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Center for International & Security Studies, U. Maryland

Report Part Title: The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Report Title: Terrorism Against Democracy

Report Subtitle: Based in Part on Stansfield Turner’s University of Maryland Course, “Terrorism & Democracy”

Report Author(s): M. Merrick Yamamoto

Center for International & Security Studies, U. Maryland (2017)

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep05041.7

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Chapter Outline Introduction I. The Cause of Terrorism II. The Threat from Terrorism III. Summary

Introduction

What is the cause of terrorism? What kinds of causes of terrorism have been proposed, and are they accurate? Are terrorists rational?

What is the threat that terrorism poses? How serious a threat is terrorism? How does the threat from terrorism compare to other threats? Does terrorism pose a threat beyond the destruction that the attacks cause? How is the threat determined? How do terrorists determine how much damage they intend to do in an attack? This chapter addresses these kinds of questions.

I. The Cause of Terrorism

What Is the Cause of Terrorism? The cause of terrorism is the decision to use terrorism as a method to pursue a goal. Many causes of terrorism have been offered, but the decision to use terrorism is the basic cause. Therefore, to find any cause or causes of terrorism, the decision process that leads to the selection of terrorism needs to be analyzed.

Decision Points. Because the selection of terrorism as a method of struggle is a deliberate choice, a terrorist attack is always preceded by a decision regarding its use. There is the initial decision to use terrorism, usually by group decisionmakers, and a final decision at the point of attack. Even when terrorism is a habitual practice, there is still a decision to use the tool.

The decision to use terrorism can be described in this way: a group or individual desires some political goal. This goal may be very small, such as trying to prevent the development of a piece of land, or very large, such as trying to replace governments. Regardless of the scope of the goal, the decisionmakers consider the array of tools available to them for their struggle, and select the tools they will use. Most groups decide to pursue their goal directly through such means as voting (Fig. 3–1), however, in a very small number of groups, the decisionmakers decide to pursue their goals through the indirect (or circuitous) route of terrorism (Fig. 3–2).1

1 In selected terrorism models, certain steps of the terrorist attack have been simplified, such as by using the term “targets of violence” instead of “noncombatants/property.”

Fig. 3–2. The Decision to Pursue Political Change Through Terrorism (Indirect Method)

5. THIRD- PARTIES

7. POLITICAL GOALS

Decisionmakers on Tools to Use

3. TARGETS OF VIOLENCE

2. uses violence against

6. responses

4. to affect

1. ATTACKER

Fig. 3–1. The Decision to Pursue Political Change Through Voting (Direct Method)

1. VOTERS

3. POLITICAL GOALS

2. Go to the polls and vote

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Why Do People Choose to Use Terrorism? People usually decide to use terrorism for one or more of three reasons, and in addition they have to be willing to use terrorism. The three reasons are that they do not think they can achieve their goals using other means; do not feel that they are making enough progress toward their goal using other methods and are not willing to keep trying, or think that terrorism will make other tools available to them to pursue their goals.

Group members may not think they can achieve their goals using other means. Members may not think that they have the political or military strength to achieve their goals through nonviolent methods such as mass protests or voting, or through violent means such as revolution or guerilla warfare. These forms of struggle require significant resources and popular support— more than most nonstate groups have. Few groups have a state sponsor or independent sources of wealth; the group’s views may be so extreme that their ability to draw support and attract new members is very limited; and members may not have the skills, or patience, to build the support required to achieve their goals through such means as mass organization.

Groups do not feel that they are making enough progress toward their goal using other methods and are not willing to keep trying. If, for example, nonviolent methods are perceived as not having advanced a group’s goal (or made progress “fast enough” toward the goal), some members may press for violent tactics. Martin Luther King wrote that during his civil rights campaign he had to continually dampen pressure to adopt more militant methods.2

Groups may use terrorism as a way to gain enough popular support and resources to make additional methods of struggle available. For example, with enough popular support, a terrorist group may be able to form a popular movement, win enough votes to get a policy changed, or even foment a revolution. When terrorism is used for this purpose, attacks may be intended to attract the attention of potential constituencies, whose emotions can be aroused and channeled toward a goal. The idea of using terrorism to make other tools available was particularly espoused by revolutionaries. Nineteenth-century revolutionaries viewed terrorism as the first stage in their struggle—acts of terrorism would raise a banner, spread the word, gather recruits, and expand the popular base, thus leading to more effective tools for insurrection—terrorist attacks alone were not expected to overthrow the government.3

In addition, groups have to be willing to use terrorism. Along with any reason why people choose to use terrorism, a group must be willing to use a method of struggle that most people view as heinous. The vast majority of people are not willing to use terrorism—what makes the few willing to do so? Being willing to use terrorism usually involves the belief that it is justified (see Appendix D for an analysis of attempts to justify terrorism). For example, if a group views a government as corrupt or as having used unjustifiable violence, terrorism may seem legitimate. A “triggering event” may occur that generates outrage. The unprovoked police killing of a student demonstrator, Benno Ohnesorg (see photo) contributed to the emergence of leftwing terrorist groups in Germany (one terrorist group took its name from the date of Ohnesorg’s death).

2 King, Stride Toward Freedom, 1958, 87–89. 3 For example, the Russian group, the People’s Will, described terrorism as intended to break the spell of government power; furnish continuous proof of the possibility of pursuing a contest with the government and in that way raise the revolutionary spirit of the people; and finally, to create cadres suited to and accustomed to warfare. “The Program of the ‘People’s Will’ Group,” in George Vernadsky et al., eds., A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917, vol. 3 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 664.

Benno Ohnesorg, June 2, 1967

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Being willing to use terrorism involves the belief that the goals being pursued are more important than the rights of those who will be victimized in the attacks (or that the victims have no rights). In the 1998 Vail ski resort attack, the environmental group ELF believed that protecting the environment was more important than the rights of those who would be harmed by the attack. In perpetrating the 9/11 attacks, members of al Qaeda believed that their goals were more important than the rights of the thousands of people the group killed and injured.

A sense of urgency may contribute to the willingness to use terrorism—a situation may appear so pressing that “immediate action” is required. When a court decision allowed the expansion of a Vail ski resort and construction was scheduled to begin, the situation appeared imminent to ELF, who wanted to stop the expansion. In other cases external pressures, such as competition from rivals, can contribute to the decision to adopt terrorism. If one group appears to have gained support through the use of terrorism, other groups vying to represent the same community may feel pressure to take up the same tactic.

Do “Root Causes” Cause Terrorism? There have been many attempts to explain the adoption of terrorism in terms of conditions, sometimes described as “root causes.” Many causes of terrorism have been offered, including oppression, subjugation, exploitation, injustice, poverty, inequality, discrimination, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, globalization, modernization, historical traditions, ideologies that condone violence, religious divisions, ideological differences, and lack of democratic institutions to redress grievances. One cause of terrorism proposed during a UN discussion was the “indifference of the foreign community towards the injustice being visited upon a population.”4 During another discussion, several UN delegations said that the underlying causes of terrorism were “capitalism, neocolonialism, racism, the policy of aggression, foreign occupation and their consequences,” and that only removing those causes would lead to the end of international terrorism.5

However, no condition, situation, or goal causes the selection of any particular method of struggle. Oppression, discrimination, and the infringement of rights do not cause terrorism—not all who are oppressed, discriminated against, or treated unjustly turn to terrorism. During discussions at the UN, a number of delegations noted that some people chose to “take a terrorist path, while his equally wronged brother did not.”6 In fact, very few groups with grievances have chosen to use terrorism—some chose other violent means, nonviolent action, or no action at all. In Spain, the Basque group ETA engaged in terrorism, but many other ethnic groups did not.

Deprivation does not necessarily lead to terrorism: several studies found no significant correlation between poverty and terrorism, and terrorists have come from all levels of wealth, education, and opportunity.7 In West Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1960s and 1970s, the well-off,

4 Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/9028, Supp. (18 Dec. 1973), in Bassiouni, International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 140–141. 5 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/34/37 (17 April 1979), para. 38, in Bassiouni, International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 309. 6 Ibid., 318–319. 7 See Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” NBER Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004; Christopher Hewitt, quoted in Nina M. Serafino, Combating Terrorism: Possible Lessons for U.S. Policy from Foreign Experiences, CRS RL31517, Aug. 6, 2004, 12; and Schmid, “Prevention of Terrorism,” in Bjorgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, 227–229.

9/11 attack on the Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2001

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

not the deprived, chose to use terrorism.8 The Saudis who hijacked the four airplanes in the United States on September 11, 2001, were from a wealthy Muslim country, had been educated, and were from the middle and upper-middle class. Some terrorists such as Osama bin Laden have been the sons of millionaires. Sometimes terrorists who are neither oppressed nor poor themselves use terrorism on behalf of those they consider to be oppressed or exploited and become their self-appointed champions—often without asking whether members of the claimed constituency desire attacks on their behalf, or whether terrorism is in their best interest. At other times, terrorists use the image of deprivation to make a movement appear more attractive, but the vast majority of people working to improve conditions chose other methods than terrorism.

Forms of government do not cause terrorism. Terrorism has occurred in countries with many kinds of governments including democracies and autocracies. Terrorists have sometimes tried to justify terrorism on the grounds that there were no democratic channels to voice perceived injustices or pursue redress, yet many groups have used terrorism even when such means existed. Terrorists in democracies have sometimes tried to justify terrorism on the grounds of a lack of “effective” means of redress, but democracy does not guarantee that groups will succeed in achieving their goals—only that they have the opportunity to try (using non-violent methods), and to keep trying. Many groups in democracies have had to pursue their goals with long-term, sustained efforts.

Specific goals or grievances do not cause terrorism—a wide variety of groups pursuing many different goals have used terrorism. For example, groups with same type of goal may either adopt or reject terrorism. Some national liberation struggles involved a great deal of terrorism, such as in Algeria, while in other liberation struggles terrorism played almost no role.

Ideologies, secular or religious, do not cause terrorism—terrorists have been revolutionaries, nationalists, separatists, anarchists, reactionaries, and religious extremists. Terrorism has been used on behalf of many ideologies and religions, and people with the same beliefs can select or reject terrorism, and very few people—including those with radical beliefs—become terrorists.

A climate of violence does not cause terrorism, but can make it easier for people to adopt terrorism as a method, and to try to justify it to themselves and others. When people grow up in violent situations or an environment of hatred, they may be more likely to believe that violence is justified. Similarly, the glorification of violence, or a tradition of violence, may make terrorism seem justified. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism claimed that one of the causes of terrorism was an “ideology that justifies murder,” but that kind of statement is not accurate.9 Ideologies or religious interpretations that condone or justify violence may facilitate the adoption of terrorism, but do not cause terrorism.

In summary, neither conditions nor political goals cause terrorism, and despite a major effort, by 2001 researchers had not identified any root causes of terrorism.10 Many groups in similar situations have not turned to terrorism. Conditions may be factors that contribute to why people decide to use terrorism, but cause nothing. Terrorists and their supporters have often cited “causes” as a way to try to justify terrorism, but this argument is not valid. People are able to choose their methods of struggle—they are not “captives” of conditions. 8 See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Explaining Terrorism, 2011, 38. 9 These kinds of statements are related to the attempts to justify terrorism. See Appendix D for an analysis. 10 See, for example, Crenshaw, “Terrorism as an International Security Problem,” in Norwitz, ed., Armed Groups, 2008, 409–412; see Jenkins, “Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (Sept.–Oct. 2001): 325 regarding research on root causes of terrorism.

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Are Terrorists Rational? The decision to use terrorism is a deliberate choice.11 Every group has a range of tools available for use in any struggle, and based on the group’s estimate of the situation and available methods, the decisionmakers decide on the tools that they will use. The focus is what can be done to advance the goal: as one Palestinian fedayeen said, “We would throw roses if it would work.”12 The decision is the result of a rational process, though the logic may be poor, the information on which the decision is based may be inaccurate, and the goals being pursued may be wildly unrealistic. Terrorists often miscalculate situations—the Red Army Faction thought that terrorist attacks in West Germany would lead to a totalitarian government, which would spark a workers’ revolt that would result in a communist government.

The selection of terrorism as a method of pursuing a goal may seem irrational to many observers, but did appear rational to the decisionmakers. And despite the image of terrorists as crazed fanatics, many terrorists have been well educated, and study how to manipulate third- parties—as George Habash said, “This is a thinking man’s game.”13 Christopher Harmon addressed this point as follows:

[Many terrorist activities] such as the creation of political front groups, demand unusual sophistication. All demand calculation, and at least some skill and education. The most successful groups calibrate their use of terrorism to suit the political and social environs, and they use multiple means, altering their approach to suit changes caused by the environment, government interference, good or bad fortune, and the like.14

Some statements by political leaders and commentators convey the view that terrorist behavior defies understanding (for example, calling terrorists “looney-tunes”), but these kinds of statements are not accurate. As Brian Jenkins noted, “Terrorism is often described as mindless violence, senseless violence, or irrational violence [but] terrorism is a means to an end, not an end in itself.”15 Other inaccurate statements convey the idea that terrorists are the product of internal evil, such as: “The root cause of terrorism lies…in a disposition toward unbridled violence.”16 However, most terrorists are not psychopaths but are relatively “normal” psychologically, and have no common personality profile or terrorism-prone pathologies.17

If terrorists are rational, why do some leaders and commentators promote the view that terrorists are irrational? One reason is that many terrorist acts appear incomprehensible, such as when the victims are not related to the terrorists’ goal in any way. But another reason is that there can be political advantages in calling terrorists irrational. For example, labeling terrorists as senseless can preclude discussion and compromise, since there is no point in negotiating with people who are not rational. But statements about terrorists as crazed killers can impede the stopping of terrorism by hampering the dispassion needed to find the most effective responses.

*** 11 Many terrorist communiqués, statements, and captured documents show the deliberate choice to use terrorism, and that terrorist groups set short- and long-term goals. 12 J. Bowyer Bell, “Terror: An Overview,” in Marius H. Livingston, ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 38. 13 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 34. 14 Christopher C. Harmon, “Five Strategies of Terrorism,” Small Wars & Insurgencies (Autumn 2001): 62. 15 Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, RAND, 1974, 3. 16 Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Avon, 1987), 204. 17 Bjorgo, Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, 257.

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

II. The Threat from Terrorism

The Two Threats from Terrorism. Terrorism poses two threats. The first threat is the actual physical damage and destruction that the violent attack causes in Phase I. The second threat is the damage that third-parties may do in their responses to attacks (Phase II). The two areas of threats are shown in Fig. 3–3.

Phase I Threats. Phase I threats consist of the physical injuries, deaths, and property damage

caused by the violence used. The direct physical harm to people and property is the most visible and measurable consequence of a terrorist attack—damage can be seen and assessed, and deaths and injuries can be counted. Other costs, however, cannot always be easily calculated, such as economic losses from disrupted services and business activity. And some consequences are irreparable and cannot be fully compensated for, such as an ancient church that has been destroyed.

When the threat from terrorism is evaluated in terms of the physical damage and destruction caused in Phase I, terrorism can appear to be a minor security problem. An illustration is the comparison between deaths from terrorism to deaths from “ordinary” murder. From 1998 to 2003, the U.S. State Department reported an average of 1000 deaths per year from international terrorism world-wide, but during that same period 16 times more people (16,000) were murdered in one country alone, the United States.18 When deaths from international terrorism are compared to deaths from wars, the contrast is even greater: an average of more than a million people per year were killed in 20th century wars and civil conflicts.19

However, the physical damage from terrorist attacks is only part of the threat from terrorism. Terrorist attacks jeopardize the lives, limbs, and property of individuals, but risk even greater damage from responses to attacks—that is, Phase II of a terrorist attack. 18 U.S. State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports 1998–2003, and FBI, Terrorism in the United States reports. Note that the number of deaths from domestic terrorism has been much higher than from international terrorism. 19 See John Steinbruner and Jason Forrester, “Perspectives on Civil Violence: A Review of Current Thinking,” in William J. Lahneman, ed., Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 3.

Fig. 3–3. The Two Areas of Threat from Terrorism

5. THIRD- PARTIES

7. POLITICAL GOALS

3. TARGETS OF VIOLENCE

2. uses violence against

6. responses

4. to affect

1. ATTACKER

Phase I

Phase II

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Phase II Threats. Phase II threats consist of the damage that third-parties may do in responding to attacks. Through their responses, third-parties may damage themselves and others, and if third-parties do not respond carefully, they can cause more damage than was sustained in the attack itself.

Responses to attacks can result in significant damage and costs in a number of areas. Many of these costs and effects can be seen in economic, political, and human rights terms.

In economic terms, the cost of responses to terrorism may be the most measurable. After the 9/11 attacks, governments and international organizations in many parts of the world spent massive amounts of money responding to the attack, and continued to spend large sums yearly. U.S. business spending for security, shipping protection, and insurance rose the following year—insurance costs rose 5 percent in the United States, and with higher increases overseas.20

The cost of responses can be very visible in terms of physical security measures. The West German government constructed a special bombproof courthouse in which to try captured leaders of the Red Army Faction (the German government was concerned about the possibility of attacks to try to free jailed group members). In response to the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the United States moved military troops to a more isolated area at the cost of $200 million (which the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed to split).21 After the terrorist attack at the 1972 Olympics, those responsible for international sporting events implemented extensive security measures. When Sweden hosted the Chilean Davis Cup tennis team, the resort where the matches were to be held was converted into a “veritable fortress protected by floodlights; fences up to 35 feet high; and a 1,300-man police force equipped with gunboats, helicopters, scores of dogs, and some 50 horses.”22

Corporations have responded to attacks by increased spending on security measures to prevent attacks and protect employees, facilities, and shipments. Airline responses have included the expenses of extensive passenger and baggage screening, inspectors, sky marshals, bomb-sniffing dogs, and security training for pilots and staff. Company responses have included the increased use of private security companies, which may involve higher costs, and result in other consequences. For example, the growth of security companies can contribute to the privatization of violence, and threaten the State’s presumed monopoly on the use of force.

Responses to attacks can damage the economies of countries. Investors may withdraw foreign capital or decide not to invest in a country, and travelers may change their destinations. Egypt experienced a severe drop in tourism after the 1997 Luxor massacre, in which terrorists murdered several dozen people, primarily tourists.

20 Dick K. Nanto, 9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs, CRS RS21937, Oct. 5, 2004. 21 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 27. 22 CIA, Research Study, 1976, 26. (Sweden had arrested and deported members of the Japanese Red Army in March 1975, and was concerned about attempts at retribution.) After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, U.S. federal, state, and local governments allocated more than $300 million for security for the 2002 Winter Olympics. See White House press release, “Preparing for the World: Homeland Security and the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics,” Jan. 10, 2002.

Fig. 3–4. Phase II Threats

5. THIRD- PARTIES

7. POLITICAL GOALS

3. NONCOMBATANTS/ PROPERTY

2. uses/ threatens

violence against

6. responses

4. to affect

1. NONSTATE ATTACKER

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

In political terms, government leaders may respond to attacks by spending their time, which has the cost of diverting their attention from other pressing issues. Legislatures may work on new legislation, particularly after an egregious attack.23 Government staff may be diverted to monitor terrorism, and to develop policy responses.24 Countries have responded to terrorist attacks with increased international tensions, such as between India and Pakistan (tensions that were particularly dangerous since both countries had nuclear weapons). The United States has responded to terrorism by reducing or closing embassies, actions that negatively affected U.S. interests and the ability to conduct foreign policy.25

In response to the threat from terrorism, officials may institute screening for public buildings. These measures have economic effects, such as the cost of security personnel and the opportunity cost of people’s time to go through screening procedures. There are also intangible costs. Working in a fortress-like environment is repugnant to many people, and a fortress-like impression can dampen the sense of freedom. Security precautions can isolate leaders from the public—after an assassination attempt, Pope John Paul II began using a vehicle with bullet-proof glass that increased his physical security, but decreased his accessibility to people.

In human rights terms, responses to attacks may undermine values, and damage individual freedoms. Hasty legislation may deprive individuals of due process rights, which may result in the loss of their physical freedom. Intrusive security measures can decrease personal privacy. Private citizens may attack others seen as associated with terrorists, and this private retaliation violates the rights of victims, damages the rule of law, and reduces national cohesion.

Who Controls the Damage That Terrorism Does and the Costs Incurred? Phase I costs are primarily determined by the attackers in their attack on the targets of violence, but third-parties control the costs and damage incurred in Phase II (Fig. 3–5). Terrorist attacks may induce, elicit, or coerce these responses, but third-parties decide what responses they will or will not take—no one “forces” any responses. (The measures may be justified; nevertheless, all measures taken are the decision and choice of third-parties.)

23 Laura Donohue reported that after the 9/11 attacks, “Congress proposed more than 450 counterterrorist resolutions, bills, and amendments. (This compared with approximately 1,300 total in the course of U.S. history.) Within four months of the attacks, more than two dozen new measures became law. President [George W.] Bush issued 12 Executive Orders and 10 Presidential Proclamations related to the attacks.” See Donohue, “Fear Itself,” in Howard and Sawyer, eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 2003, 275. 24 For example, in 1985 the U.S. government devoted approximately 18,000 man-years to counterterrorism. See Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 1986, 10. 25 See, for example, Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 26–27.

The Pope Mobile

Fig. 3–5. Control of Damage from Terrorist Attacks

5. THIRD- PARTIES

7. POLITICAL GOALS

3. TARGETS OF VIOLENCE

2. uses violence against

6. responses

4. to affect

1. ATTACKER

Phase I

Phase II

Terrorists Have Primary Third-Parties Control Control of the Damage the Damage Incurred to the Targets of Violence from Responses to Attacks

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Evaluating Phase I Threats. How do terrorists decide on the amount and type of physical damage they want to cause? There are factors that create incentives for terrorists to increase—as well as to limit—the frequency, character, and destructiveness of their attacks.

What Factors May Lead Terrorists to Increase the Destruction They Intend to Cause in an Attack? There are factors that lead terrorists to increase the destruction that they intend to cause.

The desire for a certain level of publicity and attention. Terrorists may think that a continuous upward ratcheting of violence is needed to maintain media and public interest, or that a spectacular attack will put their goals at the top of the political agenda.

Precedents. Changes in the character, method used, and amount of destruction set precedents that may lead terrorists to increase the damage they intend to cause. The 9/11 attacks caused more than ten times the number of deaths and far greater destruction than any previous attack. A change in the character of an attack, such as the first use of chemicals, sets a precedent. A change in method sets a precedent, such as the use of secondary explosive devices targeting emergency first responders. To illustrate, in January 1997 a bomb exploded at a women’s health facility in Atlanta, Georgia, and within an hour, a second bomb wounded several law enforcement personnel and emergency first responders.26 This change in method increased the threat to all involved in an attack, since the need to check for additional explosives delays responders from immediately assisting victims.

Internal pressures. Pressures may come from within a terrorist group. A group may have internal pressures for escalation—younger members, for example, may press for greater violence.

External pressures. Pressures may come from outside a terrorist group. For example, the expectations of constituents can pressure terrorist groups to increase their attacks. During the struggle for Algerian independence, the execution of FLN prisoners—regarded as heroes by many Algerians—led to strong demands for the FLN to retaliate for the executions.27 Groups vying to lead a community may strive to outdo each other by more spectacular attacks. Rival groups may compete as to which group can perpetrate the most grievous attacks against a mutual opponent. If terrorist attacks enable a group to gain supporters, other groups pursuing the same goal through nonviolent methods may feel pressure to adopt terrorism.

The development and dissemination of technology. The development and dissemination of technology can enable terrorists to use additional means of violence. These means may enable more destructive attacks, and make “spectacular” attacks more attainable.

The erosion of moral inhibitions. The longevity of some terrorist groups can lead to the erosion of moral inhibitions. A group that has been operating for long time may have less compunction about killing, particularly if people have grown up in a violent environment.

State sponsorship. State sponsorship can enable terrorist groups to conduct more lethal and frequent attacks by increasing their capabilities through such means as providing funds, weapons, intelligence, and technical expertise. State sponsorship can reduce the constraints on groups, allowing them to have less concern about alienating perceived constituents, since the group’s funds come from the state sponsor, not from supporters. State-sponsored terrorists also do not need to take the risks involved with financing themselves through such means as bank robberies and kidnappings for ransom money, and can, therefore, conduct more attacks.

26 FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1997, 3. 27 Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism, 1978, 31–32.

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

What Factors May Lead Terrorists to Limit the Destruction They Intend to Cause in an Attack? There are factors that lead terrorists to limit the destruction that they intend to cause. It is not necessarily true that deterrence “means nothing” to terrorists because they have no nation or citizens to defend.28 Terrorists can be deterred, and are constrained by a number of factors.

The need to elicit the desired responses. Terrorists decide on the amount and kind of destruction they intend to cause in light of the responses they seek to elicit. Most terrorists try to do enough damage to get attention, but not enough to alienate the people whose support they need or want to attract. Terrorists need publicity, but want to avoid backlash, and an egregious act may backfire by causing public revulsion, alienating supporters, and provoking intense government efforts to find them. The need to elicit support and avoid backlash creates an incentive for terrorists to limit the destructiveness of their attacks—a senior al Qaeda leader wrote of the importance of avoiding “any action that the masses do not understand or approve.”29

The need for legitimacy. To achieve their political goals, terrorists and their goals need to be seen as legitimate by at least a significant part of the population. John Steinbruner noted: “Terrorists want to win the battle for legitimacy, and too much damage from a terrorist attack reduces this legitimacy and with it their potential for support. It is very difficult to justify terrorism even if the associated cause succeeds, such as the role that Jewish terrorism against the British played in creating the State of Israel. The need for legitimacy imposes a constraint on the scope and character of an attack.”30

It is not necessarily true that there is an inexorable progress toward mass destruction. Terrorists are seeking particular responses, and may conclude that massive attacks may not elicit the desired responses. For example, one response to the 9/11 attacks was a coalition invasion of Afghanistan to remove an al Qaeda sanctuary, a response that the attackers had not expected.

The odiousness of certain methods. Terrorists are likely to alienate many people if they use methods that cause revulsion, such as chemical and biological weapons. Thus the widespread sense of the odiousness of certain methods can be self-deterring. For example, anthrax letters sent in 2001 did not elicit any positive effect.

The desire for possible negotiation. Terrorists may want to leave room for future negotiation and a possible political settlement. An egregious attack may destroy the possibility for desired concessions or a political settlement.

The desire to appear as the underdog to Goliath. Terrorists try to “tap into” the moral appeal of the underdog courageously battling a behemoth. Weapons that can cause massive casualties such as nuclear weapons would preclude the image that terrorists want to project. (However, paradoxically, terrorists may also strive to appear invincible and inevitable.)

The need to avoid getting caught. Terrorists need to avoid getting caught. Every attack involves this risk, and the more attacks terrorists perpetrate, the more chances they take of being caught. This constraint may lead terrorists to limit the frequency and destructiveness of attacks.

28 See, for example, the statement, “Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” President George W. Bush, address, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” June 1, 2002. 29 Letter dated July 9, 2005, from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ODNI News Release, Oct. 11, 2005, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 30 John Steinbruner, terrorism lecture, Dec. 3, 2002, author’s files.

Anthrax Letters, 2001

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Would Terrorists Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction? In evaluating Phase I threats, the issue of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) needs to be considered. There are factors that affect whether or not a terrorist group would use a weapon of mass destruction.

Why might terrorists want to use WMD (that is, a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapon)? Any act associated with the words “chemical,” “biological,” “radiological,” or “nuclear” would generate a great deal of shock and fear. The seizure of a nuclear power plant, for example, would be likely to be widely publicized and cause widespread fear of radiological pollution.

Radiological weapons can appeal to terrorists for the potential of rousing fear, and for area denial. The use of radioactive material, no matter how little, would cause significant alarm, and people might avoid the location for years. Economic activity would be disrupted, particularly if ports or business areas were contaminated.

A credible threat of detonating a nuclear weapon would have a very high coercive value, but terrorists would have to demonstrate possession and the ability to deliver and operate the weapon—and might need more than one weapon. (Without more than one weapon, if terrorists conducted a demonstration detonation, they might not be able to deter or coerce third-parties.)

Why might terrorists not want to use WMD? There are constraints and inhibitions against the use of WMD in attacks. Terrorists groups generally seek to gain from attacks without reducing their support, and attacks involving any type of CBRN might be difficult to convert into political achievement—any use would be attention-getting, but the reaction and publicity would be very negative for the cause being pursued. The use of a nuclear weapon would cause an enormous number of deaths and massive destruction, but there would be an immense public backlash, security crackdown, and hunt for those responsible. Terrorists may also fear that a nuclear weapon would kill so many people that the terrorists would lose all claim to legitimacy, and alienate constituencies.

All types of CBRN involve significant difficulties in their use, and are unpredictable in their effects. For example, all kinds of CBRN weapons are affected by weather uncertainties.

Most terrorist attacks are intended to produce immediate, dramatic effects—unlike a biological attack that produces indiscriminate deaths and illnesses over which the terrorists would have little control. Terrorists calculate the risk to themselves of certain methods, and handling any kind of WMD increases the physical risk to the terrorists themselves. For example, handling biological weapons is highly risky—and a lingering death from a biological agent is very different from an instantaneous death in a dramatic explosion. And most terrorists want to live after carrying out attacks.

Terrorists may fear that the weapon might not work. Terrorists cannot afford to look incompetent, and therefore generally prefer proven methods with fewer risks. As George Habash said, “The main point is to select targets where success is 100 percent assured.”31

Terrorists do not need to use WMD when they can pursue their goals using low-risk, low-cost means such as conventional explosives. For example, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya killed several hundred people and injured several thousand.

31 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 34.

What Is a “Weapon of Mass Destruction” (WMD)?

The term “WMD” has often been used to mean any weapon that uses chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear means (CBRN).

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Evaluating Phase II Threats. To prevent the damage sustained in Phase I from being increased by third-party actions, the impulses and responses that terrorists intend to elicit from third-parties need to be anticipated and prepared for. For example, an attack may be intended to elicit rage and provoke members of the public to attack other people, and the government needs to anticipate these impulses, and be prepared to prevent counterproductive responses.

The “leverage of terrorism” plays a role in evaluating the threat from Phase II of terrorist attacks (Fig. 3–6). The leverage of terrorism is the tendency for third-parties to respond to attacks in a way that is disproportional when compared to the actual damage caused by the attack. Through the leverage of terrorism, third- party targets can do more damage than the attack did, and therefore need to be careful in their responses. Many characteristics of terrorism contribute to the leverage of terrorism, including “who” and “what” terrorists select to attack, and the qualities of the violence. To illustrate, the selection of an outrageous target of violence such as an elementary school, or a highly symbolic target such as a national monument, can generate impulses for very strong responses. The qualities of the violence that terrorists use—that the violence is illegal, unexpected, and often random—contribute to the impulses for a strong response. The implicit threat that every attack contains of future attacks further contributes to the pressure for strong responses.

The interplay among third-party responses also needs to be anticipated. As shown in Fig. 3–7, glee aroused in and expressed by supporters may further enrage opponents and intensify the impulse to retaliate in kind.

Fig. 3–7. Example of Interplay of Responses to Terrorist Attacks <-------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------> Supporters Potential Uncommitted/ Potential Opponents Supporters Unconcerned Opponents

Glee Shock; Horror; Anxiety; Fear; Anger; Outrage; Vengefulness Overreact; Retaliate in kind

Contribute to Advancing a Political Goal

All of these kinds of factors need to be taken into consideration when evaluating the threat from Phase II of an attack. (And to be most effective, these factors also need to be considered in government plans.)

Fig. 3–6. The Leverage of Terrorism

THIRD- PARTIES

POLITICAL GOALS

TARGETS OF VIOLENCE

uses violence against

responses

to affect

NONSTATE ATTACKER

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

Terrorist Threat Assessments. Accurate and objective threat assessments are essential for effective counterterrorism efforts. Overestimated threat assessments can cause unnecessary public apprehension, wasteful changes in business practices, and pressure on governments to adopt counterproductive measures. Underestimated threat assessments risk public safety, and can lead to being unprepared for attacks.

In evaluating Phase I terrorist threats, assessments need to be based on the likelihood of credible threats, yet take low-probability threats into consideration. For example, the likelihood that terrorists would use a nuclear weapon may be low, but the potential consequences are so high that governments may feel that developing effective countermeasures is imperative. However, though many threats are possible, some are more likely than others, and the need to consider low-probability/high-consequence attacks should not distort or downgrade the attention paid to more likely forms of terrorism.

It is critical to recognize distinctions in the degree of threat posed by the different forms of WMD, and to refrain from conflating the threats from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons into a single WMD threat—the magnitude and type of threat posed by each is different. To defend against the threats from WMD, governments need to analyze the threat from each type, and how likely it is that each type of threat will occur.

Governments can avoid using the discussion of terrorist threats for political purposes. For example, a government may minimize the threat to encourage a sense of security in the public, or inflate the threat to frighten the public into supporting a particular policy.

Governments (and the public) can be alert for agencies, organizations, and businesses that may have an interest in magnifying, or minimizing, the threat from terrorism. For example, “security entrepreneurs” may benefit from emphasizing the terrorist threat in order to gain additional markets for equipment, larger organization budgets, or greater government powers.

There have been periodic discussions of “new terrorism,” but though aspects of terrorism may change, the fundamentals do not. The idea of “new terrorism” may be promoted for such reasons as to mobilize support for policy changes and new measures. But “terrorism” does not change any more than “war” does. The tactics and weapons used in war may change, as may the weapons used in terrorism, but war itself does not change and neither does terrorism.

There is danger in generalizing the threat from terrorism on the basis of particular attacks.32 For example, some experts have said that terrorists with a religious-political goal may feel less constrained because they believe that they are doing the will of a higher being, but secular terrorists have also been willing to engage in mass-casualty attacks.33 Timothy McVeigh killed 168 people—including many children—in one attack. Brian Jenkins noted that rightwing terrorists “have shown themselves capable of…indiscriminate violence calculated to create panic and a popular clamor for a political strongman who will be able to impose order.”34

32 For example, it can be misleading to generalize the threat from terrorism based on attacks against a particular country. To illustrate, members of the U.S. population may think that they are the primary target of terrorist attacks, but empirical research at START showed that the United States was not, as frequently believed, the target of “an inordinate number of terrorist attacks.” See LaFree, “Using Open Source Data to Counter Common Myths about Terrorism,” in Criminologists on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2011, 418–421. 33 CIA, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, 11. Beginning in 1969, rightwing groups in Italy perpetrated urban bombings with high numbers of civilian casualties as part of their “strategy of tension” to keep the Italian government and population from moving to the left. See Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” in Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 2011, 116–117. 34 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, RAND, 1985, 8.

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

There can be a tendency to view the terrorist threat in terms of the most recent attacks, and to overlook the potential for attacks to come from unexpected directions. Awareness of this tendency can help avoid an over-focus on current threats that might leave a country vulnerable to brewing threats.

Before the 9/11 attacks in 2001, many experts had commented on the low priority that governments and political leaders had, in general, given to terrorism. Many governments during the 1960–2000 period considered terrorism more of a “nuisance” than a significant threat. Experts and scholars noted that for decades terrorism was considered a marginal field of study and did not receive priority.35 Martha Crenshaw wrote that scholars engaged in the debate over the future of American foreign policy in the 1990s did not consider terrorism an important problem for the security studies and international relations fields, or for the development of grand strategy.36 The Clinton administrations in the 1990s did give increasing attention to terrorism, and between 1996 and 2001 nearly doubled annual counterterrorism expenditures.37 However, that emphasis did not continue when the new George W. Bush administration began in January 2001, and during the first eight months of 2001 the administration took very little action regarding terrorism, despite warnings.38 Bush’s national security team met formally nearly 100 times before the 9/11 attacks, but terrorism was the topic during only two of those sessions.39 Before the 9/11 attacks, the president, vice president, and national security adviser rarely spoke extensively about terrorism. On the day of the 9/11 attacks, the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was scheduled to give an address outlining administration policy on “the threats and problems of today and the day after,” and the speech as prepared (but undelivered) focused largely on missile defense, and argued for an increase in its funding by pointing out that the United States had spent nearly twice as much on terrorism as it had on missile defense during the previous year.40

What Should the Threat from Terrorism Be Called? How should the threat from terrorism be viewed and called? Is the threat a “what,” a “who,” or both? Is the threat a kind of belief such as communism or fundamentalism; a particular kind of goal, such as an independent State; or a group, community, or population? The threat from terrorism has been identified (and misidentified) in many ways. For example, after the 9/11 attacks, the threat from terrorism was variously called terrorist networks, terrorist groups of global reach, totalitarian threat linked to WMD, ideological extremism, ideological extremists, Islamic extremism, a fringe form of Islamic extremism, radical/totalitarian ideology, radical fundamentalism, radical fundamentalists, and a radical ideological movement. But it can be a mistake to identify the threat from terrorism in terms of the current threat, for the source of the threat changes as different groups take up— and stop—using terrorism for various political goals (which also change over time).

*** 35 See, for example, Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 2005, back cover (paperback edition). 36 Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 76–77. 37 Michael Dobbs, “An Obscure Chief in U.S. War on Terror,” Washington Post, April 2, 2000. 38 For example, the outgoing national security adviser, Samuel Berger, said that he told the incoming adviser, Condoleezza Rice, that terrorism would take more of her time than any other issue. See Barton Gellman, “A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution,” Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2002. 39 Associated Press, Ted Bridis, “Bush Team Didn’t Talk Terror Much Before 9/11,” Sacramento Bee, June 29, 2002. 40 Robin Wright, “Top Focus Before 9/11 Wasn’t on Terrorism,” Washington Post, April 1, 2004; “Excerpts from Rice’s Speeches,” Washington Post, April 1, 2004.

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Chapter 3. The Cause and Threat of Terrorism

III. Summary The cause of terrorism is the decision to select terrorism as a method to pursue a political

goal. People decide to use terrorism because they think that its use is justified by the goal they are pursuing, and that the goal is more important than the rights of those who may be harmed or killed in the attack (or that the victims have no rights). More specifically, people generally decide to use terrorism for one of three reasons: they do not think they can achieve their goals using other methods, they do not feel that they are making enough progress toward their goal using other methods and are not willing to continue trying, or they think that terrorism will make other tools available to them to pursue their goals—and in addition they have to be willing to use terrorism (which most people are not willing to do).

The decision to use terrorism is a deliberate choice from among alternatives, regardless of the accuracy and completeness of the information on which the decision is based. The many “root causes” of terrorism that have been offered do not cause terrorism, but can be factors affecting the selection of terrorism as a method. No factors cause the selection of any method—people in similar situations have chosen or rejected terrorism as a means of struggle. During the 20th century and early 21st century, the use of terrorism alone has generally been ineffective in achieving a goal, but people who take up the tool think that its use will at least advance their goal, and perhaps enable other tools to become available.

The threat from terrorism consists of the physical damage that the violence causes in Phase I of a terrorist attack, and the damage that third-parties may do in their responses in Phase II. The leverage of terrorism tends to increase the intensity and scope of third-party responses, thus making responses potentially more damaging than the attack itself.

Threat assessments need to evaluate the dangers involved with Phase I and Phase II of terrorist attacks. An accurate threat assessment examines the factors that affect terrorists’ decisions regarding the amount and type of damage they intend to cause in Phase I of an attack (the actual use of violence). The threat from low-probability/high-consequence attacks needs to be considered and planned for, but not overemphasized at the expense of more likely kinds of attacks. The threats from each type of WMD need to be considered separately—the threats from each kind are different.

Threat assessments need to be accurate and avoid both overestimating and underestimating the threat. Threat assessments need to be objective, and avoid bias from those who have commercial interests, political agendas other than counterterrorism, or preferences for certain tools because of ideology.

There can be a tendency to view the threat from terrorism in terms of recent terrorist attacks and campaigns. Viewing the terrorist threat in terms of the current threat may result in overlooking the potential for attacks to come from unexpected directions.

The threat from terrorism stems from the decision to use terrorism. The source of the threat changes as different groups take up and stop using terrorism on behalf of various goals, which have also changed over time.

The threat from terrorism needs to be labeled carefully. Inaccurate characterizations of the threat from terrorism can distort or obfuscate the true threat and thereby make terrorism more difficult to control.

*****

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