case Study

4 Being Governor

Thad L. Beyle

Since the 1960s, state government and politics have been in a state of change. Reform has been most apparent in the governorships of the fifty states. Individually, governors have been strengthened and have become the key political and governmental leaders in their states. As a group, they have worked to solidify their position within the federal system but now find their roles within their states so compelling and difficult, especially with a federal government on retreat from domestic matters and an economy in trouble, that they have little time to spend on national concerns.

This change in the governorships has had ramifications in other areas of states’ political and governmental policy systems. Conflicts have grown between the governors and certain other actors in the executive branches, as well as between governors and stronger state legislatures. The state supreme courts have become players in the political process, serving as umpire in some situations and as part of the conflict in others.

A strengthened governorship facing greater challenges has made the position more attractive. The type of politician that used to seek the office and the kind of person interested in running for it have changed. Dollar and consultant politics have replaced party leader and factional politics in many states.

With the political changes in the governorship came a change in the presidential recruitment process. In each of the eight presidential elections from 1976 to 2004, at least one of the major party candidates had served as a governor and four of them were elected president.

Two basic cycles have had a considerable effect on the states in the federal system and on the governors within the states and in the federal system. The first is the cycle of values undergirding the development of American government—representation, neutral competence, and executive leadership. The second is the cycle of leadership, which oscillates between the state and national levels—the shifting locus of activism within the federal system to provide government services.

Tensions between the values of representation, neutral competence, and executive leadership affect governors within their own state governmental systems. Shifting policy activism affects the governors within the federal system as responsibilities for various government services are transferred, in subtle and not so subtle ways, from states to the national government and, more recently, back to the states. These two cycles provide the setting in which states and governors function.

Governors as Chief Executive Officers

The office of governor has developed significantly since the establishment of colonial governments in America. After an initial period of imposed colonial executive dominance, the new state constitutions promoted the value of representation. Legislatures reigned supreme, with governors often serving as mere figureheads. By 1800 the situation began to change as the power and prestige of governors gradually increased. However, the direct election of some of the other state administrative officers was an important legacy of the pursuit of representation.

Following the Civil War, and in reaction to the excesses of achieving representation, the value of neutral competence gained in stature. The goal was to remove favoritism and patronage from government, substituting neutrality, or the concept of “not who you know, but what you know.” This movement fostered the establishment of independent boards and commissions that diluted gubernatorial power. During this period, the drive for a civil service or merit system was launched. Thus, the goal of attaining neutral competence in government was added to the goal of representation. Thousands of state merit service employees were not only insulated from the winds of politics but also from management by the governor.

In the twentieth century, the need for strong executive leadership emerged. Woodrow Wilson, Democratic governor of New Jersey from 1911 to 1913, championed the cause, along with several other strong governors— Republican Charles Evans Hughes in New York (1907–1910), Republican Robert La Follette in Wisconsin (1901–1906), Republican and Progressive Hiram Johnson in California (1911–1917), and Republican Frank Lowden in Illinois (1917–1921).

The stature of governors has increased greatly across the states and in the federal system over the past few decades because of historic reforms, the type of individuals holding office, the actions taken under their direction, and an increased capacity in the office. Governors are now compared with private sec- tor corporate leaders; they are public sector, state-level chief executive officers (CEOs). Expectations for gubernatorial performance have increased, perhaps beyond realistic levels.

Enhanced Capacity

Governors are responsible for running large enterprises that are similar in scope to Fortune 500 companies. For example, in 2003 the total expenditures of two states ranked with the sales in the top 50 corporations, and nine states had expenditures equal to or greater than the top 100 companies.1

The magnitude of the dollar decisions made by California administrators and legislators is comparable to those made by executives at American Inter- national Group and Hewlett-Packard, the tenth and eleventh largest compa- nies; and those by New York State leaders to those by executives of Valero.

Energy Co. and Marathon Oil Co., the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth largest companies. Other states in range of the top 100 corporations are Texas, between fifty-second and fifty-third; New Jersey, between seventy-four and seventy-five; Ohio, between seventy-nine and eighty; Massachusetts, between eighty-three and eighty-four; Illinois, between eighty-four and eighty-five; and Florida and Pennsylvania, both between ninety-two and ninety-three.

Do the governors have adequate executive tools to manage such large enterprises? Are they as prepared to be the CEOs of their states as their private sector counterparts are to run businesses? Do the offices of the governors have the necessary capacity to assist the governors in managing their enterprises in state government?2 Certainly, progress has been made. Since the early 1960s, no shortage of reforms has taken place throughout the states. The agenda for these reforms was drawn from changes at the national level initiated by the president and from a series of reports calling for reform in state governments.

The general goals of government reforms have been to enhance gubernatorial and legislative abilities to lead the states in more progressive directions. In 1967 former North Carolina Democratic governor Terry Sanford called upon the states “to make the chief executive of the state the chief executive in fact”; a decade later political scientist Larry Sabato declared that executive branch reforms had made the governors “truly the masters” of state govern- ment.4

One common reform has been to lengthen the term of office. Since 1955, the number of governors eligible for four-year terms instead of two-year terms has increased from twenty-nine to forty-eight. This change allows governors to spend more time on policy and administrative concerns and less on reelection campaigns.5 By 2005 only New Hampshire and Vermont still restricted their governors to a two-year term.

Another reform has increased opportunities for succession. Since 1955, the number of states precluding their governors from serving successive terms has declined from seventeen to just one—Virginia. The number of states allowing a governor to serve two consecutive terms has increased from six to thirty-five in 2005. Fourteen states in 2005 had no restrictions on the number of terms a governor could serve, despite a movement to impose term limits on many state-level officials in the last decade and a half. Changes in succession ability allow a governor to spend more time on policy and administrative concerns, that is, if the voters return the governor to office. Lifting term limitations also allows voters to retain a governor who is doing a good job.6

Yet another reform shortens the ballot, but the numbers indicate that more modifications are needed to reduce the still large number of separately elected executive branch officials. In 1955, 514 separately elected state-level officials, besides the governor, headed state agencies. In 1994, 511 separately elected officials, other than the governor, headed 260 state agencies in the fifty states.7 In 12 major state offices, not too much change occurred: 308 officials, other than the governor, were separately elected in 2004 compared with 306 in 1972.8 Fewer elective offices, and thus more appointed offices, would give the governor a broader policy and administrative reach and the citizens a governor with greater control of the executive branch of state government..

The final reform is the veto. Between 1955 and 1995 the number of governors who could veto all legislation rose only from forty-seven to forty-nine. The governor of North Carolina was the only one who lacked veto power. Finally, in 1995, toward the end of the third term of Gov. James B. Hunt Jr., the North Carolina legislature gave the voters the opportunity to amend the state constitution, which they did by a 3-to-1 ratio. As of 1995 the number of governors with an item veto had risen to forty-four. And ten governors had the power to cut specific spending items; twenty-six others had the power to veto substantive language in appropriations bills.9

Governors’ offices have expanded rapidly over the past decades. In 1956 political scientist Coleman B. Ransone Jr. reported that governors’ offices av- eraged 11 staff members, with a range from 3 to 43 among the states.10 In 1976 the National Governors Association (NGA) found an average of 29 staff members, with a much broader range of 7 to 245.11 In 2004 there were nearly 59 staff members per governor’s office, with a range of 8 in Wyoming to 310 in Florida.12 Thus, in nearly five decades, the average number of gu- bernatorial staff members grew slightly over fivefold. Increased staff means more flexibility and greater support for the governor in his or her many roles. Growth also creates more patronage positions—and more opportunity for confusion.

The configurations of gubernatorial staffs can be classified from the very personal to the very institutional. Their makeup correlates closely with the size of the state. Larger states have larger and more institutionalized offices and processes, with adequate and specialized staff resources to assist the governor. Smaller states have smaller and more personalized offices that often lack the breadth and depth possessed by those in larger states. In these offices, the governor must rely on a small pool of individuals to cover all the various responsibilities. In between are the growing mid-sized states. Here, a governor may feel the need for an institutionalized office but actually have only a small, personalized staffing structure and process at his or her disposal.

A critical expression of gubernatorial authority is the budget process. A chief executive must be able to control the development and execution of the state’s budget. Governors have consolidated their power over the budget process by placing state budget offices under their direct control. As of 2004, thirty-six governors had full responsibility for the budget, whereas fourteen others shared that responsibility with someone.14 In so doing, they have refocused the budgetary process from an earlier preoccupation “with the custodial functions of auditing and accounting” to emphasizing “new and conceptually rich systems of management decision making.”15 The budget and the budgetary process remain mechanisms by which a governor controls a state’s finances, but as the budget process has been opened to include planning and policy analysis approaches, the management capability of governors has been greatly enhanced. The budget can now more nearly be “the ultimate statement of any governments (and governor’s) policy choices.”

The policy planning process is also critical. Initially seen as part of the economic development function of state government, and thus located in those departments, state planning agencies have been migrating closer to the governor. In 1960 only three of the thirty-seven state planning agencies were located in the governor’s office; two others were housed in departments of ad- ministration and finance. A decade later all fifty states had state planning agencies. Twenty-nine were in the governor’s office, and seven were in the departments of administration or finance.17

Many of these agencies became policy planning offices, taking on a broad set of activities and responsibilities. By 1988 all but five states had policy planning offices to assist the governor. These offices are usually located in the governor’s office, within the budget office, or in the department of administration or finance. Policy planning agencies that stand free of the budget agency and process generally reflect strong governorships. Their close ties to the state’s chief executive are indicative of their importance within the state’s govern- mental system.1

What do these offices accomplish? A 1985 survey by the Council of State Planning Agencies indicated that they have two major responsibilities, varying in emphasis from state to state: policy development and administration.19 The goal of policy planning offices is to see to it that factors other than narrow agency perspectives and purely budgetary or political concerns be brought to bear in the policy process.

The ability to reorganize government is a powerful tool. In 1956 only two governors had the power to initiate state government reorganization by executive order, subject to legislative confirmation; by 2004 twenty-three governors had this power.20 During the 1960s many reformers argued that the residue of past trends and decisions had left state governments unmanageable and unresponsive to gubernatorial direction. Such criticism spurred the executive branches of nearly two dozen state governments to undertake comprehensive reorganization, and nearly all states engaged in partial re- organizations. In comprehensive reorganizations the executive branch is consolidated to various degrees under the control of the governor. Most partial reorganizations bring many programs and agencies working in the same functional area under one departmental roof. These reforms have been most prevalent in economic development, environmental protection, transportation, and human services.2

Reorganization enables a governor to reshape the executive branch for a variety of reasons. These include providing a clearer focus on particular problems and delivering government services efficiently. Additional steps that can be taken to allow governors to make state governments more focused and responsive include, for example, a decrease in the numbers of separately elected officials. Several states today would benefit from giving their governors the ability to initiate reorganization, subject to confirmation by the legislature.

Appointing and Removing Personnel

Chief executive officers, whether in the private or public sector, must be free to choose those who will serve in their administration. The power of appointment is a dual power, for it also includes the power to remove.

Many governors are constrained by the number and types of positions to which they can make appointments. First, governors cannot appoint any of the separately elected boards and commissions in a state. These boards are charged with responsibilities in public education, public utilities, higher education, and various regulatory activities, and in 1994 there were thirty-three separately elected boards and commissions in twenty-three state.

Second, governors cannot appoint separately elected officials to office, except to fill a vacancy created by death or resignation. These officials have their own constitutional base of authority and their own constituency of sup- porters. In effect, most states operate under a plural executive model rather than the presidential model we see at the national level, in which the president and vice president are the only elected executive branch officials, and they are elected as a team. The number of statewide elected officials ranges from only the governor in Maine and New Jersey to twelve in North Dakota.23

Third, governors cannot appoint officials who by constitutional authority are to be appointed by some other officer or by the legislature. Some argue that this constraint is less than it seems, as those making some of these appointments are the governor’s own appointees. Although this may be true in some states, in Texas, for example, boards and commissions in effect run much of state government. Because of the staggered terms of the officials appointed to these boards and commissions, a Texas governor may be well into a second term before gaining some control, and then only indirectly through the newly appointed members.24 However, in her first year in office former governor Ann Richards (1991–1995) was able to get the legislature to provide her with more executive power by adding some important appointments to the governorship and giving it effective control over several others.25

Practical political concerns affect a governor’s appointment choices.26

• The sheer number of appointments to be made can so overwhelm a governor that he or she may fail to focus sufficiently on key appointments. Replacing too many people can draw a governor too deeply into the bureaucracy, obviating any policy or administrative benefits.

• Patronage appointments serve as rewards, but many individuals and groups feel they should be rewarded. Appointments are evaluated with a jealous eye, and jealousy is not a positive basis on which to build a working relationship.

• Conflicting expectations over how an appointive office should be con- ducted can lead to struggles within the governor’s coalition. Coupled with the power of appointment is the power of removal. If changes in policy are needed, incumbent officeholders often must be replaced with those who will carry out the proposed reforms. In most situations key officeholders resign as a new administration comes in. But conflicts arise when resignations are not forthcoming or when a change in priorities elevates previously minor positions to importance, creating the need to appoint new officials to them.

Only twenty-three state constitutions provide governors with the power to remove individuals from positions in the state executive branch, and all but six put varying degrees of restrictions on this power. The power of removal is constrained in the original constitutions of just five states. However, as more constitutions are being revised, the power of removal is being built in. Eleven of the states that revised their constitutions after 1945 included this power for the governor. Other states provide statutory removal powers for their governors.

Governors can still experience problems exercising their right to remove personnel. Joseph Schlesinger noted that “even when a governor can remove an official, he is constrained by the wrangle which would result.”27 It is a power, therefore, that tends to be used only as a last resort. Moreover, a series of federal court decisions placed potentially severe restrictions on the removal power. In a 1976 case, Elrod v. Burns, the U.S. Supreme Court decided (5–4) that a patronage firing violates an individual’s political liberties under the First Amendment. The ruling said that “political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

This strict standard was relaxed in two subsequent decisions. In a 1980 case, Branti v. Finkel, the Court reaffirmed (6–3) its 1976 decision but also ruled that “if the employee’s private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his public duties, the First Amendment rights may be required to yield to the state’s vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency.” The burden of proof would be on the employer.29 In a 1983 case, Connick v. Myers, the Court decided (5–4) to add another restriction on the employee’s right by holding “that the First Amendment does not protect from dismissal public employees who complain about their working conditions or their supervisor.”30 In these cases, the Court indicated that a balance was needed between an individual’s rights and the administration’s needs, and it was the Court’s role to weigh those conflicts.

Although none of these cases involved them, governors were aware of the problems the decisions could cause. At the 1982 “New Governors’ Seminar,” sponsored by the National Governors Association, the newly elected governors were cautioned:

Know the Elrod v. Burns case, the 1976 five-to-four Supreme Court decision regarding the firing of personnel. You cannot fire for political reason, and you are personally liable. It even destroys the privacy privilege of counsel. The Elrod v. Burns decision requires an indemnification statute, and be sure that it covers the unpaid boards and commissions as well as full-time state officials

In 1990 the Court handed down a 5 to 4 ruling in Rutan et al. v. Repub- lican Party of Illinois that directly affected the removal powers of governors. The decision, which focused on the patronage process of the Illinois governor’s office in the administration of James R. Thompson (R, 1977–1991), said that state and local governments violate an individual’s “First Amendment rights when they refuse to hire, promote or transfer . . . [an employee] on the basis of their political affiliation or party activity.

The decision on how Thompson handled so-called blue-collar patron- age—“the conventional doling out of state jobs to the party faithful”—struck down “the hiring freezes Thompson imposed, more or less continuously throughout his tenure . . . [as] merely patronage tools used to ensure that worthy Republicans got available state jobs.” Thompson found the decision ironic as he had been chided by Republican Party leaders in the state for not being “grateful enough to those who labored in the GOP vineyards.” Thompson, at the end of his tenure in office, said, “the Supreme Court of the United States certifies what these Republican chairmen refused to believe all along—that I had the best patronage machine in the nation, that it was a Republican ma- chine

Gubernatorial Powers

Political scientists and other researchers have often attempted to compare the powers of the fifty state governors—both qualitatively and more recently quantitatively. In 1965 political scientist Joseph Schlesinger published the first comparative quantitative gubernatorial power index, and it has served as the foundation of subsequent indexes and updates. At its base are the governor’s appointment power, budget-making power, tenure potential, and veto power. It has been updated and expanded over the decades, including in this author’s five chapters on governors in later editions of the book in which Schlesinger’s original analysis appeared.

In 1987 the NGA Office of State Services issued a State Management Note in which the same questions pertaining to the comparative institutional powers of the governors were addressed. The NGA concluded that “the framework in which a governor performs his or her job can be an important factor in a successful governorship.” It noted that the indexes were used only as a suggestion of the framework and that some “governors have proven to be vital and strong leaders in many areas despite institutional shortcomings that may hamper their success,” whereas others “have failed to provide strong leadership to their states even where formal provisions indicate an authoritative office.

The NGA analysis included the four main items in the Schlesinger index—appointment powers, budget-making power, tenure potential, veto power—and two additional measures: the governor’s political strength in the legislature and the legislature’s ability to change gubernatorial budgets. The first three indices primarily concern the governor’s power within the executive

Table 4–1 Governors’ Institutional Power

	Institutional Power (range)	National Governors Association
		1965	1985	Change (%)
1.	Appointments (0–7	3.8	4.0	+ 5.3
2.	Budget making (1–5)	4.5	4.8	+ 6.7
3.	Tenure potential (1–5)	3.3	4.1	+24.4
4.	Veto power (1–5)	4.2	3.6	–14.3
5.	Party control (1–5) Legislative budget	3.8	3.4	–10.5
6.	changing power (1–5)	1.3	1.2	–7.7
7.	Average score	20.9	21.1	+ 1.0
8.	Possible range	5–32	5–32	-
9.	Actual range	14–29	16–27	-

Sources: NGA index: Office of State Services, “The Institutionalized Powers of the Governorship, 1965–1985,” in Management Note (Washington, D.C.: National Governors Association, June 1987), 12–13; Schlesinger/Beyle index: www.unc.edu/~beyle. Note: Scores = total divided by six to keep 5-point scale; dashes = not applicable; total = sum of the scores on the six individual indexes

According to the NGA indexes, governorships experienced minimal growth in strength. Between 1965 and 1985, out of a total of 32 possible points, the average score rose from 20.9 to just 21.1—slightly less than a 1 percent increase overall. Appointment and budget-making power indicators held at about the same level, whereas tenure potential increased, and the control of the legislature by the governor’s party and veto power decreased. This latter decline was due primarily to the effects of an increasing number of states with a “power split”—a situation in which the governor faces a legislature con- trolled either totally or in part by the opposition party.37

Since World War II, the power of the political parties in the states has declined.38 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the increasing number of states faced with a power split. In 1954 nine of the then forty-eight states (19 percent) had a politically divided state government, mainly in states outside the South. By the mid-1960s only thirteen of the fifty states (26 percent) were divided politically, again mainly outside the South.

Now, in 2005, twenty-nine of the fifty state governors (58 percent) face a legislature controlled by the opposition either totally or partially. Montana’s situation is unique in that one member of the state house lost his position in a December 2004 state supreme court case, leaving the parties with fifty members each. But because the newly elected governor of 2004 was a Democrat, the Democrats received the ability to organize the state house and were placed in the leadership position—and the Democrats hold a four-seat margin in the state senate.

In Table 4-1 we can see greater change in the governors’ formal powers between 1960 and 2005 than between 1965 and 1985. Governors gained the most power in their veto power ability, especially when the North Carolina governor was granted this power in the mid-1990s, as noted earlier. Also as noted earlier, governors gained some powers in regard to other statewide elected executive officials and in their tenure potential. They did not gain much in their appointment power and actually lost some power in the bud- getary area owing to reforms to the legislative budgetary power.

The governorships with the most formal power in 2005 on the five- point scale were Alaska, New Jersey, and West Virginia at 4.1 and Utah at 4.0. One quick observation on these states with the most powerful offices: in 2004 the Democratic governor of New Jersey, James McGreevey, resigned because of a developing sex scandal; the governor of West Virginia, Demo- crat Bob Wise, decided not to seek reelection owing to his low job approval ratings in state polls and some bad publicity; and the governor of Utah, Re- publican Olene Walker, was denied a spot on her own party’s primary ballot to seek another term. So, being in a powerful office does not guarantee a suc- cessful reign or a second term. The states with the weakest ranking were Rhode Island at 2.6; Alabama, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma at 2.8; and Mississippi at 2.9.

These findings demonstrate what many have suggested: reforms have been made on both sides of the separation-of-powers relationship, and al- though governors may now have more formal, institutionalized powers at their disposal (budget-making, tenure potential, veto), state legislatures possess powers that are often used at the expense of the executive (budget-changing authority, party control).

The irony of a power split is that as reformers successfully change or en- hance institutions at the state level, a growing malaise in the political world undermines the abilities of certain key, state-level actors to follow through on those reforms. Some decry this situation as detrimental to effective govern- ment, but at least one observer suggests that it may actually lead to better policy through forcing necessary compromises that take in many points of view.

Gubernatorial Conflict with Other State Government Actors

Political reforms do not always achieve their intended purposes. Some create unanticipated consequences that then generate additional reforms; others create conflict with previous reforms. And politics may render some re- forms unworkable.

Conflicts within the Executive Branch

Governors often face their greatest conflicts within the executive branch itself. Several governors have had serious problems with the lieutenant governor’s power while the governor was out of state. For example, conflict has arisen over calling special legislative sessions, appointments to administrative and judicial positions, pardons, the governor’s salary, and control of the state’s National Guard. Other problems have come about when the governor and the lieutenant governor were of different parties or different factions within the same party. Also, difficulties have emerged when the lieutenant governor had constitutional leadership responsibilities in the legislature that provided a separate power base.

With the concept of separation of powers built into state constitutions and the American constitutional system, conflict between the executive and the legislative branches is inevitable. Conflicts may occur over setting state government policy, raising and spending money, administering policy, appointing officials to executive and judicial positions, controlling the legislative process, and calling special sessions.

When the governor and the legislature are of opposite parties, conflict can take on a divisive partisan tone. If gubernatorial and legislative leaders have conflicting ambitions, strife may result between the branches. In the 371 gubernatorial races between 1977 and 2004, state house Speakers were candidates in 27 of the races (7 percent) and won 9 of them (33 percent).41

Gubernatorial-legislative tensions are greatest in most states at budget time, when the money and policy decisions must be made. It is the “governor’s budget,” but it must be passed by the legislature—and it also must be balanced. Dollar decisions become particularly difficult to make in the harsh economic times we have experienced in the early 1990s and early 2000s. Budget makers face declining resources coupled with increasing demands for services and assistance. Skeptics aside, however, some states are able to rise to the challenge of getting a workable budget passed and signed into law by elevating the level of cooperation between the two branches.

The execution of the budget by the governor leads to a second area of potential conflict—the legislature’s interest in how the budget items are administered. Legislatures have tried several ways to make sure legislative intent is followed. Governors often read these efforts as legislative intrusion into executive branch responsibilities. For example, some executive branch positions are appointments that must be confirmed by the legislature. However, some state legislatures have either constitutional or statutory authority to make appointments. In certain cases, they can appoint legislators to boards, commissions, or councils in the executive branch. If these bodies maintain an advisory role, problems may not arise. However, if they exercise management responsibilities, as twenty states allowed in the mid-1980s, charges of legislative intrusion may be lodged and challenged in state courts as a violation of separation of powers.42

Another area of conflict concerns vetoes, both gubernatorial and legislative. In 1947 governors vetoed about 5 percent of the bills presented to them. These vetoes were overridden by a legislative vote in only 1.8 percent of the cases.43 In the 1992–1993 legislative years, 5.6 percent of the bills presented to the governor were vetoed; 3.2 percent of these vetoes were overridden. However, in these averages there were some interesting extremes: Gov. Ned McWherter, D-Tenn., did not veto a single bill presented to him, whereas Gov. Pete Wilson, R-Calif., vetoed 21 percent of the bills presented to him, none of which was overridden.44 In the four years of his fourth and last term in office, Gov. Jim Hunt, D-N.C., did not veto a single bill presented to him even though he was the first governor in North Carolina to have the veto power—clearly, he knew how to get what he wanted from the state legislature.

As the ability of governors to use the item and amendatory vetoes grows, conflicts with the legislative branch escalate. A governor can veto special policy provisions in budget bills that have not run the full course of legislative re- view, thereby forcing the legislature to consider the issues in open debate.45

Conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of state government have increasingly gone before state courts for resolution. These courts usually decide in favor of the governor and the executive branch, citing the separation-of-powers clause in the state’s constitution.46 However, they some- times rule against the executive when separation of powers is not in question, as in policy and civil rights issues.

Governors and judges are often at odds over specific decisions, such as the death penalty or the selection of judges. In 1986 three states—California, North Carolina, and Ohio—had highly contested, negative, policy-related contests for the chief judgeship of the state’s supreme court. In all these races the incumbent governors were actively involved in judicial politics.

A new area of contention has been brewing between governors and legislatures on one side and the courts on the other. As governors propose and legislatures adopt state budgets with severe cuts in appropriations, the courts, like all parts of state government, find themselves unable to fulfill their responsibilities with the reduced amounts of available funds. Can the courts force the other two branches to take the necessary monetary actions, including raising taxes, to ensure that the courts receive enough money to operate? According to experiences in fourteen states, yes, they can. In September 1991 the chief judge of New York’s State Court of Appeals, that state’s highest appellate court, filed suit charging that the governor and the legislature failed to provide the courts with adequate funds—a violation of the state constitution.

Another area of conflict with governors and legislatures on one side and the courts on the other side concerns funding of K-12 education across a state. State constitutions often call for equal education opportunities for certain students in elementary and secondary schools, but since many states rely on local property taxes to support primary and secondary education there are great discrepancies in how these levels of education are financed—and hence great discrepancies in the type of education students receive in a state. Law suits in state courts have challenged this situation, and the courts have generally sided with those filing the suits. Hence, the court decisions demand that the governor and the state legislatures rectify this situation. This means major shifts in money in the state budget, even to the point of raising taxes, especially from those who can afford such increases. These are tough decisions for legislators and governors to make.

Measuring Gubernatorial Performance

Gubernatorial performance can be rated in several ways. The first and most obvious way is by the voters when they decide whether or not to reelect an incumbent governor. Table 4-2 provides a picture of gubernatorial elections from 1970 to 2004 and indicates just how well incumbent governors have fared in their reelection bids.

During the period 1970–2004, there were 481 separate gubernatorial elections in the fifty states. In 114 of these contests (24 percent), the incumbent governor was term limited and could not seek reelection; 81 others (17 percent) decided against seeking another term. Reasons for not seeking reelection could include a decision to retire from public life, a desire to return to the more lucrative private sector, a bid to seek a higher office—usually a U.S. Senate seat-or simply an acceptance of the futility of attempting reelection in the face of negative media and dissatisfied voters.

Of the 286 incumbent governors who did seek reelection, 211 of them (74 percent) won another term in office. Thus nearly three-quarters of the incumbent governors facing the electorate passed the “gubernatorial performance test.”

Of the 75 incumbent governors defeated in their bids for reelection, 56 of them (75 percent) lost in the general election, whereas 19 (25 percent) failed to receive their own party’s re-nomination in the primary. These defeated incumbents came from all parts of the country, although there was a greater tendency for them to be from the South (26) and Midwest (22) than from the Northeast (15) or West (12). The hardest state on incumbents is Texas, where five incumbents have been defeated for reelection since 1970, followed by Alabama and New Hampshire, where four incumbents in each state met the same fate.

The unsuccessful incumbents were almost evenly split between Demo- crats (38) and Republicans (37), with primary losers more likely to be Democrats (13) than Republicans (6) and general election losers slightly more likely to be Republicans (31) than Democrats (25). Republican incumbent losses were more pronounced in the 1970s; Democratic losses have been spread fairly equally over the three decades, but with an uptick in the 2000 races.

A second way to measure gubernatorial performance is through use of the rapidly growing number of statewide opinion polls that ask respondents how well they feel their governor is performing his or her job. These statewide polls are conducted by an array of individuals and organizations, ranging from university institutes, to the media, to political parties, to political candidates, to professional pollsters. Questions are asked of samples of adults, of regis- tered voters, and of likely voters. The results of these polls are disseminated through the media and become a political fact of some importance to those serving as governors.

For example, three incumbent governors decided not to seek reelection in 2004, in part because of low job approval ratings. Judy Martz, R-Mont., with only a 20 percent positive job approval rating; Gary Locke, D-Wash., with only a 33 percent positive job approval rating; and Bob Wise, D-W. Va., with only a 39 percent positive job approval rating saw themselves facing an electorate that was more negative than positive on their job performance-not a good way to start out on a campaign for reelection.

Table 4–3 presents gubernatorial performance ratings taking the 2005 incumbent governors by “class”—that is, the year the governor was first elected or succeeded to office for his or her current tenure. Overall, these forty-one governors for which such ratings are available had an average posi- tive job approval rating of 54 percent as of August 2005. This average masks a considerable range of approval ratings—from 83 percent for Mike Rounds, R- S.D., and 79 percent for Jodi Rell, R-Conn., to 19 percent for Bob Taft, R- Ohio. Twenty-nine of the governors are currently holding positive ratings in excess of 50 percent. On average, Democratic governors had slightly higher job approval ratings: 55.4 percent versus the Republicans’ 52.4 percent.

One comment on Rell’s high ratings: As lieutenant governor she suc- ceeded to the governor’s chair in July 2004 upon the resignation of third-term governor John Rowland, a Republican, who was facing a criminal indictment over corruption charges and a possible impeachment effort by the state legis- lature. In December 2004 he pled guilty to one count of corruption and is now serving a federal prison sentence. Rell obviously was a positive relief as the new governor after that previous governor’s scandalous situation.

mple, in the Class of 2002 there is a fifty-eight-point difference between the highest rating of 83 percent (for Governor Rounds of South Dakota) and the lowest rating of 25 percent (for Governor Riley of Alabama). In the Class of 2004 there is a forty-three-point difference between the top rating of 79 percent (for Governor Rell of Connecticut) and the lowest rating of 36 per- cent (for Governor Christine Gregoire of Washington). One comment on New Jersey governor Richard Codey’s rating. As president of the New Jersey State Senate he became acting governor upon the resignation of Gov. Jim McGreevey in November 2004 over a building scandal tied to his homosexuality. Codey had to stay in his position as president of the Senate because that is why he was named acting governor. Should he resign the Senate presidency, he would cease being acting governor. Hence, he holds two major state-level elected positions until the 2005 elections determine who the next governor will be.

A third way to measure gubernatorial performance is to ask a sample of interested observers to rate the governors. In the summer of 1994 I asked some 388 political scientists, members of the media, and other knowledgeable individuals how they felt their governors were doing.47 This reading of the incumbent governors by these interested observers found considerable consistency with how the public sized up their governor’s performance.

Where there were differences, the public was more volatile in their views on governmental performance. Interested observers were neither as negative nor as positive as the public was in their ratings.

One interesting finding of this survey was the correlation between how well governors interacted with the media, the executive branch, and the state legislature and how highly they were rated.48 Governors who maintained solid relationships with the media generally received higher ratings. This should come as no surprise as public knowledge and feelings toward a gover- nor are most readily shaped by the nature of media coverage, be it negative or positive.

Some Changes Afoot in the Governorships

Several changes have occurred in the governorship in recent years that are of interest. They range from the increasing costs of gubernatorial races, to the changes in just who governors are, to a rising number of governors who are forced to leave office for a variety of reasons.

Increasing Cost of Gubernatorial Elections

Over the past three decades the cost of gubernatorial elections has risen considerably. By the mid-1970s, after the Watergate and some other political campaign scandals in the states, state governments began adopting campaign finance regulations and reporting requirements. So beginning in 1977 we have a continuing picture of just how much money is spent on the gubernatorial campaigns in all the states (Table 4–4).

In the 1977 to 1980 cycle of gubernatorial elections, the 428 candidates in the 54 races spent nearly $508 million in 2004 dollars for an average of $9.4 million per race.50 In the most recent cycle of gubernatorial elections, 2001 to 2004, the more than 475 candidates in 53 races spent over $1.161 billion for an average of $21.9 million per race. That is an increase of 129 percent over the nearly three decades. Over the entire period 1977 to 2004, candidates spent nearly $5.055 billion in the 371 separate gubernatorial races for an aver- age of just over $13.6 million per race.

The greatest changes occurred in the 2001–2004 cycle, when the costs jumped by more than 59 percent over the 1997–2000 cycle. Four states had races that cost over $110 million each, with the 2002 New York race costing just over $154 million, followed by the 1998 California race costing over $143 million, the 2002 California race costing just over $115 million, and the 2002 Texas race costing just under $111 million.

Why this upward surge in the costs of gubernatorial elections? The first and major reason has been the changes that have been going on in how these campaigns are waged. Very few, if any, candidates let the party or a faction of a party run their campaigns. The candidates now develop their own personal party by using outside consultants, opinion polls, creating media ads and buy- ing time on the media to run them, and making extensive fund-raising efforts to pay for this new approach. And the old “ground war” campaigns, when can- didates worked the streets and factory gates, have been replaced by “air war” campaigns that rely on television ads as the basic way to contact potential vot- ers. The cost of these television ad campaigns is growing, as it costs a lot to get the right consultants to develop and then place the ads—and with greater use of them also come higher costs. Few states would be surprised by a high-price, high-tech campaign now.

Another factor is the increasing number of candidates who are either wealthy or have access to wealth and are willing to tap those resources to achieve their goal of becoming a governor. Raising and spending a lot of money can win elections. For example, California governor Gray Davis spent over $67.5 million in his successful reelection bid in 2002, and New York governor George Pataki spent over $46.4 million in his successful bid for a third term in 2002. But spending a lot of money doesn’t always guarantee a win. For example, in the 2002 New York election, Independent candidate Thomas Golisano spent over $80.1 million and came in third with only 14 percent of the vote. In the 2002 Texas race, Democratic candidate Tony Sanchez also spent over $80.1 million but lost when he received only 40 percent of the vote. Both lost to a successful incumbent seeking reelection to another term. Although money does count, so does a successful incumbency.

More Diversity in the Governor’s Chair

In the last few decades the diversity in who becomes a governor has grown. Obviously, as the old Solid Democratic South became more competitive, considerable growth was seen in the number of Republican governors in these previously one-party, Democratic states.51 In 1960 thirteen of the four- teen southern governors were Democrats, and all twenty-eight state legislative chambers were controlled by Democrats. Forty-five years later, in 2005, a Re- publican sat in eight of these gubernatorial chairs to only six Democrats, and the control of the twenty-eight legislative chambers was almost equal, with Democrats holding a 15-to-13 edge.

There have also been some surprises in particular states in regard to who won a gubernatorial race. In the 1989 Virginia election, Douglas Wilder, a Democrat, won and became the first black American elected to the office, and in the Washington state elections in 1996 and 2000, Democrat Gary Locke became the first governor of Chinese descent ever elected to the governor’s chair.52 We have also seen a few Independents elected to become governor in the states of Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, and Minnesota as they defeated rival candidates of the two major parties.

Finally, women have risen to the governorship in greater numbers.54 This trend has three distinct phases. In the first phase, prior to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920 granting women the right to vote, no woman had ever served as governor. Then over the next five decades, three women were elected governor—but they were all women married to a governor or former governor who was not eligible for reelection.55 In this second phase, women’s political strength was their marriage to former and well-known governors, who helped get them elected and wanted to keep their hands on what was happening in the governor’s office.

The most recent phase began in the 1970s and continues to this day. Now the women who become governor are politicians who are moving up the state’s political ladder and win the governor’s chair in their own right. Ella Grasso, D-Conn., was the first to succeed in this fashion in 1974, followed by Dixie Lee Ray, D-Wash., in 1976. Several other women became governor in these recent decades when, while serving as lieutenant governor, they succeeded a governor who had died or left office.

Now, in the first years of the twenty-first century, twelve women have be- come governor, nine elected in their own right56 and three as lieutenant governors succeeding a departing governor.57 In the last half of 2004, nine women were serving as governor, and in 2005, eight. More will be expected in the fu- ture as the diversity of who wins or succeeds to the governors’ chairs increases. As of 2005 seventy-two women had been elected to statewide elective offices other than the governorship. They included sixteen lieutenant governors, twelve secretaries of state, seven state treasurers, and five state attorneys general, and more than a few of them are now waiting in the wings for their turn to seek the governorship in a future election.

Gubernatorial Removals and Exits

There are ways for governors to leave office other than by being defeated in a primary or general election, by accepting an appointment to another of- fice, or by retiring.59 In the last three decades we have seen nine governors leave office because of problems they faced over their actions either prior to or while serving as governor. One governor was impeached, convicted, and re- moved from office by the state legislature, and another governor resigned from the office as the state legislature began to threaten an impeachment over some of his actions while serving in the office for nearly three terms.60 Two others were removed from office following a criminal conviction in a federal or state court, and two others resigned after a criminal conviction in federal court.

In a unique removal in 1979, Governor Ray Blanton, D-Tenn., found his term in office shortened by several days and the locks on his gubernatorial of- fice changed so neither he nor his staff could enter the office to remove or de- stroy potentially incriminating evidence. Governor-elect Lamar Alexander was thus sworn into office three days early. This was tied to a bipartisan agree- ment with FBI investigators looking into allegations that Blanton and his staff were selling pardons to state prisoners in the last days of his tenure.62 He later was tried and found guilty of charges of accepting bribes while governor and served time in federal prison.

In 2003 we witnessed a startling political event—a grassroots initiative to recall Gov. Gray Davis, D-Calif, from office less than a year after he had won reelection to his second term as governor in 2002 with 3,469,025 votes (47.4 percent of the vote). The initiative effort was certified in July 2003, and two questions were placed on the early October ballot for the California voters: “Should Gray Davis be recalled from the office of governor?” and “If Davis is recalled, who should replace him?” The nearly 9 million voters decided 55.4 percent to 44.6 percent that he should be recalled. Davis thus became only the second state governor ever to be recalled from office.

The replacement question was complicated by the filings of more than 140 individuals to be candidates, and in August 2003, 135 of them were certified to run on the early October ballot. They included 49 Democrats, 42 Re- publicans, 33 Independents, and 11 candidates from six minor parties, so there were no official party candidates on this ballot. Although most candidates were not well known to the voters, attention did focus on the former Los Angeles mayor Bill Simon, a Republican, whom Davis had defeated in the 2002 gubernatorial election; Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante, a Democrat; state senator Tom McClintock, a Republican; and actor, bodybuilder, and businessman Arnold Schwarzenegger, a Republican. The well-known Schwarzenegger won with 48.6 percent of the vote, followed by Bustamante with 31.5 percent and McClintock with 13.5 percent. They were the only candidates to receive more than 1 million votes of the 8.348 million votes cast on this question.

Then, in 2004, two governors resigned from office. As already noted, John Rowland, R- Conn., resigned on June 30 over a threatened impeachment possibility. Then Gov. Jim McGreevey, D-N.J., announced that in November he would resign because of his homosexuality and his relationship with a male appointee while in office. So in two years three incumbent governors left office in some sort of trouble—a message that other governors surely have heard clearly.

Governors in Association

Governors have taken significant steps to revitalize and redirect multi- state organizations during the last few decades. Foremost among these organizations is the National Governors Association. The NGA’s precursor emerged in 1908 after a call by President Theodore Roosevelt to the governors to meet with him to discuss conservation issues.

Getting Organized

For many years, the governors met regularly as the Governors’ Conference to discuss a broad agenda, with the Council of State Governments (CSG) serving as secretary. During the mid-1960s, as federal grant-in-aid programs proliferated and the federal government intruded further into the states in the form of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs, the governors felt the need for a more permanent organization. They set up an office in Washington, D.C., to press their views, interests, and needs upon the federal government. State legislative and local government leaders were taking similar steps.

The strong showing of state executive and legislative organizations in the nation’s capital was significant. Distrusting the efficacy of their U.S. congressional members, state leaders felt that a strong and independent state presence in Washington was one of several steps that had to be taken for adequate representation in the national policy process.

Growth of the National Governors Association

Under the leadership of a series of strong governors, the Governors’ Conference began to broaden its agenda and approach.65 In 1966 it changed its name to the National Governors’ Conference (NGC) “to distinguish it clearly from the regional conferences which had sprung up.”66 In 1967 the NGC switched from an ad hoc committee structure to a system of eleven standing committees. The NGC began advocating a body of policy positions that were agreed to in annual meetings.67 In 1977 the NGC became the National Governors Association “to signify the broad scope and ongoing nature of the organization.

During the 1970s the NGA began a series of activities to enhance the performance of governors within their own states. “The New Governors’ Seminar,” held within two weeks after general elections in even-numbered years, used incumbent governors as faculty. Subjects included organizing the governor’s office, press and public relations, management of the executive branch, executive-legislative relations, intergovernmental relations, the governorship as a partnership involving one’s spouse, and the transition period from campaigning to governing.69 In addition, printed materials and guidebooks were prepared for governors to take back to their home states, and transition assistance was made available.

A growing emphasis on the states and governors as innovators appeared in series of surveys and publications. These surveys and reports helped disseminate ideas across the states on how to solve problems through innovative programs. What had been known as a governor’s “show and tell” now became more systematic and analytical. Two organizations of gubernatorial staff—the Council of State Planning Agencies and the National Association of State Budget Officers—became NGA affiliates, providing it with needed policy and budget-planning capabilities.

In 1983 Carol Weissert concluded that the NGA “has gone from serving primarily as a social event to providing information, technical assistance and research needed for responsible state leadership; from shying away from taking issue stands to assuming leadership in charting a national policy course; and from having no Washington presence to spearheading a strong Washington lobbying effort.

Larry Sabato argued that the governors used the NGA as a vehicle to assert themselves at the “national level in an unprecedented and surprisingly effective manner . . . revolutionized from the hollow shell of yore to a bustling, professional lobby that can achieve results (and overcome serious handicaps to effectiveness inherent in a high-powered constituency such as the governors).

Regional governors’ associations also became more active in policy concerns. Some of this interest flowed naturally from the region itself, for example, energy and natural resources in the West, agriculture in the Midwest, and race and economic development in the South. Some stemmed from the allocation of federal grant-in-aid funds or other federal decisions. In some in- stances states in a particular region banded together to provide improved higher education or to seek a “pork barrel” project.

Although the results of these activities varied, the governors of the fifty states, by joining together, became more a part of the national policymaking process. They took new and innovative steps to provide their states with enhanced representation at the national level.

Conclusion

Over the last four decades of the twentieth century, many of the states were involved in reforming their state governments to better meet the challenges of the day. In this process, the governors gained a great deal of strength and tools to help them fulfill their responsibilities. So too did the state legislatures and state courts.

Now as we are moving through the first decade of the twenty-first century, we are seeing some changes occurring in the states. Some of these are tied to the governors—the cost of running for the office has escalated greatly, there is more diversity in who is elected and serving across the states, and most governors are still in their first terms. We have also seen some governors forced to resign from office for some negative or questionable steps they have taken. And for only the second time in the history of the states, a governor was impeached and removed from office. And, with the changes in the political parties, more of the governors are facing state legislatures in which at least one house if not both houses are controlled by members of the opposition party. So change is afoot and we must continue to watch the various developments in the states.

Notes

1. “List of the Fortune 5000,” www.usatoday.com/com/money/companies/3–22–04, and NASBO, The Fiscal Survey of the States: December 2004 (Washington, D.C.: National Association of State Budget Officers, 2004), table A-1, 17.

2. Regina Brough, “Powers of the Gubernatorial CEOs: Variations among the States,” Journal of State Government 59 (1986): 58–63.

3. AmongtheseweretheAdvisoryCommissiononIntergovernmentalRelations(ACIR), various reports; Committee for Economic Development, Modernizing State Government (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1967); Terry Sanford, Storm over the States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); National Municipal League, Model State Constitution, rev. ed. (New York: National Municipal League, 1968); and Citizens Con- ference on State Legislatures, various publications between 1967 and 1971.

4. Sanford,StormovertheStates,188;andLarrySabato,GoodbyetoGood-timeCharlie:The American Governor Transformed, 1950–1975 (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1978), 63.

5. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Question of State Government Capability (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1985), 129.

6. Thad L. Beyle, “Term Limits in the State Executive Branch,” in Limiting Legislative Terms, ed. Gerald Benjamin and Michael J. Malbin (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1992), 159–180.

7. Keon S. Chi, “State Executive Branch Reorganization; Options for the Future,” State Trends and Forecasts 1, no. 1 (December 1992): 8.

8. Kendra A. Hovey and Harold A. Hovey, eds., “Number of Satewide Elected Officials, 2004,” CQ’s State Fact Finder 2005 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), table D-12, p. 113.

9. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Question of State Govern- ment Capability, 129; and Ronald C. Moe, Prospects for the Item Veto at the Federal Level: Lessons from the States (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administra- tion, 1988), 3–50.

10. Coleman B. Ransone Jr., The Office of Governor in the United States (University: Uni- versity of Alabama Press, 1956), 44.

11. Center for Policy Research, National Governors Association, data from a 1976 survey of thirty-eight governors’ offices. The average was adjusted to exclude the two largest states, as their size would skew the overall averages.

12. CouncilofStateGovernments,TheBookoftheStates,2004(Lexington,Ky.:Councilof State Governments, 2004), 160–161.

13. ThadL.Beyle,“Governors’ViewsonBeingGovernor,”StateGovernment52(Summer 1979): 108–110. 14. Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 2004, 162–163.

15. LynnMuchmore,“PlanningandBudgetingOffices:OnTheirRelevancetoGubernatorial Decisions,” in Being Governor: The View from the Office, ed. Thad L. Beyle and Lynn Muchmore (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1983), 174.

16. Carl W. Stenberg, “States under the Spotlight: An Intergovernmental View,” Public Administration Review 45 (March/April 1985): 321.

17. Thad L. Beyle and Deil S. Wright, “The Governor, Planning, and Governmental Activity,” in The American Governor in Behavioral Perspective, ed. Thad L. Beyle and J. Oliver Williams (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 194–195.