REA 1
Main content
Chapter Introduction
Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
· Define revolutionary and counterrevolutionary terrorism.
· Outline the history, philosophy, and influence of the Tupamaros.
· Summarize the emergence and current status of FARC and the ELN.
· Describe the function and purpose of the MeK.
· Describe the rise, fall, and resurgence of the Shining Path.
· Outline the issues surrounding Naxalite terrorism.
· Explain the operations and tactics of the New People’s Army.
· Explain the rise of death squads as a reaction to revolutionary terrorism.
Civilians Train to Respond to Terrorism
LUIS ACOSTA/Getty Images
Colombia has been one of the most violent areas of the world since the mid-twentieth century. It experienced a ferocious civil war simply known as The Violence from 1948 to 1958. Analysts estimated that The Violence killed between 200,000 and 300,000 people. Since 1964, the country has been plagued by a revolutionary guerrilla war involving violent political clashes, drug violence, left-wing revolutionary terrorism, and terrorism from right-wing paramilitaries and death squads. Recent fighting has caused the deaths of over 220,000 people, and millions more have been driven from their homes. One of the revolutionary groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by the Spanish acronym FARC), upped the ante by planting hundreds of land mines. Many innocent people have been killed.
Although there appeared to be no end to the fighting, an amazing thing happened in 2012. FARC agreed to enter negotiations with the government of Colombia in peace talks sponsored by Cuba and Norway. Fighting continued and discussions were lengthy, but after two years, talking seemed to be having an effect. Even as troops and guerrillas clashed in April 2015, FARC began mine clearing operations with the Colombian army in May. Deutsche Welle (2015) reported that this was a virtual miracle. The soldiers and guerrillas were not simply clearing mines in particular sections of the countryside; they were operating side-by-side in mixed units. Terrorism comes to an end when people who will compromise silence violent extremists who will not. If revolutions can be negotiated, peace may come to Colombia.
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10-1Revolutionary Terrorism
Modern revolutionary terrorism reached its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s. It was a global movement expressing dissatisfaction in the wake of anticolonialism. Western policy and the U.S. international economic system fell under intense scrutiny, and tensions caused by the Vietnam War fanned the flames of heated political behavior. Small ideological groups appeared in Central and South America, and revolutionary groups emerged in Europe. Guerrilla movements spawned ideological spin-offs. The East–West confrontation came into play as the former Soviet Union supported its own revolutionary groups while Maoist rebellions gave a new twist to old Leninist ideologies. Japan experienced unique forms of violence that combined ideology and religious elements.
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10-1aRevolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism Defined
A common misconception is that the American Revolution was based on terrorism. If this were true, rebels would have indiscriminately murdered British citizens and clandestinely destroyed symbolic targets. General George Washington would not have fought to destroy the British army; he would have waged a campaign of symbolic murder in the hope that the horror of it all would change British political behavior. Instead, although many Americans operated as guerrillas, the majority of the rebels joined a conventional army and fought within the accepted norms of conventional warfare. Revolutions cannot be equated with terrorism, although terrorism is sometimes used during the course of revolutions.
When examining ideological terrorism, it is possible to broadly categorize a revolutionary style. Martha Crenshaw (1972), a pioneer in the field, summarized the aspects of revolutionary terrorism early in her career. She says that revolutionary terrorism can be defined as an insurgent strategy in the context of internal warfare or revolution. It is an attempt to seize power from a legitimate state for the purpose of creating political and social change. It involves the systematic use of terrorism to achieve this goal. Violence is neither isolated nor a series of random acts, and it is far from guerrilla warfare or conventional warfare. Revolutionary terrorism differs from other forms of violence because it occurs outside the normal realm of violent political action. It involves acts of violence that are particularly abominable, and it usually occurs within a civilian population. The violence is symbolic, and it is designed to have a devastating psychological impact on established power.
Revolutionary terrorism involves violent activity for the purpose of changing the political structure of government or the social orientation of a country or region. Maoist terrorism is a form of revolutionary terrorism. Its goal is to establish a Communist society similar to that of revolutionary China. Counterterrorism involves the legitimate legal activities of security forces, but some unofficial groups operate outside the law. When these groups engage in violence, it can be described as counterrevolutionary terrorism.
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10-1bModeling Revolutionary Terrorism: Uruguay’s Tupamaros
In the early 1960s, a group of revolutionaries called the Tupamaros surfaced in Uruguay (Figure 10.2). Unlike their predecessors in the Cuban Revolution, the Tupamaros spurned the countryside, favoring an urban environment. City sidewalks and asphalt became their battleground. A decade later, their tactics would inspire revolutionaries around the world, and terrorist groups would imitate the methods of the Uruguayan revolutionaries. The Tupamaros epitomized urban terrorism.
Figure 10.1Map of Central and South America
Figure 10.2Map of Uruguay
In the years immediately after World War II, Uruguay appeared to be a model Latin American government. Democratic principles and freedoms were the accepted basis of Uruguay’s political structures. Democratic rule was complemented by a sound economy and an exemplary educational system. Although it could not be described as a land of wealth, by the early 1950s, Uruguay could be called a land of promise. All factors seemed to point to peace and prosperity.
Unfortunately, Uruguay’s promise started to fade in 1954. The export economy that had proved so prosperous for the country began to crumble. Falling prices for exported goods brought inflation and unemployment, and economic dissatisfaction grew. By 1959, many sugar workers and members of the middle class faced a bleak future. Uruguay had undergone a devastating economic reversal, and workers were restless. Many of them traveled to Montevideo, Uruguay’s capital, to voice their disappointment.
Their logic seemed sound. Uruguay’s population center is Montevideo, a metropolis of 1.25 million people. Demographically, the capital offered the promise of recognition. Unfortunately for the demonstrating workers, they did not achieve the type of recognition that they were seeking. Far from viewing the marchers as a legitimate labor movement, the government considered them potential revolutionaries.
The sugar workers clashed with police, and several union members were arrested. One of those taken to jail was a young law student named Raúl Sendic (1926–1989). Disillusioned with law school and his prospects for the future, Sendic had joined the sugar workers. Sendic remained in jail until 1963. When he emerged, he had a plan for a revolution.
Sendic had not seen the brighter side of Uruguayan life in prison. The stark realities of Uruguay’s now shaky political system were evident, as torture and mistreatment of prisoners were common. If the population could not be kept content by a sound economy, it had to be subdued by fear. Democracy and freedoms faded as Uruguay’s economic woes increased. Sendic described the repression he saw in Waiting for the Guerrilla, in which he called for revolt in Montevideo.
After Sendic was released from jail, several young radicals gravitated toward him. María Gilio (1972) paints a sympathetic picture of Sendic’s early followers. According to Gilio, these young people were primarily interested in reforming the government and creating economic opportunities. Although they had once believed they could attain these goals through democratic action, the ongoing repression in Uruguay ruled out any response except violence. Gilio believed that the group of people who surrounded Sendic were humanist idealists who wanted to bring Uruguay under direct control of the people.
Others did not hold this opinion of Sendic and his compatriots. Arturo Porzecanski (1973) provides a more objective view of the group’s next move. Sendic’s group felt excluded from participation in the political system, and Sendic believed that violence was the only appropriate tool to change the political order. In 1963, Sendic and his followers raided the Swiss Hunting Club outside Montevideo. The raid was the first step in arming the group, and the first step toward a revolution.
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10-1cUrban Guerrillas
According to Porzecanski, the group was not willing to move outside Montevideo to begin a guerrilla war for several reasons. First, the group was not large enough to begin a guerrilla campaign because it represented radical middle-class students. Mainstream workers and labor activists had moved away from the militants’ position before the march on Montevideo. Second, the countryside of Uruguay did not readily lend itself to a guerrilla war because unrest grew from the urban center of Uruguay. Third, the peasants were unwilling to provide popular support for guerrilla forces. Finally, Montevideo was the nerve center of Uruguay. All of these factors caused the small group to believe that it could better fight within the city.
In 1963, the group adopted its official name, the National Liberation Movement (known by the Spanish acronym MLN). As they began to develop a revolutionary ideology and a structure for violent revolt, the group searched for a name that would identify them with the people, one with more popular appeal than MLN. According to Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne (1982, p. 206), the MLN adapted the name of the heroic Inca chieftain Tupac Amaru, who had been killed in a revolt against the Spaniards 200 years earlier. Porzecanski notes this story but also suggests the group may have taken its name from a South American bird. In any case, Sendic’s followers called themselves the Tupamaros.
Ross Butler (1976, pp. 53–59) describes the growth of the terrorist group by tracking their tactics. He says that they engaged in inconsequential activities in the early stages of their development. From 1964 to 1968, they concentrated on gathering arms and financial backing. After 1968, however, their tactics changed, and according to Butler, the government found it necessary to take them seriously.
In 1968, the Tupamaros launched a massive campaign of decentralized terrorism. They were able to challenge governmental authority because their movement was growing. A series of bank robberies had financed their operations, and now, armed with the power to strike, the Tupamaros sought to paralyze the government in Montevideo. They believed, as had Carlos Marighella in Brazil, that the government would increasingly turn to repression as a means of defense and that the people would be forced to join the revolution.
The government was quick to respond but found there was very little it could do. The Tupamaros struck when and where they wanted and generally made the government’s security forces look foolish. They kidnapped high-ranking officials from the Uruguayan government, and the police could do little to find the victims.
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10-1dCounterrevolutionary Terrorism
Kidnapping became so successful that the Tupamaros took to kidnapping foreign diplomats. They seemed able to choose their victims and strike their targets at will. Frustrated, the police turned to an old Latin American tactic: They began torturing suspected Tupamaros.
Torturing prisoners served several purposes. First, it provided a ready source of information. In fact, the Tupamaros were destroyed primarily through massive arrests, based on information gleaned from interrogations. Second, torture was believed to serve as a deterrent to other would-be revolutionaries. Although this torture was always unofficial, most potential governmental opponents knew what lay in store for them if they were caught.
The methods of torture were brutal. Gilio (1972, pp. 141–172) describes in detail the police and military torture of suspected Tupamaros. Even when prisoners finally provided information, they continued to be tortured routinely until they were either killed or released. Torture became a standard police tactic. A. J. Langguth (1978) devotes most of his work to the torture that became commonplace in Uruguay and Brazil. The torturers viewed themselves as professionals who were simply carrying out a job for the government. Rapes, beatings, and murders by torturers were common, and the police refined the art of torture to keep victims in pain as long as possible. According to Langguth, some suspects were tortured over a period of months or even years.
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10-1eEarly Successes
In the midst of revolution and torture, the Tupamaros accused the United States of supporting the brutal Uruguayan government. Their internal revolt thus adopted the rhetoric of an anti-imperialist revolution, which increased their popular support. The Tupamaros established several combat and support columns in Montevideo, and by 1970, they began to reach the zenith of their power. Porzecanski (1973) says that they almost achieved a duality of power; that is, the Tupamaros were so strong that they seemed to share power equally with the government.
During terrorist operations, numerous people were routinely murdered. The eventual murder of a kidnapped American police official disgusted the workers, even though they had no great love for the United States. Tupamaro tactics alienated their potential supporters. In the end, violence spelled doom for the Tupamaros. By bringing chaos to the capital, they succeeded in unleashing the full wrath of the government. In addition, the Tupamaros had overestimated their strength. In 1971, they joined a left-wing coalition of parties and ran for office. According to Ronald MacDonald (1972, pp. 24–45), this was a fatal mistake. The Tupamaros had alienated potential electoral support through their terrorist campaign, and the left-wing coalition was soundly defeated in national elections.
The electoral defeat was not the only bad news for the Tupamaros. The election brought a right-wing government to power, and the new military government openly advocated and approved of repression. A brutal counterterrorist campaign followed. Far from being alienated by this, the workers of Montevideo applauded the new government’s actions, even when it declared martial law in 1972. Armed with expanded powers, the government began to round up all leftists in 1972. For all practical purposes, the Tupamaros were finished. Their violence helped bring about a revolution, but not the type that they had intended.
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10-1fTupamaro Organization
The Tupamaros have passed into history, but their organization and operations serve as a model for revolutionary terrorism. It is worth taking the time to examine the MLN because many modern groups form and take actions in similar manners. The Tupamaros were one of the most highly organized yet least structured terrorist groups in modern history. Because they were virtually self-sufficient, Tupamaro growth, operations, and organization were amazing. If they failed to achieve success in the long run, their organizational structure at least kept them in the field as long as possible.
The Tupamaros were nominally guided by a national convention, which had authority in all matters of policy and operations. In reality, the national convention seldom met more than once per year and was disbanded in the 1970s. Christopher Hewitt (1984, p. 8) notes that the national convention did not meet at all after September 1970. John Wolf (1981, p. 31) believes that an executive committee controlled all activities in Montevideo. Arturo Porzecanski (1973), probably the most noted authority on the Tupamaros, makes several references to this same executive committee. For all practical purposes, it seems to have controlled the Tupamaros (see MIPT, n.d.).
The executive committee was responsible for two major functions. It ran the columns that supervised the terrorist operations, and it also administered the special Committee for Revolutionary Justice. The power of the executive committee derived from internal enforcement. The job of the committee was to terrorize the terrorists into obedience. If an operative refused to obey an order or tried to leave the organization, a delegation from the committee would usually deal with the matter. It was not uncommon to murder the family of the offending party, along with the errant member. The Tupamaros believed in strong internal discipline.
Operational power in the Tupamaros was vested in the lower-echelon units. Columns were organized for both combatant (operational) and staff (logistical) functions. Wolf (1981, p. 35) writes that most of the full-time terrorists belonged to cells in the combatant columns. They lived a precarious day-to-day existence and were constantly in conflict with the authorities. According to Wolf, they were supported by larger noncombatant columns that served to keep the terrorists in the field.
The importance of the noncombatant columns cannot be overemphasized—the strength of the Tupamaros came from the logistical columns. Without the elaborate support network of sympathizers and part-time helpers, the Tupamaros could not have remained in the field. Other groups that have copied their organizational model have not had the ability to launch a campaign because they lacked the same level of support.
Wolf’s analysis of the support network includes peripheral support that was not directly linked to the Tupamaro organization. With Porzecanski, Wolf classifies supporters into two categories. One group operated in the open and provided intelligence and background information to the noncombatant sections. The other type of supporters worked on getting supplies to the operational sections. These sympathizers provided arms, ammunition, and legal aid. Both groups tried to generate popular support for the Tupamaros. When the government attacked the terrorists in 1972, its primary target was the support network. Police officials reasoned that if they destroyed the logistical network, they would destroy the Tupamaros.
In looking at the organizational chart of the Tupamaros (Figure 10.3), it is easy to envisage the entire operation. The executive committee was in charge, but it ran a highly decentralized operation. Its main power came from the internal rule enforcement provided by the Committee for Revolutionary Justice. Columns were the major units, but they tended to be tactical formations. The real operational power came from the cells, which united for column-style operations on rare occasions. The combat striking power of the Tupamaros came from the four- to six-person groups in the cells. This organization epitomized Marighella’s concept of the firing unit. Peter Waldmann (1986, p. 259) sums up the Tupamaros best by stating that they became the masters of urban terrorism. He believes that in terms of striking power, organization, and ability to control a city, no group has ever surpassed the Tupamaros. They epitomized the terrorist role. (See Figure 10.4 for the Tupamaro symbol.)
Figure 10.3Tupamaro Organization
Figure 10.4Tupamaro Symbol
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10-1gInfluencing Modern Terrorism
As the champions of revolutionary terrorism, the Tupamaros were copied around the world, especially by groups in the United States and Western Europe. Many American left-wing groups from 1967 to 1990 modeled themselves after the Tupamaros. In Western Europe, Tupamaro structure and tactics were mimicked by such groups as the Red Army Faction and Direct Action. The Red Brigades split their activities among different cities, but they essentially copied the model of the Tupamaros.
William Dyson (2008) argues that although some terrorist structures change and suicide bombing has become more common, terrorists’ strategic and tactical practices remain constant. Several groups still follow the model of the Tupamaros. The fact that the Tupamaros created an urban movement is important in terms of the group’s impact on violence in Latin America, but it also has a bearing on the way terrorist methods have developed in Europe and in the United States. Historically, Latin American terrorism was a product of rural peasant revolt. The Tupamaros offered an alternative to this tradition by making the city a battleground. They demonstrated to Western groups the impact that a few violent true believers could have on the rational routines of urban life. The urban setting provided the Tupamaros with endless opportunities.
Tupamaro tactics and organization have also been copied by right-wing groups. In the United States, right-wing extremist organizations have advocated the use of Tupamaro-style tactics. Many revolutionary manuals and proposed terrorist organizations are based on Tupamaro experiences.
Self-Check
· What are revolutionary and counterrevolutionary terrorism?
· How did the Tupamaros envision urban revolution?
· In what ways did Tupamaro tactics impact terrorism, in general?
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10-2Examples of Modern Revolutionary Terrorism
Revolutionary terrorism began in 1789 with the French Revolution, and it continued from 1879 to 1917 in Russia. After toppling rulers, however, both newly formed revolutionary governments were forced to use terror to suppress the population. Some contemporary terrorists would face the same challenge if they came to power. To avoid rule by terror, revolutionary groups must win the support of the majority of people in country where they operate. Therefore, when revolutionary forces are strong enough, they tend to use selective terrorism in support of guerrilla operations. The Irish Republican Army did this in Ireland’s war for independence, and several revolutionary movements have employed similar techniques. The Cuban Revolution serves as an example. Mao Zedong also used selective terrorism in a long sometimes-guerilla, sometimes-conventional war against the Nationalist government and the Japanese in China, and the Vietcong copied many of his ideas in Vietnam. Yet, many groups remain too weak to operate as guerrillas (see Boot, 2013).
Three current movements engaged in revolutionary terrorism are FARC, the National Liberation Army (like FARC, it is known by its Spanish acronym, ELN), and the Iranian Peoples’ Holy Warriors (Mujahedeen-e-Kahlq or MeK). At times, FARC and the ELN have been strong enough to sustain a guerrilla army and conduct a campaign of selective terrorism. The MeK has a more difficult situation because it is in Iraq surrounded by Shi’ite militias.
It should be noted the United Self-Defense Forces (known by its Spanish acronym, AUC) was also an active terrorist group operating in Colombia, and it may sometimes have governmental support. Disbanded in 2005, the AUC was an umbrella organization for several counterrevolutionary paramilitary groups, and at times, it practiced selective terrorism by conducting extrajuridical executions. Death squads are considered separately at the end of this chapter.
10-2
Examples of Modern Revolutionary Terrorism
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10-2aFARC
Originally liberated by Simón Bolívar in 1812, Colombia became part of a large nation known as Grand Colombia. By 1830, regional interests in Colombia and Panama began to surface, and Panama gained independence during a U.S.-sponsored revolution in 1903. While Panama developed relative stability, Colombia’s history was marked by internal violence and political instability. During the last half-century, the country has been in the midst of a dirty war in which terrorists and governmental forces fight a shadow war that is interconnected with drug production (see Figure 10.5).
Figure 10.5Map of Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia
FARC went through different stages as it gradually formed a guerrilla army. As The Violence came to an end, many opponents of the new government armed themselves and moved to Colombia’s remote mountain region. One group attempted to create a self-governing commune centered in a hamlet deep in a rural mountainous area. Its plans were disrupted in May 1964 when government forces attacked the settlement. Members retreated and formed alliances with other displaced guerrillas. FARC was formed as other guerrillas drifted into their ranks, and the new group called itself the Revolution Armed Forces of Colombia (CISC, 2012b).
FARC reached critical mass in the 1970s and grew strong enough to become a true revolutionary guerrilla army. It expanded operations. By 1982, membership had grown to 3,000 people, and it continued to increase. Operating primarily in rural areas, FARC’s goals were to topple the government in Bogotá and establish a socialist government (Meacham, Farah, and Lamb, 2014, pp. 9–10; CISC, 2012b).
FARC raised funds by “taxing” marijuana growers, extorting money from local businesses, and kidnapping. Most of its money came from the drug trade. Demand for cocaine in the United States resulted in increased coca production in Colombia’s remote mountains. A weak federal government could not effectively control much of the rural countryside, and coca fields increased. As fields got bigger, incomes increased, which resulted in the emergence of several powerful drug dealers. FARC leadership decided to get into the business. Forcing local peasants to move from producing crops into farming coca, FARC bought the harvest and had it refined it into cocaine. Even though the peasants were being exploited by FARC, many of them were not dissatisfied. Coca farming doubled their income of (Meacham et al., 2014, p. 8).
Bilal Saab and Alexandra Taylor (2009) examined the importance of drugs in FARC financing. In 2005, FARC’s income was estimated as high as 300 million U.S. dollars. FARC raised almost half of its money through extortion, kidnapping ransoms, business thefts, and cattle rustling. But most of the income came from illegal drugs. While major criminal organizations in Colombia made their money by producing, redefining, distributing, and trafficking drugs, FARC approached profiteering via another path. Limiting its operations to Colombia, FARC relied on criminals to produce, refine, and traffic the product. FARC made its money by protecting coca farms, cocaine refineries, and domestic distribution routes. Examining data from 1999 as an example, Saab and Taylor found FARC charged $15.70 to protect a kilo of coca paste. If a dealer wanted to transport fully refined cocaine from FARC-controlled territory, the price for protection was $52.60. FARC also provided protection for airstrips that traffickers used. It charged $2,631 per kilo of cocaine on flights within Colombia and $5,263 per kilo to protect drugs if they were temporarily housed at an airstrip.
As FARC became more powerful, it developed multiple enemies. Concerned with illegal drugs, the United States stepped up its assistance to the Colombian government. Some peasants resisted FARC, and the government began arming them to create paramilitary defense forces. Drug producers had a twofold grievance against FARC. First, they did not want the competition. Second, FARC’s local units frequently kidnapped drug lords’ family members. Criminal organizations had heavily armed private armies that did not fight under limited rules of engagement. FARC responded with violence of its own, and Colombia sank into the abyss of a murderous, multifaceted dirty war (Meacham et al., pp. 9–10).
FARC became a fairly potent force. Making temporary peace pacts with many of the drug lords, they openly targeted the Colombian government. Soldiers, politicians, and law enforcement personnel were killed by the dozens. When the army took action in rural areas, casualties increased. Like revolutionaries from earlier times, FARC expanded territory and ruled by terror. It increased its ability to produce explosives, and it planted land mines to protect the areas under its control. It also developed powerful gas cylinder bombs to use in Colombia’s cities. They were particularly ruthless with indigenous people, often massacring entire villages (CISC, 2012b).
Alvaro Uribe won the 2002 presidential election and promised to launch a robust offensive against FARC. He began launching effective military operations against multiple groups that were fighting in Colombia’s mountainous jungles and crowded cities. Supported by the United States, he promised that he would bring FARC and other revolutionary forces to the negotiating table and dismantle paramilitary death squads. He was quick to seize on the U.S. reaction to 9/11, claiming that Colombia’s contribution to the “war on terror” would be the elimination of revolutionaries and drug dealers. Law enforcement and military operations gradually reversed the tide. FARC slowly eroded (Bustamante and Chaskel, 2008).
By 2008, Uribe’s aggressive counterterrorism policy paid off. Some of FARC’s key leaders had been killed, including the founder and leader of the group, and its structures were being degraded by effective military action. In 2009, FARC struck back, but Colombian security forces reversed the initial gains. FARC retreated deeply into its territory (National Counterterrorism Center, 2010b).
FARC also developed two ideological problems. First, drug money created wealth. While FARC championed equality and socialism, it evolved into a group motivated by greed. It was embedded in the drug trade, and for many of its members, acquiring money became more important than social equality. Second, while FARC fought for socialism and justice, it used terror to rule the territory it controlled. People began to resent FARC hypocrisy. As profits replaced social reform, members began to desert. Power began to wane. After a hotly contested national election in 2010, Colombia’s new leader, President Juan Manuel Santos , wanted peace. He offered to negotiate with FARC. Weakened by Uribe’s offensive, in 2012, FARC negotiators sat down with government officials in Oslo (Kamminga, 2013).
There are several obstacles to peace. First, the government and FARC have negotiated cease-fires in the past only to have them fail. Second, conservatives are opposed to negotiating with FARC, and Santos has promised that any settlement will have to stand the test of a national referendum. If conservatives ally with the many agricultural victims of FARC, voters may not approve a settlement. Third, FARC’s involvement in drug trafficking creates substantial incomes for coca farmers and refiners. Members of FARC have allegedly approached an al Qaeda affiliate in Algeria and Hezbollah in Lebanon asking for their assistance in drug smuggling. There is a real question about FARC’s commitment to ending the drug trade. Fourth, FARC is a decentralized organization. Its leaders can negotiate a peace settlement, but local commanders may ignore it. Finally, FARC represents only one of the groups fighting in Colombia. The dirty war may continue even if FARC’s members lay down their weapons (Jeffers and Milton, 2014).
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10-2bThe ELN
Liberation theology is a doctrine that originated in poverty. It combines the ideas of Marx with Christian teachings, specifically focusing on social justice and the poor. It became popular in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, inspiring many Catholics, Protestants, and social activists. In 1964, a small group of Catholic priests joined an idealistic group of college students to form a new organization that would fight for social justice in Colombia. Believing that poverty could not be eliminated through peaceful means, they decided to effect change by force of arms. They called themselves the National Liberation Army, or ELN (CISC, 2012a).
Father Camilo Torres, one of the early leaders of the newly formed group, encouraged his fellow clergy to join the fight. Some of them listened, with some priests coming from as far away as Spain. The little group had few resources and very little cash. The priests argued that they could not make money through the drug trade. That, they said, would be immoral. They could raise money by another crime, however. The ELN turned to kidnapping, thus accepting a logical contradiction that would appeal only to an extremist. As they raised funds and armed themselves, they marched into a revolution. Father Torres was killed in his first battle in 1966 (In SightCrime, n.d., circa 2011; and Gumey, 2014).
Through its more than 50 years of existence, the ELN has matured and changed, moving through four ideological phases. The first phase was marked by liberation theology. The idealists fought for a socialist democracy to free Colombia’s peasants from poverty. After almost being destroyed in 1973, the ELN rebounded and started to grow. The regenerated guerrillas shifted their focus as they embraced Cuban-style socialism. By 1999, the ELN reverted to championing socialist democracy, but members completely abandoned any pretense of religion. Suffering from President Uribe’s military and law enforcement offensive, the group entered its current phase sometime around 2008 and 2009. Individual units began forming alliances with newly emerging criminal gangs, and by 2012, the ELN was heavily involved in the drug trade. One thing has remained constant through the decades, however. The ELN is composed of proficient kidnappers (CISC, 2012a; Meacham et al., 2014).
While FARC has been estimated to have as many as 35,000 guerrillas, the ELN has never been as popular. One of the more violent and ideologically committed groups, its activities generated popular opposition. The ELN felt pressured at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The group sought a truce with the government in 2002 and again in 2005 but broke off discussions on both occasions. An increasingly violent fight with FARC marked the ELN’s continued deterioration through 2009. Weakened ELN members finally sought a truce with FARC in 2009, only to have one local commander break it in mid-2010 by declaring “total war” against FARC. Since that time, relative peace between the two groups has been dominated by geography. FARC tends to operate in rural areas, and the ELN concentrates on Colombia’s cities. The groups do not fight when they are separated.
The ELN’s command structure has been characterized by power struggles and purges. Currently, the senior commander is Nicolas Rodriguez Batista, who is known by his nom de guerre Gabino. He joined the ELN in 1964 at the age of 14. Although Rodriguez is nominally in charge of a central command, he shares power with other central commanders in five different departments that cover the military, political affairs, international relations, finance, and communication. These commanders also share power with regional officers who command large geographical swaths called war fronts. They come together periodically to form a congress but then return to their separate areas. This leads to many independent actions and local alliances among the semiautonomous war fronts. The structure also complicates any efforts to negotiate a peace. It is difficult to lead by committee and even more challenging to negotiate peace settlements when no one has the authority to make a truce (In SightCrime, n.d., circa 2011; CISC 2012a; Voelkel, 2015).
A BBC (2013b) background report on the ELN says that when FARC approached the government to discuss potential peace negotiations in November 2012, some of the ELN leaders expressed an interest. President Santos rebuffed their inquiries, demanding that they first take some type of concrete action. The ELN responded by releasing a kidnapped Canadian oil executive nine months later without requiring a ransom. Yet, as government negotiations with FARC moved from Oslo to Cuba, the ELN was still not involved. Bolivia and Ecuador volunteered to host peace talks.
Opinions about the future of the ELN are divided. Critics argue that elements of the ELN are morphing into Bandas Criminales or BACRIM drug gangs that have come to replace drug cartels. Various war fronts formed separate alliances with several gangs in 2014 and 2015. Other war fronts fight local BACRIMs for control of the drug trade. An article in the Miami Herald does not see the situation so pessimistically (Wyss, 2015). It states that the ELN may eventually agree to peace talks, but such a move must come from a consensus among its commanders. The International Crisis Group shares this opinion (Voelkel, 2015). It states that the ELN is afraid of becoming completely defenseless in a violent environment and concludes that the ELN’s path to peace will involve a long, slow walk. It takes time to get a committee to make a decision.
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10-2cThe MeK
The U.S. Department of State placed Mujahedin-e-Kahlq (MeK) on its initial list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) in October 1997. The MeK was founded in 1965 and thus preceded the Iranian Revolution by 14 years. Its purpose was overthrowing the Iranian government. It has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, primarily due to the assassinations of six Americans in Tehran during the 1970s and its anti-American activities during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Saddam Hussein used its services during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), and it is currently estimated to have about 3,800 members. During the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the group was officially designated as a hostile force, but the MeK negotiated a cease-fire with American forces in April 2003 (Masters, 2014).
The Council on Foreign Relations (Fletcher, 2008) states that the MeK was responsible for attacking a number of Western targets in the 1970s and for supporting the 1979 American embassy takeover in Tehran. It is the largest and most militant group opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The group espouses a mixture of Marxism and Islam, and its original purpose was to overthrow the government of the shah and to replace it with a socialist government. It supported the 1979 revolution, but its philosophy of socialism and women’s liberation contrasted sharply with the conservative views of Iran’s mullahs.
Mujahedin-e-Kahlq presents a conundrum for the United States. Officially listed as a terrorist group since 1997, the MeK settled in a camp about 40 miles north of Baghdad in 2003. As soon as the invading U.S. military forces negotiated a peace settlement with the MeK, they found that they could not fit the group’s members into a neat package. American military planners had not prepared for MeK prisoners. At first, American forces sought to treat the group’s members as prisoners of war, but according to the Geneva Convention, each member was entitled to a separate hearing to determine his or her status. In addition, a significant portion of the membership had been duped into joining during the Iran–Iraq war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld changed the members’ status in 2004 without a legal review, stating that all members were civilian “protected persons.” According to a RAND study (Goulka, Hansell, and Larson, 2009), this decision was the result of improper planning. It also placed the United States in the hypocritical position of having a relationship with a designated terrorist group.
The Times of London points out that the relationship became even more uncomfortable after this point. In 2007, President George W. Bush received a budget of $400 million from Congress to support groups that violently opposed Iran’s Islamic regime. One of the groups on the list was the MeK (Philp and Evans, 2009). According to Vanity Fair (Unger, 2007), prominent advisors to the Bush administration advocated that the United States form a link with the MeK. It was the best hope for destabilizing Iran, the advisors argued.
An in-depth Canadian press report (Petrou, 2009) suggests that MeK is attempting to demonstrate that it has amended its terrorist past. The MeK held a large rally in Paris in the summer of 2008, and it paid the expenses of several Western politicians who attended the event. The group has been removed from the British and European Union lists of terrorist organizations, and it has shared information with various intelligence agencies. The group is not popular in Iran because of its alliance with Saddam Hussein and the Iran–Iraq War. Though the group has been fairly inactive since 2001, numerous critics have pointed to its abuses of human rights. Others suggest that the MeK is little more than a personality cult built around Maryam Rajavi.
The United States removed the MeK from the list of designated FTOs in 2012, a move that infuriated some government officials yet was praised by others (Pecquet, 2015a). The group has allies in the U.S. Congress and some high-profile U.S. officials (Francis, 2015). When the last U.S. forces left Iraq in 2011, Iraqis allegedly attacked the MeK camp. Sporadic attacks have continued, including a missile attack from Shi’ite forces fighting ISIS in 2015 (BBC, 2013a; Pecquet, 2015b). According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the United Nations recognizes MeK exiles in Iraq as protected people waiting to be transferred to a third country (Masters, 2014). Although the United States no longer recognizes the MeK as a terrorist group, some former government officials vehemently reject the new status. When a congressional representative invited Rajavi to testify at a government hearing, a former state department official and a former United States ambassador left the hearing in anger (Pecquet, 2015a). Many people believe the MeK has not changed its ways.
Self-Check
· How were FARC, the ELN, and the MeK formed?
· What roles do illegal drugs play in Colombian terrorism?
· Why does the West have an ambivalent relationship with the MeK?
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10-3Maoist Revolutionary Terrorism
While the Tupamaros exerted tremendous influence on the development of urban terrorism, rural revolutionary guerillas generally incorporated selective terrorism in the traditions of Michael Collins and Che Guevara. Guerrillas in Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Africa used terrorism as a tactic to support a larger strategy. The guerrilla movement failed in Malaysia, but it was at least partially successful in Vietnam and South Africa. Other guerrillas saw few chances for success, and some of these experiences gave way to campaigns of rural terror. Some were influenced by Marxism and others by a more extreme form of Maoism.
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10-3aPeru’s Shining Path
A Maoist group, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), launched a campaign in rural Peru that began in 1980 and lasted for the following two decades (Fraser, 2007; see also Taylor, 2006). The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) joined the Shining Path in 1984, although it was much less violent. Peru’s revolutionary past was grounded in anticolonialism as the indigenous people sought to free themselves from European rule. Tupac Amaru (d. 1572) led a revolt against Spain from 1571 to 1572. Although the country did not gain its independence until 1824, he came to symbolize Peruvian independence. As military coups took control of the government throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, his name was used to invoke a democratic spirit. After a civilian-elected president took power in Lima in 1980, Tupac Amaru came to symbolize another type of revolution. The Shining Path would wage a Maoist campaign of terrorism for the next 20 years using his name.
Scholars have debated the political orientation of the Shining Path almost from its inception. Led by a philosophy professor, Abimael Guzmán , the group was deeply influenced by China and its Cultural Revolution . Guzmán believed that the leftist politics of Peru’s Communist Party were too tame, and he embraced the radical violence espoused by Maoist revolutionaries (Gorritti, 2006). In addition, the Maoist approach matched Peru’s economic structure. Most of its economic and political strength came from the countryside. Guzmán moved to build a rural power base, and most scholars view the organization as a violent Maoist movement (Gregory, 2009).
Other scholars do not accept the view that the Shining Path was based on Maoism. Paul Navarro (2010) believes that the entire Peruvian left was influenced by Mao but that the influence was rhetorical. Most Peruvian leftists were mainstream Marxists. While they called for violent revolution, the starting point was thought to be decades away. Peru’s communists were not inherently violent. Ronald Osborn (2007) argues that the Shining Path was a hyper-Marxist/Maoist group that was unique among all groups in Latin America because of its proclivity for violence. He says that the Shining Path became the first insurgent force on the left to surpass the military in waging a systematic campaign of violence against civilians.
Guzmán led the Shining Path in a twofold strategy. First, the guerrillas operated in rural areas, trying to create regional military forces. Second, Guzmán attempted to combine Mao Zedong’s ruthless revolutionary zeal with the guerrilla philosophy of Che Guevara. The result was a ruthless campaign of violence designed to force peasants into a new egalitarian society. Most guerrillas minimize terrorism because it alienates potential supporters. Guzmán’s philosophy was different. Anyone who refused to support the Shining Path was considered an enemy. Not only did Guzmán’s followers use terrorism to target individuals, they also engaged in indiscriminate violence against anyone who did not support their call. Some victims suffered from car bombings and drive-by shootings; in other areas, guerrillas wiped out entire villages. The Shining Path’s lethal methods demanded the death of all people who resisted or even gave the impression that they did not support the revolution (Theidon, 2006).
The government responded with its own campaign of counterterrorism. Security forces attacked the Shining Path with reckless abandon. Throughout the 1980s, they struck suspected areas of guerrilla support, and they grew more ruthless after the election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990 (Fraser, 2007). Fujimori created a system of secret courts and political repression. He dissolved Congress and ran Peru as a virtual police state. The rural peasants were caught in the middle. Soldiers and guerrillas followed a scorched earth policy, embracing the moral necessity of eradicating all enemies while peasants suffered from the actions of both sides. The struggle degenerated into a series of massacres and individual murders (Theidon, 2006).
Security forces seemed to gain the upper hand in September 1992 when police surveillance teams took Guzmán into custody. Fujimori began a campaign of economic reform despite his draconian measures against Peruvian democracy. The Shining Path, however, responded with a new campaign of terrorism, and the MRTA gained headlines with sensational operations. The government responded with even more repression and police death squads. The fighting ended in 2000 with all guerrillas abandoning terrorism and with the fall of Fujimori. The new Peruvian government created a truth and reconciliation commission, which released a final report in 2003 after a two-year investigation. Two decades of violence had resulted in the deaths of nearly 70,000 people. The Shining Path was responsible for about 54 percent of the total death count (Theidon, 2006).
Despite its practice of murdering anyone suspected of not supporting the revolution, the Shining Path was committed to social egalitarianism, at least rhetorically. The structure of the organization reveals two interesting social patterns. The role of families was prominent in day-to-day operations, and the Shining Path was committed to feminism. It actively recruited and engaged the services of revolutionary females, and Guzman’s second-in-command was a woman from 1980 until she was killed in 1988 (Heilman, 2010).
The fighting supposedly came to an end in 2000; however, the New York Times (2009) reports that the Shining Path reemerged around 2007, reinventing itself as a drug trafficking organization. According to the newspaper, the Shining Path moved into Peru’s cocaine-producing areas and abandoned Maoist practices for the lucrative profits of the drug trade. In 2008, the Shining Path was responsible for more than two dozen murders, making it the deadliest year since the fall of Fujimori.
Lack of leadership remains a problem. According to the Jamestown Foundation (2012), the Shining Path has partially taken over the drug trade in southern Peru. Reports of drug activities have increased, and some evidence suggests that it has formed an alliance with drug gangs in Colombia (Gange, 2015). The probable course for the Shining Path will most likely involve increased criminal activity for profit. The Maoist ideologues appear to be severely weakened.
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10-3bNaxalites of India
India has a variety of terrorist problems arising from political, religious, and ethnic strife. It is also in the throes of a Maoist rebellion. To understand the Maoist problem, it is necessary to remember that Indian society was governed by a rigid caste system for centuries. Even though the system has been formally abandoned, many lower-class peasants still suffer from its effects. India’s agrarian system is based on large wealthy landholders and unlanded peasants, formerly of the lower caste, who are alienated from the current economic structure. Great economic disparities have led to the growth of left-wing movements that demand a more equal distribution of resources. One of these movements has turned violent (Zissis, 2007) (Figure 10.6).
Figure 10.6India
Some members of the Indian government began to lobby for real reform as a result of the unrest. They saw social injustice at the base of the agrarian rebellion. Although they attempted to pass reform legislation, they were thwarted by several aspects of India’s bureaucratic and political systems. The social separation between landlords and tenants was deeply ingrained in Indian society. The civil service agencies assigned to agricultural areas were inefficient, and there was little cooperation among different units of government. Complete land records did not exist. Many peasants were illiterate, with no economic future other than working as tenant laborers for absentee landlords. When the government finally passed modest reform legislation, it did not allocate enough money to implement the program. In the end, India decided to handle any agricultural unrest as a police problem (Tharu, 2007).
The Naxalites began to emerge again in the 1990s in a variety of smaller movements. Anthropologist George Kunnath (2006) spent a year living with and observing a former member of the Naxalites. He believes that this grassroots movement gained strength because the landlord system had created a virtual feudal state. The Naxalites saw the landlords as unproductive external proprietors who exploited cheap labor. The Naxalites’ goal evolved into a movement with three promises: land to the tiller, higher wages for agricultural work, and ending the de facto caste system.
As the group began to solidify, it formed a Red Corridor stretching from the northern Nepalese border to south-central India. This became a strong geographical base of power. When two movements—the People’s Guerrilla Army of the People’s War Group and the People’s Liberation Army of the Maoist Center of India—joined the Naxalites 2004, they became a threat to regional stability. By 2005, the Naxalites were challenging India’s police with attacks on police stations and jungle ambushes, which produced law enforcement casualties in the hundreds (Turbiville, 2005; Ganguly, 2009).
The Jamestown Foundation (2010) reports that the Indian government believes that the Naxalite rebellion has become its number one internal security problem. In the summer of 2010, the prime minister was considering calling on the military to deal with the problem. Other research suggests that the violence has grown because of an ineffective response (Oetken, 2009). Regional police forces have suffered hundreds of casualties, and some observers think the police authorize death squads in response. One of the more controversial moves has been the establishment of a special police force composed of local peasants. With no training and little regard for human rights, the special police frequently operate outside the law. The Naxalites have responded in kind, and more than half the states in India are involved in the dirty war (Guha, 2007; Banerjee, 2009).
There is an interesting aspect to gender roles in the Naxalite movement. When it first began in 1967, females began protest movements that sometimes resulted in violence. Eventually, many joined the militants in the jungles. Many women regarded their activities as a “magic moment,” that is, as a time that defined their lives. Although they did not achieve emancipation, they created a new self-identity, apart from their role as peasants, and a women’s movement began to emerge (Sinha Roy, 2009). Paradoxically, they also found that they were defined by their participation in the Naxalite movement. Imprisonment, shared dangers, and a spirit of brotherhood created lifelong bonds among many groups of men (Donner, 2009).
Shameul Tharu (2007) argues that the rebellion cannot be stopped by either police or military power. It is simplistic, he says, to classify the Naxalite rebellion as a criminal problem. The Indian government needs to address several structural issues, including land reform, political reform, and ending bureaucratic corruption. Sumanta Banerjee (2009) adds that government reform would rectify the peasants’ alienation from the land. On the other hand, Naxalite violence and human rights violations against peasants have alienated their potential supporters.
The Aspen Foundation (Van Dongen, 2012) believes that the rebellion is far from over for three reasons. First, India is one of the most underpoliced countries of the world. It does not have enough personnel to confront the Naxalites effectively. Second, reversing their previous public posture, the Naxalites have begun providing social services to the poor inside the Red Corridor. These are effective no-go areas , and the Indian government cannot respond in kind. Even if the Indian government could, they have demonstrated no interest in doing so. Finally, the most important reason the rebellion continues is that the fundamental issues that caused the unrest have not been addressed.
Violence surged in 2013 and spilled into 2014. While security forces have retaken much of the forest area controlled by Naxalite militants, military force and increased law enforcement will not end the rebellion. Writing for the Harvard International Review, Daniel Epstein (2014) believes that the Naxalites and others have been politically and economically marginalized along with a substantial portion of India’s indigenous tribes. The economy in western urban areas is robust, but extreme poverty engulfs the eastern portion of India, especially in rural areas. Epstein concludes that while India must bring security to the Red Corridor, it must also bring west India’s prosperity to the east. In addition, all India’s people should be vested with the full rights of citizenship. This does not simply involve the Maoist rebels. Unless India makes strides toward economic and political justice, Epstein believes the country may fall apart.
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10-3cThe New People’s Army
While many Americans conceive of the Philippine Islands as a monolithic modern state, the reality is different. The Philippines has differing cultures, radical gaps in income, different religious traditions, and divisive politics. In addition to foreign occupation by three different countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Philippine politics has been characterized as a struggle for democracy in the midst of local revolts. In 1986, a grand people power revolution toppled a long-term repressive leader and promised to bring real democracy. The promise failed. Many local revolts continue, including a campaign by the military wing of the Philippine Communist Party, the New People’s Army (NPA).
The NPA is the longest-running Communist insurgency in the world. It is a rural movement that began in 1969 as a response to a Philippine dictatorship. It had as many as 25,000 members in the 1980s, though its membership dwindled after the return of democracy in 1986. By the mid-1990s, NPA ranks had slimmed to a cadre of less than 10,000. Today, its estimated strength is less than 7,000 (Montlake, 2007). The group eventually adopted a Maoist revolutionary philosophy, targeting security forces, politicians, judges, and U.S. military personnel assigned to the Philippines. It also gained a reputation for self-purges, killing many of its own members.
The NPA is unique due to its ideological orientation (Coronel, 2007). Most of its power base is in rural Luzon, but it has made inroads in Manila and Mindanao. It sustains operations by levying a “revolutionary tax,” which is money extorted from local residents and merchants. The NPA’s income averaged about $30 million per year in 2007, and it currently maintains a steady stream of income and logistical material (Montlake, 2007; CISC, 2015). There are many female members who operate as full-fledged guerrillas in the jungle, though the NPA is hardly a bastion of feminism. While girls are recruited at a young age, all aspects of their lives are controlled. Called Amazonas for the mythic race of Greek female warriors, they are not allowed to engage in any activity, including romantic liaisons, without permission from the male leaders (Marshall, 2008).
Many Philippine counterterrorist activities have taken place outside the law since 2000. Over 1,700 people have been murdered in extrajudicial executions, and the United Nations has placed the Philippine government on an international watch list for human rights violations (CISC, 2015). Underground death squads began eliminating suspected enemies in Mafia-style executions in 2001, and murders increased with the campaign against terrorism in 2006 (Abinales, 2008). The Philippine government used the war on terrorism as an excuse to move against church workers, union organizers, lawyers, and human rights workers. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have dehumanized the NPA, virtually creating a blood feud that can be ended only through complete annihilation (Montlake, 2007).
The Philippines has been plagued by terrorism since the mid-1970s. Two of the issues that keep the NPA in the field are the structure of political power and the distribution of wealth. The Philippines has democratic roots dating back to 1898, when the United States seized the islands from Spain. Americans quickly established democratic institutions, and they were unique. Instead of giving power to all Filipinos, the new democracy favored prosperous, landed elites. When the United States granted the Philippines independence in 1946, the elites continued to run the government. This resulted in a political structure in which most of the people are excluded from active participation (Hutchcroft, 2008).
Poverty does not cause terrorism, but social inequities can draw people to revolutionary causes. Patricio Abinales (2008) says that the political system is somewhat stable because power is not centralized in Manila. It is maintained through relations with local power structures, and the majority of the people are apathetic about the elitist government. Poverty is another issue, and there is no apathy there. Large gaps in the distribution of wealth provide a pool for revolutionaries. These potential actors are not drawn to terrorism. They are motivated by economic disparity (Coronel, 2007).
Self-Check
· What is Maoist terrorism?
· How is it manifested in the Philippines? In Nepal? In India?
· What social factors caused Maoists to gain popularity in these three countries?
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10-4Death Squads and Counterrevolutionaries
During the heyday of FARC and the ELN in Colombia, paramilitary units sprang up to fight the guerrillas. At first, the Colombian people, government, and military welcomed these groups. The army even conducted joint exercises with them, and many former members of law enforcement and the military joined their ranks. Officials expressed concern when it became obvious that many of the paramilitary units had strong connections to drug cartels. The army officially severed ties with the paramilitaries in 1989, but some elements of the armed forces continued to cooperate with them. In the early 1990s, several groups began to band together and operated under new names. In 1997, three brothers brought several larger assemblies together to form the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (known by the Spanish acronym AUC).
The AUC was effective. According to the BBC (2013b) it hunted and killed leftist guerrillas. This is the type of action that separates death squads from units acting within the rule of law. If AUC leaders suspected persons of belonging to or supporting FARC, they killed them. Deaths were frequently gruesome. Victims were tortured, mutilated, and killed. Many times, the AUC beheaded its captives. They not only killed suspected terrorists, they also began to target their critics, and this soon spread to targeting anybody with left of center political views. Media personalities, politicians, union leaders, and anyone who displeased the AUC became a potential victim. Although the majority of their funding came from drug trafficking, they raised substantial funds from businesses and oil companies who paid for protection from the guerrillas. They also extorted money, kidnapped, and committed other crimes for profit. Their military offensives were marked by rape, robbery, and massacres. The United States placed the AUC on the designated FTO list in 2001.
The Council on Foreign Relations (2008) says the AUC began to demobilize in 2003 when it numbered well over 30,000 men. The government provided legal incentives to men who turned in their weapons; it granted reduced sentences to those convicted of crimes and promised not to extradite persons wanted by the United States. Several drug lords moved to join the AUC to take advantage of the program, but when the government recognized the ploy, many traffickers were extradited to the United States. A scandal in 2007 uncovered AUC relationships with at least 50 high-ranking political officials, and it cast doubt on President Uribe’s connections with the organization.
Many death squads are smaller and subtler than the AUC. Death squads come into being when people who hold economic and political power believe that their position is being threatened and authorities are unable to mitigate the threat. The purpose of a death squad is to eliminate opposition when a government is either unable or unwilling to do so. The tactics of death squads vary. They range from semiofficial raids on government opponents to torture and secret murder. In a common scenario, uniformed members of a death squad will “arrest” a victim. The victim is carried away, and there are no records. The arresting officers frighten lucky victims and torture and murder unlucky ones. In other cases, people simply disappear.
Death squads have been associated primarily with right-wing activities, but they are used across the political spectrum. For example, after the 1979 Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, unofficial groups began to crack down on the press and on potential opposition parties. People who opposed the Communist regime began to disappear. More recently, death squads appeared in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Many parties in Iraq used death squads to intimidate their opponents.
Julie Mazzei (2009, pp. 1–24) posits a theory about the emergence of death squads in a work on counterrevolution in Latin America. Mazzei states that paramilitary groups develop based on the perceptions of power elites in the face of economic and political threats. She believes, first and foremost, that death squads must be understood as a method for resisting structural shifts. They are opposed to reform. Prior to mass electronic information networks, this task was delegated to military and law enforcement forces, but modern international pressure, which results from global communications, frequently prevents power elites from using institutional power structures in this manner. Therefore, power elites have begun creating their own extrainstitutional forces to achieve their desired goals.
Perception is the key to Mazzei’s theory. Paramilitary death squads come into play only when power elites feel that social changes are undermining their societies and that nothing can be done to stop the process. This does not refer to political movements that displace parties within a legitimate and socially accepted system; it applies to movements that shift the basic structure of a social organization. In Mazzei’s study, the hardliners in every country that has seen the creation of death squads viewed reform efforts as an illegitimate method for redistributing wealth and power, and each government in question was either unwilling or unable to stop reform. Mazzei says that both the power elites and members of the paramilitary units justify their actions because they feel that their methods are the only legitimate defense of the social and political order.
Mazzei argues that conditions that give rise to death squads develop when several factors coalesce to form a favorable environment. First, political elites must be entrenched in a society and have a vested interest in maintaining societal structures, and these elites have a history of employing armed force to protect their positions. This combines with a second factor—a reform movement that threatens to break up elite power structures and redistribute wealth and power. Third, the government must be either unwilling or unable to stop the reform movement. Finally, hardliners among the political elites break away from their mainstream counterparts based on the belief that moderate political elites are too soft and unable to stop the reform movement. The only action that will maintain social order, the hardliners believe, is physically eliminating opponents and destroying the mentality of seeking reform.
Augmenting Mazzei’s theory is a case study by Brenda Breuil and Ralph Rozema (2009). They looked at the operation of death squads in Davao City, Philippines, and in Medellín, Colombia, and found that perception of social change is indeed the key factor behind death squad activity. Breuil and Rozema explain death squads by social imagination. Their study suggests that entire groups of people in a geographical location within the same socioeconomic structure create and sustain an imaginary perception of the world. These perceptions are shared and accepted within the group, but they are not shared among other groups.
Social acceptance is a critical part of an imagined world. It involves an “in group” and a group that does not belong. The in group behaves the “right” way and lives life “as it should be lived.” When an outside group threatens this perception, it also becomes part of a social imagination. The in group comes to believe that members of the outside group are less than human and that they are so deviant that their existence is illegitimate. A group that creates a death squad believes that its place in society is natural and legitimate. Any group threatening that place is illegitimate and is usurping the rightful order. The threatening group is thus dehumanized and deemed unworthy of existence. This justifies the death squad.
Self-Check
· What do most death squads have in common?
· What factors are present when death squads are created?
· How is social imagination used to justify death squads?
10-5Emphasizing the Points
Revolutionary terrorists call for radical change in either the structure of government or the underlying political philosophy of governance. Their current origins can be traced to twentieth-century movements in Latin America, especially the urban orientation of Uruguay’s Tupamaros. Groups such as FARC and the ELN were originally inspired by the Tupamaros, but they drifted into drug trafficking to survive. Other terrorists, including the MeK of Iran, fight for political dominance. Maoist revolutionaries mirror the revolutionary theories of the Communist takeover in China. Peru’s Shining Path was a pioneer Maoist group, and it inspired Communists in Nepal, India, and the Philippines. Counterrevolutionary terrorism is frequently based on the formation of illegal military and police units that torture and kill suspected terrorists and their supporters. They are known as death squads.
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Chapter Review
10-6aSummary of Chapter Objectives
· Revolutionary terrorism involves violent activity for the purpose of changing the political structure of government or the social orientation of a country or region. Counterterrorism involves the legitimate legal activities of security forces, but some unofficial groups operate outside the law. When these groups engage in violence, it can be described as counterrevolutionary terrorism.
· The Tupamaros established an urban organization. The active cadre conducted terrorism (robbery, kidnapping, and attacking symbolic targets) while waiting on sympathizers to create a revolutionary climate. Many modern terrorist groups have been influenced by the Tupamaros because the group had a major impact on the early development of revolutionary terrorism.
· FARC and the ELN emerged as revolutionary groups in Colombia. They formed alliances with drug cartels, and their influence spread beyond Colombia.
· The MeK fought against the revolutionary government of Iran. Its operations and finances were influenced, and at times controlled, by Iraq. The group has been removed from the U.S. Department of State’s FTO list.
· The Shining Path’s 20-year terrorist campaign was launched in Peru in 1980. It was a Marxist/Maoist movement that prompted a harsh governmental response. Peru’s population was caught in the middle as the Shining Path systematically waged a campaign of terrorism against them. It reemerged around 2007, but its major goal was control of the drug trade. The Shining Path broke into two major factions centered on drug trafficking, and it has branched out into Argentina and Colombia.
· The Naxalite rebellion began in 1967 in West Bengal. It started as several Communist movements agitating for agrarian reform and peasant rights. The first rebellion was repressed with military and police power. In the second phase, Naxalites began to spread and organize in central India, creating a Red Corridor. The third phase began in 2004 when two major groups united and launched an open rebellion.
· The New Peoples’ Army is the armed with of the Communist Party in the Philippines. They are the Philippines’ most active terrorist group and use guerrilla warfare and selective terrorism.
· Death squads developed as a reaction to revolutionary terrorism. The premise behind extrajudicial arrest, torture, and murder is that normative law cannot cope with terrorist violence. People supporting death squads believe that their existence is threatened; therefore, it is necessary to operate outside the law and terrorize the terrorists.
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Chapter Review
10-6bLooking into the Future
Revolutionary terrorism will continue into the twenty-first century, and selective terrorism will be routinely included as an element of guerrilla campaigns. While many eyes are focused on the Middle East, South Asia is a crucial area for the world’s social and economic future. Prime Minister Narendra Modi swept into power in 2014 with an ambitious reform agenda that failed to materialize quickly. He still has an historic opportunity to impact the region. India has the potential to become one of the world’s great economic powers, but the government must overcome serious weaknesses. The most overriding problem is poverty. This is closely followed by enormous differences in the distribution of wealth, deep social and cultural divisions, and political corruption. These factors make India susceptible to revolutionary terrorism.
The Naxalite rebellion is indicative of a possible future for India. Other tribal, religious, or cultural groups may revolt for their own reasons. If this happens, revolutionary terrorism will spread in India, and the country may become unstable. If Modi or his successors are able to end corruption, give all Indians social and economic opportunities, and end the discrepancy in the distribution of wealth, there will be little incentive to revolt. That is important for every person on earth because instability in a nuclear power is a dangerous affair, especially when hostile and potentially hostile neighbors lay on India’s borders.
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Chapter Review
10-6cKey Terms
· National Liberation Movement
· BACRIM