Philosophy

· Determinism and Free Will

Overview

Do we have free will, or are our actions determined? This is one of the classic questions in philosophy. Philosophers have been debating the question for thousands of years. Like so many issues, that of free will and determinism is directly related to many other questions in philosophy. Obviously, the common and popular view is that we have free will. This view is very deeply ingrained in our culture; however, determinism has many powerful arguments and, as Rachels says, “as far as free will is concerned the overall trend is not encouraging. Each new discovery chips away a bit more of our confidence. The more we learn about the sources of human conduct, the less room there seems to be for the idea of free choice." When we talk of free will, we mean the philosophical idea that holds that our choices are ultimately our own. In other words, we are agents who are capable of decisions on alternative courses of action when all the external factors and antecedent conditions remain exactly the same. For example, free will would entail that at this moment you have the choice of continuing to read the remainder of this material or the choice of stopping right now, regardless of the external circumstances or conditions of your life. In short, if you have a choice between A and B, then having free will means that if you choose A you could have done otherwise (instead chosen B) while all other conditions remained the same. To many people, the idea that we have free will is taken for granted, simply because it is difficult to imagine that we don’t. On the other hand, as has been stated previously, there are some powerful arguments in the history of philosophy to suggest that this common belief may be in error.

Below, some terms related to this question are defined:

Predeterminism is generally the philosophy that all of the events of the past, present, and future have been decided before the beginning of time. Advocates of this position claim that there are a predetermined set of universal laws that are, in fact, science itself. Many argue that this position amounts to the idea of a first cause. As we have already learned, some people have wanted to give the name "god” to whatever was this first cause of the universe (assuming, of course, there was one). Predestination is a religious notion which concerns God's decision to create and govern the world and the extent to which God is involved in determining in advance what our destiny will be. The fact that predestination involves God means that it is distinguished from both predeterminism and determinism. Determinism is not the same thing as either predeterminism or predestination.

Determinism is the philosophical position that claims that every event has a cause, including all human action. Furthermore, if every event has a cause, then there are no free actions on the part of humans. If there has been even one event that was not determined, then determinism is false. In other words, the truth of indeterminism would make determinism false. Libertarianism is the view that at least some of our actions are free because they are not causally determined. It is the philosophical position that there are some events which do not have a cause. According to Rachels, in this theory "human choices are not constrained in the same way that other events in the world are constrained." In other words, human beings are capable of being the originators of causal chains. Over the years, there have been various kinds of positions on determinism argued. Aristotle set forth the problem of logical determinism, which is based upon Aristotle's law of excluded middle. The law of excluded middle is that a statement or proposition is either true or false: there is nothing in between. For example, if it is true that this is an online course in philosophy, then the statement "this is not an online course in philosophy" must be false. In logical determinism, every statement about the future is either true or false now. So, it is either true or false that you will work on your philosophy course online tomorrow. If it is true, then it will happen. If it is false, then it will not happen. Logical determinism is also commonly called fatalism. That could be confusing because fatalism is also the view that all actions are pointless because what will be will be. For example, one should not waste time studying for a philosophy test because one is already fated to do well or do poorly. If one is fated to do well, then it makes no sense to study. On the other hand, if one is fated to do poorly, then study will not help. The mistake underlying this kind of fatalism is in not understanding that our actions are themselves part of the deterministic process. In the case of logical determinism, the proposition "I will study for the test" is already true or false now. Similar to the argument for logical determinism is theological determinism, which is based upon the idea that God is all-knowing. If God knows everything, then God knows already what you will have for breakfast on this same day next year. However, if God already knows that you will have a tofu scramble on that day, then when that day arrives, you could not do otherwise. If you have instead a veggie scramble, then it would mean that God was mistaken and is not, therefore, all-knowing. So, if God is all knowing and God knows you will have tofu scramble, then you will have it, and how could you then have the choice to have tofu scramble or veggie scramble? Socrates offered a deterministic view that is known as ethical determinism. Ethical determinism is based upon the idea that humans do evil from the absence of knowledge of what is good. If one does not have the knowledge of what is good, then one's only choice is to do evil. In short, one doesn't know any better than to do evil. However, Socrates believed that if a person knew the good, then he or she could only seek that good. Thus, we are ethically determined by our knowledge of good and evil. Rachels seems to suggest that the ancient arguments for determinism, such as logical determinism, theological determinism, and ethical determinism, while presenting a challenge to human free will, are not as great a challenge as causal determinism. Causal determinism (usually called simply determinism) "came into its own with the rise of modern science." Rachels discusses different types of determinism in depth. Rachels explains the physical determinism of Pierre-Simon Laplace who said that “if one knew the exact location and velocity of every particle in the universe and all the laws of physics, he could predict with certainty every future state of the universe." Of course, this is not possible, but according to hard determinists, like Laplace, we are simply ignorant of the underlying causes of our actions. This ignorance of the cause of our actions is what gives us the illusion of having free will. Rachels discusses the underlying causes of our actions with examples of psychological causes (e.g. punishment and reward, classical conditioning, early childhood experiences), biological causes (e.g. genetic dispositions), and social causes (e.g. unemployment, upbringing, culture). With all these things taken into consideration, as Rachels says, "the more we learn about human conduct, the less room there seems to be for free choice."  It is interesting to note that the position of determinism is not restricted to Western thought. Eastern philosophy also contains notions of determinism. In Buddhism, for example, is an essential idea called dependent co-origination, which says "this is, because that is and this is not, because that is not." The principle of dependent co-origination is generally formulated as: If this is, that comes to be; From the arising of this, that arises; If this is not, that does not come to be; From the ceasing of this, that ceases.

The Debate over Free Will

The thesis of determinism is that "every event has a cause." The determinist argument in premise and conclusion form is:

1.    Everything we do is caused by forces over which we have no control.

2.    If our actions are caused by forces over which we have no control, we do not act freely.

3.    Therefore, we never act freely.

 

Rachels makes the point that our "inner feeling" that we are free is so strong that, regardless of how much evidence there is to the contrary, we may not be able to give up believing that we are free. Of course, he also makes the point that this may be simply "prescientific" thinking. One argument showing that even the most ardent determinist cannot stop believing he or she is free is that no one is capable of giving up the experience of pondering or deliberating choices. For example, even the greatest believers in determinism will ponder questions like "what should I have for dinner tonight?" or "should I go out to a movie or stay at home?" Obviously, the simple act of pondering the questions suggests that one believes one has a choice. On the other hand, just because we can't stop believing something, that is not evidence that it is true. So, we should evaluate the arguments that might support libertarianism, which denies the truth of the first premise in the determinist argument. The argument from experience is similar to the idea that we are incapable of giving up believing we are free. This argument says that we are free because we are immediately aware of being free every time we make a choice. The experiments of Jose Delgado at Yale long ago undermined this argument; however. Delgado showed that he could stimulate parts of the brain and bring about involuntary actions, which were experienced as free actions. So, as Rachels says, if free will is to be defended, then a better argument is needed than the simple fact that we experience freedom.

 

Some libertarians have attempted to argue that the universe is not a deterministic system. They have argued that contemporary science, specifically quantum mechanics in physics, shows that the behavior of sub-atomic particles is probabilistic. Setting aside the fact that some scientists believe that eventually quantum theory will be superseded by a theory that is deterministic, does quantum theory really bolster the argument for free will? According to Rachels, the implications of quantum indeterminacy for human behavior are similar to the implications for computers. In short, even if at the sub-atomic level particles are probabilistic it does not significantly affect the deterministic operations of the computer at the atomic level. The same could be true for human beings. Rachels shows also that the argument that we cannot predict our own decisions fails because the argument equivocates on what is meant by ‘predictable.’ Determinism argues predictability based upon the hypothetical observer who knows all the variables but is outside the system and is not a variable. In the argument that we cannot predict our own behavior, the prediction is itself one of the variables which might cause the decision. So, the argument is based upon a fallacy of equivocation. Rachels discusses also the argument from accountability. This turns out to be an example of what Kant called a transcendental argument, which is similar to the moral argument he used for the existence of God (discussed in Unit Two Lectures). This argument rests on the idea that we hold people accountable for their actions: we blame and praise them. Yet, blaming and praising only make sense if we/they have free will. So, humans have free will. The problem with this argument is rather obvious. If we are bound to hold people accountable, then we are not free. In other words, just because we do hold people accountable, it does not follow that they really are accountable. I will discuss the relationship between accountability and determinism below; however, first we must consider a position that argues that an act can be both free and determined at the same time, compatibilism.

Compatibilism is also known as soft determinism. David Hume was a famous proponent of compatibilism. He argued that for an act to be “free,” one does not have to be able to choose differently under the very same inner and outer circumstances. Hume said this would mean that certain events were uncaused. According to Hume (and many others), freedom should be understood in a different way than uncaused actions. Freedom involves the hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one’s circumstances were different. Acts are not uncaused (or self-caused) but rather are caused by our beliefs, desires, and character (which, of course, have been caused).   Hume acknowledged that the problem of free will is “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science.” By arguing that an action does not have to be uncaused or self-caused, Hume and other compatibilists are able to provide a different view of what it means to have free will. It is simply to be free from certain kinds of constraints. In other words, there are ways that our freedom can be limited by such things as imprisonment, a robber holding a gun to our head, threats to the lives of our family members, psychological obsession, and many other kinds of coercion. Absent of coercion, your actions are free.

So, contributing to a charity because you decide it is worthy, going to a movie because you believe it will be entertaining, or halting your reading of this lecture because you want to are all free, even though there are causes for your beliefs and desires. Compatibilists argue that if our actions were disconnected from the network of causes and effects, then they would become “random, chaotic, and unpredictable.” As Rachels says, “You would not think that someone who started behaving in this way had acquired free will – you would think he had gone crazy.”     Compatibilism, with this new understanding of what it means to be free, sounds promising as a way of saving free will and moral responsibility. On the other hand, it seems as though there is a serious problem with compatibilism. If our desires, beliefs, and characters are still determined by forces that are outside of our own control, then they are not up to us. As Rachels says, the concession that our present character, desires, and beliefs are not up to us really “gives away the game.” In short, an honest and thoughtful person would still be uncomfortable claiming that he or she is free.

Morality and Free Will

Remember that the thesis of determinism is that "every event has a cause." As discussed above, the determinist argument in premise and conclusion form is:

1.    Everything we do is caused by forces over which we have no control.

2.    If our actions are caused by forces over which we have no control, we do not act freely.

3.    Therefore, we never act freely.

The argument for determinism brings into question our responsibility as moral agents. In other words, if we are not free, then how can we be held accountable for our actions? How can we be blameworthy or praiseworthy? The argument in premise and conclusion form is:

1.    If we never act freely, then we are not responsible for our actions.

2.    We never act freely (from the conclusion of the determinist argument).

3.    Therefore, we are not responsible for our actions.

Suppose during this class we discover that one of the members of the class has a rare genetic disease. This disease has been passed down from recessive genes that his or her parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc. had back in a causal chain that started, obviously, before he or she was born. Clearly, we would not blame the person for getting the disease. We would not hold him or her accountable in any way whatsoever.

Consider now, the case of someone who robs a bank. If that person robbed the bank just because he or she desired a bunch of money without having to work for it, then according to the compatibilist position, he or she was free and can be held accountable. On the other hand, the compatibilist acknowledges that this desire was caused. Just as in the case of the genetic disease, the causal chain would extend back before the person was even born. So, the hard determinists say why does it make any more sense to hold the robber responsible than the student with the genetic disease?  On the face, it appears that moral responsibility and the whole idea of ethics (the question of how we ought to conduct ourselves) would become pointless. Bertrand Russell makes the same point with a different example: "No man treats a motorcar as foolishly as he treats another human being. When the car will not go, he does not attribute its annoying behavior to sin; he does not say, 'you are a wicked motorcar, and I shall not give you any more petrol until you go.' He attempts to find out what is wrong and to set it right." Of course, the problem, under the deterministic view, whether we ‘set it right’ or continue to blame, punish, and even execute those who ‘sin’ is also a part of causal determinism. It is rather contradictory to blame someone who is causally determined when he or she blames another human. Under the deterministic view, we cannot help holding people responsible even if they are not responsible. This takes us back to the argument for accountability, which says we must then assume that we have free will. This, of course, is not the case. What we actually must assume is that we are simply incapable of doing anything other than what we do: praise and blame. Rachels takes the position that we can use our common sense understanding of being responsible and that that is perfectly compatible with moral accountability. He says there are three conditions for being morally accountable:

1.    You must have done the act in question;

2.    The act must in some sense have been wrong; and,

3.    You must have no excuse for having done it.

So, according to Rachels, people are morally responsible (praiseworthy and blameworthy) if there are no excuses or ‘credit-eliminating’ conditions present. He concludes that "the fact that people's behavior is causally determined does not mean that they are not responsible for what they do." He seems to have, in the final analysis, overlooked that hard determinism means that our conduct is really outside of our control and somehow seems to be an excuse or a credit-eliminating condition regarding our conduct. Of course, he goes on to add, "The problem of free will is one of the most difficult philosophical issues, and anyone who ventures an opinion about it should be suitably conscious that she could be wrong."