Discussion

16

Chapter 6

Theories of Learning

Introduction

Traditionally, we have known more about how animals learn than about how children learn; and we know much more about how children learn than about how adults learn. Perhaps this is because the study of learning was taken over early by experimental psychologists whose standards require the control of variables. And it is obvious that the conditions under which animals learn are more controllable than those under which children learn; and the conditions under which children learn are much more controllable than those under which adults learn. As a result, many of the “scientific” theories of learning have been derived from the study of learning by animals and children.

Proposers and Interpreters

In general, there are two types of literature about learning theory: that produced by proposers of theories (who tend to be single-minded), and that produced by interpreters of theories (who tend to be reconciliatory). Admittedly, the distinction between proposers and interpreters is not absolute. For instance, some theorists, such as Pressey, Estes, Lorge, Gagné, Hilgard, and Huhlen, have made contributions of both sorts.

Table 6.1 presents a historic list of the major early proposers and interpreters in the literature of learning theory. To keep the list reasonably short, we have defined “major” as those who have made the greatest impact on the thinking of others. Those making contributions of both sorts have been placed in the column representing their major work. To provide a sense of historical development, the theorists are listed more or less in the order of appearance in the evolving body of literature.

Table 6.1  Propounders and interpreters of learning theory

The proliferation of proposers has presented a major challenge to the interpreters in their quest to bring some sort of order to learning theories. Researchers have exerted considerable effort in their attempts to structure the knowledge. However, no single, unified classification emerged from their early efforts. For instance, Hilgard and Bower identify 11 categories of theories, McDonald identifies 6, and Gage names 3. Hilgard and Bower’s (1966) 11 categories are:

· Connectionism (Thorndike)

· Classical conditioning (Pavlov)

· Contiguous conditioning (Guthrie)

· Operant conditioning (Skinner)

· Systematic behavior theory (Hull)

· Purposive behaviorism (Tolman)

· Gestalt theory (Koffka and Kahler)

· Psychodynamics (Freud)

· Functionalism

· Mathematical learning theory

· Information processing models.

McDonald (1964, pp. 1–26) breaks the theories down into six categories in his analysis:

· Recapitulation (Hull)

· Connectionism (Thorndike)

· Pragmatism (Dewey)

· Gestalt and field theory (Ogden, Hartman, Lewin)

· Dynamic psychology (Freud)

· Functionalism (Judd).

Gage (1972, p. 19) identifies three families of learning theories: (1) conditioning; (2) modeling; and (3) cognitive. Kingsley and Garry (1957, p. 83) provide two sets: (1) association or stimulus–response (Thorndike, Guthrie, and Hull) and (2) field theories (Lewin, Tolman, and the Gestalt psychologists). Taba (1962, p. 80) agrees with the two-family set, but uses different labels: (1) associationist or behaviorist theories; and (2) organismic, gestalt, and field theories.

These exhibits profile some of the debate in arranging the disparate categories of theories into a definitive pattern.

Learning theories primarily fall into two major families: behaviorist/ connectionist theories and cognitive/gestalt theories, but not all theories fit clearly into these two families. The behaviorist theories include such diverse theories as those of Thorndike, Pavlov, Guthrie, Skinner, and Hull. The cognitive theories include at least those of Tolman and the classical gestalt psychologists. The theories of functionalism, psychodynamics, and the probabilistic theories of the model builders do not completely and clearly fit. The distinctions between the two families of theories are not based only on differences within learning theories; there are other specific issues upon which theories within one family may differ (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 8).

Obviously, the interpreters continue to struggle in organizing the field of learning theories in a really fundamental way. In 1970, two developmental psychologists, Hayne W. Reese and Willis F. Overton, presented a way to conceptualize the theories in terms of broader models: the mechanistic or elemental model and the organismic or holistic model.

Concepts of Elements and Wholes

“Any theory presupposes a more general model according to which the theoretical concepts are formulated” (Reese and Overton, 1970, p. 117). The most general models are the world views that constitute basic models of the essential characteristics of humankind and ultimately the nature of learning.

Two systems that have been pervasive in both the physical and the social sciences are the elemental world view (the basic metaphor of which is the machine) and the holistic world view (the basic metaphor of which is the organism—the living, organized system presented to experience in multiple forms). Please refer to Table 6.2 for further clarification.

The elemental model represents the universe as a system composed of discrete pieces. These pieces—elementary particles in motion—and their relations form the basic reality to which all other more complex phenomena are ultimately reducible. When forces are applied in the operation of the system, a chain-like sequence of events results. Since these forces are the only efficient or immediate causes of the events in principle, complete prediction is possible, and susceptible to quantification (Reese and Overton, 1970, p. 131).

Table 6.2  World views or metaphysical systems

Elemental model	Holistic model
Represents the universe as a machine composed of discrete pieces operating in a spatio-temporal field: reactive and adaptive model of man.	Represents the world as a unitary, interactive, developing organism: active and adaptive model of man.

The holistic model represents the universe as a unitary, interactive, developing organism. It perceives the essence of substance to be activity, rather than the elementary particle. From such a point of view, one element can never be like another. As a consequence, it is the diversity that constitutes the unity (Reese and Overton, 1970, p. 133).

The whole is therefore organic rather than mechanical in nature. “The nature of the whole, rather than being the sum of its parts, is presupposed by the parts and the whole constitutes the condition of the meaning and existence of the parts” (Reese and Overton, 1970, p. 133). Thus, the possibility of a predictive and quantifiable universe is precluded. When applied to the sphere of epistemology and psychology, this world view results in an inherently and spontaneously active organism model of humans. It sees people as an active organism rather than a reactive organism, as a source of acts rather than as a collection of acts initiated by external forces. It also represents individuals as an organized entity, a configuration of parts which gain their meaning, their function, from the whole in which they are imbedded. From this point of view, the concepts of psychological structure and function, or means and ends, become central rather than derived. Inquiry is directed toward the discovery of principles of organization, toward the explanation of the nature and relation of parts and wholes, structures and functions, rather than toward the derivation of these from elementary processes.

The individual who accepts this model will tend to emphasize the significance of processes over products and qualitative change over quantitative change. In addition, he/she will tend to emphasize the significance of the role of experience in facilitating or inhibiting the course of development, rather than the effect of training as the source of development (Reese and Overton, 1970, pp. 133–134).

With this and the preceding set of concepts as a frame of reference, what follows is a brief examination of the theories about learning derived from the study of learning in animals and children.

Theories based on an elemental model

While John B. Watson (1878–1958) is considered the father of behaviorism, Edward L. Thorndike (1874–1949) conducted the first systematic investigation in the US of the phenomenon we call learning. It was a study of learning in animals, which was first reported in his Animal Intelligence in 1898.

Thorndike perceived inexperienced learners to be empty organisms who more or less responded to stimuli randomly and automatically. A specific response is connected to a specific stimulus when it is rewarded. In this situation, the stimulus, S, is entirely under the control of the experimenter (or teacher), and in large measure so is the response, R; for all the experimenter has to do to connect the particular R to a particular S is to reward the R when the organism happens to make it. This association between sense impressions and impulses to action came to be known as a bond or a connection. Thus, Thorndike’s learning theory has sometimes been called bond psychology or connectionism, and was the original stimulus–response (or S–R) psychology of learning.

Thorndike developed three laws that he believed governed the learning of animals and human beings:

1. The law of readiness (the circumstances under which a learner tends to be satisfied or annoyed, to welcome or to reject).

2. The law of exercise (the strengthening of connections with practice).

3. The law of effect (the strengthening or weakening of a connection as a result of its consequences).

In the course of his long and productive life, and with help from many collaborators, both friendly and critical, Thorndike’s learning theory became greatly refined and elaborated. It provided the foundation of the behaviorist theories of learning.

While Thorndike conducted his work on connections in the US, the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) conducted his experiments which resulted in the concept of conditioned reflexes. Hilgard and Bower (1966) describe his classical experiment:

When meat powder is placed in a dog’s mouth, salivation takes place; the food is the unconditioned stimulus, and salivation is the unconditioned reflex. Then some arbitrary stimulus, such as a light, is combined with the presentation of the food. Eventually, after repetition and if time relationships are right, the light will evoke salivation independent of the food; the light is the conditioned stimulus and the response to it is the conditioned reflex.

(p. 48)

Pavlov’s work resulted in a system that has been termed classical conditioning. This is to distinguish it from later developments in instrumental conditioning and operant conditioning. In his learning theory, he developed several concepts and accompanying techniques that have since been incorporated into the behaviorist thinking. These concepts are reinforcement, extinction, generalization, and differentiation. In reinforcement, a conditioned reflex becomes fixed by providing the conditioned stimulus and following it repeatedly with the unconditioned stimulus and response at appropriate time intervals. Extinction occurs when reinforcement is discontinued and the conditioned stimulus is presented alone, unaccompanied by the unconditioned stimulus. The conditioned response gradually diminishes and disappears. It becomes “extinct.” In generalization, a conditioned reflex evoked to one stimulus can also be elicited by other stimuli, not necessarily similar to the first. A fourth basic concept Pavlov developed was differentiation. In differentiation, the initial generalization is overcome by the method of contrasts in which one of a pair of stimuli is regularly reinforced and the other is not; in the end, the conditioned reflex occurs only to the positive (reinforced) stimulus and not to the negative (non-reinforced) stimulus.

The behaviorists have a common conviction that a science of psychology must be based on a study of that which is overtly observable: physical stimuli, the muscular movements and glandular secretions which they arouse, and the environmental products that ensue. The behaviorists have differed among themselves as to what may be inferred in addition to what is measured, but they all exclude self-observation (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 75).

Watson placed emphasis on kinesthetic stimuli as the integrators of animal learning; and, applying this concept to human beings, conjectured that thought was merely implicit speech—that sensitive-enough instruments would detect tongue movements or other movements accompanying thinking.

Edward R. Guthrie (1886–1959) built on the works of Thorndike, Pavlov, and Watson; and added the principle of contiguity of cue and response.

He stated his only law of learning, “from which all else about learning is made comprehensible,” as follows: “A combination of stimuli which has accompanied a movement will on its recurrence tend to be followed by that movement” (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 77). In his later work, Guthrie placed increasing emphasis on the part played by the learner in selecting the physical stimuli to which it would respond; hence, the attention or scanning behavior that goes on before association takes place became important.

Guthrie’s learning theory was further clarified and formalized by his students, Voeks and Sheffield; but the next major advance in behaviorist psychology was the result of the work of B. F. Skinner and his associates. It is from their work that the educational technology of programmed instruction and teaching machines so popular in the 1960s were derived. Skinner’s ideas are summarized in Chapter 3.

Another development in behaviorist psychology occurring during the middle decades of the twentieth century was the construction of Clark L. Hull’s systematic behavior theory, and its elaboration by Miller, Mowrer, Spence, and others. Hull’s contribution is a conceptual descendant of Thorndike’s theory. He adopted reinforcement as an essential characteristic of learning. Hull constructed an elaborate mathematico-deductive theory revolving around the central notion that there are intervening variables in the organism that influence what response will occur following the onset of a stimulus. He developed 16 postulates regarding the nature and operation of these variables, and stated them in such precise terms that they were readily subjected to quantitative testing. Hilgard and Bower’s (1966) assessment of the effect of Hull’s work follows:

It must be acknowledged that Hull’s system, for its time, was the best there was—not necessarily the one nearest to psychological reality, not necessarily the one whose generalizations were the most likely to endure—but the one worked out in the greatest detail, with the most conscientious effort to be quantitative throughout and at all points closely in touch with empirical tests. . . . Its primary contribution may turn out to lie not in its substance at all, but rather in the ideal it set for a genuinely systematic and quantitative psychological system far different from the schools which so long plagued psychology.

(p. 187)

Undoubtedly, Hull’s work also stimulated the rash of mathematical models of learning that were developed after 1950 by Estes, Burke, Bush, Mosteller, and others. It should be pointed out that these are not themselves learning theories, but mathematical representations of substantive theories.

Theories based on a holistic model

John Dewey, in 1896, launched the first direct protest against the elemental model of the associationists. Although his work falls into the category of educational philosophy rather than learning theory, his emphasis on the role of interest and effort and on the child’s motivation to solve his or her own problems became the starting point for a line of theorizing that has been given the label functionalism. Translated into schoolroom practices, functionalism provided the conceptual basis for progressive education, which as Hilgard and Bower (1966) state, “at its best was an embodiment of the ideal of growth toward independence and self-control through interaction with an environment suited to the child’s developmental level” (p. 299).

The spirit of experimentalism fostered by functionalism is reflected in the work of such learning theorists as Woodworth, Carr, McGeogh, Melton, Robinson, and Underwood. The essence of functionalism is summarized by Hilgard and Bower (1966, pp. 302–304):

1. The functionalist is tolerant but critical.

2. The functionalist prefers continuities over discontinuities or typologies.

3. The functionalist is an experimentalist.

4. The functionalist is biased toward associationism and environmentalism.

The most complete break with behaviorism occurred at the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century with the importation of the notion of insight learning in the gestalt theories of the Germans Wertheimer, Koffka, and Kohler. These theorists took issue with the proposition that all learning consisted of the simple connection of responses to stimuli; insisting that experience is always structured, that we react not just to a mass of separate details, but to a complex pattern of stimuli. We also need to perceive stimuli in organized wholes, not in disconnected parts. The learner tends to organize his or her perceptual field according to four laws:

1. The law of proximity. The parts of a stimulus pattern that are close together or near each other tend to be perceived in groups; therefore, the proximity of the parts in time and space affects the learner’s organization of the field.

2. The law of similarity and familiarity. Objects similar in form, shape, color, or size tend to be grouped in perception; familiarity with an object facilitates the establishment of a figure–ground pattern. (Related to this law is the gestaltists’ view of memory as the persistence of traces in the brain that allows a carryover from previous to present experiences. They view these traces not as static, but as modified by a continual process of integration and organization.)

3. The law of closure. Learners try to achieve a satisfying endstate of equilibrium; incomplete shapes, missing parts, and gaps in information are filled in by the perceiver. [Kingsley and Garry (1957) observe that “closure is to Gestalt psychology what reward is to association theory” (p. 109).]

4. The law of continuation. Organization in perception tends to occur in such a manner that a straight line appears to continue as a straight line, a part circle as a circle, and a three-sided square as a complete square.

Gestalt psychology is classified by most interpreters as within the family of field theories, which are theories that propose that the total pattern or field of forces, stimuli, or events determine learning.

Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) developed what he referred to specifically as a field theory. Using the topological concepts of geometry, Lewin conceptualized each individual as existing in a life-space in which many forces are operating. The life-space includes features of the environment to which the individual reacts: such as material objects encountered and manipulated; people met; and private thoughts, tensions, goals, and fantasies. Behavior is the product of the interplay of these forces, the direction, and relative strength of which can be portrayed by the geometry of vectors. Learning occurs as a result of a change in cognitive structures produced by changes in two types of forces: (1) change in the structure of the cognitive field itself; or (2) change in the internal needs or motivation of the individual. Because of its emphasis on the immediate field of forces, field theory places more emphasis on motivation than on any of the preceding theories. Lewin felt that success was a more potent motivating force than reward, and gave attention to the concepts of ego involvement and level of aspiration as forces affecting success. He saw change in the relative attractiveness of one goal over another, which he called valence, as another variable affecting motivation. Since some of the strongest forces affecting an individual’s psychological field are other people, Lewin became greatly interested in group and institutional dynamics; and as you will see later, it is in this dimension of education that his strongest influence has been felt.

Developments in the field-theory approach have appeared under several labels: phenomenological psychology, perceptual psychology, humanistic psychology, and third-force psychology. Since the bulk of the work with this approach has been with adults, major attention to it will be reserved for a later section. Since phenomenologists are concerned with the study of the progressive development of the mind, or as our contemporaries would insist, the person, they see humans as organisms forever seeking greater personal adequacy. The urge for self-actualization is the driving force motivating all human behavior.

Two phenomenologists, Arthur Combs and Donald Snygg, have focused on the learning of children and the role of their educators, and their findings have important implications for learning theories. The flavor of Combs and Snygg’s learning theory can be caught from statements from Pittenger and Gooding (1971):

A person behaves in terms of what is real to him or her and what is related to his or her self at the moment of action. (p. 130)

Learning is a process of discovering one’s personal relationship to and with people, things, and ideas. This process results in and from a differentiation of the phenomenal field of the individual. (p. 136)

Further differentiation of the phenomenological field occurs as an individual recognizes some inadequacy of a present organization. When a change is needed to maintain or enhance the phenomenal self, it is made by the individual as the right and proper thing to do. The role of the teacher is to facilitate the process. (p. 144)

Given a healthy organism, positive environmental influences, and a nonrestrictive set of percepts of self, there appears to be no foreseeable end to the perceptions possible for the individual. (pp. 150–151)

Transfer is a matter of taking current differentiations and using them as first approximations in the relationship of self to new situations. (p. 157)

Learning is permanent to the extent that it generates problems that may be shared by others and to the degree that continued sharing itself is enhancing. (p. 165)

In a sense, Edward C. Tolman (1886–1959) represents a bridge between the elemental and the holistic models. His system was behavioristic in that he rejected introspection as a method for psychological science; but it was molar rather than molecular behaviorism—an act of behavior has distinctive properties all of its own, to be identified and described irrespective of the muscular, glandular, or neural processes that underlie it. But, most importantly, he saw behavior as purposive, being regulated in accordance with objectively determined ends. Purpose is, of course, an organismic concept. Tolman rejected the idea that learning is the association of particular responses to particular stimuli. In contrast to the associationists, who believed that it is the response or sequence of responses resulting in reward that is learned, Tolman believed it is the route to the goal that is learned.

He believed that organisms, at their respective levels of ability, are capable of recognizing and learning the relationships between signs and desired goals; in short, they perceive the significance of the signs (Kingsley and Garry, 1957, p. 115). Tolman called his theory purposive behaviorism.

Child Learning

Two other later psychologists, Jean Piaget and Jerome Bruner, have had great impact on thinking about learning, although they are not literally learning theorists. Their focus is on cognition and the theory of instruction. Piaget has conceptualized the process of the development of cognition and thought in evolutionary stages. According to Piaget, the behavior of the human organism starts with the organization of sensory-motor reactions, and becomes more intelligent as coordination between the reactions to objects becomes progressively more interrelated and complex. Thinking becomes possible after language develops, and with it a new mental organization. This development involves the following evolutionary periods (Piaget, 1970, pp. 30–33):

1. The formation of the symbolic or semiotic function (ages 2 to 7 or 8). The individual is able to represent objects or events that are not at the moment perceptible by evoking them through the agency of symbols or differentiated signs.

2. The formation of concrete mental operations (ages 7 or 8 to 11 or 12). Characteristic of this stage are the linking and dissociation of classes; the sources of classification; the linking of relations; correspondences, and so on.

3. The formation of conceptual thought or formal operations (ages 11 or 12 through adolescence). “This period is characterized by the conquest of a new mode of reasoning, one that is no longer limited exclusively to dealing with objects or directly representable realities, but also employs ‘hypotheses.’”

Some reservations have been expressed about the rigid age scale and minimization of individual differences in Piaget’s schema; but his conception of evolutionary stages adds a dimension that is not generally given much attention in the established learning theories.

Jerome Bruner has also been interested in the process of intellectual growth, and his benchmarks were described in Chapter 2. His main interest, however, has been in the structuring and sequencing of knowledge and translating this into a theory of instruction. However, Bruner does have a basic theory about the act of learning, which he views as involving three almost simultaneous processes: (1) acquisition of new information, which is often information that runs counter to or is a replacement of what the person has previously known but which, at the very least, is a refinement of previous knowledge; (2) transformation, or the process of manipulating knowledge to make it fit new tasks; and (3) evaluation, or checking whether the way the person manipulated information is adequate to the task (Bruner, 1960, pp. 48–49). We shall return to this theory of instruction in a later chapter.

The main criticism of Piaget, Bruner, and other cognitive theorists by other adherents to the holistic model is that they are unbalanced in their overemphasis on cognitive skills at the expense of emotional development; that they are preoccupied with the aggressive, agentic, and autonomous motives to the exclusion of the homonymous, libidinal, and communal motives; and that they concern themselves with concept attainment to the exclusion of concept formation or invention (Jones, 1968, p. 97).

In the years following Piaget’s pronouncements, new avenues opened in such learning-related fields of inquiry as:

· neurophysiology (M. Boucouvalas, K. H. Pribrain, G. A. Miller, J. E. Delefresnaye, H. E. Harlow, D. P. Kimble, W. G. Walter, D. E. Wooldridge, J. Z. Young);

· mathematical modeling (R. C. Atkinson, R. R. Bush, W. K. Estes, R. D. Luce, E. Restle);

· information processing and cybernetics (H. Borko, E. A. Feigenbaum, B. E. Green, W. R. Reitman, K. M. Sayre, M. Yovitts, J. Singh, K. O. Smith);

· creativity (J. P. Guilford, R. P. Crawford, J. E. Drevdahl, A. Meadow, S. J. Parnes, J. W. Getzels, P. W. Jackson); and

· ecological psychology (R. G. Barker, P. V. Gump, H. E. Wright, E. P. Willems, H. L. Raush).

Summary

Learning theory literature falls into two general types: that produced by proposers and that produced by interpreters. Many proposers of theories have made a concerted effort to impose order on the system of learning theory. Among these are Hilgard and Bower, McDonald, and Gage. It was Reese and Overton, however, who successfully conceptualized the theories within a larger construct—the concept of models of development. Reese and Overton postulated that “any theory presupposes a more general model according to which the theoretical concepts are formulated.” Building on this premise, they developed the elemental model and the holistic models of individuals.

Among the theories based on the elemental model are Thorndike’s connectionism, Pavlov’s classical conditioning, and Watson’s behaviorism. Other theories within this category were those developed by Guthrie, which resulted both in the principle of contiguity of cue and response and an emphasis on the importance of attention behavior. It was Guthrie’s work that spawned additional research by Voeks, Sheffield, Skinner, and Hull’s systematic behavior theory. Behaviorism was uniquely American, and mirrored the philosophy of the turn-of-the century notion that all people could achieve great accomplishments given the opportunity (stimulus), individual initiative (response), and fair treatment (rewards).

Paralleling this effort were the holistic models. It was Dewey’s work that initiated a line of theorizing called functionalism. Tolman, however, bridged the gap between cognitive and behavioral psychologies with a theory that he called purposive behaviorism. Gestalt theories, classified by most interpreters as within the family of field theories, paralleled behaviorism. The notable field theories in which Lewin was intensely interested—group and institutional dynamics—greatly influenced this educational dimension. Recent developments in the field-theoretical approach have appeared under the labels of phenomenological psychology, perceptual psychology, humanistic psychology, and cognitive psychology.

Reflection Questions

· 6.1 Speculate as to why so many learning theories have been created.

· 6.2 What is the value of thinking of wholes and parts as they relate to learning?

· 6.3 What are some of the important points derived from elemental model learning theories?

· 6.4 What are some of the important points derived from holistic model learning theories?