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WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 13 • No. 4 • October–december 2012 5
Global Value Chains, International Trade Statistics and Policymaking
Alejandro Jara is deputy director General at the World Trade Organization.
Global Value Chains, International Trade Statistics
and Policymaking in a Flattening World
Alejandro Jara and Hubert Escaith
Introduction
For many years, the study of merchandise trade statistics was considered a ‘mature’ subject, where progress meant introducing better administrative procedures at the custom offices, while conceptual debates focused on
Hubert Escaith is chief statistician at the World Trade Organization.
Key points
• The growth in global value chains has blurred country borders and the distinction between industrialised and developing economies, and has had a major impact on the study of trade statistics.
• Growth in the developing economies’ share of international trade far exceeds the increase in their relative economic size because trade data are not corrected for the double-counting impact of global supply chains.
• improved trade statistics can throw new light on the extent and distribution of global imbalances and consequently on the relevance of trade and exchange rate policies.
• The WTO has launched the ‘Made in the World initiative’ to support the analysis of global manufacturing issues and to provide a better understanding of the rela- tionship between international trade and job creation.
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Alejandro Jara and Hubert Escaith
the proper classification of new electronic devices such as flat screens or multifunction scanner/printer/copiers. Things began to change more than five years ago when the profession realised that the nature of trade itself had changed dramatically and that what national custom statistics used to measure was not enough to have a correct picture of the situation. This mutation – some analysts even advanced a paradigm shift (Grossman & rossi-Hansberg 2006) – was caused by the globalisation of production net- works, giving rise to global value chains that are closely knitting together firms from many different countries, blurring not only the official country borders, but also the traditional distinction between industrialised and developing economies.
This new phase of globalisation made possible by the convergence of significant changes in the technological as well as in institutional and polit- ical domains, was ‘flattening the world’ (Friedman 2005). it also brought back to the same drawing table the analysts and the trade statisticians who had comfortably lived more or less separately since the late 1950s. indeed, the fact that the present article is co-authored by characters as disparate as a lawyer and a statistician may provide some ground to the paradigm- shift hypothesis, a situation where expertise in a single field can no longer provide for an adequate understanding of the situation at hand.
The changes induced by the rise of global production networks are indeed much deeper and more multi-dimensional than those of the late 1950s, with the first wave of foreign direct investment, when some large corpora- tions became multinational enterprises, opening plants abroad to produce
and sell in these foreign countries. This first trans-nationalisation of domestic firms amounted to substi- tuting cross-border trade with direct
sales, by building a physical presence in the foreign market to get closer to the final consumer. The present globalisation of production of goods and services goes far beyond, creating new trade channels instead of sub- stituting them. Today, internationalisation aims not only at incorporating foreign consumers but, more importantly, at getting closer to foreign work- ers in order to benefit from their comparative advantage and subcontract specific tasks. The value-added generated by each differentiated task along the supply chain is embedded in a buoyant intra-industry exchange of intermediate goods, such as parts and components and other goods for
Trade in intermediate goods amounts to more than half
of world trade, excluding oil.
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Global Value Chains, International Trade Statistics and Policymaking
processing. indeed, trade in intermediate goods amounts to more than half of world trade, excluding oil (WTO and idE-JETrO 2011).
The irruption of trade in tasks has important implications that go beyond trade and international economics affecting many other economic and social dimensions. Trade in tasks has the potential to create trade in intermediate goods, in situations where no trade in final goods would have taken place (Baldwin & robert-Nicoud 2010). This trade creation has allowed countries deprived of a large internal market or abundant natural resources to build an industrial base that they would have been unable to do before. For example, when only final goods were traded, comparative advantages would have predicted that an advanced country like the United states would specialise in electronic equipment, while a large developing country like china would manufacture mature products such as textiles and clothing. little room was left for smaller developing countries like costa rica besides supplying natural-resource based exports such as agri- culture or tourism. However, outsourcing and the slicing up of the value chains allowed the production of electronic equipment to be fragmented and some of the tasks delocalised. The Us firms kept the core activities and offshored labour-intensive assembly to china. costa rica, an open economy with good governance and a skilled labour force, was picked by some leading Us firms to host some of the technically complex parts of the supply chain. Thanks to this offshoring investment, costa rica is now the second largest exporter of iT products in latin America, after Mexico and before Brazil (WTO 2012). similarly, less developed countries like Bangladesh, cambodia and Vietnam have competed successfully with china in the production of clothing and footwear.
in the process, new manufacturing jobs were created in developing countries, lifting millions out of poverty. Offshoring also allowed firms from industrialised countries to remain competitive and stay in business despite the fast-expanding firms from the newly industrialised countries (Nics). confronted with a strong appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Agreement in 1985, Japanese firms diversified their supply chains by investing in neigh- bouring Asia; the success of German firms is also closely linked to a series of investments in eastern Europe and in emerging Asia in the 1990s. in con- trast to what happened in developing countries, the job impact in industri- alised economies was mixed. if outsourcing helped firms to stay in business and preserved jobs, the demand for low- and medium-skilled work shrank
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under the double effect of automation and foreign competition, while the demand for high-skilled workers increased. This employment composition effect increased income gaps and became a political issue in industrialised countries as a result of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, when unem- ployment increased, fuelling demands for protectionism. A similar trend showed up in some high-income developing countries that felt threatened by the rise of newly emerging competitors. The issue prompted the G20 to identify in its Puerto-Vallarta meeting (Mexico 2012) global value chains as one of the main components of the modern global governance.
indeed, what was initially an innovation in business management became so successful that it not only changed trade economics, but initi- ated a process that is having profound repercussions on our understanding of development policies and the conduct of social policies. The present article will focus on the trade and governance aspects, first revising the forces that led to the flattening of the world, then analysing the implica- tions for trade statistics and policymaking, before presenting some tenta- tive conclusions.
The flattening of the world
Trade in tasks is very much in tune with this new idea of a flatter world, where traditional boundaries and distances are collapsing and human societies interact as closely across oceans as they did in the villages of the Middle Ages. The exact date when the flattening of the earth started is still a subject of controversy, but a few dates can help define the main milestones. The ‘global matching’ of mass consumer demand in the Us with rising manufacturing capacities in eastern Asia started in the early 1960s and led to the emergence of the Nics besides Japan. But these new supply networks were still limited to a few business partners.
From a truly global perspective, we can propose to allocate the flatten- ing of the earth to the date of January 1979. it was the historical and ice- breaking visit of deng Xiaoping to the Us that marked the beginning of the end of the post-second World War era of separate trading blocs, and the return of china to the international market, through a long process of reform and industrialisation. Ten years later, in 1989, two highly symbolic events cemented the new world: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Brady Bond initiative, which closed the international debt crisis of the 1980s that
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Global Value Chains, International Trade Statistics and Policymaking
had engulfed so many developing countries, particularly in latin America. in the meantime, china had been progressively opening its economy and was slowly emerging as a world industrial power, gaining international recognition with its accession to the WTO in 2001.
Politics or economics alone would have been unable to flatten the world. This was also the result of the progress of transportation and information technologies, which changed the way people, machines and organisations exchange and communicate. The most emblematic symbol of the new interconnectivity is certainly the internet. But before the inter- net revolution of the early 1990s, two other innovations had paved the way for the internationalisation of production processes. The first was the container, invented by Malcolm Mclean in the 1950s,1 which dramatically facilitated trans-border trade. Freight rates are estimated to have declined by 65% between the 1950s and 1990s (WTO & idE-JETrO 2011). The second revolution was the application on a global scale of the principles of lean manufacturing, often referred as the Toyota, or the just-in-time (JiT), models. Besides eliminating excess inventories, JiT built on new ways of reorganising internal processes along work centres, and led to closer coor- dination with suppliers. What was initially applied by large firms became widely used along international supply chains, when some of these work centres were outsourced or offshored.
Global supply chains, trade in tasks and international economics
Thanks to changes in world governance, technology and management models, the way modern businesses are run has changed, with huge impli- cations for the nature of international trade and the instruments required by analysts to measure trade and understand the costs and benefits of alternative policies. The implications go far beyond national policymak- ing, as trade in tasks highlights existing gaps in today’s world governance.
Redefining comparative advantages
When the world was round, international economics and trade were best represented by the ricardian theory of comparative advantage. With
1 in 1956, Mclean developed the metal shipping container, which replaced the traditional break bulk method of handling dry goods.
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some adaptation, this model governed the way economists understood international trade up to the late 1990s. Yet, by that time, the nature of international trade was already changing. The production of final goods started to be fragmented into several stages, some of them outsourced to countries far away from the home country. Trade in intermediate goods became predominant, as parts and components criss-crossed international borders, embedding additional value-added at each stop on the inter- national supply chain. The resulting final good was the product of many embedded tasks performed by people working in different countries, and the old concept of ‘country of origin’ gradually lost its meaning.
Nowadays, in international trade of manufactures, what you see is no longer what you get: the label ‘made in a particular country’ can be misleading. A well-known example is the iPad from Apple. According to Kraemer et al. (2011), the imported cost of a mid-range tablet imported from china into the Us is about Us$290, but the chinese content is only 5% of the commercial value registered by customs, while most of the electronic content actually comes from south Korea, Japan and the Us. consumer electronics is not the sole example of global manufacturing. The first new jumbo-jet Airbus 380 that left the city of Toulouse, France, for its final export destination in singapore was flying on wings made in the United Kingdom and spain, while Germany provided the bulk of cabin and fuselage manufacturing. Even the ‘European’ origin of the car- rier could be contested, because the engines were from the Us, and Airbus industrie has more than 1,500 suppliers in 27 countries.
in this ‘post-ricardian’ model of international trade, specialisation is no longer based on the overall balance of comparative advantage in producing a final good. To borrow from Grossman and rossi-Hansberg (2006), England does not trade textiles for Portugal’s wine any more, as in ricardo’s time. in today’s flattening world the comparative advantages relate to each specific step of the global value chain that will lead, at the end of the chain, to the production of the final good. This change of para- digm from trade in goods to trade in tasks calls for a change in the analyti- cal and statistical tools we use to measure and understand the real world.
Implications for trade statistics
The growth in the trade shares of developing economies far exceeds the increase in their relative economic size. One possible explanation for this
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remarkable increase is that trade data are not corrected for the double- counting impact of global supply chains. if goods are produced through a sequence of stages, each country will add value as a product is transformed from raw inputs into a final output along a production chain that spans national bor- ders. The value-added of countries partic- ipating earlier in the chain will therefore be counted in trade flows multiple times. To avoid double counting, trade in tasks calls for a new measurement of international trade focusing on the value-added content – or domestic content – of trade flows. To take one of the previous examples, if we want to assign to each country of origin the value-added imbedded in an iPad imported by the Us, we must be able to measure how much comes from china, Germany, Japan or Korea and, of course, from the Us itself.
Koopman et al. (2011) estimate that, for the world as a whole, 78% of exports consist of value-added from the country of export. The share of domestic value-added in gross exports is relatively lower in china or Mexico (respectively 53% and 57% for their export-orientated manufac- tures). it is also low in Malaysia (58%), the Philippines (58%) and Thailand (60%), but relatively high in indonesia (77%), south Africa (82%), Brazil (87%) and russia (90%). The latter group of developing countries special- ises in producing commodities, in which fragmentation of production is less feasible, whereas the first group specialises in manufacturing, where production chains are more common.
confronted with the need to adapt the statistical apparatus, national and international statistical organisations can choose between the following two options.
1. The direct approach, by looking into the details of manufacturing and disentangling the origin and value of the inputs. case studies, like the iPad or the Airbus, do this; they are illustrative but not always representative. This is also the objective of ambitious programmes at Eurostat and OEcd, to link trade statistics and business statistics at firm level. But this is very intensive in micro-data, and reserved for the most developed statistical systems.
2. The indirect approach, chosen by WTO, which makes use of exist- ing trade and national accounts data produced, and allows worldwide
Trade data are not corrected for the double- counting impact of global supply chains.
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coverage (see daudin, rifflart and schweisguth (2009) for an example based on non-official statistics). in preliminary research, conducted in cooperation with idE-JETrO of Japan, WTO focused on trade patterns in Asia (WTO & idE-JETrO 2011). similarly, OEcd was cooperating with the World input–Output database, a project sponsored by the European Union and led by Groningen University (Escaith & Timmer 2012). in 2012, WTO and OEcd signed an agreement to develop and maintain a worldwide database, building on official statistics and embedding the progress obtained by the various national and international institutions that have been contributing to this new field of trade statistics (OEcd & WTO 2012).
it is perhaps not simple coincidence if national accounts are called up to complement trade statistics in order to better understand today’s inter- national economy. As the 2008–2009 global crisis created new demands for better statistics on the global economy, the Great depression of the 1930s led to the creation of modern national accounts. indeed, national accounts were instituted in the post-second World War period to help governments better understand their national economies and avoid repro- ducing the disaster caused by the 1929 crisis. Because the nation-state was the key actor in those years of reconstruction, and most enterprises were strictly national, the analysts devised a method that identified the terri- torial dimension within each nation-state, defining a clear-cut separation between residents and non-residents, between what was domestic and the rest of the world, between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Today’s decision-makers need to have the appropriate tools to do the same, but in a globalised world where the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is blurred, small changes in inventories at some remote point of the international supply chain may translate into large changes in factory production back home.
Revisiting trade policies
When it becomes difficult to distinguish between the residents and the rest-of-the-world, to use a national accounting concept, it becomes also more much difficult to design a purely national economic policy, as we have seen in the recent global crisis. in the face of such complex global production systems, the counter-crisis measures should not serve to isolate national economies with protectionist measures. The new ‘global trading
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and manufacturing economy’ calls for the devising of appropriate systemic and cross-national programmes, coordinated at world level. The leader- ship taken by the G20 in organising a coordinated response to the crisis in the first months of 2009 is an example of such global answers to global challenges.
The design of national policies needs also to be adapted. Old ‘mercan- tilist’ policies, based on the vision that trade is a competition between ‘us’ and ‘them’, become not only suboptimal (which they usually were even when the world was round), but also a complete anachronism in our new flatter world. Understanding that trade is not a zero-sum game between ‘us’ and ‘them’ has huge implications for trade policy and nego- tiations. For example, canada announced that it had become a tariff-free zone for manufacturing inputs and machinery. it said it was doing this not only because it was committed to maintaining open markets to help the global economy recover after the crisis, but also because this unilat- eral action by canada would help raise the competitiveness of canadian companies. similarly, the swedish Trade institute (Kommerskollegium 2012) has highlighted that most tariffs are raised on imported inputs, raising domestic production costs, and that some anti-dumping meas- ures backfired and ultimately affected re-imports of intermediary inputs exported by European firms and processed abroad. Thus, the tempta- tion to ‘buy or hire national to help national firms and workers’ is self- defeating as it ultimately hurts the productivity and competitiveness of the national economy, and destroys jobs – particularly the most produc- tive and better-paid ones.
But we know that, in times of crisis, pressure from sectoral interests and public opinion can push in the wrong direction. in the absence of objec- tive statistics demonstrating the interconnectivity of the modern produc- tion system, it is to be feared that false and obsolete policies will remain in the panoply of the most popular remedies. One of the most frighten- ing versions of Murphy’s law2 for policymakers is that every complex problem has a simple solution, easy to understand, easy to explain but totally wrong. Besides providing experts with the statistical tools neces- sary to understand the global trading and manufacturing economy, results
2 Murphy’s law is an adage typically stated as: ‘Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.’
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from such initiatives as the World input–Output database (WiOd)3 or the OEcd–WTO projects are expected to counter Murphy’s law, and provide the media and other opinion-makers with easy-to-understand but factual information about complex issues.
Global rebalancing
To illustrate the usefulness of the new global statistics that can be derived from interconnecting national productive and financial accounts, let us
take a closer look at one of the most hotly debated issues among econo- mists nowadays: the rebalancing of the global economy (de Gregorio 2011). The large balance of payments imbal-
ances accumulated during the 2000s are often blamed for the 2008–2009 crisis, and many highlight the large bilateral imbalance between the exist- ing superpower, the Us, and the new world manufacturer, china.
relying on conventional trade statistics, however, gives a distorted pic- ture of trade imbalances between countries. As we saw when looking at the chinese content of the iPad, what counts is not the imbalances as meas- ured by gross values of exports and imports, but how much valued-added is embedded in these flows. Using conventional trade statistics would overestimate the Us bilateral deficit vis-à-vis china by around 30% as compared to measuring in value-added content based on input–out matri- ces. The official figures for the bilateral deficit would be cut by about 50% when the activity of export processing zones in china, and Hong Kong, china, re-exports are fully taken into account (WTO & idE-JETrO 2011). By the same token, measured in domestic value-added content, the bilateral deficit of the Us with Korea or Japan, the main providers of electronic parts to chinese assembly plants, would increase in proportion to the reduction of the Us–china deficit.
This implies also that traditional exchange rate policies won’t fully help in rebalancing apparent bilateral imbalances. if the chinese value- added in Us imports from china is just half its commercial value (WTO & idE-JETrO 2011), a revaluation of the chinese Yuan will increase the
3 The WiOd has been developed to analyse the effects of globalisation on trade patterns, environmental pressures and socio-economic development, and covers 27 EU countries and 13 other major countries in the world for the period from 1995 to 2009.
Conventional trade statistics give a distorted
picture of trade imbalances between countries.
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costs of chinese goods by only half the rate of the revaluation. in the case of consumer electronics, the impact will be even less, and only 20% of the variation in the exchange rate will pass through the price paid by the Us importers.
Global governance and the quest for a new regulation
Henry Ford proved Karl Marx wrong when he raised the wages of his workers in proportion to their productivity. He understood that mass pro- duction needed mass consumption. The Keynesian revolution formalised the leading role of demand in regulating economic cycles, and the second half of the 20th century opened the way to the welfare state in industri- alised countries, rather than the development of social polarisation and unsolvable social conflicts. This ‘Fordist’ mode of regulation, based on an implicit or explicit covenant between firms, trades unions and political parties, implies that both production and consumption take place in the same political territory. From a statistical perspective, the macroeconomic regulation was made possible by the development of national accounts, which provided policymakers with the necessary information on the com- plex interaction between domestic supply and demand.
Yet, in today’s global production networks, the producers are no longer the consumers, and Henry Ford’s strategy has lost its effectiveness – at least up to a point. it is true that, by having their products assembled in china, the European and Us firms that offshored part of their produc- tion in this country assisted the emergence of a middle class that is now a consumer of their products. But if production (and, increasingly, consump- tion) is global, politics remains local. As long as the old mercantilist vision of ‘us’ vs ‘them’ persists, there is little chance of finding the required pol- itical momentum to break away from the ‘prisoner dilemma’ and look for cooperative solutions.
The dire state in which global governance stands today in the doha round, or in settling such critical issues as environment and sustainable growth, is illustrative of this great regulation gap. Part of the deadlock comes from a lack of information on the depth of interactions between countries and people in today’s world. interestingly, the same technique that allows measurement of the value-added content of international trade can be used to track where contaminants are produced and where they are consumed. As informed people tend to make more rational decisions than
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those who are uninformed, it is believed that better statistics on the new nature of international trade will aid understanding of the global dimen- sion of the issues, and the close interaction between national polices and global outcome. in other words, the hope is that, by building a compre- hensive set of interlinked national input–output matrices, the new trade statistics will play the same role for global regulation that national accounts did for the ‘Fordist’-type regulation.
Conclusions
Each crisis reveals new issues and calls for new policy instruments. The 1929 depression led to the creation of the modern version of national accounts, which were built on the resident/non-resident vision of the world. But today’s world of industrial production is dominated by global manufacturing, where international trade plays the role that inter-city connections played in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This intercon- nection of domestic supply and demand schedules transcends national borders to create a closely knit network of supply and use contractual arrangements. Global manufacturing is changing rapidly the way the international economy interacts, blurring the differences between the resident/non-resident visions of the world that preceded the design of national accounts.
The objectives of a series of projects geared to interlinking national accounts to measure the value-added content of international trade are ambitious but will provide an answer to the urgent need to supply the data required by the new global governance. The ambition, by providing new and more accurate statistics on international trade, is to help policy- makers and trade negotiators in designing factual-based strategies in the best interests of their constituents. The project is of importance for both developed and developing countries.
This interconnection of domestic supply and demand schedules across national borders creates a closely knit set of productive, com- mercial, financial and contractual arrangements. it is changing rap- idly the way the international economy interacts, rendering obsolete or irrelevant many of the previous analytical classifications. Global manufacturing even changes the post-second World War distinction between industrialised and developing economies, between ‘centre
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Global Value Chains, International Trade Statistics and Policymaking
and periphery’. Nevertheless, if policymakers are increasingly con- cerned by this increased interconnection of national economies, they still lack the appropriate statistical tools to measure and monitor accu- rately this interconnection.
New modes of international production are translating into new inter- national political institutions. let us face this new challenge with new visions. The governance of this new institutional order we are contemplat- ing today calls for a change in the functioning of national and international organisations. it calls also for revamping the existing statistical system and providing the decision-makers with the statistics they need to face their new responsibilities. Measuring trade in value-added, as one objective of the Made in the World initiative launched by the WTO in 2011, aims to provide support for the analysis of certain global issues linked to global manufacturing, such as the environment or a better understanding of the relationship between international trade and job creation. Even if we know that the world is still round, we must also realise that north, south, east and west are part of the same compass and are bound to share the same planet.
Acknowledgement The opinions expressed are personal and do not represent an official position of the WTO or its secretariat. The authors are grateful to Ms sheila coyle for her editing assistance.
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