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New America

Report Part Title: Raqqa:

Report Title: How Raqqa Became the Capital of ISIS

Report Subtitle: A Proxy Warfare Case Study

Report Author(s): Nate Rosenblatt and David Kilcullen

New America (2019)

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep19979.7

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http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep19979.7

Raqqa: ISIS Capital

ISIS’ rule initially offered relief from the chaos and violence of Raqqa’s contested

politics. Still, much of the cruelty Raqqawis suffered before ISIS took the city was

generated by the group’s own deliberate strategy of provoking exactly that kind of

violent uncertainty, allowing it to sweep in and rescue communities from the very

fear it had itself created. Likewise, once in charge, ISIS maintained control

through brutal repression, intimidation, and fear. That said, some locals held on

to their initial hopes that ISIS might resolve Raqqa’s political and governance

challenges.

ISIS Consolidates Control

Having pushed out challengers for control of Raqqa, ISIS began consolidating its

rule from November 2013 onward. This process was enabled both by ISIS’ soon-

to-be-proven false promise of bringing security and a rest from violence, and by

ISIS’ fueling of that very violence and its application of brutal, coercive measures.

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When ISIS began to consolidate its control over Raqqa, it gained support from

people relieved by a reduction in violence in the city. As explained below, it is not

easy to determine the reasons for this decline even as it provided a contrast with

the dangers that preceded ISIS’ takeover. In writing this paper, we worked with

Omelas, a security and risk advisory firm, to gather and analyze data on all

deaths in Syria from 2011 to 2015 in all of Syria’s 61 districts. While deaths are an

imperfect proxy for military confrontation, we can identify time periods in the

data when violence spiked in Raqqa relative to other regions in the country.

The chart above shows that lethal violence first spiked when Raqqa was captured

by the opposition at the beginning of March 2013. While Raqqa was under

opposition control, there was a sustained period of several months during which

the death toll was high for Raqqa but average relative to the rate of deaths across

Syria. Some of this may be attributed to chaotic conditions in the city, but we

suspect most deaths during this period were due to a sustained bombing

campaign by SARG. As the International Crisis Group reported at the time,

civilians “fled in droves” in March and April 2013 because they feared “regime

retaliation and in particular ballistic missile attacks.” The chart also shows that

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deaths in Raqqa plummeted in the same period that ISIS gained total control of

Raqqa. From January-May 2014, there were an average of 11 deaths per month,

among the lowest death rate of any district in Syria (excluding pro-Assad Alawite

regions). By contrast, during the period when opposition forces tried to govern

Raqqa, March-July 2013, there had been an average of 77 deaths per month, a

dramatically higher number.

Why did deaths initially decline so precipitously under ISIS? Our research, as well

as mass graves discovered around Raqqa after ISIS was defeated in the city in

2017, demonstrates that the group did engage in systematic killing of opponents

during this time. Part of the decline might be explained by the fact that ISIS

deployed highly public acts of violence as a means of demonstrating its brutal

monopoly on the use of force—as evidenced by videos of public executions—and

thereby deterred other violent actors. Yet, there were also fewer deaths because

other forms of killing—such as regime airstrikes—did not occur in Raqqa during

this period. Many analysts at the time argued that the lack of Syrian government

airstrikes was a sign that the two groups were, if not working together, at least

working toward related goals of fighting the opposition. Our own observation

suggests that allowing ISIS to grow in Syria supported a general regime narrative,

whereby President Bashar al-Assad sought to paint all rebels as jihadists in an

attempt to gain international credibility; at the same time, we found nothing

beyond circumstantial evidence for direct regime-ISIS collaboration. In effect,

Assad may have tolerated ISIS because it served his broader narrative (and

because he lacked the troops or resources to do much about it), though he

stopped short of directly collaborating with them.

Local Reactions and the Limits of ISIS Governance

Since ISIS operatives had been in Raqqa for months and had captured the city

through careful strategy using subversion and intimidation, they were familiar

with the community and its needs, and were thus better prepared to govern than

their predecessors. As the dominant local armed actor, ISIS applied a

combination of brutal repression, persuasive measures, and administrative

services to create a system of competitive control—corralling the population and

ensuring collaboration. Nevertheless, ISIS leaders turned out to be incompetent

governors of Raqqa. Their failures were linked in part to over-emphasis on

coercion and minimal commitment to substantive governance, rendering their

control both fear-based and brittle. The initial promise of security appeared real,

but was quickly lost as locals experienced ISIS’ predation and gang-like rule.

At first, ISIS’ control over Raqqa proved to be a boon for residents. ISIS fighters

flooded the local economy with cash by overpaying at restaurants, spending

extravagant amounts on basic goods from local markets, and purchasing

equipment, mobile phones, and cars from local suppliers. They reopened flour

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mills in the countryside north of Raqqa, stabilizing bread prices in the area.

They replaced imams at local mosques in most of Raqqa and issued four decrees

demanding strict adherence to Islamic law—with a Shari’a court system to mete

out harsh punishment. Yet, interestingly, they let the local council in Raqqa

continue to operate and provide services to residents providing it did not

challenge ISIS’ rule.

ISIS’ control of Raqqa thus—at least initially—brought some measure of stability.

This is important because, in war, civilian populations aim to maximize

predictability and profit, broadly defined, while minimizing risk and uncertainty.

As noted, there were also very few Syrian government airstrikes at the time,

which made things much easier for residents than in March and April 2013, when

the newly liberated city was subjected to regular aerial bombardment.

But the honeymoon period under ISIS did not last. According to surveys

conducted by Caerus Associates from December 2013 until November 2014, the

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majority of residents in Raqqa said security was at least “moderate,” and nearly

everyone had over 15 hours of electricity. (The three percent of survey

respondents who did not have 15 or more hours per day had more than 11 hours

per day.) By spring 2014, ISIS had started to stabilize bread distribution, yet most

people said bread was inaccessible or unavailable. Meanwhile, electricity access

had declined and perceptions of insecurity had started to rise, from 37 percent

saying security was “very bad” or “bad” in January 2014 to 48 percent by April.

In July 2014, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the ISIS Caliphate in Mosul, 82

percent of Raqqawis described security conditions as “very bad” or “bad,” the

highest of any region surveyed at the time. In addition, 76 percent of residents

surveyed feared crimes or kidnapping on a daily basis. In the same survey, none

of the respondents from Raqqa trusted militia commanders in their city—a

surrogate indicator for local support to ISIS since this was the only militia in the

area—whereas 32 percent of residents in other parts of Syria did trust militia

leaders. It is notable that 93 percent of Raqqa residents reported that Islamic

groups “don’t protect or help me” or “don’t fight for the revolution.” In the other

communities surveyed, only 20 percent of people reported that Islamic groups

failed to protect them or advance the cause of the revolution.

It is notable that 93 percent of Raqqa residents

reported that Islamic groups “don’t protect or help

me” or “don’t fight for the revolution.”

By the end of 2014, living conditions in Raqqa had plummeted, becoming some

of the worst in all of Syria. Only 8 percent of residents in Raqqa reported more

than 15 hours per day of electricity (down from 97 percent at the beginning of the

year). The percentage of Raqqawis reporting fewer than 11 hours of electricity

per day increased from zero percent at the beginning of the year to 58 percent.

Everyone surveyed in the city reported that bread was unavailable or

inaccessible. And every respondent expressed acute insecurity, not because of a

lack of enforcement of security, but because, as conditions in Raqqa worsened,

ISIS’ rule became more capricious.

ISIS controlled Raqqa for another three years. It remained the dominant armed

group in the city until October 2017, when an offensive by U.S.-backed forces

defeated the group and forced its last remnants from Raqqa. While some have

argued that ISIS ran a “complex system of government,” in reality, our

fieldwork—and our surveys of local opinion, which we continued to conduct in

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Raqqa even under ISIS rule—showed that the group governed poorly by creating

a set of administrative mechanisms that, within the first half of 2014, largely

failed to provide basic services to the city’s population.

ISIS controlled Raqqa for another three years. It

remained the dominant armed group in the city

until October 2017.

Raqqa has been historically known as Syria’s breadbasket. It is located on the

Euphrates River and benefits from a nearby reservoir and hydroelectric dam,

which has long provided residents easy access to clean drinking water and

electricity. The areas around the city produce large amounts of crops, and Raqqa

was the site of massive grain silos. Yet, despite ISIS’ complex bureaucracy, the

group had few people with the technical skills to manage electrical and water

systems or make necessary repairs. ISIS leaders became “desperate” when things

broke down. As a U.S. official explained in December 2015, “[they don’t] have a

whole lot of engineers and staff to run the cities.” A Syrian aid worker added,

“They’re not smart, and they’re not capable. They have no expertise.” ISIS

could capitalize on the chaos of Syria’s fragmented battlefield, but it was, in

effect, little more than an organized criminal group trying to manage a state.

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