation, such as body language, more fluid, direct and informal negotiations

during unmoderated caucuses, and varying cultural forms of communication. Either way, it is

a highly-valuable mode of learning, a must-have experience for any student of International

Relations.

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