Labour Economics assignment 1

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Chapter02.pptx

Chapter Two Labour Supply: Individual Attachment to the Labour Market

© 2012 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.

Prepared by Dr. Amy Peng

Ryerson University

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Learning Objectives

Define the key elements of labour force measurement - employment, unemployment, labour force participation, and hours worked - and explain how they are measured and reported by Statistics Canada.

Graphically illustrate how the income-leisure model reflects the trade-offs that consumers face in deciding whether and how much to work.

Theoretically distinguish between the work choices made by individuals and the economic opportunities that they choose from.

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Learning Objectives, cont’d

Explain using diagrams how an increase in the wage rate leads to offsetting income and substitution effects, and how this yields an ambiguous effect of wage changes on labour supply.

Interpret the economic and other factors affecting a married woman’s decision to work, and show how this decision can be captured within the income-leisure (labour supply) model.

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Section One

The Theory of Labour Supply

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Labour Market Terminologies: Labour Force and Labour Force Participation Rate

LF (Labour Force)

Individuals in the eligible population (15 years and older) who participate in labour market activities, either employed or unemployed

LFPR

The fraction of the eligible population that participates in the labour force

LFPR = LF/POP

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Unemployment

To be considered unemployed, a person must be in one of the following three categories:

Without work but has made specific efforts to find a job within the previous four weeks

Waiting to be called back to a job from which he or she has been laid off

Waiting to start a new job within four weeks

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Labour Force Concept

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Hours

Hours-of-work

Hours per day, days per week, weeks per year

It may affect the quantity and the quality of labour supply

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Distribution of Hours Worked Per Week by Sex, January 2011

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Basic Income–Leisure Model

The choice of hours worked given opportunities and value of non-market time

preferences and constraints

individuals choose the feasible outcomes which yield the highest level of satisfaction

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Preferences

Two “goods”

consumption

leisure

Represented by indifference curves

(A person is indifferent between various combinations of consumption and leisure on an indifference curve)

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B

B - willing to give up abundance of leisure for consumption

Indifference Curve

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Leisure

0

Consumption

A

A - willing to give up abundance of consumption for leisure

Slope - Marginal Rate of Substitution

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Preferences

Preferences over all conceivable combinations of consumption and leisure

All combinations lie on some indifference curve

Represented by an indifference map

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Indifference Curve Map for an Individual

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Leisure (time) (non-market activity)

Consumption

U0

U1

U2

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Constraints

Constrained are determined by the economic properties of the market, which, in turn, transform consumption-leisure to income-leisure by setting the price of consumption

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Linear Potential Income Constraint

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Leisure

0

T

Income

W1 High wage

W0 Low wage

W1T+YN

W0T+YN

YN

Slope depends on

the wage rate

Non-labour income

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The Consumer’s Optimum

Optimal amount of income and leisure

Utility-maximizing equilibrium

highest indifference curve given the income constraint

Compare MRS with the Market Wage Rate

MRS: measures the willingness to exchange leisure for consumption (or income)

Market Wage Rate: measures the ability to exchange leisure for income

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Equilibrium of a Participant

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Leisure

0

Income

Market wage exceeds the

reservation wage

T

R

R’

YN

Indifference curve tangent to budget constraint

U1

U2

U0

l0

W0h0+YN

E0

Interior Solution

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Equilibrium of Non-Participant

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Leisure

0

Income

U1

U0

Market wage less than

the reservation wage

T

Slope = -W0

U2

YN

A=E0

Corner Solution

Slope= -WR

R

R’

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The Effect of an Increase in Non-Labour Income on Labour Supply (two effects)

1. Labour Participation Effect

If Leisure is a normal good: Increase in non-labour income leads to increase in consumption of leisure (some leave the labour market: decrease in labour supply, and non-participants continue to remain non-participants)

If Leisure is an inferior good:

Increase in non-labour income leads to reduction of consumption of leisure (increase in labour supply)

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Effect of Non-Labour Income on Labour Supply

2. Hours of Work Effect

Increase in non-labour income results in a parallel outward shift of the budget constraint

Leisure, Normal good:

more leisure will be consumed resulting in less work hours

Leisure, Inferior good:

less leisure will be consumed resulting in more work hours

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The Effect of an Increase in Non-Labour Income on Supply (hours of work)

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Buy more leisure

Buy less leisure

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Change in Wage Rate

Two effects:

Income effect

the worker has more income to buy more goods including leisure (reduces work hours)

Substitution effect

individual may work more because the returns are greater substituting away from leisure

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Income and Substitution Effect of Wage Increase

E0

Leisure

0

Income

U0

T

-W0

l0

E’

l’

Substitution effect

Income effect

Net effect

W0T + YN

W1T + YN

l1

U1

E1

-W1

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Effect of Wage Increase on Participation

The net effect depends on both substitution effect and income effect

If income effect dominates, hours of work may decline

For a non-participant an increase in wages may leave the equilibrium unchanged or induce the individual to participate

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The Effect of a Wage Increase on Participation to a Non-participate

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The consumer choose to work at W2 but not the lower wage W1 and W0.

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Individual Supply Curve

If substitution effect dominates,

Increase in wages leads to increase in labour supplied

wages continue to increase until a point where substitution effect and income effect offset each other

Supply curve bends backward when income effect dominates substitution effect

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Substitution effects dominate, labour supply increases

Income effects dominates, labour supply decreases

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Empirical Evidence

Participation, married women

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Empirical Evidence

Evidence of the Elasticity of Labour Supply

Uncompensated elasticity

Compensated elasticity

Income elasticity

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Section Two

Extensions and Applications

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Added and Discouraged Worker Effects

Discouraged worker effects

in periods of high unemployment, people may become discouraged from looking for work and drop out of the labour force

Added worker effects

in periods of high unemployment, some may enter the labour force to supplement family income that may have deteriorated with the unemployment of other family members.

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Hidden Unemployment

The discouraged worker effect and the problem of hidden unemployment

“Secondary” or “marginal” workers

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Moonlighting, Overtime, Flexible Work Hours

Why do some people moonlight at a second job at a wage less than their market wage on their first job?

Why do some people require an overtime premium to work more?

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Fixed Hours Constraint

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0

Income

Leisure

Y1

T

C

Lc

Yc

Fixed Hours

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Underemployment and Moonlighting

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0

Income

Leisure

C

Lc

Yc

YT

T

Uc

Ud

D

Yd

Given the wage,

the consumer would rather

choose D, working T - LD

hours. As this exceeds the

available hours of work, the

consumer is underemployed.

Ld

Um

M

Ym

If a second job is available, even one paying a lower wage, the consumer may choose M,

working T - LC on the main

job, and moonlighting on the

second.

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Overtime and Overemployment

Workers prefer to work fewer hours at the going wage rate

Workers are induced to work more hours through an overtime premium

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Overemployment and Overtime

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Income

Leisure

C

Lc

Yc

YT

T

Uc

Ud

D

Yd

The consumer would prefer to work at D, at fewer hours than C, though C is still preferred to

not working at all.

Ld

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Overemployment and Overtime

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0

Income

Leisure

C

Lc

Yc

T

Uc

Uo

O

YO

The consumer could be

induced to work more hours,

corresponding to point O, if

offered a higher wage rate

for hours worked after C.

Lo

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Overtime Premium

Substitution effect is larger than the income effect

Price of leisure is higher for overtime hours

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Is Overtime Premium preferred to Straight Line Equivalent?

No!

Worker would not remain at overtime equilibrium

New (Straight Line) equilibrium on a higher utility curve

Income effect outweighs the substitution effect causing the person to supply less work

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Overtime Premium versus Straight-Time Equivalent

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0

Y0

C

Y1

T

Uo

Us

The income effect associated with the higher wage received from the first hour worked will lead the consumer to choose fewer hours worked (at S) than

when the higher (overtime premium) is paid only on hours in excess of those at C.

O

S

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Choice in Working Hours

Different groups with different preferences for work-time arrangements

Allowing workers to work desired amount of hours saves on costs

Flex-time and compressed work week

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Gains from Alternative Work Schedules

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0

Uc

T

C

Yt

Yf

F - willing to give up wages

for preferred work schedule

C - some individual are

discontent

Ud

D

D - preferred work schedule

F

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Summary

Two ways of measuring individual attachment to the labour market

Use of consumer choice theory and income-leisure model to explain labour supply behaviour

Reservation wage; income and substitution effects

Labour supply curve

Extension of the income-leisure model to explain moonlighting, overtime, and flexible working hours

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