Emerging threats and counter measures Discussion
Cyber Attacks Protecting National Infrastructure
Student Edition
Edward G. Amoroso
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Amoroso, Edward G.
Cyber attacks : protecting national infrastructure / Edward Amoroso, John R. Vacca.–Student ed.
p. cm.
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Summary: “Ten basic principles that will reduce the risk of cyber attack to national infrastructure in
a substantive manner”–Provided by publisher.
ISBN 978-0-12-391855-0 (hardback)
1. Cyberterrorism–United States–Prevention. 2. Computer networks–Security measures. 3.
Cyberspace–Security measures. 4. Computer crimes–United States–Prevention. 5. National security–
United States. I. Vacca, John R. II. Title.
HV6773.2.A47 2012
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2012000035
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ISBN: 978-0-12-391855-0
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Preface
Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured.
Thomas Paine in Common Sense
Before you invest any of your time with this book, please take a moment
and look over the following points. They outline my basic philosophy of national infrastructure security. I think that your reaction to these points will give you a pretty good idea of what your reaction will be to the book.
1. Citizens of free nations cannot hope to express or enjoy their freedoms if basic security protections are not provided. Security does not suppress freedom—it makes freedom possible.
2. In virtually every modern nation, computers and networks power critical infrastructure elements. As a result, cyber attackers can use computers and networks to damage or ruin the infrastructures that citizens rely on.
3. Security protections, such as those in security books, were designed for small-scale environments such as enterprise computing environments. These protections do not extrapolate to the protection of massively complex infrastructure.
4. Effective national cyber protections will be driven largely by cooperation and coordination between commercial, industrial, and government organizations. Thus, organizational management issues will be as important to national defense as technical issues.
5. Security is a process of risk reduction, not risk removal. Therefore, concrete steps can and should be taken to reduce, but not remove, the risk of cyber attack to national infrastructure.
6. The current risk of catastrophic cyber attack to national infrastructure must be viewed as extremely high, by any realistic measure. Taking little or no action to reduce this risk would be a foolish national decision.
The chapters of this book are organized around 10 basic principles that
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will reduce the risk of cyber attack to national infrastructure in a substantive manner. They are driven by experiences gained managing the security of one of the largest, most complex infrastructures in the world, by years of learning from various commercial and government organizations, and by years of interaction with students and academic researchers in the security field. They are also driven by personal experiences dealing with a wide range of successful and unsuccessful cyber attacks, including ones directed at infrastructure of considerable value. The implementation of the 10 principles in this book will require national resolve and changes to the way computing and networking elements are designed, built, and operated in the context of national infrastructure. My hope is that the suggestions offered in these pages will make this process easier.
Student Edition
To make it easier to teach these basic principles in the classroom, Cyber Attacks Student Edition adds new material developed by John R. Vacca, Editor- in-Chief of Computer and Information Security Handbook (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers) aimed specifically at enhancing the student experience, making it appropriate as a core textbook for instructors teaching courses in cyber security, information security, digital security, national security, intelligence studies, technology and infrastructure protection and similar courses. Cyber Attacks Student Edition features the addition of case studies to
illustrate actual implementation scenarios discussed in the text. The Student Edition also adds a host of new pedagogical elements to enhance learning, including chapter outlines, chapter summaries, learning checklists, chapter- by-chapter study questions, and more. Instructor Support for Cyber Attacks Student Edition includes Test Bank,
Lecture Slides, Lesson Plans, and Solutions Manual available online at http://textbooks.elsevier.com/web/Manuals.aspx?isbn=9780123918550.
• Test Bank—Compose, customize, and deliver exams using an online assessment package in a free Windows-based authoring tool that makes it easy to build tests using the unique multiple choice and true or false questions created for Cyber Attacks Student Edition. What’s more, this authoring tool allows you to export customized exams directly to
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Blackboard, WebCT, eCollege, Angel, and other leading systems. All test bank files are also conveniently offered in Word format.
• PowerPoint Lecture Slides—Reinforce key topics with focused PowerPoints, which provide a perfect visual outline with which to augment your lecture. Each individual book chapter has its own dedicated slideshow.
• Lesson Plans—Design your course around customized lesson plans. Each individual lesson plan acts as separate syllabi containing content synopses, key terms, content synopses, directions to supplementary websites, and more open-ended critical thinking questions designed to spur class discussion. These lesson plans also delineate and connect chapter-based learning objectives to specific teaching resources, making it easy to catalogue the resources at your disposal.
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Acknowledgments
The cyber security experts in the AT&T Chief Security Office, my colleagues across AT&T Labs and the AT&T Chief Technology Office, my colleagues across the entire AT&T business, and my graduate and undergraduate students in the Computer Science Department at the Stevens Institute of Technology have had a profound impact on my thinking and on the contents of this book. In addition, many prominent enterprise customers of AT&T with whom I’ve had the pleasure of serving, especially those in the United States Federal Government, have been great influencers in the preparation of this material. I’d also like to extend a great thanks to my wife Lee, daughter Stephanie
(17), son Matthew (15), and daughter Alicia (9) for their collective patience with my busy schedule.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Cover Image
Title
Copyright
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
National Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
Botnet Threat
National Cyber Security Methodology Components
Deception
Separation
Diversity
Consistency
Depth
Discretion
Collection
Correlation
Awareness
Response
Implementing the Principles Nationally
Protecting the Critical National Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
2. Deception
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Scanning Stage
Deliberately Open Ports
Discovery Stage
Deceptive Documents
Exploitation Stage
Procurement Tricks
Exposing Stage
Interfaces Between Humans and Computers
National Deception Program
The Deception Planning Process Against Cyber Attacks
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
3. Separation
What Is Separation?
Functional Separation
National Infrastructure Firewalls
DDOS Filtering
SCADA Separation Architecture
Physical Separation
Insider Separation
Asset Separation
Multilevel Security (MLS)
Protecting the Critical National Infrastructure Through Use of Separation
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
4. Diversity
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Diversity and Worm Propagation
Desktop Computer System Diversity
Diversity Paradox of Cloud Computing
Network Technology Diversity
Physical Diversity
National Diversity Program
Critical Infrastructure Resilience and Diversity Initiative
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
5. Commonality
Meaningful Best Practices for Infrastructure Protection
Locally Relevant and Appropriate Security Policy
Culture of Security Protection
Infrastructure Simplification
Certification and Education
Career Path and Reward Structure
Responsible Past Security Practice
National Commonality Program
How Critical National Infrastructure Systems Demonstrate Commonality
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
6. Depth
Effectiveness of Depth
Layered Authentication
Layered E-Mail Virus and Spam Protection
Layered Access Controls
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Layered Encryption
Layered Intrusion Detection
National Program of Depth
Practical Ways for Achieving Information Assurance in Infrastructure Networked Environments
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
7. Discretion
Trusted Computing Base
Security Through Obscurity
Information Sharing
Information Reconnaissance
Obscurity Layers
Organizational Compartments
National Discretion Program
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Sharing of Sensitive Information
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
8. Collection
Collecting Network Data
Collecting System Data
Security Information and Event Management
Large-Scale Trending
Tracking a Worm
National Collection Program
Data Collection Efforts: Systems and Assets
Summary
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Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
9. Correlation
Conventional Security Correlation Methods
Quality and Reliability Issues in Data Correlation
Correlating Data to Detect a Worm
Correlating Data to Detect a Botnet
Large-Scale Correlation Process
National Correlation Program
Correlation Rules for Critical National Infrastructure Cyber Security
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
10. Awareness
Detecting Infrastructure Attacks
Managing Vulnerability Information
Cyber Security Intelligence Reports
Risk Management Process
Security Operations Centers
National Awareness Program
Connecting Current Cyber Security Operation Centers to Enhance Situational Awareness
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
11. Response
Pre- Versus Post-Attack Response
Indications and Warning
Incident Response Teams
Forensic Analysis
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Law Enforcement Issues
Disaster Recovery
National Response Program
The Critical National Infrastructure Incident Response Framework
Transitioning from NIPP Steady State to Incident Response Management
Summary
Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
APPENDIX A. National Infrastructure Protection Criteria
Deception Requirements
Separation Requirements
Commonality Requirements
Diversity Requirements
Depth Requirements
Response Requirements
Awareness Requirements
Discretion Requirements
Collection Requirements
Correlation Requirements
APPENDIX B. Case Studies
John R. Vacca
Case Study 1: Cyber Storm
Case Study 2: Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructures—A Risk to the Nation
Case Study 3: Department of Homeland Security Battle Insider Threats and Maintain National Cyber Security
Case Study 4: Cyber Security Development Life Cycle
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Case Study 5
REVIEW. Answers to Review Questions/Exercises, Hands-On Projects, Case Projects, and Optional Team Case Projects by Chapter
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Deception
Chapter 3: Separation
Chapter 4: Diversity
Chapter 5: Commonality
Chapter 6: Depth
Chapter 7: Discretion
Chapter 8: Collection
Chapter 9: Correlation
Chapter 10: Awareness
Chapter 11: Response
Index
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1
Introduction
Chapter Outline
National Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks Botnet Threat National Cyber Security Methodology Components Deception Separation Diversity Consistency Depth Discretion Collection Correlation Awareness Response Implementing the Principles Nationally Protecting the Critical National Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks Summary Chapter Review Questions/Exercises
Somewhere in his writings—and I regret having forgotten where—John Von Neumann draws attention to what seemed to him a contrast. He remarked that for simple mechanisms it is often easier to describe how they work than what they do, while for more complicated mechanisms it was usually the other way round.
Edsger W. Dijkstra1
National infrastructure refers to the complex, underlying delivery and support systems for all large-scale services considered absolutely essential to a nation. These services include emergency response, law enforcement databases, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, power control
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networks, military support services, consumer entertainment systems, financial applications, and mobile telecommunications. Some national services are provided directly by government, but most are provided by commercial groups such as Internet service providers, airlines, and banks. In addition, certain services considered essential to one nation might include infrastructure support that is controlled by organizations from another nation. This global interdependency is consistent with the trends referred to collectively by Thomas Friedman as a “flat world.”2
National infrastructure, especially in the United States, has always been vulnerable to malicious physical attacks such as equipment tampering, cable cuts, facility bombing, and asset theft. The events of September 11, 2001, for example, are the most prominent and recent instance of a massive physical attack directed at national infrastructure. During the past couple of decades, however, vast portions of national infrastructure have become reliant on software, computers, and networks. This reliance typically includes remote access, often over the Internet, to the systems that control national services. Adversaries thus can initiate cyber attacks on infrastructure using worms, viruses, leaks, and the like. These attacks indirectly target national infrastructure through their associated automated controls systems (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 National infrastructure cyber and physical attacks.
A seemingly obvious approach to dealing with this national cyber threat would involve the use of well-known computer security techniques. After all, computer security has matured substantially in the past couple of decades, and considerable expertise now exists on how to protect software, computers, and networks. In such a national scheme, safeguards such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, antivirus software, passwords, scanners, audit
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trails, and encryption would be directly embedded into infrastructure, just as they are currently in small-scale environments. These national security systems would be connected to a centralized threat management system, and incident response would follow a familiar sort of enterprise process. Furthermore, to ensure security policy compliance, one would expect the usual programs of end-user awareness, security training, and third-party audit to be directed toward the people building and operating national infrastructure. Virtually every national infrastructure protection initiative proposed to date has followed this seemingly straightforward path.3
While well-known computer security techniques will certainly be useful for national infrastructure, most practical experience to date suggests that this conventional approach will not be sufficient. A primary reason is the size, scale, and scope inherent in complex national infrastructure. For example, where an enterprise might involve manageably sized assets, national infrastructure will require unusually powerful computing support with the ability to handle enormous volumes of data. Such volumes will easily exceed the storage and processing capacity of typical enterprise security tools such as a commercial threat management system. Unfortunately, this incompatibility conflicts with current initiatives in government and industry to reduce costs through the use of common commercial off-the-shelf products.
National infrastructure databases far exceed the size of even the largest commercial databases.
In addition, whereas enterprise systems can rely on manual intervention by a local expert during a security disaster, large-scale national infrastructure generally requires a carefully orchestrated response by teams of security experts using predetermined processes. These teams of experts will often work in different groups, organizations, or even countries. In the worst cases, they will cooperate only if forced by government, often sharing just the minimum amount of information to avoid legal consequences. An additional problem is that the complexity associated with national infrastructure leads to the bizarre situation where response teams often have partial or incorrect understanding about how the underlying systems work. For these reasons, seemingly convenient attempts to apply existing small-scale security processes to large- scale infrastructure attacks will ultimately fail (see Figure 1.2).
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Figure 1.2 Differences between small- and large-scale cyber security.
As a result, a brand-new type of national infrastructure protection methodology is required—one that combines the best elements of existing computer and network security techniques with the unique and difficult challenges associated with complex, large-scale national services. This book offers just such a protection methodology for national infrastructure. It is based on a quarter century of practical experience designing, building, and operating cyber security systems for government, commercial, and consumer infrastructure. It is represented as a series of protection principles that can be applied to new or existing systems. Because of the unique needs of national infrastructure, especially its massive size, scale, and scope, some aspects of the methodology will be unfamiliar to the computer security community. In fact, certain elements of the approach, such as our favorable view of “security through obscurity,” might appear in direct conflict with conventional views of how computers and networks should be protected.
National Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
Conventional computer security is based on the oft-repeated taxonomy of security threats which includes confidentiality, integrity, availability, and theft. In the broadest sense, all four diverse threat types will have applicability in national infrastructure. For example, protections are required equally to deal with sensitive information leaks (confidentiality), worms
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affecting the operation of some critical application (integrity), botnets knocking out an important system (availability), or citizens having their identities compromised (theft). Certainly, the availability threat to national services must be viewed as particularly important, given the nature of the threat and its relation to national assets. One should thus expect particular attention to availability threats to national infrastructure. Nevertheless, it makes sense to acknowledge that all four types of security threats in the conventional taxonomy of computer security must be addressed in any national infrastructure protection methodology.
Any of the most common security concern—confidentiality, integrity, availability, and theft—
threaten our national infrastructure.
Vulnerabilities are more difficult to associate with any taxonomy. Obviously, national infrastructure must address well-known problems such as improperly configured equipment, poorly designed local area networks, unpatched system software, exploitable bugs in application code, and locally disgruntled employees. The problem is that the most fundamental vulnerability in national infrastructure involves the staggering complexity inherent in the underlying systems. This complexity is so pervasive that many times security incidents uncover aspects of computing functionality that were previously unknown to anyone, including sometimes the system designers. Furthermore, in certain cases, the optimal security solution involves simplifying and cleaning up poorly conceived infrastructure. This is bad news, because most large organizations are inept at simplifying much of anything.
The best one can do for a comprehensive view of the vulnerabilities associated with national infrastructure is to address their relative exploitation points. This can be done with an abstract national infrastructure cyber security model that includes three types of malicious adversaries: external adversary (hackers on the Internet), internal adversary (trusted insiders), and supplier adversary (vendors and partners). Using this model, three exploitation points emerge for national infrastructure: remote access (Internet and telework), system administration and normal usage (management and use of software, computers, and networks), and supply chain (procurement and outsourcing) (see Figure 1.3).
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