Article Summary
O R I G I N A L P A P E R
Perceptions, emotions, and behavioral decisions in conflicts that escalate to violence
Zeev Winstok
Received: 6 July 2005 / Accepted: 23 April 2007 / Published online: 12 May 2007
� Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Abstract The present study tests the notion that cost-
benefit considerations guide individuals’ emotional and
behavioral responses when confronting an aggressive male
stranger. Data was derived from hypothetical situations,
with varying levels of opponent dangerousness and
aggression severity, presented to 212 male and female
students. Results indicate that the less dangerous the
opponent and/or the more severe his aggression, the more
intense are the respondents’ expected emotions of anger
and fear and the higher the intended severity of respon-
dents’ counter-aggression. While the expected emotional
experience for female participants is more intense than for
males, the intended behavioral counter-aggression is more
severe for male participants than for females. Finally, an
association between emotional experience and behavioral
response was found only among males and it was mediated
by opponent levels of dangerousness and aggression
severity. Findings support the cost-benefit notion and
emphasize the importance of studying aggression from an
event perspective.
Keywords Conflict � Escalation � Emotional regulation � Behavioral regulation � Anger � Fear � Aggression
Introduction
Theories from various disciplines (e.g., social learning,
Bandura 1973; evolutionary psychology, Buss 1995; ra-
tional choice theory, Klepper and Nagin 1989; Piliavin
et al. 1986) suggest that human behavior is regulated to a
large extent by anticipated consequences of prospective
actions, aiming to maximize desirable outcomes (benefits)
and minimize undesirable ones (costs) (Bandura 1973).
Consistent with this notion, studies in the field of aggres-
sion show that conflicts between non-intimates are, to a
large extent, shaped by confluence of situational parties’
perceptions of opportunities and risks (Felson 1993; Oliver
1994; Wilkinson 2003; Winstok 2006). The aim of the
present study is to test the cost-benefit hypothesis as ap-
plied to the context of a violent encounter. It seeks to an-
swer questions such as how individuals’ perceptions of
their opponent’s potential and actual harmfulness affect
their emotional experience (intensity of anger and fear) and
behavioral response (severity of counter-aggression).
Outcome expectation and aggressive behavior
The relationship between outcome expectation (anticipated
cost and benefit) and behavior in the context of interper-
sonal aggression has been discussed theoretically and has
found empirical support. Parker (1974) argued that escala-
tion tendencies of interpersonal conflicts are inversely re-
lated to damage cost, meaning that the willingness to act
more and more aggressively (i.e., escalating) decreases as
the perceived negative consequences (e.g., psychological or
physical pain and injury) of these behaviors increase. Perry
et al. (1989) showed that the anticipated consequences for
aggressive behavior vary not only as a function of personal
variables predictive of aggressive response (e.g., sex) but
Zeev Winstok, Ph.D., is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Social
Welfare & Health Studies, University of Haifa, and a Research
Fellow at the Center for the Study of Society, University of Haifa,
Israel.
Z. Winstok (&) The Center for the Study of Society, University of Haifa,
Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel
e-mail: zeevwin@research.haifa.ac.il
123
Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136
DOI 10.1007/s11031-007-9061-1
also as a function of situational factors that affect aggressive
response (e.g., degree of provocation and the opponent’s
sex). Thus, it may be assumed that in conflict situations the
perceived level of dangerousness (potential harmfulness) of
an opponent, the perceived severity level of the opponent’s
aggressive actions (actual harmfulness), and the decision to
respond to the opponent’s aggression are interrelated with
cost-benefit considerations. The behavioral decision (i.e.,
retreat or retaliate) is derived of cost-benefit evaluation.
Yet, in many situations the conditions under which such
evaluation is made are uncertain. Haselton and Nettle
(2006) argued from an evolutionary perspective, using the
error management theory (EMT; Haselton and Buss 2000),
that if judgments are made under uncertainty, and the costs
of false positive and false negative errors have been
asymmetric over evolutionary history, selection should fa-
vor a bias toward making the least costly error. If this notion
is applied to the context of interpersonal aggression,
reducing costs (avoiding injury) becomes the most impor-
tant consideration.
When identifying the level of dangerousness of an
opponent, one also makes a statement about the expecta-
tion to be hurt: the more dangerous the opponent is per-
ceived, the greater the risk of being hurt. This high-risk
evaluation may act as a deterrent calling to avoid or min-
imize such conflictual encounters (i.e., Baron 1971, 1973;
Donnerstein et al. 1972; Shortell et al. 1970). Behavioral
decisions aimed at avoiding physical harm represent a di-
lemma in interpersonal conflicts that may escalate to vio-
lence. If one chooses to retreat, he/she may exit the conflict
without substantial harm (low cost) but it could also call
forth more severe aggression on the part of the opponent
(high cost), who may perceive a person who retreats as an
easy prey. If one decides to retaliate, the opponent may be
deterred and the conflict may result in no significant harm
(low cost); but it could also spawn harsher aggression on
the part of an opponent trying to deter or save face (high
cost). Dilemmas of this type have been discussed exhaus-
tively in game theory (Camerer 2003). A solution to a
retreat or retaliate dilemma may be moderate action as long
as the opponent’s aggressive actions are also moderate
(low negative consequences), and increasingly severe ac-
tions when the opponent’s aggressive actions become more
severe (high negative consequences). In the first phase of
moderate actions the message to the opponent is ‘‘I don’t
wish to fight with you.’’ As the opponent’s actions grow in
severity, the message is likely to change to: ‘‘Don’t mess
with me,’’ ‘‘I won’t let you hurt me,’’ and finally ‘‘You
leave me no choice but to hurt you.’’ In other words, when
the retreat tactic fails, one adopts a deterrent or rather a
‘‘counter-deterrent’’ tactic. But counter-deterrence does
not preclude intentions of self-defense (terminating the
conflict by subduing the opponent or minimizing the
opponent’s ability to do harm), although the willingness to
launch a relatively more severe counter-aggression is
higher when the opponent is perceived to be less danger-
ous. In game theory this solution is known as ‘‘tit for tat’’
(equivalent retaliation). It is maintained that individuals
should follow a policy of strict reciprocity, responding
immediately to the other party’s behavior (Axelrod 1980).
Two of the research variables discussed above are per-
ception-related and are manipulated in the present study.
The first is the perceived level of dangerousness (potential
harmfulness) of a hypothetical opponent; the second is the
perceived severity of the opponent’s aggressive actions. A
third variable is behavior related and represents the deci-
sion to respond to the hypothetical opponent’s aggression.
This decision is defined as relative counter-aggression,
ranging from moderate through balanced or commensurate
to more severe response. Consistent with the theoretical
framework presented in this section, it is hypothesize that:
(1) the more the opponent is perceived as dangerous, the
less severe is the respondent’s intended counter-aggression;
and (2) the more severe the opponent’s aggression is per-
ceived, the more severe is the respondent’s intended
counter-aggression.
The role of fear and anger
Emotions alert individuals to important features of the
environment and provide directions for cognitive processes
from which behavioral decisions are derived in adaptive
ways (e.g., Campos et al. 1994; Damasio 1994; Gross and
John 2003; Lazarus 1991). Anger and fear are two emo-
tions, which received much attention in the study of
aggressive behavior and had been found as highly relevant
to the development of interpersonal conflicts (Campbell
2006). The central difference between these two emotions
lies in the timing of the event that generates them. Fear is a
future-oriented emotion. It arises due to a perception of a
negative event that may happen in the future. Anger is past
oriented and arises when a negative event has already oc-
curred (Weiner 1995). But the two emotions are not
mutually exclusive. The expectation of a negative event
may generate fear but can also be experienced as a presently
happening event, and as such it may generate anger. For
example, faced with an opponent who threatens to attack, an
aggression expected to take place in the future, a person
worries about being injured; at the same time, this person is
also angry for having been placed in this situation. Because
the dangerousness of the opponent is a potential threat that
may be realized in the future, its effect on fear is greater
than on anger; whereas the aggression of the opponent is an
event that has already happened and therefore its effect on
anger may be stronger than on fear. Another difference
between anger and fear is in the way they stimulate and
126 Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136
123
regulate behavior. Studies show that there is a positive
association between anger and aggression (Potegal and
Archer 2004) and a negative association between fear and
aggression (Campbell 1999). Anger tends to promote fight;
fear tends to promote flight (Berkowitz 1993).
The effect of situational perception on the intensity of
anger and fear, and the effect of such experiences on
behavior can lead to the conclusion that these emotional
experiences are a means of effectively handling problem-
atic situations. It is argued that perception of the situation
affects the emotional experience and the behavioral re-
sponse as well as the manner in which they are associated.
It is hypothesized that the effect of the emotional experi-
ence varies with the opponent’s perceived levels of dan-
gerousness and severity of his aggression: (1) when the
dangerousness and aggression are perceived as high, fear is
expected to be relatively more pronounced (in a negative
way) in the construction of aggressive response; (2) When
the severity of harm is high and dangerousness low, anger
is expected to be relatively more pronounced (in a positive
way) in the construction of an aggressive response.
Sex differences in the regulation of interpersonal
conflicts
Many aspects of aggression, from attitudes to behavior, are
sex related (Campbell 2006). In relation to aggressive
behavior studies showed that males are more aggressive
than females, a difference that was greater for physical than
for verbal aggression (Bettencourt and Miller 1996; Eagly
and Steffen 1986; Hyde 1984; Knight et al. 2002). In a
meta-analytic review, Archer (2004) argued that most
studies do not specify the sex of the opponent and specu-
lated that because most aggression questionnaires show the
pattern typical of same-sex aggression, it is likely that
respondents answer with the same sex in mind unless
explicitly asked about opposite-sex opponents or partners.
In a meta-analytic review, Eagly and Steffen (1986) dem-
onstrated that in studies, which specify opponent sex there
is a consistent difference for same-sex opponents (males
are more aggressive than female) and nearly always a
difference for opposite-sex opponents (females are more
aggressive than males). More recently, two studies dem-
onstrated that males tend to respond more severely than
females to the aggression by a male opponent (Winstok
2006, Winstok and Enosh in press). One of the reasons, if
not the main one, is that in such a conflict the cost of
physical injury is likely to be higher for women than for
men, and the benefit (gain in status) is small if any
(Campbell 1999). Thus it is hypothesized that: the intended
severity level of counter-aggression of males to the
aggression of a male opponent is more severe than that of
females.
Studies show that there are sex differences in emotional
experiences (Wintre et al. 1990), whereas females experi-
ence emotions more intensively than do males (Diener
et al. 1985; Fujita et al. 1991), including negative ones
(Stapley and Haviland 1989; Tangney 1990). As for fear
Campbell (1999) suggested that this emotion regulates the
mechanism by which humans weigh cost in an encounter,
and given an equal degree of objective risk and harm, fe-
males experience greater fear than do men. As for anger,
some studies showed that women experience anger more
intensely than men (Biaggio 1989; Brody et al. 1995; Fehr
et al. 1999; Kring and Gordon 1998; Strachan and Dutton
1992). Yet, sex differences in anger experience are less
evident than those in fear. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
females’ expected intensity of anger and fear is higher than
that of males. Yet, sex differences in the intensity of anger
are smaller than in fear.
Method
Participants
The study was based on a sample of 212 undergraduate
students from two universities in northern Israel, 55.2%
male and 44.3% female. The average age of males was
30.35 (SD = 8.34) and of females 29.81 (SD = 9.30). The
average age of students in this sample is relatively high
because many students in Israel, due to compulsory mili-
tary service begin their academic studies at an older age
than in most western countries. In addition, one of the two
universities sampled is an open university, which typically
enrolls older students. The average education of partici-
pants’ parents was 12.95 years (SD = 2.85). Twelve per-
cent of participants reported the level of income in their
family of origin to be lower than average, 62.6% reported it
to be in the middle range, and 25.2% reported it to be
higher than average. Among participants with a family of
their own (45.3%), 8.3% reported a family income lower
than average, 63.5% in the middle range, and 28.1% higher
than average. Jewish students made up 92.9% of partici-
pants, the others being Moslem, Christian, and Druze.
Seventy nine percent defined themselves as secular, 19.5%
as traditional, and 1.5% as religious.
Data collection procedure
Trained undergraduate students conducted the interviews.
They were instructed to recruit an equal number of men
and women for the study and to hand out an equal distri-
bution of the questionnaire’s four versions. This was per-
formed in a structured manner: one version was circulated
to one gender and then to the other, then another version
Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136 127
123
was used and so on. Data were collected on the campuses
of two universities. Surveyors randomly approached stu-
dents at campus main gathering areas, introduced them-
selves and asked the students to anonymously take part in a
study on human perceptions, emotions and behaviors
without giving any further details. Respondents (95%)
were accompanied by surveyors to a nearby classroom
where the study was explained to them and they were given
one of four versions of the questionnaire to fill out. Most of
those who refused to take part in the study (5%) explained
that the time was not right for them. Participants were
provided with oral and written instructions on how to
complete the questionnaire. All interviews were conducted
by means of self-administered questionnaires, which were
completed while the surveyors waited for participants to
finish. No identifying details were required in the ques-
tionnaire. The approach, screening, explanations, and
completion of the questionnaire lasted approximately 15–
20 min.
Instrument
The instrument to collect data was limited a priori to
specifically constructed situations in which a male stranger
of the respondent’s age attacks the respondent (male or
female) in the street, without an audience present.
Addressing a female stranger as well is important but
doubles the size of the instrument. The decision regarding
age of attacker, relationships between the parties, location
and audience were made according to convenience. For
instance if the attacker were not a stranger it could raise
questions such as who is he? Was it possible for this person
to be violent? Or if audience were included then questions
such as number, sex, age, relationship to the parties had to
be addressed and could extremely complicate data collec-
tion and reliability or to produce a more restricted study.
Respondents were presented with hypothetical conflicts
differentiated by the dangerousness of the opponent and the
severity of aggressive actions.
Opponent types were described as follows:
• One whom you clearly think you could deter. It seems that if you react to his behavior more severely than he
did, he will be scared off, will retreat, and not try to
attack you again.
• One whom you clearly think you could not deter. It seems that if you react to his behavior more severely
than he did, he will not be scared off, will not retreat,
and could attack you again with possibly even more
severe aggression.
• One whom you clearly think is crazy, ruthless, and unstoppable. It seems that if you react to his behavior
more severely he could even try to kill you.
An additional type that would not be addressed in this
study was described as follows: One whom you are not sure
whether or not you could deter. You are not certain how
your behavior could affect his.
The severity of the opponent’s aggression was expressed
in three forms of increasingly aggressive actions: verbal
aggression (a mild form), threatening with physical
aggression (a more severe form), and physical aggression
(the most severe form). The levels of severity were defined
based on a study (Winstok and Enosh in press) in which
experts in the field of aggression were asked to rate various
forms of aggression in order of severity. All expert judges
specifically differentiated between verbal and physical
forms of aggression, and there was almost complete
agreement over the following rating of relative severity
(from moderate to severe): (1) yelling; (2) cursing; (3)
insulting; (4) threatening; (5) pushing; (6) slapping; (7)
punching; and (8) kicking. These actions were grouped into
three levels of aggression severity: (1) cursing (verbal
aggression); (2) threatening to hurt (threatening with
physical aggression); and (3) hitting (physical aggression).
Respondents were asked to address nine situations: three
levels of known dangerousness multiplied by three forms of
aggression. Respondents were asked to report the level of
fear and anger that each situation aroused on a 5-point
Likert scale: 1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately,
4 = considerable and 5 = very much. They were also asked
to evaluate their decision to respond commensurately to the
opponent’s aggression (counter-aggression) on a 5-point
scale: 1 = not aggressively at all, 2 = less aggressively,
3 = with the same level of aggression, 4 = more aggres-
sively, and 5 = much more aggressively. To neutralize the
possible effect of the order of questionnaire items, four
versions were prepared. In two of the versions the danger-
ousness of the opponent was listed in increasing order, in
the other two in decreasing order; in half the versions
severity of aggression was listed in increasing order and in
the other half in decreasing order. No significant differences
(method effects) were found between the four versions (one
of the four versions of the instrument containing the items
used in the present study is shown in Appendix A).
Results
The study features three dependant measures: anticipated
counter-aggression, anticipated anger, and anticipated fear.
The statistics, including Means (M) and Standard Error of
the Means (SE) for these dependant measures broken down
by experimental condition, are shown separately for male
and female participants on the top (counter-aggression),
middle (anger) and bottom (fear) sections of Table 1.
128 Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136
123
Intended severity level of counter-aggression
To test the effect of opponent dangerousness and aggres-
sion on intended severity level of counter-aggression, a
mixed repeated measure ANOVA (with Bonferoni pair-
wise comparison) was performed, with sex of the respon-
dent as the between-subjects effect, and with level of
opponent dangerousness (3 levels) and severity level of his
aggression (3 levels) as the within-subjects effects. The
multivariate and univariate test results show that the effects
of opponent level of dangerousness and severity levels of
his aggression, and the effects of their interaction were
significant. The strongest effect was that of the opponent
level of dangerousness: F(2,189) = 29.61, P < 0.001,
g2 = 0.24; second was the effect of the severity level of his aggression: F(2,189) = 27.92, P < 0.001, g
2 = 0.23; last was
the interaction effect of opponent level dangerousness with
severity levels of his aggression, which was also found to
be significant: F(4,187) = 4.81, P < 0.001, g 2
= 0.09.
Findings show a significant difference (P < 0.05) between
levels of opponent dangerousness: the highest was against
aggression of the opponent characterized as lowest in
dangerousness (M = 2.38, SE = 0.07); it was lower against
the opponent with medium level of dangerousness
(M = 2.02, SE = 0.07); the least was against the opponent
characterized as highest in dangerousness (M = 1.65,
SE = 0.07). Findings also show a significant difference
(P < 0.05) between levels of severity of opponent aggres-
sion. Here the significant differences were between verbal
forms of aggression (cursing and threatening to hurt) and
the physical ones (beating): the highest was against phys-
ical aggression (M = 2.31, SE = 0.07); it was lower against
verbal forms of aggression, ranging between means of
1.837 (SE = 0.06) for cursing and 1.90 (SE = 0.06) for
threatening. When referring to the interaction effect of
opponent level dangerousness with severity levels of his
aggression, findings show that differences in respondents’
intended severity level of counter-aggression across levels
of opponent aggression decreased as opponent dangerous-
ness increased.
The univariate test of respondent sex yielded significant
results: F(1,190) = 8.50, P < 0.01, g 2
= 0.04. Its interaction
with the severity levels of opponent aggression was found
to be significant: F(2,189) = 6.54, P < 0.01, g 2
= 0.07, but
its interaction with opponent levels of dangerousness was
not. Furthermore, its interaction with opponent danger-
ousness and severity of opponent aggression was also
found to be non-significant. In general, the intended
severity level of counter-aggression among male respon-
dents was higher (M = 2.17, SE = 0.07) than among fe-
Table 1 Mean scores for counter-aggression, anger, and
fear broken down by sex of
respondents, level of opponent
dangerousness and severity of
opponent aggression
N = 212 (192 with no missing data in all research variables)
Level of opponent dangerousness
Low Medium High
M SE M SE M SE
Counter-aggression
Males Severity of opponent aggression Low 2.20 0.12 1.91 0.10 1.63 0.10
Medium 2.31 0.12 1.99 0.10 1.69 0.10
High 3.18 0.12 2.59 0.12 2.02 0.12
Females Severity of Opponent Aggression Low 2.06 0.13 1.75 0.11 1.48 0.11
Medium 2.12 0.13 1.82 0.11 1.49 0.11
High 2.42 0.13 2.05 0.14 1.58 0.13
Anger
Males Severity of opponent aggression Low 2.54 0.13 2.91 0.12 2.70 0.13
Medium 2.85 0.13 3.19 0.11 3.03 0.13
High 3.47 0.12 3.65 0.12 3.52 0.12
Females Severity of opponent aggression Low 2.95 0.14 3.44 0.14 3.74 0.15
Medium 3.29 0.15 3.81 0.13 4.12 0.14
High 3.93 0.14 4.20 0.13 4.22 0.14
Fear
Males Severity of opponent aggression Low 1.50 0.09 2.29 0.12 3.11 0.13
Medium 1.93 0.11 2.83 0.11 3.25 0.12
High 2.25 0.12 3.17 0.12 3.54 0.12
Females Severity of opponent aggression Low 1.85 0.10 3.25 0.13 4.05 0.15
Medium 2.38 0.13 3.81 0.13 4.44 0.13
High 3.19 0.14 4.20 0.13 4.56 0.14
Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136 129
123
males (M = 1.86, SE = 0.08). Differences in Male
respondents’ intended severity level of counter-aggression
across levels of opponent aggression were greater than for
female respondents.
Expected intensity of anger
To test the effect of opponent dangerousness and of
aggression on expected intensity of anger, a mixed repeated
measure ANOVA was performed (with Bonferoni pair-wise
comparison), with sex of the respondent as the between-
subjects effect and with level of opponent dangerousness (3
levels) and severity level of his aggression (3 levels) as the
within-subjects effects. The multivariate and univariate test
results show that the effects of opponent level of danger-
ousness and of severity level of his aggression, and the
effects of their interaction were significant. The strongest
effect was that of the severity level of opponent aggression:
F(2,189) = 64.93, P < 0.001, g 2
= 0.41; second was that of
his level of dangerousness: F(2,189) = 16.77, P < 0.001,
g2 = 0.15; last was the interaction effect of opponent level of dangerousness with severity levels of his aggression
which was also found to be significant: F(4,187) = 5.98,
P < 0.001, g2 = 0.11. Findings show a significant differ- ence (P < 0.05) between levels of severity of opponent
aggression: the lowest expected intensity of anger was
experienced in response to cursing (M = 3.05, SE = 0.08);
higher expected intensity of anger was experienced in re-
sponse to opponent threats (M = 3.381, SE = 0.082), and
highest in response to physical attack (M = 3.83,
SE = 0.078). Findings also show a significant difference
(P < 0.05) in expected intensity of anger between the
lowest level of opponent dangerousness and the two higher
ones (medium and high). No significant difference was
found between high and medium levels of opponent dan-
gerousness. The lowest expected intensity of anger was
experienced when confronting the aggression of an oppo-
nent whose dangerousness was lowest (M = 3.17,
SE = 0.08). Expected intensity of anger was higher when
confronting the aggression of an opponent with medium
level of dangerousness (M = 3.53, SE = 0.08) and an
opponent with the highest level of dangerousness
(M = 3.56, SE = 0.09). When referring to the interaction
effect of opponent level dangerousness with severity levels
of his aggression, findings show that differences in
respondents’ expected intensity of anger across levels of
opponent dangerousness decreased when the aggression of
the opponent was relatively severe (physical attack) as
compared to relatively moderate (cursing and threats).
The univariate test of respondent sex yielded significant
results: F(1,190) = 20.23, P < 0.001, g 2
= 0.10. Its interac-
tion with opponent levels of dangerousness was found to be
significant: F(2,189) = 6.03, P < 0.01, g 2
= 0.060 but not its
interaction with severity levels of opponent aggression.
Furthermore, its interaction with opponent dangerousness
and severity of opponent aggression was also found to be
non-significant. In general, expected intensity of anger
(M = 3.75, SE = 0.10) among female respondents was
higher than that expected by male respondents (M = 3.09,
SE = 0.10). Expected intensity of anger across opponent
levels of dangerousness was different for male and female
respondents: while for females an increase in opponent
level of dangerousness resulted in an increase in the ex-
pected intensity of anger, for males the expected intensity
of anger was the highest for opponents with medium levels
of dangerousness.
Expected intensity of fear
To test the effects of opponent dangerousness and
aggression on the expected intensity of fear, a mixed re-
peated measures ANOVA was performed (with Bonferoni
pair-wise comparison), with the sex of the respondent as
the between-subjects effect and with level of opponent
dangerousness (3 levels) and severity level of his aggres-
sion (3 levels) as the within-subjects effect. The multi-
variate and univariate test results show that the effects of
opponent level of dangerousness and of severity of
aggression, and the effects of their interaction, were sig-
nificant. The strongest effect was that of opponent level of
dangerousness: F(2,186) = 148.058, P < 0.001, g 2
= 0.614;
second was severity level of his aggression:
F(2,186) = 74.48, P < 0.001, g 2
= 0.45; the interaction ef-
fect between opponent level of dangerousness and severity
level of his aggression was also found to be significant:
F(4,184) = 8.41, P < 0.001, g 2
= 0.16. Findings show a
significant difference (P < 0.05) between severity levels of
opponent aggression: the lowest expected intensity of fear
was experienced in response to cursing (M = 2.67,
SE = 0.07); stronger expected intensity of fear was expe-
rienced in response to opponent threats (M = 3.107,
SE = 0.07), and highest in response to physical attack
(M = 3.49, SE = 0.07). Findings also show a significant
difference (P < 0.05) between all levels of opponent dan-
gerousness (low, medium and high). The lowest expected
intensity of fear was measured when confronting the
aggression of the opponent with the lowest level of dan-
gerousness (M = 2.18, SE = 0.07). When confronting the
aggression of the opponent with a medium level of dan-
gerousness, expected intensity of fear was stronger
(M = 3.26, SE = 0.07), and it was strongest vis-à-vis the
opponent with the highest level of dangerousness
(M = 3.83, SE = 0.08). When referring to the interaction
effect of opponent level dangerousness with severity levels
of his aggression, findings show that differences in
respondents’ expected intensity of fear across levels of
130 Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136
123
opponent aggression decreased as opponent dangerousness
increased.
The univariate test of respondent sex yielded significant
results: F(1,187) = 51.14, P < 0.001, g 2
= 0.22. Its interac-
tion with opponent level of dangerousness was found to be
significant (F(2,186) = 3.85, P < 0.05, g 2
= 0.04) but not so
with severity level of opponent aggression. The three-way
interaction (opponent dangerousness · severity of oppo- nent aggression · respondent sex) was found to be signif- icant: F(4,184) = 3.56, P < 0.05, g
2 = 0.040. In general,
expected intensity of fear among females was higher
(M = 3.53, SE = 0.09) than that expected by male
respondents (M = 2.65, SE = 0.08). Differences in female
respondents’ expected intensity of fear across levels of
opponent aggression were greater than for male respon-
dents. Furthermore, an increase in the level of opponent
dangerousness and/or in the severity of opponent aggres-
sion decreases sex differences.
Relationship between perceptions, expected emotional
intensity, and intended response
A series of regressions were used for both respondent
sexes to explore how the opponent’s level of danger-
ousness and the severity level of his aggression regulate
the effect of respondent’s expected intensity of anger and
fear on their intended severity level of counter-aggres-
sion. Each regression addressed a different social situa-
tion distinguished by opponent level of dangerousness (3
levels) and severity of his aggression (3 levels), for a
total of 9 regressions, each one explored for both
respondent sexes. The independent variables for each
social situation examined were anger and fear; the
dependent variable was the counter-aggression. Colin-
earity diagnostics indicated acceptable results in all
regressions. Results show that for female respondents
none of the social situation yielded a significant effect of
emotion variables on the counter-aggression variable.
That is, across all nine situations, neither the level of fear
nor the level of anger explains the extent of counter-
aggression for females.
The following results were found for male participants
when facing low danger of harm:
When severity of harm was low, the overall effect on
counter-aggression was significant: F(2,106) = 3.29,
P < 0.05, R2 = 0.06 with a significant individual effect for
anger: t = 2.54, P < 0.01, b = 0.25, but with a non-sig- nificant individual effect for fear.
When severity of harm was medium, the overall effect
on counter-aggression was significant: F(2,110) = 6.60,
P < 0.01, R 2
= 0.11 with a significant individual effect for
anger: t = 4.61, P < 0.001, b = 0.34, but with a non-sig- nificant individual effect for fear.
When severity of harm was high, the overall effect on
counter-aggression was significant: F(2,108) = 17.1,
P < 0.001, R2 = 0.24 with a significant individual effect
for anger: t = 5.83, P < 0.001, b = 0.51, and for fear: t = – 2.13, P < 0.05, b = -0.19.
The following results were found for male participants
when facing medium danger of harm:
When severity of harm was low, the overall effect on
counter-aggression was significant: F(2,106) = 6.99,
P < 0.001, R2 = 0.12 with a significant individual effect
for anger: t = 3.72, P < 0.001, b = 0.38, and for fear: t = – 2.03, P < 0.05, b = –0.21.
When severity of harm was medium, the overall effect
on counter-aggression was significant: F(2,107) = 3.10,
P < 0.05, R2 = 0.06 with a significant individual effect for
anger: t = 2.21, P < 0.05, b = 0.24, and for fear: t = –2.15, P < 0.05, b = –0.24.
When severity of harm was high, the overall effect on
counter-aggression was significant: F(2,106) = 10.25,
P < 0.001, R2 = 0.16 with a significant individual effect
for anger: t = 3.39, P < 0.001, b = 0.34, and for fear: t = – 4.20, P < 0.001, b = –0.42.
The following results were found for male participants
when facing high danger of harm:
When severity of harm was low, the overall effect on
counter-aggression was non-significant.
When severity of harm was medium, the overall effect
on counter-aggression was significant: F(2,108) = 6.86,
P < 0.01, R2 = 0.11 with a significant individual effect for
anger: t = 2.21, P < 0.05, b = 0.22, and for fear: t = –3.62, P < 0.001, b = –0.36.
When severity of harm was high, the overall effect on
counter-aggression was significant: F(2,107) = 12.30,
P < 0.001, R2 = 0.19 with a significant individual effect
for anger: t = 2.84, P < 0.01, b = 0.26, and for fear: t = – 4.74, P < 0.01, b = –0.43.
In sum, it seems that anger functions as aggression
facilitator whereas fear functions as aggression inhibitor.
Yet as the opponent’s aggression becomes more severe, the
effect of respondents’ emotion intensity on their decision to
respond aggressively increases. Where anger is concerned,
this tendency is more prominent when the opponent has a
low level of dangerousness, and where fear is concerned,
this tendency is stronger with the more dangerous oppo-
nents.
Discussion
This study aimed at revealing some of the perceptual,
emotional and behavioral rules (beliefs or attitudes) guid-
ing normative adults in interpersonal conflicts that may
escalate to violence. Because such rules are abstract rep-
Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136 131
123
resentations, whereas emotions and behaviors are episodic,
they often correspond (Ajzen 1991; Robinson and Clore
2002). Therefore these rules can also be regarded as
effective but partial predictors of emotional experiences
and behavioral performance in real-life situations. In gen-
eral, the findings of the present study support the cost
benefit hypothesis (Bandura 1973) as actualized through an
event perspective (Wilkinson and Hamerschlag 2005).
Findings show that the less dangerous the opponent and/
or the more severe his aggression, the higher the intended
severity of counter-aggression. Both of the perceptual
variables, dangerousness of the opponent and severity of his
aggression, contribute positively to the degree to which the
situation is perceived as problematic (the more dangerous
the opponent is perceived and the more severe his aggres-
sion, the more problematic the situation). Yet their contri-
bution to constructing an intended response in terms of
counter-aggression has opposite effects: the former sup-
presses aggressive response whereas the latter enhances it.
It is suggested here that actions result of two contradicting
tendencies: being deterred by the opponent and the need to
deter the opponent. Both tendencies derive from the per-
ception of dangerousness as deterring. The first results from
how the opponent or his dangerousness is perceived; the
second is an outcome of the attempt to construct a deter-
rence vis-à-vis the opponent. The result of the two ten-
dencies ultimately determines the response. It seems that
this result follows a tit-for-tat policy (strict reciprocity).
Another perspective of the association between these
variables is that opponent dangerousness and harm are
two facets of the same coin. Dangerousness means
potential harm; actual harm is a (sometimes partial)
realization of the potential of dangerousness. Therefore
the relevance and effectiveness of dangerousness as a
deterrent are high as long as it is not realized (or partially
realized). The more it is realized, the lesser its relevance
and effectiveness become. The more it is realized, the
more severity of harm increases in importance and be-
comes more relevant to the construction of a response.
The assumption tested in this study is that the emotional
experiences of fear and anger serve as a motivation to
shift the main factor affecting response construction from
opponent dangerousness to severity of aggression. The
idea that emotions motivate actions gains expression when
someone facing a dangerous opponent says ‘‘I am not
afraid of you.’’ This utterance, even if only tactical, sig-
nals a high level of cognitive and emotional readiness for
coping with the situation.
Findings related to the expected intensity of emotions
show that opponent level of dangerousness has a greater
effect on the expected intensity of fear than severity of his/
her aggression whereas opponent severity level of aggres-
sion has a greater effect on the expected intensity of anger
than on his/her level of dangerousness. Furthermore, while
the effect of opponent severity level of aggression on both
expected emotions is similar, opponent level of danger-
ousness has a greater effect on the expected intensity of
fear than on anger. Findings also show that expected
emotional experience for females is more intense than for
males; intended behavioral counter-aggression is more se-
vere for males than for females, and only among males the
association between emotional experience and behavioral
response is maintained and mediated by opponents’ levels
of dangerousness and aggression severity. The effect of the
emotional experience varies with the opponent’s level of
dangerousness and harm (severity of aggression): fear has a
strong negative presence in the construction of aggressive
response when dangerousness and harm are high. Anger is
strongly and positively manifest in the construction of an
aggressive response when the severity of harm is high and
dangerousness low.
Taking a step back to interpret the findings based on
study methodology, gender differences may not be so
significant and the driving mechanism for males may not
be so different from those of females. The comparison
between men and women in this study was not performed
on an equal basis: because men’s ability to cause or
sustain injury exceeds that of women, and because in all
situations tested the opponents were unfamiliar men, the
women in the study faced greater risk than the men.
Therefore the differences between males and females are
structured into the methodology, and the findings dem-
onstrate these differences. Hence, the question that must
be asked should not focus on differences but rather on
similarities. Do both sexes share the same response
mechanism despite the methodological differences? What
is the role of this mechanism? Is it aimed at reducing
costs, as suggested? Although these questions cannot be
answered within the scope of the findings, we may assume
that the answer is positive. In the given situations women
refrained from expressing their emotions. Such expres-
sions could cost them dearly. Expressions of anger and
fear, each prompted by different reasons, may encourage
their male opponents to attack them with more severity
and cause greater physical damage. Expressions of fear
may have empowered these men. Expressions of anger
may have enraged them. The aim of women in both cases
is to tone down the aggression of their opponents as much
as possible. It is therefore better for women, despite the
intensity of the emotions they experience, to put those
aside and to respond based on their perception of the
situation (dangerousness and severity). Moreover, from
the women’s viewpoint, the benefit of having a conflict
with an unfamiliar man can be very small, if any. The
social expectation of a woman having a conflict with a
man is to be wise rather than right. For women, the only
132 Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136
123
benefit is to end such encounters unharmed (to minimize
costs); for men, the cost-benefit equation in these situa-
tions may be more complex. On one hand, similarly to
women, their actions may be driven by the attempt to
reduce harm. On the other hand, a violent encounter with
an unfamiliar man may serve as an opportunity to pro-
mote their social status (benefit) not only in the eyes of
their significant environment but also (and mostly) for
themselves, as the social expectation of a man having a
conflict with another man is not to retreat. A man
retreating from conflict harms his masculine reputation,
which has certain implications. Such analysis shifts the
focus of discussion from abstract cost and benefit to
motivations and concrete goals from which the costs and
benefits are derived. The body of knowledge on sex dif-
ferences in violence and crime is based mostly on social
role theory (Bettencourt and Kernahan 1997; Bettencourt
and Miller 1996; Eagly and Steffen 1986) and sexual
selection theory (Archer 1996; Daly and Wilson 1988). It
is argued that status enhancement is more important for
males than for females, and is more important for males
than risk reduction is, whereas the opposite is true for
females (Campbell 1999). Because the goal of minimizing
risks may inhibit violence more strongly than the goal of
status enhancement, it may be assumed that violence-
inhibiting goals are more important for females than for
males. Analyzing the findings based on motivations ex-
plains the sex differences in emotional intensity, coun-
terattack severity, and their interrelations. Based on this
approach it is suggested that if indeed there are differ-
ences between men and women, they are more evident
when asking ‘‘why’’ rather than ‘‘how’’ action is taken.
In sum, it seems that in most cases among normative
adults, the manner in which emotions are experienced and
affect the decision to respond is consistent with cost-benefit
and rational considerations. Findings in this study support
Damasio’s (1994) proposition that emotions must be en-
gaged to some extent for individuals to make effective
decisions, especially in the personal and social domains.
He views emotion as vital for rationality because it allows
effective filtering and processing of information. From this
perspective, emotional reactions to environmental and
internal stimuli operate to quickly place values, or attach
preferences to those stimuli and possible responses.
Damasio suggests that a rational consideration of all the
options and consequences of a decision would make
effective decision-making in daily life awkward and almost
impossible.
This study has several limitations. First, the study design
is correlative therefore it cannot be viewed as a causal
model, explaining how reactions to aggression are con-
structed. Second, since the study is based on hypothetical
situations, it is doubtful whether it reveals the ways in
which individuals perceive, experience, and behave in real
life situations (Parkinson and Manstead 1993; Roseman
and Evdokas 2004). Thus, the findings of this study should
be viewed as examining attitudes guiding interpersonal
conflicts that escalate. Third, the model focused on the
segment of social information processing (Dodge 1980;
Crick and Dodge 1994) in which interpretation is already a
given and ends with a decision as to the desired reaction.
Moreover, the model representing this segment was tested
in a fragmented rather than holistic manner. Fourth, the
categories selected for each concept are not exhaustive. For
example, perception focused only on the level of danger-
ousness, the severity of the attack, and the opponent’s sex
(restricted to males only). Emotions were limited to anger
and fear. Response was phrased only as counter-aggres-
sion.
One link missing in the hypotheses tested in the present
study has to do with the suggestion that women’s emo-
tions, including anger, are more intense than those of
men, but men’s counter-aggression is more severe than
that of women. It has also been suggested that there is a
positive association between the intensity of anger and the
severity of counter-aggression. Sex differences found in
this study regarding this suggestion provide the missing
link. But they also raise new questions. First, what is the
mechanism regulating the effect of emotions on behavior
within the context of violence? The answer could be that
it is a compensatory mechanism present among normative
populations in high-risk situations: the more a person is
emotionally charged, the less it is expressed in behavior.
This is probably a survival mechanism preventing indi-
viduals from making irrational (i.e., emotion-driven)
behavioral decisions in high-risk and emotion-charged
situations. Yet, this issue requires further empirical
examination and development. Second, these findings cast
doubt on the widespread claim that women’s aggression
tends to be expressive (i.e., emotion-driven) and men’s
instrumental (i.e., goal-driven). The findings of the present
study support other studies that found that in the context
of violence women experience higher emotional intensity
than do men, but also show that the relevance of the
emotional experience for counter-aggression is higher for
men than for women (at least when the opponent is a
stranger). If this is the case, is the hypothesis about sex
differences in aggression expressivity/instrumentality still
valid? This issue also warrants further examination. This
may be an interactional rather than personal issue, not
dependent only on the respondent’s sex but also on the
opponent being faced. This possibility suggests that in
follow-up studies the unit of reference and analysis should
be interactional rather than individual, and identify not
only the respondent’s sex but also that of the opponent
faced.
Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136 133
123
A p
p e n
d ix
A R
e se
a rc
h in
st ru
m e n
t
(1 )
(2 )
(3 )
(4 )
Im a g
in e
th a t
in th
e st
re e t
w it
h o
u t
th e
p re
se n
c e
o f
o th
e rs
,
a m
a le
st ra
n g
e r
in y
o u
r a g
e :
H o
w m
u c h
w o
u ld
it fr
ig h
te n
y o
u ?
M a rk
:
H o
w a n
g ry
w o
u ld
it m
a k
e y
o u
? M
a rk
:
H o
w w
o u
ld y
o u
re sp
o n
d :
M a rk
:
1 =
n o
t a t
a ll
1 =
n o
t a t
a ll
1 =
n o
t a g
g re
ss iv
e ly
a t
a ll
2 =
a li
tt le
2 =
a li
tt le
2 =
le ss
a g
g re
ss iv
e ly
3 =
m o
d e ra
te ly
3 =
m o
d e ra
te ly
3 =
w it
h th
e sa
m e
le v
e l
o f
a g
g re
ss io
n
4 =
c o
n si
d e ra
b le
4 =
c o
n si
d e ra
b le
4 =
m o
re a g
g re
ss iv
e ly
5 =
v e ry
m u
c h
5 =
v e ry
m u
c h
5 =
m u
c h
m o
re
a g
g re
ss iv
e ly
1 )
C U
R S
E D
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
y o
u c o
u ld
d e te
r h
im .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if y
o u
re a c t
to h
is
b e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly th
a n
h e
d id
, h
e w
il l
b e
sc a re
d o
ff ,
w il
l re
tr e a t,
a n
d n
o t
tr y
to a tt
a c k
y o
u a g
a in
.
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
2 )
C U
R S
E D
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
y o
u c o
u ld
n o
t d
e te
r h
im .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if y
o u
re a c t
to h
is b
e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly th
a n
h e
d id
, h
e w
il l
n o
t b
e sc
a re
d o
ff ,
w il
l n
o t
re tr
e a t,
a n
d c o
u ld
a g
a in
a tt
a c k
y o
u w
it h
p o
ss ib
ly e v
e n
m o
re se
v e re
a g
g re
ss io
n .
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
3 )
C U
R S
E D
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
h e
is c ra
z y
, ru
th le
ss ,
a n
d u
n st
o p
p a b
le .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if y
o u
re a c t
to h
is b
e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly h
e c o
u ld
e v
e n
tr y
to k
il l
y o
u .
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
4 )
T H
R E
A T
E N
E D
T O
H IT
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
y o
u c o
u ld
d e te
r h
im .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if
y o
u re
a c t
to h
is b
e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly th
a n
h e
d id
, h
e w
il l
b e
sc a re
d o
ff ,
w il
l re
tr e a t,
a n
d n
o t
tr y
to a tt
a c k
y o
u a g
a in
.
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
5 )
T H
R E
A T
E N
E D
T O
H IT
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
y o
u c o
u ld
n o
t d
e te
r h
im .
It se
e m
s
th a t
if y
o u
re a c t
to h
is b
e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly th
a n
h e
d id
, h
e w
il l
n o
t b
e sc
a re
d o
ff ,
w il
l n
o t
re tr
e a t,
a n
d c o
u ld
a g
a in
a tt
a c k
y o
u w
it h
p o
ss ib
ly e v
e n
m o
re se
v e re
a g
g re
ss io
n .
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
6 )
T H
R E
A T
E N
E D
T O
H IT
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
h e
is c ra
z y
, ru
th le
ss ,
a n
d
u n
st o
p p
a b
le .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if y
o u
re a c t
to h
is b
e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly h
e c o
u ld
e v
e n
tr y
to k
il l
y o
u .
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
7 )
H IT
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
y o
u c o
u ld
d e te
r h
im .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if y
o u
re a c t
to h
is
b e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly th
a n
h e
d id
, h
e w
il l
b e
sc a re
d o
ff ,
w il
l re
tr e a t,
a n
d n
o t
tr y
to
a tt
a c k
y o
u a g
a in
.
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
8 )
H IT
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
y o
u c o
u ld
n o
t d
e te
r h
im .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if y
o u
re a c t
to h
is
b e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly th
a n
h e
d id
, h
e w
il l
n o
t b
e sc
a re
d o
ff ,
w il
l n
o t
re tr
e a t,
a n
d
c o
u ld
a g
a in
a tt
a c k
y o
u w
it h
p o
ss ib
ly e v
e n
m o
re se
v e re
a g
g re
ss io
n .
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
9 )
H IT
Y O
U .
Y o
u c le
a rl
y th
in k
h e
is c ra
z y
, ru
th le
ss ,
a n
d u
n st
o p
p a b
le .
It se
e m
s th
a t
if
y o
u re
a c t
to h
is b
e h
a v
io r
m o
re se
v e re
ly h
e c o
u ld
e v
e n
tr y
to k
il l
y o
u .
5 4
3 2
1 5
4 3
2 1
5 4
3 2
1
134 Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136
123
References
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 50, 179–211.
Archer, J. (1996). Sex differences in social behavior: Are the social
role and evolutionary explanations compatible? American Psy- chologist, 51, 909–917.
Archer, J. (2004). Sex differences in aggression in real-world settings:
A mea-analytic review. Review of General Psychology, 8(4), 291–322.
Axelrod, R. (1980). More effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 379–403. Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Baron, R. A. (1971). Exposure to an aggressive model and apparent
probability of retaliation from the victim as determinants of adult
aggressive behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7, 343–355.
Baron, R. A. (1973). Threatened retaliation from the victim as
inhibitor of physical aggression. Journal of Research in Personality, 7, 103–115.
Berkowitz, L. (1993). Pain and aggression: Some findings and
implications. Motivation and Emotion, 17, 277–293. Bettencourt, B., & Kernahan, C. (1997). A meta-analysis of
aggression in the presence of violent cues: Effects of gender
differences and aversive provocation. Aggressive Behavior, 23, 447–456.
Bettencourt, B., & Miller, N. (1996). Sex differences in aggression as
a function of provocation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 422–447.
Biaggio, M. K. (1989). Sex differences in behavioral reactions to
provocation of anger. Psychological Reports, 64, 23–26. Brody, L. R., Lovas, G. S., & Hay, D. H. (1995) Sex differences in
anger and fear as a function of situational context. Sex Roles, 32(1–2), 47–78.
Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for
psychological science. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 1–30. Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in
strategic interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. . Campbell, A. (1999). Staying alive: Evolution, culture, and women’s
intrasexual aggression. Behavior and Brain Sciences, 22, 203– 252.
Campbell, A. (2006). Sex differences in direct aggression: What are
the psychological mediators? Aggression and Violent Behavior, 11, 237–264.
Campos, J. J., Mumme, D. L., Kermoian, R., & Campos, R. G.
(1994). A functional perspective on the nature of emotion.
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 59(2–3, Serial No. 240), 284–303.
Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1994). A review and reformulation of
social information processing mechanisms in children’s adjust-
ment. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 74–101. Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the
human brain. New York: Putnam. Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988). Homicide. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Diener, E., Sandvik, E., & Larsen, R. J. (1985). Age and sex effects of
emotional intensity. Developmental Psychology, 21, 542–546. Dodge, K. A. (1980). Social cognition and children’s aggressive
behavior. Child Development, 53, 620–635. Donnerstein, E., Donnerstein, M., Simon, S., & Ditrichs, R. (1972).
Variables in interracial aggression: Anonymity, expected retal-
iation, and a riot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22, 236–245.
Eagly, A. H., & Steffen, V. J. (1986). Sex and aggressive behavior: A
meta-analytic review of the social psychological literature.
Psychological Bulletin, 100, 309–330. . Fehr, B., Baldwin, M., Collins, L., Patterson, S., & Benditt, R. (1999).
Anger in close relationships: an interpersonal script analysis.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 299–312. Felson, R. B. (1993). Predatory and dispute-related violence: A social
interactionist approach. In R. V. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.),
Routine activity and rational choice, advances in criminological theory Vol. 5, (pp. 103–126). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
Fujita, F., Diener, E., & Sandvik, E. (1991). Sex differences in
negative affect and well-being: The case for emotional intensity.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 427–434. Gross, J., & John, O. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion
regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and
well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 348–362.
Haselton, M. G., & Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: A
new perspective on biases in cross-sexmind reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 81–91.
Haselton, M. G., & Nettle, D. (2006). The paranoid optimist: An
integrative evolutionary model of cognitive biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(1), 47–66.
Hyde, J. S. (1984). How large are sex differences in aggression? A
developmental meta-analysis. Developmental Psychology, 20, 722–736.
Klepper, S., & Nagin, D. (1989). The deterrent effects of perceived
certainty and severity of punishment revisited. Criminology, 27, 721– 746.
Knight, G. P., Guthrie, I. K., Page, M. C., & Fabes, R. A. (2002).
Emotional arousal and sex differences in aggression: A meta-
analysis. Aggressive Behavior, 28, 366–393. Kring A. M., & Gordon A. H. (1998). Sex differences in emotion:
Expression, experience, and Psychology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 686–703.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Oliver, W. (1994). The violent social world of black men. New York: Lexington Books.
Parker, G. A. (1974). Assessment strategy and the evolution of
fighting behavior. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47, 223–243. Parkinson, B., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1993). Making sense of emotion
in stories and social life. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 295–323. Perry, D. G., Perry, L. C., & Weiss, R. J. (1989). Sex differences in
consequences that children anticipate for aggression. Develop- mental Psychology, 25, 312–319.
Piliavin, I., Thornton, C., Gartner, R., & Matsueda, R. L. (1986).
Crime, deterrence, and rational choice. American Sociological Review, 51, 101–119.
Potegal, M., & Archer, J. (2004). Sex differences in childhood anger
and aggression. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 13, 513–528.
Robinson, M. D., & Clore G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence
for an accessibility model of emotional self-report. Psycholog- ical Bulletin, 128, 934–960.
Roseman, I. J., & Evdokas, A. (2004). Appraisals cause experienced
emotions: Experimental evidence. Cognition and Emotion, 18(1), 1–18.
Shortell, J., Epstein, S., & Taylor, S. P. (1970). Instigation to
aggression as a function of degree of defeat and the capacity for
massive retaliation. Journal of Personality, 38, 313–328. Stapley, J. C., & Haviland, J. M. (1989). Beyond depression: Sex
differences in normal adolescents’ emotional experiences. Sex Roles, 20(5–6), 295–308.
Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136 135
123
Strachan C. E., & Dutton D. G. (1992). The role of power and sex in
anger responses to sexual jealousy. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22, 1721–1740.
Tangney, J. P. (1990). Assessing individual differences in proneness
to shame and guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect
and Attribution Inventory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(1), 102–111.
Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct. New York: Guilford Press. .
Wilkinson, D. L. (2003). Guns, violence, and identity among African American and Latino youth. New York: LFB Scholarly Publi- cations, LLC.
Wilkinson, D. L., & Hamerschlag, S. J. (2005). Situational determi-
nants in intimate partner violence. Aggression and Violent Behavior 10, 333–361.
Winstok, Z. (2006). Sex differences in the structure and content of
escalatory tendencies at the home and workplace. Aggressive Behavior, 32, 433–441.
Winstok, Z., & Enosh, G. (in press). Exploring the intention to react
to aggressive action among Israeli youth. Journal of Research on Adolescents.
Wintre, M. G., Polivy, J., & Murray, M. A. (1990). Self-predictions of
emotional response patterns: Age, sex, and situational determi-
nants. Child Development, 61, 1124–1133.
136 Motiv Emot (2007) 31:125–136
123