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Chapter 10: THE MEDIA: FRIEND AND FOE
The magnitude of media response to future disasters it likely to be much greater than that shown in this photograph of the 1971 San Fernando Valley, California earthquake. (Courtesy of Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, California)
Many emergency managers have been frustrated when they have had to divert much needed time and resources to address the demands of the media, while at the same time trying to mount a multi-organizational disaster response under conditions of extreme urgency and uncertainty. Well-planned inter-actions with the media, though, can be of critical importance in decreasing the loss of life and property. In those types of disasters where warning is possible, accurate, timely, and consistent information conveyed by the media can be one of the greatest factors preventing death and injury. It has been suggested that difficulties with the media occur because emergency agencies do not understand how the media operate in disasters and how to deal with them in an effective way. This chapter identifies some of the important patterns of media behavior in disasters and suggests ways of optimizing the interaction between the media, the public, and disaster response agencies.
DISASTERS ARE A MEDIA EVENT
Disasters are a significant source of news. In fact, one study by Gans estimated that 25% of all news stories involve natural disasters, technological hazards, or civil disturbances. Why is this the case? One reason that has been suggested is that mass media news reporting is an entertainment business. Often, news reports are called "stories," and reporters are encouraged to find events that have the same attributes as that of good fiction: drama, conflict, problems, solutions, and rising and
falling action. Disasters offer all of these characteristics, and for television they present the additional advantage of great attention-grabbing, Asuals (Wenger, 1985b:2; Larson, 1980:79,119).
"From the journalistic point of view, a natural disaster has all the ingredients for the perfect media event' (especially for the electronic media). It's brief, spectacular, often mysterious, action-oriented, and portrays human suffering and courage." (Bolduc, 1987)
Another reason that has been given to explain why disasters attract so much media attention is that they are generally so easy to cover.
"Television likes to cover disasters. All it takes is a film crew or two, a public shelter where victims can be photographed, a few shots of rising water, destroyed homes or trailers, some high turf, and an authority figure to interview and you have one minute and thirty seconds of dynamite, visual coverage." (Wenger, 1985b:3)
Evening news broadcasts are highly profitable programs for most local stations. They are also valuable for local network affiliates because they attract an audience that also tends to watch the network's national news broadcasts. Therefore, in all major markets there is intense competition for local news audiences, and a considerable amount of "show business" and entertainment has been injected into programming to help attract these audiences (Lar-son,1980:79).
THE MEDIA AS "FRIEND"
Public officials sometimes decry the mass media. Many feel that they would be able to carry out their disaster duties in a calmer atmosphere if the media were not there to play "sideline quarterback," criticizing actions and questioning decisions. However, in spite of this feeling, the absence of the media in disasters can create enormous difficulties (Scanlon, 1985:123).
The mass media, and the electronic media (TV and commercial radio) in particular, are the most important source from which the public obtains information on disasters (Wenger, 1980:241; Wenger, 1985a:62). The importance of the private sector news media as a communications system in the United States is reflected in the following quotes:
"The entire governmental structure of the United States-Department of Defense, FEMA, NASA, all of the state and local governments-together have sophisticated communications systems costing dozens of billions of dollars; they are the envy of the rest of the world. But in our society that marvel of electronic wizardry is incapable of crossing the threshold of the American home, or entering the confines of the American automobile to communicate directly to the citizen. For that link to the public the emergency management community is totally dependent on the private sector, the news media."
"The development of a reasonable, effective and constructive working relationship between the emergency manager and the media in disasters should be a high priority goal of the emergency management community. The fundamental responsibility of all governments is assuring the safety and well-being of its citizens. That mission cannot be carried out in an information vacuum. The citizen must know if and when he is in danger, and if and when the danger has passed. And he has a right to know about the fate of his neighbors." (Holton, 1985:6)
The mass media can play a number of important roles that help to lessen the effects of disaster (Comm on Disasters, 1980:vii). They transmit warnings of impending tornadoes, hurricanes,
floods, tidal waves, and volcano eruptions.
Commercial radio and television are the most frequent sources from which the public receives initial warning about an impending disaster. Even when initial warning is from another source such as sirens, people turn to the media for further information (Drabek, 1986:91,113; Quarantelli, 1982c:61; Moore, 1958:212; Kreps, 1980:61). Indeed, people often react to warning sirens with disbelief until such confirmation is obtained (Kreps, 1980:61). When media warning messages are clearly worded, authoritative, and consistent, they can be very effective in stimulating appropriate protective activity (Wenger, 1985b:18).
On occasion, the media have even been known to initiate such warnings without awaiting official requests:
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Topeka, Kansas, June 8, 1966. A local radio station had its own alert plan for severe weather situa tions. This involved the dispersal of mobile radio units that would make on-the-spot reports if a funnel cloud was sighted. The radio station's own warning broadcast was not only heard before the sounding of the public alert system, but also 30 minutes before the Weather Bureau's official teletype warning (Kreps, 1980:60).
Often, it is not only the public that receives useful warning and information from the media. When, as often occurs, there is inadequate communication among emergency response organizations, their best source of information may be from the mass media (Wenger, 1985b:18).
EXAMPLE: Flash Floods, Terrace, British Columbia, October 30, 1978. CFTK, the local radio and TV station was often the first source of information for the public about disaster-related problems. "Individuals in trouble called the ... station rather than an official agency. The station then quite quickly passed that information on to the various authorities. The station also was the first place to define the extent of the emergency situation. A number of local officials said that they had not viewed the situation as being close to a disaster until they heard the reports of the media. The various disaster response agencies intended to work on their own and not share information. Thus they learned the overall situation only by listening to radio and/or watching television (Scanlon, 1980:260).
EXAMPLE: Metro Subway Crash, Washington, DC, January 13, 1982. Little useful information was received from the accident site, and information from official governmental sources was conflicting. Most of the hospitals learned of the crash either from incoming emergency medical services personnel or from the news media (Edelstein, 1982:161).
In a number of disasters, it has been observed that the media has conveyed important information about the disaster useful to government officials and relief agencies (Moore, 1958:189; Wenger, 1985b:18; Edelstein, 1982:161; Killian, 1953:S-2).
EXAMPLE: in a forest fire disaster one radio station "be-came an emergency appendage for a number of disaster-related organizations, including the Civil Defense, the police and fire departments, the county sheriffs office, and the Salvation Army. The station not only served as an interagency communications link, but it also collected information about the fire for emergency organizations and sent that information to them through its mobile unit 'live coverage' of the disaster." (Kreps, 1980:63)
The mass media may perform a number of other useful functions to aid disaster-relevant organizations and the public:
They may convey instructions to the public as to how they can lessen or deal with the effects of the disaster. They may help to educate the public about how to prepare for disasters (Kreps, 1980:59; Wenger, 1985b:17).
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They may stimulate donations from other parts of the country which (if handled properly so as not to overwhelm the stricken areas with unneeded supplies) can help speed recovery (Kreimer, 1980:18; Comm on Disasters, 1980:4).
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They may draw attention to natural and technological hazards and stimulate public support for actions to prevent or mitigate disasters. They may help to overcome public and governmental apathy by drawing attention to disaster risks and inadequate prepared-ness (Stevenson, 1981:36; Drabek, 1986:62).
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They can help to minimize the number of inquiries from anxious loved ones by providing accurate information about the severity and scope of the disaster and by publicizing lists of survivors (Kreimer, 1980:18; Kreps, 1980:46).
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When other means are not available they can be used for point-to-point and person-to-person communications if necessary to expedite rescue and recovery (Yutzy, 1969:103,122).
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They will often withhold news if they consider it to be dangerous to release to the public (Scanlon, 1982:18).
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Good publicity from media coverage is a factor that may facilitate future funding, donations, or re-election for those involved in disaster response or management (Larson, 1980:89).
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THE MEDIA AS "'FOE"
Emergency managers have often expressed frustration and consternation with media operations in disasters (Wenger, 1985b:5; 1982). They feel that the media complicate the tasks at hand and that paying attention to media demands diverts their attention from urgent matters like casualty care, search and rescue, and evacuation. As those responding to the Mt. St. Helens eruption discovered, trying to organize all of their forces into a unified, multi-organizational effort is a monumental task. This is even more painful when it has to be carried out under the scrutinizing eyes of the international press (Kili-janek,1981:72).
Demands on Resources, Facilities, and Officials The media will make demands on communications, transportation, and other local resources. In situations where the disaster has reduced the available functioning communication and transportation systems, these demands are even more noticeable. In extreme cases, their demands may completely tie up any surviving transportation and communication facilities, and local Officials may find themselves responding more to the needs of the media than to the disaster situation. The media have other needs too, and expect local emergency personnel to fulfill them. These needs include adequate lighting, electrical power, work space, and the provision of officials to give them information or take them on tours of the disaster area (Wenger, 1985b:7, Scanlon, 1982:17, Scanlon, 1985:124; Rosow, 1977:87).
Reporters have been described as descending on disaster officials like "Wolf packs" and overwhelming them with demands for specific information the type of which is seldom available in the early phases of the incident. They win often pressure officials for "exact figures" on the number of deaths and injuries, the amount of property damage, and the quality of aid expected. In technological disasters they will ask why and how such an accident could happen. If officials say they don't know the answers, questions may be raised as to their competence. In many cases, officials are pressured to offer estimates. Unfortunately, estimates obtained from various sources may prove to be conflicting or inconsistent, which also paints a picture of organizational incompetence (Wenger, 1985b:6; Scanlon, 1985:124; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:70; Rosow, 1977:86).
Distortion of Facts The entertainment aspect of news broadcasts focuses on the dramatic and unique aspects of disasters, favoring the reporting of the unusual versus the typical or representative events Quarantelli, 1981b:63; Larson, 1980:93). It has been argued that this perspective perpetuates common myths about disasters. It also leads to an exaggerated picture of the disaster's magnitude, a factor which tends to magnify the problems of overresponse and convergence.
"Media reports frequently failed to include qualifiers about uncertain information ... (they) do not seem to want to accept the reality that disasters are full of ambiguity about precisely what happened. The media persist in trying to be precise, and in the process, blunder into inaccuracy." (Kreps, 1980:66)
Perpetuation of Disaster Myths Decades of research have revealed that a number of popular beliefs about what happens in disasters are incorrect. It has been argued that the persistence of these "disaster myths" is at least partly attributable to the images portrayed by news reports (Bolduc, 1987).
For example, documented cases of panic flight in disasters are extremely rare. In fact, a much more significant problem is getting people to leave their homes, even in the face of certain danger. Nevertheless, the news media seem so preoccupied with panic that the term is loosely applied to describe even orderly evacuations.
Another example is looting. Although documented cases of looting are rare in domestic disasters not involving civil unrest, rumors of looting are commonly reported by the press. Even when it has been correctly observed by the press that looting did not ensue, this has often been couched -in terms to suggest that this was the exception rather than the rule. What is reported is that the National Guard or police have instituted measures to prevent looting. However, what is not reported is that no looting, in fact, occurred (Wenger, 1985b:10; Tierney, 1985b:31; Drabek, 1985b:18,21).
Sometimes "what should happen" in disasters has been so well ingrained, that if the story did not conform to the expectation, the reporter shaped it so it did.
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1979. Media crews advised people to get off the streets because they felt deserted streets were appropriate for such a situation (Scanlon, 1985:124).
Exaggeration of Disaster Impact Another contention of some disaster researchers is that the media's preoccupation with the dramatic accentuates and exaggerates the destructive magnitude of disasters. This has been labeled the "Dresden syndrome" (the media make every tornado-stricken community look like Dresden after it was bombed in World War II). News films and photographs focus on scenes of destruction, but not upon the surrounding undamaged areas. The audience is often lead to believe that the whole community lies in ruins on the basis of intense coverage of damage which may, in reality, be limited to a few buildings or blocks.
EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Anchorage, Alaska, March 27, 1964. One of the widely circulated news photographs of the earth-quake showed a wrecked department store. The damage that was the focal point of the picture was impressive, but the buildings across the street were undamaged, with even their large plate-glass windows still intact (Quarantefli,1972; Walker, 1982:24).
The impression of widespread destruction is also left by the human interest story of the family that has suffered great loss from the disaster. When these news stories are told, it is not always reported to what extent they represent the disaster's impact. The viewer is often left with the impression that the family's plight is the typical situation of the residents in the disaster area, even when this is not the case (Wenger, 1985b:13; Quarantelli, 1972).
It should be said at this point, however, that the inaccuracy of news reports cannot be attributed to the media alone. There are questions about the extent to which the media introduce distortion and to what extent they are merely passive disseminators of inaccurate information provided by official sources (Kreps, 1980:44; Hartsough, 1985:282).
Interference with Disaster Operations
Effects on Over-response and Inquiries Exaggerated media coverage has been suggested as contributing to the inundation of inquiries by anxious loved ones. It has also been blamed for the over-response of resources that typify disasters, complicating their management (Wenger, 1985b:13; Quarantelli, 1983:68; FEMA, 1984a:85; Scanlon, 1985:124).
Decision-making The media have been called a source of interference in local decision-making, pressuring officials to indicate what action will be taken before the officials are ready to decide what to do. Sometimes the media even report greater precision about the intended actions than actually exist. This factor leads to credibility problems for the officials involved (Kreps, 1980:68).
"The analysis process itself requires breaking issues down into components, studying them, and manipulating the possible alternatives. That takes time. When an emergency is imminent or in progress, there is little or no time. Adding to that are the demands of media representatives who are trying to meet their own deadlines. Radio and television demand immediate response; the greater the emergency, the greater the urgency in putting something on the air. The possibilities of error are magnified.... While leaders are attempting to gather facts and make assessments, the press is pushing. To news people pursuing a disaster, there is not time; information is demanded immediately and, if officials cannot provide it, then it win be gathered from unofficial sources. Another element of traditional policy analysis is muted or removed entirely. Therefore, the structure of the analytical process is changed. Steps are omitted. Decisions are made with partial facts and without fun appreciation of the ramifications. Further, because of the media-imposed time factors, a decision once made and announced is very difficult to reverse." (FEMA, 1984a:85)
Mass media activities may even subvert the adherence to disaster plans and alter the disaster response decision-making process.
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1979. "The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had a proposed emergency response system for an accident at fixed-site nuclear facilities prior to the accident at Three Mile Island. Basically, the plan centered around the major coordinating role that was to be performed by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. However, by the later stages of the disaster, the plan had been abandoned.... The entire system had evolved into that of 'emergency management by press conference.' Under the stress of monumental media attention and demands, state and federal authorities centralized all decisions and information-distribution within the Governor's office. This alteration effectively isolated the state's emergency management system not only from active involvement in decision-making, but also from the receipt of information. Local and state emergency management officials, who had planned to be centrally involved in the response, often found it necessary to listen to radio and television press conferences in order to find out what was happening." (Wenger, 1985b:8)
The presence of the media can limit the alternatives available for response and make alternative contingency planning difficult. For example, the local mayor, considering the possibility of violence during a labor dispute, might hesitate to ask the governor to put the National Guard on standby. If word leaks out to the press, the situation could worsen. In a toxic spin disaster, if the media learns that mortuaries are being put on alert, this might conflict with the officials' simultaneous desire to calm the public (FEMA, 1984a:82).
Rescue and Recovery The convergence of media personnel at the disaster site has been reported to physically interfere
with response and recovery operations.
EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) was called in to help clear earthquake rubble from the streets. Media personnel reportedly contributed to the crowd problems which made it impossible to safely remove the debris. As a result, Caltrans threatened to remove its equipment altogether unless the traffic could be cleared (Scholl, 1984:288; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:70). "The news media was an extremely disruptive influence. They frequently hindered response ac-tions in their efforts to obtain camera coverage or to interview rescue workers, city officials, or other response officials." (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:70)
Problems with media air traffic have been reported in a number of disasters (Tierney, 1985b:34; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:15; Lewis, 1980:863).
EXAMPLE: Volcano Eruption, Mt. St. Helens, Washington, May 18, 1980. Private aircraft carrying news media personnel be-came a threat to the air search efforts, contributing to the risk of mid-air collisions (Drabek, 1981:179; Kilijanek, 1981:63,67).
As a result of repeated problems with air traffic at disasters, the Federal Aviation Administration was finally forced, in June of 1985, to issue a new regulation prohibiting helicopters from flying in disaster areas unless they were carrying out emergency or rescue assignments (Holton, 1985:13).
HOW THE MEDIA OPERATE IN DISASTERS
If disaster planners and managers are going to effectively deal with the media, they first need to understand what makes the media "tick" in disasters. Media behavior is fairly predictable. "Win-win" situations can be accomplished with the news media if disaster planners and emergency managers know what they need and are able to provide it for them (Bernstein, 1986:46).
The Media Will be There They Will Hear of the Disaster Emergency managers are rarely able to carry out a disaster response without the media hearing about it (Scanlon, 1985:124). When a major incident occurs, some citizens will call the media. Others will tell friends and neighbors, and that news reaches the media. The media also monitor the activities and radio transmissions of key emergency agencies on a continuous basis. Major response activity is difficult to conceal (Scanlon, 1982:14; Scanlon, 1985:128).
Convergence of Media at the Disaster Site In a newsworthy disaster, the media may descend on the scene en masse. Even a fairly localized disaster can become a world media event within minutes. Literally hundreds of journalists and their crews will show up at the scene (Kilijanek, 1981:77, Wenger, 1985b:7; Scanlon, 1982:14; Scanlon, 1985:124).
EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983. A swarm of media people arrived-between 150 and 200 . coming "literally from all over the world, taking photographs, interviewing emergency responders and residents, and hiring aircraft to fly over the damaged area. The presence of so many media workers added to the burden of emergency response agencies . (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:32,34; Tierney, 1985b:34)
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1979. "The size of the press corps, and especially the electronic legions that descended on the Harrisburg area in the first few days of the crisis were reminiscent in numbers and baggage of the armies of reporters, photographers, feature writers, correspondents, camera crews and editing and production units that flock every four years to the national political conventions. Only in this case there had been no planning time to establish procedures, or to set up facilities to deal with this overpowering demand for complex information. Three commercial TV networks ... established full scale field
operations in various motels in the area.... Each brought in between 75 and 100 reporters, editors, managers and technicians. In addition, camera and reporter teams were quickly on hand from individual TV stations in nearby Harrisburg, Lancaster, Baltimore and Philadelphia." (Holton, 1985:1)
Effects of Technology on Media Convergence If a Three Mile Island-type disaster were to occur today, it is estimated that the numbers of media personnel responding in the first 24 hours would be in-creased three-fold. Recent technological advances have reduced the size, weight, and cost of portable video equipment. They have also improved the ability to transmit audiovisual material over long distances by microwave and satellite. Because of this, it has become physically possible and financially feasible for local TV stations to cover news stories in distant locations.
Local TV reporters, complete with their own camera crews, are ranging as far away as Beirut, Jerusalem, Rome, Ethiopia, Peking, India, and Japan to collect lively and graphic material for their broadcasts. This, combined with the intense competition for local news audiences, has led to a multi-fold increase in the number of media personnel who will quickly descend upon a disaster-stricken community (Holton, 1985:3,11). The proliferation of local media at distant events is illustrated by the following:
EXAMPLE: In 1980, the two national political conventions in New York City and Detroit attracted crews from approximately 25 local stations which felt they could afford to send them. In 1984, the New York Times reported that nearly 400 local TV stations were sending news teams to the convention in San Francisco-an 8-fold increase (Holton, 1985:3)!
Information-seeking Behavior
General Types of Information Sought
Members of the press have been trained to report the unique and sensational. In determining the newsworthiness of a disaster, two main criteria are applied to an event. The most important is its impact in terms of deaths and injuries; the second is the extent of property damage (Larson, 1980:94,119). Reporters will want to interview participants in the response, officials in charge of disaster operations, witnesses, and victims. Those disseminating information to the media should anticipate requests for the following information (Bernstein, 1986:41; Brunacini, 1978:206.01; Scanlon, 1982:15):
Figure 10-1. Advances in communications technology have contributed to media convergence at disasters. This media satellite dish was located at "The Forty-Niner Fire," Nevada County, California, during September, 1988. (Courtesy of The Union, Grass Valley, California.)
Casualty information.
How many were killed or injured? Of those injured, how serious is their condition? How many escaped? How was escape hindered? Were any of the victims prominent persons? How were the injured managed? Where were they taken? What was the disposition of the dead?
Property damage What is the estimated value of property loss? What kind of structures are involved? Did the damage include any particularly important property (e.g., historical buildings, art treasures, homes of prominent figures)? Is other property threatened? What measures have been under-taken or are being undertaken to protect property? Is the damage covered by insurance? Has this area been damaged by disasters before?
Response and relief activities. Who discovered the emergency? Who summoned the alarm? How quickly were response units on the scene? What agencies responded? How many are engaged in the response? What acts of heroism occurred? How was the emergency kept from spreading? How are the displaced and homeless being cared for?
Other characteristics of the crisis. Were there any blasts or explosions? Collapse of structures? Crimes or violence? Attempts at escape or self rescue? What was the extent of the disaster? The duration? Number of spectators? Crowd problems? Were there other unusual happenings? What accompanying accidents have occurred? What were the resulting effects (e.g., anxiety, stress) on the families and survivors?
Causes of the disaster. Were there any previous indications of danger? Could the disaster have been prevented? How? [Questions about blame are more likely to surface in technological disasters such as hazardous materials accidents] (Wenger, 1985b:22; Holton, 1985:20). Will there be a coroner's inquest? Lawsuits? Insurance company actions? Criminal investigation?
PRINCIPLE
Many of the questions that will be asked by reporters are predictable, and procedures can be established in advance for collecting the desired information.
Types of Media and Their Different Information Needs In carrying out the public information, function, it is important to realize that different types of media have different informational and logistical needs (Scanlon, 1982:17; Scanlon, 1985:127; Holton, 1985:19; Larson, 1980:86; Bemstein, 1986:46; FEMA, 1984a:83,197).
Local versus non-local. Local news covers all phases of the disaster, ranging from the warning phase, through impact and response, and on into recovery and rehabilitation. The local media have long-range, home-town concerns. They attempt to provide specific information to area residents to help them face the crisis: warning information, evacuation advice, where help is available, and how long utilities are expected to be out of service.
In contrast, the national media are less interested in details of the disaster, such as names of people (unless they are nationally prominent) or specific locations, than in the unique aspects of a particular disaster or in the human interest stories in the event. They are more concerned with the overall picture, focusing on such things as the scope of the impact, the number of dead and injured, and the activities of federal response agencies and national relief organizations. Their interest in the local incident is generally maintained only as long as there is an active state of disaster. Concern with long-term recovery activity is less likely. Questions posed by the national media may be less sensitive, sometimes trespassing into areas that local reporters consider off limits. (Local reporters must cultivate long-term relationships with local officials who may be important contacts for future stories.) A disaster is more likely to attract national media attention if there is visually exciting
footage to film. Events occurring early in the day may get priority for coverage because of the time it takes to edit the video material.
The international press may take on an even different focus. For example, during a flood in Florence, Italy, the British press focused more on the threat to Renaissance art treasures than on the local concerns with the human suffering and loss.
Television. Television media have concerns with shipping film or transmitting video material via satellite. TV combines the qualities of sight, sound, immediacy, and motion. The impact of television is affected by the editing of the stories, the hour of broadcast, and the number of times the broadcast is repeated. The TV media want visuals; a telephone conversation is not an adequate substitute. Television is predisposed to a headline approach that emphasizes succinct, catchy 20- to 30-second statements. The haste required in assembling a major television news report is illustrated in a passage by ABC News vice president, A.V. Westin, in his book, News-Watch, as de-scribed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Monograph on the electronic news media:
"In its live and continuous coverage of a breaking story of ... significant proportions TV news compresses that [traditional editing] process. The coverage takes on a life of its own, developing momentum and drive, which forces correspondents to race rather than walk from one story element to another. The anchors become, in effect, editors and reporters. Reporters on the scene of the breaking story may add important details; still it is the anchor who summarizes, repeats, amplifies, and ultimately evaluates the material coming in from the field. All those judgments are taking place under time pressures and in the midst of near chaos. Dozens of facts, rumors, conjectures, and ideas are surging about every minute. The system does not provide for a detailed review of material. Much of what pours in are raw data, edited in the head of the correspondent as he or she reads from notes hastily scribbled at the scene. Interviews are done with eyewitnesses whose own credibility is unchallenged and unchecked. The system provides for only two alternatives: accept the material or reject it." (Holton, 1985:13)
Actually, to fully appreciate the impact of dealing with a major disaster story, what is described in the above passage would have to be mentally multiplied fifty-fold (Holton, 1985:12).
Commercial radio. Radio wants to be there first and to have rapid access to information. After all, it is able to reach audiences almost anywhere. It tends to broadcast the information almost as soon as it's received, but generally limits its reports, which are short in duration (often less than a minute) and selective in detail.
Print (newspapers, magazines). Radio and print media are concerned with availability of telephone communications to transmit information. to their offices. Because print news does not have the time constraints experienced by radio and TV, it tends to search for more background and off-beat material. Often reports include analysis and commentary, and stories may build day-after-day as the disaster progresses. They want depth and graphics and are not constrained by the same time limitations as radio and TV. Print photographers may be very aggressive, because to compete with the emotional impact of TV, their pictures have to be exclusive.
Information-sharing One of the important maxims of the media is that while it is desirable to get an exclusive story (a "scoop"), it is even more important not to get scooped. It has been observed that the tendency in a truly major incident is for almost all the reporters present from the various media to share with each other the information they obtain. The various media also monitor each other to pick up information they may have missed (Scanlon, 1982:15; Scanlon, 1985:131; Wenger, 1985b:20; Holton, 1985:21).
EXAMPLE: The Canadian public broadcasting organization (CBQ receives information from Canadian Press (CP), the main Canadian news agency. CP is linked to the United States, British,
and French news wire services, with which it shares information. CBC is also linked to U.S. television networks ABC and NBC. In addition, CBC monitors its main rival, CTV, and the Toronto newspaper, the Globe and Mail (Scanlon, 1982:15).
This information-sharing tendency has important implications for the establishment of a centralized source of public information in disasters (discussed later in this chapter).
PRINCIPLE
Newsworthy information will rapidly spread among news organizations and from one type of media to another.
The Media are Different in Disasters
Diminished Information Verification In disasters, the media become voracious consumers of information. Television and radio stations may abandon regular programming in favor of non-stop disaster coverage. News shortages develop when official sources of information are not sufficient to fill the expanded news coverage. Sometimes the pressure to keep airtime filled with disaster news creates demands on media personnel at the scene that can only be described as desperation. When this occurs, the usual pattern of checking sources is often relinquished in favor of a new norm: that all news should be disseminated from all sources (official and non-official) as soon as it is obtained. Even contradictory information may be broadcast. This is justified on the assumption that instant feedback from the public win straighten things out in the end (Larson, 1980:62; Holton, 1985:20; Scanlon, 1982:15; Scanlon, 1985:128).
Diminished Adversarial Role The traditional role of the press as a watchdog over the government goes back to the very founding of our nation. However, in disasters, the media will often moderate their adversarial posture towards government. Quite often, the media will arrive at the scene willing to temporarily set aside animosities that might have developed during routine news coverage (Holton, 1985:22). Al-though this norm has been applied to technical disasters as well as natural ones, this is less likely. In particular, nuclear accidents tend to arouse a skeptical stance and blame seeking. Whether justified or not, some journalists feel the nuclear proponents have created a credibility gap when it comes to the safety of power plant reactors. In addition, a significant anti-nuclear movement generates a hostile and untrusting stance towards emergencies involving radioactive material (Rubin, 1987:14).
The media will often cooperate with requests by officials to hold back information that might have an adverse effect on the public during the disaster. Even if there is no such request, information has been withheld on the media's own initiative when it was felt to be harmful.
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Penn- Slvania, March 28, 1979. The Harrisburg Patriot-News, acting solely on its own judgment, deleted a reporter's account of what would happen to bank records in the event of a disaster because it was concerned about provoking a run on the banks (Scanlon, 1985:124).
PRINCIPLE
The media will often withhold newsworthy disaster stories it feels would be detrimental to the public.
Domination by the National versus Local Media In routine emergencies, response and government officials may deal with familiar persons representing the local media. To some extent, local reporters have a stake in cultivating and
maintaining good contacts with local officials who are often a reliable source of daily news. In addition, local reporters have some sensitivity about the needs of the community. These factors may allow a good working relationship to develop between local media and response organizations.
Some officials may come to believe that this relationship will form the basis of their interactions with the media in a major disaster. Unfortunately, the usual ground rules of interaction are often brushed aside by the outside media whose numbers quickly overwhelm the locals. In particular, network television news tends to quickly dominate at the scene of a major disaster. There are several reasons for this (Holton, 1985:21):
The networks assign large, multi-specialty staffs to disasters, often led by producers and other personnel experienced in this kind Of event. These crews are often quite adept at acquiring lodging, office space, telephone lines, and such.
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The major networks are pragmatically aware of the advantages of cooperating with each other and have developed arrangements for doing so effectively. The effectiveness of such agreements is the basis of an efficient news-gathering operation.
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Usually each network assigns several "star" correspondents to an event of such proportions. The possibility of an appearance on "Good Morning America" or "Dan Rather's Evening News" tends to sweep aside the local media competition for interviews.
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PRINCIPLE
Local officials will have to deal with different news media in times of disaster than those with which they interface on a routine basis.
The "Command Post" Perspective of the Media For all types of media, the most important sources of news are official government agencies, and much of the news about disasters tends to be reported from the perspective of these agencies. This is known as the "command post" perspective (Larson, 1980:89; Quarantelli, 1981b). In fact, the media can be depended on to demand news conferences at which authoritative official statements can be recorded (Scanlon, 1982:16). This, like the tendency for reporters to share information, can facilitate response agency efforts to develop a central ized source for public information.
Media Difficulties with Technical Information Most news agencies have not developed a cadre of reporters and consultants with technical expertise on disaster-related topics. Accordingly, they have a great deal of difficulty evaluating the technical aspects of disasters and assess-mg the competence of various (sometimes conflicting) sources of information (Drabek, 1986:167; Scanlon, 1982:16; Scanlon, 1985:124; Wenger, 1985b:22; Holton, 1985:24).
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1979. "A seemingly simple question of whether the core of the reactor had been ... damaged elicited responses couched in terms of 'ruptured fuel pins/ 'pinholes in the cladding/ 'fuel.damage' " (Scanlon, 1985:124) Once a reporter had figured out what they were saying he might discover another source that was saying something different. Media representatives felt as if they needed a degree in nuclear physics just to ask the right questions (Scanlon, 1982:17).
This factor makes it very important for public information officers to find those to speak to the media who are adept at translating technical subjects into plain English.
IMPROVING MEDIA DISASTER OPERATIONS
The Need for Media Planning
Considering the impact the media can have on the public and disaster response agencies, both positive and negative, the need for planning in this area is of paramount importance.
EXAMPLE: Train Derailment and Chlorine Gas Leak, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, November 10, 1979. The evacuation of 220,000 residents, 3 hospitals, and several nursing homes was widely praised. The success of the response was attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the area police put the importance of media operations second only to on-site command and control (Scanlon, 1985:124,127; Quarantelli, 1982a:H-36).
However, those who have studied this topic have reported few communities that have treated this facet of preparedness as more than an afterthought. Often this has consisted merely of assigning someone the duty of writing and distributing press releases and assuming this would adequately deal with the issue. It has been claimed that a number of the problems disaster managers face in dealing with the media result from a failure to fully understand and plan for the media. Even those who understand what information the media needs and the importance of providing it are not always provided the resources (e.g., staff, time, equipment) to accomplish the task (Wenger, 1985b:8,25; Holton, 1985:iii).
Ability of the Media to Survive and Function If the local media are to be able to carry out their designated functions in a disaster, they must first be able to survive the impact. Consideration must be given to the importance of locating broadcast stations and transmitters in areas not vulnerable to natural hazards and to providing back-up electrical generators.
EXAMPLE: Flood, Rochester, Minnesota, 1978. When flood waters crested the Zumbro River and inundated the city, television station KTTC was in the water's path. Local news coverage ended when the station crew was forced to evacuate. Because the transmitter was located upstairs, the crew was able to leave the microwave link operating so that at least network broadcasting could continue. However, even this was terminated when the local power station flooded, cutting off the station's electricity. Not only was the station unable to function as it should during the disaster, but the waters also destroyed most of the film and video tapes in the basement on which were stored 20 years of Rochester history (NAB:1).
It is also important that communication links to sources of official information not depend on telephone lines. Additional considerations include provisions for sleeping and eating, for calling in staff after hours, and for rotating staff on a 24-hour basis (Scanlon, 1985:124).
Educating the Media about Disasters As in the case of disaster response organizations, media function is best carried out when the participants have an adequate disaster knowledge base. Education can help to reduce inaccurate news reporting. For example, newscasters should be encouraged not to withhold news information, warnings, and instructions to the public for fear of causing panic. The evidence indicates that the public is quite capable of handling the facts. The media should be aware that a disaster warning is less likely to be taken seriously if it is followed by resumption of normal programming. Newscasters should also be taught the importance of announcing the areas not hit by the disaster and the effect this information will have on reducing the number of calls by persons who believe they have loved ones in the impact zone. Finally, reporters should be sensitized to the fact that precise information and accurate figures on deaths, injuries, damage, and cause, in the early aftermath of a disaster, is an unrealistic expectation. Trying to pin down officials to "exact" information can be self-defeating (Scanlon,1985:129).
Media organizations often keep files to which they refer for background information when a large news story breaks (Scanlon, 1982:14). This provides an opportunity for astute disaster planners to make useful and accurate information available on a pre-impact basis. Glossaries of technical terms, schematic drawings, models, and diagrams are also valuable tools for assuring that the media, and ultimately the public, understand disaster phenomena (Bernstein,1986:86).
Involvement of the Media in Planning Probably one of the best ways to educate the media about disasters is to have them involved in the
disaster planning process. Effective planning for public information in disasters cannot be done for them. It has to be done with them (Wenger, 1985b:25). Without their active involvement, one suffers the risk of falling into the "paper" plan syndrome.
Representation on Planning Bodies One of the most important requirements for effective media disaster operations is to plug the media into all stages of the disaster planning process (Scanlon, 1985:126). The media should be represented on disaster-planning bodies. Some may oppose this idea believing that it may lead to a hesitancy to discuss preparedness weak points in the presence of the press. In that case, it may be necessary to be selective about the meetings the media should attend. On the other hand, the media can be a powerful ally when it comes to obtaining public funding and support if they understand the weak points and see a need for financial bolstering.
Local Media Participation in Media Relations One clever strategy for handling media relations is to delegate the responsibility to the local media itself. This technique has reportedly been used effectively in a number of Canadian communities. The media has been plugged right into the disaster response and served as a liaison between the Emergency Operations Center and the outside media (Scanlon, 1985:127).
Initiating Planning with the Media When initiating contact with the media, it is probably best to start at the top. Contact the commercial radio or television station owner or manager, the newspaper or news magazine publisher or editor. They will be able to assign someone in their organization to act as liaison with the local disaster planning effort. An alternative is to directly approach those responsible for day-to-day news coverage. For the print media this would be the managing or city editor, for the electronic media, the news director (Scanlon, 1985:126).
PRINCIPLE
Adequate disaster preparedness requires planning with the rather than for the media.
Reaching the Public
Knowledge about Audience Composition Merely seeing to it that there is a local radio or TV station broadcasting disaster information does not assure it will be received by all who need it. For example, some communities have significant populations of special language or ethnic groups that may not be reached by English-language broadcasting. Those with hearing or visual disabilities have to be considered as wen.
A helpful technique in public information planning is the use of viewing and listening audience surveys carried out by agencies such as A.C. Nielson and Arbitron. These surveys can be used to provide information about the audiences for various media at different times. By inference, this information can also be used to get an idea of who is not being reached (Scanlon, 1985:125). One consideration may be to use volunteers, or "TelePatrol" (see Chapter 9) to canvass neighborhoods to ascertain who cannot be reached by the normal warning and advisory methods, and to develop alternative means of conveying this information when needed.
The Emergency Broadcast System The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) evolved from the CONELRAD (Control of Electromagnetic Radiation) system created in 1951. Its purpose was to provide a means by which the President, utilizing existing commercial broad-casting stations, would communicate directly with the public in times of national emergency. While the system was originally to be used in the event of enemy attack, it has been expanded to civil disaster use so that it can be activated by certain state and local government officials as wen (NAB:20).
State-wide activation of the Emergency Broadcast System allows the governor to address the entire
state citizenry at the same time. However, the system has an inherent technical weakness. It depends on "chain-broadcasting." What this means is that the governor broadcasts a message via a commercial (usually an FM) station in the Capital. This broadcast is picked up by a more distant station and relayed on. This process is repeated until the message is conveyed across the state. If, however, one station in the chain is disabled, or can't operate because it doesn't have an emergency generator, then the "chain" is broken.
Attempts to use the EBS can fail, as in after the earthquake in Coalinga, California, when officials didn't know how to activate it (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:165). Unless government officials and commercial broadcasters are motivated enough to educate the users and test the system frequently, those who need to utilize the system in a disaster may be unfamiliar with it (another variation of the "paper" plan syndrome) (Harter, 1985).
Exceptions to FCC Regulations In emergency conditions and disasters, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allows public and commercial broadcast stations, without prior approval, to ignore certain regulations governing their transmissions. For example, certain stations have to go off the air or limit their transmission power at certain times of the day or night. During an emergency, stations may use their full power regardless of the time of day. Furthermore, at the request of government officials, stations may broadcast point-to-point and even person-to-person messages for the purpose of requesting or dispatching aid and assisting rescue operations (NAB:13; Wenger, 1985b:18).
Use of Non-local Stations When local stations are non-functional as a result of a disaster, it is often possible for local media or local government officials to convey information to stations outside the impacted area for broadcast back into the stricken locale. In this way, the flow of essential information to the disaster victims can be maintained.
TIS Radio: Be Your Own Media Using a little-known provision under Part 90 of the FCC regulations, agencies of city, county, and state government are able to set up their own "mini" radio stations. These "Travelers Information System" (TIS) radio stations, can transmit information to the public on the AM radio band. You may have encounter ed such a radio station while visiting a national park, a major airport, or while crossing an international border. Typically, you will see a sign at the roadside instructing you to tune to either 530 or 1610 Kilohertz on the AM band for local traveler's information.
TIS radio stations can be licensed for use in national parks, adjacent to major transportation centers, and adjacent to federal and state highways. It is this latter provision (being adjacent to a highway) that allows almost any city to qualify for a TIS radio station license. While most TIS stations are used to provide traffic directions and information, they can also be used for other non-commercial purposes, including the issuance of public safety information during emergencies and disasters.
The Coronado, California, Police Department established a TIS radio station in January, 1985, and has found it to be a worthwhile and cost-effective addition to their public information system in routine and emergency conditions (Boyd, 91985). Motorists entering the city, will see large road signs reading, "Traffic/ Emergency Info-Tune 530 AM,- and can get up-to-the-minute information on traffic problems and delays. They may be directed to alternative routes to avoid traffic congestion, relieving traffic officers for other purposes. During local emergencies or disasters, the radio can broadcast official information on the event, lessening the volume of telephone inquiries that typically "light up" police telephone switchboards in such events, and allowing personnel to direct their attention to emergency response-related communications.
The equipment for a TIS radio station is relatively inexpensive ($1,500 to $2,500), small in size (the transmitter occupies a space of about a cubic foot), and simple to operate (estimated training time is less than 5 minutes). Endless-loop audio tape cassettes are available in various lengths (20 seconds to 10 minutes and more) for about $5 each.
Total installation time for the system is about 4 hours. Technical assistance can be obtained from
local government radio maintenance personnel, or donated time from local AM commercial radio stations. In Coronado, assistance was given by local amateur radio operators who were already involved in local disaster preparedness activities. Coverage area is dependent on the type of antenna, its placement, the local terrain, and the maximum allowable transmitter power, which is limited to 10 watts. Even with these limitations, however, the broadcasts can be received within a radius of 7 to 8 miles. The steps needed to establish a TIS radio station are as follows:
Obtain a TIS radio station license application and a copy of Part 90 of the FCC rules. Request information regarding commercial radio stations in your area that broadcast between 520 to 540 kHz and 1630 to 1640 kHz. You must operate on a non-interference basis with other local stations.
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Using available or volunteer technical assistance, prepare the FCC license application. You can expect the license to arrive in 60 to 90 days.
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Locate a radio equipment supplier. Several manufacturers pro-duce TIS radios. Advertisements can be found in communications journals (e.g., The Associated Public Communications Officers [APCO] journal, P.O. Box 669, New Smyrna Beach, FL 32069). Delivery time will be 4 to 8 weeks. Two manufacturers are:
●
Radio Systems, Inc 5113 W. Chester Pike Edgemont, PA 19028 Attn. Dan Braverman
(800) 523-2133 or (215) 356-4700
Information Station P.O. Box 51
Zeeland, MI 49464 Attn. William Baker
(616) 772-2300
Using available technical expertise, identify a location for the equipment. You will need a 115 volt AC circuit which is on emergency backup power. A suitable location for the antenna must be located, consistent with FCC regulations which limit the height of the antenna above the average local terrain. The bulk of the installation time will be installing the antenna, wiring it to the transmitter, and tuning the antenna to match the radio.
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Centralization of Public Information Having a central source from which the media can receive official information about the disaster can help to assure that what the public receives is timely, consistent, and accurate. The Incident Command System has seen this as an important enough issue to designate a specific command staff position for it and to develop specific procedures for the process (ICS, 1981). Indeed, the design of the ICS and the forms used to keep track of the incident and resource status, contribute to the effective and efficient collection of information for the media.
Acceptance by the Media Several characteristics of the media make them receptive to a central source of public information:
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The media tend to share information anyway.● The media often prefer to attribute the news to official sources (the "command post" perspective).
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Due to news deadlines, the media will congregate where it is easiest to get the greatest amount of news quickly.
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The media will not only be receptive to press conferences in a central location where "packaged" news releases are handed out-they will often, in fact, demand them (Scanlon, 1985:124).
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Where the concept has been promoted, the media, especially television, have given it support and even offered to help preplan the details of such an arrangement (Holton, 1985:27).
The need for a public information center, as seen from the perspective of the media, is captured in the following quote:
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Worcester, Massachusetts, June 9, 1953. "Whom do you believe when you are broadcasting? Who is the real authority? There is a confused picture from confused lines of authority. They are superseding, overlapping, and parallel to each other, all at the same time.... But who knows the facts and can speak with authority about them? That is the dilemma of the broadcaster.... That is why a central clearing house of information is important.... When there is just confused authority, the broadcaster has to do the best he can. He has to make private decisions about what he will regard as authoritative sources." (Rosow, 1977:86)
Sources of Information The success of a centralized information office depends on its access to accurate and timely intelligence (situation analysis) (Rubin, 1987:12). This requires functioning procedures for inter-organizational information flow, a problem discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The adoption of the Incident Command S one way of facilitating this process.
PRINCIPLE
The propensity for the media to share information and to assume "command post" perspective facilitates the establishment of a central source of disaster information.
Limitations of Centralized Information The fact that the media will embrace the establishment of a central soikwi;, of disaster information does not mean that any emergency management or government official is going to be able to control the news. Reporters do not rely on only one source for news information. They usually have a variety of contacts and sources, and this is not likely to change in a disaster.
Although it is advantageous to establish a single media center for disaster information and to staff it with trained public information officers, the amount of information that is centralized is relative, rather than complete. To some extent, rumors will still occur, the public will still get information from friends, family members, and other sources, and the credibility of government officials will not be guaranteed (Wenger, 1985b:21).
Reducing Media Convergence Media Pools The problem of media convergence--crowding the emergency operations center, tying up communications facilities, and making demands for tours of the disaster site-can be lessened by the use of media pools. A media pool is where only one or a few reporters collect information about an event and then share it with their colleagues and competitors. The media are often not only receptive to pools, but (especially network television) will even form pools on their own initiative (Holton, 1985:21).
One tactic that might be useful is to assign local media representatives as pool coordinators. " The selection of these coordinators would depend on their taking a disaster public information training course set up by the local preparedness agency. This "disaster education" can help avoid the dissemination of disaster myths, can help the media to understand and sympathize with the difficulties faced by public officials, and can help the media to be aware of the types of public information that best assist the disaster response efforts. Because of the differences in media needs, it is best to compose the media pool of representatives from each of the following: print media, television commercial radio, and the national wire services. In addition, the pool should include representatives from local, regional, national, and if applicable, inter-national media (Bernstein, 1986:88).
Media Outreach andlor Use of Computer Communication
Another way to reduce the media's disruptive activities is to channel their information-seeking behavior. This can be done by contacting the various media and informing them where centralized information can be reached.
Don't wait for the media to show up-get the information to them where they are, and use automated or computerized devices to give regular news updates. The mere existence or designation of a centralized information office does not guarantee that it will be used. The media must be aware that it has been set up and where it is located. If media pools have been established, then media outside of the pool need to know how to obtain information from it. Printed press releases or pre-recorded (audio and/or visual) press releases can lessen the burden on public information officials. Releases can even be made available by recorded telephone messages. In fact, TelePatrol (see Chapter 9) could be well adapted for this use. Specifically tailored recorded messages can be assembled for the different types of media and telephoned to them by a computer dialing process using a pre-programmed fist of phone numbers. Centralized sources for visual material can also be conveyed in the messages.
Channeling the news media's information search is best accomplished, if possible, by contacting them before they show up at the scene. Once again, if telephone lines are available, this may be accomplished by TelePatrol. Another arrangement is to plan a tone-encoded, two-way radio net with local news media and local or regional wire service offices.
One program that illustrates the usefulness of the "media outreach" idea is the Media Computer Netu7ork (MCN), in use in Sacramento, California (Dickson, 1987). The county sheriff was the motivating force behind the idea. The net-work uses computer terminals in the public information offices of a number of public safety and other agencies which are tied by dedicated lines directly into area news agencies. At present, the network includes local TV and radio stations, newspapers, the local and Associated Press wire services, area police and fire agencies, the County District Attorney's office, the California Highway Patrol, California Office of Emergency Services, Folsom Prison, the local offices of the FBI and U.S. Attorney, and local utilities including the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant.
Each terminal can send, receive, and store messages. High-quality graphics printers allow maps, photos, and other visual material to be transmitted. Portable, briefcase-sized, inexpensive computers are available for agencies to use in the field, and cellular phones and phone booths can be used to send information from them. When a local agency, such as the police department, types a news bulletin into the system, it is immediately and automatically conveyed to every other terminal in the system. In addition, individual terminals can communicate with each other privately.
Experience with the network has revealed several benefits. First, local agencies find that use of the system decreases the number of inquiries by the press. Since the network conveys information instantly and simultaneously to 22 separate news agencies, including two wire services, this lessens the need for each of these agencies to make a separate inquiry. Prior to initiation of the network it was not unusual for the law enforcement agency to receive 20 to 25 calls on a routine developing crime story. In other words, there reportedly is a noticeable decrease in media convergence. Second, the system is in use on a daily, routine basis. For this reason, in contrast to the Emergency Broadcast System, it is more likely to be a familiar tool and more likely to be functioning and to be used in a disaster. Third, since every agency receives a printed copy of the news releases, information is less likely to be misunderstood, and incorrect information is more likely to be noticed and corrected by somebody on the network.
Although MCN is a proprietary program, and the author does not wish to endorse specific commercial products, the idea appears to have merit. Readers wishing to investigate the idea further may contact: The Media Computer Network, P.O. Box 60919, Sacramento, CA 95860, (916) 488-8624.
Regional Public Information Teams and Equipment Another novel approach that has been suggested for managing the media assault in disasters is to import specialized outside public information management equipment and/or teams of public relations specialists. Media coverage in disasters is dominated by the national television media.
Perhaps it would be good to make available to local governments teams of professionals who are experienced in handling the media (Scanlon, 1985:131).
Surviving a Press Conference or Interview To the harried official trying to manage the pressing contingencies of a major disaster, the idea of facing a national news audience can be an intimidating prospect. In fact, the absence of skill in carrying out this task can convert an otherwise adequately handled incident into a public relations disaster. What follows, while certainly not scientifically validated, is a collation of suggestions from public information professionals which may be of help in surviving the experience (FEMA, 1984a:88,198; Bernstein, 1986:45,86; Lavalla, 1983:279; Scanlon 1985:127; Johnson, 1986:106; CSTI, 1987).
Be Prepared There are certain questions (discussed above) that you can virtually predict the press will ask. Do your homework and be ready with answers. Background material, graphs, charts, and illustrations can sometimes be assembled in advance to help convey what you will want to say.
Be Wary of "'Off-the-record" Comments The reporter assumes that everything you say and everything he sees is "on- the-record" and fair game unless specifically agreed to the contrary in advance. It is wise, therefore, when talking to the press, either in person or on the phone, to assume that anything you say might be published. If you feel the information you provide should be anonymous, you might be better off not giving the interview at all.
Be Honest Trying to cover up mistakes, mislead the press, or withhold critical information about a disaster can backfire.
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accidents, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1979 and Chernobyl, USSR, April 28, 1986. "Once officials in charge did begin to talk, they were quick to put the best face on developments and reluctant to confirm bad news. This diminished their credibility and severely reduced the number of trustworthy sources with firsthand knowledge of the accident. Similarly, they provided certain kinds of information-particularly about radiation release-too late to help a worried public. This compounded their credibility problem." (Rubin, 1987)
When reporters find officials reticent to give accurate and timely information, they may impute the worst motives for the apparent evasiveness and seek alternative (possibly less reliable and authoritative) sources to get the "facts." Sometimes this also prompts them to consider the worst-case scenario in describing the disaster and the response effectiveness. This is particularly the case in controversial or politically charged issues such as nuclear accidents. Reporters have had to deal with public relations and government spokesmen who are experts at verbal misdirection. The misrepresentation and deceit attributed to government statements about events like Watergate and Vietnam have led reporters to develop a healthy skepticism when they encounter evasiveness and "no comment" responses. As a result, such statements are generally interpreted to indicate that the interviewee either doesn't know the answer or that he has something to hide (Rubin, 1987; Johnson, 1986:111).
There are, of course, times when it is legitimate to hold back specific types of information. When this is the case, it is best to state in a matter-of-fact way why the information is being withheld and when it might be made available, if that is possible. If the media have obtained information that could be dangerous to release, do not hesitate to ask them to withhold it. Be sure to give them the reasons why it should not be reported and promise to tell them when it is safe to release the information.
Admit problems and mistakes if they exist. Significant errors that are concealed will leak out and cause much more difficulty than if they had been immediately disclosed. On the other hand, this does not mean that officials are obligated to cast everything in its worst possible light. If problems
have developed or mistakes have been made, point out your positive efforts to correct them and then turn the conversation toward what has been done to effectively manage the emergency.
Stick to the facts. Don't describe the situation as any better or worse than it actually is. Avoid making statements that could be construed as trying to exaggerate or to grab undue credit or manipulate the story to create a favorable impression of your office or agency.
Manage Ambiguity Disasters are characterized by uncertainty. Often, accurate information-about the extent of the destruction, dangers to public safety, cause of the incident, and other matters of interest to the media-is simply not available early on. The interviewee should be able to admit what he doesn't know, and avoid speculating on the answers. Instead, he should state that he will try to determine the facts as soon as practical and make this information available.
Relate to the Audience Remember that you are not talking to an audience of fellow experts. Avoid using technical terminology and jargon. This only confuses the public or makes them think you are trying to hide something. On the other hand, avoid "talking down" to the audience too. Be human; strive for an informal, conversational tone, while still maintaining a professional demeanor.
Take the Initiative Often, the interviewee is chosen because he is the expert. As such, he, and not the reporter, is in the best position to judge what the important issues are. The interviewee should take the lead in pointing these out and directing the course of discussion. This can be accomplished even in the worst possible press confrontation, the "ambush interview." When the reporter suddenly pushes the microphone into your face and asks a difficult question, you can use what is called "transition technique" to redirect the direction of the interview. This is done by briefly answering the question (e.g., "yes, this is true, but ... or, "No, that is not the case, and . then proceeding to address what you consider the important facts. The interviewee should say what he needs to say, not just answer the questions posed by the reporter.
The interviewee should ask the reporter to rephrase the question if what is being asked is not clear. ("Did you mean ... ?") Do not allow misleading or inaccurate comments or statements to go unchallenged. Correct any bad information built into the questions. The longer misinformation lingers before being corrected, the more it gains credibility. Refute it politely, offering a brief explanation, and move on to the topics you want to cover.
The Team Approach Sometimes fear of the media can be the interviewee's worst enemy. One way of tackling this problem is to avoid facing the interview alone. Instead, assemble a group of experts and spokespersons and face the media as a team.
Preparation for a Television Appearance While preparation for any interface with the media is important, television requires special attention. Public relations professionals describe television as an emotional medium, rather than an intellectual one. They say that, while viewers will often forget the content of your message, they will remember your style: how you looked, your manner, and the quality of your voice. First impressions are important, and there is an advantage to having your most important and most positive statements up front. Conventional clothing should be worn (as well as accessories, jewelry, makeup, and hairstyle) with subdued colors and with a design that reflects your professional image. If it is possible to choose in advance, clothing colors that blend into the set back-ground should be avoided.
As noted before, television relies on a "headline approach" with succinct, catchy, 20- to 30-second statements. The interviewee can almost certainly assure which part of the pretaped material will be used by prefacing it with,
"The most important thing about this is..." Most newscasters work under tight deadlines and
appreciate when the experts flag what is important for them. While maintaining accuracy, try to keep answers short and to the point. The best way to lose what you are trying to get across is to "overload the system" by giving too much information.
Telephone Interviews Find out to whom you are speaking, so your answers can best meet the needs of the interviewer. Also get a phone number so you can back with additional important information or corrections. Find out when and how the material is going to be used and who the target audience is. Be sure you have a clear telephone connection. Unfortunate misquotes can result because a statement was not clearly heard. Have your interview statements read back to you. Start off by stating your main point in clear, simple language and repeat it in a concluding summary statement. Subtle or wry statements may be translated badly-avoid them. Also avoid making absolute statements. If you are in doubt about an important point, or wish to give it further thought before answering, tell the interviewer you will call back shortly-and be sure to do so. Also be sure to call back if new information develops which causes you to want to change the statements you made or the opinions you gave. Offer any photographs, charts, or illustrations that might contribute to the story if the report is to appear in the print media. Try to have some good background reference material available for reporters who are not familiar with your subject.
If the telephone interview is being taped for radio, you may have to do a few trial runs before getting an adequate product for broadcast. Be sure to find out what the time limits of the broadcasted interview are so you can avoid giving too much information. It is best that you, as the expert, determine what is most important, rather than having the reporter edit a few seconds of material out of a 20-minute interview. Turn off any noisy air conditioners or other equipment in your office that might interfere with the sound quality of your statements. Have other phone calls held. Ask whether you should use the interviewer's name in your responses. If you pause to think, avoid "ah's" and "uh's;" it is better to have a silent pause. Avoid the use of numbers; if they are essential, however, round them off and use as few as possible. Talk in a normal tone past the telephone mouthpiece rather than directly into it. Don't hold the mouthpiece too close. This will help prevent popping and hissing sounds when pronouncing "p," s," and "t" sounds.
The Interviewee's "Bill of Rights" Although providing the media with accurate, consistent, and timely information can often help an organization carry out its function, maintain a good public image, and help the public, the potential interviewee does not always have to place himself completely at the beck and call and at the mercy of the media.
Organizations do have the right to remain silent, to stick to a prepared text, or to say, "I don't know. I'll find out and get back to you later.' They also have the right to tape the interview, to keep records of the information given, to have others present, and to use their best spokesperson to face the press. If faced with a notorious, cut-throat interviewer, one tactic that might be useful is to consent to an interview, but only if it will be reported verbatim and in full (except for editing that is reviewed by and mutually agreeable to interviewer and interviewee).
SUMMARY
The need for a free press is an important part of our heritage. Nonetheless, disaster managers often feel that they could do their job better if they didn't have to divert valuable time, resources, and effort to deal with the press. In many communities, the establishment of procedures for effective media relations in disasters is not given high priority. Preparation may consist merely of assigning someone the responsibility for handing out press releases and talking to reporters that show up.
Media behavior in disasters is, to a significant extent, predictable. Because of this, proper public information procedures are likely to reduce the disruption caused by media demands. In this
chapter we have examined the types of behavior that can be expected of the media in disasters and discussed several techniques for dealing with them.
PLANNING CHECKPOINTS Is the mass media represented on your area's disaster planning body?● Do your local media organizations have emergency backup electrical power and other provisions allowing them to function in a disaster?
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Are the facilities of your local media located in areas vulnerable to disaster threats (e.g., in the flood plain)?
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Do your local TV and radio stations have pre-established procedures and agreements for conveying information to non-local stations for broadcast back into the area in the event that local stations are knocked off the air by a disaster?
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Do your local broadcast stations know what FCC regulations do not apply in disasters?● Do you have a program to educate the local media about disasters?● Do you have provisions to provide background and public educational and instructional information to the media for use in the event of a disaster?
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Does your area test the Emergency Broadcast System, including the inter-face between local government and local EBS stations, on a monthly basis? Do local officials know how to activate and use the system?
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Do your local emergency response organizations have a mutually agree-able procedure for centralized disaster information dissemination? For collecting information from the various response organizations for the information center (e.g., the procedures outlined in the Incident Command System)?
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Does your public information plan include the use of media pools?● Do your emergency managers have procedures and guidelines to follow in anticipation of information the media will request?
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Have provisions been made to provide it to them in a way that is minimally disruptive to emergency operations? Do they initiate contact with the media to provide this information? Are automated devices used to provide information to an local media (e.g., a computer electronic mail system)?
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Has your area considered the establishment of a TIS radio station?●
ADDITIONAL READING
Bernstein AB: The emergency public relations manual, revised edition, 1986. Available from: PASE, Inc, PO Box 1299, Highland Park, NJ, 08904, $125.00.
Committee on Disasters and the Mass Media, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, National Research Council: Disasters and the mass media, 1980. Available from: National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution AveWashington, DC 20418, $9.75.
Friedman B, Lockwood D, Snowden L, et al: Mass media and disasters: an annotated bibliography, Miscellaneous Report 36, 1986. Available from: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark, Del, 19716.
Hartsough DM and Mileti DS: The Media in Disaster, In: Laube J and Murphy SA, Perspective on disaster recovery, p. 282, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Norwalk, Conn, 1985.
Holton JL: The electronic media and disasters in the high-tech age, publication 109, 1985. Available from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, PO Box 70274, Washington, DC, 20024, free.
Johnson B: Dealing with Mass Media in Time of Emergency. In: Multiple death disaster response workshop, p 104, Publication SM/IG 193, 1986. Available from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, PO Box 70274, Washington, DC, 20024, free.
Lavalla R and Stoffel S: Managing External Influences. In: Blueprint for community emergency management: a text for managing emergency operations, p 273, 1983, Available from: Emergency Response Institute, 1819 Mark St, NE, Olympia, Wash 98506, $25. 00.
Policy Development and the Media. In: Formulating public policy in emergency management Course Book and Resource Manual, Student Manual 51, p 82, 1984. Available from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, PO Box70274, Washington, DC, 20024, free.
Scanlon J and Alldred S: Media coverage of disasters: the same old story, Emergency Planning Digest (Canada), 7(4):13, Oct.-Dec. 1982. Available from: Emergency Preparedness- Canada, 141 Laurier Avenue West, 2nd floor, Ottowa, Canada, KlA OW6.
Scanlon J, Alldred S, Farrell A, et a]: Coping with the media in disasters: some predictable problems, Public Administration Review, 45(Special Issue on: Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public Administration):123, (Jan.) 1985, Available from: the American Society for Public Administration, 1120 G St, NW, Washington, DC 20005
Wenger D: Mass Media and Disasters, Preliminary Paper 98, 1985. Available from: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark, Del 19716.
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