Practical Reflection
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Chapter 8
Collection
Cyber Attacks Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
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• Diligent and ongoing observation of computing and networking behavior can highlight malicious activity – The processing and analysis required for this must be done
within a program of data collection
• A national collection process that combines local, regional, and aggregated data does not exist in an organized manner
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Introduction
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Fig. 8.1 – Local, regional, and national data collection with aggregation
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• At local and national levels data collection decisions for national infrastructure should be based on the following security goals – Preventing an attack
– Mitigating an attack
– Analyzing an attack
• Data collection must be justified (who is collecting and why)
• The quality of data is more important than the quantity
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Introduction
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Fig. 8.2 – Justification-based decision analysis template for data collection
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• Metadata is perhaps the most useful type of data for collection in national infrastructure – Metadata is information about data, not what the data is
about
• Data collection systems need to keep pace with growth of carrier backbones
• Sampling data takes less time, but unsampled data may be reveal more
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Collecting Network Data
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Fig. 8.3 – Generic data collection schematic
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Fig. 8.4 – Collection detects evidence of vulnerability in advance of notification
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• National initiatives have not traditionally collected data from mainframes, servers, and PCs
• The ultimate goal should be to collect data from all relevant computers, even if that goal is beyond current capacity
• System monitoring may reveal troubling patterns
• Two techniques useful for embedding system management data – Inventory process needed to identify critical systems
– Process of instrumenting or reusing data collection facilities must be identified
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Collecting System Data
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Fig. 8.5 – Collecting data from mainframes, servers, and PCs
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Security Information and Event Management
• Security information and event management (SIEM) is the process of aggregating system data from multiple sources for purpose of protection
• Each SIEM system (in a national system of data collection) would collect, filter, and process data
• Objections to this approach include both the cost of setting up the architecture and the fact that embedded SIEM functionality might introduce problems locally
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Fig. 8.6 – Generic SIEM architecture
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Fig. 8.7 – Generic national SIEM architecture
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• Identifying trends is the most fundamental processing technique for data collected across the infrastructure
• Simplest terms – Some quantities go up (growth)
– Some quantities go down (reduction)
– Some quantities stay the same (leveling)
– Some quantities doing none of the above (unpredictability)
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Large-Scale Trending
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Fig. 8.8 – Growth trend in botnet behavior over 9-month period (2006–
2007)
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• Some basic practical considerations that must be made by security analysts before a trend can be trusted – Underlying collection
– Volunteered data
– Relevant coverage
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Large-Scale Trending
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• Collecting network metadata allows security analysts track a worm’s progress and predict its course
• Consensus holds that worms work too fast for data collection to be an effective defense – There’s actually some evidence that a closer look at the
data might provide early warning of worm threats
• After collecting and analyzing, the next step is acting on the data in a timely manner
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Tracking a Worm
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Fig. 8.9 – Coarse view of UDP traffic spike from SQL/Slammer worm
(Figure courtesy of Dave Gross and Brian Rexroad)
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Fig. 8.10 – Fine view of UDP traffic spike from SQL/Slammer worm (Figure courtesy of Dave Gross and Brian Rexroad)
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• Once the idea for a national data collection program is accepted, the following need to be addressed – Data sources
– Protected transit
– Storage considerations
– Data reduction emphasis
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National Collection Program