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Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

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Learning and Individual Differences

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Epistemic beliefs and critical thinking of Chinese students

Ngai-Man Chan a, Irene T. Ho a,⁎, Kelly Y.L. Ku b

a Department of Psychology, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong b Department of Education Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +852 2859 2296; fax: E-mail addresses: h0153802@graduate.hku.hk (N.-M

kellyku@hkbu.edu.hk (K.Y.L. Ku).

1041-6080/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Inc. Al doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2010.11.001

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 18 October 2009 Received in revised form 23 August 2010 Accepted 3 November 2010

Keywords: Epistemic belief Critical thinking Chinese student Epistemology Individual difference

Two studies were carried out to examine the relationship between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking. In the first study, 138 Chinese undergraduates completed the adapted Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) and the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment Using Everyday Situations. Their cognitive ability and thinking dispositions were alsomeasured. Results showed that other than cognitive ability, the belief that knowledge is certain was most related to thinking performance. In the second study, 111 undergraduates read a passage on a controversial issue and were asked to indicate their position, explain the reasoning behind, and rate their confidence in judgment. They were then presented relevant counterarguments and asked to respond to them. Participants were also administered the adapted EBI. There was clear evidence that those believing knowledge to be certain exhibited poorer two-sided thinking and a stronger tendency to devaluate or ignore counterarguments. Implications for the enhancement of critical thinking are discussed.

+852 2858 3518. . Chan), itfho@hku.hk (I.T. Ho),

l rights reserved.

© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

With the advent of the Information Age and increased complexity of society, critical thinking has been receiving attention as an ability that enables one to deal with myriad information, to make reasonable judgments, and to participate in society as competent citizens (Halpern, 2003; Paul, 1984). Schools have been given the important responsibility of helping students learn to think deeply and rationally so that they can evaluate different arguments and views effectively (Brown, 1997). How critical thinking may be fostered is a question that educators and psychologists have been asking.

Among the various factors affecting critical thinking performance, personal epistemology, defined as one's views about the nature of knowledge and knowing, has been proposed to be relevant (Brabeck, 1983; Gallagher, 1998; Jones, Merritt, & Palmer, 1999; Kuhn, 1999; Kurfiss, 1988; Mines, King, Hood, & Wood, 1990; Schraw, 2001). A better understanding of how personal epistemology affects thinking performance would help improve related instructional practices.

1.1. Epistemic beliefs

Personal epistemology refers to “beliefs about the definition of knowledge, how knowledge is constructed, how knowledge is evaluated, where knowledge resides, and how knowing occurs” (Hofer, 2002, p. 4). As these beliefs influence how people handle and use knowledge, they play an important role in students’ thinking,

learning, and motivation (Hofer, 2001; Hofer & Printrich, 1997; Muis, 2007; Schommer, 1994; Schraw & Sinatra, 2004).

Researchers have differed in their approaches to the study of personal epistemology. One approach, initiated by Schommer (1990, 1994), has conceptualized personal epistemology as a systemofmore or less independent beliefs. A five-factor model of epistemological beliefs has been proposed, consisting of beliefs about simple knowledge (knowledge as an accumulation of discrete and unambiguous facts), certain knowledge (knowledge is absolute and unchanging), omniscient authority (authorities have best access to knowledge), quick learning (learning occurs quickly or not at all), and innate ability (the ability to acquire knowledge is fixed).

The measurement of these beliefs started with Schommer's Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (Schommer, 1990), which utilizes a Likert-type scale to assess the strength of various epistemic beliefs. This instrument spurred efforts by other researchers to develop similar measures for the study of epistemic beliefs (e.g., Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle, 1998; Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993; Wood & Kardash, 2002). One example was the development of the 32-item Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI) by Bendixen and colleagues (Bendixen et al., 1998). The EBIwasmodeled on Schommer's questionnaire but was found to have better predictive validity and test– retest reliability (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002).

Quantitative instruments of this kind allow us to differentiate individuals on the level of sophistication or maturity in their handling of knowledge during thinking and learning. Based on the five- dimension conceptualization, sophisticated beliefs embrace “evolving knowledge, multiple approaches to the justification of knowledge, integration of knowledge,…, gradual learning, and ever growing ability to learn” (Schommer-Aikins, 2002, p.113). For example, if a

68 N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

student tends to believe that knowledge is absolute and knowable with certainty, we refer to him or her as having a naïve belief in knowledge being certain. In contrast, a student who appreciates the tentative nature of knowledge would be considered having a more sophisticated or mature belief in knowledge being uncertain. More sophisticated beliefs in the uncertain, relative, and complex nature of knowledge are associated with the ability and readiness to take in new ideas or change old ones, therefore supporting flexible thinking.

Closely associated with the development of epistemic belief measures have been efforts to delineate more clearly the multi- dimensional nature of these beliefs. While some researchers have found evidence for Schommer's original five-dimensional theory of epistemic beliefs (Schraw et al., 2002), others have been unable to replicate the proposed dimensions at the item level. For example, Schommer herself did not generate a clear omniscient authority dimension in her own study (1990), while Nussbaum and Bendixen (2003) found that omniscient authority and quick learning failed to emerge as distinct factors.

Related studies in non-Western contexts have also suggested cross-cultural differences in the structure, level, and effects of epistemic beliefs (Khine, 2008). For example, researchers studying Chinese populations often highlight the emphasis on respect for authority and conformity in the Confucian culture in their prediction or interpretation of related results (Chan & Elliot, 2004a; Lin, 2001; Qian & Pan, 2002). However, findings have been inconsistent and so far no clear patterns of the structure and effects of Chinese people's epistemic beliefs have emerged. As these studies are still very limited in number and have generated diverse findings, more investigations in relation to a wider range of learning and thinking processes are needed (for reviews of related issues see Chan & Elliot, 2004a; Duell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001; Hofer, 2008). The accumulation of empirical findings would help generate clearer patterns of universal and culture-specific aspects of epistemic beliefs and their effects.

1.2. Epistemic beliefs and critical thinking

Critical thinking is “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe and do” (Ennis, 1991, p.7). It involves an active evaluation of one's thinking process, which would provide useful and accurate feedbacks to improve the thinking (Halpern, 1998, 1999). Although authors vary in the breadth of their definition of critical thinking, overall there is agreement about judgment, reasoning, meta-cognition, and reflective thinking being the major components (see review by Fischer & Spiker, 2000). For example, Halpern (1998) proposed a taxonomy of five major critical thinking skills comprising verbal reasoning, argument analysis, hypothesis testing, assessing likelihood, and decision-making/problem-solving. These are skills frequently used in a wide range of everyday evaluative thinking.

In situations requiring critical thinking, the adequacy of individuals’ epistemological theories will in some way determine how they approach the task and what meaning they make of the given information. As illustrated above, sophisticated beliefs underlie flexible thinking, which is essential in the process of thinking critically. Indeed, many researchers share the notion that advanced epistemological awareness is a prerequisite for one to engage in critical thinking (Gallagher, 1998; Jones et al., 1999; Kurfiss, 1988), with related empirical evidence available. For example, Brabeck (1983) found a significant positive correlation between epistemological understanding and critical thinking, whereasMines and colleagues (Mines et al., 1990) noted that “students who reason using the assumptions of the higher stages of reflective judgment demonstrate better critical thinking skills than do those who use lower stage assumptions” (p. 545). Other researchers also explicitly assert that personal epistemology has the potential to inform educators about ways to enhance students’ thinking (Kuhn, 1999; Schraw, 2001).

1.3. Effects of epistemic beliefs on argumentation

While researchers have argued for a relationship between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking performance, these beliefs have been particularly observed to produce impacts on argumenta- tion skills and argument analysis, which constitute a specific and salient aspect of critical thinking ability (see for example, Halpern's 1998 taxonomy of critical thinking skills). Indeed, of the many studies linking epistemic beliefs to thinking performance, most examine this relationship in contexts that involve the evaluation of two-sided arguments or multiple solutions in relation to controversial or ambiguous issues.

One important observation fromthese studies is that naïve epistemic beliefs would induce simplistic approaches to complex issues, often manifested in an inadequate consideration of opposing views. For example, it was shown that individuals adopting naïve epistemic beliefs tended to draw oversimplified or absolute conclusions after reading passages highlighting two opposing views on controversial issues in the psychology and nutrition domains (Schommer, 1990). They would also write conclusions that failed to reflect the inconclusive nature of mixed evidence when considering controversial issues such as HIV–AIDS relationship, abortion, and communication styles of men and women (Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Schommer-Aikins & Hutter, 2002).

Furthermore, it has been observed that people with naïve beliefs would treat information that does not support their existing beliefs in a biased manner. For example, they would use fewer cognitive strategies when reading dual-position text, reflecting a tendency to ignore certain information, and distort contradictory information in order to make it consistent with preexisting beliefs during free recall of text information (Kardash & Howell, 2000). In another study, naïve epistemic beliefs were found to be associated with the tendency to decline scientific explanation when learning about the potentially controversial topic of human evolution (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). Also the conceptual change of people holding naïve epistemic beliefs was found to bemuchmore limited after reading refutation text that directly confronted their misconceptions about a physics topic (Qian & Alvermann, 1995).

Generally, people with naïve epistemic beliefs have been found to avoid argumentative situations (Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003) and perform poorly in ill-defined tasks with multiple, non-guaranteed solutions (Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995). In other words, the level of sophistication of an individual's epistemic beliefs is particu- larly associated with performance on open-ended and ill-structured thinking tasks which involve comparing alternative viewpoints, the strength of evidence, and the adequacy of arguments in order to arrive at a judgment. It is in these situations that an absolutist tendency appears to produce the greatest impact on thinking and information processing.

1.4. Epistemic beliefs and other critical thinking factors

Researchers have largely conceptualized critical thinking in terms of two major factors: cognitive skills or ability and thinking dispositions. There is general consensus that although some people may have excellent cognitive abilities which are necessary for thinking critically, they may not actively or effectively engage in such thinking if they lack the disposition to do so (Ennis, 1991; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo, 2000; Halpern, 1998; Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993). If epistemic beliefs have also been found to be related to critical thinking performance, it would be necessary to investigate how these beliefs relate to ability and dispositions and to examine their relative effects on thinking performance.

Cognitive ability and epistemic beliefs are likely to have reciprocal influences on each other. On the one hand, people with limited cognitive ability may find it difficult to process information from multiple perspectives, as in the comparison of arguments, therefore

69N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

discouraging them from endorsing more sophisticated epistemic beliefs that acknowledge the tentative and complex nature of knowledge. On the other hand, persons with an absolutist inclination or naïve personal epistemology, with their belief in knowledge being facts that are either right or wrong, may not see the need to engage in complex intellectual activities such as argument (Hofer & Printrich, 1997; Kuhn, 1999, 2001; Weinstock & Cronin, 2003), thus limiting their practice and development of higher level reasoning skills.

Thinking dispositions that have been suggested to facilitate critical thinking include having an interest in thinking (e.g., need for cognition and inquisitiveness), a mature approach to making judg- ments (e.g., openness and truth-seeking), and being careful and systematic in thinking (e.g., conscientiousness and systematicity) (American Philosophical Association, 1990; Ennis, 1991; Facione et al., 2000; Perkins et al., 1993). More advanced development in episte- mological understanding not only fosters thinking skills but also enhances the value for critical thinking. As individuals with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs see the need to evaluate assertions based on criteria of argument and evidence, they would be more willing to engage in effortful thinking and be open-minded about new evidence or alternatives. In return, these thinking inclinations will also fortify sophisticated epistemic beliefs, as the habit of engaging in complex reasoning would reinforce the experience of knowledge being complex and tentative.

Thus, cognitive abilities, thinking dispositions and epistemic beliefs probably develop in synchrony. Given that these individual difference variables are likely to be correlated, the extent to which personal epistemology provides unique contribution to critical thinking on top of the contribution of cognitive abilities and thinking dispositions requires investigation.

1.5. The present research

Current evidence as reviewed above has pointed to the phenom- enon that individuals with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs tend to be better critical thinkers. However, more research is needed to gain a better picture of how naïve beliefs about knowledge hinder good thinking. In particular, there has not been research with a focus on the simultaneous effects of epistemic beliefs, cognitive ability, and thinking dispositions on critical thinking. Furthermore, extending related research beyond Western contexts would throw light on the extent to which the hypothesized relationships are universally applicable.

The present research, consisting of two studies, aimed at extending the empirical basis for the epistemic belief-critical thinking relation- ship by examining it in groups of Chinese students in Hong Kong. The first study was an examination of general relationships that constitute basic understanding, including: (i) What is the factor structure of epistemic beliefs among Chinese students and which aspect(s) of these beliefs produce most salient effects on critical thinking? (ii) What is the pattern of relationships between epistemic beliefs and cognitive ability as well as thinking dispositions? (iii) What are the unique and relative contributions of beliefs, ability, and disposi- tions to critical thinking performance? Study 2 was a more focused investigation of how epistemic beliefs affect argumentation, which is an essential aspect of critical thinking.

2. Study 1

There were two focuses of examination in Study 1. Firstly, we explored the factor structure of epistemic beliefs as well as the relationships between these beliefs and other critical thinking factors, namely cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Secondly, we examined whether epistemic beliefs had a unique contribution to students’ critical thinking performance beyond their effects through associations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Based on

previous findings from Western research, the following hypotheses were tested:

(i) More sophisticated epistemic beliefs are associated with better cognitive ability.

(ii) More sophisticated epistemic beliefs are associated with higher levels of desirable thinking dispositions.

(iii) More sophisticated epistemic beliefs are associated with better critical thinking performance.

(iv) Epistemic beliefs have unique effects on critical thinking performance over and above those contributed by cognitive ability and thinking dispositions.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants Participants were138 Chinese undergraduate students (40 males

and 98 females) at a comprehensive university in Hong Kong, recruited through campus-wide advertising. Ages ranged from 19 to 32 (M=20.72, SD=1.60) and their average GPA was 2.92 (SD=.51). Participants consisted of students in their first (47.8%), second (37.0%) and final (15.2%) years of study with major subjects in social science, arts, science, business, and others. Participation was on a voluntary and anonymous basis.

2.1.2. Measures A pilot study was carried out to examine the applicability of the

Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) (Bendixen et al., 1998) for use with the present participants, in particular its reliability and factorial structure. The Inventory consists of 32 items falling under five factors, namely Certain Knowledge, Simple Knowledge, Innate Ability, Quick Learning and Omniscient Authority. The Inventory was found to have better test–retest reliability (stability coefficients ranging from .62 to .81) and predictive validity than earlier instruments measuring similar constructs (Schraw et al., 2002).

In the pilot study, the Chinese version of the 32 items was derived through a translation–back-translation procedure. Then 366 univer- sity and high school students in Hong Kong were asked to rate the items on five-point Likert scales (“Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”). Results from exploratory factor analysis showed that consistent with the findings from an earlier study by Nussbaum and Bendixen (2003), the Quick Learning and Omniscient Authority dimensions did not emerge as distinct factors. Instead, three interpretable and distinct factors with satisfactory internal consisten- cies (Cronbach's alphas above .65) resulted, namely Innate Ability, Simple Knowledge and Certain Knowledge. Based on the results from this pilot study, three scales, each with four items (a total of 12 items) selected from the EBI, were used in the present study. Examples of items are: “Smart people are born that way” (Innate Ability), “If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely end up confused” (Simple Knowledge), and “Absolute moral truth does not exist” (Certain Knowledge; reverse coded). Higher scores on these scales indicate more naïve beliefs.

The Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment Using Everyday Situations (HCTAES; Halpern, 2007) was used to measure participants’ critical thinking performance. The HCTAES consists of 25 everyday scenarios, each followed by open-ended and multiple-choice questions. The test provides an overall index of critical thinking performance covering all major critical thinking skills: verbal reasoning, argument analysis, hypothesis testing, assessing likelihood and decision-making/problem- solving. The following is a hypothetical item similar in length and presentation to those in the HCTAES:

Results from a recent study indicated that female adolescents who perceive themselves as being unpopular among peers are more likely to be overweight. The researchers suggested that running social skills

Table 1 Factor loadings of epistemic belief items and factor correlations in Study 1 (N=138).

Item Innate ability

Certain knowledge

Simple knowledge

1. Smart people are born that way .85 2. People can't do too much about how smart they are

.62

3. Some people will never be smart no matter how hard they work

.51

4. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are

.40

5. Absolute moral truth does not exista .73 6. Truth means different things to

different peoplea .59

7. Sometimes there are no right answers to life's problemsa

.59

8. What is true today will be true tomorrow .40 9. Too many theories just complicate things .84 10. The best ideas are often the most simple .64 11. If a person tries too hard to understand a

problem, they will most likely end up confused

.53

12. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe

.46

Factor correlations Innate ability 1 Certain knowledge −.09 1 Simple knowledge .08 .05 1

a Item reversed coded.

70 N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

training programs for female adolescents who are overweight would help solve their weight problems.

Open-ended question: Based on this information, would you support this idea as a way of

solving overweight problems for female adolescents? Type “yes” or “no” and explain why or why not.

Forced-choice question: Based on this information, which of the following is the best answer? (Four choices provided). Sample choice: Social skills training will probably reduce overweight

problems among female adolescents because the researchers found that girls who perceive themselves as being unpopular among peers are more likely to be overweight.

The HCTAES have been used with different samples of American students with convergent and divergent validity evidence reported, including high positive correlations (in the .50 to .70 range) with a number of achievement or ability tests (e.g., SAT-Verbal, SAT-Math and GRE-Analytic), and moderate correlations in the .30 to .40 range withmeasures of need for cognition and conscientiousness. Reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alphas) of over .80 have been reported for different groups of students (Halpern, 2007). Preliminary studies on the appropriateness of the test for use with Chinese students were conducted (Hau et al., 2006). Analyses of the results from these studies helped to establish the validity and reliability of the Chinese version of the test, with Cronbach's alphas for different samples of secondary and university students ranging from .65 to .74. All items were scored according to the standards provided in the original test (Halpern, 2007) and a total scorewas derived by summing all the item scores.

The Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) of the Chinese version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Third Edition (WAIS-III, Chinese Edition, 2002) was used to measure participants’ cognitive–verbal ability. The VCI is derived from scores on the Vocabulary, Similarities and Information subtests of theWAIS-III. Previous studies have shown verbal abilities to be the strongest cognitive predictor of critical thinking performance (Clifford, Boufal, & Kurtz, 2004).

Three dispositional variables that are considered important personal traits that contribute to critical thinking and are commonly examined in related studies (e.g., Clifford et al., 2004; Halpern, 2007; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Spector, Schneider, Vance, & Hezlett, 2000; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008) weremeasured. These included need for cognition, open-mindedness, and conscientiousness. All items of the scales were rated on five-point Likert scales, ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”. The Chinese version of the Need for Cognition Scale-Short Form (NCS-SF; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Hui, 2003) measures the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful thinking. It consists of 18 items and a sample item is “The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me”. This scale was found to be valid and reliable for use with Chinese students in previous studies (Kao, 1994; Ku & Ho, 2010; Kuang, Shi, Cai, & Wang, 2005). The Openness to Experience Subscale and the Conscientiousness Subscale of the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI, Costa & McCrae, 1992) were used as measures of open-mindedness and conscientiousness. They each consist of 12 items. Sample items include “I believe controversial topics will only confuse students” (reverse coded) for openness and “I work towards my goal systematically” for conscientiousness. The Chinese version of the NEO-FFI was found to have good reliability for use with Chinese students in previous studies (e.g., Ku & Ho, 2010; Zhang, 2002).

2.1.3. Procedure Participants were tested in two sessions. In the first session, they

completed the HCTAES. Within a week, participants came back for the second session, where they completed the various self-report scales and were individually administered the WAIS-III subtests by school psychology trainees who had received training on administering the

tests. Background information on participants’ gender, age, GPA, and socio-economic status (SES - family income, fathers’ education, mothers’ education) was also gathered.

2.2. Results and discussion

2.2.1. Preliminary analyses The factorial structure of the adapted three-dimensional EBI was

further examinedby confirmatory factor analysiswith thedata fromthis group of students. The fit of the data to the a priori three-factor model was reasonably good as indicated by the various goodness offit indexes; χ2(51)=71.28, RMSEA=.051, NNFI=.92, CFI=.94, with all standard- ized factor loadings greater than .40 (see Table 1). Internal consistency as measured by Cronbach's alphas for the Innate Ability Scale, Certain Knowledge Scale and Simple Knowledge Scale were .67, .66, and .71 respectively. The inter-factor correlations were all less than .10, suggesting that the three were quite distinct belief dimensions.

Internal consistency coefficients for the other scales as measured by Cronbach's alphas were .69 for the HCTAES, .87 for the NCS-SF, .67 for the Openness to Experience Scale, and .76 for the Conscientious- ness Scale. Means and standard deviations of the variables are given in Table 2. Zero-order correlations among the variables are given in Table 3.

2.2.2. Relations between epistemic beliefs and other critical thinking factors

To examine how students’ epistemic beliefs were related to demographic variables (gender, age, SES composite derived from family income, father's education and mother's education), cognitive ability and dispositions, a set of regression analyses with each of the beliefs as criterion variables were conducted (Table 4). Results showed that being younger in age and a lower need for cognition would significantly predict a stronger belief in ability being innate. Being male, a lower verbal ability and being less open to experience predicted a higher tendency to believe in knowledge being certain. None of the variables examined were related to the belief in knowledge being simple. Among the three epistemic beliefs, Certain

Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and ranges of scores (Studies 1 and 2a).

Variable Mean SD Potential range

Actual range

Study 1 Cognitive ability (VCI) 105.47 7.91 Mean=100 61–131 Openness (NEO-FFI-O) 42.20 5.39 12–60 29–56 Conscientiousness (NEO-FFI-C) 41.71 5.69 12–60 25–53 Need for cognition (NCS-SF) 58.56 9.52 18–90 37–81 Epistemic beliefs (EBI)

Innate ability 12.77 3.04 4–20 4–19 Certain knowledge 8.41 2.82 4–20 4–17 Simple knowledge 12.83 2.80 4–20 4–19

Critical thinking (HCTAES) 115.79 13.06 0–194 73–147

Study 2 Epistemic beliefs (EBI)

Innate ability 11.57 2.72 4–20 5–19 Certain knowledge 8.77 2.53 4–20 4–18 Simple knowledge 13.37 2.83 4–20 7–19

Two-sided argument skills 4.25 1.54 1–6 1–6 Confidence 2.52 .82 1–5 1–4 Convincingness of counterargument 3.19 .84 1–5 1–4 Tackling of counterargument 1.92 .78 1–3 1–3

Note. VCI=Verbal Comprehension Index of WAIS-III. NEO-FFI-O=NEO-FFI, Openness to Experience Subscale. NEO-FFI-C=NEO-FFI, Conscientiousness Subscale. NCS- SF=Need For Cognition Scale—Short Form. EBI=Epistemic Beliefs Inventory. HCTAES=Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment Using Everyday Situations.

a NStudy 1=138, NStudy 2=111.

Table 4 Relations between epistemic beliefs and other critical thinking factors (Study 1, N=138).

Criterion variable (standardized beta)

Epistemic belief

Predictor Innate ability

Certain knowledge

Simple knowledge

Demographics Gender −.02 −.30*** −.10 Age −.25** .10 −.12 SES .08 .01 .07

Cognitive ability GPA −.17 .13 .03 VCI .09 −.18* .03

Thinking dispositions Openness (NEO-FFI-O) .21 −.38*** −.20 Conscientiousness (NEO-FFI-C) .10 −.13 −.10 Need for cognition (NCS-SF) −.38** .07 −.14

Multiple R2 .15 .27 .13

Note. VCI=Verbal Comprehension Index of WAIS-III. NEO-FFI-O=NEO-FFI, Openness to Experience Subscale. NEO-FFI-C=NEO-FFI, Conscientiousness Subscale. NCS- SF=Need For Cognition Scale—Short Form. *pb .05, **pb .01, ***pb .001.

71N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

Knowledge appeared to have the strongest relationship with thinking-related constructs. Cognitive ability and dispositions, to- gether with gender, accounted for 27% of the variance in this belief.

2.2.3. Epistemic beliefs as predictors of critical thinking performance Stepwise regressions were conducted to examine the effects of

various variables on critical thinking. Demographic variables were entered in the first step, followed by cognitive ability indexes, dispositional factors, and finally epistemic beliefs. The results (Table 5) indicated that neither demographics nor dispositional factors significantly predicted thinking performance. Rather, cognitive–verbal ability (VCI) was the most significant predictor. Moreover, the naïve beliefs that ability is innate, and more importantly that knowledge is certain, predicted poorer critical thinking, after controlling for their

Table 3 Zero-order correlations among variables (Study 1, N=138).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Cognitive ability (VCI)

–

2. Openness (NEO-FFI-O)

.17* –

3. Conscientiousness (NEO-FFI-C)

−.02 −.10 –

4. Need for cognition (NCS-SF)

.15 .55** .14 –

5. EBI-Innate ability .10 −.02 −.05 −.20* –

6. EBI-Certain knowledge

−.21* −.34** .03 −.15 −.09 –

7. EBI-Simple knowledge

−.02 −.27** −.11 −.26** .07 .04 –

8. Critical thinking (HCTAES)

.46** .12 −.07 .17 −.13 −.29** −.12 –

Note. VCI=Verbal Comprehension Index of WAIS-III. NEO-FFI-O=NEO-FFI, Openness to Experience Subscale. NEO-FFI-C=NEO-FFI, Conscientiousness Subscale. NCS-SF=Need For Cognition Scale—Short Form. EBI=Epistemic Beliefs Inventory. HCTAES=Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment Using Everyday Situations. *pb .05. **pb .01.

possible joint effects with cognitive or dispositional factors. Together cognitive ability and epistemic beliefs contributed to 37% of the variance in critical thinking performance, of which beliefs contributed 11% unique variance.

To sum up, results from Study 1 provided evidence for three major dimensions of epistemic beliefs, with omniscient authority and quick learning not emerging as distinct factors. This convergedwith findings from an earlier study by Nussbaum and Bendixen (2003). There was also support for all the stated hypotheses to various extents, with the relationships between epistemic beliefs and cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and thinking performance being specified as follows:

(i) The more sophisticated belief in knowledge being tentative (uncertain) was associated with better cognitive ability.

(ii) The more sophisticated belief in ability being malleable (non- innate) was associatedwith a higher level of need for cognition, whereas the more sophisticated belief in knowledge being uncertain was associated with greater open-mindedness.

Table 5 Stepwise regression on critical thinking performance (Study 1, N=138).

Predictor Critical thinking performance (standardized beta)

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

Demographics Gender −.07 −.01 −.03 −.14 Age −.15 −.10 −.07 −.10 SES −.03 .00 .01 .03

Cognitive ability GPA .08 .11 .12 VCI .46*** .45*** .41***

Thinking dispositions Openness (NEO-FFI-O) −.05 −.16 Conscientiousness (NEO-FFI-C) −.09 −.12 Need for cognition (NCS-SF) .14 .07

Epistemic beliefs (EBI) Innate ability −.19* Certain knowledge −.32*** Simple knowledge −.14

Multiple R2 .03 .24 .26 .37 Increase in R2 .21 .02 .11

Note. VCI=Verbal Comprehension Index of WAIS-III. NEO-FFI-O=NEO-FFI, Openness to Experience Subscale. NEO-FFI-C=NEO-FFI, Conscientiousness Subscale. NCS-SF=Need For Cognition Scale—Short Form. EBI=Epistemic Beliefs Inventory. *pb .05, ***pb .001.

72 N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

(iii) The more sophisticated belief in knowledge being uncertain, and to a lesser extent also the belief in ability being malleable, was associated with better critical thinking performance.

(iv) There were unique effects of epistemic beliefs on thinking performance, other than the possible effects exerted through their association with cognitive and dispositional factors.

3. Study 2

Results from Study 1 provided evidence that personal epistemology is related to cognitive ability and thinking disposition, and it produces unique effects on thinking performance. Study 2 aimed at further examining how, or the mechanisms through which epistemic beliefs exert influence on critical thinking performance, focusing on their effects on the argumentation process. More specifically, we investigated students’ reasoning process in face of a controversial issue where reasonable arguments and counterarguments were both available. This kind of tasks is typical of those calling for critical thinking. A more fine- grained examination of where individuals with naïve epistemic beliefs differ from their counterparts holding more sophisticated beliefs in this thinking process would throw further light on the exact nature of the epistemic belief-critical thinking relationship.

Asmentioned in the literature review,findings fromprevious studies have suggested a close-minded thinking style to be an important link betweennaïve epistemic beliefs and poor argumentation, epitomized in the tendency to draw simplistic or absolute conclusions based on inadequate considerations of opposing views ormixed evidence aswell as the inclination to treat information that challenges preexisting beliefs in a biased manner. Results of our Study 1 also suggested that beliefs in ability and knowledge being fixed were associated with a reluctance to engage in thinking and be open-minded, at the same time predicting poorer performance on critical thinking tasks.

When facing a controversial issue, which usually involves reasonable arguments supporting both sides of the debate, the drawing of sound conclusions would depend on an adequate consideration of arguments on both sides, i.e., two-sided thinking. A close-minded or absolutist thinking style will likely hamper this process by fixating only on one viewpoint and focusing on evidence that support their adopted position while ignoring counterarguments that do not. This explains why individuals who hold naïve epistemic beliefs tend to perform poorly in critical thinking, as critical thinkers should be able to effectively consider alternative viewpoints (Halpern, 1998; Lewis & Smith, 1993). Based on this rationale the following hypotheses regarding the relationship between epistemic beliefs and argumentation performance were proposed and tested:

(i) Participantswith naïve epistemic beliefs areweaker in two-sided thinking, i.e., they are more likely to focus on the arguments supporting their position while overlooking counterarguments refuting their position.

(ii) Participants with naïve epistemic beliefs exhibit a greater tendency to devaluate counterarguments, i.e., naïve beliefs will bias the participants’ thinking so that they will fail to objectively evaluate reasonable counterarguments, thus finding them less convincing than they are.

(iii) Participants with naïve epistemic beliefs will be less efficient in tackling counterarguments, i.e., the lower tendency to consider and understand counterarguments would weaken one's ability to consider arguments in a reasonable manner.

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants Participants were 111 Chinese undergraduates (35 males and

76 females) in Hong Kong. Recruitment was done through making an announcement in Introductory Psychology courses. The age rangewas

from 18 to 23 (M=19.85, SD=1.13) and their average GPA was 2.81 (SD=.50). Participants consisted of students in their first (77.5%), second (16.2%) and final (6.3%) years of study with various major subjects. Participation was on a voluntary and anonymous basis.

3.1.2. Thinking task A controversial issue was developed as the stimulus for the

assessment of participants’ argumentation performance. In order to choose an issue that was appropriate for the study, a number of controversial issues were subject to several rounds of discussions and pilot-tested for their appropriateness. There were two criteria for judging appropriateness. Firstly, the number of people voting for and against the issue should be comparable. Secondly, there should be equally convincing arguments for and against the issue. Based on the results of the pilot study, an issue about whether long-term drug patent is acceptable was selected. Drug patents allow pharmaceutical companies to be the sole producer and freely set the price for a newly developed drug for 20 years. This arrangement safeguards the profit of the company and encourages the development of new drugs. Yet it also results in high drug prices which are not affordable by many who need the medicine. Therefore there has been a debate on whether this patent arrangement should be kept.

In the pilot study, a group of graduate students (N=15) read a summary of the background information and the opposing views in the debate. Then they read two passages arguing for or against the patent arrangement. Participants were asked to rate the reasonable- ness of both passages on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from −5 (“Totally unreasonable”) to 5 (“Totally reasonable”).Then they indicated their position for the issue, i.e., whether the drug patent arrangement should be kept. It was found that the two argumentative passages were both rated as reasonable by all the participants. Both the arguments for (M=3.47, SD=.92) and against (M=3.33, SD=1.11) the arrangement were rated as reasonable, with non- significant difference between the mean ratings for reasonableness of the two argumentative passages; t(14)=.358, n.s. For the final position, there were 53.33% participants indicating support for and 46.67% indicating opposition of the specified patent arrangement. Thus the controversial nature of this issue was ensured, with the two passages arguing for or against it being comparable in reasonableness.

3.1.3. Measures The adapted Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) used in Study 1 was

employed in the present study to measure participants’ epistemic beliefs. It consists of three dimensions (innate ability, certain knowledge, simple knowledge) and a total of 12 items (see Study 1 for details).

Participants’ performance in argumentation was measured through essay tasks. They were assessed on (i) their ability to provide two-sided arguments in response to the controversial issue and (ii) their ability to tackle counterarguments presented to them.

Participants first read the passage that summarized the debate on the issue. They were then asked to indicate their position regarding the patent arrangement (for or against) and write a short essay providing the reasoning behind their position (“Please explain your thinking and the relevant arguments behind your position”). They were also asked to rate their confidence in the correctness of their conclusion on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 “Totally unconfident” to 5 “Totally confident).

After that, participants were given an argumentative passage which opposed their stated position and were asked to rate the convincingness of the counterarguments on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 “Totally unconvincing” to 5 “Very convincing”). Finally they were asked to re-consider their position and explain their thinking in writing (“After reading the article, would you change your stand on the issue? Explain why you would or would not change your stand”).

73N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

A scoring rubric was developed to assess participants’ two-sided argument skills in their initial essays explaining the reasoning behind their position, with reference to the scheme developed by Ferretti, Macarthur, and Dowdy (2000) in their study of persuasive essays. Responses were rated from 1 to 6 according to their ability to recognize and address arguments for both sides of the debate and provide clear reasoning for their final conclusion (see Appendix A). Higher ratings indicated better two-sided argument skills. A random sample of one-third of the scripts was coded by another independent rater and the inter-rater reliability was found to be very good (Cohen's kappa=.80). As for the tackling of counterarguments, another scoring rubric with a 3-point scale for rating responses was derived (see Appendix A). Higher scores indicated more competent tackling of counterarguments. Again an independent rater coded a random sample of one-third of the scripts and inter-rater reliability (Cohen's kappa) was .71.

3.1.4. Procedure All participants completed the procedures in one session, being

administered the adapted EBI first and asked to provide background information on gender, age, and GPA. Then they were given the thinking task as described above.

3.2. Results and discussion

3.2.1. Preliminary analyses We started the analyses by again examining the factorial structure

and classification of the 12 items for the adapted EBI, using confirmatory factor analysis. As indicated by the various goodness of fit indexes, the empirical data fitted the a priori 3-factor structure very well, χ2(51)=68.00, RMSEA=.055, NNFI=.90, CFI=.92, with all standardized factor loadings greater than .40. Internal consistency as measured by Cronbach's alphas for Innate Ability, Certain Knowledge and Simple Knowledge was .68, .64, and .67 respectively. Again none of the inter-factor correlations were significant at the .05 level, with rs ranging from −.04 to .22. Thus further evidence was provided for the reliability of the inventory measuring three distinct dimensions of epistemic beliefs. Means and standard deviations of the variables are given in Table 2.

3.2.2. Relationship between epistemic beliefs and argumentation Regression analyseswere conducted to examine the extent towhich

epistemic beliefs predicted specific features in the argumentation process, namely (i) two-sided argument skills, (ii) confidence about

Table 6 Predicting argumentation performance with epistemic beliefs (Study 2, N=111).

Criterion variable (standardized beta)

Argumentation performance

Predictor Two-sided argument skills Con

Background Gender −.02 .0 Age −.04 .1 GPA .04 −.1

Epistemic beliefs (EBI) Innate Ability −.03 .0 Certain Knowledge −.35*** .0 Simple Knowledge −.22* −.0

Argumentation performance Two-sided argument skills .0 Confidence

Addressing counterargument Convincingness rating Tackling of counterargument

Multiple R2 .17 .0

Note. EBI=Epistemic Beliefs Inventory. *pb .05, ***pb .001.

own conclusion, (iii) attitude towards reasonable counterarguments (convincingness rating), and (iv) tackling of counterarguments. Gender, age and GPA as an index of general ability were also included in the regression equations so as to control for their possible effects on various aspects of argumentation.

Results (Table 6) showed that the certainty dimension of epistemological beliefs, and to a lesser extent also the simplicity dimension, significantly predicted weaker two-sided argumentation. Therefore Hypothesis 1 for the present study was supported. The belief in knowledge being certain also predicted a greater tendency to devaluate reasonable counterarguments, thus providing support for Hypothesis 2. However, these beliefs did not seem to be related to how well students tackled counterarguments, apparently not supporting Hypothesis 3. Instead, it was found that students who were more confident about their viewpoint were slightly more likely to tackle counterarguments with good reasoning.

In order to further explore possible differences in the treatment of counterarguments between people holding naïve beliefs and those holding sophisticated beliefs, more detailed analyses were conducted with selected groups of participants. Specifically, participants were divided into three groups based on their scores on the Certain Knowledge Scale, and comparisons were made between the group with highest scores (top one-third constituting the naïve group, N=44) and the group with lowest scores (bottom one-third making up the sophisticated group, N=35). Groupmembership was based on scores on the Certain Knowledge dimension because this dimension was found to be most salient in influencing critical thinking in previous and the present studies. The distribution of the types of responses given by these two extreme groups in their treatment of counterarguments is given in Table 7.

A chi-square test showed a significant uneven distribution of the types of responses given by these two groups; Pearson chi-square (2)=6.33, pb .05; Fisher's Exact Test=6.32, pb .05. On closer examination, there was a greater percentage of people among the naïve group (43%) ignoring or failing to address counterarguments than among the sophisticated group (17%). In contrast, students holding more sophisticated beliefs were more likely to address counterarguments, whether adequately or inadequately (a total of 83%), than their naïve counterparts (a total of 57%). Worthy to note is that the proportion of people being able to address counterarguments adequately was actually quite comparable between the naïve group and the sophisticated group (23% versus 29%, respectively). This pattern of results suggested that the naïve group and the sophisti- cated group differed more in attention to counterarguments rather

Addressing counterargument

fidence Convincingness rating Tackling counterargument

2 −.14 −.08 1 .04 .10 1 .02 −.10

1 .01 .13 1 −.24* .06 9 .11 .10

9 .09 .13 −.02 .19*

.12

4 .11 .15

Table 7 Rebuttals generated by the naïve and sophisticated groups (frequencies and percentages).

Tackling of counterargument Belief in certain knowledge

Naïve group Sophisticated group

1. Failing to address counterargument 19 (43%) 6 (17%) 2. Underdeveloped rebuttal 15 (34%) 19 (54%) 3. Sensible rebuttal 10 (23%) 10 (29%) Subtotal 44 (100%) 35 (100%)

74 N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

than in their ability to tackle them. In view of this, the regression analysis result of a non-significant relationship between epistemic beliefs and performance in the tackling of counterarguments could perhaps be attributed to the lack of differentiation between attention and ability factors in the measure of this performance. This analysis of the distribution of different treatments of counterarguments and the corresponding chi-square test results did provide some support for Hypothesis 3.

4. Summary and concluding discussion

The present studies aimed at examining the relationship between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking among Chinese students, and the results largely conformed to related theorizations in the Western context. In particular, the unique contribution of these beliefs on thinking was highlighted. Results from Study 1 showed that these beliefs had unique effects on critical thinking performance, over and above those produced by cognitive ability. Specifically, the belief in knowledge being fixed and absolute (certain knowledge), to a lesser extent also the belief that our ability to process knowledge is fixed (innate ability), significantly predicted poorer performance on everyday evaluative thinking. It was also found that this belief in the certainty of knowledge was associated with closed-mindedness and poorer cognitive ability, whereas the belief in fixed ability was related to a lower need for cognition. It appears that while poor cognitive skills contribute to poor thinking performance, the lack of recognition of the tentative nature of knowledge, together with the lack of a conviction that effort and practice would improve our ability to think, further hampers critical thinking performance.

In Study 2, it was further demonstrated that when thinking about controversial issues, beliefs about knowledge being certain and simple would deter one from considering issues from multiple perspectives and make him/her dismiss counterarguments more readily. This tendency to engage in one-sided thinking would produce detrimental effects on argumentation performance. In conclusion, the belief in knowledge being certain has been highlighted in two studies as the most significant aspect of personal epistemology affecting everyday evaluative thinking and the more specific process of argumentation.

These results throw light on the nature of epistemic effects on critical thinking. Naïve beliefs about knowledge predispose one to a fixated and single-perspective approach to issues, thus affecting the integration and generation of knowledge during thinking. In particular, the lack of multiple perspectives hampers the ability to generate and judge alternatives in decision-making and problem- solving, which characterizes good critical thinking (Ennis, 1991; Halpern, 1998). Moreover, the tendency to devalue reasonable counterarguments reflects a poor ability to reason independently of one's prior belief bias, which has also been emphasized to be an important critical thinking skill (Sá et al., 1999; Stanovich & West, 1997).

The present results also provide support for the postulation of reciprocal relationships among epistemic beliefs, cognitive ability, and thinking dispositions. While sophistication in epistemology was found to be related to cognitive ability and desirable thinking dispositions in Study 1, thefine-grained analysis of argumentation processes in Study 2

pointed further to the nature of these relationships. People holding absolutist beliefs (knowledge being certain and simple) tend to reach a position on controversial issues quickly rather than spending effort on the consideration and objective evaluation of opposing arguments. This tendency would reinforce a close-minded thinking habit. Moreover, although individuals with naïve beliefs may have the ability to pro- vide sensible rebuttals for counterarguments, the inclination of not addressing counterargument would prevent them from exercising and refining this ability. Handling problems in these ways is not adaptive as it makes the revision of one's reasoning difficult. As a result of these cyclical processes, epistemic beliefs, thinking ability and thinking dispositions would develop in synchrony.

Overall, the present findings highlight an important link between naïve epistemic beliefs and poor critical thinking, namely the tendency to draw quick conclusions without adequate consideration of alternative views. This observation is consistent with findings about the cognitive characteristics of people holding naïve epistemic beliefs in previous research, in which other thinking performances were examined with different methodologies (Kardash & Howell, 2000; Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Schommer, 1990; Schommer-Aikins & Hutter, 2002; Sinatra et al., 2003). It also corroborates other findings about the relationship between cognitive dispositions and personal epistemology: an open-minded approach is positively correlated with the belief that decision-making takes time and effort (Kardash & Sinatra, 2003), and a mature and systematic thinking style is associated with the belief in knowledge being tentative and evolving (Valanides & Angeli, 2008).

While the present findings indicate that the postulated relation- ships between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking largely apply in bothWestern and Chinese contexts, the fact that beliefs in knowledge being certain are of particular importance warrants attention. In the Chinese–Confucian culture, high values are placed on respect for authority, tradition and social order, predisposing members of the culture to cognitive conservatism (Ho, 1994). For an individual to put aside preconceptions and consider issues from alternative perspec- tives, a strong belief in the tentative nature of knowledge is needed. In other words, in a society where following established views is encouraged and arguments are discouraged, the importance of a belief in the tentative nature of knowledge as a precursor to good critical thinking is highlighted, as the present results show.

4.1. Implications for practice

Programs designed for the enhancement of critical thinking typically focus on the teaching of related thinking skills. The present results suggest that fostering sophistication in students’ epistemic beliefs is also conducive to critical thinking development. Specifically, students should be encouraged to recognize the tentative and complex nature of knowledge as well as the fact that practice and effort could help improve our ability to think. This has special significance for the nurturing of critical thinking in Chinese and other societies sharing the Confucian cultural heritage. As mentioned above, the tendency of cognitive conservatism in this culture may pose significant hindrance to people's engagement in analytical thinking. Without the simultaneous cultivation of sophisticated epistemic beliefs, the effects of critical thinking skills training may be limited.

Western research has shown that epistemological development could be fostered by the experience of epistemic doubt, where one questions the existence of absolute knowledge (Bendixen, 2002). An effective way to induce epistemic doubt is to have students reflect and judge on ill-structured problems so that they become more aware of alternative modes of thought (King & Kitchener, 2002; Kuhn, 2001). For example, Kuhn, Shaw, and Felton (1997) found that students’ metacognitive awareness of the co-existence of multiple viewpoints could be enhanced through dyadic discussions of controversial issues.

75N.-M. Chan et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 21 (2011) 67–77

Having students debate over controversial issues would also allow opportunities for practicing the generation and evaluation of counterarguments. As our results show, the tendency to devalue counterarguments that may be reasonable is a major hindrance for students holding naïve beliefs to think critically. At the end of the debate, students should draw their own conclusion based on the supporting arguments as well as their explanations for the counter- arguments being inferior to the supporting arguments. Such activities would not only foster the development of multiple perspectives but also promote the essential critical thinking skill of assessing subjective viewpoints based on objective criteria of good reasoning.

An additional implication for practice is that Chinese educators, who may succumb more to the knowledge-transmission conception of teaching and learning (Chai, Khine, & Teo, 2006; Chan & Elliot, 2004b), should be more aware of instructional practices that foster naïve beliefs in the certainty of knowledge. For example, questioning that focuses too much on soliciting factual information would reinforce the belief that knowledge is absolute (Kurfiss, 1988). In the same vein, “textbooks that present subject matter as non- problematic reinforce dualistic thinking” (Kurfiss, 1988, p. 64). The common use of assessment methods with restrictive answers might also cue students to search for model answers when they face problems and regard those answers as absolute. For example, multiple-choice questions implicitly reinforce the concept that only one correct answer exists. Where appropriate, using open-ended methods to assess students’ learning progress might be more desirable for the promotion of epistemological development. Generally speaking, constructivist learning approaches characterized by the active con- struction of knowledge through critical analysis would have more positive impacts on students’ epistemological and cognitive develop- ment (Marra, Palmer, & Litzinger, 2000; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991; Stephenson & Hunt, 1977; Valanides & Angeli, 2005).

4.2. Limitations and further research

The present studies provide clear evidence that epistemological beliefs are related to critical thinking performance, and the results largely converge with findings from related studies in Western contexts. However, more research is needed to examine how epistemic beliefs interact with cognitive ability and thinking disposi- tions to produce effects on critical thinking. Clarifying these relation- ships would help build a more precise and comprehensive theory of critical thinking, at the same time generating insights into the effective enhancement of critical thinking frommultiple perspectives. In particular, conducting similar research in different cultural contexts would enable comparisons to be made and advance our understand- ing of cultural factors in thinking.

In view of the limitations of quantitative studies using Likert scale measures, which assume that the variables could be captured on a continuous scale, it would be desirable to also conduct qualitative research (e.g., in-depth interviews) in an attempt to capture more clearly the complexity of changes in thinking and beliefs under different conditions. Discourse analysis using natural data on how students treat knowledge during thinking would also be fruitful. Employing mixed-method designs in research would enable broader perspectives in investigation and cross-validation of findings.

As the ultimate value of understanding thinking-related processes is to inform about how thinking performance may be enhanced, more direct investigations on effective epistemological intervention would be desirable. Although implications for practice could be drawn based on available evidence such as those generated in the present studies, the conclusions drawn are largely only inferential in nature based on correlational data. Direct empirical evidence generated from exper- imental or longitudinal studies would help derive more definite assertions about effective intervention. For example, tracing how students’ thinking and beliefs develop during intervention or over

time would provide valuable information. Issues that are worth exploring include the direction of causality of effects, the malleability of epistemic beliefs, and other possible intervening factors.

To conclude, the present studies have provided evidence for the significant and unique role of personal epistemology in critical thinking among Chinese students. More specifically, naïve beliefs about knowledge limit one's ability to consider alternatives from multiple perspectives and to objectively evaluate arguments that are not consistent with prior conceptions. These beliefs likely develop in synchrony with cognitive ability and desirable thinking dispositions, jointly producing effects on critical thinking. Future research should attempt to clarify the relative roles and relationships of these thinking-related factors and directly investigate intervention issues so as to specify more clearly the kind of epistemological intervention that would be effective for the enhancement of critical thinking.

Acknowledgement

Thepreparationof thismanuscriptwaspartially supportedbya grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (Project no. 443809).

Appendix A

Scoring rubrics for argumentation performance in Study 2.

Score

Description

Two-sided argument skills

1

No valid argument

The arguments used to support the position are either unrelated to the topic or invalid.

2

Partially developed one-sided argument

Although some valid arguments are stated to support the position, the exposition also contains other supporting arguments which are either unrelated to the topic or invalid.

3

Well-developed one-sided argument

The exposition states supporting arguments which are valid and elaborated clearly.

4

Two-sided argument: only recognizing counterargument

The exposition states supporting arguments which are elaborated clearly. In addition, it also mentions counterarguments but fails to give any refutations against them.

5

Two-sided argument: minimally addressing counterargument

The exposition states supporting arguments which are elaborated clearly. Counterarguments are stated clearly but not addressed adequately with sensible rebuttal or alternative solutions.

6

Two-sided argument: well-developed argument addressing counterargument

The exposition states supporting arguments which are elaborated clearly. Moreover, counterarguments are addressed either with sensible rebuttal or alternative solutions.

Tackling counterargument

1

Failing to address counterargument

Participant largely only restates own position and argument, without addressing the counterargument.

2

Underdeveloped rebuttal

Participant attempts to address the counterargument but the reasoning or rebuttal is not well developed or is of limited plausibility.

3

Sensible rebuttal

Participant provides a sensible evaluation of the counterargument and provides a reasonable conclusion.

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