c dossier articles 6-10
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Journal of Corporate Finance
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin
What is the role of institutional investors in corporate capital structure decisions? A survey analysis☆
Stephen Browna,c, Marie Dutordoirb, Chris Veldc,⁎, Yulia Veld-Merkoulovac a Stern School of Business, New York University, United States b Alliance Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, United Kingdom c Monash Business School, Monash University, Australia
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords: Capital structure Capital supply Institutional investors Security issuance Security design Financial constraints
A B S T R A C T
We survey institutional investors about their role in capital structure decisions and views on capital structure theories. Over 82% of investors believe they influence corporate capital structure decisions, especially for smaller, younger, and more financially constrained firms. Unlike corporate managers, in- vestors consider agency costs of free cash flow important drivers of capital structure. Investors' responses also support pecking order and market timing theories. Most investors find financial constraints im- portant, with components of the Kaplan–Zingales and Whited–Wu indexes dominating other proxies. Overall, our findings suggest a first-order impact of investor preferences on capital structure decisions.
1. Introduction
Despite many years of research, the finance literature does not agree on whether there is an optimal capital structure or on the related question of how companies choose between different securities. Traditionally, most capital structure theories have focused on the corporate demand for capital. These rationales, which include static trade-off (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1983), pecking order (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984), and market timing theories (Stein, 1996; Baker and Wurgler, 2002) all reason from the point of view of companies trying to attract capital. Similarly, most empirical studies tend to focus on the corporate side, without finding conclusive evidence.1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.05.001 Received 7 February 2019; Accepted 3 May 2019
☆ We thank the following academic colleagues for their suggestions on the questionnaire design: Amedeo de Cesari, Abe de Jong, Vidhan Goyal, Campbell Harvey, Maria-Teresa Marchica, Konstantinos Stathopoulos, Norman Strong, and George Wang. In addition, we thank Yangyang Chen, Thomas Chemmanur, Kevin Davis, Petko Kalev, Frederik Schlingemann, Gary Twite, Van Vu, Betty Wu, Luana Zaccaria, and participants at research seminars at Banca d'Italia, Rotterdam School of Management, University of Glasgow, University of Manchester, University of Melbourne, McMaster University, La Trobe University, the 8th Behavioral Finance and Capital Markets Conference, and the JCF Special Issue Conference on “The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate and Entrepreneurial Finance” for their helpful comments and suggestions. The following practitioners also gave helpful comments on the survey: Paul Benveniste, Nick Chapman, Paul Greenwood, Matthew Lambert, and Nikola Pike. Tim Kooijmans provided excellent research assistance. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Australian Centre for Financial Studies and CPA Australia.
⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: sbrown@stern.nyu.edu, stephen.brown@monash.edu (S. Brown), marie.dutordoir@manchester.ac.uk (M. Dutordoir),
chris.veld@monash.edu (C. Veld), yulia.veld-merkoulova@monash.edu (Y. Veld-Merkoulova). 1 For example, some studies confirm pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Dong et al., 2012), while
some reject it (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Fama and French, 2005), and some find mixed evidence (Graham and Harvey, 2001; De Jong and Verwijmeren, 2010). Similarly, some studies find strong evidence that managers try to time the equity market (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Brounen et al., 2004, 2006; Gomes and Phillips, 2012; Dong et al., 2012), while others find very little evidence of equity market timing (Jung et al., 1996; DeAngelo et al., 2010). Zhou et al. (2016) argue that static trade-off theory can hold strongly in specific subsamples of firms but not in larger samples.
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Several studies argue that corporate finance actions can also be influenced through investor (supply) rather than corporate (demand) channels (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Leary, 2009; Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). These studies typically use proxy variables derived from financial statements or market data to capture capital supply and investor preferences.
Our study takes a different approach. We directly ask institutional investors about their potential influence and views on cor- porate capital structure decisions, through survey analysis.2 Institutional investors have become major players in global capital markets, spurred by factors such as financial innovation, weakened bank balance sheets following the financial crisis, and stricter bank regulation (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016). We focus on Australian investors to achieve a sufficiently high response rate and generate more detailed answers to the open questions in our survey. Capital structure in Australia is representative of that in other developed countries.3 The only relevant difference with the typical U.S. research setting pertains to Australia's dividend im- putation system. Under this system, domestic corporate taxes are distributed to eligible shareholders as a tax credit with dividend payments, reducing the attractiveness of corporate debt from a tax perspective (Twite, 2001; Pattenden, 2006).4 Regarding the capital supply side, Australia has a ratio of (non-bank) institutional investor assets to bank assets of the same order of magnitude as Euro zone countries and the U.K., i.e. approximately 100%. This suggests a similar degree of bank disintermediation between Australia and these countries (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016).5
In total, 275 individuals responded to our survey, corresponding to an overall response rate of 16.1%. In the first set of questions, we examine investors' perceptions of their impact on capital structure decisions. We find that more than 82% of the respondents believe they play a strong role in the capital structure decisions of the companies in which they invest or are contemplating investing. On average, they estimate that their influence on capital structure is approximately equal in magnitude to that of firm and mac- roeconomic characteristics. In terms of channels of influence, approximately one-third of the investors only talk directly with cor- porate management (31%), while approximately one-fifth of the investors (19%) only talk with investment banks and not with the company. Approximately half of the investors use both mechanisms of influence (47%). In an open question, we ask investors which companies they believe are most susceptible to investor influence regarding capital structure decisions. Their answers suggest that smaller, younger, and financially constrained firms are more likely to experience an investor impact. In addition to these firm characteristics, investors highlight the nature of their relation with the firm as well as market conditions as drivers of the magnitude of their role in corporate capital structure decisions.
The second set of survey questions intends to examine investors' level of agreement with the most important capital structure theories. Capital structure is an important consideration for investors. On a scale from one (“capital structure is not at all important”) to five (“capital structure is extremely important”), equity, straight bond, and convertible bond investors give respective scores of 3.94, 4.26, and 4.20. We systematically compare our results with those obtained from Graham and Harvey's (2001) seminal survey analysis questioning corporate chief financial officers (CFOs) on capital structure theories. Our key findings are as follows. Static trade-off factors are deemed important by investors, but in different ways than for corporate managers. More specifically, investors do not consider tax advantages of corporate debt to be important, consistent with the characteristics of Australia's dividend imputation system. However, investors support agency conflicts between managers and shareholders as drivers of corporate capital structure, while corporate managers do not believe agency-driven capital structure explanations to be important (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Consistent with pecking order theory, a sizable proportion of investors expect to revise their firm valuations downward or sell stock in reaction to equity offerings. This result holds especially if there are signals of equity overvaluation, resulting in higher equity-related adverse selection costs. The latter finding contrasts with the results of Graham and Harvey (2001), who do not find evidence for an adverse selection explanation for corporate pecking order behavior. Finally, consistent with these authors, we find strong evidence that market timing and equity dilution concerns drive capital structure decisions.
We also asked respondents about their perceptions of financial constraints. Overall, they consider these constraints relevant for investment decisions. When looking at individual measures of financial constraints, investors seem to perceive the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006) index components as more important than age and size, which are the components of the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index.
Overall, our results suggest that institutional investors are first-order drivers of capital structure decisions, with the strength of their influence depending on a range of firm, investment, and market characteristics.
Our study is, to our knowledge, the first survey analysis to examine capital structure decisions through the eyes of institutional investors. Related to our work, several recent studies examine the impact of institutional investors on corporate finance policies and outcomes. Brav et al. (2008) examine the impact of hedge fund activism on firms' governance and performance, while Appel et al. (2016) and Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) focus on the role of passive investors. More closely related to the topic of capital structure, Chemmanur et al. (2009) and Chemmanur et al. (2010) document the role of institutional investors in seasoned equity offerings and initial public offerings, respectively, and Ivashina and Sun (2011) focus on institutional investors' impact on loan costs.
2 In our paper, capital structure decisions include decisions on what debt ratio to maintain, which security types to issue, and how to design these securities. We often refer to ‘institutional investors’ as ‘investors’ for brevity. 3 De Jong et al. (2008) find that the median leverage of Australian companies is of the same order of magnitude as that of United States (U.S.)
companies. Fan et al. (2012) present similar results for debt maturity. Australia has a well-developed financial reporting system, of the same level of quality as countries such as Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (Degeorge et al., 2013). 4 Dividend imputation systems are not unique to Australia. They are also adopted in countries like Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and
the U.K., with differences across countries in the extent to which corporate taxes can be distributed to shareholders as a credit (Twite, 2001). 5 For comparison, the correspondent ratio for the U.S. is around 250%. This much larger ratio may be attributable to the process of bank
disintermediation starting much earlier in the U.S. than in other countries (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016).
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Chang et al. (2018) find an impact of institutional investor horizons on firms' debt–equity choice, amount of equity raised, and debt maturity. These papers all use quantitative methods on archival data, while we use survey analysis. Most relevant to our study, McCahery et al. (2016) conduct a survey on the views of institutional investors on corporate governance issues. Consistent with our results, they find evidence of strong interactions between corporate managers and investors, with 63% of their 143 respondents stating that they have recently engaged in direct discussions with management. We complement their work by focusing on investors' role in capital structure decisions, which are not covered in their survey questions. Also related to our study, Gompers et al. (2016) survey 79 private equity firms about their valuation, value creation, governance, and capital structure practices. Consistent with our findings, the private equity firms in their study support pecking order and market timing theory. Unlike their survey, our survey respondents include a wide range of investors from mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds, and we focus on capital structure, rather than on a wide range of corporate finance practices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the methodology. Section 3 outlines the findings regarding investors' stated role in corporate capital structure decisions. Section 4 describes survey evidence regarding investors' support for the three main capital structure theories. Section 5 provides results on investors' views on the importance of financial constraints and relevant measures for such constraints. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and outlines our study's limitations and implications.
2. Survey design and respondent characteristics
Based on a review of the capital structure and security issuance literature, we developed a draft survey covering questions on the most salient topics in this literature. These topics include capital structure theories, theories on seasoned equity and bond offerings, the importance and measurement of financial constraints, and investors' views on their own involvement in capital structure deci- sions. We then circulated this draft for feedback among a group of academics with expertise on capital structure research. After incorporating their detailed feedback, we beta-tested the survey among a number of fund managers whom we asked to complete the draft questionnaire in our presence and who commented on the questions. We incorporated their feedback in the final version of the questionnaire. Based on the beta-testing, we estimated that it would take 10 min, on average, to complete the survey. The final survey consists of 25 questions, including an open question with three sub-questions. The Appendix of this paper provides the full ques- tionnaire.
We decided to focus our research on the population of Australian institutional investors. The main reason for this choice is the following. Obtaining a sufficiently high response rate is critical for survey analyses and often very hard to achieve (Dillman et al., 2014). Since three of the authors of this paper are affiliated with a highly reputable Australian university, we hoped that our geographical proximity with the respondents, as well as the reputation of our university, might increase investors' willingness to answer the survey. We also hoped that the investors would be more willing to spend further time answering open questions for a survey affiliated with a local, well-known university, one that some of them might even have attended.
We started the search for potential respondents by downloading the names of Australian-based mutual funds and pension (or, in Australian terminology, superannuation) funds from Morningstar Direct. We then used the LinkedIn business account of the lead researcher to look up fund managers within these funds. In the next step, we sent an invitation to the fund managers to connect on LinkedIn. Successful connections provided us with the e-mail addresses of the potential respondents. Our data obtained from Morningstar do not cover hedge funds. For that reason, we also sent out invitations to connect to other institutional investors, including hedge fund investors identified from LinkedIn's suggestions based on the recent investor connections that we made. In the final stage, we sent the connected investors an invitation to complete the questionnaire, with a link to it in the e-mail. We made the LinkedIn connections throughout October 2017 and sent out the survey invitations in November 2017. In total, we sent out 1712 invitations to managers with whom we connected on LinkedIn. These 1712 managers represent over 500 distinct financial institu- tions, according to their LinkedIn profiles. We sent reminders to all LinkedIn connections on December 6, 2017. We collected all responses received by January 15, 2018. In some cases, the respondents did not complete the survey. In that case, the link was left open for a week to allow the respondent to do so. After a week, the incomplete survey data were added to the database. As an incentive, we informed potential participants that they could be included in a draw for two cash prizes of 500 AUD each, which they could either receive or donate. We also promised participants an advanced view of the results before they were published. Investors were assured anonymity; therefore, we cannot connect individual responses with investor identities.
We received 275 questionnaires, 154 of which were completed. Complete and incomplete subsamples are very similar regarding the respondent characteristics. Specifically, there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups regarding the nature of their financial institutions, assets under management, or stated importance of capital structure for investment decisions. Based on the total number of received questionnaires (275) and the number of invitations sent out (1712), our response rate is 16.1%. This percentage compares very favorably with the response rate of 4.3% obtained by McCahery et al. (2016) in their survey on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. It is also substantially higher than the response rates of the corporate manager surveys of Graham and Harvey (2001) (9%), Brounen et al. (2004) (5%), and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) (12%), but lower than the response rate of the private equity firm survey of Gompers et al. (2016) (50%). If we only include completed surveys, the response rate is still 9% (154 out of 1712). Table 1 includes a description of the respondents.
Most of the respondents (157, or 93%) are male. They are spread over different age categories, but only 3% are in the category of 61 years and older. The respondents almost all have a university education, many with advanced degrees: 70 (41%) hold a master's degree, 20 (12%) an MBA, and 8 (5%) a PhD. Most respondents work in mutual funds (90, or 33%). Pension or superannuation funds also account for a substantial share of the respondents (74, or 27%). This is consistent with the documented importance of pension
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funds in Australia (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016), driven by Australia's mandatory pension fund system (Tang, 2016).6
Assets under management of the parent business vary greatly, with 13 respondents (5%) working for a business that manages less than 50 million AUD (approximately 40 million USD) in assets under management and 74 respondents working for a business with
Table 1 Respondent characteristics.
Category Number of respondents Percentage of respondents
Gender - Male 157 92.9 - Female 10 5.9 - Transgender 1 0.6 - Choose not to disclose 1 0.6
Total 169 100
Age category - Younger than 30 30 17.8 - 31 to 40 65 38.5 - 41 to 50 39 23.1 - 51 to 60 29 17.2 - 61 or older 5 3.0 - Choose not to disclose 1 0.6
Total 169 100
Education - PhD 8 4.7 - MBA 20 11.8 - Master's 70 41.4 - Bachelor 66 39.1 - No university education 4 2.4 - Choose not to disclose 1 0.6
Total 169 100
Type of investor - Mutual fund 90 32.7 - Superannuation fund 74 26.9 - Hedge fund 23 8.4 - Insurance company 8 2.9 - Pension fund 4 1.5 - Other 76 27.6
Total 275 100
Assets under management of (parent) business (millions AUD) - Less than 50 13 4.8 - 50 to 500 31 11.4 - 500 to 1000 16 5.9 - 1000 to 10,000 81 29.7 - 10,000 to 100,000 58 21.3 - Over 100,000 74 27.1
Total 273 100
Country of incorporation - Australia 224 82.7 - U.S. 31 11.4 - U.K. 10 3.7 - Other 6 2.2
Total 271 100
Responsible for selection of - Stocks 156 63.9 - Corporate straight bonds 48 19.7 - Money market investments 44 18.0 - Government bonds 38 15.6 - Convertible bonds 34 13.9 - Other 79 32.4
Total 244 100
This table presents the breakdown of the respondents by their demographic and employer characteristics.
6 While most empirical studies tend to treat non-bank institutional investors as a homogenous group, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and Woidtke (2002) provide evidence of the monitoring role of pension funds in particular. Chang et al. (2018) argue that pension funds tend to have a longer-term horizon than other institutional investors such as mutual funds. In unreported results, we do not find any meaningful differences between the responses for pension funds and other investors.
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over 100 billion AUD (approximately 80 billion USD) in assets under management. Given that we focused our search on Australian investors, it is not surprising that most businesses are headquartered in Australia (83%), with the remainder largely incorporated in the U.S. (11%) or the U.K. (4%).
To rule out the possibility that most of our respondents come from very few investment institutions, we cross-tabulate the observations by three identifying characteristics: type of institution, assets under management, and headquarter country. In our sample of 275 observations, we find 47 distinct clusters of observations with at least one respondent in each. This finding un- ambiguously shows that there are respondents from at least 47 institutions represented in the sample. The largest cluster of re- spondents (26 in total) corresponds to Australian-based mutual funds with between 1 and 10 billion AUD under management. This cluster still only accounts for less than 10% of the total sample. It is very likely that the actual number of institutions represented in the sample is much larger than 47, but we do not have additional identifying data to further discriminate within the clusters.
We asked respondents what types of securities they typically select. Since some fund managers are responsible for more than one security type, there is some overlap between the different categories. Most managers (156, or almost 64%) are responsible for selecting stocks, 48 (20%) for selecting straight bonds, and 34 (14%) for selecting convertible bonds.
We also asked respondents about their role in the decision-making process. We then linked this role to the type of securities for which they are responsible. Table 2 presents the results.
Table 2 indicates that many of our respondents are part of an organization that works with committees or teams. Most are committee members, but some respondents are the sole decision makers or chief investment officers. A few respondents are not actively involved in studying company fundamentals. For example, seven equity investors said that they “don't look at balance sheets,” implying that they do not consider firm characteristics.7 However, reassuringly, the clear majority of our sample is actively involved in the decision making around the investment process.
3. Capital supply factors
Baker (2009) argues that traditional corporate finance studies focus on the corporate demand side. These studies implicitly consider the investor side as a black box with perfectly elastic and competitive demand. However, a growing stream of research focuses on the suppliers of capital rather than on the parties seeking capital. While this stream of literature started as early as 1977 with Miller's (1977) theory on optimal leverage incorporating investor tax preferences, it only gained traction more recently with studies of Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Leary (2009), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010). These authors all argue that capital supply factors should have an impact on capital structure decisions, and provide empirical findings supporting this argument. Fan et al. (2012) also find that preferences of capital suppliers play an important role in explaining firms' capital structure. Some studies document evidence of capital supply-driven convertible bond issuance (Loncarski et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2010; De Jong et al., 2013), and of a strong impact of investor preferences on convertible bond design (Grundy and Verwijmeren, 2018). To our knowledge, there is no prior survey evidence on the role of the supply side of capital in capital structure decisions.8
Table 3 reports our survey findings on institutional investors' perceived role in security issuance and design. Our results provide strong evidence that investors perceive themselves as important influencers of corporate security choices.
Most respondents believe they play a strong role in security issuance decisions (mean score 4.06, with 83% agreeing with this statement). Interestingly, a corresponding statement regarding investors' influence on the amount of capital raised has an equally high score (4.14). This result suggests that security offering amounts could be driven by an interplay between corporate financing needs and investor demand. The respondents also strongly believe that they can influence convertible and straight bond design (mean scores 3.93 and 3.86, respectively).9 Mirror questions asking whether respondents believe they have only a minor influence on security issuance and design decisions (added as a cross-check for the previous findings) indicate only low support (mean scores
Table 2 Respondents' role in decision-making processes.
Role in investment process Stocks Convertible bonds Straight bonds
Investment committee member 71 17 24 Sole decision maker 20 3 3 Chief investment officer 17 5 6 Nobody looks at balance sheets/only go to annual meetings 7 1 0 Other 29 4 7 Total 144 30 40
This table provides an overview of survey respondents' role in investment processes in their organization. The results for respondents responsible for selecting stocks, convertible, and straight bonds are presented separately.
7 These are possibly passive investors who manage index funds. In fact, some of the e-mails that we received from potential respondents mention they are passive investors. These potential respondents indicated that they did not fill out the survey for exactly this reason. 8 In their interview study of corporate executives, Dong et al. (2018) find that companies often issue convertible bonds because there is a large
demand from investors, particularly hedge funds. However, the key focus of their study is still on the validity of traditional convertible bond rationales, which all start from the assumption of firm-specific financing costs driving convertible bond financing. 9 We did not ask a corresponding question for equity offerings, since the design parameters for such offerings are much more limited.
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T ab le
3 Su rv ey
re sp on se s on
th e ro le of in ve st or s in ca pi ta l st ru ct ur e de ci si on s.
A ll
A ge
G en de r
Si ze
Ed uc at io n
C ou nt ry
Ty pe
of fu nd
M ea n
% 4 an d 5
N 40
an d
un de r
41 an d
ov er
M al e
O th er
U nd er 10
bn A U D
O ve r 10
bn A U D
Ph D an d/ or
M Sc
O th er
U S
O th er
H ed ge
fu nd
O th er
In ve st or
de m an d
- ha s a st ro ng
in fl ue nc e on
fi rm s' ch oi ce
of w ha t se cu ri ty
ty pe
to is su e
4. 06
82 .6 3
16 7
4. 08
4. 06
4. 09
3. 73
4. 11
4. 00
4. 14
4. 01
4. 13
4. 05
3. 81
4. 09
- ha s a st ro ng
in fl ue nc e on
th e am
ou nt of fi na nc in g th at
fi rm s ra is e in th ei r se cu ri ty off er in gs
4. 14
84 .0 2
16 9
4. 16
4. 10
4. 15
3. 90
4. 15
4. 15
4. 07
4. 18
3. 81
4. 17
3. 88
4. 17
- ha s a st ro ng
in fl ue nc e on
th e de si gn
of co nv er ti bl e bo nd s
3. 93
73 .4 7
14 7
3. 93
3. 91
3. 98
⁎⁎ 3. 30
4. 06
⁎ 3. 77
3. 91
3. 93
3. 71
3. 96
3. 85
3. 94
- ha s a st ro ng
in fl ue nc e on
th e de si gn
of st ra ig ht bo nd s
3. 86
72 .8 5
15 1
3. 85
3. 89
3. 87
3. 82
3. 90
3. 82
3. 74
3. 97
3. 43
⁎ 3. 91
3. 64
3. 88
- is no t of gr ea t in fl ue nc e in se cu ri ty is su an ce
de ci si on s
2. 99
38 .6 9
16 8
2. 84
3. 13
2. 96
3. 18
2. 87
3. 13
3. 07
2. 91
3. 00
3. 00
3. 13
2. 98
- is no t of gr ea t in fl ue nc e in se cu ri ty de si gn
de ci si on s
2. 96
38 .3 2
16 7
2. 88
3. 01
2. 95
3. 00
2. 81
⁎⁎ 3. 17
3. 05
2. 87
3. 06
2. 95
3. 13
2. 95
Im po rt an ce
of a cr ed it ra ti ng
w he n co ns id er in g th e fo llo w in g se cu ri ti es :
- C om
m on
sh ar es
2. 13
14 .3 7
16 7
2. 10
2. 16
2. 02
⁎⁎ ⁎
3. 73
1. 98
⁎ 2. 35
2. 40
⁎⁎ 1. 92
2. 13
2. 13
2. 00
2. 15
- C on ve rt ib le bo nd s
2. 57
27 .5 1
14 9
2. 59
2. 46
2. 46
⁎⁎ 3. 45
2. 42
2. 77
2. 82
⁎⁎ 2. 29
2. 54
2. 58
2. 12
2. 63
- St ra ig ht bo nd s
2. 92
38 .4 6
15 6
2. 88
2. 87
2. 83
3. 55
2. 73
⁎ 3. 13
3. 09
⁎ 2. 69
2. 86
2. 93
2. 44
2. 97
Th is ta bl e su m m ar iz es th e su rv ey
re sp on se s on
th e im pa ct of ov er al ls up pl y- si de
fa ct or s an d cr ed it ra ti ng s on
ca pi ta ls tr uc tu re de ci si on s. Th e re sp on se s to th e fi rs t si x qu es ti on s on
th e pe rc ei ve d im pa ct of
in ve st or de m an d ar e m ea su re d on
a fi ve -p oi nt Li ke rt sc al e, ra ng in g fr om
on e fo r st ro ng ly di sa gr ee to fi ve
fo r st ro ng ly ag re e. Fo r th e la st th re e qu es ti on s, th e re sp on se s ar e m ea su re d on
a fi ve -p oi nt Li ke rt
sc al e ra ng in g fr om
on e fo r no ta ta ll im po rt an tt o fi ve
fo r ex tr em
el y im po rt an t. Th e fi rs tt hr ee co lu m ns pr es en tt he
m ea n, pe rc en ta ge
of re sp on de nt s ch oo si ng
4 or 5, an d th e nu m be r of ob se rv at io ns .I n al l
qu es ti on s, re sp on de nt s al so ha d an
op ti on
to ch oo se a “d on 't kn ow
/d on 't w an t to an sw er ” al te rn at iv e; th es e re sp on se s ar e ex cl ud ed
fr om
th e ca lc ul at io ns .S iz e re fe rs to as se ts un de r m an ag em
en t of th e
re sp on de nt 's em
pl oy er . Th e su pe rs cr ip ts
⁎⁎ ⁎ ,
⁎⁎ , an d
⁎ in di ca te st at is ti ca l si gn ifi ca nc e at th e 1%
, 5%
, an d 10 % le ve ls , re sp ec ti ve ly , in tw o- ta ile d
t- te st s fo r th e di ff er en ce
of m ea ns
be tw ee n ev er y tw o
su bg ro up s of re sp on de nt s.
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below 3.0, with fewer than 40% of respondents agreeing with the corresponding statements). Following Faulkender and Petersen (2006), who use credit ratings as a proxy for bond market access, we also asked about the
importance of ratings when considering specific securities. Not surprisingly, credit ratings are deemed more important for firms issuing straight bonds (mean score 2.92) than for firms issuing convertible bonds (mean score 2.57) and common shares (mean score 2.13). However, credit ratings do not seem to be considered very important overall, because even the score for straight bonds is not very high.
We concluded the analysis of investor influence on capital structure decisions with an open question (consisting of three sub- questions) aimed at gaining more insight into the magnitude and determinants of investor influence. The Appendix provides the full question. The different parts of the question were answered by 96, 99, and 113 respondents, respectively, much higher response rates than we anticipated. The results of the analysis of the open questions are presented in Table 4.
The first sub-question asks investors to estimate the magnitude of their impact on capital structure decisions, compared with the magnitude of the impact of firm and macroeconomic characteristics (i.e., determinants traditionally considered in capital structure studies). On average, investors believe that their influence accounts for 45% of capital structure decisions, with firm and macro- economic characteristics accounting for the remainder. The answers have quite a large spread, however, with a minimum estimate of 5% and a maximum of 100%. Some respondents also provided a short justification of their estimate. Again, there is large variation in these arguments. At one end of the spectrum, an investor argues, “Investor influence is very small,” while, at the opposite end, we find quotes such as, “[The impact of] investor preference is extremely large in my experience and I don't think it should be. I also, however, think most companies don't allocate capital very well.” Most investors argue that the magnitude of their influence depends on a range of factors (which we examine further in the third sub-question): “I think it is a very broad spectrum; some companies would not consider investor preferences at all, but others would give it a strong input.”
The second sub-question asks investors how they influence capital structure decisions. Specifically, we want to know whether they engage in direct talks with management or only exert indirect influence through interactions with the investment banks involved in security offerings. Approximately one-third of the investors only talk directly with corporate management (31%), while approxi- mately one-fifth (19%) only talk with the investment bank and not with the company. Approximately half of the investors use both mechanisms of influence (47%). A sizable number of investors (10) argue that the magnitude of their shareholdings in the firm determines their channel of influence. Larger shareholdings are more likely to result in direct influence, while smaller shareholdings are associated with indirect influence through the investment bank. Two investors argue that one way to influence capital structure is to “vote with your feet” and refuse to participate in security offerings with which they do not agree.
The third sub-question examines the determinants of the strength of investors' influence on capital structure decisions. The most important factor cited by investors is firm size (71 of 113 respondents). In particular, they feel they can use stronger influence on smaller firms. Representative quotes include the following: “Smaller are always more open—have less investment bankers chasing them, and they are open and receptive to all ideas” and “Smaller firms; bigger ones are a law unto themselves until they need us.” Other important determinants are firm age and the presence of financial constraints or, potentially related, the need for financing and financial difficulties. As one respondent puts it, “Beggars can't be choosers.” Several investors also mention firms' security issuance frequency as a determinant, but they diverge on the direction of the impact. Three out of four investors argue that less frequent issuers rely more on their input, while one argues that more frequent issuers might exert more effort to please investors. In addition to firm characteristics, several respondents mention the size of their shareholdings in the firm, as well as the strength of their relation with the firm and their own size as moderators of their influence on capital structure decisions. Finally, capital market conditions and liquidity are mentioned by one investor each. We conclude that the magnitude of investors' influence on capital structure decisions seems to be affected by a combination of firm, investor–firm relation, and (to a much lesser extent) market characteristics.
4. Investors' views on capital structure theories
Since equity and straight debt constitute the most important sources of financing, there is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on the choice between them. Important theories that explain the choice between equity and debt are static trade-off theory Kraus and Litzenberger (1983), pecking order theory (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984), and market timing theory (Stein, 1996; Baker and Wurgler, 2002).
Static trade-off theory states that firms have optimal debt–equity ratios, determined by trading off the advantages and dis- advantages of leverage. The advantages of leverage consist of a reduction in the agency costs of equity and the corporate tax advantage of interest deductibility. The disadvantages of leverage consist of financial distress costs, agency costs of debt, and personal tax expenses that debtholders incur when receiving interest income. Pecking order theory, in turn, argues that, due to the higher adverse selection costs associated with equity issuance, firms will prefer debt to equity financing. They will only issue the most expensive security (equity) when forced to, that is, when financially constrained. Market timing theory posits that managers are able to time the market and issue equity when the firm's stock is overvalued and retire equity when it is undervalued. Table 5 provides the answers to survey questions intended to test investors' support for each of these key theories.
We started by asking the respondents how important they find the capital structure (i.e., the amount of debt versus equity) of the underlying company in their decision to invest in individual companies. On a scale from one (not at all important) to five (extremely important) equity investors, on average, give a score of 3.94 for this question. Capital structure is even more important for convertible bond investors (4.20) and straight bond investors (4.26). The difference between stock and bond investors is significant at the 10%
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
276
T ab le
4 R ol e of in st it ut io na l in ve st or s in ca pi ta l st ru ct ur e de ci si on s.
Pa ne
lA : Pe
rc en
ta ge
es tim
at e
of th
e m
ag ni
tu de
of th
e im
pa ct
of in
ve st
or pr
ef er
en ce
s on
ca pi
ta ls
tr uc
tu re
de ci
si on
s, re
la tiv
e to
th e
im pa
ct of
fir m
an d
m ac
ro ec
on om
ic ch
ar ac
te ri
st ic
s.
M ea n
M ed ia n
M in im um
M ax im um
St . de vi at io n
N
44 .6 9%
45 %
5% 10 0%
26 .5 9%
96
Pa ne
lB : C ha
nn el
s of
in ve
st or
in flu
en ce
on ca
pi ta
ls tr
uc tu
re de
ci si on
s.
C ha nn el
N um
be r
Pe rc en ta ge
D ir ec t in fl ue nc e th ro ug h ta lk s w it h fi rm
m an ag em
en t
31 31 .3 1%
In di re ct in fl ue nc e th ro ug h in ve st m en t ba nk
on ly
19 19 .1 9%
B ot h di re ct an d in di re ct in fl ue nc e
47 47 .4 7%
N o in fl ue nc e at al l
2 2. 02 %
N 99
10 0%
Pa ne
lC : D
et er
m in
an ts
of th
e de
gr ee
of in
ve st
or in
flu en
ce on
ca pi
ta ls
tr uc
tu re
de ci
si on
s.
Fi rm
ch ar ac te ri st ic s
N um
be r
Si ze
71 A ge
33 Fi na nc ia l co ns tr ai nt s
29 M an ag em
en t te am
or bo ar d ch ar ac te ri st ic s
7 Fi na nc ia l di ffi cu lt ie s
7 N ee d fo r fu nd in g
5 Is su an ce
fr eq ue nc y
4 G ro w th
3 Se ct or
3 Pr iv at e
2 Q ua lit y
2 R is k
1 A sy m m et ri c in fo rm at io n
1
In ve st or
ch ar ac te ri st ic s
Sh ar eh ol di ng s in fi rm
5 St re ng th of re la ti on sh ip w it h fi rm
3 Si ze
2
M ar ke t ch ar ac te ri st ic s
C ap it al m ar ke t co nd it io ns
1 Li qu id it y
1 N
11 3
Th is ta bl e su m m ar iz es in ve st or s' re sp on se s on
op en
qu es ti on s in te nd ed
to fu rt he r ex am
in e th ei r im pa ct on
ca pi ta l st ru ct ur e de ci si on s. Pa ne l A pr ov id es th e re su lt s fo r a
qu es ti on
as ki ng
re sp on de nt s to qu an ti fy w ha t po rt io n of ca pi ta l st ru ct ur e de ci si on s th ey
ac co un t fo r (w it h fi rm
an d m ac ro ec on om
ic ch ar ac te ri st ic s ac co un ti ng
fo r th e
re m ai nd er ). Pa ne l B do cu m en ts th e ch an ne l( s) of in fl ue nc e th at in ve st or s us e to aff ec t ca pi ta l st ru ct ur e de ci si on s. Pa ne l C gi ve s an
ov er vi ew
of th e de te rm in an ts of th e
st re ng th of in ve st or s' im pa ct on
ca pi ta ls tr uc tu re de ci si on s, as m en ti on ed
in in ve st or s' an sw er s to th e re la te d op en
qu es ti on .T he
A pp en di x pr ov id es th e fu ll op en
qu es ti on s.
N de no te s th e nu m be r of re sp on se s.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
277
T ab le
5 In st it ut io na l in ve st or s' vi ew
on st at ic tr ad e- off
th eo ry .
A ll
A ge
G en de r
Si ze
Ed uc at io n
C ou nt ry
Ty pe
of fu nd
M ea n
% 4 an d 5
N 40
an d
un de r
41 an d
ov er
M al e
O th er
U nd er 10
bn A U D
O ve r 10
bn A U D
Ph D an d/ or
M Sc
O th er
U .S .
O th er
H ed ge
fu nd
O th er
W he n de ci di ng
to in ve st , ho w im po rt an t is ca pi ta l st ru ct ur e?
- C om
m on
st oc k in ve st or s
3. 94
75 .5
14 3
4. 08
3. 91
4. 02
3. 50
3. 91
3. 98
3. 80
⁎ 4. 15
3. 25
⁎⁎ 3. 98
3. 47
⁎⁎ 4. 01
- C on ve rt ib le bo nd
in ve st or s
4. 20
83 .3
30 4. 71
⁎⁎ 3. 82
4. 20
3. 50
4. 04
⁎ 4. 71
4. 14
4. 18
na a
na 4. 17
4. 21
- St ra ig ht bo nd
in ve st or s
4. 26
84 .6
39 4. 14
4. 43
4. 24
4. 50
4. 35
4. 16
4. 00
⁎ 4. 57
4. 00
4. 27
3. 40
⁎⁎ ⁎
4. 38
- O th er s
3. 71
72 .3
65 3. 92
3. 80
3. 82
4. 17
3. 87
3. 62
3. 68
⁎ 4. 20
3. 27
3. 80
4. 00
3. 70
Se pa ra te fa ct or s aff ec ti ng
ca pi ta l st ru ct ur e:
- N ot ha vi ng
to o m uc h de bt to ri sk
fi na nc ia l
di st re ss
4. 47
89 .6 9
19 4
4. 43
4. 44
4. 46
4. 09
4. 53
4. 41
4. 25
⁎⁎ 4. 60
3. 94
⁎⁎ 4. 53
4. 41
4. 48
- M ai nt ai ni ng
fi na nc ia l fl ex ib ili ty
3. 93
74 .4 8
19 2
3. 99
3. 89
3. 95
3. 80
3. 96
3. 88
3. 82
4. 05
3. 63
3. 95
3. 59
3. 96
- Lo si ng
cu st om
er s/ su pp lie rs du e to ex ce ss de bt
3. 65
65 .1 1
19 2
3. 68
3. 48
3. 59
3. 70
3. 72
3. 56
3. 30
⁎⁎ ⁎
3. 86
3. 33
3. 68
3. 38
3. 68
- R is k of un de ri nv es tm en t du e to ex ce ss de bt
3. 48
53 .8 8
19 3
3. 48
3. 36
3. 42
3. 64
3. 36
3. 56
3. 29
3. 55
3. 00
⁎ 3. 53
3. 35
3. 49
- R is k of ov er in ve st m en t du e to ex ce ss de bt
3. 41
55 .3 7
18 6
3. 40
3. 35
3. 36
3. 64
3. 51
3. 28
3. 25
3. 48
3. 06
3. 46
3. 50
3. 41
- Li m it m an ag er ia l em
pi re bu ild in g
2. 94
33 .3 4
19 2
2. 73
⁎ 3. 07
2. 85
3. 30
2. 94
2. 94
2. 86
2. 88
2. 69
2. 98
2. 76
2. 96
- Sa m e de bt ra ti o as pe er s
2. 56
17 .4 4
19 5
2. 59
2. 53
2. 53
3. 00
2. 45
⁎ 2. 71
2. 64
2. 48
2. 76
2. 54
2. 29
2. 58
- M ax im iz in g in te re st ta x de du ct ib ili ty
2. 43
13 .0 9
19 1
2. 47
2. 33
2. 38
2. 80
2. 33
2. 57
2. 51
2. 31
2. 50
2. 43
2. 06
2. 47
Th is ta bl e su m m ar iz es th e su rv ey
re sp on se s on
th e im po rt an ce of st at ic tr ad e- off
ca pi ta ls tr uc tu re de te rm in an ts fo r in st it ut io na li nv es to rs .R es po ns es ar e m ea su re d on
a fi ve -p oi nt Li ke rt sc al e ra ng in g fr om
on e fo r no t at al l im po rt an t to fi ve
fo r ex tr em
el y im po rt an t. Th e fi rs t th re e co lu m ns
pr es en t th e m ea n, th e pe rc en ta ge
of re sp on de nt s ra nk in g ea ch
fa ct or
at 4 or
5, an d th e nu m be r of ob se rv at io ns . In
qu es ti on s re ga rd in g se pa ra te fa ct or s aff ec ti ng
ca pi ta ls tr uc tu re ,t he
re sp on de nt s al so ha d an
op po rt un it y to ch oo se th e “d on 't kn ow
/d on 't w an t to an sw er ” al te rn at iv e; th es e re sp on se s ar e ex cl ud ed
fr om
th e ca lc ul at io ns . W e m en ti on
th e re sp on se s by
or de r of im po rt an ce , w hi ch
do es no t ne ce ss ar ily
co rr es po nd
to th e or de r of th e st at em
en ts in th e su rv ey . Si ze
re fe rs to as se ts un de r m an ag em
en t of th e
re sp on de nt 's em
pl oy er . Th e su pe rs cr ip ts
⁎⁎ ⁎ ,
⁎⁎ , an d
⁎ in di ca te st at is ti ca l si gn ifi ca nc e at th e 1%
, 5%
, an d 10 % le ve ls , re sp ec ti ve ly , in tw o- ta ile d
t- te st s fo r th e di ff er en ce
of m ea ns
be tw ee n ev er y tw o
su bg ro up s of re sp on de nt s.
a O ur
sa m pl e do es no t in cl ud e U .S . co nv er ti bl e bo nd
in ve st or s.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
278
level and the difference between stock and convertible bond investors is significant at the 5% level.10 We conclude that, overall, capital structure is an important consideration for institutional investors.
In the next three sections, we discuss the evidence for each of the three main capital structure theories. We systematically compare our findings with those of Graham and Harvey (2001), who surveyed U.S. CFOs on similar issues.11
4.1. Static trade-off theory
We asked which factors investors consider when considering the capital structure of a company in which they are investing. Regarding factors related to static trade-off theory, we find that investors are particularly concerned about the company having too much debt to risk financial distress (4.47). Maintaining financial flexibility is also deemed important (3.93), consistent with the survey results of Graham and Harvey (2001). Maximizing the tax deductibility of interest receives the lowest score (2.43). This result is in line with previous survey evidence for Australian corporate treasurers by Faff et al. (2016). It is likely driven by the Australian dividend imputation system. More particularly, corporate taxes paid by Australian companies can be allocated to shareholders by way of imputation credits included in dividends, thereby making the tax deductibility of debt interest payments less attractive (Twite, 2001; Akhtar, 2005).
Statement 5 in Q12 tests the benefits of straight debt in controlling agency costs of equity by mitigating excessive managerial spending: “The company having sufficient debt, so as to avoid managers wasting corporate cash on pet projects and perks such as negative net present value acquisitions that increase managerial prestige, large offices, corporate jets, etc.” This statement receives a decent amount of support in our survey, with a mean score of 2.94 and 33% of respondents finding it important.12 Graham and Harvey (2001) include the following statement to examine agency costs of equity: “To ensure that upper management works hard and efficiently, we issue sufficient debt to make sure that a large portion of our cash flow is committed to interest payments.” That statement is only found to be important by 2% of the corporate executives participating in their study, with a mean score of only 1.33.13
Further corroborating the importance of agency costs in our survey, we obtain even higher scores on questions on the importance of overinvestment (3.41) and underinvestment (3.48) concerns associated with debt financing. Graham and Harvey (2001) do not have direct equivalents for those questions. Only when asking about convertible bond issuance do they assess potential over- investment concerns, with the following statement: “Protecting bondholders against unfavorable actions by managers and share- holders.” This question essentially tests the same risk-shifting/overinvestment agency problem that we examine with our statement 4 for Q12: “The company not having so much debt that management might be tempted to invest in too risky, negative net present value projects (i.e., projects with a small chance of a very high payoff).”14 Graham and Harvey (2001) find that only 1% of companies that seriously considered convertible bonds find this problem to be important, with a mean score of 1.62. That result contrasts with the mean score of 3.41 for our sample mentioned earlier, with 55% of respondents finding this problem to be important.
A plausible explanation for the discrepancy between Graham and Harvey's (2001) and our own results on agency costs is that corporate managers are not aware of the potential harmful role of agency costs, and their role in creating these. Alternatively, managers might understand the problem but might be unwilling to deal with it. Our findings, by contrast, show that investors are well aware of the agency costs of equity and debt, and do find them important in judging firms' capital structure.
Finally, our results suggest that investors do not seem to care much about companies having the same debt ratio as their peers, with the corresponding statement receiving a score of 2.56. This finding is in line with Graham and Harvey's (2001) result that peer behavior only seems a minor consideration for firms in setting capital structure.
As an extension to the survey results in Table 5, Table 6 presents the results of ordered logit regressions of the importance of capital structure on the type of investor, the characteristics of the investment institution, and the demographic characteristics of the respondents.
The dependent variable is the response to the question, “When deciding to invest, how important is the capital structure?” Respondents were asked to answer the question on a five-point Likert scale ranging from one, for not at all important, to five, extremely important. Column (1) of Table 6 presents the base case in which we relate the answers to this question to the type of investor. We find that straight bond investors are significantly more concerned about capital structure than stock investors are. That result is intuitive. Straight bond investors lose out from companies being levered too strongly, while unlike stock investors, they do not benefit from the gains of using too much leverage. Convertible bond and other investors do not find capital structure significantly more important than common stock investors do. In Column (2), we add variables for the type of investment institution. Two remarkable results from this analysis are the fact that hedge funds and U.S.-based investors are both less concerned about capital structure than other types of investors are. In Column (3), we add the characteristics of the respondents to the base case. We find that
10 Significance levels are not included in the table. 11 Other surveys in the literature covering capital structure obtain findings similar to those of Graham and Harvey (2001) for other countries than
the U.S., e.g. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) and Brounen et al. (2004), (2006) for European firms, and Faff et al. (2016) for Australian firms. We do not separately refer to these surveys in the remainder of this section. 12 This statement is presented as “limit managerial empire building” in Table 5. 13 They document a score of 0.33, but since they use a scale from 0 to 4 instead of 1 to 5, their score translates into 1.33 on our scale. We have
made similar adjustments in the remainder of the text. 14 This statement is presented as the “risk of overinvestment due to excess debt” in Table 5.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
279
investors with PhD or master's degrees find capital structure less important than other investors do. Overall, after controlling for various institutional and demographic characteristics, the main result from this table stands that straight bond investors find capital structure significantly more important than stock and other investors do.
4.2. Pecking order theory
Table 7 provides the results for our questions aimed at testing the validity of pecking order theory. Pecking order theory predicts that risky security offerings will be associated with a negative stock price effect, since they signal
that the firm is overvalued. Moreover, the theory predicts that more equity-like security offerings will provoke more negative stock price reactions than debt-like security offerings will, since the former provide a stronger signal of equity overvaluation (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Consistent with the predictions, Table 7 shows that investors are much more likely to revise their valuations downward or sell stock following corporate equity offerings than after straight bond offerings (mean scores of 2.97 versus 2.54, respectively, the difference being significant at the 1% level). The score for convertible bond offerings is only slightly lower than that for equity offerings (mean scores of 2.97 versus 2.92, respectively, the difference being not statistically or economically significant), suggesting that investors perceive convertibles to be very similar to equity.15 However, Table 7 also shows that only approximately one-fourth (27%) of institutional investors agree or strongly agree that they would revise their opinion on a firm's stock downward if the firm announced an equity offering. This percentage is surprisingly low considering pecking order theory's prediction that equity offerings are associated with a downward stock price revision.
In follow-up yes/no questions, we asked those investors who do revise their valuations based on security offerings to assess the validity of several factors suggested by pecking order theory. In total, 88% of respondents agree that their valuation revision and/or probability of selling stock following an equity offering announcement would be stronger if there were less information available about the company's value of assets in place. This result is consistent with pecking order theory's prediction that adverse selection costs should be more severe for firms with higher information asymmetry. A revised version of the pecking order theory predicts adverse selection costs to be less severe for firms with valuable growth opportunities (Cooney and Kalay, 1996). In line with this theory, 88% of the respondents agree with the argument that they would adopt a less negative revaluation following equity offering announcements by companies with valuable growth options. Krasker's (1986) model predicts higher adverse selection costs for larger equity offerings. This prediction also receives strong support from the respondents, with 82% of the investors agreeing that larger offering sizes would result in larger downward stock price revisions.
Finally, Myers and Majluf (1984) predict higher adverse selection costs for firms with larger amounts of slack capital available, since equity offerings for such firms could send a stronger signal of firm overvaluation. Consistent with this prediction, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) find that firms with more slack capital are less likely to issue equity compared with straight bonds, arguably to
Table 6 Determinants of institutional investors' perceived importance of capital structure.
Variable Type of investor Investment institution Respondent characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Convertible bond investor 0.51 (1.47) 0.51 (1.42) 0.31 (0.70) Straight bond investor 0.65⁎⁎ (2.09) 0.69⁎⁎ (2.18) 0.73⁎ (1.74) Other investor −0.35 (−1.27) −0.38 (−1.36) −0.11 (−0.30) Large investor 0.24 (0.77) Hedge fund −1.05⁎⁎ (−2.19) U.S. based −1.35⁎⁎⁎ (−3.02) Age 40 and below 0.44 (1.31) Male −0.02 (−0.03) PhD and/or master's degree −0.86⁎⁎ (−2.47) N 277 272 188 χ2 (p-value) 7.34 (0.06) 22.13 (0.00) 12.39 (0.05) Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.038 0.032
This table reports the results of ordered logit regressions of the importance of capital structure on the type of investor, the characteristics of the investment institution, and the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The dependent variable is the response to the question, “When deciding to invest [in shares/convertible bonds/ordinary bonds/individual companies – See Questions 8-11], how important is the capital struc- ture?” measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from one for not at all important to five for extremely important. Those who invest in different asset classes had an opportunity to answer this question for each asset separately. Common stock investor is the omitted category. Large investor is a dummy variable equal to one when assets under management of the respondent's employer are larger than $10 billion, and zero otherwise. z- statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered by respondent, are in parentheses. The superscripts ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
15 This perception confirms the results of Lee et al. (2009), who study the equity-likeness of convertible bonds in different countries. In line with Lewis et al. (2003), they define equity-like convertibles as those that have a probability of conversion above 60%. The probability of conversion of Australian convertibles in their research is 70%, making them highly equity-like, on average.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
280
T ab le
7 In st it ut io na l in ve st or s' vi ew
on pe ck in g or de r th eo ry .
A ll
A ge
G en de r
Si ze
Ed uc at io n
C ou nt ry
Ty pe
of fu nd
M ea n
% 4 an d 5
N 40
an d
un de r
41 an d
ov er
M al e
O th er
U nd er 10
bn A U D
O ve r 10
bn A U D
Ph D an d/
or M Sc
O th er
U .S .
O th er
H ed ge
fu nd
O th er
Pa ne l A .
Im pa ct of se cu ri ty off er in gs
on va lu at io n an d de m an d fo r eq ui ti es :
- W he n a co m pa ny
an no un ce s an
eq ui ty off er in g, I us ua lly
re vi se m y
va lu at io n of it s st oc k pr ic e do w nw
ar d an d/ or se ll so m e of it s st oc k
2. 97
27 .2 0
12 5
2. 84
3. 06
2. 93
3. 00
2. 98
3. 00
2. 98
2. 91
3. 29
2. 96
3. 07
2. 95
- W he n a co m pa ny
an no un ce s a co nv er ti bl e bo nd
off er in g, I us ua lly
re vi se m y va lu at io n of it s st oc k pr ic e do w nw
ar d an d/ or se ll so m e
of it s st oc k
2. 92
23 .5 8
12 3
2. 81
3. 00
2. 91
2. 50
3. 01
2. 78
2. 98
2. 84
3. 14
2. 91
3. 00
2. 91
-W he n a co m pa ny
an no un ce s a st ra ig ht bo nd
off er in g, Iu su al ly re vi se
m y va lu at io n of it s st oc k pr ic e do w nw
ar d an d/ or
se ll so m e of it s
st oc k
2. 54
8. 20
12 2
2. 38
2. 58
2. 46
3. 00
2. 61
2. 44
2. 65
2. 36
2. 57
2. 54
2. 43
2. 56
Eq ui ty di lu ti on
co nc er ns
fo r ex is ti ng
sh ar eh ol de rs
4. 45
90 .4 7
12 6
4. 61
4. 40
4. 52
4. 50
4. 54
⁎ 4. 26
4. 46
4. 56
4. 29
4. 46
4. 40
4. 46
Pa ne l B . D ow
nw ar d va lu at io n re vi si on
at eq ui ty off er in g an no un ce m en t w ill be
st ro ng er if
% ag re e
N
- Le ss in fo rm at io n is av ai la bl e ab ou t th e co m pa ny 's as se t va lu e
88 .4 6
26 10 0. 00
83 .3 3
N A
10 0. 00
⁎⁎ 70 .0 0
87 .5 0
93 .3 3
33 .3 3⁎
⁎⁎ 95 .6 5
10 0. 00
86 .3 6
- Fe w er gr ow
th op po rt un it ie s
88 .2 4
34 93 .7 5
92 .8 6
N A
86 .3 6
91 .6 7
10 0. 00
90 .4 8
10 0. 00
87 .5 0
10 0. 00
86 .2 1
- La rg er is su e si ze
81 .8 2
33 73 .3 3
85 .7 1
N A
81 .8 2
81 .8 2
87 .5 0
76 .1 9
10 0. 00
80 .6 5
80 .0 0
82 .1 4
- La rg e ca sh
re se rv es
54 .5 5
33 60 .0 0
38 .4 6
N A
57 .1 4
50 .0 0
85 .7 1⁎
⁎ 38 .1 0
50 .0 0
54 .8 4
40 .0 0
57 .1 4
Th is ta bl e su m m ar iz es th e su rv ey
re sp on se s on
th e im pa ct of di ff er en t ty pe s of se cu ri ty off er in gs on
va lu at io n an d th e de m an d fo r st oc ks .T he
re sp on se s to th e fi rs t fo ur qu es ti on s ar e m ea su re d on
a fi ve -
po in t Li ke rt sc al e ra ng in g fr om
on e fo r st ro ng ly di sa gr ee
to fi ve
fo r st ro ng ly ag re e. Th e fi rs t th re e co lu m ns
pr es en t th e m ea ns , th e pe rc en ta ge
of re sp on de nt s ch oo si ng
4 or
5, an d th e nu m be r of
ob se rv at io ns .T he
re sp on de nt s al so ha d an
op po rt un it y to ch oo se th e “d on 't kn ow
/d on 't w an tt o an sw er ” al te rn at iv e; th es e re sp on se s ar e ex cl ud ed
fr om
th e ca lc ul at io ns .W
e m en ti on
th e re sp on se s by
or de r
of im po rt an ce ,w
hi ch
do es no t ne ce ss ar ily
co rr es po nd
to th e or de r of th e st at em
en ts in th e su rv ey .S iz e re fe rs to as se ts un de r m an ag em
en t of th e re sp on de nt 's em
pl oy er . Th e la st fo ur
qu es ti on s on
th e
fa ct or s aff ec ti ng
pe rc ei ve d va lu at io n w er e on ly as ke d to th e re sp on de nt s w ho
ag re ed
(a ns w er ed
4 or 5) th at th ey
re vi se th ei r st oc k va lu at io ns
do w nw
ar d fo llo w in g a se cu ri ty off er in g. Th e re sp on se s to
th es e qu es ti on s ar e m ea su re d us in g th e al te rn at iv es ye s, no ,a nd
“d on 't kn ow
,” th e la tt er re sp on se be in g ex cl ud ed
fr om
al lt he
ca lc ul at io ns .T he
su pe rs cr ip ts
⁎⁎ ⁎ ,
⁎⁎ ,a nd
⁎ in di ca te st at is ti ca ls ig ni fi ca nc e at
th e 1%
, 5%
, an d 10 % le ve ls , re sp ec ti ve ly , in tw o- ta ile d
t- te st s fo r th e di ff er en ce
of m ea ns
be tw ee n ev er y tw o su bg ro up s of re sp on de nt s.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
281
mitigate equity-related adverse selection costs. In our survey, we find little evidence that firms' slack capital matters in affecting their adverse selection costs. Only slightly more than half (55%) of the respondents agree that they would make a smaller downward stock price revision for equity issuers with smaller cash reserves (acting as a common proxy for slack capital). We do not find differences in any answers across investor and fund characteristics, except for the fact that the importance of information about assets in place is significantly greater for smaller funds (which, arguably, could have fewer analysts available to tap nonstandard sources for company information) and for non-U.S. funds, while better-educated investors support the importance of slack capital.
Overall, we conclude that, while the overall percentage of respondents making downward stock price revisions or selling shares following risky security offering announcements is lower than expected, other answers are strongly consistent with predictions yielded by pecking order theory. Adverse selection seems to be a strong driver of investor reactions to security offerings. This conclusion differs from that of Graham and Harvey (2001). While they do find evidence of pecking order behavior in CFOs' security choice decisions, CFOs' answers suggest that these pecking order tendencies are not affected by adverse selection concerns. Our results in Table 7 therefore uncover a tension between the determinants of CFOs' external financing choices, and those of investor reactions to these choices.
For completeness, we also asked investors about the importance of equity dilution concerns around equity offering announce- ments. The survey evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001) strongly supports the notion that earnings per share (EPS) dilution matters for CFOs. Nearly 69% of the CFOs who seriously consider issuing common equity in their study (strongly) agree with the statement that EPS dilution affects their issuance decision, making this the most important factor affecting common equity offerings. In our survey, we ask about equity dilution, which includes both EPS and control (voting rights) dilution. We find strong evidence that dilution concerns matter. As the last row of Panel A in Table 7 shows, the relevant survey statement receives a mean score of 4.45, with 90% of the investors (strongly) agreeing with it. According to standard theory, EPS dilution should not be a concern for investors if the firm earns the required return on new equity (Brealey et al., 2012). However, concerns about voting rights are legitimate. Given that we asked about the combination of the two factors, we are unable to separate these two effects, but we do find that CFOs and investors likely hold similar opinions on this issue.
4.3. Market timing theory
Table 8 provides the results on market timing theory. Consistent with the key prediction of market timing theory, the survey statement that firms tend to offer equity when equity valuations are high receives very strong support (mean score of 4.07, with nearly 80% of respondents (strongly) agreeing). These results mirror those of Graham and Harvey (2001), who find strong support for equity market timing behavior among CFOs.
Extending the market timing argument to straight bond markets, we obtain the prediction that firms try to time straight bond offerings when economy-wide interest rates are low. Support for this argument is slightly weaker than for the equity market timing argument (mean score of 3.78, with nearly 70% of respondents (strongly) agreeing). Convertible bond issuers could exhibit both equity and straight bond market timing tendencies, given their hybrid characteristics. Accordingly, investors believe that convertible bond issuers time both equity and bond markets, although the scores are slightly weaker than for the corresponding non-hybrid securities. Investors with stronger educational backgrounds seem to have a stronger belief in the market timing tendencies of con- vertible bond issuers. This finding could be associated with the fact that they have a better overall understanding of the hybrid design of convertible bonds. In theory, firms could try to time convertible bond offerings when volatility is high, because this might enable them to sell the embedded call option at a higher price. However, our results provide little evidence of the importance of such volatility timing behavior as perceived by investors. Overall, our results show that market timing is not only exercised by firms, as found by Graham and Harvey (2001), but is also fully anticipated and likely priced by investors.
5. Financial constraint theories and measures
Firms are defined as financially constrained if it is considerably cheaper for them to use internal funds than external funds. There are different ways to measure financial constraints and the literature does not agree which of these variables is the most suitable. Until recently, the KZ index was very popular as a measure of financial constraints. This index includes the following variables: cash flow to total assets, leverage, dividend to total assets, and cash to total assets.16 An alternative for this index is the WW index, which includes some of the same variables as the KZ index, others that are defined slightly differently, and some new variables. More specifically, the WW index comprises the following variables: cash flow to total assets, a dummy for dividend-paying firms, long-term debt to total assets, the natural logarithm of total assets, the firm's three-digit industry sales growth, and the firm's sales growth. In an empirical study, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) compare the two indexes and conclude that neither is truly suitable for measuring financial constraints. They therefore suggest a new index, the HP index. This index consists of the age and size of the firm, as well as the square of the firm's size.
We asked the respondents whether they find financial constraints important in investing. In addition, we asked them to rate different variables that are included in the different indexes based on their perceived importance as measures of financial constraints. Table 9 provides the results.
Overall, investors find financial constraints to be moderately important. The mean score for this question is 3.51 and slightly more
16 We only asked about the Baker et al. (2003) version of the KZ index. The Lamont et al. (2001) version also includes Tobin's Q.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
282
T ab le
8 In st it ut io na l in ve st or s' vi ew
on m ar ke t ti m in g th eo ry .
A ll
A ge
G en de r
Si ze
Ed uc at io n
C ou nt ry
Ty pe
of fu nd
M ea n
% 4 an d 5
N 40
an d
un de r
41 an d
ov er
M al e
O th er
U nd er 10
bn A U D
O ve r 10
bn A U D
Ph D an d/ or
M Sc
O th er
U .S .
O th er
H ed ge
fu nd
O th er
Fi rm s tr y to ti m e:
- Eq ui ty off er in gs w he n eq ui ty m ar ke t va lu at io ns
ar e hi gh
4. 07
79 .4 0
16 5
4. 09
4. 03
4. 04
4. 57
4. 19
⁎ 3. 91
4. 03
4. 09
3. 69
⁎ 4. 12
4. 06
4. 07
- St ra ig ht bo nd
off er in gs w he n in te re st ra te s ar e
lo w
3. 78
68 .3 5
15 8
3. 86
3. 71
3. 78
4. 25
3. 71
3. 90
3. 88
3. 72
3. 93
3. 77
3. 53
3. 81
- C on ve rt ib le off er in gs
w he n eq ui ty m ar ke t
va lu at io ns
ar e hi gh
3. 61
61 .1 9
15 2
3. 67
3. 55
3. 61
4. 00
3. 58
3. 66
3. 79
⁎⁎ 3. 48
3. 85
3. 59
3. 36
3. 63
- C on ve rt ib le bo nd
off er in gs
w he n in te re st ra te s
ar e lo w
3. 47
54 .1 9
15 5
3. 67
⁎⁎ ⁎
3. 22
3. 47
3. 67
3. 42
3. 57
3. 64
⁎ 3. 33
3. 62
3. 46
2. 93
⁎⁎ 3. 52
- C on ve rt ib le bo nd
off er in gs
w he n vo la ti lit y is
hi gh
3. 01
24 .5 0
15 1
3. 08
2. 90
2. 98
3. 50
2. 94
3. 11
3. 05
2. 95
3. 67
⁎⁎ ⁎
2. 96
2. 93
3. 02
Th is ta bl e su m m ar iz es th e im po rt an ce of m ar ke t ti m in g be ha vi or as pe rc ei ve d by
in st it ut io na li nv es to rs .T he
re sp on se s ar e m ea su re d on
a fi ve -p oi nt Li ke rt sc al e ra ng in g fr om
on e fo r st ro ng ly di sa gr ee
to fi ve
fo r st ro ng ly ag re e. Th e fi rs t th re e co lu m ns pr es en t th e m ea ns ,t he
pe rc en ta ge
of re sp on de nt s ch oo si ng
4 or 5, an d th e nu m be r of ob se rv at io ns .T he
re sp on de nt s al so ha d an
op po rt un it y to ch oo se th e
“d on 't kn ow
/d on 't w an t to an sw er ” al te rn at iv e; th es e re sp on se s ar e ex cl ud ed
fr om
th e ca lc ul at io ns .S iz e re fe rs to as se ts un de r m an ag em
en t of th e re sp on de nt 's em
pl oy er .W
e m en ti on
th e re sp on se s by
or de r of im po rt an ce , w hi ch
do es no t ne ce ss ar ily
co rr es po nd
to th e or de r of th e st at em
en ts in th e su rv ey . Th e su pe rs cr ip ts
⁎⁎ ⁎ ,
⁎⁎ , an d
⁎ in di ca te st at is ti ca l si gn ifi ca nc e at th e 1%
, 5%
, an d 10 % le ve ls ,
re sp ec ti ve ly , in tw o- ta ile d
t- te st s fo r th e di ff er en ce
of m ea ns
be tw ee n ev er y tw o su bg ro up s of re sp on de nt s.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
283
T ab le
9 In st it ut io na l in ve st or s' vi ew
on fi na nc ia l co ns tr ai nt s.
A ll
A ge
G en de r
Si ze
Ed uc at io n
C ou nt ry
Ty pe
of fu nd
M ea n
% 4 an d 5
N 40
an d
un de r
41 an d
ov er
M al e
O th er
U nd er 10
bn A U D
O ve r 10
bn A U D
Ph D an d/ or
M Sc
O th er
U .S .
O th er
H ed ge
fu nd
O th er
Im po rt an ce of fi na nc ia lc on st ra in ts in de ci si on
to in ve st
3. 51
52 .3 8
18 9
3. 48
3. 53
3. 50
3. 44
3. 52
3. 48
3. 33
⁎⁎ 3. 65
2. 94
⁎⁎ 3. 55
3. 18
3. 54
M ea su re s of fi na nc ia l co ns tr ai nt s:
- Le ve ra ge
4. 18
84 .4 2
15 4
4. 24
4. 16
4. 20
4. 25
4. 15
4. 22
4. 11
4. 28
4. 00
4. 18
4. 15
4. 18
- R at io of ca sh
fl ow
to to ta l as se ts
4. 01
79 .8 7
15 4
4. 17
⁎⁎ 3. 87
4. 04
3. 88
4. 06
3. 94
4. 06
4. 01
3. 83
4. 01
3. 62
⁎ 4. 04
- Sa le s gr ow
th of th e fi rm
3. 53
53 .8 9
15 4
3. 60
3. 44
3. 51
3. 88
3. 60
3. 42
3. 29
⁎⁎ ⁎
3. 76
3. 17
3. 55
3. 23
3. 55
- St oc k m ar ke t lis ti ng
3. 42
48 .6 3
14 6
3. 27
⁎ 3. 64
3. 52
⁎⁎ ⁎
2. 14
3. 58
⁎ 3. 23
3. 29
3. 56
4. 13
⁎ 3. 39
3. 85
3. 38
- R at io of ca sh
ba la nc e to to ta l as se ts
3. 29
45 .7 5
15 3
3. 40
3. 21
3. 30
3. 50
3. 38
3. 22
3. 38
3. 27
3. 08
3. 31
2. 75
⁎⁎ 3. 34
- Sa le s gr ow
th of th e in du st ry
3. 12
36 .3 6
15 4
3. 14
3. 10
3. 09
⁎⁎ 3. 88
3. 17
3. 08
3. 05
3. 20
2. 75
3. 16
3. 23
3. 11
- C re di t ra ti ng
3. 01
35 .3 0
15 3
2. 82
⁎⁎ 3. 21
2. 98
3. 38
2. 95
3. 09
2. 92
3. 05
2. 58
3. 05
2. 92
3. 01
- Fi rm
si ze
2. 94
28 .1 0
15 3
2. 90
2. 98
2. 94
2. 63
2. 85
3. 06
3. 18
⁎⁎ ⁎
2. 72
2. 75
2. 97
2. 69
2. 96
- R at io of di vi de nd s to to ta l as se ts
2. 84
26 .3 1
15 2
2. 84
2. 90
2. 85
3. 13
2. 84
2. 86
2. 89
2. 86
2. 33
⁎ 2. 90
2. 31
⁎ 2. 89
- In du st ry pe er s' de bt ra ti os
2. 78
19 .6 1
15 3
2. 83
2. 69
2. 77
2. 75
2. 67
2. 92
2. 84
2. 72
2. 92
2. 78
2. 92
2. 76
- Fi rm
ag e
2. 05
8. 05
14 9
2. 03
2. 05
2. 05
1. 88
2. 11
2. 00
2. 05
2. 07
1. 92
2. 07
2. 08
2. 05
Th is ta bl e su m m ar iz es th e im po rt an ce of fi na nc ia lc on st ra in ts in in ve st m en ts an d th e m et ri cs us ed
to m ea su re fi na nc ia lc on st ra in ts .T he
re sp on se s ar e m ea su re d on
a fi ve -p oi nt Li ke rt sc al e ra ng in g fr om
on e fo r no t at al li m po rt an t to fi ve
fo r ex tr em
el y im po rt an t. Th e fi rs t th re e co lu m ns pr es en t th e m ea ns ,t he
pe rc en ta ge
of re sp on de nt s ra nk in g ea ch
fa ct or at 4 or 5, an d th e nu m be r of ob se rv at io ns .I n al l
th e qu es ti on s, th e re sp on de nt s al so
ha d an
op po rt un it y to ch oo se th e “d on 't kn ow
/d on 't w an t to an sw er ” al te rn at iv e; th es e re sp on se s ar e ex cl ud ed
fr om
th e ca lc ul at io ns . Q ue st io ns
re ga rd in g se pa ra te
m ea su re s of fi na nc ia lc on st ra in ts ar e on ly ad dr es se d to th e re sp on de nt s w ho
ch os e 3, 4, or 5 in th e qu es ti on
on th e im po rt an ce of fi na nc ia lc on st ra in ts .W
e m en ti on
th e re sp on se s by
or de r of im po rt an ce ,
w hi ch
do es no t ne ce ss ar ily
co rr es po nd
to th e or de r of th e st at em
en ts in th e su rv ey .S iz e re fe rs to as se ts un de r m an ag em
en t of th e re sp on de nt 's em
pl oy er .T he
su pe rs cr ip ts
⁎⁎ ⁎ ,
⁎⁎ ,a nd
⁎ in di ca te st at is ti ca l
si gn ifi ca nc e at th e 1%
, 5%
, an d 10 % le ve ls , re sp ec ti ve ly , in tw o- ta ile d
t- te st s fo r th e di ff er en ce
of m ea ns
be tw ee n ev er y tw o su bg ro up s of re sp on de nt s.
S. Brown, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 270–286
284
than 52% of the respondents indicate that they find financial constraints to be important or very important. This result holds for all different types of investors, with U.S.-based investors finding financial constraints to be somewhat less important compared to investors from other countries.
When looking at individual measures of financial constraints, it becomes obvious that the two components of HP index are not deemed very important. The mean score for firm size is 2.94, while age receives the lowest score of all financial constraints, 2.05. In addition, these scores do not seem to differ much across types of investors. The scores for the individual components of the KZ and WW indexes are much higher. Leverage and cash flow to total assets, which are part of both indexes, both score very high, with mean scores of, respectively, 4.18 and 4.01. Again, there is not much variation between different categories of investors. Scores for other components of these two indexes also tend to be higher than the scores for the two individual components of the HP index.17 Overall, our results suggest that investors measure financial constraints with the components of the KZ and WW indexes rather than the HP index. One potential explanation for this finding is that the components of the former indexes may be more visible and easier to understand for investors than the components of the latter index.
6. Summary and conclusions
The seminal paper of Graham and Harvey (2001), in which they survey CFOs on various corporate finance topics including capital structure, paved the way for the acceptance of questionnaires as a well-respected research instrument in finance. The authors' U.S.- based survey was followed up by survey analyses of European CFOs (e.g., Brounen et al., 2004, 2006; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004) and Australian corporate treasurers (Faff et al., 2016). However, until now, nobody had asked institutional investors what they think about the capital structure decisions of the companies in which they invest or are at least contemplating investing, as well as their impact on these decisions. This is an important gap in the literature, given the increasing role of institutional investors as corporate capital providers around the world (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). We fill this gap in the literature by surveying 275 Australian in- stitutional investors on this topic.
We first examine the importance of the supply side of the market as a driver of capital structure decisions. We find that more than 82% of the respondents believe that they have a strong influence on the security issuance choice of the firms in which they invest or are considering investing, and more than 84% believe that they have a strong influence on the amount of financing that these firms raise. Investors influence capital structure decisions both directly through talks with management, and indirectly through talks with the in- vestment banks assisting with securities issuance. Overall, our results highlight the strong role of institutional investors as first-order drivers of firms' capital structure decisions. Investors, furthermore, mention several moderators affecting the strength of their potential impact on firms' decisions, including firm characteristics such as age and size, as well as characteristics of the investor–firm relation.
We find that, among equity, convertible bond, and straight bond investors, more than 75%, 83%, and 84%, respectively, indicate that they find capital structure important when making the decision to invest in a particular company. With regard to the validity of capital structure theories governing firms' decisions, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that CFOs do not find agency problems to be important. We find the opposite for investors: more than 50% of our respondents consider agency problems of overinvestment and underinvestment to be important. One explanation for this discrepancy is that managers are unaware of the impact of agency costs on their capital structure decisions. We furthermore find support for adverse selection costs-driven pecking order, market timing, and equity dilution explanations for capital structure. These results are mostly consistent with those of Graham and Harvey (2001), although these authors do not find that pecking order behavior results from adverse selection costs.
An obvious possible follow-up to this research would be to conduct a similar study for the U.S. Given the dividend imputation system that is used in Australia and not in the U.S., a study for the U.S. may lead to some different findings on the importance of the tax deductibility of interest for corporate tax purposes. However, for the remaining part we would not expect many differences, since the institutional setting for both countries is very similar. Of course, our survey could be extended to other countries than the U.S. as well.
Our survey measures investors' stated influence and views on corporate capital structure (theories). These stated opinions are subjective in nature, and may differ from investors' actual role and views. For example, investors may want to provide inflated estimates of their own importance in deciding firms' capital structure. Like other surveys, we hope that the anonymous nature of our survey has encouraged investors to respond honestly to our questions, thereby reducing potential biases in our findings (Gompers et al., 2016). Overall, we expect that our results will be useful in future empirical research modeling the impact of investor pre- ferences and capital supply on corporate finance decisions.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.05.001.
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- What is the role of institutional investors in corporate capital structure decisions? A survey analysis
- Introduction
- Survey design and respondent characteristics
- Capital supply factors
- Investors' views on capital structure theories
- Static trade-off theory
- Pecking order theory
- Market timing theory
- Financial constraint theories and measures
- Summary and conclusions
- Supplementary data
- References