REA 4
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Chapter Introduction
Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
· Explain the different meanings associated with homeland security.
· List the agencies responsible for homeland security and describe their functions.
· Describe the intelligence process.
· Differentiate between criminal and national security intelligence.
· Explain the importance of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan.
· Describe the functions of fusion centers.
· List some of the organizations responsible for processing intelligence.
· Summarize some of the major issues in homeland security.
· Discuss aspects of intelligence reform.
· Cite evidence to argue that intelligence reform is unnecessary.
A Border Patrol Agent on the Job
Gary Williams/Getty Images
The U.S. homeland experienced major cyberattacks in 2015. January began with a breach of the Sony Corporation’s computer system. It was allegedly masterminded by North Korea because the country’s leader was angry about the way he was portrayed in a satirical movie. This attack was followed by a massive data breach in the federal government. As officials investigated the intrusion, they found that it was much worse than expected. Hackers uncovered personal details, including names, addresses, and social security numbers from more than 20 million current and former federal employees and contractors. When United Airlines experienced a massive cyberfailure in July, and the New York Stock Exchange closed for four hours on the same day due to computer problems, officials immediately suspected hackers.
The U.S. economy and social structure is totally integrated with technology, and all systems are vulnerable. A vast network of public and private organizations that controls the infrastructure further complicates security. Even on the local level, all layers of government, local autonomous governing boards, multiple educational institutions, small businesses, large companies, and multinational corporations may control various parts of the infrastructure. Homeland security is charged with protecting all the people served by those systems and the physical infrastructure. If the FBI director is correct, these systems and infrastructure are extremely vulnerable.
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13-1Many Meanings of Homeland Security
Homeland security means different things to different people and organizations. The federal government usually refers to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when approaching the topic. State and local governments apply the term to law enforcement agencies and criminal intelligence organizations. Governors look to the National Guard and state troopers. Health officials consider epidemics and casualties, and emergency responders may think of fires or natural disasters. While counterterrorism analysts tend to approach the topic by focusing on prevention, responders see homeland security as rescue, recovery, and restoration operations.
Scott Robinson and Nicola Mallik (2015) find that homeland security has multiple and unclear connotations. They argue that universities create academic homeland security programs but have no regimented approach for addressing the topic. Although criminal justice suffers the same problem, it is much more pronounced in homeland security. Robinson and Mallik conclude that the current semieclectic approach to the topic is healthy because aspects of homeland security require combining groups of individuals with differing skill sets.
Approaches to homeland security are not merely multidisciplinary. They are orientated toward differing goals, and they require an array of vocational and professional preparation. For example, this book is focused on analyzing and preventing terrorism, and this can legitimately be called homeland security. The book makes virtually no mention of bomb disposal techniques, scene management, or first aid. These would be topics for individuals responding to terrorism, but that is also homeland security. Essentially, many organizations define homeland security based on their missions.
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13-1aDefining and Evaluating a Mission
Issues surrounding homeland security were confused after 9/11 because the country was dealing with a new concept, a new meaning of conflict, and a change in the procedures used to defend the United States. In the past, military forces protected the homeland, projecting power beyond U.S. borders, but the world changed with the end of the Cold War in 1991. President George W. Bush formed the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 to direct and coordinate efforts to secure the mainland.
Critics maintain that DHS’s mission is confused and the patchwork of agencies protecting the country is ineffective. Stephen Flynn (2002, 2004a, 2004b) points to weaknesses in port security. Robert Poole (2006) told Congress that aviation security remains inadequate even after the disasters of 9/11. The greatest criticism is aimed at the borders. Although illegal immigration is a hot topic of political debate, the southern border is not secure by any measure. Many counterterrorism experts believe that it will become one of the main infiltration routes for jihadists. The northern border, which does not receive the same amount of attention, is also difficult to secure (Clarke, 2007).
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13-1bSecurity Missions
It might be more appropriate to move beyond the confusion about homeland security to look at the missions of various organizations and their common understanding of the concept. Essentially, mission and understanding of homeland security mean the same thing, but there are many different understandings of homeland security because agencies have differing missions. For example, the Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for protecting nuclear materials, power grids, and gas lines. DOE’s understanding of homeland security is related to its mission. Customs and Border Protection in the DHS, on the other hand, uses its agents to secure U.S. borders and points of entry, with customs agents collecting revenue. It has a law enforcement mission and defines homeland security within this context. The elements of security expand or contract depending on an organization’s mission.
There is confusion, to be sure, but it centers on policy, not mission. The policy guiding homeland security in the United States has not been fully developed, and agency leaders are not quite sure how all the missions of the various agencies fit together. Groups inside and outside government are adjusting to new roles. The intelligence community was criticized after the attacks, and the 9/11 Commission and its supporters were successful in implementing reform in the intelligence community. Critics, however, are not impressed with the commission’s version of reform. They maintain that the 9/11 Commission was established to investigate the attacks but that it had neither the expertise nor the capability to reform intelligence gathering (Posner, 2004). This leaves the roles of the various intelligence groups in transition. The law enforcement and military communities are trying to find policies to define their roles. The functions of domestic and international laws have not been fully established. Various levels of government and private industry are trying to figure out where they interact. All of these undertakings take time.
Homeland security also involves civil defense, that is, citizens engaged in homeland security. Civil defense did not develop overnight; rather, it emerged slowly from civilian functions during World War II. After 1960, civil defense structures were intended to help government protect citizens in such areas as emergency communications, through private and public broadcasting, direct assistance during emergencies, and designation of evacuation routes and fallout shelters. During the Cold War, various organizations involved in civil defense gradually learned specific missions. The idea of “civil defense” will take on a new meaning in the coming years because the nature of conflict has changed. Homeland security is much more than the sum of the agencies charged with protecting the United States. A major portion of security is a civic responsibility.
Self-Check
· Why is there confusion about the meaning of homeland security?
· How effective is the Department of Homeland Security?
· How is homeland security related to civil defense?
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13-2Agencies Charged with Preventing and Interdicting Terrorism
Congress approved the creation of DHS by uniting 22 agencies in 2002, but many other governmental organizations also focus on homeland security. These organizations exist at all levels of government: federal, state, and local. Two types of private-sector organizations participate in homeland security: businesses providing critical infrastructure and businesses centered on security technology and services. The health care system and energy sector are also part of the infrastructure of homeland security.
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13-2Agencies Charged with Preventing and Interdicting Terrorism
Congress approved the creation of DHS by uniting 22 agencies in 2002, but many other governmental organizations also focus on homeland security. These organizations exist at all levels of government: federal, state, and local. Two types of private-sector organizations participate in homeland security: businesses providing critical infrastructure and businesses centered on security technology and services. The health care system and energy sector are also part of the infrastructure of homeland security.
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13-2aThe Department of Homeland Security
The DHS was created from the Office of Homeland Security in 2003 as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks. It has several different missions. One group of internal organizations responds to natural and human disasters, and this function is complemented by a group of agencies charged with health and policy. Closely related to this are organizations charged with monitoring science and technology, including the detection of nuclear activities. Other parts of the department are tasked with managing both DHS’s internal affairs and some functions external to it. DHS also coordinates its responses with thousands of state and local organizations. There are several internal agencies that have security functions directly related to terrorism prevention.
Formerly, the U.S. Coast Guard was under the Department of Transportation (except in times of war, when it is subsumed by the U.S. Navy). It was the first agency to be assigned to the DHS. The coast guard has many duties, including the protection of coastal and inland waterways, environmental protection, the interdiction of contraband, and maritime law enforcement. For counterterrorism, its primary mission is to intercept terrorists and weapons on the high seas. Coast guard personnel also serve wherever U.S. military personnel are deployed under the command of the armed forces.
Other departments inside DHS have counterterrorist responsibilities. Many DHS agencies are involved in intelligence: Its Office of Intelligence and Analysis coordinates intelligence with other agencies. The Transportation Security Administration is responsible for airport security. The Customs and Border Protection includes customs agents and the Border Patrol. Their work is augmented by an investigative agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is DHS’s largest investigative arm. The Secret Service also serves under DHS. In addition to providing presidential security, the Secret Service retains its former role in countering financial crime. It is also involved in investigating identity theft, banking practices, and cyberattacks (Figure 13.1).
Figure 13.1DHS Organizational Chart
Many DHS employees are employed in law enforcement tasks and have arrest powers. In the new Homeland Security structure, these special agents and federal police officers are trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glencoe, Georgia. FLETC instructors also teach basic and advanced classes on terrorism. Before 2003, FLETC was responsible for training all federal law enforcement officers except special agents from the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These agencies have their own training academies at the Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia.
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13-2bThe Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ) maintains several functions in the realm of counterterrorism. The most noted agency is the FBI (n.d.). Before 9/11, the FBI was designated as the lead agency for investigating cases of terrorism in the United States. After 9/11, Director Robert Mueller maintained that preventing terrorism would be the bureau’s chief mission. The FBI enhanced its Counterterrorism Division and increased the number of intelligence analysts assigned to it under Mueller’s direction. As discussed at other points in this text, the FBI also coordinates state and local law enforcement efforts in its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The bureau also maintains Field Intelligence offices in its local agencies (see the section titled “Building Intelligence Systems” later in this chapter).
The DOJ is involved in other areas as well (U.S. DOJ, 2006). U.S. attorneys investigate and prosecute terrorism cases and coordinate intelligence sharing (see the section titled “Building Intelligence Systems” later in this chapter). The U.S. Marshals Service (2005) provides protection to federal officials under any type of threat in addition to the securing the courts and apprehending escaped offenders. Marshals are also responsible officials from terrorist attacks. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) has for years played a leading role in counterterrorism. Bombs are one of the most frequently used weapons in terrorism, and the ATF has some of the best explosives experts in the world. It is also charged with federal firearms enforcement. Although the FBI is the lead agency in domestic terrorism, ATF’s role in explosives and firearms enforcement is crucial. Many FBI investigations would be less productive without ATF help (ATF, 2015). The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) has trained more than 100,000 state and local officers since 9/11 in the BJA State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program (BJA/SLATT, 2010). SLATT trainers have also been used by various federal law enforcement agencies and the armed forces.
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13-2cThe Department of Defense
Obviously, in times of war, the military organizations in DOD play the leading role. DOD has also assumed counterterrorist functions. It does this in two ways. First, DOD operates the U.S. Northern Command to ensure homeland security. Because the Constitution forbids military forces from enforcing civil law except in times of declared martial law, the Northern Command limits its activities to military functions. It participates in information gathering and sharing, but it is excluded from civil affairs. In times of emergency, however, military forces can provide much-needed assistance to local units of government. This is the second function of DOD. When civilian authorities request and the president approves it, military forces may be used to support civilians in counterterrorism efforts (DOD, 2015). This power can be used in times of national emergency or to assist in disasters or civil disorders.
13-2dThe Intelligence Community
The federal intelligence community underwent massive changes after 9/11, the invasion of Iraq, and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) began operations in April 2005. The purpose of the ODNI is to unite America’s national security intelligence under one umbrella. The idea dates back to 1955, when several intelligence experts suggested that the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should run day-to-day intelligence operations for the agency and that the director should assume the responsibility of coordinating all national intelligence efforts. The 9/11 Commission report suggested sweeping intelligence reforms, including the creation of a single intelligence director. The ODNI resulted from those recommendations (ODNI, 2015).
The ODNI is a new concept in intelligence gathering. It coordinates information from national security and military intelligence. These agencies include the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. It also includes intelligence operations from the Department of State. Based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the ODNI has incorporated federal law enforcement intelligence under its umbrella as well. Law enforcement agencies that report to the director of national intelligence include the FBI’s National Security Branch, the DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence (Figure 13.2).
Figure 13.2Office of the Director of National Intelligence
13-2eState and Local Law Enforcement
The federal government also envisions three intelligence roles for local governments. David Carter (2009) explains the first two. State and local law enforcement agencies need to collect tactical intelligence for the prevention of terrorism and other crimes. They must also use intelligence for planning and the deployment of resources. Chief Gary Vest (2007) explains the third role. Information sharing is at the heart of local intelligence systems. Vest says that agencies are sharing information at an unprecedented scale but that they need to enhance the process by creating systems governed by policies. Vest believes that agencies need to form associations with governing boards that have the power to enforce rules and regulations. These will regulate intelligence within the law, prevent leaks, and provide routine methods for sharing the information.
Carter (2009, pp. 2–6) says that the role of intelligence and information sharing among state and local law enforcement agencies enhances counterterrorism efforts. Large federal systems operate on a global basis, and officers in local communities know their jurisdictions better than anyone else. Community partnerships enhance the amount and quality of information that they can accumulate. The federal government does not have the resources or the community contacts to develop these links. The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan comes to the same conclusion. The ability of state and local agencies to share information is at the heart of preventing terrorist strikes within the borders of the United States (Daniels, 2003). When it comes to terrorism, state and local agencies are crucial to homeland security.
Self-Check
· What federal departments and agencies are charged with homeland security?
· Why does the intelligence community interface with law enforcement?
· What roles do state and local law enforcement agencies have in homeland security?
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13-3Building Intelligence Systems
Redirecting military and police forces is an essential part of developing a system to protect the nation. The most important aspect of security, however, is the information that guides security forces. If policies and strategy are important to the overall effort, information is crucial for day-to-day operations. For example, Thomas Barnett’s (2004) idea of creating an inclusive geopolitical economic policy in which everybody wins is a long-term strategy for reducing international violence. Somewhere between the current state of affairs and the outcome of such a policy is the everyday world of homeland security. This world is driven by intelligence, and security forces can be no more effective than their ability to gain information and process it in a meaningful way.
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13-3aThe Intelligence Process
For example, if a terrorist threat is coming from a particular country, intelligence analysts need to have a basic understanding of terrorism, crime, and political power before they are able to begin an examination of the problem. They need to have skills in several social sciences, an understanding of communication and language, and the ability to estimate the influence of nationalist and religious influences on behavior. Such basic knowledge comes from a multidisciplinary liberal education. It may not have a direct bearing on the problem, but basic information provides the skills needed to gather and analyze information about the actual terrorist threat. This is applied information.
Although academic in nature, this process is directly applicable to gathering intelligence. Police intelligence systems can be modeled after academic research. Basic intelligence involves general information about a subject and its subdisciplines. Applied intelligence involves gathering basic information about a target and real-time information about its current activities.
The practical application of this process comes through organizing structures aimed at collecting, analyzing, and forwarding information. Someone in every American law enforcement agency should be assigned to collect and forward terrorist intelligence. In small agencies, this may mean assigning a person who represents several police and sheriff’s departments; in moderate-size agencies, the function could be performed in the detective bureau or the planning unit. Large metropolitan and state police agencies need full-time intelligence units. At the state and regional levels, efforts must be made to assemble, categorize, and analyze information and place it within national and international contexts.
This results in a four-step process:
· Basic information: Analysts begin work after obtaining an in-depth, multidisciplinary education.
· Applied information: Analysts gather information about a specific problem.
· Real-time information: Analysts receive actual information as it is forwarded from the field.
· Analyzed information: Analysts produce intelligence based on analyzed information.
Ideally, steps two through four are repeated with each new piece of information.
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13-3bNational Security and Criminal Intelligence
As mentioned earlier, in network-to-network conflict, bureaucracies should not change their role. For example, if the CIA were to operate as if it was gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution, it would not be able to function. The same applies to all levels of law enforcement. Police agencies cannot gather information illegally. If they do, they defeat the society they are trying to protect. Each organization in a network has its own function, and the key to success in a network is sharing information.
This leads to the need for two different types of intelligence. National security intelligence is gathered to defend the nation. It is not used in criminal prosecutions, and it is not subject to legal scrutiny. Criminal intelligence is gathered by law enforcement and prosecuting attorneys. It cannot be gathered, analyzed, or stored without a reason to believe that a crime is about to take place or has taken place (J. White, 2004b, pp. 73–74).
Richard Best (2001) argues that national security differs from law enforcement. In police work, officers react to information provided voluntarily. Police actions are governed by the rules of evidence, and the ultimate purpose is to protect the rights of citizens, including those who have been arrested. National security intelligence, on the other hand, is used to anticipate threats. It uses aggressive methods to collect information, including, at times, operations in violation of the law. National security intelligence is ultimately designed to protect targets, not individuals’ rights.
Best quotes Stansfield Turner, a former director of the CIA, to summarize the differences between law enforcement and national security. “Give the FBI a task,” Turner once said, “and it will try to complete the mission within the constraints of the law. Give the CIA the same mission, and it tries to complete the task without concern for legality.” Law enforcement’s prime concern is public service. The American police will lose public trust if law enforcement relies on covert illegal operations.
Using Best’s insight, law enforcement should plan and develop two channels for information. One channel should be aimed at law enforcement intelligence, that is, the types of information police agencies collect. As Best (2001, 2014) describes it, this information is based on criminal activity and the protection of individual rights. It is governed by the rules of evidence. In other words, it must be legally admissible in court. Yet, police agencies will inevitably come upon threats to national security involving information that will not be used in a criminal prosecution. At this point, state and local police agencies should be prepared to pass such information along to defense sources. These two paths for information, one for criminal investigation and one for national security, can serve as the basis for dealing with intelligence collected by state and local police agencies. For example, an officer may stop an individual for suspected criminal behavior. After questioning the person, the officer no longer suspects that a crime is being committed, but the person seems to be associated with a known terrorist organization. The officer gathers information about the person and forwards it to a local fusion center. Neither the officer nor the police agency can keep this information because it does not involve a crime. The fusion center, however, has a group of analysts responsible for national security. They will analyze the officer’s information, transforming it into national security intelligence. It will not be used in a criminal prosecution, and it will not be stored by a law enforcement agency or used in a criminal prosecution (see Hammond, 2010).
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13-3cA Checkered Past
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies present their systems in a positive light, but critics point to two types of failures. First, intelligence processes have been ineffective. The FBI and CIA have been roundly criticized for failing to gather adequate information before the September 11 attacks and ineffectively analyzing the information they did have (Dillon, 2001; Nordland, Yousafzi, and Dehghanpisheh, 2002). The Bush administration and police agencies expressed disapproval of the FBI’s information sharing policies (Fields, 2002).
Second, the government has abused its authority in the past. Civil liberties groups fear growing power in agencies associated with homeland security, and others express concern over expanding executive authority (Herman, 2001; CNN, 2006; Keefer, 2006; EFF, 2011).
Rules for collecting criminal and national security intelligence are necessary to prevent such abuses in the future. For example, in the 1950s, the CIA tested drugs on Americans without their consent or knowledge; the FBI’s counterintelligence program COINTELPRO exceeded the authority of law enforcement in the name of national security. The government, responding to such abuses, began to limit the power of intelligence operations, unintentionally hampering their effectiveness. Law enforcement and national defense intelligence experienced difficult times during the administration of President Jimmy Carter (1976–1980). Carter was not seeking to dismantle intelligence operations; rather, he wanted to protect Americans from their government. The president tried to correct the abuses of power and end the scandal of using covert operations against American citizens.
Carter’s reaction was understandable, but critics believe that he went too far, and no other administration has been able to reconstitute effective intelligence organizations. A Time magazine article (Calabresi and Ratnesar, 2002) states the issue succinctly: America needs to learn to spy again. National security intelligence is crucial, but law enforcement has a role, the Time authors argue. They also censure bureaucratic structures for failing to share information, and they condemn the system for relying too heavily on machine and and other electronic information. We need information from people, the Time authors state emphatically. Another weak point is the inability to analyze information. Intelligence is fragmented and ineffective. Their opinion has been reflected in other studies (Best, 2001; D. Wise, 2002; Hammond, 2010; Fingar, 2011) (see the feature titled “Another Perspective: Types of Intelligence” later in this chapter).
Another Perspective
Types of Intelligence
There are different types of intelligence-gathering systems. The differences are crucial when dealing with civil rights (see Chapter 16), but each intelligence system has its own practical methods for assembling information.
Criminal intelligence is gathered by law enforcement agencies investigating illegal activity. State, local, and federal police agencies are not allowed to gather, store, or maintain record systems on general activities. Their information must be based on a reasonable suspicion that some sort of criminal activity is taking place or has taken place. Certain FBI operations may gather noncriminal intelligence if agents are assigned to national security. They do not use this evidence in criminal prosecutions.
National defense or security intelligence is gathered by several organizations in the DOD, National Security Agency, DOE, DHS, FBI, and CIA. Defense or security intelligence is usually based on one or more of the following sources:
1. HUMINT: Human intelligence from spies, informers, defectors, and other people
2. IMINT: Imagery intelligence from satellites and aircraft
3. SIGINT: Signal intelligence from communications
4. MASINT: Measures and signatures intelligence from sensing devices, such as detecting a weapons system based on the amount of heat it is producing
Defense or security intelligence can be gathered whether the targets are involved in a crime or not.
Unlike national defense or security intelligence gathering, police agencies are required to demonstrate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before they may collect information. As long as agencies reasonably suspect that the law is being broken or has been broken, law enforcement departments may gather and store criminal intelligence. The USA PATRIOT Act, first passed in October 2001 and renewed in July, 2015, increases the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information, but David Carter (2009), one of the foremost academic experts on law enforcement intelligence in the country, solemnly warns that the abuses of the past must not be repeated if police agencies want to develop effective intelligence systems (see also Dreyfuss, 2002). If police agencies improve their intelligence-gathering operations, they will do so under more stringent rules than those required for national security (see the feature titled “Another Perspective: David Carter’s Recommendations for Law Enforcement Intelligence”).
David Carter’s Recommendations for Law Enforcement Intelligence
David Carter suggests refocusing law enforcement efforts. Police activity, he argues, should be led by intelligence. To accomplish this, police agencies should take an “R-cubed” approach: reassess, refocus, and reallocate.
1. Reassess the following:
1. Calls for service
2. Specialized units
3. Need for new specializations
4. Community resources
5. Potential threats
6. Current intelligence
7. Political mandates from the community
2. Refocus in these ways:
1. Establish new priorities based on reassessment
2. Weigh priorities in terms of criticality
3. Actually implement changes
3. Reallocate—commit the resources needed to implement changes
Law enforcement intelligence differs from intelligence gathered for national security. Law enforcement agencies must base their activities on a reasonable suspicion that some criminal activity is taking place or has taken place.
Source: Carter, 2009.
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13-3dDomestic Intelligence Networks
Shortly after 9/11, the IACP joined with the DOJ to create the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) . The plan established norms for collecting, analyzing, and storing criminal intelligence within legal guidelines. It also suggested how information could be shared among agencies. Its primary function was to set minimum standards for criminal intelligence so that every American police agency knew the legal guidelines for using criminal information. It also sought to create standards for using technology and giving police officers access to information. The standards guide intelligence-gathering activities, and a national coordinating group seeks to maintain them (BJA, 2005; Brooks, 2011).
David Carter (2009, pp. 123–143) points to a number of criminal intelligence networks in operation after 9/11. The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) was created in 1973. RISS has six centers—each serving a selected group of states—that share criminal information with investigators working to combat a variety of criminal activities, including terrorism. RISS expanded operations in April 2003 by creating the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX). Complementing these systems is the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), which provides FBI intelligence to state and local agencies. The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) was created by a variety of police agencies in 1956. Today, it serves as a venue to share secure information on organized crime and terrorism.
Homeland Security Information Network
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a computer-based counterterrorism communications system connecting all 50 states; five territories; Washington, D.C.; and 50 major urban areas.
The HSIN allows all states and major urban areas to collect and disseminate information among federal, state, and local agencies involved in combating terrorism. It also:
· Helps provide situational awareness.
· Facilitates information sharing and collaboration with homeland security partners across federal, state, and local levels.
· Provides advanced analytic capabilities.
· Enables real-time sharing of threat information.
This communications capability delivers to states and major urban areas real-time interactive connectivity with the National Operations Center. This collaborative communications environment was developed by state and local authorities.
Source: DHS, 2015a.
Carter notes that the DHS has also created an intelligence system. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is set up to connect all jurisdictions with real-time communication. It includes state homeland security officials, the National Guard, emergency operations centers, and local emergency service providers. HSIN provides encrypted communications on a secure network. Designed to combine the criminal information of RISS with critical infrastructure protection, HSIN is designed to unite all the different organizations involved in homeland security (see the previous feature titled “Another Perspective: Homeland Security Information Network”). Critics maintain that the system is underused and that it duplicates the functions of proven systems like RISS (Jordan, 2005).
Despite the systems and networks that were developed to share information, many agencies still were not part of the information-sharing process. Fusion centers came about to correct this. Endorsed by the NCISP, fusion centers were designed to place all intelligence in a single center, combining multiple agencies in a single unit to analyze all types of threats. As a result, a typical fusion center may have analysts and agents from several federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, military personnel, and local police officers and criminal analysts. It merges information—earning the name fusion—into a single process of data analysis. Criminal information is channeled to investigations, and national security intelligence is passed on to the appropriate agency. Once passed on, national security intelligence is not available for criminal analysis or storage in law enforcement files (DHS, 2015b).
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13-3eFusion Centers
An intelligence fusion center represents a new concept, but it has actually been developing over the past 35 years. Law enforcement agencies were aware of the need to collect and analyze criminal intelligence long before the attacks of 9/11. David Carter (2008) says that fusion centers evolved from Regional Intelligence Centers (RIC) created to counteract drug trafficking in the 1980s. There was no single model for these units, and the structure and organization of RICs differed from state to state. The RICs eventually evolved into High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) intelligence centers—HIDTA-RIC.
Carter says the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) began to centralize its efforts to gather intelligence for reducing gun violence over the next decade, creating Regional Crime Gun Centers (RCGC) . Realizing the effective operations of the HIDTA-RICs, ATF began coordinating activities with them, and in some jurisdictions, both gun and drug intelligence operated from the same buildings. These specialized intelligence units aimed at specific crimes would become the basis of the fusion centers.
Although the centers were operating by the beginning of the twenty-first century, Carter reports that they had some drawbacks. First, their focus tended to be on local crimes and issues. There were few efforts to share information on a larger, more systematic scale. Second, no funding was available to expand the operation of the centers. These factors combined to produce a third weakness: There was no incentive to expand or increase operations due to the focus on the immediate region. Finally, the centers focused only on specific crimes. The directors of the intelligence centers made no effort to look at exotic crimes like terrorism, and they had no effective method of identifying and passing on national security intelligence. Indeed, the attitudes of the Department of Justice and the attorney general would have prevented such activity.
Despite these weaknesses, cooperation between the HIDTA-RIC and the ATF centers gave law enforcement a new advantage. Information from multiple jurisdictions was being gathered, analyzed, and “fused” into a single intelligence picture of criminal activity. This was the embryo that would grow into a larger intelligence system. David Carter says the intelligence process changed drastically after 9/11 but that the foundation for fusion centers was present well before the event. When the newly created Department of Homeland Security looked for a model to enhance domestic intelligence, it found one in the partnership between HIDTA-RICs and ATF. DHS began funding the centers, and they eventually evolved into fusion centers.
Although each fusion center remains unique and is geared to meet regional needs, the centers follow a common process. Bart Johnson (2007a, 2011) describes the model for fusing intelligence. The purpose of fusion centers is to place experts and analysts from a variety of fields and organizations in a single collaborative work environment. The analysts bring diverse skill sets to provide the resources and expertise necessary to evaluate and disperse intelligence. Raw information comes to fusion centers from law enforcement, other government agencies, and the private sector. The raw information is analyzed to reveal patterns of suspicious activity, the behavior habits of known or suspected terrorists, the vulnerability of targets, and the probability of an attack. This information, known as an intelligence product , is returned to the field on a need-to-know basis. When they were initially created, the primary focus was terrorism, but the mission would expand. Although these models differed, the fusion centers together created the basis for state, local, tribal, and federal intelligence partnerships (see DHS, 2015b).
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13-3fFusion Center Intelligence
Fusion centers continued to evolve with an “all crime” or total criminal intelligence (TCI) mentality. Carter (2008) shows that fusion centers took the TCI concept one step further by analyzing information about “all threats,” and from there analysis went to “all hazards.” The primary mission remains analyzing intelligence to identify terrorist threats, but there is a great redundancy in information. In other words, information that can be used to prevent terrorism is also useful in identifying criminal and public health problems. Carter says the same type of information can also be used to target law enforcement activities for community-based crime control and problem solving. Finally, fusion centers created an opportunity to improve the delivery of emergency and nonemergency services.
Practitioners argue that the new efforts have proven to be successful (Johnson, 2007, 2011). For example, a California town experienced a series of armed robberies at gas stations in 2005. At first, this appeared to be a series of local crimes. Officers investigating the robberies gathered standard criminal information to help identify suspects, and in the routine course of the investigations, they forwarded information to a fusion center. Analysts at the fusion center made a startling discovery. The robberies were not being staged for financial gain. The group behind the robberies was trying to collect money to support a campaign of domestic terrorism. The robberies were solved, and several planned acts of terrorism were thwarted.
Such incidental evidence indicates that fusion centers have increased the effectiveness of law enforcement and have enhanced domestic security. There is a need for more systematic research and evaluation to determine the overall effectiveness of the fusion centers. Currently, 72 centers collect and analyze information, coordinating that information with DHS. Still, there are squabbles from time to time about information sharing, and there are struggles among the various bureaucracies for control of information. The ideal goal is to distribute information to agencies that have a right to know and need to know. Sometimes, the ideal is not attained. The rhetoric is based in information sharing and cooperative analysis. Rigorous research is required to determine if this is actually happening.
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13-3gU.S. Attorneys and JTTFs
The DOJ has created two intelligence systems, one in federal prosecutors’ offices and the other in law enforcement. According to DOJ (2015), “The United States Attorneys serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General. There are 93 United States Attorneys stationed throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. United States Attorneys are appointed by, and serve at the discretion of, the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. One United States Attorney is assigned to each of the 94 judicial districts, with the exception of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands where a single United States Attorney serves in both districts. Each United States Attorney is the chief federal law enforcement officer of the United States within his or her particular jurisdiction.”
The various JTTFs operate in a similar manner. Each JTTF is made up of officers from all levels of American law enforcement and from a variety of different types of agencies. This gives each JTTF a wide range of authority because officers from different police agencies have different types of law enforcement authority and power. Every JTTF agent also receives a national security intelligence clearance. Like the ATAC, JTTF agents may not use national security intelligence in criminal prosecutions, but they are allowed to collect and use it for national defense. They may also work with various intelligence agencies. In addition, each regional FBI office has a field intelligence coordinator who works with ATACs and JTTFs (Cumming and Masse, 2004; FBI, 2015).
Self-Check
· How does raw information become intelligence?
· What is the difference between national security and criminal intelligence?
· How can existing systems be used to create or to expand future intelligence networks?
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13-4Issues in Homeland Security
There are many organizational and bureaucratic problems inherent in organizations. These issues are discussed in Chapter 14. Other aspects of homeland security are directly related to homeland security. These issues include understanding the role of law enforcement, the value of symbolic targets, threat analysis, planning, and how to create a culture of information sharing.
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13-4aLaw Enforcement’s Special Role
If military forces are to transform themselves in the fashion suggested by Thomas Barnett (2004), law enforcement must seek and find new roles. More than half of the DHS agencies have police power, and state and local governments look to law enforcement to prevent attacks and respond to the unthinkable. Interestingly, federal, state, and local officers have taken the lead in identifying and disrupting terrorism in the United States. Whether terrorists are homegrown or imported from foreign lands, police agencies are responsible for breaking some of America’s most formidable terrorist cells. Law enforcement has a key function in homeland security (see Carter, 2009).
American law enforcement has a long tradition of reactive patrol, that is, responding to crimes and calls for assistance. With the advent of radio-dispatched motorized patrol, response time became the measure of police effectiveness. It was assumed that the sooner the police arrived at the scene of a crime, the more likely they would be to make an arrest. Like fire departments responding to smoke, police effectiveness was determined by the ability to respond quickly to crime.
If state and local agencies shift to offensive thinking and action, two results will inevitably develop. First, police contact with potential terrorists will increase, but as Sherry Colb (2001) points out, the vast majority of any ethnic or social group is made up of people who abhor terrorism. This increases the possibility of negative stereotyping and abuses of power. Second, proactive measures demand increased intelligence gathering, and much of the information will have no relation to criminal activity. If not properly monitored, such intelligence may be misused.
Another issue appears in the private sector. Kayyem and Howitt (2002) find that offensive action begins in the local community. The weakness in local systems occurs, however, because state and local police departments frequently do not think beyond their jurisdictions, and they do not routinely take advantage of potential partnerships inside their bailiwicks. Kayyem and Howitt believe that partnerships are the key to community planning. One of the greatest potential allies is private security organizations. Unfortunately, many law enforcement agencies frown on private security and fail to create joint ventures with the private sector.
On the positive side of the debate, counterterrorism is not a mystical operation. It requires many of the skills already employed in preventive patrol, criminal investigation, and surveillance. With a few tweaks, police intelligence operations and drug enforcement units can add counterterrorism to their agendas, and patrol and investigative units can be trained to look for terrorist activities in the course of their normal duties. If properly managed, these activities need not present a threat to civil liberties.
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13-4bThe Role of Symbols and Structures
Asymmetrical war is waged against symbolic targets , and homeland security is designed to secure symbols. Just because a target has symbolic significance does not mean it lacks physical reality. The bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, for example, had symbolic value, and the casualties were horrific. Attacks against symbols disrupt support structures and can have a high human toll. Defensive measures are put in place to protect the physical safety of people and property as well as the symbolic meaning of a target (see Juergensmeyer, 2003, pp. 155–163; Critical Incident Analysis Group, 2001, pp. 9–16).
Symbols need not only be considered in the abstract. Blowing up a national treasure would entail the loss of a national symbol, but killing thousands of innocent people becomes a symbol in itself. Grenville Byford (2002) points out that a symbolic attack may simply be designed to inflict massive casualties—killing people has a symbolic value, and thus killing civilians achieves a political purpose for terrorists. Strategies for protection should be grounded in an understanding of the problem. Ian Lesser (1999, pp. 85–144) outlines three forms of terrorism: symbolic, pragmatic, and systematic. Symbolic terrorism is a dramatic attack to show vulnerability; pragmatic terrorism involves a practical attempt to destroy political power; and systematic terrorism is waged over a period of time to change social conditions. Lesser also points to several examples in which symbolic factors enter into the attacks. In other words, terrorists use symbolic attacks, or attacks on symbols, to achieve pragmatic or systematic results.
All societies create symbols, and American democracy is no different. In a time of asymmetrical war, American symbols demand protection. The key to security, the CIAG concludes, is to enhance protection while maintaining openness. The irony is that every added security measure increases the feeling of insecurity. The CIAG report cites metal detectors at county courthouses as an example. Simply going through the detector before entering a building gives a person the feeling that things might fall apart. The key is to make symbolic targets as secure as possible while giving the illusion that very few security precautions have been taken.
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13-4cPlanning for Homeland Security
Everyone knows that planning should take place before a problem emerges. Effective police planning incorporates a description of a goal and methods for achieving it (Hudzik and Cordner, 1983). Planning should be based on the assets available to an agency and a projection of resources needed to meet the goal. A good plan will show how different entities interrelate and may reveal unexpected consequences. Planning brings resources together in a complex environment to manage multiple consequences (see the feature titled “Another Perspective: Community Threat Analysis”).
Another Perspective
Community Threat Analysis
Examine the following considerations for defensive planning, or community threat analysis. What other items might be added?
· Find networks in and among communities. Look at transportation, power grids and fuel storage, water supplies, industrial logistics and storage, and the flow of people.
· Think the way a terrorist does. Which targets are vulnerable? Which targets would cause the most disruption? Which buildings are vulnerable? Where is private security ineffective?
· Obtain architectural plans for all major buildings. Protect air intakes, power supplies, and possible points for evacuation.
· Have detailed emergency information for each school.
· Practice tactical operations in each school building after hours.
· Prioritize. Assign a criticality rating to each target, assessing its importance, and rank targets according to comparative ratings.
· Coordinate with health services.
· Discuss triage and quarantine methods. Plan for biological, chemical, and radiological contamination.
· Look at emergency plans for other communities.
· Prepare added security for special events.
· Designate an emergency command post and roles for personnel from other agencies. Practice commanding mock attacks.
· Study past emergencies and determine what law enforcement learned from its shortcomings.
Source: Management Analytics and others, 1995
The IACP (2001) believes planning can be guided by looking for threats within local communities. Police agencies should constantly monitor communities to determine whether a terrorist threat is imminent. Indicators such as an increase in violent rhetoric, the appearance of extremist groups, and an increase in certain types of crimes may demonstrate that a terrorist threat is on the horizon. Planning is based on the status of potential violence, and law enforcement can develop certain responses based on the threat. Prepared responses, the IACP contends, are proactive (see the feature titled “Another Perspective: Information for Planning”).
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13-4dCreating a Culture of Information Sharing
The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 56; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004b, pp. 3–34) calls for increasing information sharing among law enforcement agencies by building a cooperative environment that enables sharing of essential information. It will be a “system of systems that can provide the right information to the right people at all times.” This is an excellent idea in principle.
D. Douglas Bodrero (2002) believes that many of these systems are already in place. The six-part RISS information network, whose policies are controlled by its members, is ideal for sharing intelligence. It has secure intranet, bulletin board, and conference capabilities. The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) system and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) are also sources for information sharing. The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) routinely shares information with member agencies. These established systems are now complemented by HSIN and a host of fusion centers (U.S. DOJ, Office of Justice Programs, 2006). Critics say that these networks are underused. In the past, Robert Taylor (1987) found two primary weaknesses in U.S. systems:
· (1)
Intelligence is not properly analyzed, and
· (2)
agencies do not coordinate information.
Today, critics say the same thing. They feel that information sharing is recommended on the highest levels, but it does not take place (ONDCP, 2015.).
Despite criticism, information sharing is growing into a law enforcement norm. The NCISP has been accepted at all levels of police administration. The systems created after 9/11, older systems such as RISS, fusion centers, and individual agency operations point to a new idea in law enforcement, intelligence-led policing . This concept is a continuation of community policing, in which police officers anticipate and solve community problems with citizens before an increase in crime and social disorder occurs. Community policing is based on information gathered from police–citizen partnerships, and intelligence-led policing systematically combines such information with other intelligence data from multiple sources. The purpose of intelligence-led policing is to redeploy resources in areas where they are most needed based on the analysis of criminal information (Duekmedjian, 2006).
Another Perspective
Information for Planning
· List available resources.
· Project potential attacks.
· Identify critical infrastructures.
Factors influencing plans, including:
· Emergency command structures
· Coordination among agencies
· Mass casualties
· Victim and family support
· Preservation of evidence
· Crime scene management
· Media relations
· Costs
· Training and preincident exercises
Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2001.
Intelligence-led policing is part of a process to guide the deployment of law enforcement resources. Carter says that information from citizens defines the parameters of community problems. Law enforcement agencies need to provide information so that citizens can distinguish between normal and suspicious behavior. The law enforcement agencies are to organize community meetings and work with the community to gather information. In addition, they must communicate with the community, working with citizens and advising them of police policy for problems. In this model, the police are to serve as an extension of community needs while advising citizens on the issues that the police see as social problems. All data are scientifically analyzed to guide the distribution of law enforcement resources.
Intelligence-led policing, especially within the framework of counterterrorism, is not without its critics. Critics are afraid that information sharing will lead to massive databases on people who are not subject to criminal investigations. They also fear privacy violations as citizens share information, and they are afraid that anyone who casually encounters a known terrorist suspect will be labeled a terrorist supporter. Critics also say that intelligence-led policing may work in conjunction with national security intelligence gathering, and there will be no oversight of the collection, analysis, and storage of information. They also fear misguided profiling. For example, when a Muslim family moves into a non-Muslim neighborhood, citizens who see the practice of Islam as a suspicious behavior could discriminate against the family (Abramson and Godoy, 2006).
Self-Check
· How do diverse, independent law enforcement agencies assist with homeland security?
· Why is planning an important process in protecting both infrastructure and symbols?
· Explain intelligence-led policing and total criminal intelligence.
13-5Intelligence Reform
The Washington Post (Priest and Arkin, 2010) ran a series of articles critiquing the intelligence community in the summer of 2010. The project involved a dozen journalists doing research over a two-year period. The Post found that the intelligence community had grown so large that no one could account for its costs. In fact, the number of people involved in intelligence and the number of agencies doing the same work were also unknown. It found that over 3,000 public and private organizations operated counterterrorism-related programs at 10,000 locations across the United States. The number of top secret security clearances, for about 854,000 people, was astounding. Over 50,000 intelligence reports were published each year, and no one agency had the authority to manage the overall operation. A panel of experts (Washington Post, 2010a, 2010b) concluded that the massive endeavor was unmanaged and ineffective, and it operated with no clear lines of authority. Its worst characteristic was that the intelligence community did not produce credible information about potential threats.
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13-5aMoving in the Right Direction?
Nancy Tucker (2008), a former executive in the intelligence community and now a professor at Georgetown University, suggests that the failure of intelligence analysis is evidenced by two factors: the surprise attacks of September 11 and the analysis of the WMD program in Iraq. Congress created the ODNI to address such flaws. The ODNI was intended to be a vehicle for continuous reform, an organization to prevent bureaucratic goal displacement and organizational stagnation; however, its massive restructuring met all types of resistance. First, many people believed that the efficiency and methods of the intelligence community needed to be improved. Restructuring created another level of bureaucracy, but it did not address the need for accuracy and efficiency. Second, the new organization confused traditional lines of authority. Specifically, the director of the CIA was to be the one person who could synthesize information and present an apolitical, objective assessment of data to the executive branch of government.
Tucker, however, believes that the reorganization of intelligence under the ODNI has signaled the beginning of improvement. The ODNI is able to balance all the intelligence agencies’ needs for information. In the past, the CIA director performed this function but was always forced to guard the interests of the CIA. The ODNI is able to avoid this bureaucratic pitfall, producing a better balance in analyzed information. The ODNI has also been able to attack the problem of group think by placing analysts in critical thinking training during the first stages of their careers.
Tucker concludes that the system of classifying information, the process of making information secret, can be unreasonable. This happens in two primary ways. First, political actors may classify information to defend their political position. For example, a president can classify information that would be harmful to his party’s political position, even though the information has nothing to do with national security. Second, bureaucracies hold classified information for power. Overabundant secrecy and manipulation of “need-to-know” information creates power structures among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Although not cited by Tucker, almost any law enforcement officer who has worked closely with the FBI knows how an agency can hoard information. Information, Tucker says, should be developed and shared to produce outcomes. Classification should be designed to protect sources, not information. Almost all the information is in the public realm anyway.
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13-5bRedirecting the Focus of Reform
Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott (2008) suggest that the problem in intelligence is not the structure of the system; the problem can be found with individual analysts. Official intelligence investigations into shortcomings tend to focus on structures and organization, so they miss this point. Certain types of personalities, Bar-Joseph and McDermott argue, are more prone to fall prey to making erroneous judgments. Some people have traits that influence their ability to objectively analyze information. Personality assessment tests are able to screen people for these tendencies, and intelligence agencies should spend more time examining and selecting analysts.
Bar-Joseph and McDermott base their argument on psychological assessment techniques that have been developed over the past 50 years. To help to ensure that internal prejudices do not filter the information under review, it is important to identify biases that an analyst brings to the job. Psychological assessments can determine which people would discount information not contained in their personal experiences and which people would interpret ambiguous circumstances only within the framework of previous understandings. Both of these traits create an internal circle; that is, new information is interpreted within existing understandings of reality, discounting any new possibility. When this happens, analysts develop conclusions that they expected to find in the first place. This type of reasoning is susceptible to group think, where groups of similar individuals join together to reinforce their own erroneous conclusions. This leads to a three-part pattern:
· (1)
There is new information about a surprise activity before a terrorist attack develops,
· (2)
analysts ignore new information and focus on their previous experiences with terrorism, and
· (3)
the real-life outcome is a surprise.
This is reinforced by a bureaucratic tendency to avoid taking risks. When respected peer group members suggest that information be interpreted in a particular manner, it is difficult to go against the current.
The key to reform, Bar-Joseph and McDermott conclude, is to shift the unit of analysis away from organizational structures and consumer-driven intelligence products. The entire system needs independent minds that will look at new ways of interpreting data and that will challenge established methods of interpretation. The authors argue that psychological assessment during the analyst selection process will help agencies find the types of people who think in this manner. This change will produce a new method of selecting, training, and promoting analysts. It will also provide, they believe, better information and fewer surprises.
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13-5cTarget-Based Analysis
John Gentry (2008) suggests that the current spate of reform is part of an American tradition. The literature of American intelligence is replete with examples of failures to predict significant events and reform efforts to overcome deficiencies. Gentry believes that most current efforts will fail because they are misdirected. The bureaucracies in the intelligence community have a tremendous stake in preserving the status quo, and employees in each organization believe that they will be blamed for misinterpreting information. This produces a culture that avoids risk taking and reinforces group think.
Reform, if and when it develops, is laboriously slow. Gentry concludes that the intelligence process will work better if local domestic issues and vulnerabilities are lessened. Target-based analysis focuses on two questions: What targets are vulnerable? What capabilities exist to address threats? As David Carter (2009) concludes, intelligence works best when information is based on potential threats and there is a sharing of the information among differing levels of government.
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13-5dThe Need for Reform Questioned
After a major gaff in foreign policy, especially when it involves loss of life, politicians and others are quick to blame the intelligence process. They denounce analysts for failing to predict events, they criticize agencies for bureaucratic policies, and they demand change and reform. Congress holds hearings as it tries to find the guilty party responsible for the intelligence failure. There are people, however, who believe that the intelligence community is not in need of reform, and the political decision makers who act improperly on false assumptions bear the responsibility for many “intelligence failures.”
Thomas Fingar (2011), a retired high-ranking intelligence officer from the Department of State, argues that the intelligence community actually does reasonably good work. Its goal is to reduce uncertainty. Analysts provide decision makers with information. Although they are to be blamed when information is not clearly presented or is intentionally skewed, the simple fact is that there is quite a bit of information they do not know. Furthermore, in criminal intelligence, analysts must have reasonable evidence that the actions they wish to analyze are associated with criminal activity. Information is almost always incomplete in criminal and national security intelligence.
You can see an example in your college career. Have you ever known a professor who misstated a fact or presented a probable course of action based on faulty information? Most professors engage in activities similar to intelligence analysts, with two major exceptions. Academics are usually not working in a life-or-death environment, and they frequently have weeks, months, or even years to analyze a problem. Intelligence analysts work in time frames involving, weeks, days, and sometimes even minutes. Often, lives depend on their ability to analyze information. Your professors make mistakes. Intelligence analysts do, too.
Analysts are charged with tracking criminals, drug traffickers, and terrorists throughout the world, and they are expected to provide timely information to protect American lives and property. They try to present as complete a picture as possible, realizing that there will always be gaps in the information. When there is a mistake, it is often in the decision, not in the process and analysis that provided the intelligence.
Self-Check
· What prompted calls for intelligence reform?
· Do reform efforts look promising?
· Why might there be no need for reform?
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13-6Emphasizing the Points
Homeland security involves a variety of activities at all levels of government, law enforcement agencies, the military, intelligence agencies, and the private sector. Preventing terrorism is the result of gathering and analyzing information. This is accomplished under two sets of laws, one guiding criminal intelligence and the other focused on national security. While this is extremely complicated, the NCISP has provided guidelines and standards for managing the intelligence process. This takes place in regional fusion centers. Homeland security is ever-changing, and the intelligence process must be continually reviewed and changed to meet new threats.
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Chapter Review
13-7aSummary of Chapter Objectives
· Homeland security has a variety of meanings to different government agencies, private organizations, and interest groups. The best way to define it is to look at the mission of each particular agency dealing with homeland security.
· After 9/11, several federal agencies were tasked with homeland security. The Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense have major roles in preventing terrorism. The intelligence community contributes to counterterrorism efforts, and there is a major role for state and local law enforcement to play.
· The intelligence process is very similar to basic and applied academic research. It involves the legal recognition, collection, analysis, and distribution of information. Intelligence is “analyzed information.”
· Criminal intelligence requires a criminal predicate, and it may be used in criminal prosecutions. It can be revealed at a criminal trial. National security intelligence cannot be used in criminal investigations or criminal trials. It is not subject to discovery.
· The International Association of Chiefs (IACP) of police created a committee to develop national standards for criminal intelligence. This resulted in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). The Department of Justice created the Global Justice Information Sharing Coordinating Council (Global) to address the problems inherent in sharing information among multiple levels of law enforcement.
· Fusion centers developed from Regional Intelligence Centers. The Department of Homeland Security expanded their operations after the 9/11 attacks. Fusion centers take criminal intelligence from multiple sources and blend, or “fuse,” it together to create a real-time picture of criminal activity. They can also forward national security intelligence without using it in criminal prosecutions.
· Law enforcement has a leading role in homeland security because of its presence in communities and its ability to gather information. There are several excellent federal networks, for example, RISS and HSIN. HIDTAs and EPIC assist in distributing antiterrorism intelligence, even though they were designed for drug interdiction. Fusion centers are involved with providing state and local intelligence.
· There are several important issues for homeland security. Law enforcement has a special role in terms of recognizing possible terrorist activity and coordinating preventive measures from multiple community partnerships. Planning is a crucial part of the process. While the infrastructure is critical, symbolic targets also have a special significance. Finally, all partners responsible for homeland security must create a culture of information sharing.
· While intelligence has received quite a bit of attention since 9/11, reformers argue that there are areas where it can be improved. The goal of creating a safe homeland should guide intelligence efforts. Analysts must be trained to recognize broad patterns. Finally, intelligence must be based on threats to known or suspected targets.
· Reform may not be needed. Intelligence will always be incomplete because it is not possible to gather all the information about a target. So-called failures may be the result of poor decision making, not poor intelligence analysis.
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Chapter Review
13-7bLooking into the Future
The analysis of criminal and national security intelligence is moving into the cyberworld and social media networks. This has been happening for a number of years, and the trend will probably continue as technology increases. Use of the Dark Web or Deep Web, Internet traffic hidden from most users, will most likely follow this pattern. The growing use of electronic intelligence will not mean that undercover operations and informant development will become passé. Quite the opposite will be true. As cyberanalysis becomes more sophisticated, traditional methods of intelligence gathering will grow in importance to verify the veracity of information. Electronic intelligence will improve human intelligence gathering.
The nature of state and local intelligence gathering may change. The New York City Police Department has deployed about 100 officers to foreign countries because information from federal sources has been lacking. Local agencies and regional associations may begin to establish international intelligence networks unless federal cooperation increases.
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Chapter Review
13-7cKey Terms
· Department of Homeland Security
· Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
· National security intelligence
· National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan
· Regional Information Sharing System
· Regional Intelligence Center
· High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area