Philosophy

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Unit 0: An Introduction to Thinking Critically

Module 1 - Logic and Critical Thinking

Readings: Solomon and Higgins, "A Little Logic"; Solomon and Higgins, "Deductive Logic Valid Argument Forms"; Solomon and Higgins, "Common Informal Fallacies"

Unit 1: The Real and the Rational

Module 2 - Evidentialism

Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief'

Module 3- Classical Theistic Arguments

Readings: Anselm, "The Ontological Argument"; Thomas Aquinas, "The Five Ways"; Rowe, "An Examination of the Cosmological Argument"; Paley, "The Watch and the Watchmaker"; Collins, "A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God"

Module 4 - Problem of Evil

Readings: Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence"; Plantinga, "The Free Will Defense"; Hick, "Evil and Soul-Making"; Rowe, "The Inductive Argument from Evil Against the Existence of God"

Unit 2 - Experience and the Real

Module 5 - Pragmatism and Reformed Epistemology

Readings: Pascal, "The Wager"; James, "Will to Believe"; Bergmann, "Rational Religious Belief without Arguments"

Module 6- Existentialism and Mysticism

Readings: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity"; Selections of Mystical Experiences, James, "Mysticism"; Alston, "Perceiving God"

Unit 3 - Paths to the Real

Module 7 - Problem of Religious Diversity I

Readings: Dalai Lama, "Buddhism, Christianity, and the Prospects for World Religion"; Hick, "Religious Pluralism and Ultimate Reality"

Module 8 - Problem of Religious Diversity II

Readings: Plantinga, "A Defense of Religious Exclusivism"; Basinger, "Hick's Religious Pluralism and 'Reformed Epistemology'-A Middle Ground"

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U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 107

Fair Use, Educational Purpose

138 PART II• TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

II.A.1

The Ontological Argument ST. ANSELM

St. Anselm (1 033-11 09), Abbot cif Bee and later Archbishop cif Canterbury, is the originator cif one of the most intriguing arguments ever devised by the human mind, the ontological argument for the existence of a supremely peifect being. After the short selection from Anselm's Proslogion, there

From Motw/ogiou and Proslogion, with the replies ~{ C.1ut1i/o ami Anselm, trans. with introduction and notes by Thomas Williams. (Indianapolis. IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.) © 1996 by Thon'las Williams. Used with penuission.

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eST, ANSELM,•:TH·E QNJQLOGICAV.ARGUM.ENT 139

follows a briif selection from Gaunito 's reply,. In Behalfof the Fool; and a cQUnterrespoi:lse by Anselm: . .

[ST, ANSEL.M'S

PRESENTATION]

Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to faith, grant that, insofar as you know it is useful for me, I may understand tharyou eX:istas we believe you exist, and that you are what we believe you to he. Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can he thought. So can it be that no such nature exists, since ''The fool has saidinhisheart 'There isho God"' (P5alm 14;1; 53:1)? But when thi~ same fool hears me say "something than whfchcnoth- ing greater can be thought," he surely understands what he hears; and what he understands exiSts in his understanding, 1 even ifhti·does not understand that it exists [in tealityl For it is one thing for ari object to exist in the understanding and quite another to under- stand that the object exists [in reality]. When a painter; for example\ thinks out in advance what he is going to paint, he has it in his understandihg, but he does not yet understand·that it exists;· since· he has not ·yet painted it. But once he has painted·it, he both·has it in his understanding and understands that it ex:ists because he has now painted it. So even the fool inust admit that something than which nothing greater can be thought exists at least in his ull.derstand..: ing~ since he' understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood exists in the ·understanding. And surely that thari which a greater cannot be thought c1nhot exist only in the understanding. For ifitexists ·only in the understanding; 'it can be thought to exist .in realitY as well, which is grdter. So if that than which a greatercannotbe thought exists only iri the understanding; then thatthan which a greater can" not be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But that is dearly impossible. Therefore; there is no doubtthatsomethirig th1mwhi€h a greater cannot be • thought exists both· in the understanding and in reality ....

This· [being] • exists so truly· that it cannot be thought not to exist. For it is possible to think: that something

exists that cannot be :thought not to exist, and such a being is greater than one thatcan be thought not to exist: Therefore; ifthat than which a greater cannot be thobght.can bethought not to: exist; then .that than which a greater·cam1ot. be .thought is not that than which a greater cannot he thought; and· this ·is a contradiction. So that than which a. greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought not to exist.

And this is you, 0 Lord our God. You exist so truly, 0 Lord my God, that you cannot be thought not to e~d~t .. :And r~ghtly so,· (or •if ~ome @nd could think something better than you, a creatur~ would rise; above the c;reator and sit injudgmen,t upon him; which is completely absurd. Jndeed, ev<;ry- thing that exists; ex:cept for you alone, .c:an be thought not. to exist. So yc)u alone among aU things have existence mos.t truly, ;and therefore most greatly. Whatever else. exists has existence less truly, and therefore l~ss greatly. So .then why did "the foolsay in his heart, 'There is. no God,'nwhen it is so e;yident to tqe ratiqnal mind th;ttyouamong all, beings exist most ,greatly? Whyjnde,ed, except because he is stupid and a fool? ...

But how, has he said in his heart.what he could•not think? Or. how, could he not· think what he said in his heart; since to.say inone's heart is the same as to think? But if he really-:-or rather;csince.he ·really.,.-'- thought this, be€ause he said it in his heart,. and did not say it in his heart, because .he could not think it, there must be more than one way in which. some- thing is "said in one'~ heart" or ''thought,~' In one sense of the word, to think a thing is to think the word that signifies that thing, But in •another sense, it is to understand what exactly the thing is. God can be thought,notto exist.in thefitstsense;butnot at all in the second sense. No one who understands what God is can think thatGod .does not ·exist, although he may say these•wotds in his heart with no signification at all, or with some peculiar signifi- cation. For God is that than which a greater cannot

140 PART II • TRADITIONAl \ARG l.JMENTS FOR'THB EXISTENCE OF GOD

be thought. Whoever understands this ;properly, understands that this being exists in such a way

, that he cannot, even in thought, tail to exist. So whoever· understands~. that God; exists.in this way cannot think·that he does not exist.

. Thanks be to you, my good Lord, thanks be to you .. For what I once believed through:,your grace; I now understand through your'·illumina-' tion, so' that even if I .did·not wanLJo believe tha:t you exist, I could not fail to understand'tliat· you exist. ...

[GAUNILO''S CRITICISM]

"For example, there are those' who say thafsome- where in the ocean iS an. island, whii:::h,'bebuse of the difficulty-"'-otrather, impossibility..:.....:of finding what dOes 'not exist, some call 'the' Lost . ISland'! This: isliuid''(so the 'story goes) is more plentifully endowed than even the IsleS:· ofthe Blessed with an indescribable abundance of 'a}} sorts ·Of riches and delights: And beduse"it has neither dwil.er nor inhabitant, it is everywhere sl1pehor iri its abun~ dant riches to' all the otlier lands that htimari 'bein:gs inhabit.

"Suppose someone tells me all this. The story is easily told and• involves no difficulty,''and so··I understand it. But ··if' this person went on to draw a conclusion, and say,. 'You cannot any'longer doubt that this iSland; more excellent than all others on earth, truly exists somewhere in reality: For yot1 do not doubt that this· island exists in your under- standing; and since it is.more excellent to exist not merely in the understanding, but also in realitY, this island must also exist· in reality, For ifit did not, any land that exists in' reality would be greater than it. 'And so this more excelk~nt thin,g that you have understood would not in f~ct be more excellent.'..,.If, I say, he should tty to convince me by, this argument that I should no longer doubt whether the island truly exists, either F•would think he wasj6king, or I would not kilow whom I· ought to think more foolish: myself,. if I grant him his conclusion, or him, if he thinks he has

established the existence of that island with any degree of certainty, without first. showmg that its excellence exists in my understanding as a thing that truly and un:dotihtedly~>exiSci and not in any way like someth~g (alse or uncertain." ...

(S;J . .: ANSELM'S;REJ.QI NOER]

But, you ·say, this; is just the samG· as·if. someone were .. to claim .. that it cannot· be doubted that.a certain island in the ocean,. surpassing, all o.ther lands in its fertility (whicildrom the difUqdty ~ onather, impossibUity-:-:af finding what •does not exist, is ;called "the Lost .Island''), .tr.uly .exists in rGality, because .someone, can easily understand it when itis described to him in words.) say quite qonfidently that if anyone can find .for me· some-, tl}ing existing. either in reality or only in. thought to which he can apply this. inferente in myargu., ment, besides that than which a.greater cannot bG thought, I will find and give tQ ·him that Lost ISland, never to be lost again. In fact, l}oweyer, it has a4eady become , quite clear ·that that than which;a greater. cannot bG thought cannot be thought not to exist, since its existence is a matter ofsuch certain truth. For otherwise it would not exist at. all.

Finally, i£ someone says that he .thinks it does not ·exiSt; I say that when. he thinks this, either he is thinking something than which a greater. cannot be thought,; or heis I1ot, If he is not, then he is not thinking that it dqesnot.exi:;~; since.heis·notthinb ing it at all. £utjfhe is, he is surely thinking some- thing that cann()t. be thought not to e:l{ist. ·For if i~ could. be thought not to. exist, it .could be thought t(.) have a begirming and art end; which is impossi,.. blec. Therefore;. SOI11eone. who is thinking. it, is thinlqng something ~hat.cannot be thought .not to exist,, i\nd of course someone who is thinking this does not think that that very thing doe$ not. exist, Otherwise he would be thinking something that cannot be thought. Therefore, that than: which a greater cannot be· thought' cannot be· thought not to exist ....

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IMMANUEL KANT • A CRITIQUE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 141

NOTE

1. The word here translated "understanding" is "intellectus." The text would perhaps read better if! translated it as "intellect," but this would obscure the fact that it is from the same root as the verb

"intelligere," "to understand." Some of what Anselm says makes a bit more sense if this fact is constantly borne in mind.

From Kant's Critique~( Pure Reason, translated by J. M. 0. Meiklejohn (New York: Colonial Press, 1900). Translation revised by Louis Pojman.

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11.8.'1

T.he Five: Ways THOMAS AQUINAS .

T11e Dominican .friar. T11omas' Aquinas . ( r 22 5-127 4) is considered by ·many to. be th~ greatest theo- logian in W~tern reli.iion. The five ways tifshowing.'the existence o/ God given 'In 'this. selection are .. · versions Of the cosmological a;_gument. The first way concerns the fact that there is change(?' motion) and. argues that there must be an Unmov:d Mover that originates all change ?ut itself is. not m~ed. T11e second way is from the idea of causation dna argues that there tnust' lieafirst, unca~sed cause to ex,plai~ the exist~nce oj'all othercauses. T11ethird way is .from the ideaq[conting~ncy: It argues thaf. 6eca~se there aredependeYJt beings (e.g., humans), there must be an indep~nilent or necessary being qtiwhoin the dependent beings rely jodheir subsistence: The fourth way is frmii e;;cellence, and itargties ·that because there are degrees o/ excellehce,there must be a peifect bei.iigftom whence all excellences come ;The final

··way is ftom the h-armony o/ things;· T1ure is a harmony o/ nature, which' calls for qn explanation. The only 'suffidehi explamition is that. there is a divine de~gner' who planned' this ham;ony.

147

ARTICLE 3:'D'OES G'Ob EXIST? B~t l.t seems that e~erythirig that happen~ in the , ~ :' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' - - " . , -- -- - --' -- - - _. 1 - -' ' t - , •

If seems that God does not exist: Objectiont:Ifone ofa pair of contraries

were infinite, it .would 'totally destroy the other contrary. But by the name 'God' one means a cer:- tain infinite good. Therefore, if God existed,. there would be nothing eviL But there is evil in the world. Therefore, God does not exist.

Objection 2: What ~an be accoQlplished with fewer principles isnot done thro~gh more principles:

world could' have been accomplished .. through other principles~ ~venif Godclidnot exist; for things that are . natural are traced back to hature ·.as a princi- ple, whereas thing.; that are purposeful are. traced back to human reas~n· mwil! i1S a principle. There- fore, there.is no. need.to .ciaiii:i.that God.·exists.

But contrary to .thls::Exodusl:14 says.urider the perso~age of God, "I im Who ain."

I respond: There are five ways to 'proVe that God exists. · ·

Printed with the pen11ission of the thnslator, Alfred). Freddoso: This translation is being published by Saint Augustine's Preis'.

148 PARTII•TRADITIONALARGLIMENTSFOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The first and clearest way is that taken from motion:

It is certain, and obvious to the senses, that in this world some things are moved.

But everything that is moved is moved by another. For nothing is moved except insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to that actuality toward which it is moved, whereas something effects motion insofar as it is in actuality in a relevant respect. After all, to effect motion is just to le~d something from potentiality into actuality. But a thing cannot be led from potentiality into actuality except through some being that is in actuality in a relevant respect; for example, something that is hot in actuality----say, a fire-makes a piece \ofwood, · which is hot in potentiality, to be hot in actuality, and it thereby moves and alters the piece of :wood, But it is impossible for something to be simulta- neously in potentiality and in actuality with respect to same thing; rather, it can be in potentiality and in actuality only :with I:espec~ to differ;ent things: For what is hot in actualityc:umot simultai}e(msly be hot in potentiality; rather, ,it is dold i11 potentiality. Therefore, .it is in1possible. 'that. soiil.ething should be both moverand ~oved i11 th.e sam~ way'imd with respect.to the sam~ thillg, or; in ~ther words, that somet~ing, ~hould. n1ov~ itSeff; Til~!~fore, every- thing that is moved nn1st pe moved by~another.

If, then, that by whishs~m~tliing is ITiove(is itself lllO'[ed, then jt, too, must be moved by another, and that oth~t:. by still another.l;>ut this · does not go on to infinity. For if it ·. d1d, then there. would not be any first mover and, ;}S a result, none of the others wduld effect IIl.otiop, eithe~. For secondary movers effect modo~ only because they

being moved by a first mover,justas astick do~s not effect. motion except because it is being moved by a h,and. Therefore, ()ne has to arrive at some first mover that is rw( being moved byanyfhing. And this is what everyone t;tkes to be God. '

The' second way is based on the notion of an efficient cause: ·· . .

· · · We find that among sensible· things there is .an ordering of efficient causes, and yet we do ·not find-nor is it possible to find-'-anything that is an efficient cause of its ownsel£ .for if.something

were an efficient cause of itself, then it would be prior to itself-which is impossible.

But it is impossible to go on to infinity among efficient causes. For in every case of ordered effi- cient causes, the first is a cause of the intermediate and the intermediate is a cause of the last-and this regardless of whether the intermediate is constituted by many causes or by just one. But when a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there

· w,ere no first among the efficient causes, then nei- ther would there be a last or an intermediate. But if the efficient causes went on to infinity, there would not be a first efficient cause, and so there would not be a last effect or any intermediate efficient causes, either~W.hich is obviously false. Therefore, one must posit some first efficient cause--which every-

, one calls God. The third way is taken from the possible and

the necessary, and it goes like this: Certain of the things we find in the world are

able t!) exist and able not to exist; for some things are found to be generated and co~pted .and, as a result, they areable tO (!XiSt .and able nOt tO exist.

. ' But it is impossible that everYthingshquld be like this;fo~ that whichisable not tp exist is. such that at some tiro~ It does~otexist. Therefore, if everything is such that it is.;tb}e n()tto exist, then at some time ~othing .e~isted ih the world. But ifthi~ \Vere true, then nothingwould.exi~t.even t!Ow ... Fo~what does not e~iSt:heg41sto exist only thrqugn soll].e~ing that does exist; therefore! ifthere we.re no beiilgs, then it was impossible that anything should have begun to exist, an!f. so rr()thiJ:lg would .exist no\V~\Vhich is obviously £alse. therefore, not all beings are. able to exist [and able not to exist]; rather, it mt~st l;>e that there is.s()mething necessaryinthe worla: ....•.. · .. . Now every nece.ss:try.b~ing eitl~er has'a·cause of its necessity from Ot}tslde ~ts.elfor it does.not: But it is impossible to go on tt?, infinity among Ilecessary b(!mgs that havea cau.se of their .. necessicy;in . the same way, as was p~ovelrabo~e, that itis illlpossible tp go on to infihity among efficient .causes. The~e­ fqre, one m~st posit something that. is nece~;try per se, which does not have acause ofi~ necessity from out.:. side itself but is instead a cause of necessity for the o~her.[necessary] things. But tb.is everyone.callsGod.o

SAM t;J,EL CLARKE:• THE ARGUMENT FRQM,(ON·TINGEN.CY 149

The fourth way is taken from the gradations that are found in the world:

In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and less true, more and less noble, etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal being; for accord- ing to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are maximally true are maximally beings.

But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fire, which is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something that is a cause for all beings of their esse, their goodness, and each of their perfections-and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of things:

We see that some things lacking cognition, viz., natural bodies, act for the sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or very frequently act in the same way in order to

Reprinted from A Discourse Conceming NatuMI Religion (1705).

bring about that which is best, and from this it is dear that it is not by chance, but by design, that they attain the end.

But things lacking cognition tend toward an end only if they are directed by something that has cognition ~nd intelligence, in the way that an arrow is directed by an archer. Therefore, there is something intelligent by which all natural things are ordered to an end-and this we call God.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in the Enchiridion, "Since God is maximally good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works if He were not powerful enough and good enough to draw good even from evil." Therefore, it is part of God's infinite goodness that He should permit evils and elicit goods from them.

Reply to objection 2: Since it is by the direc- tion of a higher agent that nature acts for the sake of a determinate end, those things that are done by nature must also be traced back to God as a first cause. Simi- larly, even things that are done by design must be traced back to a higher cause and not to human reason and will. For human reason and will are changeable and subject to failure, but, as was shown above, all things that can change and fail must be traced back to a first principle that is unmoved and necessary per se.

150 PART II "TRADITIONA(ARGUMENTS FOR 'THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

11.8.3

An Examination of the Cosmological Argument WILLIAM ROWE

Briif biographical remarks about William Rowe appear bifore selection I. B. 9. In the present selection, taken from the second edition tif his Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (1993), Rowe begins by distinguishing between apriori and a posteriori arguments and setting the cosmological argument

From Rowe, l'hilosoplly of Religion, 2nd edition.© 1993 Wadsworth, a part ofCengage Learning, Inc. Reproduced by pennission. www.cengage.com/pennissions

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WILLIAM ROWE • A.N EXAMINATION OF THE COSMOL0(31CAL ARGUMENT 151

in historical perspective. Next, he divides the argument into two parts: that which seeks. to prove the. • existence of a self-existent being and thatwltich seeks to, prove that this.self-e;xiStent being is the· God;of. . theism. He introduces the principle of sufficient reason..,.,-"There•mustbe an explanation (a)ojthe ·.·· ·· existence of any being and (b) of any positivejact whatever",..-,andshows.itsrole in the cosmological·.; argument. In the light ofthis principle, he .examines the argument itseifand four objections to it.

STATING THE:AR;GUMENT

Argt!mel'lts for the existence of God are tonihionly divided into a posteriori arguments and a prjori argu- ments. An a posteriori argument depends on a prin- ciple or premise that can be kn:own'C>nly by means of our experience of the world. An a priori argu- ment, on th~ other hand, purpo~s to rest on prin- ciples all of "'hich can· be' knowit. independently of our experience of the world, by just reflecting on and understandirig them. Of the three· major argu- ments for the eXistence ofGod-the Cosmological, the Teleological, and the Ontological..:.._orily the last 6fthese is entirely a priori. Intlie Cosn1ological Al:gul:nent one startS from some simple fact about the world, such as that it contains thirigs which are caused to exist by other things. In the Teleolog- ical Argument a somewhat more complicated. fuct about the world :serves as a starting poirit, the fad thanhe world exhibits order and •design. In the Ontological':Argumerit, however, one· begiris siinply with a concept of'God ....

··Before we state ·the Cosmological Argument itself, we shall consider some rather general points ahouttheargument. I-Ii~torically, it can, betrac~d to the writings of the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, but the major developments in the argu- merit took place i~ the thirteenth and in the ~igh­ teenth centuries. In the thirteenth century Aquinas put forth five distinct arguments for the existence of God, and of these, the first three are versions of the Cosmological Argument.1 in the first of" these he started from the. fu~:;t that there are things in the world undergoing change and reasoned to the con- clusion that there must be some. ultiniate cause of change that .is itself unchanging. In the second he started from the fact that there are things in the world that clearly are caused to exist by oilier things and reasoned to the conclusion .. that there must he some ultimate cause of existence whose<own

existence is itselfuncaused. And in-. the thir,4 argu"" men the started from the fact that there are things in the world which need not have: existed at all, thipgs which do exist but which we can easily in1agine might not; and reasoned to; the· conclqsion that there must he some heirig that ·had to be ;"that exiSts and could not have failed to exist. Now it might be objected. that even .if Aquirias' arguments do:prove beyond doubt the existence of an unchanging changer, an uncaused 'cause, and a.: being: that could .not have failed to• exist, the arguments fail to prove the existence· of the· theistic·. God; For the theistic -God, as we .saw, is supremely good,oomnip~ otent, omniscient, arid creator ofbut separate from and independent of the world. How do we know, for example, that the· unchanging changer isn't evil or slightly ignorant? The answer to this<objection is that ilie CosmologiCal Argument has two parts. In the first part the .effort is to prove the. existence of a special sort ofheirig,for•example, abeingthat could not have failed to exist, or. a being that ·causes change in .other things but is itself unchanging. In the second part .. of the argument ,the effort is to prove that the .special 1sort of being whose existence has been established in ilie frrst part has, arid must have; the·features-perfect goodness, omnipotence, omniscience, and so on.,---which gu together ·to make up the theistic idea of God .. What this means, then,, is that Aquinas' three arguments· are different versions of only the frrst part of the Cosc. mological Argument; Indeed, in later sections ofhis Summa Theological Aquinas undertakes to; show iliat the unchanging .changer, the • tmcaused cause of existence, and. the•.heing.cwhich had to exist are one and the saine·being and thatthis single being hasall·of the··attrihutes ofthe theistic God,

We noted above that a; second major develop- ment in the Cosmological Argument took .place in the eighteenth .century;• a· development reflected ill the writirig5 of the Gem1an' philosopher, Gottfried

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152 PART II•'T:RADITIONAL A·RGUMENTS n:>R THE EX'ISTENCE· OF~"GOD

Leibniz (1646"-1716), and especiaUy in the whtings of the English' theologian ·and;philosopher,·Samuel Clarke (1675-1729). In 1704 Oarke gave a series of lectures, later published imderthe title A Demonstra~ · • tion cif the Being and Attributes ~fcGod. These lectures constitute, perhaps, the most complete, forceful, and<cogent presentation of the Cosmological Argu- ment we possess. The· lectures:were. read.by the m,ajor: skeptical philosopher of the centuiy; David Hume (17l1-17J6),iand in his btilliant attack on the attempt to justify religion in thei court of reason; his Dialogues Concerning Natural Rel~ion, Hume advanced several penetrating criticisms ofClarke's arguments, criticisms which have persuaded many philosophers in the modem period to reject the Cosmological Argument. In ountudy of the c<;tr:gu- mentwe shall concentrate. our. attention largely on its ·eighteenth-century form and try to assess its strengths • and. weaknesses. in the light .of the criti-' cisms which Hurhe. and others····have advanced against it.

The first part qf the eighteenth-"d:ntury form of the Cosmological Argument seeks to .establish· the existence • of a self:.-existent' being/ The. second part of the argument attempts to ·pfove that the' self- existent being is the .theistic God, ·that is; has •the features which we have noted to ·be basic elements in the. theistic idea of God. •.W e shall consider mainly the first part of the argilment, fodt is against the first part that. philosophers .froni Hume to Russell have• advanced very important objections.

In stating the first part of the Cosmological Argumentwe shall make use oftwoimportant con-' cepts, the concept of a dependent being and ,the· con- cept ofa self-existent being. By a dependentbeingwe meal'l a being whose existence. is accountedfor by the causal activity cif other things:' Recalling Anselm:s clivi:: sion into the three cases: "explained by another," ''explained by nothing," and ''explained by itself,:' ies dear that 'a dependent being .is a being whose existenc'e •is explained 'by another. By a self-existent being wdmean a being whose,existence is accounted for by its own nature. This idea ... is an essential element in the theistic concept of God. Again, in terms .of Anselm1s three cas,es, a self-existent being is a being whose cexistence is~explained by itself· Armed. with

these two• concepts; thee> concept of a dependent being.•and the yoncept of a self"'existent being, we can now state· the fitst part of the Cosmological Argument.

T Every beirig (tliat' exists or ever dl:d'exist) is either. a depend~nt, b~ing or. a ~elf -existent being. · · · ·

2. Nqt every being can be a depenqe,nt being.

Therefore,

3. . Ih~re exists ,a self-exis~ent. being.

I)EDU(:TtV.E VAL.IDlTY

Before we loo~ critically at each of the premises of this. argument, we sho.uld note .. that this argument is, to. use an expt:ession frqm the logician;s yocabu- lary, detiuctively vqlid. To find out V\)'hether i!l1 argu"' rnent is deductiyely .yalid, we 11eed only as~ the question: If its premises were true, w,ould)ts co.n~ elusion: have to be true? If the answer is yes, the argument .. i~ deductively valid., If.the;.answer. is nq, the argument is deductively ipvalid:Notiq:itha,tthe question ;of the va.lidity of an. a~:gument is. entirely different fi:om. th.e. ql1estion ofw,hether: ,its premises are in fact true. The follo'Yi.ng <J.J:gUment is made up entirely of false statements, l:m~ it js deductively valid.

1. Babe Ruth is the Presidentof'the Onited · ' .

States.

The Presidentbf th;'Uriited States is from Indiana,

Therefore,

3. Babe Ruth.is from Indi:ma. · ;. ,_ - - -,

The argument is deductively valid because even though its premises ar:e f;~:lse, if they were trUe'its.conclusion would have to be true. Even God, +Aquinas would say; cannot bring it ·about that the .premises of this argument are true and yet its conclusion is false ,for God's power extends only to what is ·possible, and it is·. an absolute impossibility ·.that Babe Ruth be. the~ President;

' '

f

WI LLIAM,ROWE • AN cEXAM I N'ATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAlARG U MENT ~53

the President be from Indiana, and yet Babe Ruth not be from Indiana.

,The Cosmological Argument (that is; its first part) is a deductively valiq argument. [fits prernises arec or were true~ its conclusion would. have. to be true. It's dear from our example about Babe Ruth, however, that the fact that an argumentc.is deduc- tively valid is insufficient to establish cthe truth of its conclusion .. What else is required? Clearly that we know or have rational grounds' for believing that the premises are true. If we know that the Cpsmo- logical .i'\rgument is deductively valid, and can establish that its premises are true, we shall thereby have proved that its conclusion: is true. Are, theti, the premises of the Cosmological Argument true? To this more difficult question we must now tt~m.

PSR AND THE fiRSfPREMISE

At first glance the first premise might appear to be an obvious or even trivial truth: But it is neither obviousnor;triviaL And if it appears to he obvi()US or trivial, we must be confusing the igea of a self~existent being with the idea of a being that is not ~ dependent ·.being. Clearly,.· it is tr)Je. that ~ny • being. is either a dependent b~i'[lg (explain~d bY other things) or it is UO! a dep(![ldent being (not ~xplained by other things). But .. What our premise says is that any being is either a depen'dent being (explained by other things) or it is, a self- existent ~eing. ·.(explained by itself). Consider again Amehn's. tlifee cases.

a. explained by another

b. explained by nothing

c. explainedpyitself

What otir first prernise asserts is that each being that exists (of ever did exist) is either ofsbrt a or of sort e; It denies that any being is of sort b, And it is this denial that makes the first premise both significant and controversiaL.The obVious truth we must not confuse it with is the truth. that;any being is either of sort a or not of s9rt a. While this is true it is neither very significant nor controversial.

Ea,rlier we saw that Anselm accep~ed. as a •basic principle that whatever exists has an. explanation of its existence. Since this basic. principle denies that anytliing of sort b exists or everdid·exist,;ifs clear thatAnselrri would,,believe the first premise .of our Cosmological.Argument. •The eighteenth-century proponents of the argument also ;were. convinced of the truth of the. basic .principle ;we attributed to Anselm ... And because they,,were convinced •of its truth; they readily ·accepted. the first premise of the· Cosmological Argument:· But :by the eighteenth century, Anselm's basic principle had .been more fully elaborated and had received a name, the Prin- ciple if Sufficient Reason. Since this principle (PSR, as we shall call it) plays such an important role in jus- tifying the .premises· ()f the \CosmologiCal Argument, it will help us to consider it for a moment before we continue our enquiry into the truth or talsity of the premises of the Cosmological Argument.

The Principle ofSufficient Reason, as it was expressed byboth Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, is a very general principle and is·bes.t .understood as hav~ ing two parts. In its first part it.is simply a· restate~ ment of Anselm's principle.that there must be an explanation of the existence· of any· being whatever. Thus• if we come. upon a man· in a room;. PSR implies that there must be an;•explanation iof.the fuct that that particular man exists .. A moment's reflection,. however; reveals.• that: there are· ;many facts about the man other than the mere .fuct that he exists. There is the fact thatthe .man in question is· in the room he's in, rather than somewhere else, the fuct. that he is in good. health, and the fact that he is at .the moment thinking of Paris, .rather. than; say, London. Now, the purpose·. of the second· part ofPSR is to require:an·explanation ofthese fucts, as well. We may state·PSR, therefore, as the pririciple that there must be:atl explanation (a) of the existence of a11y being, and (b) of any. positive fact whatever. We are now in a position •to study the role this veryimpor"- tant principle plays in the Cosmological Argument.

Since the proponent of the Cosmological Argument accepts• PSR in both its·. parts, it· is clear that he will appealto its first part; .PSRa; as justifi::. cation for the fitst premise of the Cosmological Argument. Of course;. we can and. should·enquire

154 PART II•'TRAPITIONAI!.'ARGUMENTS FOR THE" EXISTENCE OF GOD'

into ;the deepyr question -of whether the proponent of the' argull1ent is rationally> justified.· in· accepting

. PSR.itself. But: we shall p'ut.this question aside•for the moment. What we need to see. first is whether he is correct in thinking •that if l?SR is true then both·· of the premises of the Cosmological•Argu" ment are true. And what we have· just seen 'is ,that if only. the first part of PSR, that is, PSRa; is•.ttue, the first premise of the Cosmological·Argument will be true. But. what of .the second premise .,of the argument? Forwhatn~asons does the proponent think that it must be true?

THE S'E.COND PREMISE .

According to· the· second- premise; not every· being that exists can be a dependent being, that is, can have the explanation of its existence' in some other being or beings. ·Presumably, the proponent of the. argument thinks there is something funda- mentally wrong with the idea that every being that existsf is dependent, that each existing; being was caused by some other beingo·whfch in tum was caused by, some other being, and SO• on.' But just what does he; think is wrong with ·it? To help us in understanding his thinking, let~s:simplifY things by supposing that there· exists only one. thing now, At; a living•thing perhaps, •that was;brought into existence by something else, A 2 , whiCh perished shortly after it brought A 1 into existence. Suppose further that A 2 wasbrm:ight into existence in similar fashion some time agobyA3·, and A3 byA4, and so forth back. into the past .. Each of these beings is a dependent being, it owes' its existence to· the preced~ ing. thing in the series. Now jf nothing else ever existed.ibut these beiligs, then what the second premise says would not be true. ·for if every being that exists or ever did exist is an A and was pro"' duced by a; preceding A, then every.· being· that exists or ever did exist would be dependent and, accordingly; . premise> two of the Cosmological Argument would be false. If the proponent of the Cosmological Argument • is correct there must; then., ·be ; something •wrong with t.he idea tha:t

every being that exists or did exist is· an A and that they form a causal series:.A1 caused by A 2; A 2 caused by A3\ A3 caused by A 4, , .. A,; caused by An~t~ How .does the proponent ofthe Cosmo..:. logical· Argument propose to. show us that thew is somethirig'\vrong with• this view?

A.popular butmistaken idea1of how the pro- ponent tries to show·that•somethingis"wrong with the view, that every being might' be dependent, is that he uses the following argument to reject it.

1. ·There must be afl;stbeingio start any cau~al series.

2. If eyery ,l?eing were dependent there would,be no first being t() start; the causal series ..

Therefore,

3. Not every being can be a dependent being.

Although this argument is. deductively valid,. and its second premise is 'true, its first preniise overlooks the distinct possibility that a causal series might be infinite; with no first member at all .. Thusifwe go back to our series o( A bein~, where . ~ach A is depend~nt, having been produced by· the' preceding A in the! ca~sal senes, it's dear that 'if the -series existed. it wohld have·. ho first ~elliber, for ev'ery

in . the. series there . wollld be' a .• piece ding. A Which produced it:· ad infinitum. Thefirst premise of the arg~ment just ~ven. assumer that a . causal series. must stop with a first member somewhere in th~. distant past. But there seems to be no good

reason for' making tlut assumptiop ....•.. ··. •·••· · .. · ... ·•·.·.· .. · .· The eighteenth-century proponents of the

Cosmological Argument recognizedthatthe cahsal series of dependent beings could be infinite, with- out a first member to start the series. J'h,ey rejected the idea that every being thatisor ever was is dependent not because there. would. then ·.be no first member to thee series of· dependent beings, but because there would then be no· explanation fot the, fact that there are and have . always, been dependent beings. To, see their reasoning Jet's return to our simplification of the supposition tha.t the only ·things that exist .or ever did exist· care dependent beings: hi our simplification· of that sup- position onlyrone of-the dependent beings exists at

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I WILLIAM'ROWE •' AN EXAMINATION: OFTH E'CiOSMOLOGICALcARGUMENT 155

a .time, each,one:perishing as it produces the next in the series, Perhaps .the first thing to 'note ahoul: this supposition is that there .is no individual A in the causal series of dependent beings whose existencejs unexplained'-,-A 1 is,explained by A 2, by A3, and A, by An+ 1• So the first part o(PSR, PSRa, appears to be satisfied. There is no particular ,being whose existence lacks an explanation, What, then, 'is it that lacks an explanation, if every particular A in the causal series of dependent beings has an. expla,.. nation? It is the series>itself that lacks an explana.,., tion, or,·.as Tve chosen to express it, thCjact that there are and have always been dependent beings.' For suppose we ask why itjs that there are and have always been As in existence. kwon't do to say that As. bave· always been producing other As...,.,we can't! explain why there have always been As by saying there always have been As. Nor, on the supposition that only As have ever existed, can we explain the fact that there have always been As by appealing to something other than an A- for ·no such thing would have existed. Thus the supposition that the only things that exist :or ever existed are dependent things leaves us with a fact for ,which there can be .no explariation;•namely, the fact that there are and have, always been dependent beings,

QUESTIONING THE

JUSTIFICA'TlON OF THE

SECOND PREMI.SE

Critics of the Cosmological Argument ha:ve raised severalimportant objections against the claim that if every being is dependent the series er collection of those • beings would have no explanation. Our understanding of the Cosmological Argument, as well as of its strengths and weaknesses, ,\\'ill be deep.~ ened.:by a careful consideration ofthese criticisms.

The first criticism is that the proponent ofthe Cosmological Argument makes the mistake of treating the collection or series of dependent beings as though it were jtself a dependent being, and,

therefory, requires ari explanation .of•its. existence: But, so the objection goes, the collection, ofdepen"' dent beings is not itself a dependent being any more than a collection ?fstafl1ps is itself a stamp.

A second 'criticism i~ that the ·p~8ponent makes the mistake of inferring .that·because eaGh member of the· collection bf dependent beings has a cause, the .collection itself must have. a cause,.<But,> as Bertrand Russell. noted; such. reasoning• is, as falla~ cious as to infer. that ·the human• race (that is, the collection ofhuman·beings)·must.have a mother bec~use each member . of.the c:ollection (eaCh human being) has amother.

A third criticism is that the proponent•pf the argument fails to realize that for there .to· be ,an explanation of a. collection:. of things is• nothing more.thahJor.there to be an explanation of each of the things making up the colleCtion. Since in the .infinite collection (or series). of depeJident beings, each .• being in the: collection· does have an explanation~by virtue of having been caused. by some preceding member. ·.of .the•. collection"""7the explanation of . the collec:tion; •so the criticism goes, has already been given: As David .Hume remarked, "Did I show you the particular. causes of each ihdividual in. a collection of tw-enty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable; shouldyou aftenvards askme, what wasthecausy of the whole t~enty. This; is: sufficiently. explained in explaining the cause ofthe parts. "2 .•

Finally, even if the proponent of the. Cosmo., logical Argument can .. satisfactorily answer ,these objections, he. must fa~e one last objectioh to his ingenious attempt to justify premise tWo of the Cosmological. Argumenti• For .someone may agree that if nothing exists. but an infinite .collection of dependent beings,• the infinite collection will• have no explanation' of its existence; ·and· still·refuse to conclude from this that: there. is .something wrong with the idea that every being is a dependent being. Why, he might ask, should•we think that every-:- thing has to have an explanation?, What's Wrong with admitting that the fact that there are arid have always been dependent beings is. a. brutejact, a fact having no explanation whatever?. Why ;does everything .have to have an explanatioir''anyway?

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156 PART II• TRADITIONAt ARGUMENTS F~R THE· EX"ISTE:NCE OFcGOD'.

We must now see what £an be said•ip. response to these se'veral objectionS:

·Responses to' Cfiticism

It is certainly ·a mistake. to think that a collection of stamps is itself a stamp; and very likely a mistake to think • that the collection of dependent· beings is itself a dependent being: But the; mere fact that the proponent. of the· argument thinks that there must ·be an explanation· not .only· for: each member of the collection of dependent beings but for the collection itself is not sufficient grounds for con- cluding that he must view the colle<::tion as itself a dependent being. The collection of hui:han beings, for example, is certainly not itself a human being. Admittin'g· this, however, we might still seek an explanation· of why there is a: collection nf human beings;' of why there are such things as human beings(atall. So the mere·fact that an:explanation is demanded for the collection of dependent beings is no proof that the person who demands the expla- nation mustbe supposing that the: collection itself is just another dependent being.·

The.csecond criticism attributes to the propo- nent of the Cosmological Argumenfthe following bit of reasoning.

{. Every wember of the coll~~~on'qfdependent . beings has a cause or. explanatio.n.

Therefore, '

2. The collection of depend~nt b~ings has a cause or explanation.

As we noted in setting forth this :criticism, argu~ ments ofthis sort are often unreliable.' It would be a mistake to conclude that a collection of objects is light in weight simply because each object in the collection is light in weight,. for if there were many objectS3·in•the:collection it might be quite heavy. Onthe::otherhand;•ifwe know that each marble weighs more than one ounce, we could infer val- idly that the·collection of marbles weighs more than an ounce. Fortunately, however, we don:t rteed to decide whether the inference from 1 to 2 is valid or invalid·:<W'e:need not decide this question because

the proponent of the Cosmological:Argumentneed not use this inference .to establish that there must be an explanation· of the collection ·. of dependent beings; He need not use this ·inference because he has in PSR a prirlcipfe from which it followsimmec. diately that the collection ofdependerit beings •has' a cause or explanation. For according to PSR, every positive fact must have an ·explanation. If it is a fact that there exists a collection of dependent beings then, according to PSR, that fact too must have an explanation. So it is PSR that the proponent of the Cosmological Argument appeals to in con- cluding that there .must be an explanation of the collection of dependent beings; and not some dubi-' ous inference from•the premise that each•member of the collection. has an explanation. It seems, then, that neither of the first two criticisms ·is strong enough to·do any serious damage to the reasoning used to support the second premise of the Cosmo- logical Argi.lment.

The third objection contends that to explain the eXistence ofa collection.ofl:hings is the same thing as to explain the existeqce of each of its members. If we consider. a collection of dependent. beings where each being in the collection is explained by the pre- ceding member ·which caused it, it's clear' that no member of the collection will lack 'an explanation of its existence. But, so the criticism goes, if we've explained the existence of every member of a col- lection, we've explained the existence of the collec- tion-there's nothing left over to be explained. This forceful criti<;:ism, ori~ally advanfed py David Hume, has gained considerable support in the mod- ern period. But the:critkism rests on an assumption that the proponent of the Cosmological Argument would not accept. The assumption is that to explain the existence of a collection ofthings itis sufficientto explain the existence. of every member in the collec- tion. To see' what is wrongwith this assumption is to understand. the basic issue iri ·the· reasoning by which the prop'onent of the'Cosmological Argument seeks to establish that not every being,can be a dependent being,

In order for there to be an;explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent, beings; it's clear that the eighteenth-century proponents would

/

WILLIAM ROWE •AN ;EXAMINATION, OF THE.CcOS.MOLOGICAL .ARGUM.ENT 1.57

require that the following two conditions be satisfied:.

C1. 'fhere is an explanation of the ~xistence of~ach of the. niemhers ·of the collection of depende11~

· beings. · ·.· . · ·

C2 . .There is ~n explanati9n of why .there.are any qependent bein,gs.

According to the propon~nts of the Cosmological Argument, if every being that exists or ever·did eXistis a: dt~pendent~ being'-that is/if the whole ofreality consists of nothing more than a collectiOn of dependent beings-"-Cl will he satisfied;' but C2 will not be' satiSfied. Aild since C2 Won't be' satis- fied, there will •be rio explanation of the collection of dependent beings. The third. criticism; therefore, says in effect that if Cl is satisfied, C2 will be satis-' fied; and, since in a collection. ofdependent beings each member will have an explanation in whatever it was that produced it, Cl will be satisfied, So, tliefefore, C2 will be satisfied and the collection of dependent oeings will have an explanation.

''Although the issue is a complicated one, I think it is possible t6 see that the third 'criticism rests ori a mistake: the 1nistake of thinking' that 'if Cl is satisfiea C2 must also be satisfied, Tile niistake is a natural· one to make ·for it·is easy to 'ima'gine Circumstances in which 'if Cl is satisfied C2 also will be satisfied> Suppose; for example that the whole of reality includes· not just a collection of dependent beings but alsb a self ... existent being. Supposefurther th~t instead" Of each dependent being Having been produced By some other dependenf be'ing, every dependent being was produced by the self-existent being. Finally, let us consider both the possibility that the :collection ofdepeilderit beings is finite intime ~nd has a first rnernber, and the possibility thatthe collection of deperideht ;beings is infinite in past time, having no first member. ·Using G for· the self.:existent being, the first ,possibility may ;be diagramed as follows:·

G, we shall. say,;·has always·existed and always wilL We can· think of. d1 as so1he •presently .ex;isting dependent being, d2, d3, arid so forth as dependent beings that existed at some tirne;in :the past, arid d.; as .the ·first ·dependent being to exist .. 1'he' second possibility may be portrayed• as follows:'

On thi~ diagra~thereis riofirstfu~mber ofth~ col, l~ction .. of dep1~ndent beings. EaTh membei:'. of tht; infinite collection, however, is exP-l;rined. })y refer:: ence. t~ • the self-existent being G . which' J'r()duced it. Now the inter~st~g pointabout bothth(!se cases is that the explanation that has been provided for themerrrbers ofthe <;ollection ofdependent bein.gscarries 'With,it, at l~;,15t in p;trt, ,ari answer to the ques6on of why th:reare any dependept beings at all. In both cases we may explaiti why there are depencleht. beings by po1ndng out th:~f there exisfs a self-existent beillg that has been enga~ed in produc- ingthem. So oncewe.have le'~ed."that theeJcistence of each member of the collection ()fdependept beings has. its existence explained by the fa\t that c produced it, .;"'e have alreaqy feaw.~d· why there are depepdentbeings. , .. · . , · . . . ·. · . · .....

Someone might object that we hav~n't really learned,whythere a~ dependent beings until. w~ also learn why has been· .nroc:Iucingthern. But, ,of coul'Se, "Ye could also saythatwe hayen't really explained FheFexistence of .. ~ partictjlar dep?ndent being,say,d3, until we als9 leaw not just tha((; pro;- duced it. but why ~ produced.ft:The pointwe need to grasp, hq~e~er, is that onc(! weadmitJpiit ~very dependent being's existence is explained by G, we must admit that the fact that there are dependent beings has alsobt;en e~pJ~in.ed .. so it is not unnatural that someone' should think that to explain the exis- tence of the collection ofdependentbeings is nothi!lg more than to explain· the'existerice or'itsmembers. For, as we've seen, to e'h.'plain the collection's eXis,- tence is to explain each ri1eii!ber' s .existenc~ and tp explain why therea~e any dependent being$ at ~­ Ari:d, iri the exan1pks :we've, considered, in doing

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- 158 PART II• TRADITIONAl ARGUMENTS' FOR THE' EXISTENCE OFGOD

die onei (eX:plaining' why each dependent being exists) we\!e already done the Other (explained why there are any dependent beings .at all). We must n9w see; however,•that on the supposition that the Vllhole of reality consists .only ofa collection•.Ofdependent beings, to give an explanation of each membefs.exis'-7 tence is not to provide an explanation of why there are dependent beings;

In the examples we've considered, we have gone outside of the collection of dependent bemgs in order toexplain the n1embers' ~xiste~ce. B,utJf the only beings thatexist o~ ever e~ted ~e depe!Jd~ntbeings then each

1 d~pendent beillg · will b~ ·e:)Cplained by

some other dependent \:Jeing, . ad infinitull1·. This does. not mean that there \\fill be 's6II1e particular depend~nt. b~ing,whose .e~istence is yriac,coumed for. E~i.ch dependent being hasan explanationofits existence; nWtely, in t?e dependent obing "'hi~li pre~eded it andproduced it. So C1. is satisfied: there is an explailation of the existence of eaci:J. member of the. collection. of dependept. ~~iiigs. I~fning tp C2, however, wefansee that 'it will not\:Je.satisfied. We cann()t explain' why the.re are' (or haveev~r be~n) 4ependent beings bx ~ppealing to. ali the m'embers of the infinite.colle~tion,Q~dependent beir).gs. For if the questi<}nto be :mswered is why there (()r have ever been) any dependent beings' at all; we cannot answer that questi<,m by H()ting diatthere aiways have beendependept beings, each op.e' accoUnting for the. existence of some otller i:i6peJ1dent being. Thus on the ·stippos.itiqri th.ateverybeing is depen- dent, itseerruthere Will be rio explana,~ion of why there aredependent beings. C2 willnotbe satisfied. Therefo~~. on the supposition. that ever¥ \:Jeing is dependent there will be no expian.ation of the'ex1s ... tence oftplcollection of dependent b~ings. . .

THE TRUTH OFPSR

we .c9ine now to the final criticism ofthe reasoning. supporting die second premise of the Cosmological Argument, 1~cording to the, ~rhicisril, it is admitted iliat. th~ suppqsitiol1. that every beirig is Oepen~ent ilnpljesthat the~ewill be a brntefaetin the unive~, a: £let, that is, for wliich diere can be rio explanation whatever. For there will be no explanation of the

fact that~ dependent beings • exist and have always been in existence. It is this brute fact that the pro- ponents ofth(! argum~11t were describing wht;n.they po~ted qut 'that if every.· being is. dependent, the series or collection of d~pendent beings would.lack an explallatio~ of its. existence .. The final criticism askS what is wrong with admitting that die universe contains such a brute, unintelligible fact: In· isking this quest1on the critic challenges th.e: fundamental principle, PSR, on \Vhich the Cosmo~ogic;:al J\rgw- I11~f1t re~ts·, For, as we?v:e seef1, the first premise ofthe a,rgumen,t denies thi}tthere exists a being \Vhose exis- tence. has no e,xplanation. In support o(diis premise the. propqnent appeals .. t() die first part of PSR .. The second prelllise of the argument. ,claims that n()t evt?ry being can be dep~ndent. In support of this premi~ the. proponent appeals to ~e second part of PSR, the part which states that there .must be an explan,ation of any. positive fact whatever,

The proponent reasons that if every being were a dependent being, then although the first part .of PSR would. be satisfied~very ,being. woj.l}d have an explar1ation~the second part W{)l,lld b.e yiolated; there would be r10 explanation for.the pqsitiv:e fact that there. are an,d. have. always . been d~pendent beings .• For. Hrst, •· since . every being .. is supposed. to be . dep.endent,. there would be. nothip.g. optside of the collectiqn qf dependent .beings to explain the collection's. existence. SecoQd, the .fact. that· each membeJ; .. ()( the cqllection has an,.explanation in sorp.e , other dependeQt being .is ir1sufficient to explain whythere,are ang hav,e alw,~ys been depen~ dent. beings, And, fin¥ly, ,there is J:l,Othing ~bout the collection ofdependentbeings that V\l0419sug~ gest that it is a self-existent .collection. Conse-

, - - - - - --- ~ - - - - - -·

quently, ife\!ery being were dependent, the fact that the.re are ar1d have always geen dependent bein~;wol).ld. have .no explanation. But ~pis violates the second part of PSR,, So the secpng premise of the Cosmological Argument _must be . true: Not every. being ca11 :be, a dependent being. This con- clusion, however, is no better than the principle, PSR, on which it rests. And it is the point of die final criticism to question the truth of PSR. Why, after all, shpuld we accept the idei} that every being and every positive fact must have an explanation? Why, in short, should we believe PSR? These are

\

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WILLIAM ROWE • AN EXAMINATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 159

important questions, and any fmal judgment of the Cosmological Argument depends on how they are answered.

Most of the theologians and philosophers who accept PSR have tried to defend it in either of two ways. Some have held that PSR is (or can be) known intuitively to be true. By this they mean that if we fully understand and reflect on what is said by PSR we can see that it must be true. Now, undoubtedly, there are statements which are known intuitively to be true. "Every triangle has exactly three angles" or "No physical object can be in two different places in space at one and the same time" are examples of statements whose truth we can apprehend just by understanding and reflecting on them. The difficulty with the claim that PSR is intuitively true, however, is that a number of very able philosophers fail to apprehend its truth, and some even claim that the principle is false. It is doubtful, therefore, that many of us, if any, know intuitively that PSR is true.

The second way philosophers and theologians who accept PSR have sought to defend it is by claim- ing that although it is not known to be true, it is, nevertheless, a presupposition of reason, a basic assumption that rational people make, whether or not they reflect sufficiently to become aware of the assumption. It's probably true that there are some assumptions we all make about our world, assump- tions which are so basic that most of us are unaware of them. And, I suppose, it might be true that PSR is such an assumption. What bearing would this view of PSR have on the Cosmological Argument? Perhaps the main point to note is that even if PSR is a pre- supposition we all share, the premises of the Cosmo- logical Argument could still be false. For PSR itself could still be false. The fact, if it is a fact, that all of us presuppose that every existing being and every pos- itive fact has an explanation does not imply that no being exists, and no positive fact obtains, without an

explanation. Nature is not bound to satisfY our pre- suppositions. As the American philosopher William James once remarked in another connection, "In the great boarding house of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and leave the plates so clear."

Our study of the first part of the Cosmological Argument has led us to the fundamental principle on which its premises rest, the Principle of Suffi- cient Reason. Since we do not seem to know that PSR is true, we cannot reasonably claim to know that the premises of the Cosmological Argument are true. They might be true. But unless we do know them to be true they cannot establish for us the conclusion that there exists a being that has the explanation of its existence within its own nature. If it were shown, however, that even though we do not know that PSR is true we all, nevertheless, presuppose PSR to be true, then, whether PSR is true or not, to be consistent we should accept the Cosmological Argument. For, as we've seen, its premises imply its conclusion and its premises do seem to follow from PSR. But no one has suc- ceeded in showing that PSR is an assumption that most or all of us share. So our final conclusion must be that although the Cosmological Argument might be a sound argument (valid with true pre- mises), it does not provide us with good rational grounds for believing that among these beings that exist there is one whose existence is accounted for by its own nature. Having come to this conclu- sion, we may safely put aside the second part of the argument. For even if it succeeded in showing that a self-existent being would have the other attributes of the theistic God, the Cosmological Argument would still not provide us v...ith good rational grounds for belief in God, having failed in its first part to provide us with good rational grounds for believing that there is a self-existent being.

NOTES

1. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Surnnza Theologica, Ila. 2, 3.

2. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part IX, ed. H. D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1948), pp. 59-60.

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WltUAM,~AL'EY • THE,,WATCH 'AN,D.T.HEWATCHMAK£R

, U.C.1

WILLIAM PALEY

William Paley (1.7 43~ 1805), Archdeacon <?{Carlisle, was a leading' evarigelical' apologist. , Hi,s most important work is Natural Theology, or, Evidences of the Existence: and 'Attributes oft he Deity Collected from the Appearances ofNature (1802), the .first chapter of which is: reprinted here. Paley argues thatjust as we infer the existence of an intelligent designef: to explain the presence of

From William Paley, Natural 711eology, or Evitletu:es of tlie Exiswnce and Atrtibutes 4 the Deity Collecte,Jjrom tlteAppe~rances oF Nature (1802).

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181

I -J

182 PART'II • TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FORTH E: EXISTENCE OF GOD

a subtle and complex artifact like a watch, so too we must infer the existence c.if an intelligent Grand Designer to explain the existence c.if the works c.if nature, which are far more subtle, complex, and cleverly contrived than any human artifact.

STATEMENT OF THE

ARGUMENT

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had given-that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other; viz., that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, if a different size from what they are, or placed after ariy · other manner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To r~ck6Ji:Up a few ofthe plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one result:-We see a cylindrical box containing a: coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) communicating the acti()n of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which•catch in; and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from· the fusee to the bal- ance, and from the balance to the pointer, and, at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels,

so regulating that motion as to temlinate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent sub- stance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed, (it requires indeed an exanlination of the instrument, and per- haps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood,) the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construc- tion, and designed its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the con- clusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making orie; that we were altogether incapable of executing

. such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of under- standing in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of s~me lost and to the gen- erality of m'aclcihd, ·of the'lno~e curious productions of modem manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's skill, ifhe be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at 'some fom1er 'time,· and in some place or other. Nor: can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether. the question arise concerning a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing, in some respect, a different nature.

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WIL.tiAM f'AL'EY'fTHE.WATCH AND:THE WATCHMAI<::ER 183

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate :0ur conclusion, that the ·.Watch 'sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom: went exactly hghLThe purpose of the machinery, the :design, and the designer, mightcbe evident, and, in the ·case sup- posed; . would be evident; in whatever· way we accounted for the irregularity of·the movement, or whether we could account for 'it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made; still less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncer- tainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not dis- cover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not. ascertain whether they conduced to that effect in any man- ner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case, if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate .effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the sec- ond thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that he had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoningwhich we had insti- tuted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and ,that this

configuration ihight be the structufe.riow exhib- ited, viz., of the works o(\1 watch, as well as a different structure:

y.Nor, fifthly, wouldit yield his inquiry IlJ,Or,e, safisfactiol1,.to •. be'answerea, that,there.· eristed in tnfngs a prin21pl7 of order,. whi~~ h~d:diip~~ed the parts of the .·~atch into th~ir.prese'nt .. form ~nd situati<m,. never .• knew a \Vatch madeliy tlle, principl~ df order;. nor can he evell: form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.

vn. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, oper- ative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him such as "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or, indeed, as "the law of nature" in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena in exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confi- dence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument: he knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does know ....

184 PART "11 • TRADITIONAl ARGOMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE Of GOD

,APPLICATION OF THE

'ARGUMENT,

~very ,i,ndication ~f contrivance, . ~very manifesta- tion of d~sign,' which existed 'in'tl1e' watch exish in',the Zyor,ks of nattir~; ~ith the'differeh~e ~n t}ie s~de of ~atu.re, ofbeing great~rand inore,! and that i}1. a. 'degree which exceeds. all tomputatio~. I mean that' the i::()titrivances

1of n~ture S!,Upass the

contrivanceS'.>of ait,. in the complexity,· subtilty, and curiosity ofthe mechanism; and still more, if poSsible,. do they·go beyond them in number and variety; yet in a' multitude of cases, are not less evi~ dently ·mecHanical;: not less evidently ccontrivances, not less evidently accommodated to .their end;' or suited to .their office, than,are the most perfect •pro"- ductions•of human ingenuity>'

From David Hume, Dialogue Concemit~g Natiot1a/ Religiofl (1779) London: Longman ·c.;ieen, 1878.

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202 PART II•TRAOITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

11.(.4

A Scientific Argument for the

Existence of God ROBIN COLLINS

Robin Collins (1961- ) is professor of philosophy at Messiah College, and he has written several articles on the argument from design. The article included here presents a simplified version (if an argument that he has developed in much more technical detail elsewhere. He begins by noting that ltfo would have been impossible had certain laws of nature an.d fundamental physical constants (such as the gravitational constant) been even slightly d!fferent. He then argues that since this apparent 'fine- tuning" of the laws and constants is significantly more probable on the assumption that the universe was designed to be hospitable for ltfo than on the assumption that it was not designed at all, such apparent fine-tuning counts as evidence in favor if the existence if a designer.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Evidence of Fine-Tuning

Suppose we went on a mission to Mars, and found a domed structure in which everything was set up just right for life to exist. The temperature, for example, was set around 70° F and the humidity was at 50 percent; moreover, there was an oxygen recycling system, an energy gathering system, and a whole system for the production of food. Put sim- ply, the domed structure appeared to be a fully functioning biosphere. What cqnclusion would we draw from finding this structure? Would we draw the conclusion that it just happened to form by chance? Certainly not. Instead, we would unan- imously conclude that it was designed by some intelligent being. Why would we draw this conclu- sion? Because an intelligent designer appears to be the only plausible explanation for the existence of the structure. That is, the only alternative

explanation we can think of-that the structure was formed by some natural process~eems extremely unlikely. Of course, it is possible that, for example, through some volcanic eruption vari- ous metals and other compounds could have formed, and then separated out in just the right way to produce the "biosphere," but such a sce- nario strikes us as extraordinarily unlikely, thus making this alternative explanation unbelievable.

The universe is analogous to such a "biosphere," according to recent fmdings in physics. Almost everything about the basic structure of the universe-for example, the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy-is balanced on a razor's edge for life to occur. As the eminent Princeton physicist Freeman Dyson notes, "There are many . . . lucky accidents in physics. Without such accidents, water could not exist as liquid, chains of carbon atoms could not form complex organic molecules, and

From Reasot1 for rile Hope Within, Michael J. Murray, ed., © 1999, Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI. Used with pennission.

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I ROBIN COLLINS <• A SCJENTIFIC ARGUMENTFO,RTH.E:·EXISTENCE,OF GOD 203

hydrogen atoms could not' forr:h breakable bridges between .molecules" 1~in short,dife as we know ,it would be.impossible. ·

·Scientists; <:all this· .. extraordinary . balancing' :of the·paranieters .of physics and. the initial conditions of the universe the "fme-tuning of the cosmos." It has been extensively discussed by philosophers, theologians> and scientists; especially: since .. the early 1970s,. with hundreds ofarticles and dozens of books written on the topic; Today, it is widely regarded as offering by far· the most persuasive cur• rent argument for the existence ofGod: For•exam.,.. ple, theoretical physicist and popular science writer Paul Davies-whose early writings were not partic- ularly sympathetic to theism-claims that with regard to basic structure of the universe, "the impression of design is overWheli:ning:"2 Similarly, in response to. the}ife-pemlittin,~ fine-;tuning of the nuclear resonances responsible· for the oxygen and carbon synthesis in sta~. the fam()~S astrophysicist Sir Fred Hoyle de'dares that · ·

r a6 'not believe that any . scientists \Vho ~f(aillined the evidence would fail to draw the inf~rence that, the law~of nudearphysics hav~ be~n deliberately.design~d with regard t? .. th~. consequences ,they produce inside srars:Ifthis is.so, thenmy apparently . random ql!ir;ks haye become pirt of a deep- lai1 sch~JJ1e, If not then .ye a~,bkck again at a monstrous sequence of acddents.3

A few examples. ofthis fine-tuning •are listed· beloWJ

1. Ifthe'initial explosiori of the big ban,g hafdif: fer~d in strength by as little as one part 'ih'l 060, . theuniverse would have either quickly col- laps~d back on itself, or expand~d .too rapidly for stars to form. In' either case,life would be . . · imp~ssible. (As John Jefferson Oavis po~ts qut, ail accuracy of one part in 1060 can be compared to firing a bull~t at a one-inch target on the other side o( th~ observable univ~rse, twenty bilhon light years away,and hl.tting the target/

2. Calculations. indicate. that: i[th~ strong n~clear force, the force that binds protons and neutrons togetheLi11 an atom; h4d been st~onger or .

· · weaker by as little as five percent,; :life would :be impossible,5 · · · , •

3. Calculatihns By 'Brandon Cartt+ show' that' if . gr<ivity had been stronger orwe~kei by' one.

· part in "10~0, then 'life-"sU:stamirig staidike the surr. could not exist. 'This· wotild most' likelY niakeSlJ:fe in1possible.6 · · ... •

4. Ifthe·fi~U:tro~ wefe not'aboutr:oofHmesth~ mass of'the prot<m, all protons 'Nould have decayed into neutronsor 'all neutrons' woU:~d' hare. d~tayed ~n.t6' protons,. a~d thus life wouid not b'e· possible. 7 . ·. · · ·

5. If the elect~()magnetic force were slighfly stronger or weaker, life would he impossible, for a variety of different reasons. 8

Imaginatively, one could think of each instance of fine-"tuning as a radio dial: uriless' all the dials are set exactly ~ight, life would be ilnp6ssibk 'Or, one cotild think of the initial conditions of the universe and the furidainellthl· parameters of physics as a dart boatdthat fills the whole galaxy,'ai1d the conditions necessary for life to ~exist as a 'siTJill orie-f66t-wide ta.fg({ unless the dart hits'the target; life would be impossible: The tad that the dials ·ar~'J>erfectly set: or. 'that the datt has hit the target, strongly suggests that sonieotie set the dials or aimed the dart'fot it seerri~' enormbusly itllprobable'that suth a ·~oinci..: derice could have happened'by 'chance. ·

Although indiVidual·calculations of fine::.tu:nirig are only' approxiiilate and could be in error, the tict that the universe ·'·is 'fine~tuned ··for· life is \ilniost beyond question ·hec~use. ohhe l~rge · number of independent instances of; apparent.· fme'-tU:ning. As philosopher Johh Leslie has pointed out, "Clues heaped upon dues catFconstitll.t~ weightf evidence despite doubts about eacli element in ;the pile.''9

What is' controversial/ liowever, is the degtee to which the fine-tuning proVides evidence for the exis- tence of God. As.\t11P!:eS§tV.e.as the argument from fine~tuning seems to be, atheists have raised several significant objections to it. c8nsequeritly, those\vho are aware of these objeCtions, "ot ·have thought of them·. on their . own, often~ will·· fmd . the argument unconvincing. This is' n6t orily true of atheists; but

204 PART II•TRADITIONAlARGUMENH' FOR THETXISHNCE OF GOD

alsd ,many theists .. I have known~ for. instance,',both a committed Christian Hollywood filrrimaker; and a conunitted Christian biochemist . who remained

' " " ,. ' ' '. . ' f . . ~ ' ' ' • ' • ·' ' . • .

unconvinced because of certain. atheist objections to the ;J.rgurnent. Th.is,is unfortunate, partiqllarly since the. firleHup.!ng argurner1t is probably tl}e, n~ost pow- erfUl current argument for the existence qfGod. My g()al. in this. ~htpter, therefc:~r~, to n1ake the fine,.. turung ar~ment . <1$, str9i':g )~ .. p9ssible; This will involve developing the 'argttllient in as objective ;tQd rigor()US a way as I can,,an~ tl!en answering the major atheist obj~ctions to. it. Be(ore launching into this, hovyever, I will need to ~ake a preliminary distinctiorL

A Preliminary Distinction

To develop the fine-tuning argument rig()rot;tsly, it is useful· to distinguish between what I shall call tile atheistic.. single-universe hypoth~;sis and .• the • (ltheistic many-uf!iverses hypothesis. Accordin,gto the. atheistic single-upivel'Se hypothesis, ,there i~ only ~me uni- vel'Se, ;;tll.d it is ultimately an inexplicable,. "brute" fact th;;tt the. univel'Se exists, and.is.fine-tuned. Many atheists, ho:wever, advocate another.hypothesis,one which a~tempts to explain; how the ~eemingly improb,a~le fine-tuning of the univel:'Se .. c;ould ,be the I'esultof chance. )Ye will, call t~~ hypothesis the atheistic many-worlds hypothesiS,, or !~e. atheistic many-tmiverses hypothesi~:. Aq:ordjng to •this hypoth- esi~, there exists. what could; be im~ginatively thought ofas a "univel'Se generator" that produces a very large or infinite number of .univel'Ses, with e,ach univel'Se having a randomly selected set of ini- tial condi~ons and . values for .. th~ . pararnetel'S of physics. Bec;ause this generatqr produ,ces .so many univel'Ses, just by 1=hance it will eventually produce qne ~~;tt is fine-tuned for,intell,igent life to occur(

Plim of the Chapter

:ijelow, we w,ill use. this distinctip:Q between the ~t,heistic single,-l1~!vel'Se. hypothesi~ and the atheistic many..-un.iverlies.hyp,qthesis to present; t:wO separate argu111~n~ for theism based pn th~ fine~ tuning: one which argues that the fine-tuning provides strong

reaSons to).prefet theism. oveFthe atheistic<single- univel'Se hypothesis< and one which argues that we should prefer theism over the atheistid many- universes. hypothesis, We will develop the argu- ment againstthe atheistic single-universe hypothesis in section·II below;.referring to it as the core argil- ment. Then we will ·answer objections to this core argument in section III, and fmally develop the argument for preferring theism . to . the' atheistic many-universes. hypothesise in section IV. An app·endix is also included that further elaborates and justifies one . of the key premises of :the core argument presented in section II.

II. CORE ARGUMENT

RlGOR.OUSLV FORMULATED

Gen~ral Principle of Reasoning_ 'used .

The Principle Explained We will fornmlate the fine-tuning argument against the':athei~tic single- univel'Se hypothesis in terms of what I Will call the prime principle of conjinn~tion. The prime pi;inci- ple of' confirmation is a generdl principle reason- ing which tells us \~hen some obse'rvati'on co lints as evidence. in favor of one hypothe.sis bver arwther. Simply put,' the principle says that whenever 1.1/e. are con- sidering two competing hypotheses, ati observation counts as evidence in Javor oj the hypothesis i:nder 'Which the observation has the .highest probability (or is the. least improbable). (Or, put slightly differen.tly, the princi- ple says that whenever 'we . ·;re considering two competing hypotheses, H 1 and H 2, aiiobset:Vation, 0, counts as evidence in fa~or of H 1 over if 0 is more probable urider H 1 than· it is .. urider. H2.) Moreover, the degree to \Vhich the ~vidence counts in favor of one' hypothesis o~er another' is propor- tional to the degree to ~hich the dbservadon is more probable under t!'te o11e hypothesiS than the other:10 'Por example,' the. fine:..tuning much, much more probable under theisrh 'than under the atheistic single-uni.Jerse ·hypothesis, so it· counts a's strong . evfdence for theism over this atheistic hypothesis. In· the· b:ext major subsection; we will

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ROBIN COHINS •-A SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT: FOR-THE EXISiH NCE OrGOD 205

present a -more fonnaLand ··elaborated rendition of the :fme-;:turring argument in. terms of tlie prime prinCiple .. First; however;lefs look-at a cbuple of illustrations ofthe principle and therr.present. sowe support for it.

Additi.onal Illustrations .of the Principle For our first illustration,· suppose that .I weni hiking in the mountains, and found underneath a certa.in .. cliff a group: of rocks arranged in a· formation thaCdearly forinedi the patterri ,''Welcome to the mountains; Robin Collins," One hypothesis is.that, by chance, the rocks just happened to •be arranged in that pattern--'-ultimately, perhaps, because ofcertain ini- tiaLconditions .ofthe universe. Suppose the only viable alternative. hypothesis is that my brother, who· ·was in the mountains before, me, arranged the rocks in this way .. Most of us wouH,immedi..,. ately take the arrangements. of rocks .. to_ be ·strong evidence in favor of the "brother'' hypothesis: over the "chance" hypothesis. Why? Because it strikes us as extremely improbable that the rocks would be arranged that way by chauce; but no~ improbable at all that my brother would place th:n1, in that con- figuration. Thu~~ by the prime prinCiple of confir- mation we would conclude that the arrangement of rocks strohgly ·. ~upports. the '"brother'' hypdthesis over the chance'hypothesis;

Or consider· another case', thaf of' finding· the defendant's fingerprints on the; murder Weapon. Normally, we would take such a finding as strong evidenc~ ;that the .. defendant was guilty. Why? Because we judge.that it. would be unlikely for these fingerprints to- be on the murder weapon if the defendant was. innocent,: but not unlikely if the defendant. was guilty. That is, we-would go through the same sort of reasoning as in the above case.

Support for ,the Principle Several t~ings can be said in favor of the prime principle· of confirmation: First; many· phildsophers think. that this . principle can be derived from what is known as the probability calculus, .the s.et ofmathe.matical rules that. are typi-' cally assumed to govern. probability. Second, there does not appear to be any case of recognizably good reasoning that violates this principle. Finally, the

principle. appears to have .a·wide range .ofrapplita'-- bility,, unqergirding much of our reasoning in sci"' ertce"tand everyday Jife,. ,as the examples above illustrate;· Indeed,· some have· even, claimed that a slightly more .generahVersion of· this J>ririciple undergirds all scientifi(;. reasoning. Because of all these reasons in favor of the principle, we .. can be very confident in it.

Further DeveiQpmellt of Argument

Tb fi.ttthet develop core Veri>ibrl :of'the firte- tuning 1 aq~~meh t, We ~ill· S:u'nunaii.ze; the argument by explicitly listing it~ ' two premises · and 'its conclus1ol1: '

• Premise 1 .. The existence of the fine..,tuning is not improbable under theism.

• Premise 2. The existence· of the fine..: tuning is very impri>bable l.lndet the atheistic single- universe hypothesis.

• Conclusion: 'Fr6m. pien{ises (l). and. (2) anH th~. prime principle of confirmation,, itfoii<)ws that the fine-tuningdataprovide'st~ortg evidence to favor the design hypothesis over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis.

At this point, we should paQse to note t:wo featt._u::es of this argument:·· First, the argument-does not say that the. flne-tQning. evidence proves :that the uni~ verse was designed, or. ex en that it is likely t;hat the uniyerse was designed. In. order to justifY tpese sorts of claims, .we would have to look .at tQ.e full range of evidence both for. and against the design hypoth~ esis, sowething .we .are not. doing in .this chapter. Rather, the argqment merely .concludes -that the fine-tuning strongly supports theism over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis,

In this . way; the ·•· evidence of the' fine-:-ttming argument is mw::h Jike fiQ.gerpJ'ints found on. the gun:.although they .. can ,proviqe· strong e.vid,ence that the defendant coiilihitted the murder, .ope could not copclude. merely frox:n them .alqne that the defeqdant is guilty; one would also have to.look at all the other e.vidence offered. Perhaps, for instance, ten .·reliabl('! witnesses claimed to see the

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~ 206 PART II•TRADIHONAl:. ARGUMENTS FOR THE:EXISHNCEcOF GOD'

defendant at a party at the • time ofthe shooting.· In this case, the fingerprints would still count as signif- icant evidence of guilt,' but·this evidence would be counterbalanced bythe testimony ofthe witnesses. Similarly the evidence of fine-tuning strongly sup" ports theism over the atheistic single-"universe hypothesis; though iL does not itself show that, everything considered, theism is the most plausible explanation of the world. Nonetheless, as I argue in the conclusion of this chapter, the evidence of fine- tuning provides a :J:iuich stronger and more objec- tive argument for theism (over the atheistic singl~;­ universe hyp'Othesis) .than the strongest atheisti~ argumentcloes against theism. . , · , ..

The ~econd feature of the argument we should note is that, given the truth of the prime principle cif confirmation,. the conclusion of the argument follows from the premises. Specifically, .jf the premises of the argument. are true, then we_ are guaranteed that the conclusion is. true: that is,. the ~rguiilent is what philosophers call valid. Thus, insofar as we can sho)V that the pre~ises of the, argu!Jlent are true, we_ ~ili have shown that the conClusion is true. Our next t~sk, therefore, is to atte~pt t~ show th~t the premises are tru~, or at 'least, that ~e have s~rong reasons to believ~ them.

Support ·for. the. Premises Support for Premise (1) Preniisei(T) is ea5y to sup-' port and fairly uncontroversial. One major : argu- ment in support of it ·can be simply stated · as follows: since God is an all good bt.?ing; and it is good for intelligent, conscious beings to exist, it is not surprising or improbable that God would create a world that- could support ·intelligent life. Thus, the fine~tuning is not improbable under theism, as premise (1) asserts.

Support for Premise (2) Upon looking at the data, many people find it very obvious that the fine- tuning is. highly improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis. And•' it is c easy to see why when we think of the fine..:tuning in terms of the •analogies offered earlier. •In the dart board analogy,•for example; 'the initial conditions of the universe and the fundamental parameters of physics ar~ thought •of as a dart board that fills the whole

galaxy, and the conditions necessary for life to exist as• a small one-foot-wide• target; Accordingly,.from this. analogy• it 'seems· obvious that it rwould be highly• improbable ·for the fine-tiuiingno occur under the atheistic single-universe . hypothesis,___ that is, for the dart to hit the target by chance.

Typically; advocates of. the fine~tiihing ·argu"' ment are satisfied•with resting the justification of premise (2); .or something like it; on this sort ofanal- ogy; Many atheists and .theists;,.however, question the legitimacy of this sort of'ahalogy;· and thus find the argument unconvincing. For these people; ;the appendixto this chapteroffers a rigorous and objec.:. tive justification of premise (2) using standard prin-; ciples of probabilistic reasohing, Aniong other things, in the process of rigorously justifying premise (2), we effectively answer the• common objection to the fine-tuning argument that because the uhiverse is a unique, unrepeatable event, we cannot meaningfully assign a probability to its. being fine-tuned.

Ill. SOME OBJECTIONS : ' - i. ~

TO CORE VERS.ION

As powerful as the c~~e versi;n ~fthe fue,-tuhing argument is, . several major objection~ have been raised to it, by both atheists :md .theists. In this sec- tion, ,we will. consider these obje_ctions in tum.

Objection 1: Mote 'Fundamental

law Objection

One criticism of the· fine..::tuning argument· is that;· as far as we know, there could be a more fundamental law under ·which, the parameters of physics must have the values they do. Thus, given such a law, it •is notimprobable that the knowncparameters of physics fall within the life-permitting range.

Besides being• entirely speculative, the problem with postulating such a law: is· that it· simply moves the ·improbability of the fine'-tuning up one ·.level, tothat of the postulated physical law itself. Unoer this hypothesis, what is improbable is that of all the conceivable fundamental physical laws 'there could

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ROBIN COLLINS •:A SCIE·NTIFIC ARGUMENJ.FORTH.E.EXlSJE.NCE•OF GOD 207

be, the universe .just happens to have the. one. that constrains. the. cparameters of physics in a·.; life~ permitting way, ·Thus; trying to explain the fine:.. tuning by postulating this sort •offundamentallaw is like trying to.explain why the pattern ofrocks below a cliff spelL7~Wekome to the mountains, .Robin Collins'' by postulating,that an. earthquake occurred and that all the rocks on the diff face were arranged in just ~he right. configuration. to tall· into the· pattern in qilestion .. Clearly this explanation merely transfers the improbability up oneJevel; sihce now it seems enomiously improbable that ,of all the possible con- figurations the rocks could be in oil the cliffface, they are in the one which results in the pattern •::w elcome to the mountains, Robin Collins."

A similar sort of response can be given to the claim that the fine-'tUning is not. improbable because .it:might he logically necessary for the para- meters of physics to have life"'pertnitting .. •values; That is,· according to this .. claim;:the: parameters of physics must have life-permitting values in the same way 2 + Z must equal 4, or the interior angles of a triangle. nmst add •UP to 180 degrees in Euclidian geometry. Like the. 7'more ftmdamentallaw'' •pro~ posal above, however; this postulate simply transfers the improbability up one level: of all the lav.'S and parameters of physics that conceivably could have been logically nscess;uy, itseemshighh' improbable that it woUld be' those that are life-permitting.11

Objection 2: Other Forms of

Lif~ Olljettion

Another objection people commonly raise to the fine.:.tuning a:rgufu.ent is that as: tar"aS we know; other forms oflife could exist even if the parameters ofphysicnvere different. So; itis'clairned, the fine.:. tuning· •argument ends up presupposing that all fonhs ofintelligeritlife musthe like tis. The answer to this objection is that most cases of fine-tuning do hot ···niake this · ptesuppositioll. Consider, for instance, the case of the fine.:..tulling ()f the strong nuclear force,: Jfit we're Slightly smaller, h() atoms could exist other than hydrogeri. ·Contrary to what one might see on Star Trek;an.ind:~lligent life-form cannot becomposedmerely ofhydrcigen gas: there

is simply.cl'wt enough' stable complexjty, So,dn'gen~ eial the.:fine"'tuning argument merely, presupposes that· intelligent ·.·life requires some, degree .oLstable; reproducible organized complexity': This iScertainly a very reasonable a~sun.1ptiol1.

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•Objection. 3: Anthropic PrinCiple ·

' obj~ctiori

Acco.rding to. the we;aLversion of the so-called anthropic principle, if the l~ws of nat!Jre were; not fine-tuned, we would not be here to corhmt;pt on the fuct. Some have argued, therefore, that the fme- tulJ.irig is'not really i;npiobable (irsuprisirig at all' under atheism, but simply follows from the fuct 1 thaC we exist. Th~.; response .to tgis. ol;ljt:ction is to simply restate the argument in te~ of.our e,xistt!I1Ce: our existt;nce as eml?oQ.ied, intelligent beings is ex:tremely unlikely under the atheistic single-univ~rse hypothe- sis (since our existence r~quires fme-tuning), but not improbable under theiSill: The11,•We sirpply ;:J.Rply the prime principle 9f confirmation to dra}v tht: conclu- sion thatol{r ,exjstf!!Ce strongly confinns th~ism over the atheistic single:;:-upiv~rse hypothe~is,

To further illustrate this response, consid~r the followi~g "flring squad~' ;malogy. As John .Leslie points out,. if fifty sharpshooters all miss me, the response ''if'they had riot rnissedtmel .wouldn't be here tb ·consider the tact" ·is' 'not adequate: Instead, I wouldri~turally conclude that then! was some reason why·theyall missed;suth as that they never really intended to kill me. :Wh{would r con..: dude this? Because my continued existence would be· very improbable' undet the hypothesis th~t•they missed me by chance, but not' improbable". under the . hypotfiesis. that there wa.s some reason 'why they missed me. Thus, bf the prime ·principle c:f confirmation,·.···· tri.y . continued eXistence strongly confirrhs the latter hypothesis. 12 ·

·objection 4: The HWho Designed

God?" ObjectiC)ri.

Perhaps the inost common objection that atheists raise to th'e argument from design, of which .the

208 PARJU.•JRADITIONAI!.ARGUM·EN'TS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

fine,..tuning argument .is on'e instance, is thafpostu...: lating the existence. of God qoesnot solve· the prob"'

. lem ·of design, but 'merely;ttansfet'S it up one level; Atheist George S!Uith; for example;>claiills that

If the universe is wo'Ad.~rl"~lly designed: surely God is even more wonderfully desigiied. 'He rimst, therefore, 1iiM~1iliad a designer even m()re yv:qn~erful than He is. If God did not require a designer, then

. there is no reason why such a: relatively leSs wonderful• thing as the 'universe needed one:B·

Or, as philosopher J.. J. C. Smart state~ the qbjection:

If we postUlate God in addition t<f the created universe we increase· the:·

· coniplexiry of outhypothesis; We have all the complexity of the ;universe" "itself; and we have in addition die at least equal C()mplexit)r ofGod: (The desighefofari artifact must be at leasHis eomplex as the designed ai:tifact) .... if the theistiiin show the atheist that postulating God ai:tually reduces the complexitY of one's total world vieiV; then

'the atheist should be a theist:14 ·

.. • The first resp9nse. ~o .the ~l?o;e, atheist objection is to point out tqat the atheist c:laiffi. that the designer of an arti£lct must be as c()tnplex; as the artifact designed is ce~;tainly not obvim1s. }3tit I <io believe that . their claim has some infuitiye p]ausi~ility: for e.x'an1ple, in the ;world we ex;perience, organized complexity. se:ems only to be produ~~d by systems that already: possess it, such as the . hurnap br;tin/ mind,. a factory, ()r an organism's biological.p~en~,

The second, and better, response is topointout that, at m~st,. the atheist objec:tion ~ply. works agamst a version of the design argufii1en(t4at claim~ that all organized complexity needs an explanation, and that God is the best explanation of the orga- nized comple;xity f()t;IIf.d in the W()t:M. 'fpe version of the argu~en~J presented. <lgainst the atheistic smgle-universe hypothesis, however, only required that the fine-tuning be more probable;under thdsm than under the atheistic· single-unive;tse hypothesis.

But this requirement is still met .even ifGod:exhil bits; tremendous internal complexity, tar exceeding that o£ the universe.· Thus, even 'if we wer~ :to· grant the 'atheist assumption· that. the· designer· of an· arti~ fact muSt be as complex as the •artifact, the finel tuning would.still give us strongcreasons"~o prefer theism over the atheistic'sirigle,.uriiverse h)'pothesis.

To illustrate, considerthe example ofthe ''bio'- sphere1' on .Mars presented at the beginning ofthis paper, As; mentioned:above;.the ·existenceof.the biosphere would be much ntore probable under the .hypothesis that intelligent life 6nce visited<Mats than under the chance hypothesis: Thus;• by;:the prime principle. of corifirrnation,.the existence of such a "biosphere,, would constitute' strong i evi.,;; denee that intelligent, extraterrestrial life had>once been on Mars, even though this alien life would most. lilcely have' to· be inuch more complex than the ''biosphere'' itself

The final response theists can •giVe to this objec:... tionis to show that a supermind such as God would not require a high degree of unexplained organized complexity to create the·· universe:. Although .. I have presented. this response •elsewhere; presenting it •here is beyond the scope ofthis•chapter. ·

lv. rtiEArijEisrrc MANY- uNivERsEs HYPOTHESIS

The Ath~isti!=. Many~Universes

Hypothesis Explained

I11 response to the theistic explanation. of fine" tuning ofthe cqsmos, many atheists ha:ve pffered an alternative explanation, what I will call the athe- ~stic ·rnany-uJ1iVe;rses ~ypothesis, (In the, literatpre j~ is more. fX>mlllonly referred tq .as th~ many-worlds hyppthesis;. th()ugh.l believe·, t}lis .. Qame is. s()mew}lat misleading) Accordipg t() tNs hypothesis, there are a very large-;cperhaps,.infinite~number of U1li::' verse~, with the. fundaJI1ental paramete~ ,of physics

. fr . . . 15 Of · · . varymg ()Ill, umverse: to umveJ:Se• r+. course:. ·111 the vast. ma.jol(ity of these universe.s the parameters of physics w,()p.ld .not have life-.perniitting values.

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; ROBIN COLLIN.S • ASCI ENTI f'IC ARG U MENTF(DRoTH:E.•EXJS'fE N:C E :OF GOD 209

Nonetheless, in a small proportion of universes they would, and consequently it is no longer improbable that universes such as ours exist that are fine-tuned for life to occur.

Advocates of this hypothesis offer various types of models for where these universes came from. We will present what are probably the two 'most popu- lar and plausible, the .so,-called . vacuum fluctuation modelsand the osdllating big bang models. According to the vacuum fluctuation models, our universe, along with .these other universes,. were: generated by' quantum' fluctuations in a preexisting ,super- space}6 Imaginatively, one can think of this preex~ isting superspace as an infinitely extending ocean full of soap, and each univenie generated out of this superspace as a soap· bubble which. spontane- ously forms on the ocean.

.. The other model, the oscillating big bang model,. is a version of the big bang theory. Accord.., ing,to the .big bang theory, the universe came into existence in an "explosion" (that is, ·a "bang") somewhere between ten and fifteen .. billion years ago. According to the oscillating big bang the.ory, our universe will eventually collapse back in ori itself(what is called the·"big crunch';) and then from that "big .crunch'' will arise another "big bang," forming a new universe, .which will in tum itself collapse, and so OIL According .. to those who 'i use this model to attempt to • explain the fine'- tuning, during every. cycle; the parameters of phys..:. ics• and the. initial• conditions of the universe are reset . at random. Since this ·process of collapse, explosion, collapse, and explosion .has been going on for all eternity, eventually. a fine-tuned universe will occur, indeed infinitely many of them.

In the neA.'i: section, we will list several reasons for rejectingthe atheistic many-universes hypothesis,

Reasons for Rejecting the Atheistic

M~ny"Universes Hypothesis ; > '' ,-- - '

First Reason · The·· first· reason for rejecting the atheistic many..:. universes hypothesis, and preferring the theistic hypothesis, is the following general rule: everything else being equal; we s/Wuld prifer hypotheses for which we have independent evidence or that are, natural

extrapolations from what we already know. Let's first illustrate• and· support this. principle, and. then apply it to the case of the fine~tuning:'

··Most of us take the existence ofdiriosaur· bones to. coum' as , \Zery . strong evidence that dinosaurs existed:in the .past. But suppose a dinosaur skeptic claii:ped that she; could explain the bones by postu~ lating a '~dinosaur .... b,onec,producing-field". that sim'- ply materialized the bones out · of thin air. Moreover, suppose further that; to· avoid objections such as that there are nb,knownphysicallaws that would allow. for such a •mechanism, the. dinosaur skeptic simply postulated·that.we have· not yet dis-. covered these laws or detected these fields. Surely, none of us would let this skepticalilypothesis deter us from inferring •the existence • of dinosaurs: Why? Because although no one .. has· directly .. observed dinosaurs, we do have experience of other animals leaving behind ·fossilized remains, arid thus the dinosaur explanation is a natural extrapolation from our common experience. In contrast, to explain the .dinosaur ·hones; the ; dinosaur skeptic has invented a setofphysicallaws, and a set ofmechan- isms that are. not; a natural extrapolation from any~ thing we• kriow or experience.

In the case ofthe fine.,;tuning,·we already know that minds ,often ·produce fine .... tuned: devices, such as Swiss- watches:. Postulating God-a supenhind-'-'- as the explanation of the fine-tuning~ therefore, is a natural extrapolation from what we already observe minds to. do. In contrast, it is difficult to see how the atheistic many-universes hypothesis could be considered· a natural extrapolation; from what we observe. Moreover, unlike; the .atheistic . manr universes hypothesis, we have. some experiential evidence for the existence of God, namely religious experience. Thus, by ;the above principle, we sho.uld ·prefer· the · theistie:explanation of the fine-' tuning .over the atheistic manyc.universes explana-' tion, everything. else being. equal.

Second Reason

A second reason for rejecting the atheistic· many- universes hypothesis is that the .. · "many-universes generator" seems like it would need to be designed:

210 PAR-rll• TRADITIONA'f:ARGUMENTS FOR TH:E EXISHNCE :oF GOD

For mstance, in all current :worked...::out,proposals for 1whatthis . .''universe generator''; could b~uch as the oscillating:big· barig and the vacuum fluctua- tion models:~ explained abov~the 'igenerator" itself is.· governed by a comple:x:' set of ·physical laws that allow it to produce·the imiyet:Ses. It stands to ·reason; therefore; that ifthese laws were .slightly different the generator prqbablyiwould not be able to produce any universes that could· sustain life: After all, even my bread madiine· has to be made just right in order to·work properly, and it only produces loaves ofbread;not tmiverses! Or consider a device as simple as .a mousetrap: it requires that all the parts, such as the 'spring and hammer, i be arrangedjust right in order to function. It is doubt~ ful, therefore,.. whether· the·. atheisticmany'-universe theory can entirely eliminate the problem of design the atheist faces; rather, at least to some extent, it seems simply to move the problem. of design up onelevel.17

Tliird Reason A third reason for rejecting the atheistic many-universes hypothesis is •that the uni- verse generator must not only select the parameters of physics at random, but· must actually randomly create or select the very laws ofphysics themselves. This makes. this hypothesis' seem: even more far- fetched since it is diffic~lt to see what:possible phys-c ical mechanism could select or create laws.

The reason the ··~many-'universes generator'' must randomly select the' laws of: physics is that, just as the right:va:lues for the parameters of physies are needed for life to' occur, the right set:of laws is also needed~ Ifi for instance, certain laws· of physics were missing, life would be impos5ible. For exam- ple, without the law of inertia, which guarantees that particles do not shoot off at high speeds, life would probably not be possible) 8 Another example is the law of gravity: if masses did not attract each other, there would be no .planets or stars; and once again it seems that life would be impossible. Yet another example is the Paj,ili Exclusion Principle, the principle of quantltrh mechanics that says that no two ferrnions~uch ·as electrons or protons-'-, can ~share the same quantum state; As prominent Princeton physicist Freeman lJyson points out, 19

without this principle all eleCtrons would collapse into· the .nucleus and; tnus atoms would' be impossible.

Fourth Reasori 'Fhe feurth reason for ,rejecting the atheistio•many~universes'hypothesiS .·is.;.that it cannot explain other features of the •universe that seem··to .. exhibit apparent· design,. whereas •·theism can. ,for ·example; •many physiCists, such as Albert Einstein,. have observed that the ;basic laws of physics exhibit an ·extraordinary degree. of beauty, elegance, >harmony, and ingenuity; NobeL prize:. winning physicist ·Steven·. Weinberg,· for.,instance; devotes. a:'whole chapter of his bookDreams;ofa Final·Theory20 :explaining how the criteria of beauty and elegance ate commonly used to guide physicists in formulating the right laws. Indeed, one '<ofthe most p,r:ominent theoretical physicists of this cen- tury, ·Paul Dirac, went so fur as to claim:: that "it is more important to have beauty in one:s equations than to have them fit experiment."21

Now such beauty, elegance; and· ingenuity make sense lfthe universe was designed by God. Under the atheistic riiany~universes hypothesis; however; there is no reason tb expect the furida .. meiitallaws to be elegant or beautifuL As•theoreti'-- cal iphysiCist ··Paul· Davies writes, ''.Jf nature is so 'clever' as to exploit mecfianisms that amaze ·US with theiringenuity, is that not persuasive evidence for the existence ofintelligent desigp;behind the universe?·Jf the world's··finest minds can unravel only with difficulty the• deeper workihgs of nature; how could it be·supposed that those .workings are merely a mindless accident, a product of blind chance?"22

FinalReason This brings us· to the· final reason for rejecting the atheistic many-universes hypothesis, which,tnay be the n~()st .diffi<;ultto gr<~,sp: namely, neither the ath~istic 01any-universes,J1ypothesis (nor the atheistic single:.:uJiiv~rse hyp<>'thesis) can at present adequately account for the improbable initial· arrangement of matter, in the universe required by the second·. law of thermodynamics. To see. th~,· note that acc:ording to the second. law of thermodynamics, the entropy of the

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ROBIN COLLIN.S~• A SC.IE•NTIFIC ARGUMENT;FO;R'.HIE EXISTENCE.QF G0D 211

universe is·constantly increasing. The standar&.way of understanding this .entropy increase is to say that the universe is going from a state of order to· dis-" order. 'We observe this entropy increase all the time around us: things, such as a child's·bedroom, that start out highly organized ;tend to "decai'. and become disorganized unless. something or some- one intervenes to. stop it.

No:w,. for purposes of illustratioh, we could think of the universe as· a.· scrabbkcboa:rd ·that ini~ tially starts out in a highly ordered state in which:all the letters are aminged to form words; .but which keeps getting randomly shaken. Slowly, :the board, like the universe, moves from a state. of .order to disorder. The problem for the atheist is to explain how the universe could have started out in a highly ordered state, since it is extraorciinarily improbable for such states to occur by chance?3 If, for example, one were to dump. a bunch of letters at random on a scrabpk-board, it would be very unlikely for most of them.to form ·into words. At best, we would expect. groups of letters to form into words in a few places on the board .

. Now our. question is, Could the atheistic many'-universes hypothesis explain the high deg~ee of initial order of our universe by clailliing that given enough universes, eventually one will arise that is ordered and in which intelligent life occurs, and so it is no surprise that we find ourselves in an ordered universe? The problem with this explana- tion is that it is overwhelmingly more likely for local patches oLorder to form ih one or two places than for the whole universe to be ordered, just as it is 'overwhelmingly more likely for a few letters on the scrabble-board randomly to form words than for . all the letters throughout the board randomly to form words. Thus, the. overwhelming majority of universes in whichintelligent life occurs will be ones in which the intelligent life will be surrounded by a small patch .oforder necessary for its existence, but in which the rest. of the universeis. disordered. Consequently, even under the atheistic many-" universes hypothesis, it would· still be enormously improbable fot intelligent beings to find the111Selves in a universe such as ours which is highly ordered throughout.24

Conclusion

Even 'th6ugh the aboye critifiStl1sdo not#efini- tively ~efute 'the.atheistic n1al1y-universes'pypot~e­ sis, "they do show that it·. has .soni~ sevJ~e disadvantages· ~dative to theis~. This meaps that'if ~theists adopt the atheistic many-universe~hypotfl~ esis' to defend their positiori,then' ;.theism has be~on1e muc.h 'less, plausible . th~n it used to·. be: Modifyiflg a turn ofphqse C()ilie'd by'p~ilo~ophei: Fred Dr~tske: these are.iritlationary times: arid the cost of ~theism has just gorie llP·.

V. OVERALL CONCLUSION

In the above sections I showed there are, good, objective. reasons• for claiming that the fine-tuning provides strong evidence for theism. Lfil:stpresented an argument for thinking that the fine'-'tuning pro., vides strong evidence for preferring theism: over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis, and then • pre-' sented a variety of different· reaSOllS' 'for rejecting the ath~istk: many-universes hypothesis as an ex:pla~ nation of the fine'-funing, In order to help one appreciate the strength · ofthe arguments' presented, lwould.like.to end by comparillgthe strength of:the core version' of the argument::fromthe· fine'"'tuning to what is widely regarded as the stiongesf atheist argu~ ment against theism, the argunierit from evil. ~5

Typically, the atheist"argurhent against iGod based: on evil takes a similar form to the core ver~ sion of. the . fine-tuning ·argument. Essentially, the atheist argues that the existence of; the. kinds of evil we• find in the world is very improbable under theism, but not improbable under atheism, Thus, by the prime principle of confirmation; they conclud.e that the exiStence of evil provides strong reasons for preferring atheism over theisin.

·What makes this argumentweak in comparison t() the core version •of the fine~tuning argument is that, unlike in the case of the fine-luning, the athe- ist does not have a significant objective basis for claiming that the existence of the kinds of evil we find in the world is highly improbable under the- ism. In fact, their judgment that it is improbable

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seems largely to rest on a'triistake in reasoning. To see. t~is, .. note that i11 order< to .. show that jt . is Improbable, atheists ~oul<Jh~ve ~o show tha(it is un'lik~ly that the types of evils . find ,in the world are .11~ce~ary for any ll1orallygood, .. greater J:mrp()St', sip.ceifthey,a~e, th~njt is cle31:ly nqt at'allunlikely t~t ar1 all good, all powerful beirlg would creat~ a world in which those evils are all~wed to occqr. l,)uthowcould ~thei~ts sho,V this without.first su,r:- v~yipg all 'QO~sible morally'' goop . purp9s,es such. a being· might have: . somethtng they hav~ Cleai:Iy not done? Consequently, it seems, at most the atheist could argue that since no one has come up with any ade- quate purpose yet, it is unlikely that there is such a pur- pose. This·argumeht, however;' is very weak, as I will now show.

The first problem with this atheist argument is that it assumes that the· various explanations.people have offered for why an all good God would create evilc-:-such as the free will theodicy---"ultirnately fail. But even if we grant that these theodicies fail, the argument is •still very:.weak. To •see why; wnsider an ana1ogy. Suppose someone tells me thauhere. is a rattlesnake in my, garden, and J examine .. a portion ofthe; garden and do..not find.the,snake. I w~uld only be justified in concluding that there was prob- ably no snake in the garden' iCeither:: i) · L had searched ·at least halUhe garden; or ii). I had good reason to believe that ·if the snake were in the gar- den, it would likely be in the portion of the garden that I examined. If, for :instance, Iwere randomly to pick some small segment of the • garden to· search and did not firid the snake, I would be unjustified in concluding from my search that there was prob~ ably no snake in the>garden. Sitriilarly, if I were blindfolded· and did not have any idea of how large the garden was (e.g., whether it was.ten square feet or several square triiles), I would be unjustified in concluding that it was unlikely thauhere was a rattlesnake in the garden, evert if I had searched for hours with my .rattlesnake-detecting dogs. Why? Because·:! would not have any idea of what per- centage ·of the garden· I had searched.

As·withthe garden example, we have no idea of how large the realm .is of passible greater pur- poses for evil that an 'all .good, omiiipotent..being

could·have, Hence"we,do notknowiwhat:propor.,- tion '/of this realm w,e have: actually •searched. Indeed, ' considering the finitude of our own minds, we have good :reason to believe;:.thav we have> so far only searched a small proportion, and we do not have significa:h:t reason to believe that all the purposes ·God might have for allowing evil would be in the proportion we searched. Thus, we have ·little·· •objective .·· basis ·for . saying.··. that the existence of the types ofevil we find in:tne• world iS highly improbable. under theism:

from the. above .discussion;' therefore, it>is ·clear that the relevant probability estimates in i:he.,case .of the fine~tuning are much more secure than those estimates in the probabilistic version of the atheist's argument fromevil; since unlike the latter, we can provide>a fairly rigorous, objective basis for them based on actual calculations ofthe relative ran~;e of life~permitting values for the parameters of:physics, (See the appendix to this chapter for a •rigorous derivation of the probability of; the fine'-'tuning under the atheistic single~ universe , hypothesis.) Thus, I conclude, the core argument for. preferring theism over the probabilistic version ofthe atheistic sin,gle"universe hypothesis is much. stronger than the atheist . argument

fi .126 rom evr ·'

. APPENDIX

In this appendix, I offer a rigorous .:support· for pretriise (2) of the main argumen't;/ that is, the claim that i:he fine,turiing is very improbable under the atheistic <single.,universe hyPothesis; Support for premiSe (2) will, involve three major subsections. The first' subsection: will be devoted to explicating the fine-tuning of gravity since we Will· often · use this,: to· illustrate . • our .. ·. arguments, Then,'.in our second subsection, we.nvilkshow how· the in1.probability of the .fine,:.turting under th,e <,atheistic single.:.universe hypothesis can be derived from a commonly used; objective principle of probabilistic reasoning called the prinCiple 4 indiffirence. 'fiinally, in our third subsection, we will explicate what it could mean to saythat the

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ROBIN COLLINS'• A SC.IEN.JIFIC ARGUMENTF.OR'THE .EXISUNCE•OFGOD 213

fine.,.tuning is improbable· given that the. universe cis a ·unique, ;unrepeatable .event' as assumed ,by the atlieistic single~ universe hypothesis, The .appendix will in effect ~nswer the common atheist qbjection that theists can neither justify the claim that the fme-" tuning is. improbable under, the atheistic single-" universe hypothesis,. nor can ~they provide.; an account of what it could possibly mean to·•say that the fme~tuning is·improbab}e;

i. The Example of'Gravity

The force ofgravity is deteri:nined by Newton's law E Gm1m2ll. Here G is what is known as·. the gravitational constant, and is basically a ·number that detennjnes the force .of gravity in any given circum.,. st;mce. For instance, the gravitational attraction between the moon and the. earth is given by first multiplying the mass. oLthe moon (m1) times the mass of the.earth (m2), and then dividing by the dis.,- tance between them squared(?). Finally, one multi-' plies this result by the number G to obtain • the' total force. Clearly the force is directly;propol:tional to G: for example, if G were to double, the force.between the moon and the earth would double.

In the previous section, we reported.that some calculations indicate that the force ofgravicy must be fine~ tuned to one part in 1040 in order for.life to occur. • What does such fine~ttining ··mean? To understand it, imagine a radio dial, going .from 0 to 2Go, where. C 0 represents the current value ·of the gravitational constant. Moreover, imagine the dial being broken up into 1040-that is, ten thou~ sand, billion, billion, billion; billion-c-evenly spaced tick marks: To claim that the strength of gravitY must ·be fine~tuned to one part in 1040 is simply to claim that; in order forlife to exist, the constant ofgravity cannot vary by even one tick mark along the dial from its current v:alue of Go-

ii. The Principle of lnditferen(e In the following subsections, we will use the princi, ple of indijference to justifythe· assertion that the fine"' tuning is .. highly improbable under the ';atheistic single.,.universe hypothesis ..

a;. The::•Principle Stated. Applied•.to .cases in which there is. a finit.e number of alternatives; the principle of indifference can be formulated as the claim that we. should assign the same proBability, tq what are called equipossible alternatives,· where. two or, more alternatives are said to be equipos5iblel"if we have_ no reason .to prefer one .of the alternatives over any ofthe others.,(In anotherversion oftheptinci- ple; alternativ:es that are' relevantly symmetrical are considered equipossible and hence the .ones :that should be assigned equal probability.) For instance; in the case•ofastandard two~sided coin, .we have no. niore reason to think that the .coin will. land on heads than that it will land on tails, and so We assign them each an equal probability. Since the total ·probability must add up to one; this· mi:fans that the coin has a 0.5 chance oflanding oii heads. and a 0.5 chance oflanding.on tails, Similarly, ip. the case of a standard six,..sided die, we have no more reason to think that it will land on one number, Say a. 6, than-any flf.ilie'other. numbers, such as a•4 .. Thus, the principle of indifference .tells us to assign each possible way of landing an equal probability~ namely 1k.·

, The above expli~ation of the. principle. applies only when there are a finite number ofalternatives; for e.Kample six.sides on a ,die, In the. case of the fine~tuning, however, the alternatives are not finite but form a··continuous magnitude. The value of G; for instance,• conceivably could have been• any number between 0 and infinity. Now, continuous magnitudes are ;•usually thought oLin ternis of ranges, areas, or volumes depending on whether or not we. are: considering' one, furo., three, or more dimensions. For example, :the amount of water in an .8 oz. glass could fall anywhere within the range 0. oz. to 8oz., such as. 6.012345645 oz, Or, the .exact position thatxdart hits 1a dart boaro .can fhll anywhere within the area of; the dart ::board, With some qualifications to be discuss.ed below, the principle ofindifference becomes in the contin~ uous case. the ,principle that when we have no reason t.o prifer any one ·value if. a parameteY. over anoth(!.r,. we should, :assign equal probabilities to equal ranges, areas, or volumes . . So, for instance;: suppose one aimlessly throws a dart at a dart board .. Assuming the dart hits

214 PART'U.•TRADIHONAtARGUMENTS FOR THrEXISTENCE OF GOD'

the board, what is tlie probability it ~will hit within the bulrs eye? Since the .dart;is:thrown aimlessly, we have no more reason to believe it will hit one part of the •·dart. board than any other part. The principle of indifference, therefore; .tells Us that the probability of its hitting the hull's eye is the same as the probability .of hitting any•other·partof the dart board of equal< area; This •means• that the probability of its hitting the bull's·,eye is Simply the ratio of the area• ofthe hull's eyeto the rest of the ·dart board. ·So, for instance', ifJhe bull's• eye fornis · only S percent of the total area of the board, tnen the probability ofits· hitting· the ·hull's eye will be 5 percent.

b~; Application to Fine-Turri.itg In the •case ·Of the firre"'tlining; we have no more reason to think that the parameters of·physics will fall within the life"-permitting range than within any other range, given the atheistic single-universe hypothesls:t Thus according to the prinCiple of indifference,·equal ranges• of these parameters should be . assigned equal>probabilities. As in the' case of the dart board mentioned in the last section, this means that the probability of the . parameters of physics falling• within· the life-pennitting range • under. the atheistic . singk-universe• hypothesis . is . simply the ratio of the range• oflife.:.permitting yalues. (the "area of the hull's eye'') to the total relevant range of possible values (the "ielevanuarea of·rhe• dart board'?).

Now physicists ;can make rough estimates .of the range of l!fo-permitting values .for the parameters of physics, as discussed above in the case of gravity, for instance. But what is the "total relevant range of possible values'!? At first one might think that this range cis infinite, since. the values of.the parameters could conceivably be anything: This, however, is not cbrrect, ·for although the possible range of values' could be infmite, for most. of these values we<have· no way of estimating whether:: they ate life~permitting'or not; We .do not truly know, for example, what would happen if gravity were 1060

times stronger than its "current value: a.s far as we know; a new form of matter might come into•exis- tence that could sustain·· life. Thus( as far as we

know,· there/could be; other life,..permitting ranges fat'' n~n1oved from the actual values that the para'-' meters 'have.iConsequently, aU we caw say is that the ·lif~;permitting. range is very, very small relative to the limited range of values for which we tan make estimates, a range that •we will here'-'aftet refer to as the. ':illuminated'~ range;

Fortunately, however, this limitation does. not affect the overall argument~ The .reason is that; based on the principle of indifference, we can still say that it is yery ~PI"Obj!ble.for tl1e .:v:Uues for the parameters o(physics to have· faJlen ·in the life- permitting range instead· of some other part of the '.'illuminated'~ range.27 And thiS •impro.bability is an that is actually needed' for our main•argument•to work. To see this, consider an analogy. Suppose•a dart landed on the hull's eye at the center of a huge dart board, Further, suppose that this hull's eye is surrounded by a very large empty, bull's:.:.eye.:.free, area. Even if.there were many other hull's eyes on the dart boarO., we would still take the fact that the dart landed on the hull's eye instead 6fsome other part of the large empty area surrounding the hull's eye.· as., strong evidence·. that it ,was ainie:d. Why? Because we wouH reason that gillen ·that the· dart landed in the empty area,. it was very improbable for it to land• in the· hull's eye by chanceubut not improbable. if it wete aimed. Thus, by the prime principle of confinrration;.we could colldude that the dart landing oh the rbull' s eye •strongly confirms the.hypothesis that it .was aimed over the .chance hypothesis. ·

c. The ·Principle Qualified Those who ·are familiar with the principle of indifference, and mathematics; will recognize . that one ·important qualification rieeds to be ;made to. the above account of how to apply the principle of .indifference. (Those who are not mathematically adepFrhight want to skip this and perhaps the next paragraph.) To understand tile q ualific;atign, note that the ratio of ranges . used' in ca.iculatirig the probability is dependent on/how one parameterizes; ·or writes, the • physical laws, For example, suppose· for. the sake of illustration that the range of life c. permitting values for the gravitational constant is 0 to.·G0; and

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ROBIN COLLIN.S • A SC.I E·NTU'IC ARG UMENJ FOR. THE\ EXISTENCE O•F GOD 215

the "illuminated~' range of possible values <for Gis•O to 2G0• Then, the ratio oflife-permitting values to the range of "illuminated" possible values for the gravitational constant will be Yz. Suppose, however; that qne writes the law of gravity.in th<r mathemat~ ically equivalent form 'ofF ::::::yf&mtm2/f'. instead of.F:= Gm 1m2 !1, where V = G2• (Inthisway of writingNewton'slaw,··.U becomes Jhe new gravita-' tional constant;) This means that Uo = G0

2 ; where

U0, like:G0, represents·the actualvalue.ofUin::our universe o Then, the range .of Iife~permitting ·values would be• 0 to U0, and the '~illuminated" range of possible values would be 0 to 4U0 on the U scale (which.is equivalent to 0 to 2G0 on the G scale). Hence; calculating the ratio of life.-permitting values using the U scale instead of the G scale yields a ratio of J4 .instead oL~ Indeed, for almost any ratio one chooses~uch as one in which the life- permitting range is about the same $ize as ·the "illuminated?' . rang~there exist mathematically equivalent forms of Newton's law that will yield that ratio. So, why choose the standard.way ofwrit~ ing: Newton's law :to calculate the. ratio instead of one in which the fine-tuning is not improbable at aU?

;The answer to.i this:questionis ·to.require that the proportion used in calculating the probability be between real physic;al· ranges, areas, or volumes, not merely· mathematical.· representations· of them. That is, the proportion given by the scale used in one's representation must directly correspond to the proportions actually existing imphysical reality, As an illustration, consider how we might calculate the probability that a meteorite will fall· in New ·York state instead of somewhere else in the horthern, contiguous United States. One way ofdoing this is to take a standard map of the northern, contigu~ ous United States; measure. the area covered by New ·York on the map (say 2 square inches) and divide it by the total area ofthemap (say 30 square inches). If we were to do ·this, we would get approximatelythe right answer because the propor- tions on a•.standard map direc;tly correspond to the actual froportions of land areas in the United States. 2 0n the other . hand, . suppose we had a map made by some lover of the east coast in

which;•: hecatise of the, scale,used, the .. :east coast toohup half the map.df.we used the proportions of areas.as represented• };>y this map we would· get the wrong: answer since .the scale ·used would not correspond to · .. ·real ; proportions: • of. land ···areas. Applied to the. fine-tuning; this means that our.cal;,. culations. of these proportions .must .be done• •using parameters ;that. ;directly correspond .to physical quantities in.order to yield valid probabilities. ·In the case ; of gravity; for instance, the gravitational constant G directly corresponds · to the force between two unit masses a unit distance apart, whereas U does not. (Instead, Ucqrresponds to the square.· of the. force.) . Thus,· G is the correct parameter to use •in calculating the probability}9

d. Support: for Principle Finally;;f!lthougp the principle of indifference has been criticized on yar-, ious grounds, several powerful reasons can • be offered for its soundness if if is restricted i in; the ways explained in the last subsection. ·First; it has an extraordinarily wide range of applicability. As Roy Weatherford notes ·in his hook;. Philosophical Foundations· of Probability; Theory,· "an. astonishing number of extremely complex problems itt proba"'" bility theory have been solved, and usefully so, by calculations based entirely on the assumption of ~quiprobable 'alternatives [that is, •the:, principle ·()[ indifference]."~0 Second, at least for• the. discrete case,·· the .. principle can be given •a significant •theo'- retical grounding in information . theory;+ being derivable from Shannon's important ilnd well-: known measure ofinjormation, or negative: entropy. 31

Finally, in certain .everyday cases the principle of indifference seems the only justification we haye for assigning. pr0bability. To illustrate; <suppose that in the last ten minutes a factory. produced the first fifty':'sided die<ever produced. Further suppose that every side. of the die is.(macrdscopically) per- fectlysymmetricil with every otherside,.except for there being different.numbers printed on ·each side. (The die we are.itnagining is like a .fair six-'sided.die except that it has fifty sides insteaa ofsix.) Now, we all immediately know that upon being rolled the probability of the die conririg , up on any giyen side is one. in fifty, .Yet, we do .not; know this

216

directly from experience with fifty-sided 'dice;' silice b:y. hypothesis no one has yet' rolled such ;dice to detennine the relative frequency with which they come up on each side. ·Rather, 'it seems our only justification for assigning this probability is the prin'- ciple ofindifference: that is, given that every side of the die is· relevantly macroscopically: symmetriCal with every other side, we have no reaSon to believe that the die will land oh one·side •over any other side, and th1,1s·we assign them all1an equa1'probabil- . f . fifty 32 1ty o one m, :

iiCThe Me~ning ofProbabilitY ,•,' > • ,- ' In the·last section we used •the principle ofindiffer:.. ence to rigorously justify the claim that the fine- tuning is highly improbable under the atheistic single-universe, hypothesis. We did ;not explain; however, what it could . mean ·to say that it ·is improbable, especially given that the universe is a unique, unrepeatable event. To address this issue, we shall'now show how the pr()hability invoked in the fine-tuning. argument can be straightfor- wardly understood either as what· could be called classical probability •or as' what is known as epistemic probability.·

Classical: Probability ·The' classical conception of probability defines probability in terins . of the • ratio ofnumber of·~·'favorable casesn to the total number of equipossible cases,~? Thus, for instance, to say the p'robability of a die• coming up ''4" is one out of six is simply to say that the nuniber of ways a die could come up "4" is one-sixth the number -of equipossible ways· it could come up. Extending this definition· to the continuous case; .classical probability can be defined in terms of the relevant ratio of ranges, areas, or volumes :over whiCh the principle of indifference applies. Thus, under this extended· definition, to say that the probability of the parameters of physics falling into. the life- permitting value is very improbable· simply tneans that the ratio of life-,perrilitting values to the range of possible yalues is very, very small. Finally, notice that this definition of probability implies the prin-' ciple of indifference, and thus we can be certain

thafthe principle, of indifference holds for ,classical probability~

Epistemic Probability · Epistemic probability is a widely ;recognized·type of probability that applies to claims; 'statements, •and. hypotheses..,.,_.:.that> is; what philosophers • call. propositions. 34 (A proposi:... tion is any daim, assertion, statement, or hypothesis about the world.): Roughly, the epistemic pro- bability 'of a proposition can be thought of as the degree of credence--that is, degree of confidence or belief......;:;we rationally should have in the propo:.: sition. Put differently, , episterhic probability is a measure of our rational degree of belief under a condition ofignorance concerning whether a prop- osition is true or false. For example, wh~n,one •says that the special theory of relativity is probably true, one is making a statement of epistemic probability. After all; the theory is actually either true or false. But, we do not know for sure whether it! is true ot false; so we say it is probably true to indicate that we should put more confidence in, its being true than>in its: being false. It is also comrhonly argued thatthe probability of a· coin toss is best understood as a case of epistemic probability. Since the side the win will land '(m. is determined by the laws of phys- ip, itis argued that our assignment of probability is simply a measure of our rational· expectations con- cerning· which side the ,coin will land on:

Besides epistemic probability 'Sumpliciter, phi:.. losophers also,speakofwhat is known as the condi- tional epistemic probability of one proposition on ariother. The conditional epistemic probability of a propositionR on another,proposition 5--:--written as P(R/ S)-can,be defined as the degree to which the proposition S of itself should rationally lead us to expect that R is true. For example, there is a high conllitional probability that it will rain today on the hypothesis that the weatherman'has predicted a 100 percent chance of rain, whereas 'there is a low conditional probability that it will rain today on the hypothesis that the weatherman has pre.,. diCted only a 2 percent cQ.ance of rain. That is, the hypotl:iesis'that the weatherman has predicted .a 100 percent chance of rain today should strongly lead us td expect that it wilh rain, whereas .the

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ROBIN COLLINS • A SCIENTIFIC ARGI.:J MENT FORTHLEXISJENCE o.F GOD 217

hypothesis. that the weatherman has predicted a 2 percent chance should lead us to expect that it will riot rain; Under the epistemic conception of probability; ther'e£ore, the statement, that the fine- tuning of the CosttUJS is very improbable uniler the atheis- tic single-universe hypothesis makes perfect serise': it is to be \inderstood as making a statement about the degree tO which the. atheistic ?ingle..:imiverse hyp~thesis would or should, of itself, rationally

. . . · ... · . ·~ lead us .to expect the cosmic fine:-tuning ..

·Conclusion

Th~. ~bove' discussiOJ1, slH:~vy-s ·.that .;;e· h~y~ ·~~Jeast two , ways. of understandiq.g imprqpability:, inv.oked in our main argu111ent: as ·classicaJ probab~lity or episte111ic. probability .. This un,dercuts the. <ioJ11lllon atheist '.objection that it is meaningless to• speak of the· probability of the fine-"tuning under. the atheis- tic single-universe hypothesis . since under this hypothesis the universe is JlOt, a, repeatable, .event.

NOTES

1. Freeman Dyson, Di~turbing th~ Univer~e (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 251.

2. Paul Davies, T1Je Cosmic Blrleprint: New Discoveries in Nature's Creative Ability to Order the. Universe (New

· York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 203.:

3. Fred Hoyle, in Religion and the Scientists (1959); quoted in T1Je Anthropk Cosmological Principle,· ed. ·

Jphn Barrow and Frank Tipler {Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 22.

4. See Paul Davies, Tiw Accidental Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge UniveJ;Sity Press, 1982), 9{}-.91. John Jefferson Davis, "The Design Argu- ment, Cosmic 'Fine-tuning,: and the Anthropic Principle," The International Journal ~fPh(losophy of Religion .22 (1987): 140 ..

5. John Leslie, Universes (New York: Routledge, 1989), 4, 35; Anthropic Cosmologica/Principle, 322.

6. Paul Davies,· Supeiforce: T1Je Seard1 for a Grand Unified Theory~{ Ndwre (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 242.

7. Leslie, Universes, 39-40:

8. John Leslie, "How to Draw Conclusion from a Fine-Tuned Cosmos,'' in. Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A Common Quest for Understattding, ed. Robert Russell et·aL (Vatican City State:·Vatican Observatory Press, 1988), 299.

9. Leslie, "How"toDraw Conelusions,"300.

10. 'For d10se fan:Uliar with the; p~obability calculus, a p~ecise staternent of the degre~. to w~ich ~vidence counts in favo~ ,of qp.e hypothesis over .another can be given in terms pfthe odds form of Bayes's Theorem: that is, P(H1/E)/P(H2/E) = [P(H1/P

(H2)] X [P(E/Ht)/(E/H2)]. The ge'!eral version of the principle stated h~r~, h~we~er,do~s not' require the applicability or truth 0 fBayes's Theorem.

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11. Thpse with sorne trainip.g in probapility theory will want t9 • note. that· the .kinde ofprobabi!ity;invoked

, here is what ph\losophers•call epistemi( probability, which is a measure .ofthe rational degree o(belief we should hav;e ina proposition(see app,endix, su'bsectioniii). Since ot1r rational degree ofb~lief in a)lecessary tr\Jth qa~ b~ less ·than l, we can sel')sibly speak ()f it b~ing impropable fora,.given law. of nature to exist necessarily. for example, we <;an

. speak 'of ,an l!npr9veri mathematical hyp,~thesis­ suchas Goldbach's conjecturF that every even number greater than 6 is the ~urd df twoodd prirlles_._.as, being pi:oba:bfy true. or probably talse given. our cu~rent eviden2e, even though' all niatherriat'ical hypothe;es are either necessarily true or necessanly false. .

12. Leslie; ''How to Draw Con~ll1siofi," 3o4. 13. George Smith, ''The Case.Against God,"reprl~tedin

An Anthology qf A 'theism and Ratidtialism, ed .. Gordon Stein (Buffalo: Ptometheus.Prek 1980), 56.

14. ]. J. C. ~n~art, ''Laws of t-J'i~:ture and Cosmic Coinciden~e," Tize Philwophical Quarterly 35 (JulyJ985): 275)-76,italics added. ·

15. I define a "universe'' as.ahy ·region pf spacbtime that is disconnected from other regions in such a way that the, parameters ofphysi9in thatregion could differ.;significantly ~rom th~ other r¢gions.

16. Quentin Smith, "World .Ensemble. Explanations," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 6 7 (1986): 82.

218 PART II• TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR TH;E EXISTENCE OF GOD

17. Moreover, the advocate. of the atheistic many- universes hypothesis could not avoid this problem by hypothesizing that: the many universes always existed as "brute fact" without being p'roduced by a universe gerl.erator. This would sitnply add to the problem: it would not orily leave'Unexplained 'the ·fine~tuning or.our.own univei:se;but would leave unexplained the existence of these other universes.

18. Leslie, Universes, 59:

19. Dyson, Disturbing the Universe, 251.

20. Chapter 6, "Beautiful Theories."

21. Paul Dirac, "The Evolution of the Physicist's Picture of Nature," Scientific Amen"can (May 1963): 47.

22. Davies, Supeiforce, 235-36.

23. This connection between order and probability, and the ·second law· of thermodynamics in general, is given a precise formulation in a branch of fundamental'physics called statistical fileclwnics, actording to which a state· of high order represents a very improbable state; and a: state of disorder represents a highly probable state.

24. See Lawrence Sklar, Physics and Chance: Philoso- .. pliical Issues in the Foundation of Statistical Mechanics

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 8, for a review cif the nontheistic

'explanations for' the ordered arrangement· tif the universe and the severe difficu!fies'they face.

25. A more thoro~gl{ disc,ussio~,of ~he atheist argu- ment fro~ evil is presented in Daniel Howard- Snyder's chapter (pp. 76:._ 115), and a discussion of 9ther atheistic arguments is give~ ir1]9hn' O'Leary-Hawthom's chapter (pp. 116-:-:34).

26. This work was made possible in part by a Discovery Institute grant for the fiscal year 1997-1998.

27. In the language of probability theory, rhis sort of probability is known as a conditional probability. In the case of G, calculations indicate th~t this conditional probabiliry of the fine.:. tuning would be less than 10~40 since the life-perml.tting range is less than 10-40 ohhe range 0 to 2G0, the latter range being:certainly smaller than the total "illuminated" range for G.

28. I say ''approximately right" because in this case the principle of indifferenc~ only applies to strips of

, land that are the same distance from the equator: The reason for this is 'that only strips of land

equidistant from the equator are truly symmetri<;al with regard to the motion oLthe earth. Sin<;e. the· northern, contiguous United .States ;1re all about

.. the sam~ distance. from. the equator, equal land . 11rea~ .should be assigned approximat~ly eq~~~ ··.

.. probabilities. ' ' . ·

29. Thls solution will not always ~ork sin~e, as the well-known Bertrap.d P~radoxes illustrate (e.g., see Roy W,e<1therford, ·Fo11ndations of Pro~ability :Theory [Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982], 56); sometimes there are tw'o eqtia:lly' g0od and 'con- flicting parameters that directly correspond to a physical quantity and to which the principle of indifference applies. In these cases, at best we can say that the probability is somewhere between that given by the two conflicting parameters. This problem; however, typicallydoes not seem to arise for most cases of fine-tuning. Also, it should be noted that the principle of indifference applies best to classical or epistemic probability, not other kinds of probability such as relative frequency: (See subsection iii below.)

30. Weatherford, Probability Theory, 35.

31. SHu, Physics and Chance, 191; Bas van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 345.

32. Of course, one could daim that•oi.u experience with items such as coins and dice teaches us that 'whenever two alternatives 'are macroscopically syintn-;:trical, we should assign them an eqtial probability, unless we hive. a: particular reason not to. All this claim implies, however, is that we have· experiential justification for the prin- ciple of indifference; and· thus it does, not take away from. our ,main point that in • certain practical situations we must rely on the principle of indifference to justify our assignment of probability. ·

33. See Weatherford,Pmbability Theory, <;h. 2.

34. For an il);-depth discussion of epistemic probability, see Richard Swinburne, An .Introduction to Con- firmation Theory (London: Methuen, 1973); Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philoso- phical Study of Ea~ly I1eas Abo11t Probability, Induction and Statistica( Inference (Cambridge:· Cambridge University Press, 1975); and Alvin 'Plantinga, Wa"ant and Proper FiJnction (Oxford: Oxford University Pr~ss; 1993), ch~pters 8 and 9. \

ROBIN COLLINS • A SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 219

35. It should be noted here that this rational degree of expectation should not be confused with the degree to which one should expect the parameters of physics to full within the life-permitting range if one believed the atheistic single-universe hypoth- esis. For even those who believe in this atheistic hypothesis should expect the parameters of physics to be life-permitting since this follows from the fact that we are alive. Rather, the conditional epistemic probability in this case is the degree to which the atheistic single-universe hypothesis of itself should lead us to expect parameters of physics to be life- permitting. This means that in assessing the conditional epistemic probability in this and other similar cases, one must exclude contributions to our expectations arising from other information we

have, such as that we are alive. In the case at hand, one way of doing this is by means of the following sort of thought experiment. Imagine a disembodied being with mental capacities and a knowledge of physics comparable to that of the most intelligent physicists alive today, except that the being does not know whether the parameters of physics are within the life-permitting range. Further, suppose that this disembodied being believed in the atheistic single-universe hypothesis. Then, the degree that being should rationally expect the parameters of physics to be life-permitting will be equal to our conditional epistemic probability, since its expectation is solely a result of its belief in the atheistic single-universe hypothesis, not other factors such as its awareness of its own existence.