Question for help
Chapter 13
Economics of Three-Strikes Legislation
Introduction
Thus far, there has been an implicit assumption that criminals know the expected sanction from criminal action.
Because there is substantial discretion by judges and juries, defendants at best may have only a rough estimate.
Some could argue that criminals have little awareness of the potential costs of the criminal's activity, bringing into question the economics of crime deterrence model.
For example, if there is an increase in sanctions, will the criminal process that change into their decision making, or is it so noisy that it doesn’t change anything?
Introduction
Three-strikes legislation formalizes the sentencing process and makes the consequences of different crime choices far more evident to potential offenders.
The term three strikes refers to three felony convictions and then the person is “out”, similar to bating in baseball.
The third offense is a minimum sentence of 25 years, 80% of which has to be served before parole
28 States currently have three-strikes laws including Florida
The Nature of Three-Strikes Legislation
Beginning in the 1990s, states began passing three-strikes and minimum sentencing laws. Part of the basis for this is that some judges were too lenient
These laws remove variability in sentencing and make sentencing more predictable.
Typically, the first strike begins after the first violent felony, then any felony conviction afterwards, violent or otherwise, counts as a strike.
A person can commit several non-violent felonies without accumulating strikes, but once they commit a violent felony, any felony afterwards counts as a strike
The Nature of Three-Strikes Legislation
This creates a natural experiment since first time violent felons will have a much larger expected sanction for non-violent felonies relative to people with no violent felonies.
And people who have two strikes have a much higher expected cost than those who’ve only had one.
The Deterrence Effect of the Second Strike
There is an opportunity to apply a difference in difference research design to assess the deterrence effect of harsher sanctions.
Individuals with two strikes face harsher penalties for any felony conviction than offenders who have a similar criminal history but have one strike.
To study this deterrence effect, we need a good comparison group for people with two strikes.
Comparing to a sample of all the people with one strike is likely a bad comparison since people with two strikes probably engage in more crime on average.
The Deterrence Effect of the Second Strike
Consider an instance in which two people are charged of a violent crime and one is convicted of the violent crime, but the other convicted of a lesser, nonviolent crime. There could be various reasons for the person not being convicted of the violent crime including taking a plea bargain, there not being enough evidence to convict, a lenient judge, a poor prosecutor, overcrowded jails, etc.
Then at a latter date, both of these individuals are charged with another violent crime, but this time both are convicted. Then both individuals have similar criminal records, but one has two strikes and the other has one.
This would be a much stronger comparison group than all people with one strike vs all people with two strikes.
The Deterrence Effect of the Second Strike
Helland and Tabarrok (2007) used this estimation strategy and found that in California those with two strikes had felony arrest rates 17-20% lower than those with one strike, and that in Texas those with two strikes had felony arrest rates 50% lower than those with one strike.
They also did similar analysis in two non-strike states, Illinois and New York and found no difference in arrest rates between the two groups.
These graphs show the probability of a felon not being arrested X days after release.
Unconditionally, felons with 2 strikes are more likely to be arrested.
This is unexpected since 2-strike felons face a higher cost of crime, but conditioning on criminal history, 2-strike offenders are less likely to be arrested
Offender Adjustments to the Second and Third Strikes
Iyengar (2008) used the economics of crime model to identify three predicted responses of offender to three-strike legislation
Enhanced sanctions should reduce felony participation by those with two strikes
The legislation tends to remove differences in expected sanctions between more and less violent felonies, therefore, among those with strikes, there should be a tendency to commit a more violent felonly
Offenders with one or two strikes face much harsher expected sanctions in California than in surrounding states.
Offender Adjustments to the Second and Third Strikes
Iyengar used criminal history data to compare criminal activity of inmates released two years prior and two years after the initiation of the three strikes law.
She found that felons with one strike had an 18% reduction in felony arrests and those with two strikes had a 28% reduction in felony arrests.
She found that conditional on committing a felony, there was a 4-percentage point increase in violent crimes those with one strike, and a 10-percentage point increase for those with two strikes.
She found a 6% increase in felonies committed outside California among felons with one strike, and an 8.5% increase among felons with two strikes.
These results indicate that there can be unintended side effects of three strikes including an increase in violent felonies.
Conclusion
Three-strikes laws significantly alter the incentives of criminals in part by increasing the sanction for offense and by making the sentence more certain to the criminal.
For those with zero strikes, there is an incentive to not commit a violent felony
For those with strikes, they are less likely to commit a felony, but may be more likely to commit a violent felony and may be more likely to commit crime outside of the state.