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510 CHAPTER 15 THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGY
involved should vary according to the nature of the issue (see Figure 15.2 ). 18 For example, issues that are urgent and could involve major changes to strategy (such as an acquisition opportunity) are best approached by small special project teams, consisting of senior managers and perhaps planners and consultants. Issues which may be important but are not urgent (such as deciding on key competitors) can benefi t from more prolonged and open strategic conversations, both formal and informal. Urgent issues that do not involve major change (such as responding to competitor threats) require only limited participation. Issues that may involve major changes but require idea generation over time (such as the search for global opportunities) might benefi t from more open participation, though this might be organised more formally through a series of planned events, such as conferences bringing together large groups of managers in particular geographical regions.
Illustration 15.2 shows one approach to achieving inclusion at Barclay’s Bank. The Wychavon end of chapter case provides a public-sector example.
15.3 STRATEGISING
Whereas the previous section introduced the key strategists, this section concentrates on what these people do – in other words, the activities of strategising . The section starts with strategy analysis, then issue-selling, decision making and communications about the chosen strategy. In practice, of course, these activities rarely follow this logical sequence, or they may not hap- pen at all. As Chapter 12 made clear, strategies do not always come about in such ways and strategic decisions are often made without formal analysis and evaluation. So the section ends with a reminder about the often ‘messy’ nature of strategy development.
Figure 15.2 Who to include in strategy making?
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STRATEGISING 511
15.3.1 Strategy analysis
A good deal of this text is concerned with strategy analysis, and indeed analysis can be an important input into strategy making. However, managers often use a limited set of analytical tools and do not always follow textbook procedures. SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis is by far the most widely used tool, but in practice managers often deviate from the technical ideal even with this simple tool. 19 For example, SWOT analyses tend to pro- duce unmanageably long lists of factors (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats), often well over 50 or so. These factors are rarely probed or refi ned, little substantive analysis is done to investigate them and they are often not followed up systematically in subsequent stra- tegic discussions. (See the discussion on SWOT in section 3.4.4 .)
However, criticism of managers for their analytical limitations may sometimes be mis- placed. There are both cost and purpose issues to consider. First of all, analysis is costly in terms of both resources and time. There are of course the costs of gathering information, particularly if using consultants. But with regard to time there is also the risk of ‘ paralysis by analysis ’, where managers spend too long perfecting their analyses and not enough time taking deci- sions and acting upon them. 20 Managers have to judge how much analysis they really need. Second, with regard to purpose, analysis is not always simply about providing the necessary information for good strategic decisions anyway. Ann Langley has shown that the purposes of analysis can be quite different. 21 Setting up a project to analyse an issue thoroughly may even be a deliberate form of procrastination , aimed at putting off a decision. Analysis can also be symbolic , for example to rationalise a decision after it has already effectively been made. Managers may be asked to analyse an issue in order to get their buy-in to decisions that they might otherwise resist. Analyses can also be political , to forward the agenda of a particular manager or part of the organisation.
The different purposes of strategy analysis have two key implications for managers:
● Design the analysis according to the real purpose . The range and quality of people involved, the time and budget allowed, and the subsequent communication of analysis results should all depend on underlying purpose, whether informational, political or symbolic. For example, prestigious strategy consulting fi rms are often useful for political and symbolic analyses. Involving a wide group of middle managers in the analysis may help with subsequent buy-in.
● Invest appropriately in technical quality . For many projects, improving the quality of the technical analysis will make a valuable addition to subsequent strategic decisions. On other occasions, insisting on technical perfection can be counter-productive. For example, a SWOT analysis that raises lots of issues may be a useful means of allowing managers to vent their own personal frustrations, before getting on with the real strategy work. It may sometimes be better to leave these issues on the table, rather than probing, challenging or even deleting them in a way that could unnecessarily alienate these managers for the following stages.
15.3.2 Strategic issue-selling
Organisations typically face many strategic issues at any point in time. But in complex organ- isations these issues may not be appreciated by those involved in developing strategy. Some issues will be fi ltered out by the organisational hierarchy; others will be sidelined by more urgent pressures. Moreover, senior managers will rarely have suffi cient time and resources to
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512 CHAPTER 15 THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGY
deal with all the issues that do actually reach them, so strategic issues compete for attention. What gets top management attention are not necessarily the most important issues. 22 Issues need to be ‘sold’.
Strategic issue-selling is the process of gaining the attention and support of top manage- ment and other important stakeholders for strategic issues. Managers need to consider at least four aspects in seeking attention and support for their issues:
● Issue packaging . Care should be taken with how issues are packaged or framed. Clearly the strategic importance of the issue needs to be underlined, particularly by linking it to critical strategic goals or performance metrics for the organisation. Generally clarity and succinctness win over complexity and length. It also usually helps if the issue is packaged with potential solutions . An issue can easily be put aside as too diffi cult to address if no ways forward are offered at the same time.
● Formal and informal channels . Managers need to balance formal and informal channels of infl uence. Figure 15.3 indicates some formal channels for selling issues in a multidivisional organisation (based on the American conglomerate General Electric). Here formal chan- nels are split between corporate, line and staff. On the corporate side, they include the annual business reviews that the CEO carries out with each divisional head, plus the annual
Figure 15.3 Formal channels for issue-selling
Source : Adapted from W. Ocasio and J. Joseph, ‘An attention-based theory of strategy formulation: linking micro
and macro perspectives in strategy processes’, Advances in Strategic Management , vol. 22 (2005), pp. 39–62 .
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STRATEGISING 513
strategy retreats (or workshops) of the top executive team. The line channel involves the regular line interaction of operational managers, divisional heads and the CEO and other executive directors. Finally, there are the various reporting systems to staff functions, including fi nance, human resources and strategic planning. However, formal channels are rarely enough to sell strategic issues. Informal channels can be very important and often decisive in some organisations. Informal channels might include ad hoc conversations with infl uential managers in corridors, on journeys or over meals or drinks. Illustration 15.3 shows how informal channels can be important for consultants.
● Sell alone or in coalitions . Managers should consider whether to press their issue on their own or to assemble a coalition of supporters , preferably infl uential ones. A coalition adds credibil- ity and weight to the issue. The ability to gather a coalition of supporters can be a good test of the issue’s validity: if other managers are not persuaded, then the CEO is unlikely to be persuaded either. But notice that enlisting supporters may involve compromises or recipro- cal support of other issues, so blurring the clarity of the case being put forward.
● Timing . Managers should also time their issue-selling carefully. For example, a short-term performance crisis, or the period before the handover to a new top management team, is not a good time to press long-term strategic issues.
15.3.3 Strategic decision making
Strategic decision making is not always rational. Nobel prize-winner Daniel Kahneman and colleagues have developed an approach called ‘behavioural economics’, which seeks to improve decision making by taking into account real-life human behaviour. 23 Kahneman points out that even senior managers bring ‘cognitive biases’ to their decisions: their mental processes are liable to neglect, distort or exaggerate certain issues. The trouble with cognitive biases is that, by defi nition, it is very hard for people to recognise what they are suffering from. However, Kahneman suggests that designing good decision-making processes can help rem- edy the ill-effects of these biases. He highlights fi ve common decision-making biases, along with ways to reduce them:
● Confi rmation bias is the tendency to seek out data that confi rm a favoured course of action, and to neglect information that might disconfi rm it. One way to counter this confi rmation bias is to insist that alternative options are always considered in decision processes. Then the discussion shifts from whether or not to take a favoured action, to how much better it really is compared to the alternatives.
● Anchoring bias is the common error of being tied (‘anchored’) to one piece of information in making a decision. Anchors are often things that might have been valid in the past, but may not hold true in the future. For example, managers may rely on past sales trends, and neglect the possibility that these trends might change. Sometimes managers will make an initial estimate of a cost or revenue, and allow that value to become entrenched in their decision making, forgetting that it was only an estimate in the fi rst place. One way of coun- tering anchoring biases is to introduce different analytical methods into the process (for instance, a discounted cash fl ow as well as a pay back period analysis). A different analysis may surface unacknowledged assumptions or force out new data or insights.
● Saliency bias refers to when a particular analogy becomes unduly infl uential (‘salient’). For example, managers may say a particular project is just like a successful project in the past,
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514 CHAPTER 15 THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGY
ILLUSTRATION 15.3
Dinner with the consultants
Consultants operate through both formal and informal channels to
influence strategic thinking.
Locco * was a major European automotive component
manufacturer. In the mid-1990s, it began to experience
declining profits. The CEO therefore invited consultants to
undertake a strategic review of the firm. This consultancy
team included a partner, a senior consultant and a junior
consultant. Their recommendations led to changes in
Locco’s product and market strategy.
Like all other consultancy assignments the consult-
ants undertook extensive analysis of industry data and
company data. However, in addition to this more formal
work, there was more informal engagement between the
consultants and the management, including three din-
ners held during the period of the project.
At home with the CEO
At the beginning of the assignment the CEO invited the
partner and senior consultant to meet senior managers at
his home for dinner ‘to get together in a more informal
way . . . to get to know each other better . . . and . . . learn
more about the history of our company’, but also to estab-
lish trust between the managers and the consultants.
Others saw it differently. For example, the marketing
and sales manager viewed it as an attempt by the CEO to
influence the outcome of the project: ‘(he) likes to do
this. While dining in his home you can hardly oppose his
views.’ The consulting partner was somewhat wary, fear-
ing a hidden agenda but none the less seeing it as an
opportunity to ‘break the ice’ as well as gaining political
insight and understanding of the management dynamics.
Over dinner discussion was largely between the CEO
and the consultants with the CEO setting out some con-
cerns about the project, not least the danger of cost
cutting leading to a loss of jobs. As they mingled over
after-dinner drinks other sensitive issues were raised by
other managers.
At the castle
In the third week of the project the consultant invited the
CEO to a restaurant in a converted castle. He saw this as
an opportunity to get to know the CEO better, to gain his
agreement to the consultants’ approach to the project,
but also to gain a clearer understanding of the politics
among the senior management and establish more
insight into the CEO’s perceived problems of Locco.
Over the meal the consultant established that there
were two management ‘camps’ with different views of
strategy. The consultant also took the opportunity to
influence and gain the CEO’s approval for the agenda for
the next management meeting.
At the pizzeria
Some weeks later the senior consultant invited middle
managers whom he saw as ‘good implementers’ for pizza
and beer at an Italian restaurant to ‘exchange informa-
tion and get opinions on some of our analyses, see how
some of the middle managers react . . .’. Some of those
who attended were sceptical about the meeting but went
along. Senior managers were not invited.
At the dinner the consultant discussed his initial
analysis, particularly on strategic competences. He also
raised some issues to do with the political dynamics within
the senior management team. The consultant regarded
the dinner as a success both in terms of establishing
a rapport but also in establishing that ‘some (of the
managers) know exactly why the company has a prob-
lem . . . they already have some ideas for solutions . . . but
their voices are not heard’. The managers who attended
were, on the whole, also positive about the dinner, many
regarding it as ‘good fun’ though others who were not
there felt threatened by their absence.
* A pseudonym used by the researchers.
Adapted from A. Sturdy, M. Schwarz and A. Spicer, ‘Guess who’s com-
ing to dinner? Structures and uses of liminality in strategic manage-
ment consultancy’, Human Relations , vol. 59, no. 7 (2006), pp. 929–60 .
Questions 1 Why are informal settings such as dinners
useful?
2 Could the consultants have influenced the
agenda in more formal ways? How?
3 If you had been one of the managers at the
Italian restaurant, what would your views of
the meeting been?
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STRATEGISING 515
minimising differences: on the analogy with past experience, they simply expect success to be repeated. It is important here to ask for other analogies, or to seek out possible differences between the successful case and the one being considered. A form of this saliency bias is the so-called ‘halo effect’, where a manager or organisation that has been successful in one domain is simply assumed to be successful in another: the manager or organisation is treated like a saint (with a ‘halo’) and assumed to do no wrong. Again, it is important here to check for differences. Just because a manager has been successful in managing a series of acquisitions does not mean he or she will be equally so in managing a joint venture.
● Affect bias occurs when managers become too emotionally attached to a particular option (too ‘affectionate’). In cases of issue-selling, this is often called champion’s bias : the likelihood that people will exaggerate their case in favour of their particular proposal. If the proposal comes from a team, it might be worth checking with members individually for signs of dis- comfort: it may be possible to obtain a more balanced view from the less enthusiastic team members. Having just the lead ‘champion’ present the proposal on his or her own max- imises the danger of hearing the most positive side of the argument.
● Risk bias is where managers hold distorted views of risk. Managers are often over-optimistic in assessing their ability to deliver on projects. Here Kahneman recommends that instead of relying on the organisation’s own assessment of its capabilities (an ‘inside view’), decision- makers also look at the record of other organisations undertaking similar projects (an ‘out- side view’). It is easier to acknowledge the failures of other organisations than to undertake a sceptical review of one’s own internal capabilities. On the other hand, managers can sometimes be biased towards pessimism, so-called ‘risk aversion’. Their fear of failure may be greater than their appetite for success. Risk aversion can be reduced by reviewing incen- tives: the rewards of success can be either clarifi ed or increased.
Thus Kahneman’s behavioural view leads to concrete methodologies to reduce biases in stra- tegic decision making. Overall, he encourages hurried managers to ‘think slow’ – to take the time to ask for additional views, analysis and data. Of course, managers should recognise the danger of paralysis by analysis ( section 15.3.1 ): in fast-moving environments, the informed intuition of experienced managers may be more effective than thorough but time-consuming analyses. 24 However, Kahneman believes that the costs of error generally outweigh the costs of missed opportunities. It is important too not to exaggerate the importance of decision making in strategy. As explained in Chapter 12 , many strategies are emergent rather than consciously decided anyway.
These insights from behavioural economics underline the potential benefi ts of constructive confl ict in decision making. 25 Confl ict can expose champion’s biases. It can challenge optimistic self-assessments of managerial competence. Confl ict is fostered by having diverse managerial teams, with members prepared to be devil’s advocates, challenging assumptions or easy con- sensus. But productive confl ict needs careful management. Table 15.1 uses the idea of ‘games with rules’ to summarise ways in which this might be done (see also the discussion on ‘organ- isational ambidexterity’ in section 14.3 ).
15.3.4 Communicating the strategy
Deciding strategy is only one step: strategic decisions need to be communicated. The rise of more open approaches to strategy has put a greater premium on transparency ( section 15.2.5 ). Managers have to consider which stakeholders to inform (see Chapter 4 ) and how they should
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516 CHAPTER 15 THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGY
tailor their messages to each. Shareholders, key customers and employees are likely to be par- ticularly central, all with different needs. For every new strategy, there should be a commun- ications strategy to match. It is also important to remember that communication is a two-way process. Harvard’s Michael Beer and Russell A. Eisenstat 26 argue that effective communication needs to involve both advocacy of a strategy by senior management and inquiry about the concerns of infl uential internal and external stakeholders. In the absence of the former, there is lack of clarity, confusion and frustration. In the absence of the latter, concerns will surface in any case, but in ways that actively or passively undermine the new strategy.
As a minimum, effective employee communications are needed to ensure that the strategy is understood. In the absence of this there are two likely consequences:
● Strategic intent will be reinterpreted . As the Key Debate in Chapter 12 shows, it is inevitable that people in the organisation will interpret intended strategy in terms of their local context and operational responsibilities. 27 The more such reinterpretation occurs, the more unlikely it is the intended strategy will be implemented.
● Established routines will continue . Old habits die hard, so top management may under- estimate the need to make very clear what behaviours are expected to deliver a strategy. Of course, effective communication is only one way in which change can be managed; the wider lessons of managing strategic change in this regard need to be taken into account (see Chapter 14 ).
In shaping a communications strategy for employees, four elements need to be considered in particular: 28
● Focus . Communications should be focused on the key issues that the strategy addresses and the key components of the strategy. If top management cannot show they are clear on
Rulebook • Establish clear behavioural boundaries. • Encourage dissenting voices. • Keep debate professional, not emotional.
Referees • Ensure the leader is (a) open to differing views, (b) enforces the rules.
Playing field • Ensure each side of the debate has a chance to win. • Be clear on the basis of resolution (e.g. decision from the top or consensus).
Gaps to exploit • Does each group have a specific objective to champion?
Relationships • Ensure individuals (a) deliver on their commitments, (b) behave with integrity. • Ensure leaders throughout the organisation further test perspectives up and down
the hierarchy.
Energy levels • Ensure sufficient tension to promote useful debate, but monitor this. • Do leaders understand what people really care about?
Outcomes • Ensure leader gives bad news without damaging relationships. • Ensure dignity in losing and risk-taking rewarded.
Source : Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business Review . Exhibit from ‘How to pick a good fight’ by S.A. Joni and
D. Beyer, December 2009, pp. 48–57 . Copyright © 2009 by the Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation.
All rights reserved.
Table 15.1 Managing conflict
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STRATEGISING 517
these, then it cannot be expected that others will be. If possible it also helps to avoid un- necessary detail or complex language. CEO Jack Welch’s famous statement that General Electric should be ‘either Number One or Number Two’ in all its markets is remembered because of this clear focus on the importance of being a dominant player wherever the com- pany competed.
● Media . Choosing appropriate media to convey the new strategy is important. Mass media such as emails, voicemails, company newsletters, videos, intranets and senior manager blogs can ensure that all staff receive the same message promptly, helping to avoid dam- aging uncertainty and rumour-mongering. However, face-to-face communications are important too in order to demonstrate the personal commitment of managers and allow for interaction with concerned staff. So, for example, senior managers may undertake road- shows , carrying their message directly to various groups of employees with conferences or workshops at different sites. They may also institute cascades , whereby each level of man- agers is tasked to convey the strategy message directly to the staff reporting to them, who in turn are required to convey the message to their staff, and so on through the organisation. Of course, if this is to be effective, it is essential that the key issues and components of the strategy are clear. Such roadshows and cascades may, of course, also raise new issues and should therefore be part of a two-way communication process.
● Employee engagement . If a two-way process of communication is to be achieved, it needs to involve multiple levels of management. Indeed, it is often helpful to engage employees more widely in the communication strategy, so that they can see what it means for them person- ally and how their role will change. Interchanges through roadshows and cascades can help, but some organisations use imaginative means to create more active engagement. For example, one British public-sector organisation invited all its staff to a day’s conference introducing its new strategy, at which employees were invited to pin a photograph of them- selves on a ‘pledge wall’, together with a hand-written promise to change at least one aspect of their work to fi t the new strategy. 29
● Impact . Communications should be impactful, with powerful and memorable words and visuals. A strong ‘story-line’ can help by encapsulating the journey ahead and imagined new futures for the organisation and its customers. One struggling medical centre in New Mexico communicated its new strategy, and inspired its staff, with a story-line representing the organisation as ‘The Raiders of the Lost Art’, adapting the fi lm title to convey a simulta- neous sense of courage in adversity and recovery of old values. 30
15.3.5 The messiness of everyday strategising
There is a danger of seeing strategising as part of a neat, linear process driven by management rationality. Chapter 12 made it clear that this is not always so; there are multiple processes at work that contribute to the development of strategy. Formal analysis and meetings may take place, but these go hand-in-hand with more everyday practices. Senior executives do meet over lunch or coffee and discuss strategic issues. Managers spend most of their time in face-to- face meetings or telephone and email discussions with other managers. As sections 12.3.2 and 12.3.4 explained, in such settings, strategic issues and solutions may arise on the basis of organisational politics or simple chance. In such circumstances, managers need political acumen and the ability to build coherent strategic narratives from the often fragmented dis- cussions that take place. 31
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518 CHAPTER 15 THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGY
15.4 STRATEGY METHODOLOGIES
Strategists have a range of standard methodologies to organise and guide their strategising activity. The methodologies introduced here are not analytical concepts or techniques such as in most of the rest of the text, but widely used approaches to managing aspects of strategy work such as issue-selling or decision making. These could include strategy workshops (or ‘away-days’) and strategy projects. Projects may be driven by hypothesis-testing techniques. Finally, strategising output typically has to fi t the format of a business case or strategic plan. This section introduces key issues in each of these methodologies.
15.4.1 Strategy workshops Strategies are often made through series of managerial meetings. These meetings frequently take the specifi c form of strategy workshops (sometimes called strategy away-days or retreats). 32 Such workshops usually involve groups of executives working intensively for one or two days, often away from the offi ce, on organisational strategy . Such executives are typically senior managers in the organisation, although workshops can also be a valuable mechanism for involving a wider group of managers. Workshops are used typically to formulate or reconsider strategy, but also to review the progress of current strategy, address strategy implementation issues and to communicate strategic decisions to a larger audience. Workshops can be either ad hoc or part of the regular strategic planning process, and they may be standalone or designed as a series of events. As well as facilitating strategy making, workshops can have additional roles in team-building and the personal development of individual participant. Illustration 15.4 shows how they can contribute to strategy development as well as how they can go wrong.
Strategy workshops can be a valuable part of an organisation’s strategy-making activity. Research suggests, however, that their form can infl uence the nature of participants’ debate of strategy and its likely success. Workshop design matters. Above all, whatever the purpose of the workshop is, clarity of that purpose is strongly correlated with perceived success. Given this, if the purpose is to question existing strategy or develop new strategy successful workshops are likely to involve:
● Strategy concepts and tools capable of promoting the questioning of the current strategy.
● A specialist facilitator to guide participants in the use of such tools and concepts, free man- agers to concentrate on the discussion, help keep the discussion focused on the strategic issues and ensure participants contribute equally to discussion.
● The visible support of the workshop sponsor (perhaps the CEO) for the questioning and the facilitator. In the absence of this the workshop is unlikely to succeed.
● The diminishing of everyday functional and hierarchical roles . This may be aided by a distinctive off-site location to signal how different from everyday routine the workshop is, help detach participants from day-to-day operational issues and symbolically affi rm the occasion is not subject to the usual norms of executive team discussion. Ice-breaking and other apparently playful exercises – sometimes called ‘serious play’ – at the beginning of a workshop can help generate creativity and a willingness to challenge orthodoxies. 33
On the other hand, workshops with the purpose of reviewing the progress of current strategy are likely to be successful if they have a more operational agenda and if participants maintain functional and hierarchical roles.
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EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 12/25/2018 11:14 AM via AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIV SYSTEM AN: 1418653 ; Johnson, Gerry.; Exploring Strategy Text & Cases Account: s7348467
STRATEGY METHODOLOGIES 519
ILLUSTRATION 15.4
A tale of two workshops
How strategy workshops are designed is a significant influence on
their success.
Given the growth of the business the directors of
Hotelco * decided to hold two two-day workshops to
rethink the organisational structure needed for the
company’s future strategic direction. Both workshops
were facilitated by an external consultant.
Workshop 1 The first workshop was held in a luxury rural hotel in
the south of England far away from Hotelco’s modest
offices. This was not just to ‘get away from the office’,
but also because: ‘It freed up the mind . . . It was a
great experience.’
Together with one of the directors, the facilitator
had organised the agenda. The ‘command style’ of
the CEO was replaced by a participative approach
orchestrated by the facilitator: ‘He made it a more
level playing field.’ He had interviewed staff about
the core values of the business and provided a report
to the directors as a basis for the discussion: ‘Does
everyone know what Hotelco stands for?’
The directors became genuinely engaged with the
discussion: ‘It focused our minds. It made us all
understand the things we were good at and . . . the
things we were weak at and what we needed to do.’
They regarded the workshop as a success, concluding
that a change was needed from an authoritarian, com-
mand management style to a more structured and
devolved approach to management, with responsibil-
ity being passed to middle levels, so freeing up the
top team to focus more on strategy.
This outcome was not, however, carried forward.
On their return to the office, the directors came to the
conclusion that what was agreed during the workshop
was unrealistic, that they were ‘carried away with the
process’. The result was significant back-tracking but
without a clear consensus on a revised structure for
the business.
Workshop 2 The second two-day workshop, two months later, was
for the top team and their seven direct reports and
used the same facilitator. It took place in one of the
group’s own hotels. Again the workshop began with a
discussion of the interviews on Hotelco’s values. One
of the directors then made a presentation raising the
idea of an operational board. However, in discussion
it emerged that the directors were not uniformly com-
mitted to this – especially the CEO. Eventually, as the
facilitator explained: ‘I had to sit the four directors
in another room and say: look, until you sort this
out, you’re just going to create problems . . . The four
directors got into a heated argument and forgot about
the other seven.’
This was not, however, how the directors saw it.
Their view was that the facilitator was seeking to
impose a solution rather than facilitate discussion.
With the directors in one room and the direct
reports in another, the comments of each group were
transmitted between rooms by the facilitator. It was a
situation that satisfied no one. In the afternoon the
CEO intervened, replacing the idea of a seven-person
‘operational board’ with an intermediary level of three
‘divisional directors’.
No one was content with the workshop. One of the
seven who was not to be a divisional director com-
mented: ‘I didn’t know where I sat any more. I felt my
job had been devalued.’ A director also recognised:
‘We left these people feeling really deflated.’
* Hotelco is a pseudonym for a small UK hotel group.
Questions 1 Evaluate the design of the two workshops in
terms of the guidelines in section 15.4.1 .
2 If you were a facilitator, how would you have
organised the workshops differently?
3 What benefits (or disadvantages) might such
workshops have in comparison with other
approaches to strategy development for such
an organisation?
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b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e
co py ri gh t la w.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 12/25/2018 11:14 AM via AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIV SYSTEM AN: 1418653 ; Johnson, Gerry.; Exploring Strategy Text & Cases Account: s7348467