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Contemporary Politics

ISSN: 1356-9775 (Print) 1469-3631 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccpo20

Understanding the foreign policy of autocratic actors: ideology or pragmatism? Russia and the Tymoshenko trial as a case study

Anastassia Obydenkova & Alexander Libman

To cite this article: Anastassia Obydenkova & Alexander Libman (2014) Understanding the foreign policy of autocratic actors: ideology or pragmatism? Russia and the Tymoshenko trial as a case study, Contemporary Politics, 20:3, 347-364, DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2014.911500

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.911500

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Understanding the foreign policy of autocratic actors: ideology or pragmatism? Russia and the Tymoshenko trial as a case study

Anastassia Obydenkova a,b,c∗

and Alexander Libman d∗∗

a Political and Social Science, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona 08005, Spain;

b Centre for

International Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK; c Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica CSIC, Barcelona, Spain;

d Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

gemeinnützige GmbH, Juniorprofessor für Internationale Politische Ökonomie/Fakultät, Sonnemannstrasse 911, Frankfurt am Main 60314, Deutschland, Germany

While the literature on the autocratic regimes has been rapidly growing in the last years, there still exists a research gap in this field: which impact do autocratic regimes have on the regime transition in the neighbouring countries? The literature on autocracies has demonstrated that autocratic political leaders tend to support each other. This article argues that the external influence of an autocracy may be more complex. The article analyses the case of Russia’s international standing in relation to the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko. Using detailed process tracing, it has been shown that in terms of the Russian position, pragmatic goals may undermine ideological goals. Thus, while the main objective of Russia is to ensure the stability of gas contracts, the unintended consequences of its actions undermine the consolidation of autocratic regime in Ukraine. The article builds on the literature on regime transition, autocracy, and international relations.

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; autocracy promotion; foreign policy

1. Introduction

The literature on autocracies has been growing in recent years (Croissant and Wurster 2013); 1

however, while a number of studies have made important contributions to the understanding

of the nature and internal dynamics of autocracies, autocracies’ foreign policy and external

implications remain relatively under-studied. 2

A particularly salient issue deserving attention

is the ability of autocracies to affect regime transition abroad. The literature on autocracies

has demonstrated that autocratic political leaders in different countries tend to support each

other, either to provide assistance to ideologically close regimes or to counteract the spread

of democratic values and practices. This autocracy promotion agenda potentially represents

an important competitor to democracy promotion by Western countries.

However, while regimes’ ideological affinities may influence autocracies’ foreign policies,

the motivation behind their foreign policies may be more diverse. This paper aims to demon-

strate that the foreign policy decisions of autocrats may face a trade-off between autocracy pro-

motion and what we will refer to as pragmatic goals; specifically, the various interests of the

# 2014 Taylor & Francis

∗Dr. Anastassia Obydenkova is a senior researcher and an accredited associate professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, as well as being a research fellow at LSE and IAE (CSIC). She holds a PhD from the Euro- pean University Institute (Florence). Email: anastassia.obydenkova@upf.edu ∗∗Dr. Alexander Libman is an assistant professor at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. He specializes in studies of political economy of non-democracies. Email: a.libman@fs.de

Contemporary Politics, 2014

Vol. 20, No. 3, 347 – 364, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.911500

elite, such as those associated with rent-seeking. The existence of the multiplicity of goals of

foreign policy is hardly surprising; we show, however, that the pragmatic goals may dominate

the interests of autocracy promotion to the extent that autocrats effectively side with anti-author-

itarian forces abroad. In this case, while autocrats definitely do not intend to promote democracy,

their influence may unintentionally limit or even undermine authoritarian tendencies in the

country they affect. We demonstrate this outcome through an analysis of Russia’s standing in

relation to the 2011 trial of the leader of the democratic political forces in Ukraine, Yulia

Tymoshenko. The trial of Tymoshenko is one of the most important events in the modern pol-

itical development of Ukraine and in the ‘authoritarian backlash’ initiated by the government of

Viktor Yanukovych; the Russian position during this trial, however, received little attention in

academic literature. This paper aims to fill this gap.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides the theoretical framework of our

analysis. Section 3 explains the selection of the case and describes the methodology. Section 4

examines the relationship between autocratic Russia (under Putin’s government) and Ukraine in

its attempts at democratization. Section 5 presents the circumstances of the Tymoshenko trial,

describes the position of external actors, looking at both the democratic actors (e.g. the European

Union (EU)) and the autocratic actor (Russia), and investigates Russia’s motivation to side with

anti-authoritarian forces. The final section concludes.

2. Theoretical context

The impact of ideology on the foreign policy conduct of authoritarian regimes has been the

subject of two groups of studies. The first set of literature looks at the cooperation and conflict

between autocracies and developed in parallel to the studies on democratic peace. The literature

on democratic peace explains the lack of conflict in democratic dyads using two arguments: an

institutional and a normative one. The former is based on decision-making mechanisms and

democracies’ warfare capacity, while the latter is based on the commonality of norms and impor-

tance of particular values for democratic regimes (Hayes 2011). It seems compelling to hypoth-

esize the possibility of an ‘autocratic peace:’ a lower likelihood of conflict between certain types

of autocracies. This peace could again be driven by the institutional specifics of regimes, but

some studies conjecture that peace and cooperation between autocracies could also be explained

by the commonalities in their ideologies (Peceny et al. 2002). Several papers, examining the

experience of Socialist countries (Oren and Hays 1997) and oligarchic republics (Weart

1994), argue that common values limit the likelihood of conflicts among autocracies. 3

There are limits to the ability of ideology to ensure the cooperation of autocracies. First, the

extent to which a particular autocratic regime is committed to a certain ideology at all varies

significantly; some regimes may have only a weak ideological foundation (Lai and Slater

2006) and thus will not tie their foreign policy to an ideology. Second, the ideologies of author-

itarian regimes are diverse (more diverse than normative foundations of the Western-style

democracies), which makes cooperation between a random pair of autocracies questionable.

Only regimes with sufficiently similar ideologies should be more likely to cooperate;

however, third, the ideological radicalization of a regime could also become a source of conflict

caused by small variations within the same ideology existing in different countries. 4

The literature suggests that ideology can foster cooperation between autocratic regimes in

two cases. First, cooperation occurs if combating a particular external (or internal) enemy is

the core of the ideology, and autocracies can assist each other in this respect. Peceny et al.

(2002, p. 19) suggest that this logic could explain the cooperation of Latin American military

dictatorships, which ‘took power to fight real or imaginary communist insurgents’. However,

many regimes have been flexible even in managing these core elements of their ideology. 5

348 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman

Second, Owen (2005) argues that ideologically driven alliances are more likely when there is

a threat of a rivalry ideology. If this competing ideology succeeds in one country, the dem-

onstration effect could threaten the regime in another country as well. In a related study,

Owen (2002) shows that imposition of domestic institutions by force in foreign countries

is particularly likely in times of ideological confrontation. This argument is closely linked

to the context of the second literature looking at the foreign policy behaviour of autocracies:

that on autocracy promotion.

Studies on autocracy promotion focus on the ability and likelihood of certain autocratic

countries to exert an influence on the regime transition of their neighbours, supporting

nascent autocracies and combatting the spread of democracy. There is a growing body of litera-

ture on this topic (Allison 2008, Ambrosio 2008, 2010, Burnell and Schlumberger 2010, Melny-

kovska et al. 2012, Obydenkova and Libman 2012, Vanderhill 2013), which pays particular

attention to countries such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, the so-called ‘black knights’

(Levitsky and Way 2010). While the empirical evidence of autocracy promotion is substantial,

the question of what explains this type of behaviour remains. One interpretation is that ideologi-

cally driven autocrats simply prefer to support particular types of regimes or to prevent the

spread of democracy (Corrales 2009); it may hold even for regimes with weak ideological foun-

dations (Kuchins 2006, Kagan 2008). There are also several more specific mechanisms that can

be discussed in this respect.

First, adherence to a particular ideology is important for regime legitimacy, which is

(together with repression and cooptation) one of the main elements of authoritarian rule

(Gerschewski 2013, p. 13). 6

Therefore, compliance to ideological goals in foreign policy may

be driven by domestic audience costs (Weeks 2008): facing a foreign policy choice where a

certain pattern of behaviour is implied by their ideology, autocracies must take an ‘ideological’

stand or face the disapproval of their population and elites, which could challenge regime stab-

ility. As mentioned, autocracies have been skilful at avoiding this problem by manipulating the

interpretation of their ideologies, but there may be limits to this manipulation.

Second, successful democratization abroad can become a threat to an autocratic regime, first,

by the power of example, and second, because the domestic opposition can seek alliances with

new foreign democratic regimes (especially important if there are strong ties between countries).

From this point of view, autocracies may again behave ideologically but not act in favour of a

particular ideology, rather acting against the spread of democratic norms and values.

Third, legitimacy can also be derived from the external support of the regime, including its

recognition by other states through, for example, membership in international organizations.

Because there are limits to the membership of non-democracies in many key international organ-

izations, where adherence to democratic norms is required, an alternative is for these autocracies

to establish ties with fellow autocrats (Libman and Obydenkova 2013). Democratization abroad

threatens the regime, as it loses the ability to legitimize its rule through external support, and,

again, the autocratic regime may act against democratization.

The existence of the motives described above, while important, does not preclude the impact

of other factors on the foreign policy behaviour of autocracies, particularly, their likelihood to

engage in autocracy promotion. For example, the standard neo-realist motivation of foreign

policy driven by the quest for power and national security is certainly valid for autocracies as

well. Furthermore, autocracies may base their decisions on the interests of their elites, associated

with the acquisition of foreign assets and revenues from trade (Wallander 2007). As mentioned,

we refer to these interests as ‘pragmatic’ goals. While in some cases these interests can be better

served by the autocratic rule in the partner country and become reason for autocracy promotion, 7

in others, pragmatic goals and the goals of supporting fellow autocrats contradict each other.

Contemporary Politics 349

This paper aims to investigate how this trade-off is resolved, looking at a case where both auto-

cracy promotion and pragmatic goals are particularly salient.

3. Choice of the case study and methodology

The need for methodological pluralism in the studies of autocracies is acknowledged in the lit-

erature on this subject (Kollner and Kailitz 2013), as well as in general political science research

(Mahoney 2000). Apart from augmenting the large-N studies, research on autocracies also

requires detailed qualitative case studies to untangle the causal mechanisms at work. This is pre-

cisely the avenue pursued by this paper. Specifically, we focus on the relations between Russia

and Ukraine.

Russia provides an example of autocracy promotion that is studied particularly frequently

(Ambrosio 2009, Tolstrup 2009, Jackson 2010, Kaestner 2010, Cameron and Orenstein 2012).

While the Russian regime does not have a clear-cut ideological foundation similar to that of

the USSR, the Russian regime does consider the spill-over of democratization from abroad a

potential threat (Horvath 2011) and does seek external alliances as a source of legitimization. 8

Examples of Russian assistance to fellow autocrats include the long-term support provided by

Russia to Alexander Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus (Silitski 2005) and the relationship

between Russia and Uzbekistan after the Andizhan massacre (Fumagali 2007). Putin’s Russia

attempts to systematically mimic Western countries in affecting regime transition abroad. In

2008, the Russian government established an Institute for Democracy and Cooperation to

monitor human rights violations in Europe and in the USA, and since 2011, Russia has published

reports on the global human rights situation, again focusing on the USA and Europe. The

Russian-sponsored Mission of Election Observers of the Commonwealth of Independent

States systematically endorses suspicious elections in post-Soviet autocratic countries (Kelley

2012).

Over the last decade, Ukraine was the object of particular attention from Russian foreign

policy. On the one hand, there is Ukraine’s geographic proximity to Russia combined with its

economic interdependence on Russia: a shared border and strong ties between peoples (for

example, 50% of Ukrainian families are claimed to maintain contact with their relatives

living in the Russian Federation; see Kopat’ko 2011). Given this context, political transition

in Ukraine is the transition that is most likely to spill-over to Russia and to serve as an

example for the Russian opposition. In fact, the ‘Orange Revolution’ has been a common nick-

name in Russian political discussion for possible threats to the Putin regime since the winter of

2004. As mentioned, precisely this type of possible spill-over is a likely cause for autocracy

promotion.

On the other hand, Russian elites have a vested economic interest in Ukraine. 9

First, Ukraine

has been one of the major arenas for the expansion of Russian multinationals, which have

acquired key positions in a number of the country’s industries (Kosikova 2004). Second,

Ukraine is the major transit country for the Russian gas sold to the EU states. Resource

export is the primary source of revenue for Russian elites (Aligica and Tarko 2012), from the

allocation of budgetary resource revenues to direct rent-seeking through particular mechanisms

of export deals. 10

To conclude, from the point of view of the concerns of both autocracy pro-

motion and pragmatic foreign policy, as defined in the introduction, Ukraine is important for

Russia, and as such, the Russian – Ukrainian nexus is a suitable case for our analysis.

Given that the goal of this paper is to trace the dynamic change in the international

standing of an autocratic actor, we employ a detailed process to trace the most suitable methodo-

logical option to address this task. A number of methodological studies noted the importance of

process-tracing as capable of identifying and clarifying causal mechanisms at work (Bennett and

350 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman

Elman 2006). Vennesson highlights the main contribution from the positivist perspective, the

establishment and evaluation of causal links, while from the interpretivists’ perspective, it is

the importance of the links per se and their context (2008, pp. 232 – 233). Thus, process-

tracing becomes almost indispensable given the specificity of the chosen case study. On the

other hand, the detailed analysis of this process also makes an additional contribution through

placing the international development of the ‘black knight’ within a more general context.

Given both the contextual importance and actual links within Russia’s international standing,

process-tracing seems to be indispensable and the best methodological candidate to fulfil the

analysis. More importantly, the process-tracing is one of the best, if not only, methods that

allows for the capture of the actors’ perceptions (Vennesson 2008, p. 235), which is precisely

the goal of this paper. It is the perception and intention that lie behind official statements that

we need to uncover through a step-by-step analysis of the events feasible within the process-

tracing approach.

This paper is based on the analysis of several types of sources. The first type constitutes

the official statements made by high-ranking elites (particularly Russian elites), ranging from

individual interviews to articles published in newspapers and journals. We also used official

press releases from the Russian government’s website, government.ru. We have traced these

statements from both Russian-language and English-language sources, mostly newspapers

and websites. The second source contains summaries of events published by journalists in

newspapers and on websites. The Russian-language newspapers were extracted from the East-

View database, which is sufficiently accurate in its coverage of most of the central Russian

and Ukrainian publications. Of the websites, in addition to sources containing simple accounts

of events and quotes from politicians (e.g. Lenta.ru, Novosti.ua, Newsru.ua, RIA Novosti, etc.),

we singled out Polit.ru, a Russian website (of which there is also a Ukrainian version) containing

detailed discussions of political events that were very useful for our analysis. The systematiza-

tion of the dispersed information on the key events from all these very different national and

international sources of information allows the detailed process-tracing analysis presented

below.

4. From the Orange Revolution to the return of Yanukovych

In the first half of the 2000s, Ukraine provided one of the most clear-cut cases of Russian inter-

vention in the role of an anti-democratic external actor (D’Anieri 2005a, 2005b, Kuzio 2005,

Way 2005, 2008). This was partly due to the nature of Ukrainian politics during this period,

when individual actors’ stances towards democracy were strongly correlated with their

foreign policy orientations. Thus, anti-democratic national actors (such as Yanukovych, and

since 2003, Leonid Kuchma) were openly pro-Russian and anti-Western in their foreign

policy orientations. 11

By contrast, democratic political national actors (such as Tymoshenko 12

and Viktor Yushchenko) were anti-Russian and pro-Western. The reasons for this particular

shape of the domestic political landscape in Ukraine are beyond the scope of this paper;

however, it is important to stress that this strict division into anti-democratic pro-Russian

actors and democratic pro-Western actors appears to have faded over time. Again, it is not

our purpose to study the dynamics of Ukrainian politics, but this distinction should be noted

to ensure the clarity of the argument. 13

During the falsified 2004 elections, which culminated in the Orange Revolution, Russia sup-

ported Yanukovych, a pro-Russian and anti-democratic candidate backed by the incumbent pre-

sident, Leonid Kuchma, who also adopted a pro-Russian stance in the last years of his

presidency. Russia provided substantial assistance to Yanukovych’s camp during the electoral

campaign in the fall of 2004 (Fraser 2008). In September 2003, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,

Contemporary Politics 351

and Belarus had signed a treaty on the Common Economic Space, which was proclaimed as a

major breakthrough in cooperation among countries and helped Kuchma to acquire electoral

support. 14

Vladimir Putin, then president of Russia, visited Ukraine twice before the elections

and the run-off elections in October and November 2004 to express his support for Yanukovych.

Putin was the first to congratulate Yanukovych for becoming the president-elect of Ukraine after

the elections on 21 November 2004 (interestingly, he did so even before the results of the run-off

elections were announced). Russian TV (which is very influential in Ukraine) also backed Yanu-

kovych quite strongly (McFaul 2007).

Yanukovych won against the democratic and pro-Western candidate Yushchenko during the

run-off elections, but after the mass protests of the Orange Revolution, these elections were can-

celled, and the new run-off elections in December 2004 resulted in Yushchenko’s success. To

indicate the success of the revolution, Tymoshenko stated on the day after the second run-off

election (26 December 2004) that she was happy that Putin did not congratulate Yanukovych

again. 15

Yanukovych’s loss (the election results were announced in December 2004, and Yush-

chenko was inaugurated as president in January 2005) was perceived as a heavy defeat for Putin

himself and resulted in a substantial effort to insulate Russia from possible colour revolutions

over the next few years (Krastev 2005), regardless of whether this perspective was realistic

(Duncan 2013).

During Yushchenko’s 2005 – 2010 presidency, Ukraine appeared to provide many reasons

for the Russian elites to be concerned. In April 2005, Yushchenko had already re-introduced

the goal of NATO membership to Ukraine’s military doctrine (this goal had been removed

from the doctrine in July 2004 by Kuchma). 16

In early 2008, the NATO secretariat announced

that it had received a letter from Ukraine expressing its intention to join the pre-accession pro-

gramme. The Ukrainian president announced that he intended this to happen by the end of 2008

(the plan eventually failed due to protest from the parliament). 17

In August 2008, Yushchenko

strongly opposed Russian military intervention in Georgia, not only criticizing Russia but also

announcing his willingness to increase the military budget and to foster cooperation with NATO

to prevent similar threats against Ukraine. 18

In August 2005, Ukraine made it clear that it did

not wish to participate in the Common Economic Space. During his visit to the USA in April

2005, Yushchenko openly questioned the need for another Russian-led organization, the

Commonwealth of Independent States. In April – May 2005, and subsequently in December

2005, the Ukrainian leadership stated the need to revise the status of the Russian Black Sea

fleet stationed in Sevastopol on Ukrainian soil (under the existing treaty, the Russian fleet had

the right to be stationed in Ukraine until 2017). In December 2005, Ukraine, together with

Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, rekindled the GUAM organization, an alliance of post-

Soviet states critical to Russia that was renamed the ‘Organization for Democracy and Economic

Development’.

Further issues of debate with Russia during Yushchenko’s government included matters of

the interpretation of history (e.g. the perception of Golodomor, the massive famine in Ukraine in

the 1930s, interpreted as the genocide of Ukrainians by many members of Yushchenko’s gov-

ernment, which was unacceptable to Russian political elites) and the Russian language in

Ukraine (again, Yushchenko strongly opposed the idea of providing Russian with official

status, a position favoured and promoted by Russia). Thus, it is safe to say that for Russia, Yush-

chenko was a highly problematic cooperation partner. Relations with other key players of Ukrai-

nian politics during this period were more ambiguous. On the one hand, Russia maintained close

ties to Yanukovych, who, in many instances, appeared to be a person with whom the Russian

leadership was willing and able to negotiate. This accord was particularly evident in 2006 –

2007, when Yanukovych briefly served as prime minister. For example, in March 2007, he

stated that Ukraine’s approaching entry into NATO was not under consideration. 19

352 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman

Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and Putin’s United Russia signed a cooperation agreement in

2005 and a cooperation memorandum in 2007, aiming to coordinate their political positions

and to promote cooperation between the countries. 20

On the other hand, Russia began to search for common ground with Tymoshenko as well.

During her first term as prime minister (when she attempted to reconsider the privatization

deals allowing Russian companies to purchase a number of key Ukrainian assets) and her

subsequent time in the opposition, Tymoshenko was a very difficult negotiation partner for

Russia. Tymoshenko’s (2007) article in Foreign Affairs noted the need for the coordinated

action by the West to restrict Russia’s expansion and limit the dependence on energy

from Russia. Nevertheless, in 2005, Russia dropped the criminal charges against Tymoshenko

from the Military Prosecutor’s Office, initiated as part of the Russian effort to undermine the

Orange coalition in 2004. In 2008 – 2009, Putin was ready to negotiate with Tymoshenko on a

broad range of topics, and Tymoshenko’s position on many key issues for Russia (such as the

Georgian war) differed from that of Yushchenko, largely accommodating Russian attitudes.

Thus, it would be incorrect to characterize the Russian position in the late 2000s as

clearly anti-Tymoshenko and pro-Yanukovych; rather, it was an attempt to balance different

partners in the Ukrainian political elite (some even suggest that Russia was largely interested

in supporting Tymoshenko). 21

In 2010, Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych competed in the presidential elec-

tions, and this time, Yanukovych won. 22

A discussion of the reasons for this development,

which was most likely linked to Ukraine’s unsatisfactory economic performance during the

global economic crisis, conflicts within the Orange coalition (especially between Yushchenko

and Tymoshenko), and the failure of key reforms that sought to improve the quality of

administration, is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, Yanukovych’s victory

immediately provided a number of opportunities for the Russian government (Sherr 2010).

For example, Russia and Ukraine managed to negotiate the extension of Russia’s lease of

the naval base in Sevastopol beyond the originally agreed-upon term of 2017 (in April

2010, the commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Igor Tenyukh, who was deeply concerned

about the Russian military presence in Ukraine, resigned because of this decision 23

).

Ukraine provided Russian businesses access to a number of attractive assets (e.g. Prominvest-

bank) and passed new legislation preventing Ukraine from joining any military alliances,

effectively precluding any further negotiations regarding NATO membership. Over time,

however, Yanukovych’s position seems to have shifted away from that of Russia, turning

him into a difficult negotiation partner.

At the same time, Yanukovych introduced a number of changes to Ukraine’s domestic poli-

tics, which appear to be in line with the model of semi-authoritarian presidencies existing in

other countries of the former Soviet Union (Kuzio 2010, Haran 2011a). There is substantial evi-

dence of re-instated censorship in the Ukrainian media. 24

Yanukovych removed all representa-

tives of the opposition from the National Television and Broadcasting Council, an agency

responsible for the regulation of the media market in Ukraine. A decision of the constitutional

court in 2010 restored the presidential authorities removed from Yanukovych by the reform of

2004. The president established control over the parliament by creating a coalition, which,

according to some claims, was established through an anti-constitutional procedure. 25

A

reform of local elections in favour of Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions was conducted in

2010 (Haran 2011b). Thus, Ukraine appears to be a prime example of the fusion of domestic

and external factors influencing the trajectory of regime transition (Jacoby 2006) but supporting

non-democratic outcomes. However, the existence of this fusion may be debated if one examines

the most prominent milestone in the development of Yanukovych’s regime: the Tymoshenko

trial.

Contemporary Politics 353

5. The Tymoshenko trial

5.1. Description of the case

From the very beginning, Tymoshenko has been considered a figure of symbolic importance for

the success of the Orange Revolution. In 2010, she ran for president alongside Yushchenko and

Yanukovych, eventually losing to the latter by a small margin (25.05% versus. 35.32% in the

first round and 45.47% versus 48.95% in the run-off elections). Unlike Yushchenko, who

received very little support during the elections (approximately 5% during the first round),

Tymoshenko gained substantial support, becoming the Yanukovych government’s major chal-

lenger. She immediately adopted a very critical stance toward Yanukovych and was one of

the main politicians to note the return of censorship and the possible autocratic tendencies of

the new presidency. 26

Already in 2010, the Yanukovych government had initiated a series of criminal investi-

gations against Tymoshenko to eliminate its strong political rival. 27

The accusations had

various foundations. In 2010, Tymoshenko was accused of manipulating budget money

during her time as prime minister (specifically in relation to the acquisition of cars for the health-

care system and the use of proceeds from the Kyoto protocol quotas). 28

In May 2011, the Office

of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine issued an arrest warrant against Tymoshenko, which was

not implemented because of strong pressure from European countries, the EU and the USA. In

June 2011, however, a new criminal investigation was initiated concerning the gas agreements

signed by Russia and Ukraine in 2009. In August 2011, Tymoshenko was arrested, and in

October 2011, she was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, effectively removing her

from possible candidacy for the next presidential election. Whether Yanukovych’s strategy to

strengthen his regime was successful is debatable; the intention, however, was straightforward

Thus far, the story corresponds with what one would expect from the post-Soviet countries.

The consolidation of autocratic regimes in this part of the world during the 2000s was often

based on the use of courts against political opponents, especially those who had business back-

grounds (Junisbai 2012). Before entering politics, Tymoshenko was the CEO of the United

Energy Systems of Ukraine (UES), one of the largest energy companies in Ukraine, had a pos-

ition as an intermediary in the gas trade between Russia and Ukraine and, in fact, had been

arrested for possible violations with respect to the activities of this company in 2001 (although

she was never sentenced and was released 42 days after the arrest). This investigation was also

revived in 2011.

The reaction of the West was also predictable, as was, to some extent, the Ukrainian govern-

ment’s decision to ignore this reaction (in similar situations, Putin of Russia and Nursultan

Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan both ignored criticism from abroad). However, as we will demonstrate

below, the reaction of the ‘black knight’, Russia, to the Tymoshenko trial was unpredictable if

one looks only at ideological affinity. Although Russia contributed to Yanukovych’s success, it

appeared to adopt a clear pro-Tymoshenko stance that used rhetoric very similar to that of the

European countries.

5.2. The position of democratic external actors

Let us first briefly sketch the predictable part of the story, the reaction of the West. On 30

December 2010, the USA announced its concern over the accusations against Tymoshenko

and her political colleagues and made a statement against a ‘political or politically motivated

trial’. A few months later, on 24 June 2011, the USA announced that the Tymoshenko trial

was politically motivated and a strategy used by the incumbent president to eliminate the

strong democratic political opposition led by Tymoshenko. On 13 January 2011, the Czech

354 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman

Republic offered political exile to the former economic minister in Tymoshenko’s cabinet,

Bogdan Danilishin. 29

After Tymoshenko was arrested on 5 August 2011, external democratic actors retained their

extremely critical stance toward the Ukrainian leadership. Freedom House demanded the release

of Tymoshenko 30

and stated that Tymoshenko’s trial signalled the end of open democratic poli-

tics in Ukraine. Transparency International stated that Ukraine had yet to reveal the criminal

aspect of Tymoshenko’s actions. 31

Similar statements were made by Amnesty International

and the Human Rights Watch. The EU stated that Tymoshenko’s trial was unjust and politically

motivated. 32

The European Parliament (on 1 December 2011) and the European People’s Party

(on 7 December 2011) accepted a resolution stating that the conditions for the association and

free trade area between Ukraine and the EU should be the release of Tymoshenko and other pol-

itical prisoners and granting Tymoshenko the right to participate in future elections. 33

The USA

called for the release of Tymoshenko and other imprisoned representatives of the opposition. A

number of other democratic governments made similar statements (among them, Sweden,

Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, Great Britain, Hungary, France, Italy, and Canada).

The meeting initially planned for 20 October 2011 between the EU’s representatives and

President Yanukovych was cancelled. 34

In April 2012, the leadership of several European

countries (such as Germany) announced that it would boycott the European Soccer Champion-

ship scheduled in Ukraine in June, and there was even discussion of moving the championship

itself to another country. In fall 2013, EU negotiators considered the release of Tymoshenko

(either through amnesty or through a change of legislation allowing her to receive medical treat-

ment abroad) as a condition for signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine.

5.3. Russia’s position

The Russian attitude towards the Tymoshenko trial seems to fit the trade-off between ideological

affinity and pragmatism described in Section 2. On the one hand, removing Tymoshenko as a

political actor strengthens Yanukovych and increases the chances of autocratic consolidation

in Ukraine. It would substantially reduce the threats that democratization in Ukraine poses for

the Russian regime through the power of example. In addition, Yanukovych, while showing

authoritarian tendencies, is substantially weaker than other post-Soviet presidents, and thus,

the success of the autocratic consolidation project is not a given, which makes Russian autocracy

promotion particularly important. Furthermore, it would contribute to the legitimization of the

specific tools used by the Russian leadership itself to combat political opponents: the use of

the courts and economically motivated accusations. On the other hand, to sentence Tymoshenko,

Yanukovych used a particular set of arguments associated with the export of Russia gas that

could threaten the pragmatic goals of Russian elites.

Negotiations regarding the price of gas transit over Ukrainian territory and the supply of gas

to Ukraine have been a constant topic of discussion over the last two decades. On the one hand,

Russia has accused Ukraine of misusing – in fact, stealing – the gas transferred through its ter-

ritory. On the other hand, Ukraine has attempted to re-negotiate more attractive conditions for

the gas supply. The conflicts occurred regularly under Kuchma; under Yushchenko, as one

would expect, they became more frequent and intense. From December 2005 to January

2006, Russia cut the supply of gas through the Ukrainian pipeline system, resulting in a decrease

in the supply to European countries. A settlement during this period involved the establishment

of an intermediary company, RosUkrEnergo, which had an opaque ownership structure. The

media have mentioned multiple members of Ukrainian and Russian elites as possible benefici-

aries of RosUkrEnergo (in Ukraine, interestingly, members of both the Orange coalition and the

pro-Yanukovych group were sometimes mentioned among the beneficiaries). From the

Contemporary Politics 355

beginning, Tymoshenko and her bloc were extremely critical of RosUkrEnergo, requesting the

abolishment of the opaque structure.

From December 2008 to January 2009, the situation repeated, again leading to a decrease in

the supply to Europe (especially the Balkan countries). Tymoshenko, then prime minister,

managed to negotiate a contract with Russia that removed the intermediary company RosUkrE-

nergo and determined the formula for the gas price to be used by Russia and Ukraine, which was

linked to the oil price in global markets. As a result, the price for January – March 2009 sky-

rocketed given the very high oil prices on the global market, reaching 360 USD per thousand

cubic metres. The contract was negotiated between Tymoshenko and Putin, who were the two

prime ministers during this period. As a result, the two states resolved the energy crisis. For

the first time in post-Soviet history, the contract between Russia and Ukraine was signed

based on a transparent formula calculated according to world oil market prices.

These gas contracts were crucial for Russia for several reasons. First, Russia had to ensure its

reputation as a reliable gas supplier to Europe. The gas conflicts with Ukraine in the second half

of the 2000s resulted in supply interruptions in 2006 and 2009, which were damaging to Russia’s

reputation. Second, the contracts ensured a stable revenue stream for Gazprom and for the

Russian budget, and the distribution of budgetary revenues is an important source of rent-

seeking for Russian elites. Third, Ukraine’s dependence on the Russian gas supply provided

the Russian government with important leverage over Ukraine, which, for example, could

have been used to pressure the Ukrainian government to provide Russian investors with

access to key companies in Ukraine. The literature suggests that the gas contract was signed

on terms that were highly beneficial for Russia (Pirani 2010).

In 2011, this contract became the subject of scrutiny by the Office of the Prosecutor General

of Ukraine (since 2010, occupied by Viktor Pshonka, an appointee of Yanukovych; they had

worked together since 1997, when Pshonka served as the prosecutor of Donetsk region and

Yanukovych served as its head of regional administration). Specifically, Tymoshenko was

accused of instructing the Ukrainian state-owned gas company Naftogaz to accept the prices

offered during negotiations, resulting in a substantial budgetary loss for Ukraine, as well as

making the decision alone as prime minister (the formal procedure required the participation

of the entire cabinet). Therefore, the accusations against Tymoshenko had another important

consequence: they introduced the possibility of renegotiating Russian gas supply contracts.

The risks from contract renegotiation were only potential, however; post-Soviet regimes often

use different rhetoric in domestic and international affairs, and the attack against gas agreements

in the former does not mean that they will be challenges in the latter.

Summing up, the conflict of goals faced by Russian foreign policy was between the benefits

of autocratic consolidation in Ukraine and potential costs associated with a particular tool used

to achieve this consolidation. This trade-off created opportunities for a multitude of responses.

Russia could side with Yanukovych, prioritizing the affinity with fellow autocrat. It could take a

neutral stand, which would not discourage Yanukovych’s autocratization effort, but at the same

time give Russia an opportunity to react more forcefully in case of an actual threat of contract

renegotiation (i.e. when internal rhetoric begins to affect external rhetoric). Finally, it could

prioritize pragmatism and criticize Yanukovych, siding with an anti-authoritarian actor. One

can show that the last option was actually chosen.

On the day of Tymoshenko’s arrest (5 August 2011), the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

issued a statement claiming that the gas agreements of 2009 were signed according to the laws of

Ukraine and Russia and based on the explicit permission of the presidents of the two countries

(Yushchenko in Ukraine and Dmitriy Medvedev in Russia) and that the Russian side expected

the court proceedings to be impartial, just, and humane. Furthermore, the Ministry claimed that

the trial ignored evidence in favour of the legality of Tymoshenko’s actions. Unofficially, Russia

356 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman

is said to have warned Yanukovych of the possible long-term consequences of Tymoshenko’s

arrest. 35

Similar statements were made by Putin and Medvedev themselves. On 1 November 2011,

following a question posed by journalists, Putin stated that ‘Tymoshenko is a pro-Western poli-

tician’ and therefore, by default, Russia’s opponent because pro-Western politics were inconsist-

ent with his own view of beneficial economic integration between Russia and Ukraine. Despite

this issue, Putin stated that he did not understand the essence of the accusation against

Tymoshenko and considered her actions in terms of the energy contract transparent and in accord-

ance with national and international legal regulations. Even earlier, on 7 June 2011, Putin had

stated that Tymoshenko drove a very tough bargain in 2009 (thereby de facto releasing her

from the accusation of acting in Russia’s interests). 36

Russia’s position was described more

directly by Dmitry Peskov, the Russian prime minister’s press secretary, on 14 October 2011.

Peskov stated, ‘We never supported Kyiv in accusation against Tymoshenko and especially in

terms of contracts signed by Gazprom and Naftogas. We have repeatedly stated this fact to

Ukraine’. 37

On 31 August 2011, Medvedev claimed that Tymoshenko was accused ‘because of the

agreements with Russia and not other past sins’ 38

and that the entire Russian leadership

backed the cited statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued on 5 August 2011. On 18

October 2011, Medvedev expressed a wish that the Tymoshenko trial would not be politically

motivated and anti-Russian. 39

We must acknowledge that this statement’s effect on Tymoshen-

ko’s position is more ambiguous than that of other statements. On the one hand, Medvedev

argues that Tymoshenko’s trial is not based on the rule of law and is political; it removes the

legitimacy from the attack pursued by Yanukovych against his opponent. On the other hand,

it first acknowledges that Tymoshenko may have ‘past sins’, and second, describes Tymoshenko

as ‘pro-Russian’, which may reduce her support within the Ukrainian opposition itself. It is unli-

kely that this language was chosen consciously to undermine Tymoshenko’s position; in this

case, Medvedev could have made a much clearer statement.

On 11 October 2011 (when Tymoshenko’s sentence was announced), the Russian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs stated that Tymoshenko’s conviction was made only on ‘political grounds’, uti-

lizing language used by Western democratic actors rather than autocratic Putin’s Russia. The

Russian Minister of Energy, Sergei Shmatko, stated on 18 August 2011 that the agreements

with Ukraine, which formed the basis of the accusations against Tymoshenko, fully corresponded

with the law. 40

On 14 October 2011, General Leonid Ivashov, former director of the Office of Mili-

tary Cooperation of the Russian Federation in 1996 – 2001, stated that the new issues raised by

Ukraine were meaningless because Russia had forgiven the debt to Ukraine for the sake of

more important strategic goals. 41

Ivashov’s case is interesting; he was traditionally counted

among the ‘hawks’ in the Russian elite and had a very strong anti-Western attitude. Therefore,

the change in his position is even more striking. The endorsement from former political opponents

could have been more valuable in the public opinion than endorsement by the West, which always

supported Tymoshenko (for a similar argument, see Chiang and Knight 2011).

It is unlikely that the Russian government was interested in protecting democratic norms and

courts in Ukraine. It was merely concerned with the preservation of the existing gas agreements,

especially because Yanukovych, after a very promising beginning (from the Russian point of

view), was changing his position in negotiations. Nevertheless, Russia appeared to adopt the

same stance on the process as the Western powers, not only in terms of supporting Tymoshenko

personally but also in terms of accentuating the need for fair jurisprudence and the rule of law.

The reference to the rule of law is likely to have been purely rhetorical, but it made the inter-

national context for Yanukovych’s attempts to consolidate his regime less favourable in one

of the key issues of the formation of Yanukovych’s regime.

Contemporary Politics 357

There were important differences between the EU and Russia in terms of the credibility of

their claims. As mentioned, the EU linked the signing of the Association Agreement to

Tymoshenko’s release – most likely the main tool it had to influence the Ukrainian leadership.

Russia did not link any substantive policy measures to the outcomes of the Tymoshenko trial,

although this may have been due to a lack of instruments. Nevertheless, on some occasions,

Russia’s support of Tymoshenko has been more substantive than merely rhetorical. The best

example is the case of the old debt of Tymoshenko’s company, UES, to the Russian Ministry

of Defense. This issue, as well as the accusations of bribery associated with the deals

between the UES and the Ministry, was the subject of several criminal investigations in the

early 2000s in both Russia and Ukraine. In the context of the current events, the existence of

the debt was used as proof of Tymoshenko’s personal interests. The investigation committee

claimed that it was because of this debt that Tymoshenko agreed to the contract that contradicted

Ukrainian interests; in exchange, the Russian government agreed to withdraw the debt claim.

However, almost immediately after this statement was made, the Russian Minister of Defense

issued a declaration that the debt of the UES still existed and that Russia requested it be

repaid in full, essentially removing one of the prosecution’s arguments against Tymoshenko. 42

5.4. Subsequent developments

Our argument suggests that Russia’s position in the case of the Tymoshenko trial was driven by

the particular choice of instruments used by Yanukovych for regime consolidation. Hence, it

also suggests that as soon as the regime resolves to use other instruments, or the saliency of

the gas agreement debate decreases (and thus the risk that Yanukovych actually attempts to

reconsider the agreement goes down), the trade-off disappears, making autocracy promotion

more attractive for the Russian leadership. It should make the Russian positions less stable

than that of the EU and the Western countries.

This is precisely what we observe. After new accusations unrelated to Russian gas contracts

were made against Tymoshenko in 2012 (this time, she was accused of organizing the murder of

a member of the parliament, Evgeny Sherban, in 1996), Russia remained silent on the topic.

Thus, although Russia’s position used the rhetoric of fair courts and trials, it was driven by

the country’s pragmatic interest in preserving the existing gas contracts. In 2013, the Yanuko-

vych regime was tested by mass protests following his decision to stop the Association Agree-

ment with the EU, the Euromaidan (which began on 24 November). This time, pragmatic goals

and goals of autocracy promotion coincided: the Association Agreement was perceived by the

Russian leadership as a serious threat to its position in Ukraine, and Russia was willing to

support Yanukovych for his decision not to sign it (Charap and Troitskiy 2013); the success

of Euromaidan would serve as another potentially ‘contagious’ example for Russia. Thus, the

Russian leadership clearly sided with Yanukovych, with Putin describing Euromaidan ‘more

like a pogrom than a revolution’. 43

6. Conclusion

Autocratic countries such as Russia appear to play an important role as external actors in the

paths of their neighbours’ regime transitions, supporting autocratic outcomes and counteracting

the impact of democratic external actors, although with varying levels of success. This paper

examines the case of Ukraine, a highly important country for Russia in terms of goals underlying

autocracy promotion (risk of spill-over of democratization) and elites’ rent-seeking. It shows

that the latter dominated the former to the extent that Russia sided with the anti-authoritarian

forces because their goals better suited the pragmatic policy interests of the Russian elite. In

358 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman

the case of Ukraine, Russia adopted a position similar to that of the EU in terms of criticizing the

Yanukovych regime with regard to its treatment of Tymoshenko.

Russia’s position regarding Ukraine in the Tymoshenko case is not unique. For example, in

2009, Belarus has been negotiating access to Russian financial support for its troubled economy.

Unlike similar negotiations during the previous two decades, however, Russia imposed severe

conditions on Belarus. This new conditionality coincided with the benchmarks of economic

reforms and openness promoted by, for example, the IMF. In this case, the main goal is to

ensure access to key assets in Belarus, which requires the liberalization of the Belorussian

economy; but again, pragmatic goals dominate the interests of autocracy promotion. 44

There is an important argument that contradicts the logic we have presented thus far. Exter-

nal actors may be interested in supporting autocratic regimes because these regimes may have

greater difficulties in finding allies elsewhere (particularly in the West); therefore, they may

be forced by the ‘black knights’ to submit to less favourable conditions for cooperation. A demo-

cratic Ukraine would likely have much more support from Europe than the autocratic Ukraine

under Yanukovych; thus, Russia may have a stronger advantage in relation to an autocratic

Ukrainian government and use this advantage for rent extraction. Although we must acknowl-

edge this argument, there is an equally important counterargument that can be derived from

the literature: non-democratic countries find it difficult to ensure the credibility of their commit-

ments toward external parties and to make any concessions on their autonomy (Gaubatz 1996).

Even if, in a particular critical situation, autocracies agree to concede to the requirements of the

external partner, they are likely to attempt to renegotiate their obligations or to ignore them at the

first opportunity.

As an example, Russia played a crucial role in establishing Rakhmon’s authoritarian regime

in Tajikistan after its civil war. However, once the regime achieved a certain level of stability, it

became reluctant to cooperate with Russia, expropriating Russian assets in Tajikistan, for

example (e.g. the Rogun Power Plant). Even if Russia has strong leverage (as in relation to

Belarus), it is often difficult to achieve concessions. For example, Russia forced Belarus to

sell the Belarusian gas transportation company Beltransgaz to Gazprom after more than a

decade of negotiations (the deal was concluded in 2007 – 2011). In 2013, the Belarusian presi-

dent attempted to resolve a conflict about the distribution of revenues from potassium exports

(implemented by a partnership between the Belorussian state-owned Belaruskaliy and the

Russian Uralkaliy) by arresting the CEO of Uralkaliy, Vladislav Baumgertner, in spite of pro-

tests of numerous high-ranked members of Russian elite.

Thus, we conjecture that the limits to Russian autocracy promotion are driven by two factors.

The first is possible or actual losses in terms of pragmatic interests, e.g. the renegotiation of con-

tracts, failure to acquire attractive assets, or limitations for Russian business. The second is the

credibility of the regime Russia addresses in terms of its compliance with Russia’s demands. If

the credibility is low and the losses are high, they may easily outweigh the importance of con-

siderations associated with autocracy promotion. The examples we discussed also suggest that in

these cases Russia would attempt to achieve its particular goals (access to assets, stability of con-

tracts, release of arrested businessmen, etc.). As soon as these goals are achieved, Russian be-

haviour may once again be dominated by autocracy promotion.

There are two important implications of our study for the extant academic literature. First,

this paper provides a potentially useful caveat for the growing literature on autocracy pro-

motion, stressing the need to include foreign policy objectives other than ideological affinity;

the existing literature clearly focuses on the latter. While, generally speaking, the fact that prag-

matism (as defined in this paper) affects the foreign policy goals of autocracies is not surprising,

to our knowledge, it has not been discussed or taken into account in the literature investigating

how autocracies affect regime transition abroad. Rent-seeking can dominate ideological affinity

Contemporary Politics 359

even in cases that are extremely important for standard autocracy promotion goals (like Ukraine

for Russia).

Second, the results suggest that to understand the impact of autocratic countries on regime

transition abroad, we must also examine the possible unintended consequences of their

actions, which are not necessarily limited to autocracy diffusion. Again, we should stress that

Russia clearly did not aim to promote or support democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine.

However, the unintended consequence of its pragmatic policy towards protecting its elites’ inter-

ests (in the form of signed gas contracts) limited Yanukovych’s ability to implement an impor-

tant step in consolidating his regime. This, in turn, affected the political developments in

Ukraine.

Postscript (written in mid-February 2014): The winter of 2013 – 2014 constituted a major

challenge for the Yanukovych regime. Ukraine witnessed an unprecedented wave of mass pro-

tests and attempts of Yanukovych to hold onto power. The position of external actors in this con-

frontation is clear: the EU and European states side with the anti-authoritarian forces, while

Russia provides support to Yanukovych. Anti-authoritarian forces of Ukraine are also explicitly

against the Russia-driven integration initiatives and in favour of the Association Agreement with

the EU (which Russian elites view as a point of concern for their economic interests). The issue

of European integration remains as salient as democratization for the Ukrainian opposition. One

could only speculate on how Russian attitude would have been if its economic (pragmatic) inter-

ests had been absent or accommodated.

Notes

1. Among the most recent excellent analyses of autocracies, see the special issues of Contemporary Poli- tics (2013, 19(1)) and Democratization (2013, 20(1)) and separate set of literature focused on external influences on regime transition (Obydenkova 2008, 2012, Obydenkova and Libman 2012).

2. See Roller (2013), McGuire (2013), Wurster (2013), Knutsen and Fjelde (2013) and Tanneberg et al. (2013).

3. Jackson (2014) examines how common values affect cooperation of modern Eurasian autocracies. 4. One example is the Sino-Soviet confrontation of the 1950s and 1960s (Luethi 2008). 5. While anti-Communism was certainly at the core of the Nazi regime in Germany, it did not preclude it

from signing the Molotov – Ribbentrop pact in 1939. 6. See Holbig (2013) for the case of modern China. 7. The focus of autocrats on private goods provision makes them attractive partners for rent-seeking (see

Bader et al. 2010). 8. According to Furman (2010), as early as in the 1990s, Russian leadership encouraged the presidents of

other post-Soviet countries to disband their parliaments inherited from the Soviet period to partly legit- imize similar Russian actions in 1993.

9. There are also other considerations that the Russian leadership takes into account. In terms of the secur- ity – military dimension of the relationship, there is the hypothetical possibility of Ukraine’s accession into NATO, which had been discussed as an important issue over the last two decades, and was per- ceived painfully by Russian elites.

10. In addition, both Russian investments in and control over gas exports play an important role for the Russian regime as instruments of “soft power” (Tsygankov 2006, Nygren 2008).

11. In the 1990s, the situation was different: Leonid Kuchma, who was elected as a pro-Russian president, became an inconvenient partner for Russia towards the end of the decade. He returned to pro-Russian foreign policy attitudes in the early 2000s, however.

12. As Way (2010) notes, this black and white picture of Ukrainian politics may be overly simplistic. Thus, Tymoshenko’s aspirations towards increasing centralized control may also have been a problem for democracy in Ukraine if she had won the 2010 elections. Nevertheless, for the main empirical case of this study (Tymoshenko’s trial), the two sides’ positions are relatively clear: Tymoshenko again stood in the way of the strengthening of the Yanukovych regime, and her prosecution undermined the competitiveness of Ukrainian politics.

13. The politics of Ukraine before the Orange Revolution are discussed by Way (2004).

360 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman

14. On the perception of post-Soviet regional integration initiatives by the Ukrainian electorate, see Hale (2008).

15. Grani, 26 December 2004. 16. Lenta.ru, 25 April 2005. 17. RIA Novosti, 12 May 2008. 18. Novaya Gazeta, 13 August 2008; Ukrainskaya Pravda, 18 September 2008. 19. RBC Ukraine, 27 March 2007. 20. See http://pr.dn.ua/articles/art_309.html [accessed 8 March 2013]. 21. Kommersant, 8 August 2011. 22. It is important to stress that in 2010, although there was a divide between Tymoshenko/Yushchenko

and Yanukovych in terms of their foreign policy preferences, Russia and the West did not take sides as openly as they did in 2004.

23. LigaBiznesInform, 17 March 2010. 24. For example, censorship was reported by the TV channels STB and 1+1 (Ukranews, 7 May 2010).

Concern regarding censorship in Ukraine was expressed by the European Federation of Journalists in a press release from 10 May 2010.

25. It included individual members of parliament, whereas the Ukrainian constitution allows the coalition to be formed only by parties represented in the parliament.

26. Focus, 11 May 2010. 27. Personal motives and world perception may also have played a role (see Kuzio 2011). 28. Ukraine, like many developing countries, had the right to sell its quotas for CO2 emissions according to

the Kyoto protocol. Tymoshenko was accused of using the proceeds from the Ukrainian quotas (sold to Japan in 2009) for purposes other than those set by the law (specifically, the money was transferred to the Pension Fund of Ukraine instead of being used for forest planting).

29. Financial Times, 1 January 2011. 30. Focus.ua, 5 August 2011. 31. RBC-Ukraine, 12 October 2011. 32. LentaRu, 11 October 2011; RBC, 11 October 2011. 33. Segodnya, 9 December 2011; Glavkom, 9 July 2011. 34. Novosti.ua, 18 October 2011. 35. Kommerstant, 5 August 2011. 36. Government.ru, 7 June 2011. 37. NewsRu.ua, 14 October 2011. 38. Available from: http://podrobnosti.ua/power/2011/08/31/788909.html [accessed 12 May 2012]. 39. NewsUkraine, 18 October 2011. 40. RBC, 19 August 2011. 41. Ukranews, 14 October 2011. 42. Available from: http://www.polit.ru/article/2012/03/21/al210312/ [accessed 12 May 2012]. 43. Telegraph, 2013, 2 December. 44. The case of Belarus is interesting because it provides an example of the competition of ‘black knights’.

Since 2011, Belarus has received financial support from China, which, unlike Russia, does not impose conditions in terms of economic reforms.

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364 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman