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Each student should complete an annotated bibliography for their approved research paper topic. Create the bibliography using at least 5 peer reviewed journal articles.

Topic – Economic sanctions and effectiveness

Write 60-80 words for each topic

International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2013 Volume 12, Number 11

Effectiveness Of Economic Sanctions:

Empirical Research Revisited

Siamack Shojai, Central Connecticut State University, USA

Patricia S. Root, Central Connecticut State University, USA

ABSTRACT

This paper reexamines economic sanctions research and identifies explanatory variables used by many previous theoretical and empirical research studies on the effectiveness of voluntary and non-voluntary economic sanctions since World War I.

A normative legal, political, and economic methodology is used to measure effectiveness of economic sanctions as a random walk process. The paper concludes that choosing a target and imposing economic sanctions is a random process that occurs when a sender is faced with a real or perceived threat. Sanctions are imposed as an alternative to inaction or going to war. The theory and research on effectiveness of sanctions has been a mere exercise in running regressions on a series of random numbers and do not shed any light to guide policymaking.

Keywords: Economic Sanctions; Logit Model of Effectiveness Sanctions; Humanitarian Law & Sanctions

INTRODUCTION

T	his paper provides a normative legal, political, and economic framework to analyze and measure

	effectiveness of economic sanctions. A non-exhaustive theoretical and empirical review of sanction
	debates is provided in the next section. The legal regime of economic sanctions with reference to the

United States legal system, the international humanitarian law, various Articles under the United Nations Charter, and the World Trade Organization is provided in the following section. Finally, a normative legal, political, and economic framework (methodology) is used to measure effectiveness of economic sanctions. The paper concludes that probability of success/failure of economic sanctions is a random outcome and empirical works done so far are flawed because of this randomness.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SINCE WWI

The most comprehensive and serious research on economic sanctions conducted by Hufbauer et al. has been presented in a series of scholarly manuscripts (1985, 1990a, 1990b, and 1997; Elliot and Hufbauer, 1999). Hufbauer et al. estimated effectiveness of sanctions imposed between WWI and 1990 using the Gravity theoretical model (Frankel, 1997) and an Ordinary- Least- Squares regression estimation technique. In their original research, they surveyed experts and constructed a “policy result”, as well as a “contribution of sanctions to policy results” (all on an ordinal scale of 1-4), to measure the success or failure of economic sanctions. They concluded that empirical research on 115 cases of sanctions imposed from World War I to 1990 indicate that sanctions are more likely to succeed if its goal is modest, the target country is smaller than the sending country, the receiving and sending countries have friendly relations with substantial trade prior to imposition of sanctions, the cost to sending country is not significant, and sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively.

The cost of sanctions to the U.S. has been estimated using the same model. Elliot (1997) argued that since 1970, only 13 percent of unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. have been successful and had cost the U.S. $15-$19 billion annually. Despite these dismal success results, economic sanctions have proliferated since the 1990s. Elliot argues that prior to the 1970s, 50 percent of U.S. economic sanctions partially or fully succeeded. The success ratio declined to 21 percent between 1970 and 1990.

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Dashti-Gibson et al. (1997) used the same data collected by Hufbauer but employed a logistic regression model to estimate effectiveness of sanction episodes from 1914 to 1989 in achieving their respective goals. They questioned the statistical construction of the dependent variable (success measure) used by Hufbauer et al. and, instead, developed a binary dependent variable that assumes a value of one for success and zero for failure episodes. They consider six dependent variables to explain success or failure of sanctions. These include cost of sanctions to both target and sending country, political stability and economic health of the target, the duration of sanctions, whether sanctions are financial or trade sanctions, and a secular trend variable. Various estimation results of their model indicate that when the goal of economic sanctions is to destabilize the target, economic costs to target, length of sanctions and the stability of target are determining factors in the success of sanctions. However, when the goal of sanctions is other than destabilization of the target, only the secular trend is negatively and statistically significant.

Drury (1998) also used Hufbauer’s data in an ordered logit model to reexamine empirical results and recommendations made by Hufbauer et al. According to his multivariate estimation, only four out of 11 propositions made by Hufbauer et al. are supported.

Parker (2000) provides a comprehensive critique of the methodologies used by various researchers to measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions. He identifies anecdotal, case studies, and scorecards (econometric modeling). He argues that anecdotal approaches deliberately choose isolated examples of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of economic sanctions to demonstrate their points. The case of Cuba sanctions is a primary example of this. Case studies provide a lot of detailed information but do not provide a generalized stylized framework to apply to all cases. He critically evaluates shortcomings of econometrics (scorecard) models, including lack of control group, selection bias, subjectivity, proxy problems, collinearity, and insufficient data, among many others (Parker, 2000 p. 259). Oskarsson (212) argues that definition of sanctions’ success determines judgment about their effectiveness. If the goal is regime change and success is defined accordingly, then many sanctions, such as the ones imposed on Libya and Iraq, have been a failure. He provides some detailed information about the devastating impact of sanctions on the economies of Iraq, Iran, and Libya. However, sanctions have not been successful in achieving their officially stated primary goal despite their effectiveness. He agrees with Parker that generalization across all cases in not possible or useful and one needs to study each case individually.

Rarick and Han (2010) highlight the significance of multilateral sanctions to increase the probability of success. The next section briefly considers the legal aspects of economic sanctions before a normative framework (methodology) to measure success of sanctions is presented.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

While the effectiveness of economic sanctions, as a practical tool of foreign policy, has been called into question, the status in international law can best be described as ambiguous (Kondoch, 2011). The source of this ambiguity generally stems from the nature of international law and questions of jurisdiction and enforcement and, more specifically, from the complex interplay of national legal regimes, the United Nations perceived role as the primary source of governance in the global security arena, humanitarian law, and the role of international trade organizations and economic interdependency.

Domestic Security: The United States

Nations can and do use their own domestic law to effectuate sanctions, often as an alternative to military action. National leaders find that sanctions provide at least the appearance of taking decisive steps without resorting to violence and are more acceptable in the international community. Rationales for imposing sanctions include seeking to influence a country to change its policies, punishing a country for its policies and symbolically demonstrating opposition against a country’s policies to a number of possible audiences (Carter, 1987).

The United States is instructive in that it is the most prolific in its willingness to apply unilateral sanctions. There is a tradition of employing sanctions since the colonial era, as a substitute for and complement to the use of force. Carter suggests U.S. laws governing sanctions can be divided into five categories:

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International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2013 Volume 12, Number 11

1. Government programs, such as foreign assistance and landing rights

2. Export control

3. Import control

4. Private financial transactions

5. International financial institutions

Presidential authority is strongest in the areas of government programs and export control. The President’s authority to deny access to large programs providing low-interest credit and loan guaranties, for example, is unfettered when tied to foreign policy reasons. While Congress has the power to oppose such sanctions, to do so would require that body to provide strong political and practical arguments for why it opposes taking action against something which is objectionable to U.S. interests.

The President also has broad authority over exports through the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), which prohibits, with few exceptions, all exports from the U.S. unless they are licensed by the Department of Commerce. While “general licenses” are not burdensome to obtain, the Executive Branch can exert greater control based on national security, foreign policy, or short supply. The EAA was amended in 1985 by the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1975 (1985 EAAA), which placed some limits on the President’s power, especially regarding agricultural embargos, foreign policy controls and the “contract sanctity” provision. This latter provision limited the President’s ability to impose export controls that abrogate existing contracts unless the President certifies to Congress that there is a serious and direct threat to U.S. strategic interests, the proposed export controls will help remedy that threat, and the export controls will last only as long as the threat persists.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), gives the President virtually unlimited authority to regulate nuclear materials, equipment and technology. This is also true with all arms exports under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

Unlike export controls, the President has no general statutory authority to restrict imports for foreign policy reasons. Rather, his authority is scattered among numerous statutes. For example, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provides authority to limit imports for foreign policy reasons, specifically threats to national security. However, “national security” has been interpreted to only limit imports of critical defense materials, especially in order to protect domestic production base or to protect against an embargo of an important foreign suppler. Import controls over particular countries or specific products may also be mandated by statute. Products are particularly challenging, given the multilateral structure of the World Trade Organization, as discussed elsewhere in this paper. Although various statutes allow the President to regulate imports for economic reasons, these statutes do not provide any authority to regulate imports for foreign policy reasons (Carter, 1987).

Still another approach to product sanctions is contained in Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which requires public companies to disclose whether certain minerals in their supply chain originate from the DR Congo or its neighboring countries. Rather than sanctioning so-called “conflict minerals”, this section provides consumers with information about where and when these minerals are used, thereby allowing consumers to avoid purchasing products derived from that product. This has been described as a “Second-Order Sanction with Second-Order Humanitarian Effects” (Owen, 2013).

International financial activity has grown dramatically in recent years and offers a potent area for imposition of sanctions. However, it remains difficult under U.S. law to regulate private financial transactions. One source of statutory authority to control U.S. private credit is section 15 of the Export Administration Act, which authorizes regulations that may apply to the “financing, transporting, or other servicing of exports and the participation therein by any person.” While it specifically references financing, this language has never been interpreted to prohibit general controls of private financial transactions (Carter, 1987).

While regulation of private financial transactions is difficult, the U.S. has even more limited influence over the international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These two institutions control billions of dollars and are designed to promote cooperation within the international monetary community. U.S. laws direct representatives at these various institutions to oppose certain loans or financing; for

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instance, when the U.S. sought to cut off IMF assistance to leftist governments that engaged in human rights violations. Decision-making within these institutions, however, is often done through informal consensus. Moreover, economic constraints have reduced U.S. contributions to these institutions and therefore U.S. influence. These factors underscore the fact that the U.S. exerts little real power within the institutions, but rather is limited to informal persuasion to build alliances (Carter, 1987).

The President also has the authority to invoke sweeping emergency powers in the event of a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA). As amended in 2006, section 1701(a) of the IEEPA gives the President authority “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”

The United States has either comprehensive or limited sanction regimes (Culvahouse, 2010). Countries with comprehensive economic sanctions include Cuba, Sudan (excluding Southern Sudan) and Iran. Limited sanctions regimes that prohibit some, but not all, commerce are currently in place with respect to Syria, Burma (or Myanmar) and North Korea. Since the Bush Administration had a preference for targeting individuals, governments and entities (so-called “specially designated nationals, a.k.a. SDNs), the SDN list grew significantly during his administration. Culhavouse (2010) speculates that the Obama Administration has shown a willingness to relax, if not remove, certain economic sanctions, notably in Cuba and Iran.

International Security: United Nations Security Council

Following World War II and based on the experiences of both World Wars, the international community worked together to devise international institutions which would ensure a “durable peace” (Reyes, 2009 p. 535). The institutions included the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and an International Trade Organization. From these institutions, the United Nations developed into the mediator of international security governance.

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sets out the U.N. Security Council’s powers to maintain peace and security. It allows the Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace and security". The Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and its powers include establishment of “sanctions” as a measure to be taken against a state to promote international peace and security. Within Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 25, taken together, make any economic sanctions authorized by the Security Council (41) mandatory on all members (25).

Article 41 states:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 25 states:

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Chapter V sets out the basic structure of the Security Council. There are 15 members, including five veto-wielding permanent members based on the victors of World War II - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. There are also 10 non-permanent members, with five elected each year to serve two-year terms. This basic structure results in no permanent representation from about two-thirds of the world’s population. Further isolating the Security Council’s decision-making authority is the fact that its decisions cannot be reviewed or modified by the U.N. Secretariat or the General Assembly and there is effectively no judicial review. Article 96 of

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the U.N. Charter states that the Security Council may ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory ruling on its own actions, but the Court’s ruling is non-binding. Given this basic structure, during the Cold War, the veto power of the permanent members, coupled with their various conflicting agendas, effectively constricted decision-making regarding sanctions.

Jurisdiction and enforcement are two fundamental legal principles that are strained in the context of the Security Council’s role in economic sanctions. First, the U.N. does not have compulsory jurisdiction. Although the ICJ is charged with adjudicating international disputes, it is merely a secondary mechanism since nations must consent to its jurisdiction. Indeed, even when a nation consents, it can be withdrawn if there is an adverse decision, as the U.S. did in the Nicaragua case. Also, even when the ICJ issues a decision on the merits of a case, it does not have enforcement power and a number of nations have openly refused to comply. The Security Council can enforce ICJ decisions, but its inherent discord makes it difficult to take action. Second, although the U.N. Charter provides for the development of standing U.N. military forces, none was ever created. Article 43 created a mechanism whereby member states would provide armed forces to serve as a United Nations standing army. However, no member state ever provided those forces. The U.N. must rely on a “coalition of the willing” in order to respond to specific security threats, greatly reducing its ability to regulate economic sanctions regimes (Reyes, 2009).

Notwithstanding these limitations, the use of sanctions by the Security Council became more prevalent after the Cold War ended. During the 1990s, the Security Council imposed sanctions against eleven countries, most notably Iraq. The Iraq sanctions are instructive to understanding the legal regime created by the basic structure of the Security Council. In 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council issued Resolution 661 which contained no provisions for how or when the sanctions would expire. This created a scenario where the only way to end the sanctions was through action of the Security Council, which could be blocked by any permanent member, forcing the sanctions to continue indefinitely. Further, under the Resolution, a committee of the Security Council was created to provide oversight. Since part of the mandate for the so-called “661 Committee” was to address sanctions’ violations, the committee decided to operate in closed meetings, with restricted circulation of its minutes. Essentially, the committee would act as its own enforcement and accountability mechanism. Since its actions are secret, there was no functioning precedent to guide the committee from decision to decision, allowing for inconsistency and arbitrariness. For example, Iraq would be allowed to import ambulances on one occasion and denied the identical application a few months later, without explanation (Gordon, 2001). In her article Chokehold on the World, Gordon describes the case of Iraq Sanctions Committee as follows:

I have never before heard of any bureaucratic apparatus with such an extreme aversion to transparency that the agenda for its meetings was not distributed to its own members and no actual minutes were kept, only summaries. The 6,000 decisions per year were not computerized, making them effectively unavailable, even to the committee’s own members. (Gordon, 2001 P. 29)

The U.N. exercise of this authority has been criticized for a number of reasons, especially humanitarian concerns and their ineffectiveness. Regarding the legal structure, it has been suggested that there is a need to provide much more structured legal principles to guide the case of U.N. Security Council Sanctions. In the “Bossuyt” Report, prepared by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, a six-prong test was suggested to evaluate a sanctions regime. First, the reasons for imposing the sanctions must be valid (a threat of or actual breach of international peace and security). Second, the sanctions must target the parties responsible for the threat. Third, no humanitarian goods should be targeted. Fourth and fifth, the sanctions must be reasonably limited by time and effectiveness. Sixth, any objections by governments, NGOs, intergovernmental bodies, scholars and the general public must be considered prior to adopting the sanctions (Kondach, 2001).

Humanitarian Law

There are two aspects of humanitarian international law to consider in the context of sanctions. First, sanctions are being used more widely than ever as a response to perceived and real human rights violations on the part of the targeted states. Second, sanctions can also be viewed as the cause of human rights violations on the part of the sanctioning nation.

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While sanctions have long been a feature of foreign and national security policy, in recent years they have been increasingly invoked as instrumentalities of international human rights law and policy under generally applicable rubrics of public international law and foreign affairs law. For instance, the U.S. trade sanctions against South Africa were instituted in response to that nation’s apartheid. While those sanctions did not end apartheid, they are viewed as having been at least one motivating factor in South Africa’s decision to terminate that practice (Malloy, 2013).

A more direct legal challenge to both unilateral and multilateral sanctions has been the often devastating humanitarian impact that sanctions cause in the target nation. While sanctions are often viewed as more neutral and less devastating than military action, there is no doubt that they have always exacted a humanitarian cost (Kondach, 2001).

Humanitarian law provides several avenues to challenge the legality of economic sanctions. First, promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is considered to be among the primary purposes of the United Nations. Therefore, the Security Council must take those principles into account when acting under Chapter VII. Second, the doctrine of jus cogens was developed in the late 1960s and can be found in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Jus cogens is that body of peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted; those norms are recognized by the international community, as a whole, as being fundamental to the maintenance of an international legal order. Those norms include the safeguarding of peace and humanitarian concerns, including prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination. This doctrine provides the most basic core of human rights and international humanitarian law, and therefore applies to the Security Council under Chapter VII. Finally, and more generally, if the Security Council were to ignore the two preceding points, this disregard for the rule of law would contradict their responsibility for maintaining international peace and security (Kondoch, 2001).

The four Geneva Conventions, the Protocols thereto, and relevant customary international law provide specific rules regarding humanitarian law and economic sanctions in the course of an armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions and their Protocols do not address non-military sanctions because the drafters did not anticipate the humanitarian costs that would later accrue from sanctions that were imposed outside of armed conflicts. This fact does not preclude applying customary humanitarian international law to non-military sanctions, especially given the fact that this area of law is “highly adaptive and widely interpreted in a dynamic way” (Kondoch, 2001 P. 284).

Kondach identifies the following requirements of international humanitarian law in armed conflict.

1. Starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited.

2. There is an absolute right to humanitarian assistance, including:

a. Free passage and distribution of relief goods, such as medical supplies, religious objects, and essential food stuffs, clothing and tonic, for civilian populations.

b. Relief actions may be undertaken, subject to consent of the parties concerned.

c. Civilians threatened by starvation or severe shortage of medical supplies, as a result of naval blockades, must be granted relief.

d. Relief assistance must be provided to civilians in occupied territories.

3. The rule of distinction provides that belligerents are required to distinguish between civilians and combatants at all times.

4. The principle of proportionality requires that any collateral damage to noncombatants not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that is anticipated.

It has been suggested that the application of these rules of international humanitarian law in armed conflict can be imposed either directly or by analogy to sanction regimes that are outside the context of an armed conflict. This argument is particularly strong when the humanitarian suffering continues into peacetime after an armed conflict. It is less clear how this applies when the sanctions are not originally associated with an armed conflict.

Kondach (2001) concludes that regardless of whether the Geneva Conventions and their protocols apply when not associated with armed conflict, the legal regime provided by human rights law and the genocide

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convention can protect civilians from the adverse effects of economic sanctions during peacetime. This regime consists of the following:

1. The right to life is incorporated in numerous international human rights instruments, such as Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). These can be interpreted to require states to provide essential goods to those in need or, at a minimum, to prohibit states from deliberately acting to deprive human beings of food and to cause hunger and starvation.

2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) provides, inter alia, that every child has the inherent right to life and the right to the highest attainable standard of health and access to medical services.

3. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, prohibits genocide in times of peace and war. Genocide is described as killing or attempting to kill a group based on intent to destroy a national ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.

4. The principle of proportionality, which can be found in almost all branches of international and national law, requires that a balance be struck between the interest in attaining the goal of a sanctions regime and its interest in avoiding unacceptable harm to the civilian population.

Preferential Trade Agreements and Economic Sanctions

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have increased dramatically in recent years. One recent study suggests that these agreements have no direct effect on the propensity of states to sanction each other (Haffner-Burton, 2008). Others see inherent power in PTAs, specifically the World Trade Organization (WTO), as “uniquely situated to act as an effective governor of national security in the economic sphere” (Reyes, 2009 p. 531). The WTO governs a variety of international economic treaties which prohibit restrictive trade measures that are often used in the name of national security. One such treaty - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - specifically prohibited embargos and quotas, which are economic tools often used to protect national interest. However, Article XXI of the GATT provided an exception for national security:

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:

(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or

(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests

(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;

(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;

(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or

(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

WTO members have successfully argued that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has no authority when sanctions are imposed for national security reasons, which are considered too sensitive and closely related to a nation’s sovereignty. The issue of determining if one of the five criteria set forth in Article XXI has been met is determined subjectively; the nation invoking Article XXI is allowed to make that determination without an objective assessment of the record.

As part of the Uruguay Round, the WTO adopted a Dispute Settlement System (DSS). There are three reasons the DSS is viewed as an important international tribunal. First, there is compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising under the WTO-covered agreements. Second, decisions issued within DSS enjoy a high rate of compliance. Third, members typically seek redress within the DSS rather than the alternative - withdrawing from the WTO altogether (Reyes). These dispute settlement features remedy the three primary failures of the ICJ. The extent to which the WTO will impact the enactment and enforcement of sanctions regimes will be closely watched going forward.

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In conclusion, the legal framework for economic sanctions is comprised of multiple layers of both domestic and international law. The United States’ legal regime involves both statutory and legislative authority and often revolves primarily around the notion of national security and the need to take action short of military engagement. The legal regime in international law is contained in various treaties, accords, and doctrines. Issues of jurisdiction and enforcement add to the ambiguity of the status of sanctions in international law. This uncertain legal framework only exacerbates the random outcomes for sanctions’ success or failure rates.

METHODOLOGY

A brief review of sanctions literature and the legal framework provided above leads to the conclusion that success of economic sanctions depends on many economic, political, and legal variables, as measured and estimated by various researchers. These variables include sanction goals, political or economic stability of the target, presence of international cooperation (McLean & Whang, 2010; Kondoch, 2001), friendly or adversarial relations of sender and the target, threat to national security of the sender, ideological nature of the target’s regime (Takeyh & Maloney, 2011), the duration of sanctions, the authoritarian or democratic nature of the target’s government (Lekzian & Souva, 2007), cost to the sender as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), cost to the target as a percentage of GDP, and openness of the target ‘s economy to international trade measured by sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. This almost exhaustive list of potential variables that could affect the outcome of economic sanctions could normatively be grouped into three broad factors - Economic, Political, and Legal.

Almost all political and legal measures of these factors used by various researchers assign binary values of one or zero to explanatory variables. For example, Druray (1998) assigns a value of one when a threat to national security of the sender is present and a value of zero when it is absent. He also assigns the same binary values for presence or absence of multinational sanctions. So, it is not unusual to see a multivariate regression result with multiple dummy variables that assume values of one or zero. The original work of Hufbauer et al. (1990a) measured success of sanctions by surveying experts who assigned values of 1 to 4 to “policy results” and “sanctions contribution to policy results” variables. A multiplicative index of these two variables produced the universe of all possible values for success/failure composed of 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, and 16. These values were used in an OLS regression model as the dependent variable considering a value of 9 or greater as a success and anything less as a failure (Hufbauer et al., 1990a). In conclusion, in logit or multivariate models of sanctions effectiveness, the universe of all possible values for political and legal factors included binary or limited ordered numbers. The economic factor is generally expressed as a percentage of GDP, but given the nature of the relevant variables (cost to sender and target, openness to international trade, etc…) presents limited possible variations based on structure of the global economy and the economic position of targets and senders.

This paper constructs three samples of randomly assigned numbers from the universal set of Hufbauer’s data (1, 2 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, and, 16) for the dependent variable (success or failure of sanctions), a dummy variable that assumes a value of one when a positive political or economic factor is present and a value of zero in its absence, and a normative set of possible economic outcomes (1, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 40 percent) to measure the impact of economic variables on success of economic sanctions. Ordinary least Squares results of regressing success (failure) of sanctions (Y) on a constant, any legal/political factor (X1), and any economic factor (X2) are presented in Table

1. All randomly generated samples produce a statistically significant positive constant term and insignificant coefficients for political/legal explanatory variable. Only estimation results of Sample one indicate that the economic factor impacts success of sanctions positively and significantly. In all cases, the R-squares range from one to five percent indicating that the explanatory variables, at most, explain five percent of variations in success of economic sanctions.

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*International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2013*	*Volume 12, Number 11*
	Table 1: Dependent Variable (Y) Equals Success of Economic Sanctions
Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error of Coefficient	t-value
Sample 1
X1	.811	.924	.878
X2	7.520	3.496	2.151
R2		.054
F		2.754
Sample 2
X1	-1.072	1.036	-1.034
X2	2.969	3.744	.793
R2		.014
F		.661
Sample 3
X1	.254	.828	.307
X2	5.120	3.493	1.466
R2		.023
F		1.145

The cumulative distributions of the dependent and explanatory variables for all samples are presented in Table 2. As expected, the probability of drawing each item in these randomly drawn numbers is 1/n, where n is the number of possible outcomes. Therefore, the average cumulative probability of success (outcomes 9, 12, and 16, according to Hufbauer, 1990a) across three samples is 0.31. Also, the mean probability of existence of favorable legal and political attributes across the samples is 0.49. Normatively, one could assert that the role of economic factors could be low (outcomes 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10), moderate (outcomes 0.15 and 0.20), and high (outcome 0.40). The mean probabilities of existence of low, moderate, and high favorable of economic factors are 0.508, 0.316, and 0.175, respectively. These random outcomes are pretty much in line with empirical research presented in the review of literature above.

Table 2: Cumulative Frequencies for Success Scores, Political/Legal Environment, and Economic Factors

						Cumulative Frequency (Percentage)
	Variables			Sample 1		Sample 2		Sample 3
Y	X1	X2	Y		X1	X2	Y	X1	X2	Y	X1	X2
Success	Political/Legal	Economic

1	0	.01	13.1		47.5	23.2	12.1	50.5	15.2	16.2	49.5	17.2
2	1	.05	22.2		100	37.4	19.2	100	37.4	28.3	100	26.3
3		.10	38.4			53.5	27.3		54.5	39.4		44.4
4		.15	53.5			69.7	38.4		65.7	54.5		66.7
6		.20	60.6			82.8	55.6		78.8	63.6		85.9
8		.40	69.7			100	62.6		100	73.7		100
9			82.8				72.7			89.9
12			88.9				85.9			93.9
16			100				100			100

Countries impose economic sanctions as an alternative to inaction or going to war. Targets are not chosen because of the existence of most favorable factors that would make sanctions successful. For example, the United States did not impose an economic sanction on Iraq because it could receive domestic and international legal and political support or because Iraq’s economy was very vulnerable to sanctions. The U.S. imposed multilateral, UN-backed sanctions on Iraq because of its invasion of Kuwait. Also, the U.S. would not impose a sanction on the European Union because of strong economic ties and openness of the EU economy. Targets chosen are basically random outcomes of some political, economic, or security threats felt by the sending country. Unlike consumers who may behave according to economic theory supported by empirical work, political policymakers chose targets based on existence of some real or perceived threat regardless of sanctions theory and research. Thus, this paper concludes that the choice of imposing economic sanctions and targets is a random outcome and the probability of its success is 1/N, where N is the possible success outcome as defined by researchers.

2013 The Clute Institute Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 1487

International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2013 Volume 12, Number 11

CONCLUSIONS

This paper provided a legal, political, and economic framework to analyze and measure effectiveness of economic sanctions. The legal regime of economic sanctions was discussed with reference to the United States’ legal system, international humanitarian law, various Articles under the United Nations Charter, and the World Trade Organization. Theoretical and empirical research on the effectiveness of voluntary and non-voluntary economic sanctions since World War I were examined in order to identify variables that explain success of economic sanctions.

A normative legal, political, and economic normative methodology was used to measure effectiveness of economic sanctions as a random walk process. The paper concludes that choosing a target and imposing economic sanctions is a random process that occurs when a sender is faced with a real or perceived threat. Sanctions are imposed as an alternative to inaction or going to war. The theory and research on effectiveness of economic sanctions has been a mere exercise in running regressions on a series of random numbers and it doesn’t shed any light to guide policymaking. For example, the research doesn’t guide policymakers as to when and how an economic sanction may be effective. It also doesn’t provide any practical and useful information about what economic, political, or legal variables are significant in affecting sanction outcomes. Also, sanctions are imposed regardless of existence of favorable or unfavorable conditions and structures.

AUTHOR INFORMATION

Siamack Shojai has been Dean of the School of Business at Central Connecticut State University since 2007. Prior to joining Central Connecticut State University, he served as Dean of Business at State University of New York-Plattsburgh and later at Georgian Court University in New Jersey. Also, he had been professor of economics and finance at various colleges and universities, including Fordham University, Manhattan College, and Marist College, starting upon completion of his doctoral degree in 1984. He holds an MBA from Iona College and a Ph.D. in economics from Fordham University. His academic papers have appeared in scholarly journals such as the Journal of Energy and Development and the Journal of Economic Development. He is the editor of four volumes in the areas of global oil markets, globalization of the economy, and global budget deficits. E-mail: shojaisia@ccsu.edu (Corresponding author)

Patricia S. Root is an associate professor at Central Connecticut State University where she teaches courses in the legal environment of business. She began her academic career in 1990 as an assistant professor at University of Hartford. Her research interests include international and intellectual property law, curriculum development and assessment, and business school administration. She held positions of interim dean and interim associate dean at C.C.S.U. between 2000 and 2003. Professor Root was practicing attorney prior to entering the academics, with positions at several law firms in the Hartford area, where she specialized in corporate and realty law. She received her J.D. from the University of Connecticut in 1982. E-mail: rootp@ccsu.edu

REFERENCES

1. Carter, B. E. (1987). International economic sanctions: Improving haphazard U.S. legal regime. California Law Review, 75, 1159–1278.

2. Culvahouse Jr., A. B. (2010). A practice guide to international sanctions law and lore: Mamas, don’t let your children grow up to be sanctions lawyers. Houston Journal of International Law, 32(3), 587–604.

3. Dashti-Gibson, J., Davis, P., & Radcliff, B. (1997). On the determinants of the success of economic sanctions: An empirical analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 608–618.

4. Drury, A. C. (1998). Revisiting economic sanctions reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research, 35(4), 497– 509.

5. Elliott, K. A. (1997). Evidence on the costs and benefits of economic sanctions. Institute for International Economics.

6. Elliott, K. A., & Hufbauer, G. C. (1999). Ineffectiveness of economic sanctions: Same song, same refrain?

Economic sanctions in the 1990’s. The American Economic Review, 89(2), 403–408.

7. Gordon, J. (2001). Chokehold on the world. The Nation, (January 1), 27–32.

1488 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute

International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2013 Volume 12, Number 11

8. Gordon, J. (2006). Accountability and global governance: The case of Iraq. Ethics & International Affairs, 20(1), 79–98.

9. Haffner-Burton, E. M., & Montgomery, Alexander H. (2008). Power or plenty: How do international trade institutions affect economic sanctions? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52.

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Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

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13. Kondoch, B. (2001). The limits of economic sanctions under international law: The case of Iraq.

International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, 7, 267–294.

14. Lektzian, D., & Souva, M. (2007). An institutional theory of sanctions onset and success. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 848–871.

15. Malloy, M. P. (2013). Human rights and unintended consequences: Empirical analysis of international economic sanctions in contemporary practice. Boston University International Law Journal, 31, 79–129.

16. McLean, E. V., & Whang, T. (2010). Friends of foes? Major trading partners and the success of economic sanctions. International Studies Quarterly, 54, 427–447.

17. Oskarsson, K. (2012). Economic sanctions on authoritarian states: Lessons learned. Middle East Policy, 19(4), 88–102.

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20. Rarick, C. A., & Han, T. (2010). Economic sanctions revisited: Additional insights into why they fall. Economic Affairs, 68–70.

21. Reyes, C. L. (n.d.). International governance of domestic national security measures: The forgotten role of the World Trade Organization. UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, 14, 2009.

22. Takeyh, R., & Maloney, S. (2011). The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions. International Affairs, 87(6), 1297–1312.

2013 The Clute Institute Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 1489

International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2013 Volume 12, Number 11

NOTES

1490 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute

image1.jpg

Economic Sanctions on Iran and Nuclear Medicine

S. Rasoul Zakavi*

Nuclear Medicine Research Center, Mashhad University of Medical Sciences, Mashhad, Iran

image2.png

ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
Article type:	Please cite this paper as:
	Zakavi SR. Economic Sanctions on Iran and Nuclear Medicine. Asia Ocean J Nucl Med
Editorial
	Biol. 2019; 7(1): 1-3. doi: 10.22038/AOJNMB.2018.36919.1248

“It is not a wise choice!”, this was the reaction of my father when I applied for nuclear medicine residency program 26 years ago. The old retired officer continued that hi-tech nuclear medicine is dependent on multiple advanced sections that may not be easily available especially in the developing countries. Now he is not alive to see that political misconducts have added fuel to the fire.

Global shortage of Technetium-99m in recent years revealed the vulnerability of nuclear medicine and dependency of our clinical departments on the policies of the governments to support production of radiotracers (1). Although the mission of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world”, its application is highly affected by local governmental policies (2).

Recent unilateral withdrawal of USA from Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action-JCPOA) followed by imposing economic, trade and financial sanctions against Iran, has deleterious effect on nuclear medicine either on supply of radiotracers or spare parts of nuclear medicine devices (3). Although medicine is apparently not included in the list of sanctions, secondary sanction, aviation and transport embargo as well as financial restrictions, made it extremely difficult for medical companies

to be able to do any transaction. Payment for the drugs or instruments and shipment of the goods to and from Iran have turned to a lengthy, difficult and risky task. Nuclear medicine seems to be at particular risk due to its link with atomic energy agency.

Multiple reports in the literature have been indicated the harmful effect of previous economic sanctions, on health of Iranian patients (4-9). It has strangled Iranian’s health, disrupted drug supply and negatively affected millions of patients(10). It has shown that the negative effect of sanctions has ranged from death to different complications of disease mainly due to limited access to the drugs. The most critical patients have been affected the worst including children, patients with cancer, hemophilia, cardiovascular disease, asthma and epilepsy (11-14). Nuclear medicine plays important role in diagnosis and treatment of these patients. It seems that among different disciplines of medicine, nuclear medicine is the weakest link in critical conditions. Supply of radiopharmaceuticals, imaging instruments and their spare parts disrupted in previous sanction in 2012 and nuclear medicine departments in Iran were shut down for about 45 days before being able to secure a new source for Molybdenum(15). Furthermore, economic sanctions have been

· Corresponding author: S. Rasoul Zakavi, MD, IBNM, FANMB, Nuclear Medicine Research Center, Mashhad University of Medical Sciences, Mashhad, Iran. Tel/Fax: 05138400494; Email: Zakavir@mums.ac.ir

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecom-mons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Zakavi SR AOJNMB Editorial

resulted in remarkable inflation that kept

most of hi-tech diagnostic and therapeutic modalities out of reach of patients with poor economic conditions. Not to mention that drastic devaluation of the national currency, moved large number of people from middle to lower economic classes and they could not afford medical costs anymore (16).

Iranian experiences from previous sanctions however urged them for local production of radiopharmaceuticals and assemble of radioactive generators. Currently a wide variety of radiopharmaceuticals are locally produced including nearly all types of cold kits, 131I, 201Tl-chloride, 67Ga-citrate, 153Sm-EDTMP, 177Lu-EDTMP, 177Lu-Octreotate, 177Lu-PSMA, 90Y-citrate, 90Y-hydroxyapatite colloid, 188/186Re-sulfur colloid, and 188/186Re-HEDP as well as Mo-99/Tc-99m Generators, Ge-68/Ga-68 generators and Rb-81/ Kr-81m (17). Due to competitive prices of these products, many nuclear medicine departments in developing countries have been importing these radiopharmaceuticals from Iran. Currently, Iran is one of the suppliers of radiopharmaceuticals in Iraq, India, Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, Georgia and few other Asian, and European countries(18). However raw materials have been imported for these productions and secure air transport is mandatory to export the final products, so any sanction in this sections will hamper supply of radiopharmaceuticals in the region far beyond Iran.

Economic sanctions has been used as a tool of pressure in political disputes against many countries including Iraq, Russia, Syria, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea and Haiti and have not resulted to regime change in any of these countries. However there is clear evidence that they resulted in death and severe health problems for many patients in these countries (19-21). As people has the basic right to health, these sanctions can be considered as a violation of basic human rights (4, 22). Human suffering must not be used as a tool for political achievements(22).

In conclusion, recent USA economic sanctions on Iran have been adversely affected practice of nuclear medicine and patient care in the country, that might extend beyond national borders.

References

1. Perkins A, Hilson A, Hall J. Global shortage of medical isotopes threatens nuclear medicine services. BMJ. 2008;337:a1577.

2. Deatsch-Kratochvil AN, Pascual TN, Kesner A, Rosenblatt E, Chhem RK. The international atomic

energy agency’s activities in radiation medicine and cancer: promoting global health through diplomacy. Can Assoc Radiol J. 2013;64(1):2-5.

3. Declaration on radiopharmaceutical sanctions. Iranian Society of Nuclear Medicine. Available at: URL: http://www.irsnm.ir; Accessed on 2018.

4. Kokabisaghi F. Assessment of the effects of economic sanctions on Iranians’ right to health by using human rights impact assessment tool: a systematic review. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2018;7(5):374-93.

5. Kheirandish M, Varahrami V, Kebriaeezade A, Cheraghali AM. Impact of economic sanctions on access to noncommunicable diseases medicines in the Islamic Republic of Iran. East Mediterr Health J. 2018;24(1):42-51.

6. Shahabi S. International sanctions: sanctions in Iran disrupt cancer care. Nature. 2015;520(7546):157.

7. Massoumi RL, Koduri S. Adverse effects of political sanctions on the health care system in Iran. J Global Health. 2015;5(2):020302.

8. Deilamizade A, Esmizade S. Economic sanctions against iran, and drug use in Tehran, Iran: a 2013 pilot study. Subst Use Misuse. 2015;50(7):859-68.

9. Baradaran-Seyed Z, Majdzadeh R. Economic sanctions strangle Iranians’ health, not just drug supply. Lancet. 2013;381(9878):1626.

10. Arya N. Economic sanctions: the kinder, gentler alternative? Med Conflict Survival. 2008;24(1):25-41.

11. Ghiasi G, Rashidian A, Kebriaeezadeh A, Salamzadeh J. The impact of the sanctions made against Iran on availability to asthma medicines in Tehran. Iran J Pharm Res. 2016;15(3):567-71.

12. Asadi-Pooya AA, Tavana B, Tavana B, Emami M. Drug adherence of patients with epilepsy in Iran: the effects of the international economic sanctions. Acta Neurol Belg. 2016;116(2):151-5.

13. Heidari R, Akbariqomi M, Tavoosidana G.

Medical legacy of sanctions in Iran. Nature.

2017;552(7684):175.

14. Hassani M. Impact of sanctions on cancer care in Iran. Arch Bone Jt Surg. 2018;6(4):248-9.

15. Hosseini SA. Impact of sanctions on procurement of medicine and medical devices in Iran; a technical response. Arch Iran Med. 2013;16(12):736-8.

16. Shahabi S, Fazlalizadeh H, Stedman J, Chuang L, Shariftabrizi A, Ram R. The impact of international economic sanctions on Iranian cancer healthcare. Health Policy. 2015;119(10):1309-18.

17. Jalilian AR, Beiki D, Hassanzadeh-Rad A, Eftekhari A, Geramifar P, Eftekhari M. Production and clinical applications of radiopharmaceuticals and medical radioisotopes in Iran. Semin Nucl Med. 2016;46(4):340-58.

18. Radioisotope development & production for industrial & medical applications. ParsIsotpe Company. Available at: URL: http://www.

parsisotope.com; Accessed on 12/15/2018.

19. Sen K, Al-Faisal W, AlSaleh Y. Syria: effects of conflict and sanctions on public health. J Public Health. 2013;35(2):195-9.

2 Asia Ocean J Nucl Med Biol. 2019; 7(1): 1-3.

Editorial AOJNMB Zakavi SR

20. Gibbons E, Garfield R. The impact of economic sanctions on health and human rights in Haiti, 1991-1994. Am J Public Health. 1999;89(10):1499-504.

21. Duttagupta S, Yampolsky D, Chowdhury CA. Economic sanctions and market access for pharmaceuticals: case studies with Russia, cuba and

Iran. Value Health. 2015;18(7):A569.

22. Marks SP. Economic sanctions as human rights violations: reconciling political and public health imperatives. Am J Public Health. 1999;89(10):1509-13.

Asia Ocean J Nucl Med Biol. 2019; 7(1): 1-3. 3

Copyright of Asia Oceania Journal of Nuclear Medicine & Biology is the property of Mashhad University of Medical Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

FOCUS

John J. Forrer and

the US Treasury’s Specially Designated Nations and

Kathleen Harrington

Blocked Persons List (SDN) in any single year, based

The Trump Administration’s

on an analysis by the law firm Gibson Dunn (2019).

The majority of these sanctions were related to

Use of Trade Tariffs as

nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, enhanced sanc-

Economic Sanctions

tions against Russia, and sanctions on Venezuelan

people and entities (Gibson Dunn 2019).

The analysis shown in Figure 1 provides a

clear visual of the uptick in sanctions during the

Trump administration. In the years 2017 through

2018, there is a dramatic increase in additions to

the Specially Designated Nations and Blocked Per-

OVERVIEW

son’s list. Compare that sharp sloping increase

from 2017–2018 to the ebb-and-flow rhythms that

The Trump administration’s enthusiasm for eco-

characterized the experience earlier in this century

nomic sanctions has been reflected in their equally

during the Bush administration (2002–2009) and

passionate embrace of trade tariffs. Both foreign

the Obama administration from 2009 to early 2016.

policy tools have been used to excess well beyond

Neither the Obama nor Bush administrations made

the practices of past administrations. Even most

more than 800 additions to the SDN list during their

notable is the unprecedented re-purposing of trade

entire tenure, but the Trump administration quickly

tariffs as economic sanctions. Rather than using

exceeded the 800 actions cap characteristic of pre-

tariffs as intended by statute to adjust conditions for

vious administrartions.

imports in response to unfair practices with trade

Fundamentally, sanctions are a collection of

partners, the Trump administration has threatened

tools designed to inflict economic losses on coun-

and imposed tariffs to pressure countries to change

tries, institutions, and/or individuals sufficient to

policies they oppose – the exact rationale behind

induce a sought-after change in policy and behav-

the use of economic sanctions. The use of trade tar-

ior. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

iffs as economic sanctions raises important ques-

defines sanctions as both broad-based and oriented

tions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of such

geographically, which would include the tariffs

a practice.

against countries such as Cuba and Iran, while other

forms of sanctions are considered more ‘targeted’.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S AGGRESSIVE USE OF

These targeted sanctions are applied in cases of

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and focus on

specific individuals and entities. These programs

The Trump administration’s use of economic sanc-

may encompass broad prohibitions at the country

tions is best characterized as aggressive, particularly

level as well as sanctions directed at specified tar-

when compared to previous administrations. Eco-

gets (US Department of the Treasury 2018). Sanc-

nomic sanctions have become a go-to foreign pol-

tions are one of many government tools available to

icy tool to support its ‘America First’ foreign policy

further specified national security and foreign policy

strategy. According to the US Treasury Department

goals.

data, in 2017, the United States placed sanctions on

In addition to a disproportionate reliance on

1,500 people, companies, and entities (Harrell 2019).

economic sanctions as the favored foreign pol-

This is 50 percent more than has ever been added to

icy tool, there has been enhanced use of second-

ary sanctions by the Trump

Figure 1

administration.

Secondary

Additions to the SDN List ᵃ by Year

sanctions are a tool designed

Number of newly sanctioned parties

push

foreign

countries,

companies, and

individuals

1600

into halting business dealings

Bush

Obama

Trump

1400

with

countries and entities

1200

on which primary economic

1000

sanctions have been imposed

800

(Harrell 2019). This aggressive

600

push

is evident in countries

400

such

Venezuela,

where

200

National Security

Advi-

sor

John

Bolton

threatened

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

sweeping bans on companies

ᵃ US Treasury’s Specially Designated Nations and Blocked Persons List.

and individuals attempting to

Source: Gibsondunn.com; US Department of the Treasury.

image1.png

John F. Forrer George Washington

image2.jpg

University

image3.jpg

Kathleen Harrington George Washington

University

CESifo Forum 4 / 2019 December Volume 20 23

Figure 2

US Average Tariﬀs on Imports from China

FOCUS

conduct business in Venezu-ela; bans that applied across

image4.png

hundreds of companies

and

Section 301

Aluminum

Steel

individuals

(Goodman

and

Washer

Solar

2017

Smith 2019). The broad scope

23.8%

26.6%

of secondary sanctions, such

21.0%

as those applied to Venezuela,

17.6%

cause significant fringe dam-

age to allied countries such as

12.0%

Spain

and France,

countries

who still have oil

and avia-

3.1%

tion companies operating in

Venezuela. Or the threats of

2017

2018

10 May 2019

1 September

1 October

15 December

secondary sanctions against

2019

every country that conducted

Source: Based on data from Bown (2019); author’s calculation.

commerce with Iran following

the US abrogation of their par-

ticipation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

throughout the year. Increasing how much a prod-

(JCPOA) − see also Calamur (2018).

uct is taxed is one method of using tariffs aggres-

The Trump administration’s liberal use of pri-

sively, and China’s exports into the United States

mary and secondary sanctions is a tool to compel

were threatened by increasingly high percentages

others to adhere to US national security and for-

of tariff tax rates. Along a similar vein, Figure 3

eign policy goals. The Trump administration’s cor-

highlights the percentage of US imports from China

responding aggressive use of trade tariffs has lured

subject to special US trade protection. The United

what has been a clear distinction between sanctions

States has maintained a special protection tariff

as applied through the US Treasury Department and

towards China since the 1980’s, but this figure high-

tariffs pushed forward through the United States

lights how much more expansive this special tariff

Trade Representative (USTR) and the US Department

protection has become in the Trump administration

of Commerce. Employing these two separate for-

(Bown and Zhang 2019b). In essence, the admin-

eign policy tools as one in the same raises question:

istration is threatening to apply the special tariff

should tariffs and sanctions be used in a similar way

protection on more products being imported from

and with similar justifications, and if they are being

China. Both the percentage rate of the tariff and the

used in similar ways, what effect might the dual-use

amount of imports affected by the tariffs have are

purpose of these foreign tools have on effectiveness

markedly higher, revealing an aggressive use of tar-

of US foreign policy?

iffs. Threatened tariff rates and volumes are used

by the Trump administration as leverage points to

USE OF SANCTIONS AND TRADE TARIFFS

further an ‘American first’ economic policy, and in

response to China’s unfair trade practices related

Similar to its expansive use of economic sanctions,

to the forced transfer of American technology and

the Trump administration has also imposed trade

intellectual property (Office of the United States

tariffs on allies and adversaries at an alarming rate.

Trade Representative 2019).

USTR has announced not only more tariffs in terms

In their use of tariffs against China and in numer-

of volume of products globally, but the executive

ous

other instances, the

Trump

administration

body has also applied tariffs

at a higher percentage level

Figure 3

(Office of the United States

US Imports from China Covered by Special Protection by Sector 1980–2018

Trade

Representative 2019).

Other

Electronics and electrical machinery

A more specific example of

Plastics

Metals

this ramping up of tariffs is

Textiles and apparel

exemplified through the tar-

iffs imposed on China. The

Pre-WTO

Post-WTO accession

Peterson Institute for Interna-

tional Economics

developed

two graphics to showcase the

ramp-up of the China tariffs.

Figure 2

highlights

the

increased percentage of the

tariff

rate

threatened

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

the

Trump

administration

Source: Bown and Zhang (2019b).

image5.png

image6.png

24 CESifo Forum 4 / 2019 December Volume 20

flaunts trade tariffs as a foreign policy tool used for similar purposes as economic sanction. The use of tariffs as economic sanctions raises serious ques-tions about the statutory authority and indented goals of this familiar foreign policy tool. Evidence of the Trump administration’s sanctions-like use of tariffs is best demonstrated through the tariff taxes applied on Turkey. The ‘Turkey tariffs’ highlight the increasingly nebulous and nefarious roles tariffs play in the administration’s foreign policy. The first of the tariffs affecting Turkey began on 8 March 2018, when President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation to impose an overall 25-percent ad valorem tax on steel articles imported to the United States from abroad (The White House 2018a). This was applied broadly, across a number of countries.

However, a second presidential proclamation was issued a few months later, on 10 August 2018. This proclamation set to adjust imports of steel into the US, but this time, the proclamation was target-ing specific countries. This second proclamation (the August 10 proclamation) had the stated and legally authorized goal of increasing domestic capacity uti-lization and ensuring the viability of the domestic steel industry (The White House 2018b). The Procla-mation investigation conducted by the US Depart-ment of Commerce recommended that a tariff be applied on certain countries, and Turkey was specif-ically targeted. Turkey is one of the major exporters of steel for domestic use in the United States. Using executive authority granted through Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,1 the tariff levels determined in this August 10 proclamation went into effect. The United States imposed a 50-percent ad valorem tariff rate on steel articles imported from Turkey, a dramatic doubling of the previous 25-per-cent tariff imposed in March.

The tariffs on Turkey illustrate their creep into the realm of sanctions. The tariffs have an under-pinning justification of national security, a terri-tory typically reserved for sanctions. Invoking the national security clause of the Trade Expansion Act to justify sanctions on Turkey is not credible and it is clear the tariffs were imposed to cause economic hardship on Turkey. Also, the messaging surround-ing these tariffs also was more aligned with the fur-therance of foreign policy goals typically befitting a sanction. External messaging through social media outlets such as Twitter explicitly stated that the tar-iff was punishment on Turkish political actions. An August 16, 2018 tweet from Donald Trump’s handle @realDonaldTrump proclaimed the ad valorem tar-iffs imposed just six days before were a reaction to Turkey’s detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson, a major foreign policy concern happening at the same time. The tweet states “we will pay nothing for the release of an innocent man, but we are cutting back

1 See Public Law 87-794-Oct. 11, 1962, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/STATUTE-76/pdf/STATUTE-76-Pg872.pdf.

FOCUS

on Turkey!” ‘Cutting back’ signals the effects of the ad valorem tax: reducing Turkish steel imports by the United States. Such a justification was absent from the official Presidential Proclamations announcing the tariffs.

Around this same time, in early August the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Con-trol imposed sanctions targeting two Turkish offi-cials, Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu, for their role in the arrest and detention of Pastor Brunson. These sanctions had the explicit goal of forcefully expressing the US’ position that Brunson’s continued prosecution was wrongful (US Department of the Treasury 2018). The tariffs and sanctions imposed upon Turkey had sig-nificant overlap both in timing and intent, and again, highlight the heavy use of both policy tools by the Trump administration, but also the significant cross-over of the role of tariffs.

TRADE TARIFFS AS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A GOOD OR BAD IDEA?2

The basic justification for economic sanctions is that economic losses that are sufficiently painful will con-vince another country to change a policy objected to by the sending country. At the same time, countries’ vulnerability to economic sanctions vary widely, and may have many viable options that help them evade the actual effects of an economic sanction. At the heart of a successful economic sanctions pol-icy is knowing (i) how much economic suffering is required to compel the target country to yield and make the sought after change in policy; and (ii) an ability to implement sanctions in such a way that results in real economic losses commensurate with the planned level of losses (Forrer 2017).

The determination of the success of economic sanctions is problematic. Research on economic sanction episodes throughout history have struggled to make a definitive case on the role played by eco-nomic sanctions in determining the outcomes of the events (Hufbauer et al. 2007; Askari et al. 2003). Once imposed, as long as the offending policy remains intact, sanctions could be viewed as a failed effort. If sanctions are removed before the policy has been revoked, claims of failure or premature action could be offered. And if the policy targeted by sanctions is revoked, sanctions can be highlighted as the reason for the change, even if other factors caused the pol-icy change. As in all situations, ‘sanctions don’t work until they do’.

The cost-effectiveness of economic sanctions is more easily assessed. Economic sanctions cause

2 The terms trade tariffs and economic sanctions tend to be used interchangeably as both a tool of foreign policy – a foreign policy strategy – and a legal action taken based on an authority granted to a government agency. Our discussion on trade tariffs as economic sanctions addresses the first sense of the terms largely unanticipat-ed by the second sense.

CESifo Forum 4 / 2019 December Volume 20 25

FOCUS

intended and anticipated economic losses to govern-ment agencies, firms, and individuals in the sending and target countries. Innocent communities also suf-fer economic (and personal) losses due to economic sanctions. Since all these losses can be estimated, an assessment could be made as to whether the value of a change in the offending policy is worth the losses suffered by all parties. It also opens up for consid-eration the question of whether an alternative to economic sanctions would be more cost-effective in achieving the foreign policy goal.

In the context of economic sanctions, trade tariffs might be seen as simply ‘economic sanc-tions-lite’: rather than banning a specific economic activity, trade tariffs have the effect of raising prices on designate products and services, and thereby discouraging their purchase. But economic sanc-tions can be designed with great nuance relating to the level of economic loses and who bears those loses. In practice, trade tariffs do not enhance the capacities of a country to stylize sanctions to have the desired effects. In addition, trade tariffs suffer from the same set of design and enforcement chal-lenges faced by economic sanctions that limit their effectiveness:

· Limited enforcement capacities

· Smuggling

· Fraud

· Evasion

· Re-exporting

Trade tariffs offer no more advantages over eco-nomic sanctions as the legal instruments used to inflict economic losses on countries in an effort to change their policies. But using trade tariffs as eco-nomic sanctions does pervert the established public policy justification for imposing any trade tariff, and thereby undermines public accountability of govern-ment actions taken to pursue foreign policy goals.

Placing a tariff on exports from another country raises the price on those goods and services to the consumers in the country imposing the tariffs. The tariff can be in the form of a fixed fee or percentage of the cost per item. The resultant price increase gives an economic advantage to domestic firms compared to foreign exporting firms. Such a market interven-tion through the use of trade tariffs that are justified by very specific conditions has specific rationales behind this approach.

The adoption of a trade tariff against specific goods and services requires that a finding be con-ducted that shows evidence of unfair trade practices. Such a finding not only justifies the adoption from a public policy perspective, but the analysis of the trade practices in question provides valuable infor-mation to determine the form of the remediate trade tariff. At their core, trade tariffs are justified by cor-recting an unfair trade relationship between coun-

tries. The scope and scale of the tariff – to accomplish that goal – must be tailored to the specific situation. Trade tariffs are by design intended to correct – or at a minimum remediate – trade relationships that impose an unfair condition on a country. Trade tariffs are justified due to their ability to claim that it is solv-ing an existing problem and making it ‘right’.

Alternatively, economic sanctions are justified by the argument that suffering experienced by the sanctioned country is sufficient to persuade it to alter the offending policy in question. It is recog-nized that economic pain on innocents will result in both the sanctioning and target countries, but the importance of achieving the foreign policy in ques-tion should account for this unavoidable collateral as part of the price paid when using an economic sanc-tion. Economic sanctions are justified by pressuring other countries to adopt desired policies.

But to make matters worse, trade tariffs have become the easiest ‘path of least resistance’ for the Trump administration to adopt foreign policies. In the Trump administration, trade tariffs have become the ‘poor person’s’ economic sanctions. Relying on a clause that allows trade tariffs to be invoked at the discretion of the President, trade tariffs allow a path of least resistance to placing economic sanc-tions-like activity on countries in dispute with the US, but not necessarily involving trade issues.

CONCLUSION

The use of trade tariffs to impose economic sanc-tions on other countries may be consistent with the Trump administration campaign of assailing US trade agreements as unfair, and providing a political jus-tification for using trade tariffs as the best remedy, and impinging on the territory of economic sanc-tions. But the conventional policy justification for using trade tariffs as economic sanctions has been circumvented, undermining public accountability for the actions taken by the government and their effectiveness. Any administration that intends to continue using tariffs as a ‘sanction-lite’ tool should have their use clarified and codified in a revision of existing legislative authority. A legislation change would ideally bring more statutory clarity defining the two economic tools (sanctions and tariffs) and could set a foundation for a more accountable for-eign policy approach by and across government agencies. Greater clarity on the boundaries of trade tariffs to advance purposeful US foreign policy would be an available step in that direction.

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CESifo Forum 4 / 2019 December Volume 20 27

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Economic sanctions and academia: Overlooked impact and long-term consequences

Louise Bezuidenhout

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1*, Ola Karrar2, Javier Lezaun1, Andy Nobes ID 3

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· Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, United Kingdom,

2 Department of Statistics, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, Sudan, 3 INASP, Oxford, England, United Kingdom

· louise.bezuidenhout@insis.ox.ac.uk

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OPEN ACCESS

Citation: Bezuidenhout L, Karrar O, Lezaun J, Nobes A (2019) Economic sanctions and academia: Overlooked impact and long-term consequences. PLoS ONE 14(10): e0222669. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222669

Editor: Andrew Carl Miller, East Carolina University Brody School of Medicine, UNITED STATES

Received: May 18, 2019

Accepted: September 4, 2019

Published: October 1, 2019

Copyright: © 2019 Bezuidenhout et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability Statement: Dataset available at

https://osf.io/9tw7x/ .

Funding: This study was funded by the Africa Oxford Initiative through a travel grant held by LB and OK.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Abstract

Financial sanctions are often thought of as the “soft alternative” to armed conflict and are widely used in the 21st century. Nonetheless, sanctions are often criticized for being non-specific in their action, and having impact beyond their intended remit. One often-overlooked area affected by sanctions are academic systems of research and education. Sanctions place “invisible barriers” for research in these countries by limiting access to necessary resources and curtailing their effective use. In this paper we present a national survey of Sudanese academics focused on the impact of 20 years of economic sanctions on their work. It identifies key areas of academic research and education that have been impacted by international sanctions. Moreover, these data highlight how the impact of sanctions on academia is likely to persist long after they are formally lifted. The paper concludes by pro-blematising the current interpretation of jus post bellum, or moral behaviour after conflict. It suggests that the responsibility to make reparations in the form of support for academic sys-tems applies to countries who impose economic sanctions.

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Introduction

This study examines the impact of financial sanctions on higher education and academic research. The introduction briefly introduces the concept of sanctions to the reader, and out-lines why they are an object of concern for robust academic infrastructures.

Sanctions as an alternative to war

Since World War I, sanctions have become increasingly viewed as a liberal alternative to war [1]. Modern sanctions can be largely grouped into two different areas: weapons-trade restric-tions and economic restrictions. Economic sanctions, the focus of this paper, can be imple-mented with varying intensity and scope. For example, the entire opposing economy may be targeted or just one critical sector [1]. Regardless of the type and style of implementation, eco-nomic sanctions may be best understood as actions aiming to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state through a reduction in international trade.

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Sanctions and Sudanese academia

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Since the end of the Cold War the use of sanctions has risen considerably, and the tendency has become even more marked since the turn of the century. For instance, as quoted in Drezner, “between February 2014 and February 2015, the US introduced or amended twenty different sanctions programmes” [2]. While there have recently been fewer comprehensive, multilateral sanctions introduced, states still engage in unilateral or bilateral broad sanctions and multilat-eral, “targeted” sanctions [3]. The latter could include asset freezes, travel bans and smart trade sanctions.

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The US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), for example, interprets comprehensive sanctions as prohibiting all transactions between the sanctioned country and the US (except in special circumstances where a license is granted by OFAC). This means that there can be no imports, exports, financing of goods, distribution of technology and services, or trade broker-ing between American citizens and the sanctioned country [4]. Countries currently under comprehensive, multilateral sanctions include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Syria. Until recently, this list also included Sudan. The US also maintains other, more “targeted” (i.e. counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics) sanctions against specific individuals and entities. These programs may encompass broad prohibitions at the country level as well as targeted sanctions [5].

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Sanctions as indiscriminate tools

Despite their widespread use, sanctions are often criticized for failing to realize their policy goals [1], [3]. In a review of sanctions literature, Mack and Khan write that “the only real dis-agreement in the contemporary sanctions literature relates to the degree to which sanctions fail as an instrument for coercing changes in the behaviour of targeted states. No study argues that sanctions are in general an effective means of coercion, although individual sanction regimes can and sometimes do succeed” [6]. They rarely lead to regime changes or reform [7]. The sanctions regime used against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in particular, have been subject to widespread criticism. It has been noted that “nearly everything for Iraq’s entire infrastructure —electricity, roads, telephones, water treatment—as well as much of the equipment and sup-plies related to food and medicine has been subject to Security Council review” [8]. Indeed, Gordon highlights how the US definitions of “dual use” and “weapons of mass destruction” led to the argument that everything, from water pipes to laundry detergent or children vac-cines, could be used to produce weapons. This understanding enabled the US to prevented critical humanitarian goods from entering Iraq [9].

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The potential of sanctions to trigger broad humanitarian crises relates not only to an expan-

sive interpretation of security, but also to the generally indiscriminate nature of economic

sanctions. The difficulty of limiting economic impact to a single locus means that the effect of

sanctions can spread far beyond their intended reach, leading to widespread suffering [3],

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[ 10 ]. It has been observed that sanctions often lead to an increase in inequality in the targeted

county, often harming rural and non-industrialized areas disproportionally, and that they

often thwart humanitarian and aid efforts unrelated to the targeted state’s political behavior.

Moreover, the effects of sanctions persist after they are lifted, as they can have a negative

impact on the cost of reconstruction and development.

Sanctions and academia: Why the concern?

The indiscriminate effects of sanctions on national infrastructures has been noted in many sit-uations. However, as the world becomes increasingly interconnected and interdependent, it is easy to see how economic sanctions can have widespread impact on areas not traditionally

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associated with economic activity. In this paper we consider the impact of economic sanctions on one such area—academic research and education.

Modern academic research and education is reliant on an international network of collabo-rators, online information, equipment and reagent suppliers, and international travel. More-over, as national actors increasingly promote research, development and innovation (RDI), the boundaries between research and commercial ventures, public, private, and state activities, or education and innovation (in terms of activities, equipment utilized and research outputs), are increasingly blurred. This blurring has been epitomized by the “triple helix” model of uni-versity-industry-government relations proposed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff [ 11 ]. Govern-ments, they suggest, “are offering incentives, on the one hand, and pressing academic institutions, on the other, to go beyond performing the traditional functions of cultural mem-ory, education and research, and make a more direct contribution to "wealth creation. More-over, multi-national institutions such as the European Union, the World Bank and the U.N. are also “moving to embrace concepts of knowledge based economic development that bring the knowledge, productive and regulatory spheres of society into new configurations” [ 11 ].

The embeddedness of modern academia within the national and international economic exchange necessarily raises concerns about the imposition of sanctions. Such concerns must extend beyond recognizing the restrictions on importing equipment or finances from abroad. Indeed, modern sanctions do not only control physical trade, but also online activity. Thus, the same sanctions that stop academics from purchasing laboratory equipment may also be responsible for limiting their access to online data, if the company hosting that data is based in a country that is imposing sanctions. Similarly, some academic publishers in the US are known to have refused submissions from Iranian and Sudanese authors due to by threats of fines of up to $1 million and imprisonment of up to 10 years by the US treasury. Even after legal action caused a revision of these rules, the vagueness of the existing policies have still led to some reluctance on behalf of publishers to accept papers from authors in countries under sanctions [ 12 ]. In this way, the reach of sanctions insidiously extends beyond the intended tar-get to affect all areas of academia.

By introducing barriers in many areas of academic activity, sanctions can be seen to influ-ence what research is done, how it is disseminated, and how students are educated. As many of the countries under long-term sanctions have relatively small and fragile academic communi-ties and low rates of investment in STEM, the impact of sanctions can be devastating. One of the major difficulties in raising these concerns is the lack of evidence from academic commu-nities under sanctions about the impact of these restrictions on their academic activities.

Within the literature on sanctions, there are only a handful of references to the impact of sanctions on academic systems. For example, the aforementioned sanctions on Iraq which had impacted on all areas of Iraqi life and infrastructure, also profoundly affected education at pri-mary, secondary and higher levels, which had previously seen unprecedented improvement before the sanctions [ 13 ]. This has inevitably had a knock-on effect on research capacity and post-conflict research and reconstruction, for example childhood trauma research [ 14 ].

In Iran, US sanctions are known to have harmed scholarly and scientific activities on several levels: restricting international collaborations; travel opportunities for conferences and work-shops; and international collaborations, inevitably reducing scientific output [ 15 ]. Some researchers have reported problems publishing in international journals for political, not sci-entific reasons [ 16 ], [ 17 ], in some cases because of confusion over the authors’ employment by the government [ 18 ]. Scientists have also experienced problems with paying for society sub-scription and event registration [ 16 ]. Whilst there is some evidence of growth in scientific out-put since sanctions were relaxed, this may be partly down to the investment and growth into Iranian-published scientific journals [ 19 ].

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Serbian and South African academics who worked during periods of sanctions (1992–2001 and 1960–1990 respectively) report not only severe restrictions on travel, international collab-oration, access to resources and inability to publish, but also notable psychological effects of isolation [ 20 – 23 ]. Post-sanction recovery in these countries didn’t occur immediately, but was driven by transition into a free market global economy. In the case of Serbia, external support was particularly vital as academics had largely missed out on the digital information revolution [ 20 ], [ 24 ], as well as suffering the effects of hyperinflation and brain drain [ 21 ]. Similar to Iran, research output has been partially improved by the growth in national publishing outlets and government incentivising of publication outputs [ 21 ].

The literature on the long-term impact of sanctions on the growth trajectory of academia after sanctions are lifted is thus very limited and requires further investigation. The coming section empirically addresses these issues, using a survey conducted amongst Sudanese acade-mia as a case study.

Study objectives

While there has been anecdotal discussion about the impact of sanctions on Sudanese acade-mia, there is a paucity of empirical evidence on the subject. This study aimed rectify this over-sight by surveying Sudanese academia regarding their perceptions of the impact of sanctions on their work. It is important to highlight that while the survey responses are are self-reported perceptions of impact, they nonetheless provide insight into the impact of sanctions on daily research and educational activities.

Methodology

Selection of case study

Sudan is one of the few countries that have been subjected to a long-running system of com-prehensive sanctions. In 1993 Sudan was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, leading to a suspension of United States (US) Embassy operations in 1996. In 1997 the US imposed com-prehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the country [ 25 ]. The sanctions included a fairly comprehensive trade embargo, a freeze on government assets, and tight restrictions on financial institutions dealing with Sudan. The sanctions prohibited any transac-tions using US currency or products, and stopped any business which operated in the US from trading with Sudan. This ban covered everything from airplanes to vital health equipment. Similar measures were subsequently introduced by, amongst others, the European Union and the United Kingdom. Moreover, in 2005 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolu-tion 1591 in response to the conflict in Darfur, imposing an embargo on the sale or supply of arms ‘and related material,’ as well as a travel ban and asset freeze on several individuals.

Studies on Sudan show evidence of widespread impact of sanctions on areas integral to national development and economic recovery. These include social entrepreneurship initia-tives, domestic education, medical industry, civil infrastructure, personal and family finances and local businesses [ 25 ]. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that sanctions have also had an impact on the international recognition of Sudanese certifications. Malik notes, for instance, that “required [computing] certifications necessary to advance careers and establish legitimacy are not available in Sudan—Google does not allow their certifications to be received in the country. As a result, researchers and students are forced to either work uncertified, or travel outside of the country to receive the certification” [ 25 ], [ 26 ].

In 2017 the sanctions against Sudan were partially lifted by the US. Nonetheless, it is likely that Sudanese academia will experience the same long-term impact of the international sanc-tions as discussed above. The lack of a comprehensive understanding of the impact of over 20

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years of sanctions on the academic regime also makes it difficult to highlight key areas requir-ing targeted intervention, funding and capacity building.

Limitations of study

This study was carried out in 2018 while President Bashir was still in power, but after the US started to lift the sanctions in 2017. The political situation in Sudan has changed dramatically since this study was conducted, more of which will be discussed below.

The effects of political instability and sanctions are, of course, very difficult to disentangle, and a significant overlap in both action and effect is to be expected. However, sanctions can be seen as uniquely contributing to academic interactions beyond borders. It is this area that the rest of the paper will focus on, namely how sanctions have affected and continue to affect the ability of Sudanese academics to engage with the global science system.

Methodology

Ethics and piloting. In order to gather data around this topic, we designed and dissemi-nated a survey with questions relating to daily research practices, access to online resources and engagement with online resources. The survey was originally developed in English and translated into Arabic. Ethical approval for the dissemination of the survey was granted by the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography Research Ethics Committee at the Univer-sity of Oxford (Ref No.: SAME_C1A_17_103).

The survey was hosted on SurveyMonkey and distributed electronically to teaching staff via institutional emails. A link for the questionnaire was also shared through a number of scien-tific and academic Sudanese networks in social media websites, mainly Facebook and Twitter, recommended by number of active researchers to involve young researchers who are actively interacting through these platforms. The purpose of the survey was clearly outlined on the sur-vey landing page, together with details of data protection and re-use. Potential participants were informed that participation in the survey was entirely voluntary and anonymous. This introductory page also stated that participation in the survey was taken as consent for the use of the data as outlined.

The survey was piloted at the University of Khartoum with 15 academics representing a diversity of gender, age and discipline. Comments from the pilot were incorporated into the final survey design.

Inclusion criteria and dissemination. To determine a roll-out strategy, consultations were held with the director of research in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (HESR) and his deputy, and with a group of senior professors in different research domains. According to their advice, we targeted the three top-ranked universities in Sudan as well as research institutes with active research groups and well reputed research leadership and network-ing. These universities and institutes contain the majorities of senior professors contributing to scientific publication and training of younger generation of master and PhD students.

The survey had very broad inclusion criteria, and was open to any individual who was employed as full/part-time academic staff (postdoctoral researchers, lecturer or higher aca-demic grade) at a Sudanese academic institution. It was also open to full/part-time postgradu-ate students (Masters or PhD at Sudanese universities) and individuals working in governmental/commercial institutions who are involved in research activity in Sudan. Exclu-sion criteria were individuals not currently engaged in research activities, not currently employed in Sudan, or engaged only in undergraduate studies. Demographic data was col-lected about age, gender, discipline, years of research activity and research institution so as to allow selected analyses.

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The voluntary survey was live for a three-month period between November 2017 and Feb-ruary 2018. The survey had broad inclusion criteria, requiring participants to be employed by an academic institute, resident in Sudan and in possession of at least an undergraduate degree. In total, 328 completed responses were collected. The major research groups represented were in the fields of health sciences, life sciences, natural sciences, social science, engineering and business. The demographics of the study population are presented schematically below.

Data management. All data from the survey was fully anonymised at point of collection. The data was stored securely on a password-protected cloud storage facility and backed up on the password protected University of Oxford server. Only the authors of the study had access to the raw data. In keeping with the agreed project outline, a summary of the survey data has been archived at the Open Science Foundation ( https://osf.io/9tw7x/ ), and the raw data will be destroyed 2 years after the completion of the project publications.

Results and discussion

Demographics

The respondents were predominantly male (61.5%) ( Fig 1 ), and relatively young, with 42% under 35 age bracket, a further 27% in the 35–44 age bracket and the remaining 31% were over 45 ( Fig 2 ). In terms of experience, 26% had spent less than 5 years in academia, 19% between 5 and 10 years, and the remaining 54% had over 10 years of experience ( Fig 3 ). Those with a doc-torate made up 43% of participants, with 38% having achieved a Master’s and 15% a Bachelor’s degree ( Fig 4 ).

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Fig 1. Gender of respondents.

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Fig 2. Age of respondents.

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The survey questions were grouped into two main sections. The first aimed to examine the perceived impact of 20 years of sanctions on all areas of academic activity. The second section asked respondents to identify areas that needed further investment in order to facilitate the effective growth of Sudanese academia in the post-sanction era.

One of the first questions on the survey was whether respondents felt that sanctions had impacted their ability to function as an academic and researcher. As Fig 5 demonstrates, a compelling 98.67% of respondents answered “yes,” unequivocally supporting our assumption that the impact of sanctions was significant and worthy of detailed study.

The impact of sanctions on Sudanese academia

Academia and the economic climate under sanctions. When the survey was designed, it was recognized that separating out the impact of sanctions and the general economic climate would be very difficult. Indeed, as the sanctions were intended to cause economic downturn, sometimes these “cause and effect” assignations were one and the same. Indeed, it is highly likely that the imposition of sanctions and the resultant economic downturn led to curtailed budgets for academia and less investment in academic infrastructures. In consequence, some of our results will be similar to reports from other low/middle-income countries that are not necessarily under sanction. The issue of how limited financial investment in academia leads to lack of equipment, reagents and research infrastructures across LMICs has been researched and discussed widely (10,11).

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Fig 3. Years of experience in academia.

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Readers might therefore be tempted to dismiss the reported concerns about economics as “general problems for LMICs”. Nonetheless, countries subjected to extensive sanctions differ from other LMIC economies in several respects:

· Inability to access currency: banking restrictions curtail purchasing with foreign currency as well as access to funds held abroad;

· Lack of equipment and reagents: funds are not necessarily absent, but are difficult to spend

· Purchasing power: sanctioned economies such as Sudan may experience hyper-inflation that can lead to currency devaluation and lower purchasing power

· Addressing inequalities: researchers may not be eligible for funds or support to address resource shortages

These distinctions were evident in the responses for the question: “select the top three chal-lenges you experience while managing a research grant under sanctions”. The most frequent response (65.22%) was “banking restrictions complicate research-related purposes”. The next two responses were “distributing the grant funds to cover necessary core purchases such as hardware and software” (45.7%) and “accessing funds from funding bodies” (39.1%). These responses clearly show that researchers operating in sanctioned economies face difficulties in mobilizing and utilizing available funds.

Funding under sanctions. Only 1/3 of respondents said that they had received research funds in the period between 1993 and 2017. The majority of respondents who said that they

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Fig 4. Highest degree obtained.

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had received funding were recipients of national funding under $10000. This would suggest that most of the research projects would be short/medium length and collect smaller datasets. This has widespread complications that are often under-recognized that shape research prac-tices. Necessitating academics to commit to short, relatively small research projects often causes difficulties for the individual researcher in forging a coherent body of research and data. This can cause them to be excluded from future collaborations and from contributing high-impact publications to their field (12).

It is also likely that lack of access to international funds and funded research networks has long-term impacts on the diversity of the research landscape. This survey data highlights the need for a comprehensive review of Sudanese publications and funding in the sanctioned period. This will enable the government and international funding community to identify areas that are critically under-funded and under-represented within the Sudanese academic landscape.

Access to equipment, hardware/software under sanctions. Academic research and edu-cation are increasingly reliant on hard/software and other equipment, much of which is made in the Global North. It can become very difficult to procure the necessary equipment from countries under sanction, meaning that the sanctions can have significant impact on the style, content and continuation of academic research and education. Moreover, as the rate of tech-nological innovations speeds up, sustained periods of sanctions can leave academic communi-ties considerably out of date.

When asked respondents to rank the areas in which sanctions had most affected their aca-demic activities, the responses showed considerable diversity ( Fig 6 ). This suggested that the

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Fig 5. Did sanctions impact on respondents ability to function as an academic and researcher?

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sanctions had wide-reaching and pervasive influence. Of all options, however, “access to equipment and reagents” was ranked the most impacted, while “access to peer-reviewed publi-cations” was the lowest.

The challenges of acquiring laboratory equipment and reagents is readily understandable given the import bans imposed by the sanctions regimes. In contrast, however, the challenges experienced in accessing information and communication technology (ICT) software are per-haps more surprising. In response to the question: what challenges do you face with regards to computing hardware and software in your research environment, the responses suggested widespread challenges ( Fig 7 ).

Interestingly, however, the two highest ranking statements were lack of access to software and lack of access to software updates ( Fig 8 ). As Sudanese academics are currently unable to access products such as Kaggle due to the location of the owner company (Google), this is per-haps unsurprising. In the following question respondents admitted using software from a vari-ety of sources, including free and open source software (FOSS) (64% agree/strongly agree), copies of proprietary software that they did not purchase (65% agree/strongly agree), or soft-ware sent from colleagues overseas (42% agree/strongly agree).

Based on these results it would appear that a significant number of participants were using pirated or unlicensed proprietary software. To a greater extent, this would therefore explain their reported inability to get software updates. Nonetheless, such results seem incompatible with the 64% of respondents claiming to use FOSS. It is, of course, possible that the term FOSS was not familiar to respondents, and that they took it to mean “free” rather than “open source” software (13). In order to probe this further, one of the authors based in Sudan (OK) attempted

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Fig 6. What areas of academic activity have been most impacted by international sanctions?

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to download a commonly-used FOSS, R Studio. Without using a VPN she was unable to do so.

Such experiences suggest that the access to FOSS is extremely problematic within Sudan.

Availability of data and papers under sanctions. As many publishers are commercial entities, they are subject to the same expectations of compliance as any other company. The vast majority of academic publishers are located in Europe and the US, causing the dissemina-tion of research outputs from countries under sanction to also be problematic. This—particu-larly for those requiring an Article Processing Charge (APC)—can make them unwilling or unable to accept submissions from academics based in countries under sanction.

Probing further into the difficulties experienced by Sudanese researchers in accessing data online, respondents were asked to select statements that reflected their own personal experi-ences. 85.9% said they “struggled to pay membership fees to access data sites”. These difficul-ties came not only from a lack of research funds to cover such costs, but also due to the difficulty of making online financial transactions using Sudanese credit cards. Under sanc-tions, companies based in countries imposing sanctions on Sudan were not allowed to accept transactions from Sudanese accounts (Executive order 13067 [ 27 ]). It is important to recognize that this ban not only affected commercial institutions, but also include any academic network, databases or organization that banks or operates within a country imposing sanctions.

Another key challenge for Sudanese academics was IP blocking. 78.4% of respondents reported having “access blocked from certain sites because of their Sudanese IP address”. This practice has significant implications for access to online data, as seemingly open data resources because inaccessible due to the location of the researcher attempting to access them.

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Fig 7. What computing hardware and software challenges are currently experienced by Sudanese academics?

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In addition, 62.31% of respondents reported not having “access to the software necessary to download the data” ( Fig 9 ). Similar to the issues relating to membership fees described above, many Sudanese researchers struggle to purchase research software due to the difficulties of making international/online purchases. This can lead to situations in which they are unable to analyse the data they are able to gather due to the lack of appropriate software.

Risk averseness and collaborations under sanctions. It is important to recognize that many sanctions scenarios make specific exemption for certain areas deemed vital to the popula-tion, such as healthcare. Since 2013, the areas of exemption in the Sudanese sanctions have also explicitly included academic activities [ 28 ]. Nonetheless, changing sanctions regimes are not nec-essarily communicated to individual businesses—or indeed academic institutions. This can lead to lags in demonstrable changes [ 26 ]. Within our own collaboration, we experienced consider-able difficulty making financial transactions between our universities in the UK and Sudan.

Perhaps even more problematic is that boundaries between research/commercial ventures, public/private/state activities, and education/innovation (in terms of activities, equipment uti-lized and research outputs) are increasingly blurred. This can mean that foreign businesses, collaborators and universities are unwilling to take the risk of possibly violating sanctions and preferentially avoid interacting with academics from countries under sanction. This “voluntary isolationism” extends beyond sharing/selling equipment, reagents, samples and hard/software and includes endorsing academic travel, collaboration, international networks and the acquisi-tion of international research grants [ 12 ], [ 29 ].

No doubt in part due to lack of awareness and risk-averseness, many Sudanese academics reported having problems accessing international research funding, networks and

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Fig 8. How do Sudanese academics currently overcome software challenges?

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collaboration. Respondents were asked to order statements about how they perceived sanc-tions to impact on their ability to interact with the global scientific community ( Fig 10 ). The statement receiving the highest score was “sanctions affect my ability to access international research funds”. This observation is reinforced by the anecdotal evidence and weblinks offered by a number of respondents where funders explicitly stated that researchers from Sudan were ineligible to apply. These responses correspond to a later question about international funding, where only 12% of respondents said that they had received international funding. The second highest scoring statement was “sanctions affect my ability to form and sustain international collaborations”.

Areas requiring further investment in order to facilitate the effective growth of Sudanese academia in the post-sanction era

The previous section outlines some of the (many) areas in which sanctions have impacted on Sudanese academia. The survey data strongly suggests that sanctions have had a marked, nega-tive effect on the ability of Sudanese academia to develop along a similar trajectory as compara-ble, un-sanctioned countries. The data also suggests that Sudanese academia is not necessarily in the position to immediately take advantage of the recent changes in sanctions.

Relying on the resilience of systems is not sufficient. In the 20 years of economic sanc-tions, the Sudanese government has made efforts to sustain their academic community through targeted funding. This was evident in the responses to a range of questions. For instance, 50% of respondents agreed that they had “received some kind of fund/grant for your

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Fig 9. Problems of accessing publications and data experienced by Sudanese academics.

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study or research during the period between 1993 and 2017”. Of these respondents, 73% of respondents agreed that they had the “opportunity to study for a postgraduate degree outside of Sudan”, and 40% said that they had received “national funding for the studies abroad”.

Similarly, as discussed above, 40.7% of respondents confirmed that they had received fund-ing for research projects. Of those that had received funding between 1993 and 2017, 47.8% had received small national grants of under $10000. Larger grants were relatively scarce, with only 10.9% receiving national funding over $10000 and 17.4% international grants of the simi-lar sizes. 58% of respondents said that they had “published a paper in a peer-reviewed journal”, but less than half of respondents had published more than 5 papers in the last 5 years.

These low levels of research outputs are also reflected in national data on publications. Sco-pus data suggests that following the start of sanctions in 1997, there was a visible dip in publi-cations, including international co-authorships. The number of publications has risen tenfold since, most notably in the area of medicine, but in line with global averages since the explosion of the internet era. It is currently too soon to consider publication data since the end of sanc-tions in 2017—however, some preliminary data from Scopus suggests a significant rise in pub-lications in computer science, engineering and mathematics. (Scimago Journal and Country Rank: Sudan, 2019, https://www.scimagojr.com/countrysearch.php?country=sd , accessed 26th July 2019)

In comparision, neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia have experienced sig-nificantly more growth during the same time period. This suggests that sanctions have left a lasting mark on Sudanese academia, requiring Sudanese scientists to now play ‘catch up’ to their neighbours [ 29 ]. While the efforts of the Sudanese government to sustain the academic

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Fig 10. Difficulties experienced by Sudanese academics in engaging with the international research community.

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community are important, it is inappropriate to assume that these efforts have been sufficient to enable the national academic community to seamlessly re-integrate with global academia.

Major investments are needed. In response to an open question on the current issues relating to sharing and accessing research data online, one respondent said: Most of the Suda-nese community (including myself) is so behind on data usage and technology that even if it were open we wouldn't know how to use it efficiently. This comment was representative of the 42 responses to the open question, suggesting a pervasive negativity regarding the current state of Sudanese academia. The idea that one “does not know what one does not know” encapsulates the feeling of being “left behind” by the international research community. The comments sug-gested that considerable investment in academic infrastructures were perceived as urgent.

In recent years there has been a rise in investments in African academia. Many funding bodies, such as the Wellcome Trust and the Gates Foundation, have earmarked considerable funds for funding African research projects. As the sanction regimes against Sudan dissipate, the eligibility of Sudanese academics for these funds can be expected. While this, of course, represents an important opportunity for research capacity building in Sudan, it must be recog-nized that such funding structures will not necessarily address the massive research technology deficit in the country. The majority of these funding initiatives offer project-specific funds that only allow project-related equipment purchases. They do not fund “core” laboratory equip-ment or other non-essential items [ 30 ]. While there are a small number of equipment broker-age and/or donation schemes, such as Seeding Labs and TReND in Africa, they are not large enough to be able to counter country-wide deficits immediately. If Sudan is to rely solely on

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these funding models, it is unlikely that infrastructural deficit will be quickly or efficiently addressed.

An additional complication of the sustained technological deficit relates to the “not know-ing what one does not know” referred to above. For 20 years Sudanese academics have been marginalized from technological developments in their fields of research. This has left many without experience in the use of many of the research technologies currently in use. Effectively addressing the technological deficit thus also requires training for researchers in the use of the equipment they acquire. Moreover, there is a critical need for training for the support staff and technicians that will be responsible for the maintenance, calibration and repair of the research equipment.

Lack of contacts, networks and social capital. In a final open question, respondents were invited to identify “any other key issues challenging Sudanese academia”. Amongst other things, responses included language barriers/training in English communication (5 responses), learning how to collaborate (6 responses) and network at conferences (3 responses) as skills needed by Sudanese academics. These responses point to the perceived need for training in the soft skills that play an increasingly important role in modern academia. In particular, the responses highlighted the skills associated with direct communication with the international academic community.

The difficulties of international travel have left a lasting legacy for Sudanese academia. In the past 20 years, academics have struggled to attend international conferences and workshops. In addition to losing the opportunity to present their work and gain feedback on their research, academics have lost the chance to network amongst their peers. Such networking leads to greater research visibility, and often results in international collaborations.

Sudanese academics are thus placed in a difficult position. Sustained travel-related isolation means that many have few international contacts and active research networks. Moreover, lack of training in the “academic soft skills” can make them apprehensive of their future net-working successes. Viewed collectively, it may be suggested that Sudanese academia currently experiences a deficit in “social capital”. As defined by Pierre Bourdieu (1983), this refers to "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recogni-tion” [ 31 ]. It is clear that efforts are needed to address this deficit in social capital through skill enhancement and increased travel, although clear strategies on how this could be done remain problematic. Indeed, increasing social capital cannot be reduced to increased opportunities to network, but the mutual adoption of a shared identity and understanding, norms and values, as well as shared trust, cooperation and reciprocity.

Skill shortages. In a number of questions, the survey respondents identified key skill shortages that they felt would impact Sudanese academia’s ability to benefit from the changing sanction regimes. Respondents were asked to rank statements in response to the question: “as sanctions are lifting, Sudanese academics will have increasing opportunities to engage with the international academic community. Do you feel that there are skill/resource gaps that you would like assistance with?”

All the statements offered ( Fig 11 ) received very similar weightings, indicating that respon-dents perceived the need for a range of interventions. Nonetheless, of all the statements the highest ranked was the need for “training in the use of online resources, such as collections of articles, data and FOSS”.

Similarly, when asked about communicating research to the global scientific community, the respondents selected “assistance in learning publishing/peer review processes” as the most important. Similarly, a question on research data had the need for “training in data manage-ment skills” as the most critical requirement. Together these responses suggest that the

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Fig 11. What skills are most necessary for Sudanese academics?

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sustained isolation of the Sudanese academic community has left skill gaps in the ability to not only communicate research findings, but to make use of the research findings of others.

The survey concluded with an open question where respondents were invited to add any other issues they viewed as currently challenging Sudanese academics. Respondents (73 respondents) identified language barriers/training in English communication (5 responses), as well as training in “scientific thinking” (4 responses), writing papers (10 responses), and ethics training (4 responses) as of importance. Respondents also identified the need to learn how to collaborate (6 responses) and to network at conferences (3 responses) as skills needed by Suda-nese academics. From the responses it is evident that the respondents considered a range of the so-called “soft skills” as vital for academic careers. In particular, skills associated with direct communication were deemed as lacking, undoubtedly linked to the impact that travel bans have had on international conference attendance and collaborations.

Discussion

A rapidly changing milieu

In January 2017, the US began to lift economic and trade sanctions on Sudan, due to coopera-tion from the Sudanese government in fighting terrorism, reducing conflict, and denying safe haven to South Sudanese rebels, as well as improving humanitarian access to people in need.

In October 2017 the US permanently lifted all 1997 sanctions after Sudan cut all ties with the North Korean regime of Kim Jong Un [ 32 ]. While other countries maintain weapons embar-goes against Sudan, many have similarly adjusted their economic sanctions. The sanctions

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imposed by the United Nations Security Council in relation to the Darfur conflict remain in place [ 33 ].

While the lifting of US sanctions was met with optimism, the hoped-for economic regener-ation remained absent. Indeed, since 2017 the Sudanese economy has been plagued by sluggish growth and hyper-inflation. Moreover, Sudanese citizens continued to report continued diffi-culties accessing foreign goods and services. According to a recent news report, “Sudanese offi-cials blame the US—suggesting that Washington has not properly spread the word that there is no longer any risk involved in doing business in Sudan. Others, though, feel that the Sudanese government used the sanctions to mask its own responsibility for the deteriorating living stan-dards” [ 33 ].

In December 2018 a series of demonstrations broke out in a number of Sudanese cities, due at least in part due to the rising cost of living and the national economic [ 34 ]. These protests rapidly turned into a nation-wide movement demanding the resignation of President Omar al-Bashir. In April the military removed al-Bashir from power, but failed to implement a civil-ian-led transitional government [ 35 ]. Following almost 7 months of extreme unrest a deal was agreed between the military and civilian protesters and a period of transition was entered lead-ing to elections in 2022 [ 36 ].

Going forward

Sudanese academia seems at an impasse. 20 years of sanctions have had a marked effect on the academic community, research infrastructures and practices, but the recent lifting of these sanctions will not return the situation of “business as usual”. This survey demonstrated that the imposition of sanctions will have long-term effects far into the sanction-free future. The sanctions have isolated, and will continue to isolate, Sudanese researchers.

While Sudan is gradually being included on funding schemes (such as the UK Global Chal-lenges Research Fund), there is a pervasive silence about whether national governments (and the research communities in these countries) owe Sudanese academia some kind of reparative investment. Our survey clearly shows that assuming the Sudanese academic community will seamlessly be able to re-integrate and be instantly globally competitive are both naive and lazy.

The first set of results presented data about the long-term effect of sanctions on academic growth. The second set of results flagged areas urgently needing attention, such as investments in technological infrastructures, up-skilling activities and networking opportunities. While these suggestions are very similar to other capacity building activities on the African continent, they differ in terms of chronology and moral justification. The former highlights the urgent need for these interventions to ensure that the negative long-term impacts of sanctions are minimized as soon as possible. Ensuring a timeous response will enable academic systems to recover effectively from the enforced isolation.

The latter difference refers to the reason why such activities should be undertaken. Capacity building activities amongst LMIC academia are normally presented according to the more general justifications for aid [ 37 ], whereby both contributors and recipients derive benefit from the interaction through good-will, mutual collaborations and a broader community of expertise. In addition to these humanitarian and distributive justice arguments, the responsi-bility for post-sanction activities must be recognized to carry another form of moral duty as sanctions are understood as a form of aggression.

Jus post poenas

In modern warfare the concept of jus post bellum refers to the post-battle activities aimed at building a “just and lasting peace” [ 38 ]. Scholars such as Brian Orend have proposed a

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deontological underpinning for a three-pronged approach to the morality of armed conflict [ 39 ]. Appropriate post-war actions include a range of activities that focus on stabilising and rebuilding war-torn societies and restoring/implementing democratic governance [ 38 ], [ 40 ], [ 41 ]. These activities are not only recognized as vital for sustaining the peace within the affected country, but an important aspect of the victor’s just war defence for military intervention.

Despite economic sanctions being viewed as the liberal alternative to war [1], there has been little systematic discussion on what would constitute peace-building activities for sus-tained economic sanctions would constitute. To paraphrase the terminology above, what would be a jus post poenas (we use the Latin term poena to refer to sanctions, which demotes a punishment, penalty, or “to pay the price”). As a result, there is little systematic evidence detailing the types of support offered to nations recently emerging from sanctions. Nonethe-less, it is important to recognize that the lifting of sanctions does not guarantee that countries automatically return to “business as usual”. Particularly in the case of long-term, widespread sanctions there could be extremely significant and long-lived implications. In addition to the obvious impact on the national economy, these could include:

· Social systems needing to realign with global trends

· Outmoded systems of technology

· Lack of international trade/collaboration

This lack of post-sanctions peacebuilding activities is exacerbated by the highly variable response from the international business community. The lifting of economic sanctions is unevenly publicized, and the implementation largely up to the individual company. Many businesses will thus delay updating sanction information—either from lack of knowledge, apa-thy or excessive caution. As a result, the impact of sanctions can be perpetuated beyond their legitimate end as companies neglect to update their financial practices [ 42 ].

All of these issues have significant implications for the academic community. Indeed, lifting sanctions cannot be seen as automatic reintegration into the international science community. Depending on the length and severity of a regime of sanctions, academic systems could face long-term physical, social and regulatory challenges. Physical challenges could include out-dated research infrastructures that require considerable financial investment to modernize. Social challenges could include a dearth of international collaboration, lack of international recognition for existing research, lack of engagement with current research trends, and a scar-city of key skills (such as data science) that are defining modern research. Regulatory compli-cations could arise from a lack of alignment between in-country regulations governing research (such as biosafety and biosecurity) and international standards, which could hamper future funding and collaboration relationships. Moreover, as mentioned above, widespread tardiness within commercial companies to remove sanction-related restrictions in their finan-cial systems could mean that academics continue to face challenges in making international/ online purchases for reagents and equipment.

Recognizing these multifaceted challenges raises important questions. Most broadly, it necessitates that we question what jus post poenas should mean for situations of sanctions— both for those imposing the sanctions, and for those receiving them. In such cases, if educa-tion, research and innovation are recognized as important elements of economic growth, is there an expectation that jus post poenas activities extend to supporting the reintegration of previously-sanctioned academics into the international academic community. If so, does the responsibility lie solely at a national level, or does the international academic community bear some responsibility towards supporting academic re-integration? This section briefly

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considers four questions relating to developing a jus post poenas for academia recovering from sanction regimes. The relative silence about how to re-integrate the Sudanese academic com-munity—and who is responsible–must be seen as symptomatic of a broader problem with eco-nomic sanctions, namely the lack of jus post poenas in addressing the aftermath of sanction regimes.

Responsibility: Finding where the “buck stops”

One of the most obvious problems of assigning a jus post poenas responsibility for sanctions is the nebulous nature of both the implementer and the recipient. In large part, this is due to the pervasive and non-specific effect of economic sanctions. Indeed, as we highlight in this paper, the academic community was not the explicit target of the sanctions imposed on Sudan (and, indeed, since 2013 were explicitly exempted from these sanctions). Petitioning implementer nations for financial investments in academic capacity building are likely to be fraught with attempts to assign, or shift, blame.

Another key problem relating to the non-specific impact of economic sanctions involves the inevitable “prioritisation” of development targets that would guide any jus post poenas activities. If any money is dedicated, it is likely that this will be directed to peace-building activ-ities, reinvigorating manufacturing or developing structures to support democracy. Such pri-oritization reflects the close relationship between the security and peace building communities [ 43 ], from which academia is largely absent. This is not to say, however, that this exclusion is inevitable. The prominent role that RDI play in national development strategies [ 44 ] suggest that future conversations are possible . . . but they do not occur yet.

Who, then, bears the responsibility for addressing both the immediate and long-term impact? If, as suggested, it is unlikely that there will be considerable traction from national governments, where should pressure be applied? We suggest that the responsibility lies with the global academic community—researchers, funders and related stakeholders. The modern milieu of research is characterised by the Open Science movement that priorises the free and open sharing of scientific resources in a manner uninhibited by borders, disciplines or societal positions [ 45 ]. Open Science is underpinned—and dependent on—by a commitment to egali-tarianism. Highlighting that sanctions thwart this egalitarian ideal should place the responsi-bility for jus post bellum firmly at the feet of the global science community, and places a moral duty not to ignore the insidious barriers that sanctions erect in the seemingly open world.

Activism: Addressing the “transformation lag”

One of the difficulties of addressing the long-term impacts of economic sanctions is the uneven way in which information about the lifting of sanctions is disseminated to commercial (and non-commercial) entities. Indeed, Sudanese officials suggest that the US has not properly spread the word that there is no longer any risk involved in doing business in Sudan [ 42 ]. Anecdotal evidence from Sudanese academics suggest that many of the companies they inter-act with maintain the trade restrictions they utilized during the sanction period. A key element of effective jus post poenas would thus involve ensuring that companies providing academic resources are cognizant of sanction changes.

For countries such as Sudan, motivating companies to update, change or refresh their cur-rent business strategies in their favour is complicated by the relative size of the Sudanese aca-demic market. As it continues to represent a very small portion of the global research market, there is little incentive for these companies to invest time and financial resources in overhaul-ing their business practices. Nonetheless, the ideology of the global (Open) academic

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community recognizes that academic communities around the world deserve the same oppor-tunities to flourish as academics, regardless of context.

Empathy: Committing beyond sanctions

In many cases, sanctions are symptomatic of broader national challenges. Indeed, the removal of sanctions does not automatically guarantee that researchers will be working in stable and flourishing national contexts. In many cases the imposition of sanctions is not solely about ideological differences, but symptomatic of activities resulting from poor governance, lawless-ness and state mismanagement.

Such is undoubtedly the case in Sudan, a nation that has recently experienced extreme political turmoil. In situations such as this, it is unlikely that the academic system will receive the necessary support needed for rejuvenation in the near future. This observation is sup-ported by survey responses, where respondents ranked political instability as equally disruptive to their work as academics ( Fig 12 ). It is highly likely that they will continue to face consider-able challenges in the post-sanction future. Such challenges, unfortunately, do not necessarily go away overnight.

Further compounding the post-sanction challenges of Sudanese academics is the continued hyper-inflation and economic instability [ 46 ]. The currency has gone through a period of rapid devaluing and Sudanese academics—regardless of their new ability to apply for interna-tional grants—will struggle with problems of budgeting and international purchasing (due to lack of forex). Such situations significantly complicate efforts to build research capacity. This

Fig 12. Political instability is as impactful as sanctions on Sudanese academia.

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financial uncertainty undoubtedly contributes to the persistent “brain drain” experienced by Sudan, that is similarly undermines other fragile academic systems. The 2016 UNESCO Sci-ence Report: Towards 2030 drew attention to the impact of conflict and brain drain on devel-opment. It pointed out that between 2002 and 2014, Sudan lost more than 3,000 junior and senior researchers to migration.

Asking the global academic community to engage in jus post poenas activities—in Sudan and in other countries—is thus not likely to be straightforward. The challenges associated with conducting research/networking/educational activities in unstable states are well recognized. In order to ensure interventions that are effective and have longevity thus requires a firm moral commitment, practical support and pragmatic experience sharing. Effective jus post poe-nas needs to be a long-term strategy, and cannot be thought of as once-off activities or a brief financial commitment.

Concluding comments

We recognize that sanctions are a difficult topic to address. They sit at the nexus between secu-rity, national identity and social values and raise uncomfortable tensions between individual and academic identities. These tensions should not be minimized, and the individual interpre-tations of what constitutes “right action” should be respected. Nonetheless, the immediate and long-term impact of economic sanctions have the potential to damage present and future aca-demic research in affected countries. In turn, this has widespread implications for economic and social development. We therefore advocate strongly for discussions about how jus post poenas activities could be developed to ensure that the impact on academia is minimized.

Acknowledgments

LB would like to thank Clare Weightman for her suggestion for the term jus post poenas.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.

Data curation: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.

Formal analysis: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.

Funding acquisition: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Javier Lezaun.

Investigation: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.

Methodology: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.

Project administration: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.

Resources: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.

Software: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.

Supervision: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.

Validation: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.

Visualization: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.

Writing – original draft: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Javier Lezaun, Andy Nobes.

Writing – review & editing: Louise Bezuidenhout, Javier Lezaun, Andy Nobes.

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Gutmann, Jerg; Neuenkirch, Matthias; Neumeier, Florian; Steinbach, Armin

Working Paper

Economic sanctions and human rights: Quantifying the legal proportionality principle

ILE Working Paper Series, No. 12

Provided in Cooperation with:

University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)

Suggested Citation: Gutmann, Jerg; Neuenkirch, Matthias; Neumeier, Florian; Steinbach, Armin

(2018) : Economic sanctions and human rights: Quantifying the legal proportionality principle, ILE Working Paper Series, No. 12, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg

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WORKING PAPER SERIES

Economic sanctions and human rights:

Quantifying the legal proportionality principle

Jerg Gutmann

Matthias Neuenkirch

Florian Neumeier

Armin Steinbach

Working Paper 2018 No. 12

May 2018

NOTE: ILE working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes.

They have not been peer-reviewed.

Economic sanctions and human rights:

Quantifying the legal proportionality principle

Jerg Gutmann∗, Matthias Neuenkirch†, Florian Neumeier‡, and Armin Steinbach§

ABSTRACT

The proportionality principle, as the cardinal principle of international law, includes a necessity and a proportionality test, both of which rest on empirical premises. The necessity test involves an assessment of whether a legal sanction is well-suited to achieve its objective. The proportionality test questions the causal link between the sanction and the human rights situation in the country against which the sanction is aimed. This study analyzes the empirical basis of the proportionality principle by examining the consequences of economic sanctions for the target country’s human rights situation. We use endogenous treatment-regression models to test the empirical basis of the pro-portionality principle by estimating the causal average treatment eﬀect of US economic sanctions on diﬀerent types of human rights within a uniform empirical framework. We find that economic sanctions do not pass the legal necessity test in cases where the purpose of the sanctions is to improve the human rights situation. On the con-trary, we find that such sanctions actually lead to a deterioration of the human rights situation. Moreover, our finding that the sanctions have no eﬀect on basic, economic, and emancipatory human rights calls into question the dominant view that economic sanctions are disproportionate. On a general note, our study underscores the empirical contingencies of a core legal principle under international and national law.

∗University of Hamburg, jerg.gutmann@uni-hamburg.de.

†University of Trier, neuenkirch@uni-trier.de.

‡ifo Institute Munich, neumeier@ifo.de.

§European University Institute (Florence), armin.steinbach@eui.eu.

· Introduction

Economic sanctions theory claims that economic pressure on civilians translates into pressure on the government for policy change (Hafner-Burton 2014). However, a widely held criticism of this claim is that economic sanctions frequently fail to achieve desired policy changes, while still harming the civilian population (de Waart 2015; Peksen 2011). In legal scholarship, there are various strands of literature touching upon the subject of economic sanctions. One strand focuses on the lawfulness of economic sanctions, adopted either by the United Nations (UN) (Reinisch 2001; O’Connell 2002, 64ﬀ.; Davidsson 2003; Happold 2016; Kondoch 2001, 281), the European Union (EU) (Orakhelashvili 2015) or the United States (US) (Hernández-Truyol 2009; Baek 2008). Those contributions deal with issues such as the legal basis for economic sanctions under the UN framework of collective security (O’Connell 2002, 70ﬀ.; Davidsson 2003), or under the law governing countermeasures as part of state responsibility (Kern 2009, 60). Another strand of legal literature deals with the adverse eﬀects of economic sanctions on civilians. These contributions question the legality of economic sanctions given the observation that in many cases the continuation of economic sanctions would have led to a humanitarian disaster (O’Connell 2002, 69; Fausey 1994; Cortright/Lopez 1999). In essence, the illegality claim typically rests on two grounds: the violation of human rights (Reinisch 2001, 851ﬀ.; Marossi/Bassett 2015) and the non-compliance with the principle of proportionality (Reisman/Stevick 1998, 126).

The latter strand of legal literature has been echoed by contributions in political science and economic literature measuring the eﬀects of sanctions on human rights. This literature points out the exacerbation of human rights problems and harm to innocent people as a consequence of sanctions (de Waart 2015; Pape 1997; Peksen 2011; Cortright/Lopez, 2000; Andreas 2005). Some empirical studies suggest that sanctions may lead to discrimination against marginalized groups in society (Peksen 2016a) and wide-spread infringements of hu-man rights (Peksen/Drury 2009; Escriba-Folch 2012). Other studies even go so far as to compare the eﬀects of sanctions on human rights to those resulting from military interven-tions (Allen/Lektzian 2013).

This paper contributes to the literature in an interdisciplinary manner by incorporating a quantitative analysis of the eﬀect of economic sanctions into the legality judgment. The goal is to verify the empirical premise underlying the judicial assessment of economic sanctions. More specifically, the proportionality principle – the “cardinal principle” of international law (International Court of Justice 1996, 257, para. 78) – relies on assumptions about empirical regularities that the legal discipline implicitly draws as a basis for the normative judgement. We aim at highlighting the dependency of the proportionality judgment on empirical insights gained about the relationship between economic sanctions and human rights. On a more general note, this paper seeks to refine our understanding of the interaction of normative and empirical aspects when applying the cardinal principle of international (and national) law. The empirical assumptions linked with the proportionality principle materialize on two

levels. First, the issue of eﬀectiveness is associated with the necessity test derived from the proportionality principle. The necessity test involves an assessment of whether the measure is well-suited to achieve the sanction’s objective (e.g., changing the target country’s policies). This test implies an empirical judgment regarding whether sanctions exert a substantive eﬀect on the achievement of their objectives. Our analysis addresses the empirical and normative interaction in the necessity test by studying economic sanctions that are explicitly aimed at improving the human rights situation in the targeted country and, on that basis, the eﬀectiveness of these sanctions in improving human rights is assessed. Methodologically, our approach oﬀers an improvement compared to previous studies (Carneiro/Apolinário 2016; Drury/Li 2006; Drury/Peksen 2014; Escribà-Folch 2012; Gutmann et al 2016; Peksen 2009; Peksen 2016a; Peksen 2016b; Peksen and Drury 2010; Pond 2017; Soest and Wahman 2015a; Wood 2008) to the extent that it connects the eﬀectiveness analysis to the specific policy goals driving the sanctions.

Second, we extend the analysis by Gutmann et al (2016) and oﬀer novel empirical insights for conducting the proportionality test by examining the causality claim between sanctions and the human rights situation. Both legal and political science literature typically presume the existence of a causal relationship between sanctions and human rights deteriorations. Empirically, the question is whether the human rights situation is worsened as a consequence of the imposition of the sanction. The literature that has tried to confirm this, however, suﬀers from several drawbacks hindering such a causality assessment, particularly by ignoring the endogeneity of the imposition of sanctions to the human rights situation. In a nutshell, a careful empirical analysis of the human rights consequences of economic sanctions has to disentangle the treatment eﬀect, that is, the consequences of economic sanctions themselves, from the selection eﬀect, that is, the reasons for why sanctions have been imposed in the first place. We aim at addressing this endogeneity issue of measuring human rights consequences, and the legal question then becomes how the proportionality judgment can be informed by accounting for endogeneity. We find that once the endogeneity of treatment assignment is taken into account, the adverse human rights consequences of sanctions expressed in large parts of the literature are no longer unambiguously supported by the data. Our analysis focuses on the US, since we are able to credibly address the endogeneity problem specifically for US sanctions. However, as an extension, we distinguish sanctions where the US has been joined by other nations or international organizations.

The results of our empirical analysis inform the legal interpretation on three levels. First, because we find no evidence that sanctions actually lead to human rights improvements, eco-nomic sanctions do not pass the necessity test in those cases in which sanctions aim at an improvement of human rights in the target country. On the contrary, we find that sanctions which aim specifically at improving human rights protection in the target country lead to a deterioration of said rights, even when the endogeneity of the imposition of sanctions is ac-counted for. Second, because economic sanctions can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent categories of human rights, the proportionality analysis has to include an assessment of the

impact of sanctions on diﬀerent categories of human rights (basic, economic, emancipatory, and political) rather than confounding them in one overall eﬀect. This finding calls for a refinement of the legal proportionality analysis. Third, accounting for causality for the pur-pose of assessing proportionality reveals a diﬀerential eﬀect of sanctions on human rights. More specifically, disproportionality cannot be found for the eﬀect of sanctions on basic, eco-nomic, and emancipatory human rights, unlike for their eﬀect on political and civil rights. This finding calls into question the dominant narrative of disproportionate economic sanc-tions. Lastly, this contribution highlights the dependency of the proportionality principle on empirical insights, rather than assumptions, thereby suggesting that the application of such core legal principles should make use of the research methods oﬀered by other disciplines to gain such insights.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the legal background, that is, the necessity and proportionality tests. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and its results. Section 4 re-visits the legal analysis in light of the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.

· Legal analysis – Necessity test and proportionality test as legality benchmarks

There is little doubt that economic sanctions may have a detrimental eﬀect on human rights. There are numerous anecdotes illustrating the harmful eﬀects of economic sanctions on civil-ians (Happold 2016, 88). Because there are multiple dimensions of human rights, violations can materialize in diﬀerent forms. In line with international human rights agreements, we distinguish four human rights categories: basic human rights (e.g. political imprisonment, torture), economic rights (e.g. property rights, freedom to trade), emancipatory rights (e.g. women’s economic and political rights) and political rights and civil liberties (e.g. freedom of assembly and speech). For example, the right to life is threatened by execution, dis-appearance or torture. All of these human rights have been addressed and protected by international agreements, both on the global and regional level (see Table A1 in the Ap-pendix), and states are required to take positive measures to protect the recognized rights (Reinisch 2001, 862).

Although the potential of sanctions for an adverse eﬀect on human rights does not seem controversial on a theoretical level, the legality of specific economic sanctions still depends on two questions. First, the legal benchmark against which the lawfulness of economic sanctions can be assessed must be clarified – this is an exercise of legal interpretation as it concerns determining the applicable substantial law standard (Marossi/Bassett 2015). Second (and more relevant for the purpose of this analysis), the degree to which quantitative analysis can inform the legal judgment depends on the extent to which the legal assessment is contingent on a precise understanding of the empirical facts. This particularly relates to the humanitarian impact of sanctions and the causality between sanctions and changes

in the human rights situation. To that end, the legal standard must be examined as to the extent to which it incorporates empirical contingencies and how they interact with the normative analysis.

The applicable legal standard for states to impose economic sanctions does not rest solely in the framework of the UN Chapter VII. States enjoy freedom under the rules of state responsibility in customary international law to impose unilateral sanctions (Kern 2009, 57). However, this freedom granted under international law does not release the sanctioning state from legal restrictions, as the implementation of sanctions is bound by fundamental norms of international humanitarian law and international law of human rights (Reisman/Stevick 1998, 86-141). Some controversies surrounding the direct eﬀect of human rights notwithstanding (O’Connell 2002, 63-79), it is widely acknowledged that at least ne-cessity, proportionality, and discrimination standards apply to any party imposing sanctions. In the particular case when sanctions are associated with collateral damages occurring to non-dispute parties, the international humanitarian law principles of necessity and propor-tionality constitute the legal yardsticks for determining the extent of permissible collateral damage (Owen 2013, 117).

Thus, irrespective of the applicable substantive law (international humanitarian law or countermeasure law), the principles of necessity and proportionality determine the legal-ity of economic sanctions on the basis of social goals, costs, and alternative consequences (Reisman/Stevick 1998, 129). For the purpose of this analysis both tests – necessity and proportionality – invite empirical verification.

2.1 The necessity test

The principle of necessity requires that the imposing state limits itself to those measures that can reasonably be expected to achieve its objective (Owen 2013, 118; Geiss 2005, 175). Necessity thus involves a weighing and balancing of the sanction’s measure in question and whether it is likely to achieve the sanction’s objective (e.g., changing the target country’s policies). The necessity test does not give unconditional discretion to the state as to the choice of the measure it considers necessary to attain the objective. Rather, the measure concerned should be subject to an empirical assessment regarding the prospective eﬀect on achieving the objective (Kern 2009, 65).

Therefore, there should be an initial comparative test, assessing the proposed measure regarding its eﬀects in comparison to all other alternatives (Reisman/Stevick 1998, 130; Owen 2013, 118). That is, economic sanctions pass the necessity test only if they plausibly generate economic impact on the target country’s economy, which in turn could have some eﬀect on political groups that could induce a policy change by the regime (Kern 2009, 65). This eﬀect of sanctions, however, may be questionable in many cases. For example, sanctions imposed on the Haitian government benefitted some wealthy individuals in Haiti, while large parts of society had to suﬀer from hunger as a consequence of the sanctions

(Tsagourias/White 2013, 231). In such cases, the eﬀect of sanctions is, at best, unclear. Consequently, in cases where an initial evaluation suggests that sanctions are likely to be eﬀective in an economic and political sense, the sending country should still have in place a set of contingency plans to abandon sanctions when they are shown to lack proportionality, or to be ineﬀective in meeting their objectives (Kern 2009, 65).

2.2 The proportionality test

The proportionality test prescribes a limit on the damage permitted under the necessity inquiry (Owen 2013, 118). It restricts the magnitude of damage that may be found by the necessity test. Even if necessary, a sanction may not exceed the bounds of proportionality (Reisman/Stevick 1998, 131). The central function of the proportionality principle is to keep countermeasures from spiraling out of control (Franck 2008, 763).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has specified the somewhat construed term of proportionality in relation to the use of armed force, which can also inform judgements in the context of the collateral impact of economic sanctions on civilians. The ICJ interprets proportionality to prohibit the infliction of unnecessary suﬀering on combatants, that is, to cause “a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives” (ICJ 1996, 257, para. 78). This also implies “never [to] use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets” (ibid.). While jurisprudence has not oﬀered a precise “exchange rate” for weighing measure and collateral damage, it still generally imposes limitations on the implementation of sanctions in order to minimize the losses to those not responsible for the initial unlawful act. These restrictions are further manifested in the concept of indiscriminate attacks codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, according to which an attack is indiscriminate and hence prohibited if it can be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilians.

While the weighing of interests and rights concerned is a genuine normative and legal exercise, there is an empirical dimension to assessing proportionality of the sanction to the eﬀect – this is so because the amount of permissible collateral damage can only be deter-mined in light of the actual degree and durability of the injury posed to the public (Owen 2013, 118). The proportionality assessment rests on empirical parameters, because it re-quires a sanctioning state to assess the prospective economic, social, and political eﬀect of the sanction. Since the referential point of evaluation for proportionality is the immediate or prospective consequences of the act that triggered the contingency (Kern 2009, 64; Reis-man/Stevick 1998, 131), the legal proportionality judgment depends on investigating the actual eﬀects and their relationship with the sanctions imposed.

Against this background, the legal benchmark applicable under public international law to judge the lawfulness of economic sanctions rests on several empirical premises. First, the necessity test invites an eﬀectiveness analysis – the goal of the imposition of sanctions must be compared to their actual impact, that is, whether the goal (e.g. improvement

of the human rights situation) can be achieved by virtue of the envisaged means. Some aspects of the legal necessity (e.g. the impact of sanctions on the compliance of the initial wrongdoer) have been addressed in the political science literature. Studies show somewhat ambiguous results, because, on the one hand, sanctions can entail an improvement in human rights in cases where sanctions increase pressure on the regime and thus undermine the regime’s resources (Martin 1992; Blanchard/Ripsman, 1999; Hovi et al 2005). On the other hand, a number of studies find adverse eﬀects of sanctions leading to a deterioration of the human rights situation and increased government repression (de Waart 2015; Peksen 2011; Hufbauer/Oegg 2000, 11; Pape 1997; Weiss et al 1997; Cortright/Lopez 2000; Li/Drury 2004; Andreas 2005). Thus, while a consensus regarding the impact of sanctions on human rights is lacking, the legal necessity test may contribute to this literature by oﬀering a more sophisticated approach. Under the necessity test, a legitimate goal pursued by the sanctioning party is evaluated against the prospective eﬀects. The necessity test thus limits the analysis to those cases in which the sanctioning party explicitly seeks to improve the human rights situation and precludes sanctions aimed at other goals (e.g. suppression of dictators or ending wars). Hence, the assessment requires, in a first step, the identification of sanctions that are explicitly aimed at improving the human rights situation and, secondly, to study the eﬀect of the measure towards this goal. By adapting the approach typically chosen in the political science and economics literature to the peculiarities of the legal necessity test, we may gain an enriched analytical perspective.

Second, and in relation to the proportionality test, it is essential to evaluate whether economic sanctions actually lead to adverse eﬀects on the human rights situation, as is often presumed in the legal literature to justify concerns with respect to proportionality. More specifically, causality in the relationship between sanctions and human rights has to be determined. There are two ways to structure the empirical part of the proportionality analysis. One mirrors the general approach in the legal literature, according to which pro-portionality is determined by considering all dimensions of human rights (basic, economic, emancipatory, and political) as one uniform body of human rights. Legal studies typically do not diﬀerentiate in their analysis the distinct eﬀects of sanctions on various dimensions of human rights. Another more sophisticated approach allows for diﬀerentiation between the kinds of human rights concerned in order to detect potentially ambiguous eﬀects on human rights. Hence, the contribution of an empirical assessment of proportionality should proceed in two directions: To study the causal impact of sanctions on human rights as one uniform category and, alternatively, to distinguish between types of human rights in order to gain a more diﬀerentiated picture of the (adverse or positive) impact of sanctions on specific human rights dimensions.

· Empirical assessment

3.1 Data on human rights and economic sanctions

In order to demonstrate how the empirical premises of the proportionality principle can be tested, we build on the analysis by Gutmann et al (2016) who study the human rights consequences of economic sanctions imposed by the US. However, unlike Gutmann et al, we diﬀerentiate between sanctions that have been imposed with the explicit aim to improve the target country’s human rights situation and economic sanctions in general.

The dependent variables in our empirical analysis capture the human rights consequences of economic sanctions in terms of the overall human rights situation and four diﬀerent human rights dimensions (basic, economic, emancipatory, and political rights). Indicators reflecting these dimensions are taken from Gutmann and Voigt (2015), who apply principal component analysis to 19 well-established human rights indicators covering 121 countries over the period 1981–2011. In our analysis, we standardize the five indicators such that each of them has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in order to facilitate the interpretation of our coeﬃcient estimates. Higher values indicate a better protection of human rights. Our main explanatory variable, a sanction indicator, takes the value 1 if country i is subject to US economic sanctions in year t, and 0 otherwise. We rely on a unique dataset by Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) covering all US sanction episodes between 1976 and 2012. After combining the data on economic sanctions with the smaller human rights dataset, 235 country-year observations with US sanctions in place remain. The list of countries in our sample can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. In total, 34 out of these 111 countries were subject to US sanctions.

To get a first impression of the human rights situation in sanctioned and non-sanctioned countries, Table 1 displays the average human rights scores in both groups alongside t-tests of diﬀerences between the groups.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	No Sanctions	Sanctions	Diﬀerence

Overall Human Rights	0.128	-1.285	1.413**
Basic Human Rights	0.102	-1.020	1.121**
Economic Rights	0.116	-1.160	1.276**
Emancipatory Rights	0.085	-0.850	0.935**
Political Rights	0.117	-1.178	1.295**

Observations	2,359	235

Notes : Table shows mean values of the overall human rights indicator and the four human rights dimensions for country-year observations (not) subject to sanctions alongside t-tests of diﬀerences between the groups. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.

The human rights situation is clearly worse in sanctioned countries compared to their non-sanctioned counterparts as indicated by the negative figures for the latter. The diﬀerence is as large as 1.4 standard deviations for the overall human rights indicator. However, can we take these diﬀerences at face value?

3.2 Estimation strategy

The descriptive findings outlined in Table 1 are not surprising and do not necessarily imply that sanctions lead to a deterioration of human rights. In fact, sanctions are typically imposed for three reasons (Hufbauer et al, 2009): (i) to coerce states (or militant groups within states) to stop threatening or infringing the sovereignty of another state; (ii) to foster democratic change in a country, protect democracy, or destabilize an autocratic regime; or

(iii) to protect the citizens of a state from political repression and enforce human rights. As a consequence, one would expect the human rights situation in countries that are about to be sanctioned to be worse than that of the average non-sanctioned country. Only a careful empirical analysis of the human rights consequences of economic sanctions ensures that the

treatment eﬀect, that is, the consequences of economic sanctions themselves, is disentangled from the selection eﬀect, that is, the reasons for why the sanctions have been imposed in the first place.

The simplest – yet imperfect – way to account for the selection eﬀect is to estimate the conditional eﬀect of sanctions on human rights, holding other variables related to the human rights situation constant. To do so, we rely on a simple two-way fixed eﬀects panel model:

yIT = αI + x′ITβ + δsanctionsIT + λT + εIT (1)

The dependent variable yIT is one of the five human rights indicators, our key independent variable is the binary sanction variable sanctionsIT. Country-fixed eﬀects αI and time-fixed eﬀects λT account for a global non-linear time trend, as well as time-invariant unobserved

′

heterogeneity in human rights protection between countries. The control variables xIT in-clude one-year lagged realizations of the four human rights dimensions, a country’s level of democracy as well as dummy variables for minor conflicts and major conflicts. Additionally, we consider the following one-year lagged macroeconomic variables as controls: real GDP per capita in logs, the growth rate of real GDP per capita, population size in logs, trade openness (exports plus imports divided by GDP), the trade share with the US (exports to plus imports from the US divided by the country’s total exports plus imports), economic and military aid per capita received from the US (both in logs), and foreign direct investment per capita from the US (in logs). The error term is denoted by εIT.

In a second step, we account for the fact that a two-way panel fixed eﬀects model might not be suﬃcient to tackle endogeneity concerns. Indeed, the indicator for economic sanctions might be systematically related to unobservables – e.g., the economic, political, and social environment in targeted countries beyond the set of covariates employed in the regression

analysis – leading to biased estimates. To account for this potential endogeneity problem and to identify the causal influence of US economic sanctions on the target states’ respect for human rights, we employ an endogenous treatment model. Endogenous treatment models allow identification of the causal treatment eﬀect when selection into treatment is based on unobservable factors that also aﬀect the outcome of interest. An endogenous treatment model consists of two parts. The first part, the outcome model, is similar to the least squares model in Equation (1):

′ ˜	˜	(2)
yIT = α˜I + xITβ	+ δsanctionsIT + λT + εIT

All variables are defined as in the OLS case. The second part, the selection model, is a probit model explaining the selection into treatment:

dIT∗ = zIT′ + υIT

(3)

d∗ITis a latent variable, which is assumed to be standard normally distributed such that

1 if f d∗IT > 0

dIT

0 if f d∗IT ≤ 0

and zIT is a vector of exogenous covariates that aﬀect the likelihood of being selected into treatment. The vector zIT in the selection model may, but does not have to, overlap with the vector of covariates xIT employed in the outcome model.

To see how the endogeneity of treatment assignment aﬀects the outcome of interest, it is helpful to take a closer look at the relation between the error terms of Equations (2) and (3). Assume that the vector of error terms (εIT, υIT) comes from a mean zero bivariate normal distribution and has the following covariance matrix:

=	σ2	σρ

	σρ	1

ρ measures the correlation between the treatment assignment errors and the outcome errors and σ2 measures the variance of the outcome error. For identification, the variance of υ is restricted to 1. Exogeneity of the treatment implies that ρ = 0, that is, the outcome of interest is not related to unobservables aﬀecting the likelihood of treatment assignment. In contrast, ρ = 0, indicates the existence of a selection bias, as it implies that unobservables predicting the imposition of sanctions also aﬀect the outcome of interest. For example, a negative (positive) value of ρ implies that unobservables that negatively aﬀect a country’s human rights situation tend to concur with unobservables that increase (decrease) the like-lihood of being subject to US economic sanctions. As a consequence, the standard OLS estimates would be biased.

Estimating the treatment eﬀect presupposes the identification of ρ which, in turn, re-quires that at least one variable in the vector zIT is not included in vector xIT . This non-included variable (or variables) also needs to be significantly correlated with the likelihood of receiving treatment, but uncorrelated with the error term of the outcome model. We refer to a variable that fulfills these conditions as a treatment instrument.

3.3 Treatment instruments

Following Gutmann et al (2016), we employ three diﬀerent treatment instruments in our analysis. For our first treatment instrument we use the geographical distance in logs between the capital of each country included in our sample and Washington, D.C. (Bell et al 2017). There are several reasons to believe that countries that are close to the US are, ceteris paribus, more likely to become targets of US economic sanctions. First, internal conflict in a country that is close to the US may represent a greater threat to the US itself. Moreover, human rights violations that cause safety-seeking refugee flows are more threatening to US interests when the country of origin is close to the US (Nielsen 2013). Second, the closer a country is to the US, the greater the awareness of its political and social situation among the general public in the US, thus increasing the pressure on US politicians to intervene (Nielsen 2013; Peksen et al 2014). Finally, sanctions may be considered more eﬀective if the prospective target nation is close (Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2015).

Our second treatment instrument is an indicator of genetic distance by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). Underlying this instrument is the same logic used for the geographic dis-tance indicator. Giuliano et al (2014) show that genetic distance functions as a proxy for geographical barriers to migration and trade (specifically seas, mountain chains, and the ruggedness of territory) beyond what can be explained by a simple measure of distance, because these factors shaped genetic diﬀerences across populations, mostly in the Neolithic Period. These features of geography are important barriers to cultural and economic ex-change between countries and we use genetic distance as a proxy for these barriers. We expect, in line with our arguments in the previous paragraph, that countries with a higher genetic distance to the US are less likely to be targeted by US sanctions.

Using data taken from Bailey et al (2017), our third treatment instrument measures the alignment of a country’s votes in the United Nations General Assembly with US votes in the UNGA. Arguably, a country that tends to vote in line with the US (i.e., those countries where the values of the voting distance measure are close to zero) can expect a more favorable treatment, thus reducing the likelihood of being targeted by US sanctions (Dreher and Jensen 2013; Nielsen 2013; Soest and Wahman 2015b).

The vector zIT of the selection model includes all variables mentioned as part of vector xIT in the outcome model. In addition, we control for US President-specific and time-specific influences, such as diﬀerences in foreign policy positions between US Presidents (Reagan, Bush Sr., Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama) or changes in the global political environment

(e.g., the fall of the Iron Curtain or the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals), with the help of US President-fixed eﬀects.

Table A3 in the Appendix shows that, indeed, two of the three treatment instruments (geographical distance and genetic distance) explain significant diﬀerences in the likelihood of being sanctioned and the sign of the estimated coeﬃcients is in line with our priors. Based on a modified overidentifying restrictions test, we can confirm that our treatment instruments are excludable, that is, uncorrelated with the error term of the outcome model. Hence, we are able to identify a causal eﬀect of economic sanctions on human rights with the help of the endogenous treatment model.

3.4 Empirical results

The OLS estimates from the two-way fixed eﬀects model are presented in Table 2. These results suggest that US economic sanctions have an adverse eﬀect on the target state’s respect for human rights in general and basic human rights as well as political rights and civil liberties in particular. This finding is well in line with the evidence provided by Peksen (2009) and Wood (2008). Quantitatively, the eﬀects indicate that the human rights situation in countries that are subject to sanctions is, ceteris paribus, roughly ten percent of a standard deviation worse than in non-sanctioned countries. In contrast, we do not find a significant association between economic sanctions and the level of economic rights or emancipatory rights.

Table 2: OLS Estimates

	Overall	Basic	Economic	Emancipatory	Political

(1) US Sanctions	-0.081**	-0.099*	0.000	-0.048	-0.117**
	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.026)

Notes : Table shows eﬀects of US sanctions on the overall human rights indicator and the four diﬀerent human rights dimensions based on panel least squares (Equation 1). Models include control variables described in Section 3.2, as well as country-fixed eﬀects and year-fixed eﬀects. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.

As mentioned before, panel least squares estimations might not be suﬃcient to address endogeneity concerns. Hence, Table 3 presents the estimates based on our endogenous treatment model. Here, we not only look at the eﬀects of sanctions in general (row 1), but also on specific subgroups of sanctions. We distinguish between sanction episodes imposed because of human rights violations (113 observations; row 2) and those imposed for other reasons (122 observations; row 3), as well as between unilateral sanctions imposed only by the US (133 observations; row 4) and multilateral sanctions where the US was joined by other nations or international organizations (102 observations; row 5).

The results based on the endogenous treatment model draw a diﬀerent picture than the OLS estimates. Regarding sanctions in general (row 1), the treatment eﬀect estimates

for overall human rights and basic human rights are smaller and statistically insignificant,

indicating that the OLS estimates are indeed biased downwards due to endogeneity. A

dispiriting finding is that sanctions that aim specifically at improving the human rights

situation (row 2) are found to have a strong negative eﬀect on basic human rights and on

political rights (respectively twenty and ten percent of a standard deviation). Furthermore,

the results suggest that the common criticism that economic sanctions may lead targeted

regimes to become even more repressive (making the human rights situation worse) is only

true with respect to political rights. The adverse eﬀect on political rights is due to both

human rights-motivated (row 2) and other sanctions (row 3) as well as due to multilateral

sanctions where the US was joined by other countries or international organizations. In

contrast, we find a strong and significantly positive influence of US economic sanctions on

the target state’s respect for emancipatory rights. The positive eﬀect on emancipatory rights

is particularly driven by US non-human rights sanctions (row 3) and unilateral US sanctions

(row 4) and has been discussed extensively in Gutmann et al (2016).

Table 3: Endogenous Treatment Estimates

		Overall	Basic	Economic	Emancipatory	Political

(1)	US Sanctions	-0.040	-0.064	-0.015	0.285**	-0.094**
		(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.093)	(0.035)
(2)	US HR Sanctions	-0.049	-0.198**	0.003	0.106	-0.095*
		(0.044)	(0.066)	(0.027)	(0.121)	(0.042)
(3)	US Non-HR Sanctions	0.008	0.115	-0.028	0.456**	-0.119*
		(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.036)	(0.082)	(0.047)
(4)	Unilateral US Sanctions	-0.019	-0.096	-0.035	0.358**	-0.063
		(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.031)	(0.084)	(0.043)
(5)	Multilateral US Sanctions	-0.071	-0.043	0.001	-0.179	-0.116**
		(0.052)	(0.073)	(0.030)	(0.140)	(0.045)

Notes : Table shows eﬀects of US sanctions on the overall human rights indicator and the four diﬀerent human rights dimensions based on endogenous treatment models (Equations 2 and 3). Models include control variables described in Section 3.2, as well as country-fixed eﬀects and year-fixed eﬀects. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. The results of the selection stage can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix.

· Re-visited legal analysis incorporating the empirical results

The proportionality judgment on economic sanctions rests on empirical premises connected to both the necessity test and the proportionality test. Our empirical results oﬀer insights that are relevant to the legal assessment in several regards. First, on the level of the ne-

cessity test, the empirical results feed into the assessment of whether economic sanctions can reasonably be expected to achieve their objective. In fact, economic sanctions can be imposed in pursuit of diﬀerent objectives, which requires an assessment of the eﬀectiveness of sanctions based on their contribution to achieving their specific objective. In this regard, the empirical analysis oﬀers a diﬀerentiated assessment for those economic sanctions explic-itly aiming at improving the human rights situation (Table 3, row 2). We find that those sanctions do not produce improvements in any dimension of human rights and that a strong deterioration of the protection of basic rights occurs. The legal implication of this result is the unlawfulness of the sanction, as economic sanctions not passing the necessity test are to be considered disproportionate and thus illegal. While our results cannot generally rule out the necessity of future economic sanctions indenting to improve human rights, the results cast doubt on the general suitability of economic sanctions as an instrument to improve the human rights situation in a country.

Second, on the level of the proportionality test the results inform the legal analysis by allowing us to determine the eﬀect of sanctions on human rights and thus to ascertain the actual degree and durability of the injury posed to the public. The empirical results reveal significant ambiguity in the eﬀects on human rights, which speaks against treating human rights as a single homogenous category. Indeed, eﬀect heterogeneity is illustrated by the diﬀerence between treating human rights as one category (Table 3, column “overall”) and the results for the respective individual human rights dimensions (Table 3, columns “Basic, Economic, Emancipatory, Political”). For the legal analysis, this ambiguity oﬀers input for the “weighing and balancing” exercise that is genuinely associated with the proportionality test (Franck 2008). That is, the divergent eﬀects on diﬀerent human rights feed into an overall proportionality assessment of the imposition of economic sanctions. For the purpose of further refining the overall proportionality test, recourse can be taken to criteria such as the gravity, duration, number of victims concerned, irreversibility of the injury, etc. However, these parameters would require additional information about the actual human rights situation.

Third, the proportionality analysis must be concerned about endogeneity and take the determination of the causal eﬀect of economic sanctions seriously. In particular, a simple “before-after-comparison” of human rights is not suﬃcient for a legal analysis. More specif-ically, reliance on descriptive statistics as shown in Table 1, which taken by itself would suggest a dramatic deterioration of human rights due to economic sanctions, would render the legal analysis empirically ill-founded. However, accounting for endogeneity casts doubt on the prevailing view of the disproportionality of economic sanctions. In fact, we find no worsening of basic, economic, and emancipatory human rights, while sanctions indeed have an adverse eﬀect on political rights. Without prejudice to the individual case, this indicates that economic sanctions typically cannot be claimed to lack proportionality.

Fourth, the discussion above has implications for the legal assessment of necessity and proportionality in two diﬀerent directions. As demonstrated, the necessity test is likely to

fail in cases where sanctions primarily serve to force improvements in human rights. This, as such, suﬃces to render these sanctions unlawful. In contrast, our empirical findings raise less legality concerns with respect to the proportionality test of such measures, because we do not find a consistent pattern of causality between sanctions and human rights deterioration. The implication of these findings must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Yet, if sanctions cannot be considered necessary, the proportionality test will not take eﬀect, as its application presupposes the necessity of the measure. For the legality judgment, the necessity test is more likely to indicate the unlawfulness of sanctions, while proportionality is less likely to pose insurmountable hurdles once necessity is aﬃrmed.

· Conclusions

Detrimental eﬀects resulting from economic sanctions that harm the civilian population are a widely lamented phenomenon in the legal and social science literature. Both empirical and legal analyses tend to claim a causal eﬀect of the imposition of economic sanctions on the worsening of human rights in targeted countries. Legally, this translates into a finding of disproportionality, rendering economic sanctions unlawful under international law. We have challenged this view through integrating an empirical analysis into the legal proportionality assessment. Our interdisciplinary contribution highlights how decisively the proportionality judgment rests on empirical premises and our analysis further underscores the extent to which this empirical insight can inform the legal analysis. Hence, this paper refines our un-derstanding of the interaction of normative and empirical aspects. We infer the general claim that the proportionality analysis, as the cardinal principle of international (and national) law, should be held open for integrating empirical insight. This claim holds on all stages of law-making and in the application of law, where it is governed by the proportionality principle. In other words, a judge assessing the legality of a public measure, or a law-maker drafting a law, are obliged to observe the proportionality principle and should care about its empirical foundation.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that producing and integrating an empirical analysis poses challenges to lawyers when dealing with sanctions. It also defies practical intuition to expect law-makers and judges to develop an empirical analysis employing high (though desirable) methodological standards. However, the above analysis suggests at least a few rules of thumb that could be used by policy-makers and practitioners in conducting a pro-portionality assessment. First, verification of the objective of the sanctions matters. Since human rights improvements are unlikely to be attained through sanctions (and thus fail to pass the necessity test), it appears more suitable that policy-makers pursue other objectives. Second, the diﬀerential eﬀects of sanctions on diﬀerent dimensions of human rights have to be taken into account. For example, our analysis shows that for US sanctions pursuing non-human rights goals, emancipatory rights are improved while political rights suﬀer (Table 3, row 3). Knowledge about such patterns of eﬀects can be valuable for policy-makers. Third,

the main hurdle for legality is the necessity rather than the proportionality test, at least where sanctions aim at an improvement in human rights. Hence, the potentially adverse eﬀects sanctions have on human rights tend to be less of a concern, and over-restraint of sanctions is, thus, not warranted on the basis of proportionality.

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Appendix

Table A1: Human Rights Categories, Dimensions, and Important International Agreements

Basic Human Rights (Disappearances, Extrajudicial Killings, Political Imprisonment, Torture): Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol, UN Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures.

Economic Rights (Legal Structure and Property Rights, Regulation, Freedom to Trade Internationally): Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Regional agreements (e.g. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, European Social Charter, European Convention on Human Rights).

Emancipatory Rights (Women’s Economic Rights, Women’s Political Rights, Women’s Social Rights): Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Oﬀenders (‘the Bangkok Rules’).

Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Foreign Movement, Freedom of Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Electoral Self-Determination, Freedom of Religion, Political Rights, Civil Liberties): Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Regional agreements (e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights).

Notes : Table shows the four human rights categories considered in this paper alongside the covered dimensions (in parentheses) and important international agreements protecting these.

Table A2: List of Sample Countries

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bo-livia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Fin-land, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mau-ritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thai-land, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Table A3: Estimates of the Selection Model

	Coeﬃcients	Marginal Eﬀects

Log(Geographical Distance to US)	-0.190*	(0.083)	-0.018*	(0.008)
Log(Genetic Distance to US)	-0.262**	(0.079)	-0.025**	(0.007)
Log(Voting Distance to US)	-0.111	(0.112)	-0.011	(0.011)

Lag Basic Human Rights	-0.586**	(0.076)	-0.056**	(0.007)
Lag Economic Rights	-0.299**	(0.086)	-0.029**	(0.008)
Lag Emancipatory Rights	-0.074	(0.076)	-0.007	(0.007)
Lag Political Rights	-0.815**	(0.099)	-0.078**	(0.009)
Lag(Log Real GDP/Capita)	-0.090	(0.077)	-0.009	(0.007)
Lag(Real GDP/Capita Growth)	-0.009	(0.009)	-0.001	(0.001)
Lag(Log Population)	-0.117*	(0.048)	-0.011*	(0.005)
Lag(Openness)	-0.005*	(0.002)	-0.000*	(0.000)
Lag(Trade with the US)	0.005	(0.007)	0.000	(0.001)
Lag(Log Economic Aid/Capita)	0.128*	(0.064)	0.012*	(0.006)
Lag(Log Military Aid/Capita)	-0.308**	(0.075)	-0.029**	(0.007)
Lag(Log FDI/Capita)	0.040	(0.037)	0.004	(0.003)
Polity 2	0.009	(0.013)	0.001	(0.001)
Minor Conflict	-0.212	(0.128)	-0.020	(0.012)
Major Conflict	-0.849**	(0.211)	-0.081**	(0.020)

Reagan	Ref.		Ref.
Bush Sr.	0.583**	(0.182)	0.064**	(0.019)
Clinton	0.642**	(0.199)	0.072**	(0.020)
Bush Jr.	-0.275	(0.208)	-0.021	(0.017)
Obama	-0.537*	(0.242)	-0.037*	(0.017)
Constant	0.485	(1.171)

Observations	2594
Pseudo R-squared	0.44
Exclusion Test Instruments	χ2(3) = 19.36**

Notes : Table shows coeﬃcients and average marginal eﬀects of the selection model. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. The corresponding F-test exclusion statistic when estimating a linear probability model for the selection stage is F(3,2571) = 13.10**, which exceeds the threshold for non-weak instruments in 2SLS estimations.