Postion Paper - Gun Control

The Production of Criminal Violence in America: Is Strict Gun Control the Solution?

Lance K. Stell

( ( / ^ trict gun control" (SGC) has no clear meaning. ^ ^ so it is ne*cessaiy to clarity it. I define .SCIC; as ^>^ an array of legally sanctkmed re.strictions

designeel to impose llreanii searcity on the general popu- lation. StiCs pLiblic poiicv goal, gun scarcity, commonly rests on the predicates that "dangerous eriminal control" is not ihe central problem tor reelucing ihe problem of crimi- nal gun V iolence but rather that it is the stxial prevalence of the distinctively-lethal instalments (guns) by which lx)th SLipposedly "'g(H)d citizens' as well as violent criminals intliet A staggeringly high percentage of injurv' and death.

Protes.sor Zimring (who also has an essay published in this issue) is one SGC's most tii.stinguislied. prolific anci comprehensive theorists, lie has adv-(xateci for handgun scarcitv- among the general population since at least 1969.' Recognizing that .Anx'ricans have had a long love affair with their guns and are loathe to give them up. Zimring has Ix'en candid that stigmatizing guns must Ix* a compo- nent ofa violence-redue tion strategy that seeks ultiiiiatelv' to impose gun scarcity on the general population.- I le has been candid tcxi in acknov\ k^dging that none of this will Ix* accomplished ciuickly. easily, or cheaply, I'hus. in 19H9. he predicted a grim, culture-rentiing and violent tuture tor America over the near term, even if the policies he fav-ors were enacted. He wrote "The most marked reduction in nreariiis violence cannot be expected until well past the intrcxiuction of Ie*gislation designed to achieve handgun scarcity anei long after the pericxl of nio.st intense .scH'ial anei political detrinx*nt or co.st,"'

Professor Zimring argues that even the mo.st cursorv' review of .-Xmerican gun-homicide elata show that reduc- ing guns' "market share" of homicide must be a key

Journal of Ixiw. Medicine & Lithics. M (mUY. 3H-t6. ® 20(>} bv the .'\iiX'rie-an Stxietv of Liw. .Medicine .S: llthics.

ingreelient of an enlightened ilrearms policy. This suppos- edlv' follows from the laet that gun assaults are 5-7 times more likely to result in death than non-gun assaults and from ihe tact that ~(J"ii of American homicides are commit- ted v\itli guns. Other countries with assault rates similar to Americas but with lower gun prevalence and vvith a coiiimensLirately lower percentage of homicide committed w ith guns enjoy homicide rates 5Wo+ lower than America, He concludes that it only .stands to reason tliat were a smaller ix-rcentage of .America's a.ssaults committed vvith guns, its homickle rate must marginally decline, if tlie overall a.s.sault rate stayed the same.

Points of Convergence Professor Zimring and I agree that carefully-crafteci. vveil- enforced fireamis control policies can contribute to niiirginal reductions in criminal violence. We agree that what mat- ters from the .standpoint of enlightened gun policy making is the cjue-stion of who has guns, how they use their guns and the incentive effects that gun poiicv- can have on Ixith "who'" and "how" at the margin. 1 al.so agree with Professor Zimring's .speculative hypothetical claim that putting an additional lO.O(K) guns on the street will not automatically result in a propoaional increa.se in the homicide rate. Fi- nally, we agree that while no firearms policy by itself can usher in a Utopian, violence-free scxial order, even mar- ginal reductions in criminal violence are worth pursing when the Ix'neflts exceed the costs and the methtxl pur- .sued iscost-eftective. Changes in gun ;x)lit"V' that rea.sonably hold out such promi.se deserve thoughtful cxmsideration.'

OVERVIEW

In this paper. I will demonstrate the speciousness of

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TheJ(nirnal of law. Medicine & Ethics

I'rofessor Zimringsargument thai reducing the percentage of homicieles committed vv ith guns is the ke> to reciucing America's homicick* rate. 1 v\il| luaher argue that pursuing any gun control me*asure de*signed to impose- (hanel)gun .scareity on the general populatioti is both neeelless anei usele.ss. Whether il is etiiiealiv enlighteix'd lo fuel America"s culture wars by encouraging gun-stigmalization antl blatant displays of intolerance directed at private gun ownei'shi[i per se is a topic tor another day,"

Zimring's Argument for Changing Course with America's Firearm Policy

Pn)fe.s.sor Zimring tliinks that gun eontiol iavvs can maigin- ally reduce the homicide rate by jiiaking guns progressively scarcer in the scKial environment. Mow large a iiiaiginal reekie-iion mighi such ;x)licie*s win over time? Zimring has relietl on a single FBI .statistic to tell the tale." t i u n s are u.sc-tl in apfiroNitnaiely " 0 " ! of all eriminal killings, I Ie writes "this tells us jmmediately what the s|X-e'ial problem ol gun use- is in violent crinx" - an increa.se in the death r a l e . . , ' lie-eause he subscritx-s to (and c-.m fairiy < laim to Ix- have oiiginateeh tlie "iasiai mental ity hv |x )ihe-sis." ae e (Heling t() vv hich the (sup- |X)sed) greater inherent lethaiiiy of guns make-s assaults committe*el with them S-"* linx-s more- eleadly. inele|x-txieni of ix-qx-trator-laetoi's. Proles.sor Zimring intimates thai the [xnential marginal reciuction in the iiotnieieie' rate le-sulting trom supply-side restriclioiis might be- tjiiite- huge.

Protes.sor Zimring claims that all mainsiream eriminolo- gists now r e c o g n i z e that g u n s a r e an i n d e p e n d e n t 'contributing cause" to siKietys homicitle rate- anei that the t e r m s o t their intramural elebates now t o i x e i n how large- a homicide rate- rceluetion might result w e r e guns" "niarkel share"" ot assaults t-eduec-d,

-'\lthougli suicide is not a e'rime- anei so. by elefinition. doe-s not (|uality as a criminal as.sault. it is c o m m o n to count a suicide as A violent tleath. It so. Zimring's "insiai- mentality h y p o t h e s i s ' shoukl also exte*nd to a ietiiaiity retluttion analysis of 'self-assaulls" (suieiele attempts). Ame-riea's suieitk* rate is ap|-)roximatelv iwice as high as its c u n e n t homieiele- rate (roughly 11 versus ix)ughly (>). .More than 3n.(K)() Amerieans e-ommit suicide each year, putting suicide in the t o p ten causes of ek-ath. t a i n s ' "market sh;ire' in suicide is S(("u - not as large as the-ir maike-i share in homicide, percentage-wise, but the boeiy e'ouni is ixailv tvviee as high,

.\ssuiiiing that g u n s are S-~ times inherently more lethal than other nx-ehanisins {)t injui-v, and with guns' mar- ket ,sliareot suicide at (̂l"i>. tlx* instaimeniality thesis ,s;iys that .•\merit-as sukitle niie shoulei tall if tewer ,se-it-as,saLiits wvte commitle*ti with guns, it the overall numlx-r of sc*lf-a.s,s;iults (siiie'iele attempts) weiv to remain llle' siiiiie-. And llx* instni- mentalitv h>ix)tlie.sis predicLs tlnciing lovwr suieide rates in countries where comparative gun sc-arcitv' results in a smalk-r

jx-rceniage ot suieieles eommitteel with guns, rnlortunaiely. the liy|iothe-sis generateel by the suicieie--

t'orollai'V'ot theiiLstaiiiK'niality tht-sis is talse. (iountiics known tor having ven' le-strielivv gun [Xjlicies anei for having much lower gun prevalence than the I'niteel States (for e.samples. Ilungai-v, Denmark, Austria. N o m a y . anti I-'rance) neveithe*- k-.ss have |X*t^i.stelltly higher suicide rates, notw ithstaneiing thai a e'omparatively low ]x*tventage arc* committee! with guns."

e Seventy Percent Solution? The statistic that Zimring finds so telling in favor of his instaimentality thesis cl(x*s not tell the tale he thinks it cl(x*,s. As a c e n i u r y s w o r t h of ehita g r a p h e d below s h o w s . -America's estimated \\n\y\\c'K\v c u e fluctuated by an order of magnituele - from a re|ioned low of I.I per Kl().()(H) in I'>i).-S to a high of Kt." in I9.S().'

Figure 1. Homicide Rate, 1900-2001 Rate per 100,000 population

15 r-

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2001

\.i(i' Tin- yol lull- iniliiih-\ %U-ulli.\ ultnhiiliittil till- V II tt-rmrumutttuLs

In summarv': • .\t the lx*ginning of thecenturv'. there vvere \.l homi-

cides |x*r lOd.OdO population- • Kates t-ose signiticantly alter 1901 reaching a peak of

9 . - in 19.53. • Trom 19.-̂ 1 to I 9 i i. (encompassing the years of the

(iieat Depression) rales tell to ^.d in 19-4-i.

• Atter A slight increa.se trom 19 iS a n d 19-16 w h e n rates reached (>,!. rates cieclineci. falling to ),S in I9SS.

• ,\tier I9SS rates inct-ease'd slightly each vvar uniil the mid 19()t)s w h e n there w a s a .steeji inerease re-aehing a peak of 10,1 in 19^H.

• Kaies tell slightly in 19~S a n d 1976 but lx*gan rising thei'c-alier. reaching an all time high of 10," in 1980.

• from 19SI to 19.Si, rates cleeline-ei. lalling to K.i in 19Kl.

• Atier 19HS. raies intre-a.seclag;iin [x-aking in IWI at l(),S, • .After 1991 raies declined slightly but reiiuiined at

around 10 iht-ough 199.-̂ .

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Volume 32:1. Spring 2004

• Starting in lW t. nites declined each year, reaching 6.1 in 2(KK). the lowest rate since 1967.

However, unlike the nation's homicide rate, a random sampling indicates that the percentage e)f homicides committed with tlivarms remaineci companitivcly e-(m.siant. For example, in the pc*ri(xl 1920-26. "Puof homicides were by gun,'' According to the FBI. the percentage of hcmiicides committed with guns dropix-d to 62'̂ <. in 19H9'" but was back up to 70"'(i in 1993. as Profes.sor Zimring has noted. Mo-st recently, the FBI e.stimated that, of the 16.20-1 homi- cides committed in 2(K)2.6"",̂ i were-e'ommittc*c! vvith tireanns,"

Since the homicide rate varied remarkably over the last 1(K) years bui the {K'rceutage o^ homicides committed v\ith guns did not. the latter figure cannot provide an explanation for the fonner. Instead of giving us insight, a centurv's vvonh of data sav' that .\merica's homicide rate is vinually independent of the percentage of homicides committed vvith guns.

'This is not a subtle |X)int. so I reiterate its importance for Prole*-ssor Zimring's argument. The data do not support that Americas homicide rate is .strongly and independently detennineci by the [XTcentage of homicides committed with guns. Therefore, we should not infer "immediately"' that reducing guns' 70% 'market share' of criminal killings must Ix' sine t|ua non in a comprehensiv e .strategy to reduce the nation's homicide rate,'-

Profes.sor Zimring may Ix- correct to -say that the ciebate amongst mainstream contemporarv criminologi.sts has shifted trom perpetrator-focu.sed theories to their arguing the magnitude of the instai mental ity effea on the homicide rate, but the data support onlv those criminok)- gi-sts who estimate its eltea as ver '̂ small or negligible,''

It is not clear what might explain a shift Zimring claims to have cxcurred among.st "main.stream"' criminologi.sts, Kleck s comprehensive reviev\" of the data and of the crimi- nological literature found no empirical basis for it.'"* For example. Kleck notes that in 1972 Zimring acknowledgeti "'differentia! intention or personality may play .some role in gro.ss intercalilx*r differences in death rates,"

Kleck further notes that in 19K2 Philip Cook, another strong proponent of SGC. seemed to share Zimring's view that perpetnitor factors cannot Ix? ignored when he postu- lated that "the task dete.*rmines the tcx)l.'" .And again in I9K7. CcK)k opined that 'the choice of weapon may also Ix? as- scxiated with.. .the assailant s intent. If the roblx-r plans to kill tlx* victim, then presumably lie will trv' to et]uip him- .self with the most appropriate ttKil tor the task," I lovvever. by 1991. lx)th Ctxik and ZimHng apparently had aban- doned acknowledging that peipetnitor tactors (such as his intent and his abilitv" to sustain murderous motivation during the few .seconds it takes to intliet lethal injuries) are imi^ortant le*t ha I it\-enhancers that make a elitlerence in Ixjth weapon seleetion anti use. If we inter the comparative

importance a criminologi.st attributes to various lethalit\'- enhancing factors in the prcxiuction of criminai violence from the emphasis he gives it. it seems that ZimHng now discounts a perpetrator's lethalitv-enhancing factors in favor of the in.staimentality etTect. Thus he sa>'s. "fatality -seemis] to Ix* an almo.st accidental outcome of a large numlx*r of a.s-saults committed vvith guns or knives.'"''̂ And in his article, he savs his data "suggesteel that many homicides were the result of attacks apparently conducted with less than a single-mineled intent to kill.'

Zimring dtx*s not luither clellne "large numlx*r." or 'niaiiy.' nor ckx'S he .'viv' how one might reliably discern whether a killer was single-minded or amiiivalent or atting inadvertently during the seconds or minutes it t(K)k him her to intliet a mortal vvounci on a victim. Whv' el(K*s it matter that we hav'e .such clarifications and accounts? IJecau.se we should demand, at a minimum, clear and convincing evidence to rebut our presumptions that ttim|X*tent adults, including ix*rpetratorN of criminai gun ass:uilts. intend the reasonably fore.se*e*able C(m-se*e|uences of what they do and that they ix*i1oi-m acts inieniionally (such as. cam a loaded gun rather than a pack of chewing gum in anticipation of their criminal uncoilntei-s. puli the trigger while the gun is pointed at tlx* victim, or tliaist the blade when the victim's alxkimen is within a n u s length) preciselv Ix'cau.se they intend to pnxkice or are v\illing to risk piXKlucing the rea.scmably exix*ctable results. Absent a com[X'lling account for comparatively neglecting [-)eipetrator-factors. Zimring .seems to l->e claiming that in "a lar^e numIxT of ass;iults." the killer is as much a v ictim of circumstance as the person lie kills - just luckier, bec^iuse of where the gun was pointed when the trigger pulled his finger.

I n h e r e n t Lethality?

2 . ( l i i i K ' s c n n u i i i l t c d w i l l i l i i v i n n i s . ,

Q ' • • • ' 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 199

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The Journal (f Law. Medicine & Ethics

On cursor)' review, this graph might .seem to contirm Professor Zimrings "market share" hypothesis about homicide, lieginning approximately in 199.i. there commenc'e-d a remarkaiik* decline in tlrearm u.se in crime, A.ssiK'iatc*d with the de*clining use of guns in crime v\as a A(f^\\ decline in the Immieiele rate. So tar so good tor the market-share corollarv' of the instaiitx-ntality thesis.

Ihmever. the lO".! decline in the homicitle rale was not associaie*ei with a remarkable reeiueiion in the jx-i'evnt- age of iiomicitie*s committed with guns (which at 67".ii in 2002. remaineel close to the ~0"<i level founei in IW.̂ . .And. it should not be ix*cessai"v lo .\di\ that the homicide rate decline was not a.sscxialed vvith any documented, progres- sive gun-scarcity amc )ng the general p( )pukuion nt )r am* >ng e-riininals.

Kijiiire3. Nonfatal firearm-reliitod \ iolent vidiniizalion rate, 1993-20(12

Number of victims per 1,000 persons age 12 and older

In 2(102. incidents involving a firearm constituted ""•> of the (.9 million violent crimes of rape, sexual a.s.sault. robbeiA', anci ag,nrav-ateci anei simple assault. Over the pe- riod 1993-2002. the non-tatal. tirearm-related violent victimi/-;ition rate fell to the lowest level ever recorded.

So what do ihc-se data tell us about ilie tailli of ihe' in-stnimentality thesis?

• I-"irearms have not Ix'come scaiee among the ge-tx-ral population.

• -Vs far as we know, the [lereenlage of criminaK who own guns has not declined,

• 'Iliere has lx*en a dnimatie dec line in criminal gun u,se. • The rate of non-tatal Iliearm a-ssaults iias eleciineei to

the lowest level ever recorcied, • The homicide rate has elecline*d to a level last se-en in

the mid-l%Os. • \\-\. the percentage ol homicides e-omiiiitteel with fire-

arms remains within a narrow range tliat has hekl constant for loo vears.

'These elata suggest thai the insiniriie'iil.ilitv thesis is almost certainly false.

Perpetrators and Their T«K»1S

II is a trui.sm that gun as.saults are perpftratetl by gun-armed perfx-traiors. But in thi.s case, the truism is noi loo true- t() be gooei. "The eiata on latal outcome lre-(]uene'y elo not permit our elistinguishing a weafioiis inherent leliial propcrlie-s from the eloseiv relale-el effeels ot a perpettators elangei'ousness.

It is obvious anei unarguable that sonie- killings oceur that w'()ulcii'i t have oeeurre'ci haci the perpetraior possesseci some other weapon ivpe or none ai all. I lovvever. we iiiiisi not be loo liasiy lo map gun/non-gun onto this [loint. Sub- stituiing sonx- other gun. elitTe-reni from ihe one Lieiuallv ii.seel to kill, one unlaniiliai to ihe peiix-irator. heavie-r. moie avvkvvarei. anei with a verv siilf grip s;ifety (as some 1911s have-) riiighl have- maele- ihe- oule-oiiie- non-taial 'The [X-r|X'- tiatoi mav noi have- Ix-en able to make- the- im.iginai'v- sub.stitute llreanii tire at all, or while tleielling wiih it. tiAing it to figure out why it v\oultln't tire, ihe- vietim niigiii h.ive taken theop|X)rtuniiy toesea|x-. or taistration lesuiting trom an inabilitv to make the gun tire might have e(K)le'el our w'oukl-lx- killer's murelerous motivation. Bui ihere is no tree luneh. .\ eiunky. harel-to-use firearm may interlere with an oihervvise comparatively helpless ix'rson's lawful use of tieaelly f< ire'c in se-ll-delen.se- sue'li thai she dies iii the ass.iiili she mighi oihervvise have forestalled.

That injuries inflicted with llrearms are S-~ tinit-s more likely to lesiilt in death C1<K*S not prove that guns are inliei- ently "more leihal" mechanisms for intlicting injui"V' than others, such as lx)mbs. bludgeons or buteher knives. The le-tliality of a suiciek- bomlx-r. for example, importantiv involves •'|x*rsonality fatioi's." ap|X*ar.ince laeioi-s. tacts al>out his her intent and willingness to "push the button"' vvlien the time comes, not merely the contents ot the Ix-lt s he wears, concealed from view. (Would suicide bombers be-come more leilial h\ substituting firearms tor their explosive under garments":" Palestinian terrorists u.se*cl to use fli-e*arms in their atiaeks. but the se'ope ot iheir planiie-d earnage was too often taineated bv- aniieel victim bystaneler intei"vention.)

The limitations ot ourcrimint)logieal elaia notv\1tlistanel- ing. the trauma literature enable-s a eieare-r tocus on eoniparalive inherent lethality in- mechanism of injun'. However, this evidence source seems noi to support thai gunshoi woutxis. as a ela.ss. aiv remarkably more lite-ihteai- ening ihan vvountls inlliclecl by other mechanisms, such as bulehe-r knives or ice-pitks. For example, a studv pub- iisiied in the .Xnnals of Siitgeiy 'w\\x-<\\2;.\wx\ the niortaliiy assotiateel vvith 130 ca.ses involving ixnetrating wounds lo the alxloiiien. In l(•^^ cases the mc-chanism of injui-v' was known. Shotguns proved the mo,st lethal with a mortalitv

Volume 32:1, Spring 2004

of 20.4%. Pi.stol-inllicted abdominal wounds had a mortal- it)' of 16,8"'(), Ice picks v\-ounds and butcher knite wcxinds ranked next with l-}.3"i> and 13.3 'H) mortality' respc*ctively. liiese findings support that gun shot wounds (GSWs) to the abdomen are somewhat more life-threatening than penetrating wounds inllicted with other weapcms. but not 5-7 times more life-threatening.'"

It is plausible to suppo.se that perix'trators of a.s.sault vvho are generaliv more wiiling to intliet ie*thal injurie*s and who desire to Ix' thus perceived by others, (antl v\ho, unlike suicitle-bomlx'rs. want to survive t!ie assault them- sc*lv-es). are also more likely to choo,se guns rather than other mechanisms. Whether guns have S-7 times greater intimitiation value' than other weapons in a criminal a.ssault is unknown, but in so far as guns liavx- maiginally- greater intimidation value than .some other weapons, it is partially tx-eause* of the estimateti increaseti seriousne.ss of purpose that gun possession tentis to convev to others.

Behav ior ni( Kliflcatk>n tlieoiy also suggests that a crimi- nal may index his own intimidation level to the weapon he carries. Thus he may select a gun type wideK" regarded among fellow gang nx'mlx'rs as more intimidating and he may aciually become more intimidating when he has it in his pos.se.ssi(m. ( "I must be a pretty tough guy. after all I'm carrving a .-15 calilx'r mcxlel 1911 just like the toughest of my daig-de*aler buddies, not .some wussy. nickel-plated .2S caliber "pimp gun "'),

It is \vell-appa*ciatecl tli;it gun-underwritten intimidation deters viciim resi-stance and increa.scs victim compliance and .submi.ssk)n. 'liiat gun-amied roblx'rs are le.ss likely to inflict injury on their victims than unarmed robbers or roblx-i-s anix'c! v\-ith other vveapoas is ct)nsi,stent witJi their preferring submission to intlicting injurv'. The type of v'iclim on whom the jx-qx-trator typic-ally piv*ys will also play a nile in his choice of wc*-aix)n. Robbing children of their lunch monev' ivc]uires a dilTerent calculus of intimicLition than robbing c(mvenience stoies. banks or fellow claig ciealers. Robbing daig dealeî s is ri.sky Ix-caLLse they enjoy a reputaticm for violence anei v\-ill almost certainly Ix' amied. But ixink roblx*r Willie .Suttons principle .still reconimencLscoasidering them Ix-cause tiaig deak*r>i are' known to c-arrv- large amounts of uiim;irked c-ash and will likely not re[Tort vic-timi/iititm to the [police. (Sunon was (mce aske*ti "Wiiy do you n)b banks?" He replied. "liecause. that's where the mtmev' Is,'")

A preference tor v ictim submi.ssion does not aile out a criminal's contingent willingness to inflict injury. nord(X's it exclude his having a comparativ-cly high susceptibility to preference inversions regarding violence that may be triggered by se*emingly trivial situational factors such as his victims hav ing an 'altitude' (or even having a contempt- ible lack of it), "The triminological dynamics of labile |-)relerences amongst opportunistic criminals has been well destrilx*ci by James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrn.stein.'"

Who Shoots People, Who Gets Shot? The romantic stereotype of gun-shot-vvound-inflicting- criminal perjX'trators as ordinarv- folk, like you and me. v\'ho JList happen to have a gun ready when momentarily provoked to anger by friends or family meml')ers does not .sc|uare vvith the facts. In .so far as the data permits stereo- typing, neither killers nor their victims are just plain folks.'" It has long Ix'en appreciated that killers are signiticantly more likely than the general population to sutTer from below-average cognitive* ability, brain dysfunction, brain injurv' or mental illness, alcoholism or other substance abu.se or all or several of these in combination, \'iolent offenders al.so tend to have hi.stories of personal violence from child- h(xxl. initially as a victim and eventually as victimi/ers of other children, siblings and non-human animals.'' Data gatlieretl from UX)O to date indicate that most homicide |x*qx'trators are male, younger than 30.70-80% have crimi- nal records and average four arrests for major felonies. By contrast. 89!.. of ihe genenil jxipulation has never <mce lx?en arrested. None of these statistics pennit inferring that any individual captured by this demographic profile vvho has not yei murdered anyone, to a high degree of certainty', will do so eventually. Most will not.

The demographic profile of homicide victims tends to mirror that of their killers. A .study of GSWs reported to the police in Charlotte, NC, found that 71% of adult victims had criminal records. The Bureau of ju.stice Statistics reports that v'oung African .\merican males are 6 times more likely to murder .someone and 6 times more likely to be a murder victim than their vsliite counterparts. As Profe,ssor Zimring d(xuments in Crime Ls .\ot Ihe Problem, America's lethal violence problem is over^vhelmingIy and disproportionately A problem among its v'oung. poor, African American pt)pulatkm. Blacks are more than .seven times as likely as whites to l->e arrested for violent offenses and more than eight times as likelv- to Ix" arrested for homicide, A.ssaults by black offenciers are more than twice as likely to result in a death than assaults committed by white offenders. Zimring notes that the concentration of serious violence among blacks is so much greater than the concentration of eMher criminal otTen.ses that if robt-)ery and homicide were not so concentrated among black oftend- ers. the I'nited States would lie a much safer country.-"" and most especially for African-America as.-' But again, the.se relative-risk -Stati.stics must Ix* balanced bv' the facts that most young .Afriean-.'Xmerican males w hether poor or not pcxir. do not commit roblx'rv' <jr homicide and that hcmii- cide .stati.stics have improved for Atrican-Americans just as they have for everv' other demographic categorv'.

10,000 Guns Prote.s.sor Zimring claims that intnxlucing lO.CKX) guns into an environment where viole-nt assault is rare will not

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'IheJournal tf law. .Medicine C- Ethics

prcxluce a laige numlx-r of additional deaths unless doing so somehow were lo increase the assault rale-. < )n the- oilier hanet. were 10,000 guns aeleled to an e*nv'ironiiient where rate-s of criminal attack are alreadv high the contribution made* lo ihe e-xpeetable inere-ase in the- eleatli toll Irom violence mu.st Ix- high.

This thought ex[X*riment (taken from his b<H)k Crime Is .\(it the Problem) captures Zimrings soeioiogieal the-orv" of lethal violeixe in a nut.shell. Note that, in the hv[X)tlieticals he considers. Zimring limits speculating to whether a l>olus of 10.000 (of n<it tunher spe*e'itied types of) guns acide*cl tt> an imaginan- stKiety would resuit in a small or large ntimber of additional deaths. He does not even consieier that aeiciing iO.(H)() guns to a social environment might have no net-ettect on the number of deaths. \ o r does he consider that an ;icleliiional 10.000 guns might actually Ix- assoeiated vvitli an overall decline in the violent cieath total or rate. That ackiing 10.000 guns might have net-positive .social efkrts is noi even among ihe* remote possibilities.

But we needn't limit ourselves to subjeetively specu- lating along with Professor Zimring about tht- tnore or lt-,ss likely c"onsee|uences of adding 10.000 guns in a simulated .s(Kiai experiment. Instead we can anaiy/e elata from a real-workl ex|X-riment that enables less s|x'culative an.swei-s. We have Bureau for ,\lcoliol. 'Tobacco and Pirearms (B.-VTI-') firearms [-Jicxluction import export elata that enables an objective e*,stimate of liovv large a lx)lus (»f guns ,\nx*rie-a has actually received over the past 20 yeai-s. We al.so have the [X*rspective |ii'ovieled by a centurv's worth of year-by- year homiciele elata. And we have a huge, county-by-counti^' ciata-set from the entire United States that enables a judgment whether the nation's 3 i (X'̂ W states" putting approximately 3-* million non police carriers of concealed handguns on the .streets has tninsformeti them into ihe*

jurisciictions.

o 4. Homicide h\ Woapon l y p c 1976-2000 Number of victims

15000

10000

5000 - Other Guns Knives

Other Methiods

Blunt Objects

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Aeeoaiingto liATl's data." from I982-2(K)1 American gun nianutaeturers priKluced ',3(>1.(I13 firearms, includ- ing 3i.t8(.i~(> hanciguns. .\\\ were sokl in the .American retail market exce|it for ( H . 8 1 3 handguns and %. H()l long gun,s (rifles and shotguns) that were exporte-el. What was happening in ihe hoiiiieiele market over thai peri(Kl?

The graph shcmsthat the nunilx-rof homicklescoiiiniit- leci with "other guns'(vv Inch would inelude shotguns ihat the trauma data siiy aa* inherently more- lethal than handguas). knives, bluni objeds and 'other iiietlKKLs" held remarkably constant. By contrast, the numlvr of homicides committed wiili haixlguns is much higher and more highly variable.

In I9H0. wiien Americas homicide rale hit its all time l i i g l i ! lO"). there weiv 23.(ViO homicides, with sligliiiy fewer than 50".I committed vvith handguns, liy IW2. the homi- cide rate was 9.3 but ihc homiekle total hit an all-time high. 2i.""()(). in IW3. while the number of homicides e-onimitteel with hanelgunssoareel to more than l-l.()OO(vv-iih homiciele It-oni all meeliLinisins loialing 2 i.S3()), the homi- ciele rate actually hael eledine'ei (aibeit not mueli) trom its 1980 all-time high to 9.S.

Beginning in IW3. the homiciele rate lx*gan a swey* elecline to its cuiTent level of 6/l(X).(KX). the lowest since the mid I96()s. I lanelgun homicides also eleciineei sharply. However, the handgun inlusion tontinue-d. ailx-it also declining from a ix*ak of 2.(i million in 1993 lo 9)3.213 in 2001, Haneigun kiiiings cieciineel. hanelgun proeluetion eleelineel and the homicide rate eleciineei- Bui I leite-rate. the ix'rcentage of killings committed with fire*arms. to v\ hith Professor Zimring's lethality hy|X)thesis aitaches such great imponance. did not change remarkably (namelv. 6~'!i) in mU) tVom what it had Ix-en in PW3 (namely. 7(y ,̂,).

Beginning in Tlorida in 198"" and now including 3 i C(!\\"-issuing states, more ihan 3 million so-calk'el "shall issue' license*s to c-ari"V' a concealed handgun have be-en obiained bv (|ualiliecl persons. Typically, these laws prohibit ihe cat-rving of coiiceale*ci handguns to anyone who has not satistied statutory' requirements iiut mandate issuing a permit to everv' |ierson who satisties ihem, I<e*(|Uii'emeni.s incluek-age restrictions: a [X-i-sonal hisioiy tree of telony convidions or ane-sts tor violence and a metlical liistorv flee from eloe-umenteel mental illnc'.s.s as verified by an a[-)|^iicant-authorizeel investigation of his her iiietiical avoiels: enroilmeiii in a state-approved course on gun .safety, legallv' |X*niiissiblegun use in |X'rsonal proteetion. aixldem- onstrate-ei m i n i m u i i i proficiency in aetual gun use. finger-printing and Mil background check. A.sscK'iatt'tt ap- plicatii )n tees, ci )unM.'-tuiti( in tcvs. etc v ai"V" the c ()sts assc >eiLUi.*d with tiblaining a (renewable) licease trom SISO-S^OO,

'The most important aad rigorous work on ihe erimi- nological conse*(|uencvs ol (XAX" laws has Ix-en elone by John 1-oti who claims to have founei a suhsiantiai reeluetion in eriminal violence in CCW-issuing juri.sdictions. with the a[iparent deterrent etfe*cts being proportionally greater in

Volume 32:1. Spring 2004

counties th;it issue licenses in proportionally greater numlx*rs.-' Lott has freely sharetl his data .set vvith anyone who recjuests it. Several .scholai-s have replicate'el Lotts flnel- ings. others have l-jeen highly critical on metlnxlological grounds anei many harshlv' so. on political grountis.

liTes[X-ctive the tletails of the Tott-related controversy. it is unarguable that juri.sdictions that have adopted ("CW laws have not paid a heavy price in blocKl anti gore, as was first pa*clictecl for I'loricia in 198" anci predicted again and again in e\'erv' subsecjuent political battle tiver their atloption elsev\here. Criiiiinological theories rarely enjoy such a direct verifying talsifying realitv check. Some theories havv Ix-en rescued from refutation by contrarv" appearances by making the logically-available claim that ('CW laws dici not ciici not change scK'ial leality. they onlv made legal WIKU was widelv ciotx- vv hen iliegal. This might make alt l.otts 'disctn-eries" inve-stigation-relative artifacts, absorlx-d into nothingness by properly-done regressions. If so. logic provides a refuge tor projioiients of Zimring's iastaimentality thesis and the nations experience with CCW" does not necessarily 'slam dunk" over the theoretical obstacle interposed by it after all.

Why ZimHng Ignores the Apparent Benefits of Armed Self-Defense Profe.ssor Zimring has alwav's oppo.sed the use of force in self-defense. Initially, his arguments agaiast resisting crimi- nal attack were pragmatic, luirly analysis of the data on V ictim-resi-stance shov\e*d that victim.s v\'ho were criminally attacked and resisted were also more likely to l̂ e injured or killed than victims who put up no resistance at all. However, the early analysis only found a .statistically significant asscxriation Ijetween victims who did worse and vietims who resisted. The data were not recorded in such a way as to permit inferring that resisters did worse ljecause\\\Q'\x resistance provoked an injury-causing attack that might have not have cxcurred othervvi-se. And the early analysis did not distinguish Ix-tween gun-backed resistance and non-gun resi.stance.

However, further analysis of the tiata did distinguish betw'e'en types of resistance. It was found thai victims who used a gun to resist criminal attack not only did lx*tter than victims who resisted by other me*ans. thev also did Ix'tter than Victims who offere*ci no resi.stance what.stx-ver. Where once we haci no ciata on the efficacy and frequency of ciefensive gun use (DGD. we now have at least 15 such -Studies. The most statistically sophisticated of these supports that DGU (xrcurs more frequently than criminal gun-assaults, probably not significantlv' less than 2.S million times per year and perhaps more free|uently,- '̂

The.se findings have apparently prompted Zimring to sliitt his ground. With a|-)parent benefit and trecjuencv- of civilian eiefensive gun use now established. Zimring now

denies that there is a valid difference lx?t\veen criminal lethal violence and lawtul u.se force in .self-defense. He lumps tliese together under the general rubric "lethal violence." Indeed. Zimring thinks that the American tr.idition that attaches ethical importance to the di.stinction betv\een criminal violence and lawful use of force in selt-detense contributes tt) |x*rpetuating .Xmerica's violence- problem. "This explains why Professor Zimring thinks that America's "v iolence problem" is not merely criminological. but comprehensively .societal.

Since Zimring regards alt uses of deadly force as malignant, irrespective whether it is perpetrated by crimi- nals or used i>y (ailegedlv) "go(xl citizens" in -selt-defense, his social caicuius refuses to count as tx*neficial any u.se of deadly force by private citizens. 'Theoretically, this makes the now-substantial liieratuiv on defensive gun u.se irrel- e*vant loan ethical ine|uiiy whether the net-ctleci of fire*aaiis violence is Ix-netkial. or malignant. Its all malignant {XTSC.

It is al.so noteworthy that Zimring ignores lethal Vioienee peipetrateti bv- government officials, irrespective whether clearly lawful, e.g,. when a law enforcement otficer ju.stifiably shoots a violent felon in the line of duty or outrageously violates individual rights under the color of lav\'. e.g.. as when the attomev" general of the I'nited States authorized u.se of tanks, incendiaries and auteMiiatic weapons to kill indiscriminately men. women anci 19 children, as she did in Waco. 'Texas in 1994.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental ethical problem posed by imposing gun scarcity' on the genenil population has nothing to do with the comparatively trivial "sporting interests' of the public. Nor does gun control implicate merely idiosyncratic, out- iiKxied notions of personai lil>erty. On the contrary', the tunciamental ethical problems i^oseti for projxjnents of SGC arise when thev" sub.scrilx; simultaneously to the tbilowing propositions:

(1) An ethically legitimate state must recognize and re- s]x*ct c*t|ually the fundamental, individual right to Ixxiily integrity-, vv hich includes a fundamental, serious right to self-defeiLst-. and: (2) the state has no general duty- to pnnide minimally ade'Cjuate protection from criminal violence to anv' indi- vidual. nor ckx's it incur a special obligation to anyone by expressly promising an individual that it will provide her a reasonable, minimum of protection from criminal violence, and: (3) the .State's inherent poiice powers include the au- thority to threaten competent, non-fekm adults vvith criminal penalties for having anns for self-preservation anti defense.-'' (4) A st:ite whose laws .seriously impairs the riglit of a

Ihe Jolt mat if lair. .Medicine <"- Ethics

com|X*tent. taistw-orthv" citizen tock*leiicl hei-sc-lf from vio- lence, < >vvL*s her C( )m|x-as;iting pn rteelii m tix )m Ix ttlily injui-v'.

Affirming 1-3 is incolx-reni- 2 ^̂ 3 rule out 1.-'" Prohibito!"v- giin laws diree tly implicate the state's dutv-1(> res|x-ct e(|ually each pe-iMm's inlercsi in boelily integrity. If the stale bans civilian |x )-s,se".ssion of "Ve|ualizers"" by invoking a monopoly |)ower untler |-)rospet-t 3. il loriiieis ihose who are-, as a result, maeie vulnerable to offset ihe criminologieal etteeis of natur.il inec|ualities (of Ix'ing frailer, smaller anci weake-r). .Machiavelli |iut it crisply: "There simply is no ec|ualiiy lx*twe*en a man who is armeel anei one- who is not.'-''

Sirict gun control, by elfecl if not intent, institutional- izes the natural preciatoi"v acivantages of larger, stronger, viok'tice-prone |X-rsons or gangs ol such petsons, atxl yet its proponents incur no liability to ollsc-t resulting risks unless they renounce proposition 2 above.

Prohibiting competent. Lidult. non-telons to po,sse.ss "ee|uali/eiN"' aiso has distributional wealth efiects not only Ix-tweeii e'riminals aixi the law abieling, bui also among ihe lavv'-abieling. Siriei gun control ciisproix)rtionateiy iixrc-ase-s tlie risks of violent victimiz.:ition for le.ss well-oH" law-abieling citizens who eannoi take aelvantage of the privileged ccmix-tlic m.s t() < )Mie iais that we*altliier citizens lake fc )r gr.inte*tl. l.e,ss well-off citizens cannot afford the serviees of profes- sional IwKiv'guartis who guartl our .social eliies. Tht-veannot afforel alarm systems or the enhanced physical security that comes with living in exclusive, gated communities. Strict guncontix)! in.siitiitionalizt*suix-([ual rfs;x-ct toi each citizen's fundamental interesi in lx)elily integritv.

Similarly, banning "cheap'" .so-calletl Saturelay Night S|X'e1als eftectively discounts the ee|ual boelily integrity interests ot |ioorer citizens, and not merely the intere*.sts of pre*elatoiy criminals, who tenel generalK to Ix* pcK)rer than avvrage. Outlawing "che-ap'guns threalens to transtonii }xx)r but law-abieling citizens into lavvbre*akei> ,solelv lor ch(x)s- inga pnx-luei on the basis of it-sailorelabilitv.'T<x). eliminating a class ol ''chea|i'" guns necessarily tlemoies what were tbrmeriy "marginally non-cheap' guns to c h e a p ' gun statu.s. eligible tor banning as cheap guns." step by ste|).

Since supply-side restricting gLin e-ontrol lavvs that target the general population mitigate the citizens funtla- meiital interest in IxKlily integrity and as well as his her interest in Ix-ing a political e*c|ual. while also materially afle-ct the balance of advantage Ix-tween criminais anei the law-abiciing in tavor of criminals, and have distributional wealth eltc-cis anumg the law-abiding, elfeclivelv' pricing lives ditterentially. everv' rational, lilx-nil iiiinck-tl person has re*a,son to get the data necessai")- tor responsiiile retlee- tion on sup|-)|y-siele restrictiw gun e'ontrol.

We shoulel al-so consieier the as.s(K'iateei aelininisinitive and entbrceiiieiii costs .seconclai-v to enaeiitig guti iav\s aimed at the general po|iulation and pretiicate all tii.scus- sions about the costs benefits of gun controi on an

a.ssumption of imperfect compliance-. Prohibiting murder has not eliminateel it: nor has iiunishing its peipetrators with death, B.mning handguns cannot make tlie-ni di.sap- pear, nor eveti make them searce. Despite elee'aeies pi'osee'uling our sociallv' anei eeonomically aiinous "war on drugs." c(K"aine. craek and other banned substances remain readily available.

Tinally. we shoukl tx*ver forget that officially autho- rized violence, wliethei inllie'led in war against aliens or inllicted in geiKxitlal. domestic exterminaticms peqx'trated under the color of law. has a grim, stubbornly enduring hisioiT,. W hc-n eompareel with tlx- ot1ieially-.sanctione*el kill- ing lieki-s in Cambociia or Kv\-ancia or Kosovo or Iraei. or Hiller's nia.ssivv exieriiiination appar.itus. or Stalin s mass killings, or ,\lao's various "CLunpaigns'" against "Bati T;leiiients.' private violenee. mere criminality, pales in eompaiison, ""• Tjiiluisiasm tbr :i state monopoly o \ e r firearms mu.st Ix- tempered by these memories.

Ri-n-RtNcts

T .V(Y'IM'!. Ziniriiii'. "Is Ciun C^ontroI Likely t o Ketiuee' \"i<>- knl Kittinjis':'" t nit etyityitf ChicagoIxlir Hetieir ̂ '^

2. See I'.I'. Ziinring anei ( i . tlavviins. (.rime Is .\i>t 'Ihe Prohlent: lelhal \'ii>lence in .inwricaiSew "t'nrlN: OxfitrtI t nive-r- sjiy f're-ss, | W ~ l . I'utliiii^ siK'ial sligina o n the- tnMrurne-nIs of" te-liial \iole-iHe- |irres|X'elivi- wtm u^e-s llie-ni, is kcv lx-i';mse-| "Tlie- rlie-lorieal hi,i;li grininii in viiik-nev pre-ve-nliim may k';i\e- litlk- r<MHii lor elisiingui.sliinii tx-lwe-en ly|x-s ot \'i(ile'Tiet'"" p.^llS tiy "etisiinmii^tiin.ii Ix-lwee'ii ly[x*s ol vioteiiev."" /.imring nie-ans ihe iiirre-nlly-inaete- elisiinetioii lx'lv\'e-e-n iinl:iv\'fut offensive viotetice :inel lawtul ekle-nsive vloleiiee.

^ .Sfcl'.l! /-itnriiig and (I I fa\vkins el, 'lhe(jtize}is dtdde to dun ControhSvw ^"ork: .Macinill.in I're-ss. I'JW); 2iiS.

I t rjiin^ "tlioughltiil eonsielci-.ilion"' ol\nun j-Kiticy elianjie-s mav IK- as oxytimronie polilie'ally as e'umme'neiinii "ihoughlfut eonsielcnition" ofelian.ne-s in alx)ili()ti i^itiey-

^. A "back (if i h e e-nve-tope-."" cduntv'-base-et caleulation inelieate-s ihal. in ihe 2()()0 I're-sieienliai l'lk-ciion. r<niniie-s going lur .W Cmrt- tiael a luimiciek* r.ile* ot 13.2. wtiik- e-ouniie's going tur tUisti had a lioinieieie- r.ile-of 1.2. ( ^ u r e u r r e n i t'asciiiaiioii wilti reel V. tiliii- si:it(.-s jiiel o r eoiintit's nneter\vrile-s e-fle'etive- potilical siraifgy tml is poU'iitially w n harmful lo IIK-e'ounii-v as .i whole-.

(). tn (.rinte ts .\ot Ihe Prohlew. he- aeklitionally supix)rts il hy n o t i n g ihat llie- h o m i d e i e rates in the- iT eountrie-s are- tnarke-ellv lovve-r ihan that in the Linite-el .States ek-spile- lhe*ir hav- ing ass;nilt i-itcs similar t o the-1 nite-tl Stale-s". Se*e* e-.stx-e'i:illy Ctuple-r - . Ktfvllt).

~. .S'trD.U. Kaies, 11,1'. SelKitfe-r.l.K. t-illinie'r C, H. .Murray anet I ' l l . Casscrii. d u n s aiiel t'uhlie t t c a t l h : l!pielernie ol \ iole-iiee- or I'.nxlfniii' ol I'ropa.naticia':'" lettnes^ee tutir lierieuU2 (1*)<JSI- ^ 1 3 - ^ % .11 ^(i3. 'Tile- prohie-m ot etitle-re-nlial suieiele-- atiem[ii rale.s re-mains. Sinee- iiianv cievel()|X-ct coiinlries have* siiii.iclc rales higlie'r ihan ihe- t nilcti Slale*s'. jl vvoutet se-e*m thai ihe-ir atlenipt-ratc's must IK- tiighe-r KKI. sinev c've*rv' suiciek- pre-- siipjxxse-s ;t (siie-e'Cvstiil) alli-m|')l "The- niimIXT ol taile-el aile'illpls is hirge-ly iinknovvahk-, lor LI tiost cd o h \ i o i i s re-asons.

S. rix- gr.iph ot IIK- nation's homieiek- niie- is iivailahk- al ihe- BureMU ot Jiistitf Siativlits Website-. It shouk! IK- noRcl ituil :\\ lllf h t g i n n i n ^ ol ttle- 2(lltl Ce-nlui'V. several .st.ite-s k n o w n o r

Volume 32:1, Spring 2004

siis|X-e'te-el of having conipar.ilivelv' high homieieie nite*s eliel not report itieir liomicicte- data to ihe feelerat governnx'nt. This sugge-si.s thai the nations hdmicieic' r.ite must tiavc lx"cn lujjlicr ihan the' re|')<)rteci naiionai e'slini:ile' during llio.se* years.

Profe.ssor Kk-tk has [X)inie-el oui lo me in a pe*rsonai comniu- nie-alion that "The eluia tor 1<)().VI932 are iioi aeiually national data, hul r.ilher merely eover ihe ehanj.;in^ suhsels of the I.S, thai were itulucic-el in the Dealh Kegisiraiion ,\rea < I)H.\). v\liich e-otisisieel ul ttui,se ,sMtes ih;il have aetiiewei relaiively complt'Ie cover.ige of ek-ailis in iheir vital slaiisiics .syslems. .Most itie ap- parently enorinuus inereasf in liomit-iele ntle.s trom l'-Xt.V192(). ami part of ilic iy2l-iy.'^3 incre*a-se*. is a -stati.stical mirage', attrih- iitable to nev\, nioslly high homiciele. slates tx-ing aeklcel lo the n K , \ . ( ) n l y a minoriiy ol the t .S. was covered hv ihe I'XI.^ DttA. pretiominanlly low honiieiete Norlhe'asi siale-s. while all ot ii was covert'ti hy 1933. t'lifonunalely. llieie was a sysiemalic patle*rn lo vvhiih siaies got aekleel lo ihe I)K.\ lale-si — gt-nenilly ihe .staieslhai v\ ere ihe lasl t()>;el iheir slaiLsiieal .systems up to s[X-t-el anei join ihe 1)K.\ also leneleel to Ix- the homitieic states, mosity from llle South and S<nilhvve.sl. K-j;.. the verv- lasl stale lo join vv'as Texas, a huge conlrihLilor to the national homiciele r.ite lx)ih Ix'cause ot ils high rate anei ils large |'K)pii1alion In realilv', the incre*ase in ihe I'.S. Iiomiciele rale was much inilekr than v'our chan inciicaie-s, u\i uniil Prohihilion weni into etfevi in l')2(). at vvtiich [X)ini homieieie reallv'eliel jump up, ttioui-h noi as much as the- DKA-haseei etala .se*ems lo ineiicale."

y. ,Vtt'Hrcarle'y. cilecl in G. Kleck. Point lilank duns and Violence in Anietica (\x:\\ York: Aleiinc de-Ciaiyte*r.l99I): 20.

U), TBI data cited in Klcek, supra note 9:20, U . Tirearms anei Crime Slaiisiics. at <http:. - wvvvv-

e)jp.ustloj.gov hjs guns him> (last checked Ft'tiaiarv- 29. 2(X)-i). 12. 5»/jmnole 2.\9^)-2O2. 13. TOr a furtht'r. critical discussion of the comparative

merits of pt*r|X'tral<)r ihcorics and insiru mental ity iheories, .se*e 0.1). I'alsy and D,li, Kat.s. "American Iloniieick* Kxcepiionulism" UniiVKily o/Colorado Unr Reneu-69. no. H ( I W 8 ) : 'Xi9-I00H,

14. See G, Kle*ck, 'Icirgetinfi Guns.- Firearms and their Contn}USc\\ Wnk: Akiine* dc- Cmivit-r.l99"): 22~-2,W.

15. F,I{, Zimring, "Tire-arms. \'iulence and Public Polity." Scientific American 265 ( I W I ) : iHoS. al -49.

16 .Sti'l I. WUseHi anei K, Sheniun. "Civilian i'e*nctniting Wounds of the .\lxlome*n." AnnahmfSui'geiy 1S3. no. S (1961): 639-C>i9.

1 " , 5tt'i.Q, Wilson and K.J. He-rni.sicin, Ciime and Human Sature: Ihe I X'/h lit ire Study of the Causes of C/i me (^c\\ York: Simon iS: Sc-liiister.l9HS). esix'cially chapter 2.

lH. .Sw/»r/note 13. e-sp. W2-tWJ. 19. .Vt't'L.II. .Alheiis. VH'Cre<llion of nani>erous Violent

Crimi)ials (\'rhAn,i anei Chicajjo: t'nivvrsiiy of Illinois Press. 1W2). Also Sii'R. KhiKles, Why IheyKill: IheDiscoietiesofaMawrick Criniinol(jgi.'it.i\c\\ \'ork: Knopf Publishers. 1999).

20, See, esp. Supra note 2: "'Sff.

2\.

5. ll(Mnk'i(lo \ ictimi/iition hv Kact' 1976 200(1

Rate per 100,000 population

Blacks

Whites

1980 1985 199O 1995 2OOO

22. By fecienil law, everv' fire-arm priKluevei by .American gun manufaelurers must hear a >e-rial numlx-r. l':ach tirearm iiii|xnie'el miisi al.so iK-ar a serial number. Donu-slic protluction loiais, im|X)n.s anei excK^s niusi Ix- repnrieel atinually lo llx* Mureau of .Mcohol. r'irearms aiitt Tobacco. 'Hit- tr.ick- publication ShtKJtinf^ Indtistiy .il^o publishes annually, ba.secl on BA'TP- provielfcl elata. ihe numlx'r of tire*arms pnKluce'ei over a ainning 20 year perioel. These data ineluele H.VTI' loiaLs hy hanelgun lyi-ie (revolvers anei pistols) anei by calitxT They enaiilt- an obje-ciive basis for evaluaiitig mai-ke*t irenets anei for estimating and upelating the nunitxT of civilian-ovvncel guns.

L.sing li.VTT figures to estahli.sh a I9-4S ha.se'line, Garv- Kle-ck has dev'elo|x-el a prcKiuction-ba-sed mcKle*l that cumulates annual elonx'siic puKiuetion. adds imports anci -suhtraets exports. From 19-n-199i. ihe .American civilian gun total rose from an e-stimated (6,909.183 guns to an esiimaietl 23'i,6O-4.(K)l j^uns. an increa.se of SOi.J^'Ji. Over thai pe-ri(Ki, the numtx-r of privale'ly- ovvne'd handguns increase^d from an e.stimaiecl 12.(»5~.61H to an estimated H-i.6(n.6tX), a gain ot 66«.'/'.i. From 19-45-lW-i, .-Vmeri- can.s IxHight haticlguns at a Iiigher rate- than tlie-y Ixnijihi long guns. The whole-pe-riocl handgun grov\ih raie was l ^ r ' n of the whole pe*ri(Kt long gun lirovvtli rate* (a total haneigun increa.se of 6(>8,'>'li vs, a totai iong gun increase- of •\-\0.'^"'u).

Between 19')3-1'^W ihe inclu.sirv' prcKlucetl approximatelv' 2S,6 million t"ire*arms, inciuding 12,5 million hantij,;uns. Ailovvjng for im|X)ns and subtracting for exiX)rts. we may rc*ason:il')ly esiimaie ihal ihe current >;iin total approximate*s the si/e ol the I ' -S popu- laiion. iiKluclin.n ap|iroximalely 9S-1(X) million hanel^uns l̂ ii-ure'el on a pK-r capita basis, .American civilians probably o w n j-Lins ai a rate Ix-tween 969 and 1016 [x-r I.()(H) aelults. including a rate lx*tvvee*n 365 anei .IKH haneigLins ix*r XCf-M.) aeluils.

23. At'j.R, I.oti. Moreduns. Ix-ssCrinie: I ndeKtand ing Crime and Gun Control l.aus I2i.\ Kelition) (Chicago: I'niversiiy of Chicago Press. 20(H)).

24. See- supra note I t . , ch.5 tor a comprehensive rev'ie-v\', 25. . V t r l l . Ufoliette*. C'.un C;oniroi. /:'//Nt-.N-266 (2(HK)): 110

for an (Ulie-i"v\'ise .sophistiealeei eliscussion that ignores the eltiical implications of the "public service" eloctrine of State immunity.

26. See^. Whtvler. "Self-Defense and CtH.'rcett Risk-.Accep- tance." Puhlic Affaity Quarierly 11 (199"): -i3I.

2". N. .Machiavelli, Ihe Prince CS.t:\\\ox\!.: Penguin Bcxjks. 1981): HH.

2H. See S. \X'he*e*ler. "Anns as Insurance. Public Ajj'itirs Quar- terly \^{\^)^)^)v. 111.

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